PACIFIC UNITARIAN SCHOOL FOR THE MINISTRY
NON MINISTRARI SED MINISTRARE
INCORPORATED MAY 12. 1906
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

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CHAS W. POOLE
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VOL. I. NO. I.

THE NEW YORK REVIEW.

A Journal
of
The Ancient Faith and Modern Thought.

> "*Every scribe who is instructed in the Kingdom of Heaven, is like unto a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure, things new and old.*"
>
> (*Matt. XIII, 52*).

June-July, 1905.

St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers,
NEW YORK.

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PRESS OF
THE HOME JOURNAL AND NEWS
YONKERS, N. Y.

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THE SPIRIT OF NEWMAN'S APOLOGETICS

Wilfrid Ward, B. A.

The Christian Church, said Cardinal Newman in one of his latest essays, began as religion; then it came upon the intellectual classes and developed a theology; then it organized its external relations and government and became a polity. And the Cardinal himself has left a memory great in each of these three departments of Christian and Catholic activity. His spiritual influence has been great. His work for the intellectual side of the Christian Faith has been of the highest order. And though he was not an ecclesiastical statesman, his analysis of the functions of the Church as a polity has been equally valuable.

Of the first—his directly religious influence—little need be said, for it is sufficiently familiar to all. The Oxford Sermons, the Dream of Gerontius, Callista, the religious poems are well known to the world at large. Indeed, the sense of a great spiritual power looking out on the world from the watch tower at Edgbaston was probably the most universal feeling which Newman's presence during the last years of his life inspired among his countrymen and abroad.

On the intellectual side, in one respect he recalls to us St. Thomas Aquinas. That is to say, he fulfilled for an intellectual movement, which was the antithesis of the scholastic movement, the function performed by the Angelic Doctor in reference to thirteenth century scholasticism. St. Thomas effected that assimilation of Aristotelianism with the teaching of Aristotle's great enemies, the Fathers, which has come to be known as the Scholastic Theology. The great agitation of mediæval thought which accompanied the introduction of Aristotle's metaphysical and physical works from the East, by Frederic II, and the scepticism which it produced, were first dealt with satisfactorily from a Christian point of view by the Angel of the schools. The movement was unquestionably a dangerous one. It was rationalistic, and in some instances, under Arabian influences, it became pantheistic. At

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In this article are reproduced a few passages from an article contributed by the writer some years ago to the *Weekly Register*.

the beginning of the thirteenth century the Papacy made vain endeavors to stamp it out. As St. Bernard had half a century earlier vehemently denounced its great precursor, Abelard, so Innocent III, in 1210, condemned the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and forbade the faithful to read them. But as Frederick Schlegel has pointed out, such attempts were in their nature futile. The movement was too strong, too deeply identified with the mind of the age to be stamped out, though it might be guided and purified. What was needed was a thinker steeped in the Aristotelian culture, competent to hold his own in the dialectical tournaments of the day, and at the same time steeped in the traditions of the Church and the teaching of Holy Scripture. Such a mind alone could save theology from a false position—that of a necessarily ineffectual rejection of the characteristic culture of the time.

The work of fusion begun by Albertus Magnus, was completed by St. Thomas. So, too, Newman, intensely sensitive by temperament to surrounding intellectual influences, endowed even with an almost prophetic insight into the future developments of the Zeitgeist, and yet from early years a close student of the Fathers, coming upon a critical time when the divergence between many traditional theological forms and modern culture could no longer be ignored, laid down the lines of the synthesis which was a crying need to thinking minds. Like Tennyson he had, although he was no specialist, a close intuitive perception of the demands of the scientific method in physics. In history his special studies of one period—of the ecclesiastical history of the first three centuries—made this perception still more acute. Under circumstances of exceptional difficulty he pointed out the path to conciliation, which to his successors is likely to prove a boon simply inestimable. In the Essay on "Development" and the Sermon on "Development," in the lectures on "The Relations between Science and Theology," delivered at Dublin, in the last chapter of the *Apologia*, in the introduction to the *Via Media*, he has laid down principles which must quite inevitably guide Catholic thinkers of the future, however much short-sighted men may attempt to retard their frank acceptance. He saw truly that the questions raised, the modes of thought determining men's deepest convictions are now largely different from those which obtained in the thirteenth century, and were expressed in theological and philosophical works which the Church has preserved and reverently handed down to our own day. There is no reason why these valuable relics of another age should be abandoned or rejected. "I feel no temptation at all," he wrote, "to break in pieces the great legacy of thought thus committed to us." It would be disastrous to lose the important truths these writings enshrine, but much of their space is occupied with speculations which do not really touch the matters now found by experience to be vital. The historical and scientific sense has come upon us now with a force equal to the passion for logic and the syllogism dominant in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Philosophers in those days hoped to discover by syllogisms the secrets of the universe. And we may now, some of us, be over-sanguine as to the probable achievement of the new methods. But the methods themselves must be frankly adopted, while the more adventurous conclusions—drawn by advocates whose speculations are in part based on an anti-Christian philosophy—should be held in check by the wisdom of ages, and the teaching of revelation. Writing at a time when it needed infinite tact to suggest so grave a reform without offending, Newman achieved its lines, so gently yet so surely, that many have not seen the magnitude of the task he accomplished; while some of those who are most sensitive to the requirements of the time have felt that no more is needed than the full and detailed adaptation of the principles he sketched, to successive stages of scientific and historical enquiry as they arise. Not long ago an eminent writer in the *Revue du Clergé Français* pointed out—some fifty years after the Essay on Development had been published—its bearing on the theological outlook. It was noteworthy that the prophetic whispers of its author should come so clearly through half a century, and help a rare mind in an atmosphere so unlike that which prevailed in 1844. If St. Thomas was the first Doctor of the Church under the new intellectual *régime* of the thirteenth century—the *régime* which combined the wisdom of the Fathers with the Aristotelian culture—Newman may prove to be the first of the new series which is to show us how the essential teaching of Catholic tradition may be combined with due recognition of the claims of the positive sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Such may be his place in theology proper. But he also has his place as a guide in the ecclesiastical polity. And as in a theological crisis he recalls the work of St. Thomas Aquinas in a crisis somewhat similar, so, in dealing with the practical government of the Church he recalls another great thinker—Edmund Burke. Thought, in the Church as in the world, does not move in abstract intelligences undisturbed by passion. On the contrary, it is often passion that sets it in motion. It moves among concrete human beings, unequally endowed, and swayed also by sympathies and antipathies, prejudices and feelings. And in the Catholic Church its utterance must be regarded not only as a contribution to ultimate knowledge, but as affecting the present peace and welfare of the polity. Great thoughts and great ideas may be, and generally prove in the long run, principles of union—a common bond of inspiration for many, and a large measure of freedom in discussion is necessary for the full development and exact expression of such ideas. But freedom may find vent, at a given time, in untrue utterances or in tactless or exaggerated forms of expression, which upset the body politic, and tell for dissension, disloyalty or rebellion. Such was the experience of the age of Tom Paine and Rousseau in the civil order. And it is equally true in the ecclesiastical. In regard to such speculations and writings, Newman was to the ecclesiastical polity much what Burke was to the civil. He insisted that men should in word or action ever respect the established order, that reforming views should be practical in their expression, and that abstract theories, however important, must not be so advocated as to cause present disruption. The claims of the existing government and order in the Church must be respected.

Burke's treatment of the theory and practice of government had two great *momenta*—reverence for the essentials of the Constitution (the outcome of the development of the national life), and zeal for its reform. The first part of his public life was marked by popular sympathies, protests against tyranny, protests against the abuse of caste privilege; the last by scathing denunciations of the French Revolution. In his earliest writings he protested against the meanness of great nobles. The revolution of 1688 aroused his enthusiasm. The king, he held, and not the people, had violated the Constitution. He protested against British injustice in India; and Warren Hastings, as he listened to Burke's impassioned impeachment, for a moment thought himself a villain. He went to his furthermost point in sympathy with popular wrongs when he maintained before the American War that "when popular discontents have been very prevalent it may well be affirmed and supported that there has been found something amiss in the Constitution or in the conduct of the Government." "The people," he wrote, "have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the State it is far otherwise." An enthusiasm for drastic reform, a keen and sympathetic sense of popular wrong and of the selfishness and tyranny of the ruling classes were leading features in his character. But when Rabaud de St. Etienne formulated the programme of the French Revolution—"changer les idées, changer les lois, changer les moeurs, . . . tout détruire puisque tout est à recréer"—he was horrified and aghast. His defence of authority was as passionate as his resentment of its abuses had been indignant.

And the careful student of Newman's career sees a similar principle running right through it—respect for the constitution of the Church and zeal for those liberties which are essential to life, growth and necessary reform. From 1833 to 1839 he was vindicating what he held to be the Constitution of the Anglican branch of the Church Catholic against the encroachments of authority, civil and ecclesiastical. He protested against the Erastianism of the State: he stood up against Protestantism and absolutism among the ecclesiastical authorities. He urged the liberty of Anglicans to adhere to the Catholic traditions, recognized by the Constitution of the Anglican Church. On the other hand, when Tractarian free lances wanted to assert their absolute independence of existing Anglican authority in its lawful sphere, he saw that such a theory involved revolution; and he strenuously opposed it. "My Bishop was my Pope," he has said. When, therefore, the Anglican Bishops, in their charges of 1841, officially disowned what he held to be the fundamental order of the Church Catholic, his whole position was broken up. Like James II, they had violated the Constitution. The local Church they represented could no longer be regarded as part of that larger Constitution to which he owed paramount allegiance. It was as false to the Catholic Church as the Jacobites were to England.

The first years after 1845 witnessed enthusiastic devotion to an institution which at last realized for him the requirements of an organization true to its own fundamental principles. The popular agitation after "the Papal aggression," with its intense unfairness, drew all Catholics together and kindled anew the deep sentiment of loyalty to the Holy See. Then came the beginning of troubles—first, his difficulties with the Irish Bishops as Rector of the Catholic University, then the liberalism of the *Rambler* and the *Home and Foreign Review.* Just as Burke offended Tories by his keen reforming spirit and elevation of ideal, and then offended Democrats by his hatred of the Revolution of 1789, so, too, Newman went through a period when he broke with the Catholics whose sympathies were liberal, and a period when some of those in authority looked at him askance. The late Lord Emly, who closely shared in the struggle of 1855-1864, has characterized Newman's attitude towards the liberal Catholic Review—the *Home and Foreign*, and its forerunner, the *Rambler*—as one of "interest and disappointment." His sympathy with the thoroughness of research preached and practised by such men as Lord Acton and Mr. Simpson was intense. But the author of the *Life of Campion* imparted a tone to the Review which was distinctly hostile to authority—"a Protestant smack," Newman termed it. To approve of this would have been to contradict the principles of a lifetime. It was dangerous, not simply or primarily on intellectual grounds, but because it was disturbing to the general Catholic mind, and disorganized the ecclesiastical polity. What might be largely true in itself was at times stated in the *Rambler* and *Home and Foreign* without necessary qualifications, and became even false to the mass of minds "from the refraction" (to use Newman's own phrase) "with which it entered into their conceptions." Apart from this, Newman fully appreciated the great intellectual value of the movement represented by these able reviews. Signs are not wanting that he felt keenly the wooden theological absolutism which was threatening in various quarters. He had felt it in Ireland. He had urged with pathetic eloquence in Dublin, in his lectures on *Christianity and Scientific Investigation*, that specialists in the sciences, both physical and historical, should be allowed provisional freedom, untrammelled by the premature, often ignorant, interference of theological critics. Now a band of zealous and eager young men, keenly alive to the unreality of special pleading, were treating history and science with thoroughness, reality, and learning. What immense gain for the Church if such life could be infused into Catholic thought! Vainly he strove to mediate between genius which ran to excesses and the spirit of unsympathetic repression which was opposing it. The liberal Catholic writers could not be persuaded to desist from irritating personalities and acts of aggression against those in power, or from exaggerated statements which shocked the average Catholic. Personal irritation in some, and a hard, unsympathetic nature in others, were at work among their opponents. In yet other critics of the Review, a genuine spirituality, keenly alive to the functions of humility and obedience in the true Catholic spirit, tended to confound real sensitiveness to intellectual difficulties in some of the liberal writers, their love of truth and reality, with mere pride or vanity or the spirit of rebellion. Protests against the semi-rationalism of treating as final and exhaustive, theological propositions which had been framed in a stage of civilization long past, and necessarily represented only partial intellectual developments,—protests, that is, against identifying eternal and divine truths with a special analysis by the human reason conditioned by obvious limitations of time and place—were identified with rebellion against religious mystery—that is, with their precise opposite. Looking back at this distance of time, it may safely be said that Newman was in sympathy with neither party. His sentiments towards Mr. Simpson, on the one hand, and towards some of those who helped to procure the censure passed on him by Bishop Ullathorne on the other, were probably much the same as his attitude towards Origen, and Theophilus, Bishop of Alexandria. Origen was wrong on the censured points. Yet how much the Church owes to his genius and writings! And "who" (he asks) "can speak with patience of his enemy . . . Theophilus, Bishop of Alexandria? Who can admire or revere Pope Vigilius?"

Obey we must, so long as authority is acting in its rightful sphere —"obey without a word," he writes. Yet that does not justify tyranny or inconsiderateness on the part of those in authority, or neglect to inform themselves as to the true state of the case. As with Burke, his hatred of intolerance and of arrogance on the part of the rulers was so keen that the "free lances" were probably surprised to find, when authority was really seriously threatened, how far deeper was his sense of the value of the principle on which the whole existence of the Church depends.

He did, however, once and for all vindicate the functions of intellectual freedom in the economy of the Church against the Protestant conception that our duties towards authority involve the rule among Catholics of ecclesiastical absolutism. This remarkable passage in the *Apologia* should never be forgotten:

> "It is the custom with Protestant writers to consider that, whereas there are two great principles in action in the history of religion, authority and private judgment, they have all the private judgment to themselves, and we have the full inheritance and the superincumbent oppression of authority. But this is not so; it is the vast Catholic body itself, and it only, which affords an arena for both combatants in that awful never-dying duel. It is necessary for the very life of religion, viewed in its operations and its history, that the warfare should be incessantly carried on. Every exercise of infallibility is brought out into act by an intense and varied operation of the reason, both as its ally and as its opponent, and provokes again, when it has done its work, a reaction of reason against it. . .
>
> "St. Paul says in one place that his Apostolical power is given him to edification and not to destruction. There can be no better account of the infallibility of the Church. It is a supply for a need, and it does not go beyond that need. Its object is, and its effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in re-

ligious speculation, but to resist and control its extravagance. . . . Can then the infallible authority, with any show of reason, be said in fact to have destroyed the energy of the Catholic intellect? . . . I think the whole history of theology puts an absolute negative upon such a supposition.

It is hardly necessary to argue out so plain a point. It is individuals, and not the Holy See, that have taken the initiative, and given the lead to the Catholic mind, in theological inquiry. Indeed, it is one of the reproaches urged against the Roman Church that it has originated nothing, and has only served as a sort of *remora* or break in the development of doctrine. And it is an objection which I really embrace as a truth; for such I conceive to be the main purpose of its extraordinary gift. It is said, and truly, that the Church of Rome possessed no great mind in the whole period of persecution. Afterwards for a long while it has not a single doctor to show; St. Leo, its first, is the teacher of but one point of doctrine; St. Gregory, who stands at the very extremity of the first age of the Church, has no place in dogma or philosophy. The great luminary of the Western world is, as we know, St. Augustine; he, no infallible teacher, has formed the intellect of Christian Europe; indeed to the African Church generally we must look for the best early exposition of Latin ideas. Moreover, of the African divines, the first in order of time, and not the least influential, is the strong-minded and heterodox Tertullian. Nor is the Eastern intellect, as such, without its share in the formation of the Latin teaching. The free thought of Origen is visible in the writings of the Western doctors Hilary and Ambrose; and the independent mind of Jerome has enriched his own vigorous commentaries on Scripture from the stores of the scarcely orthodox Eusebius. Heretical questionings have been transmuted by the living power of the Church into salutary truths. The case is the same as regards Ecumenical Councils. Authority in its most imposing exhibition, grave Bishops, laden with the traditions and rivalries of particular nations or places, have been guided in their decisions by the commanding genius of individuals, sometimes young and of inferior rank. Not that uninspired intellect overruled the superhuman gift which was committed to the Council, which would be a self-contradictory assertion, but that in that process of inquiry and deliberation, which ended in an infallible enunciation, individual reason was paramount. Thus Malchion, a mere presbyter, was the instrument of the great Council of Antioch in the third century in meeting and refuting, for the assembled fathers, the heretical Patriarch of that See. Parallel to this instance is the influence, so well known, of a young deacon, St. Athanasius, with the 318 Fathers at Nicaea. In mediaeval times we read of St. Anselm, at Bari, as the champion of the Council there held against the Greeks. At Trent, the writings of St. Bonaventura, and, what is more to the point, the address of a priest and theologian, Salmeron, had a critical effect on some of the definitions of dogma. In some of these cases the influence might be partly moral, but in others it was that of a discursive knowledge of ecclesiastical writers, a scientific acquaintance with theology, and a force of thought in the treatment of doctrine."

If I were to single out any one great contribution which Newman has made to the religious thought of our age, I should find it in the conclusion indicated though never fully analyzed by him—that the three rôles of which I have spoken—saint, thinker, and ecclesiastical statesman, have their share in the *practical* ascertainment and preservation of religious truth. This is a theme too far-reaching to develop, but I may briefly indicate my meaning. And I do so by reference to another great thinker whose ethical character was in some respects very similar to that of Cardinal Newman.

James Martineau, who lived through almost exactly the same eventful phase of English theological thought, who had a mind like Newman's, keenly alive to the critical and scientific movement, went through a very curious experience. His deep spirituality—which has been compared to that of such great mystics as Augustine and à Kempis—was coupled with a certain readiness on the intellectual side to follow the speculations of the biblical and historical critics of the extreme left. Towards the end of his life he had, as before stated, a very singular experience in consequence of the double influence which he thus exercised on his disciples. He found some of the men whom he influenced most deeply on the ethical side, passing from their early Unitarianism to an acceptance of the Incarnation. And he found those who were most closely in sympathy with his destructive criticism losing more or less completely that spiritual and mystical type which was in his eyes by far the most important element in religion. In some cases they appeared to lose all belief in Theism itself. Mr. R. H. Hutton, who belongs to the former category of his disciples, writes of him as follows:

> "In philosophy, Dr. Martineau is, to the roots of his being, Christian. In exegetical criticism, and in his excessive sympathy with the practical scepticism of science on the subject of physical miracles, he finds the separating film dividing him from the theological creed by which, for nearly all the centuries of her life, the Christian Church has been penetrated. He leads others to conclusions into which he cannot follow them, and occasionally watches, with a mingled feeling of sympathy and wonder, the conquests made by revelation over the minds which his own teaching had prepared to receive it. He watches, too, with less sympathy, and perhaps also less wonder, the not unfrequent passing over to agnosticism of those who have felt the force of his spiritual philosophy."

What is the solution of the problem which is raised by these opposite tendencies of Martineau's keenly critical and frank inquiry into the trend of physical science, and into the historical records of Christianity, and of his direct and mystical sense of God's presence and guidance—a sense which has ever been characteristic of the Christian saints?

One answer at all events is to be found in the pages of Cardinal Newman, if their import is carefully investigated.

(1) In the first place we have the philosophy of individual religious conviction given to us in the *University Sermons* and in the *Grammar of Assent.* The process whereby the human mind can justify belief in religion is not, Newman maintains, a matter of mere explicit dialectic, or of mere investigation. The man reasons, and his premises should *include* that sense of the presence of God in the human conscience

which orthodoxy has, at whatever cost of occasional credulity and superstition, at the cost even of shutting out, for the time at least, historical and scientific speculations which may be largely true, cultivated and kept real and living. The specialist who is wholly concentrated on his negative historical criticism may, even when that criticism is just, be led to abandon religion by his false philosophy of religious belief. He may treat what should be only the pruning of an excrescence in the historical setting of religion, as though it was the consideration of the whole religious problem.

(2) But still more impressive is this argument if not confined to the individual, but extended to the Church in history. The Church, as a whole, ever includes representatives of the three rôles of which I have spoken—the saints, the thinkers and specialists, and the rulers who are guardians of the interests of the whole community of the faithful. That is to say, she includes representatives of the mystical side and of the rational side of our nature—both of which are essential features in the great quest, and moreover the "overseers" or Bishops who should preserve the balance between these two elements. Her corporate guardianship of the faith is safeguarded by the presence of all the elements required at once for the attainment of substantial truth, and for protecting individual consciences. That there may be very serious defects in one or other of these departments at a particular time—that intellect, or piety, or rule may be without its due weight—or may unduly predominate—Newman strongly maintained. But *in the long run*, in history the development of Catholic life and thought has been accomplished by all three factors. And if, as both Newman and Martineau held, the conscience and spiritual perceptions are the highest development of human nature—dim, and accompanied by illusion, like imperfect sight, but still giving some knowledge of a higher world as sight reveals to us regions which are unknown to touch and hearing alone,—it is plain that the merely critical and intellectual faculties apart from the conscience will be wholly inadequate to deal with the bearing of research on religion as a whole. The rôle of the saint as representing conscience at its highest point of insight, is essential to a just view. That realization of conscience in Christian Faith, which has in history taken at times an inaccurate form in its historical or scientific expression, must not be lost or weakened when its expression is being corrected. It must, on the contrary, be jealously preserved while the new channels of expression are being effected.

And here comes in the importance of the ruler's functions which are based on the organic nature of the Christian community, and the gradual and corporate character of the advance of its intellectual analysis. If in practice one side is being developed in the community at the expense of the other,—the critical at the expense of the ethical—departmental truth is being won at the expense of what is on the whole error. From the point of view of religion, the loss is greater than the gain. A number of agnostic critics, and of simple souls whose faith has been destroyed by criticism for which they were not fitted, in place of pious belated scholastics and God-fearing but credulous souls, would not be a hopeful sign of the really desirable advance of which the poet sang these lines

> "Mind and soul, according well,
> May make one music as before,
> But vaster."

Therefore, the ruling power has—as I have already indicated—to keep the balance between the elements, and prevent the gain of one truth from leading to the loss of truths more vital, to prevent the rational element from encroaching on the domain of the ethical, to prevent the rôle of the critic from predominating over that of the saint. This is, Newman has noted, historically and actually the ideal of the Catholic Church in its constitution. And though at one time tepidity and laxity among the people or carelessness among the rulers, at another undue interference on the part of the governing element, an undue crushing of the intellect, may be disastrous to present interests, nevertheless the fact that the faith has been and still is in the keeping of these normal guardians of religious truth—which belongs to a sphere higher than the critical intellect alone can measure or reach,—is a source of confidence and a testimony to the Church as witness to the truth The individual Catholic can largely make his own those elements in the organism to which he belongs, and find in them a balance and a philosophy more satisfying—more in harmony with the ever-growing character of all intellectual analysis, than the purely personal effort of R. H. Hutton's constructive theology, or the barren negations of those who, like the author of "Robert Elsmere," almost identify religious problems with the researches of the historical critic.

The Church then—as Newman points out—*combines* the two divergent tendencies of Martineau's teaching, and registers the development of interaction of each, as presented in history, and as now existing in the representations of Christian thought and Christian prayer. Newman sees alike in the life-giving spirit first infused into the Church by her founder, preserved in the liturgy, the ascetic theology, the lives and writings of the holy men of our own time, and (on the other hand) in the intellectual speculations of our best philosophers, and biblical and historical critics, the heirs to what has existed in the Church in different forms from early ages, namely, the representatives of the spiritual elements and of the intellectual elements, which must combine in order that theology may take account at once of ancient religion and of modern science. The attempt to despise either of these factors has never permanently prospered. A true philosophy of religion for us on this earth must ever take account of both. Therefore, though Newman may tremble for the individual weakness which runs on one side into obscurantism and on the other into scepticism, he treats the *Ecclesia* as capable in the long run of combining both in due proportion. He falls back on the great body of which every baptized Christian is a member, for the supplement to individual one-sidedness or weakness. And if he does not actually find all that he needs here and now, he believes that it is to be found potentially in the lessons written in the stories of the great Saints, Doctors and Pontiffs, and actually in the developments of Catholic sanctity, learning, and philosophy, which will receive their fuller expression and recognition in the age to come.

WILFRID WARD.

CATHOLICITY AND FREE-THOUGHT

George Fonsegrive

In their controversy with free-thinkers, believers are too often satisfied with merely pointing to the frequent inconsistencies of their opponents, such as the contrast between the servile docility with which they accept the ideas of their leaders, and the domineering way in which they try to impose these second-hand opinions on everybody else. It is an easy task to show that free-thinkers, as a class, are neither free nor thinkers.

This method is good as far as it goes. It serves to show that the High Priests of this irreligious religion are unreasonable and inconsistent, and will help to discredit their authority. Its defect is that it leaves the main position of free thought untouched. If we wish to obtain a lasting victory, we must direct our attacks against this main position rather than against the accidental and more or less incoherent or contradictory forms under which it may be presented by its advocates.

In order to make a proper study of free-thinking as a system, I think it best to begin with an historical sketch of its origin, so as to be able to give it an exact definition. It will then be easy to show that Catholicity and free-thinking are necessarily antagonistic positions.

To arrive at a settlement of the dispute, we shall have to examine on what grounds free thought bases its claims, and inquire whether it can extend its rights—if rights we must suppose—over the whole domain of mental and moral life. Should any part of life lie outside the pale of free thought, is Catholicity included in that out-lying domain? Such will be the ultimate question. If it be answered in the negative, free thought will have won and Catholicity must give way to it; but if in the affirmative, Catholicity will have conquered and free thought will have to be satisfied with the section of intellectual life which belongs to it.

It may be safely said that amongst the ancients the problem of free thought was not clearly stated. Philosophers, it is true, and a

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Published concurrently in French in the author's magazine, *La Quinzaine*.

physician here and there, gave the example of free research and bold initiative. Socrates dared to investigate the origin of written law, a crime for which he was put to death. Aristotle criticised his teacher, Plato. But independent spirits in philosophy founded schools in which the *Ipse dixit* reigned supreme, schools which devoted themselves to the preservation of tradition and obedience to the authority of the masters; in a word, all antiquity is traditionalistic. *Novis rebus studere* is considered criminal; the golden age is always in the past; to imitate the past, to preserve the traditions of the ancestors in everything is the strict duty imposed on the rising generation, both by law and religion. In the field of philosophy and science, as well as in the social and civil order, everything was to be decided on the basis of authority.

With Christianity a new conception appears. The kingdom of God opens new vistas on the future. The holy city after which every Christian seeks is not the Jerusalem of the past, that of David or Solomon, but the new Jerusalem that is to be. These Christian views are favorable to the ideas of progress. The future must excel the present just as the present is an advance upon the past.

However, even Christian generations could not entirely shake off the old ways of thinking, with their blind respect for tradition. For if Christianity reformed morals, it left the sciences untouched and exercised no influence on their teaching, which was still based exclusively on tradition and authority. The conservative attitude on questions of science pervaded the mediaeval universities and rendered unavoidable the conflict between authority and the progressive development of thought. The time came at last when fortunate investigators and discoverers, such as Magellan, Gilbert, Galileo, Torricelli made observations, experiments, or discoveries which clashed violently with the traditions of antiquity. It became necessary to take sides, and the authority of the masters was forced to undergo a series of striking defeats. In 1521, Magellan sailed around the world and thus proved conclusively that Aristotle was wrong in saying there cannot be antipodes. The axiom of the ancients *Natura horret a vacuo*, which held so high a place as a physical law in mediaeval science, was rendered empty of meaning by the experiments of Torricelli and Pascal with the barometer. By these and many other such discoveries, blow after blow was inflicted on the authority of tradition.

However, in spite of these reverses, the methods of authority inherited from the past and still exclusively used in the schools, did not immediately disappear. Against Harvey's proofs for the circulation of the blood, philosophers could still oppose reasons taken from Aristotle; while crowds were flocking to the theatre, to hear Corneille's tragedy Le Cid, pedantic critics warned the poet that his work could not be good, since it was in violation of the rules laid down forever by the ancients. Those were days when patients had no right to get better in defiance of the prognoses of the Faculty.

The physics of Aristotle, antiquated medicine, alchemy, pedantry in literature, tradition and authority in all branches of knowledge were as dead weights keeping down all intellectual activity, even that of genius. All innovations were forbidden; discoveries were interdicted and inventions proscribed. Universities like the Sorbonne strove conscientiously to bring the progress of the human mind to a standstill.

But at this very time Bacon in England, and in France Pascal and Charles Perrault, and later on Descartes and even Moliére were engaged in vindicating the rights of intellect. To those who kept asserting the wisdom of the ancients, Bacon and Pascal both retorted that antiquity is the youth of the world and we are the true ancients. *Antiquitas seculi juventus mundi*, said Bacon; or as Pascal puts it in his luminous style, "Mankind is like one man who lives forever and learns continually." The question then naturally arose: if our fathers improved on the science of their ancestors, why cannot we criticise the opinions of our fathers? Thus little by little the conviction was established that human thought had a right to freedom of discovery, of research, of investigation. We must also remark—and this is important —that the question was gradually changing and becoming more general. The danger was that the just complaint of scientists against being compelled, in the teeth of facts and experience, and in spite of decisive proofs, to worship an authority which had no foundation but tradition, would lead men to feel that all tradition should be considered doubtful and all authority worthless. Thus legitimate freedom of investigation, tended towards free-thinking and all the exaggerations that hide to-day under the cloak of that pompous title.

Now let us examine the nature of that tendency. It consisted in transforming a special question into a general one, a question of the method proper to special sciences and cases into a question of universal method and even of general philosophy. Because tradition and authority had abused their rights in special instances, the extent and the very existence of those rights were now questioned.

Pascal clearly perceived this danger. In his Preface to a *Traité du Vide* he strongly emphasized the distinction between sciences of reasoning and sciences of authority. And by carefully assigning Theology to the latter class he thought he had saved everything. That this was only an illusion, Descartes showed very soon. In his Discourse on Method, he tries by the sole effort of his own reason to rediscover all principles and to derive all the consequences contained in them. We can affirm with certainty, he says, only those clear and distinct propositions in which there is no trace of obscurity or mystery, and in which we perceive clearly the connection between subject and predicate. Now it is evident that this is a radical exclusion of authority from the whole sphere of thought.

Thus at the very time when modern science was being created, University Professors and learned Doctors were trying to subject everything to the authority of the ancients, of whom they claimed to be the disciples and interpreters. And then came Descartes and his school, and after them the whole eighteenth century, loudly affirming that authority is altogether without value in matters of science; nay more, that, in philosophy as well as in science, all investigations are to be conducted as if nobody had ever philosophized before. Criticism of authority in matters of science or philosophy by the great pioneers of modern thought, such as Bacon, Vinci, Pascal and Descartes, became in the hands of Bayle, Diderot and Voltaire a destructive criticism of authority in matters of religion as well.

Now authority was nowhere so evident and so express as in the Catholic Church, and it was in the name of that same Church that authority most solemnly and most strikingly opposed to scientific novelties an almost impassable barrier. Needless to recall the condemnation of Galileo, the commotion it produced in the whole world of thought, and the objections which the adversaries of the Church have ever since been able to draw from it.

Thus in spite of Calvin's treatment of Servetus, in spite of the excommunication fulminated by the Synagogue of Amsterdam against Spinoza on account of his exegetical opinions, neither Judaism nor Protestantism was accused of opposing science. It was against the Catholic Church, and against her alone, that this accusation was leveled. So, little by little, the opinion gained ground that it is impossible to think freely in the Catholic Church, that dogma is opposed to science and reason to faith.

The sceptics and free-thinkers of the eighteenth century waged war against the Catholic Church in the name of science and reason. In this manner free thought became the direct antagonist of the Church, and tried to raise over against the edifice of knowledge built up in the Universities under the control of the Church, a new structure in which all sciences would be taught, classified and co-ordinated independent of, and even directly hostile to the teachings of Theology. Such was the task of the Encyclopedists.

This struggle is not yet over. It lasted through the whole of the nineteenth century, and outside the pale of Catholicity it is almost a commonplace to proclaim that freedom of thought is an absolutely necessary condition of scientific research, and at the same time that it is directly opposed to the teachings of the Church, so that it is impossible for a logical-minded man to be at once a Catholic and a scientist. This antagonism to religious authority finds its expression in the axiom which Renan stated as the foundation of all scientific research: "There is nothing beyond nature"—an axiom which was reaffirmed by the recent Congress of free-thinkers.

We can now understand that free-thinking is nothing but the claim that freedom of mind is necessary for science, and that such freedom cannot exist unless all authority, and especially the dogmatic authority of the Catholic Church, be destroyed. Free-thinking is anti-dogmatic and consequently anti-Catholic. Our modern free-thinkers are the logical progeny of an historical evolution. Their state of mind is now clear to us. It remains to examine whether that state of mind can be justified before the tribunal of logic, science, and reason.

II.

Science demands freedom of thought. Does it demand free-thinking? That science is impossible if the mind is not free is evident from the historical sketch we have just given. If a man brings into his scientific researches preconceived ideas and prejudices which he tries not to examine but to justify, and which he prefers to truth itself, evidently his whole inquiry will be vitiated. True, a scientist cannot conduct his researches at random; he needs some theory to guide his inquiry; but he does not make his experiments in order to show that this theory is true; he is only anxious to find out whether it be true or not. He does not assume the task of demonstrating, but of investigating; he is an inquirer, not an apologist. He asks questions from nature and elicits an answer, be it what it may.

It is evident that unless scientific research had full freedom it simply could not exist. But freedom of investigation implies doubt. For when a man affirms with certainty any proposition whatsoever, he is past the period of research and inquiry; there is no question in his mind, the answer has been given already; he has no longer to seek, since he has found. At most he can perform now without hesitation the experiments which, at first, in the period of research, led through many trials to the discovery of the answer to the questions he was then asking. But experiments at this stage are no longer a method of research, but only of demonstration. Demonstration supposes that the truth has been discovered, and that science has attained its perfection; research, investigation, inquiry and doubt are conditions of science in the making.

It is this which seems to be the cause of the misunderstanding between the advocates and the opponents of free investigation and free thought. Unless we can freely investigate, say the former, there can be no science, because freedom is necessary in order to undertake any research, and, consequently, to arrive at any discovery. If you are always free to reopen every question, reply the latter, there is nothing fixed or definite in science. What is then this so called science which is continually seeking what it declares it will never find, always moving forward, but never to any goal? Is it indispensable for science to doubt the elementary propositions of arithmetic or algebra? Would it be scientific to question that two and two are four?

Thus on the one hand, science is impossible unless it starts with freedom of inquiry, and on the other, when once constituted, it seems to leave no room for freedom of investigation on the points which have been acquired. Thought must be free to arrive at the discovery of truths; when truth has been discovered, thought must cease to be free. But here the modern scientific spirit seems to be radical in opposition to the old-time views. Formerly, the name of science was given to acquired knowledge, to the truths which had been demonstrated. Nowadays, when we speak of the conditions of science, we think of the process rather than the product. We are inclined never to consider any proposition as completely proved and settled. Criticism and research are always fruitful, whilst a mere rehearsal of acquired truth is necessarily sterile. To investigate anew an uncontested truth may lead to discoveries. For instance, a fresh study of the composition of air brought about the discovery of argon. If the physicists had been satisfied with teaching for ever, without instituting any new research, that air is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, it would never have been known that our atmosphere contains other gases.

Nothing is settled for good; every discovery is provisional. Man is on the way to truth, he can make continual approximations to it, but will never reach it. There is not and there never will be any such thing as Science rounded out and final; science is forever undergoing a process of evolution or becoming; it is not made, but making. And consequently, its methods are not the methods of authority but of free inquiry. Science demands free thought and can never be brought to condemn or proscribe it. All dogmatism which stifles inquiry, even the dogmatism of science, is fatal to the progress of science. It would seem that the unscientific attitude of mind is not so much in believing without proof, as in thinking that any question is capable of absolute and final settlement.

Such is the opinion of many philosophers. But this extreme view does not seem to represent the opinion of scientists themselves. For no matter how bold may be the ideas of the latter and their criticism of acquired results, even the most radical profess that there is a certain number of truths or elementary propositions which cannot be questioned, since they have been confirmed and verified by every possible experiment. These may be very few, they may be very elementary; but they remain incontestable. We may go further and deeper, we may deduce from them many unexpected conclusions, but they will never be overthrown. Such are the truths of mathematics, the fundamental laws of astronomy, chemistry, and physics, and the main facts of biology.

So investigation, criticism, free research, free thought—whatever name may be given to it—is a method indispensable for the begetting of science, but when science is once begotten, when results are really attained, this method no longer serves a purpose. When a building is finished, the scaffoldings are taken down. Dogmatism, far from being fatal to science, is on the contrary the remote goal—infinitely remote perhaps—towards which science progresses. Doubtless it will never attain a universal dogmatism because we shall never have a thorough knowledge of everything, nor for that matter, of anything. But without the idea of a goal to attain, science would be without any object. In all probability we shall never reach complete and final truth; but we shall attain some solid and lasting truths from which we can safely proceed to further investigation.

Even if we admit settled points and acquired results, these results are scientific only inasmuch as they constantly remain capable of verification and proof. Professors, students, all sorts and conditions of men must have an opportunity of following for themselves the same logical processes as the original thinker, or there is no science. They may, indeed, owing to practical needs or through well deserved confidence in his authority, accept the settlements of a scientist without verifying them; but such a belief does not constitute a scientific assent. The latter rests wholly on verification and proof. It is scientific only when it has been the object of a careful scrutiny independent of all bias and prejudice. Assent as well as research must then be free in order to be scientific.

III.

As there is no research, so too there is no verification without some provisional doubt. Now, when one doubts, thought is not determined; it can either affirm or deny; it is therefore free. At the outset of every science, there must be freedom of thought.

Does it follow then that we must hold the dogmas proclaimed by those new-fangled Congregations, the Free-thinking Societies? If we wish to conduct any kind of scientific research, must we question all the truths that we have accepted, and in particular, must we give up our religious beliefs and the maxims which form the basis of our moral life? This is what free-thinkers inform us we ought to do, but they are far from being right.

When chemists are studying a problem in their own science, they use the scales, they cipher according to the rules of arithmetic, without calling into question the results of physics and mathematics. Free-thinkers claim that thought must continually remain in suspense and free on every point; impartial and unbiased thinkers are satisfied to maintain their freedom on the points under present investigation. The chemist who, in order to verify a chemical analysis, accepts the laws of equilibrium and uses the scales, is an unbiased thinker, but not a free-thinker. So too is the astronomer, who uses a table of logarithms without trying to prove its correctness.

A fortiori, we have a right to hold, without submitting them anew to research, criticism, or doubt, previously established convictions, beliefs, practices or scientific affirmations which have but a remote relation or no relation at all with the object of our studies.

How, for instance, can any personal convictions about the date of the Code of Hammurabi prevent me from investigating freely the problems which the existence of radium may raise? And how does it affect the freedom of mind necessary to a learned electrician that he believes in the Koran, in the Bible, or in the infallibility of the Pope? Unless indeed it be claimed that the electrician, who believes in the Pope's infallibility, is thereby obliged to believe whatever the Pope may command him, even concerning electricity. But then the only answer would be to refer the free-thinker to the catechism, where he will find the field of the Pope's infallibility clearly defined.

But here the free-thinker will say that we cannot and should not admit belief in any kind of infallibility, or an attitude which exempts from criticism and investigation an affirmation of primary importance for the intellectual and moral life. Science constitutes intellectual life, and the moral life is without value unless its practices are approved by intellect, that is, unless they are determined by science. Now if the only proper intellectual attitude is that of universal criticism, of universal doubt, of provisional and free investigation in every question—and this is the position not only of free-thinkers, but of all who pretend to think without bias or prejudice—how can any one lay down as a principle that on any point he will accept the so-called infallible pronouncements of an authority which will dictate to his mind beliefs which he will have no right to verify or criticise?

IV.

The postulate which is at the basis of the contention of free-thinkers is now plain to be seen, viz., that the attitude of the scientist must be the dominant one. Now if science is the outcome of free individual thought, and if we must act only according to the conclusions of science, we have no right to do or affirm anything on the authority of others.

Just as no propositions are scientific except those which we have discovered for ourselves or which we are able to justify before the bar of unprejudiced thought, so no actions are moral but those the justice and goodness of which are established in the court of our free individual conscience. Just as our thought admits of no authority but our own minds, so our conduct admits of no master but our consciences.

If free-thinkers were consistent, they would have to admit freedom of conduct as well as freedom of thought. In fact, they do so, as long as they confine themselves to theories, and as long as they are not confronted with the practical consequences which necessarily follow from them. In the theoretical order they are intoxicated with freedom and independence. But when dealing with practical life they lose some of this cocksureness, though they still claim that if we do not always direct our actions according to independent reasoning, this is owing to certain accidental circumstances which may in some cases excuse an exception to the general rule, but which do not destroy the rule itself or its binding force. Nobody is bound to do anything except what his conscience commands him; and conscience can command nothing but what independent intelligence recognizes with certainty as good.

Now if this be true, if intellectualism, as it is called, be right, then the whole position of the free-thinkers is justified. But is it true? In order to act rightly, are we bound to prove for ourselves, without any recourse to authority, the propriety of our ways of acting? As soon as we put that question to ourselves clearly—and here is the real issue—we see just as clearly that not only do we often act rightly without any such previous investigation, but that in the great majority of cases we are bound to do so.

This is evidently true in all cases when we must act without the knowledge necessary to decide for ourselves. For instance, if we are sick, shall we do without the physician because we must trust only ourselves? Shall we, under the same pretext, avoid consulting a lawyer when we have a lawsuit? When we wish to take a trip, shall we board the train only after studying physics and mechanics and examining into the working of the engine? In fact, to be perfectly consistent with the principles of free inquiry, we ought to learn all about running a train, and before starting from New York to Boston we should have to see for ourselves that the track is in good order, that is, we should have to go to Boston before we could have any right to take the Boston train. And so we should never eat or drink anything without having had it analysed—not indeed by others, since we must not trust authority—but by ourselves. So the only meat, milk, or water we could use would be that which has been destroyed by chemical analysis. We could safely eat or drink only what would be no longer eatable or drinkable. A man who would act thus would be considered a fit subject for a lunatic asylum, and yet he would be only a thorough-going follower of Descartes and the free-thinkers.

But we know very well that we do not act on such principles, and that we act reasonably just because we trust those who have knowledge and ability—doctors and chemists, cooks and engineers. How do we know that we have a right to the name we bear, and that we really belong to our family, if not on authority? Authority enters into every phase of our life. To try to escape it on the plea of maintaining our freedom would be sheer insanity; it would be to maintain the right to die because we refuse to accept the necessary conditions of life.

Whenever we have to act without time to examine everything thoroughly, we are forced to push into a region beyond that which is lit up by knowledge. We have to fall back on custom as it prevails amongst those about us. The error of the so-called intellectualists and free-thinkers is in imagining that the rules of theoretical morality, or the rules of science are the same as those of action. They forget that action has demands which science has not. Action demands decision, frequently prompt decision. In no case does it admit of postponement or neutrality. To wait, or to do nothing, is to act. *In dubio abstine*, says the proverb. Nothing could be more misleading. The scientist alone can apply it. He may doubt, and wait for further knowledge. The man of action cannot. Willy nilly, he must form his decision and take a side. Neutrality is impossible for him. My friend is sick. Shall I go for the doctor? I doubt the value of medicine. Well, if I go, how am I different from one who believes in it? If I do not, I am in the same position as a man who is absolutely sure that medicine is useless.

The scientist can assume one of three attitudes with reference to a proposition: he may affirm, deny, or doubt; action has only two alternatives—to act or not to act. The scientist by suspending judgment, can always avoid error; the man of action enjoys no such immunity. In many instances his error is hardly imputable to him, for he has had to choose his course without time to investigate. In practice it is often necessary to decide from our own limited knowledge. In many cases indeed, we have to decide from what others do or say. For man is not isolated either in space or in time. Every one of his actions belongs to a series, is a part of his own history, forms the connecting link between his past and his future. His own life, his individual history, is a part of a general history. He belongs to a group which influences him and which is in its turn influenced by him. We have no right to act as if we stood alone; our decisions may have a deep influence on our fellowmen—contemporaries, relatives, fellow-citizens, and associates. We must be mindful of the solidarity which binds us all into one. We have consequently to take into account in our decisions the beliefs and thoughts of men, and even their prejudices, and those obscure sub-conscious volitions which are manifested in their customs and traditions.

A philosopher may think as if there were nobody in the world but himself; he may believe that he is a free-thinker and make boast of it; but as soon as he enters into the life of his fellowmen he has to bow to social requirements and commands; he can no longer be a free-thinker without becoming immediately an outlaw from society. Free thought is impracticable and anti-social.

Descartes himself saw this clearly; for he confesses in his Method, and for the very reasons we have just given, that he must, until a scientific moral code be established, "preserve the religion in which he was brought up from childhood, and keep the laws and customs of his country," and in everything else, "follow the most moderate opinions." In other words, where scientific evidence is wanting, one must stick to authority. Later on he recognizes that it would be impossible for science to make progress if men could not fund their experiences. So it must be lawful to accept unverified propositions or experiments on authority.

As a matter of fact, scientific workers give approval to this principle by their practice. How could they verify every discovery of their predecessors? And the more science will progress, the more difficult this verification will become. Life would be all too short for such a task. So that the very progress of science brings about the necessity of relying on the authority of others. The whole scientific world to-day admits the existence of radium, but how many scientists have repeated the experiments of M. and Mme. Curie? They agree to accept experimental data through faith in the authority of competent scientists. Scientific work, like every other human activity, is a social work. Through co-operation only is progress possible. But co-operation supposes confidence. In other words, a man's thought is not independent of the thoughts of other men, and if under the pretext of giving it freedom he keeps it isolated, he deprives it of its very conditions of existence, and makes of it an instrument of dilettanteism, but not of fruitful work. For thought is a means to an end; it is of no value unless it helps action; ideas are measured by their results in action. An idea which produces good results has its guarantee in those good results. Free-thinkers would impose on the human mind conditions which are impossible. Man belongs by nature to a family, to society; he depends on his parents to learn how to live; he needs the co-operation of his fellows to live, to act, to make progress in science, industry, or art. The free-thinker could follow out his principles to their last consequences only on a desert island, and there he would consistently starve.

It does not follow that criticism is banished from science or even from life; it occupies there its place and rank; so does freedom of thought. But this rank is subordinate. Free-thinkers would fain submit everything to criticism, inquiry and doubt. Unbiased thinkers maintain the right to doubt and inquire in matters scientific, but they profess that thought is but a means subservient to life. Free-thinkers would sacrifice life itself to the idol of criticism; unbiased thinkers acknowledge the superior right of life, and direct their thoughts accordingly, and when they refuse to submit all truths at all times to the criticism of reason, it is only to keep human thinking reasonable.

V.

Free thought is then a method which is legitimate if applied to science, illegitimate, if applied to action. The attitude of the free-thinker is the attitude of the scientist; it would be utterly unreasonable to force it on the man of action. Just as criticism and investigation and doubt have a function to perform, so too have authority and faith and trust. Both are equally reasonable in their respective domains, the former in the theoretical, the latter in the practical order.

Now to come to the crucial questions: are the demands which Catholicism makes upon its adherents unreasonable? Are free-thinkers justified in proscribing Catholicism as a religion of intellectual slavery and moral death? To decide these questions, it will suffice to ask whether the dogmas of the Catholic faith belong to the merely intellectual and theoretical, or to the practical order; in the former case they ought to be subject to doubt and investigation; in the latter they may demand our assent prior to any direct research.

At first glance it would seem that Catholic dogma is made up of a system of propositions which are theoretical rather than practical, and therefore within the field we have marked out for free scientific inquiry. God exists, God is a spirit infinitely perfect,Creator of heaven and earth. He is one in three Persons. He created man. Man fell; sin was transmitted to the children of Adam. The Second Person of the most Holy Trinity, to redeem man, took a body like ours. Jesus Christ is God incarnate. He was born, He preached, He performed miracles, He suffered, died, rose from the dead, ascended into heaven. He founded the Church. Man is made of soul and body; the soul is immortal, and will, after death, be punished or rewarded according to its works.

This list of the principal dogmas seems to be but a series of propositions which make their appeal to intellect, and consequently cannot claim our assent unless supported by proofs, that is, unless they have been subjected to previous doubt and inquiry. But it must be noted that there is not one of the above propositions, however clear it may seem to be, which does not contain an element of mystery. God, Creation, the Trinity, transmission of original sin, the Incarnation, the Redemption, eternity of rewards and punishments—each of these expressions enshrines a mystery. The believer gives an intellectual assent to the plain meaning of these formulas, but it is the province of faith to give assent to that larger element in them which lies beyond the narrow limits of human comprehension.

The element of mystery enters so deeply into these propositions that dogmatic beliefs would be emptied of the greater part of their content if limited to the bare force of the terms. The realities signified by the formulas lie infinitely beyond our powers of conception. Now these are the truths which we hold by faith. So our faith is not cabined and confined by the ideas, but reaches out beyond them. The believer's concept of God, for example, is different from that held by the philosopher.

Now since the object of faith is mysterious, it may well be that beliefs are not to be submitted to methods proper to science, and that dogmatic propositions are to be treated by a process different from that which is applicable to scientific propositions.

Moreover, dogmatic propositions deal not so much with general laws and abstract ideas, as with real, singular, concrete facts. The question is not so much of the First Cause, as of God the Creator and Father, One and Triune; not of sin in man, but in men; not of the salvation of mankind, but the salvation of men, one by one. This is strikingly unlike scientific propositions, which are abstract and universal.

Some of these propositions, moreover, are historical, and therefore can be established only by authority and tradition. Amongst such are the following: Christ was born; He died on the Cross; after His death He appeared to His disciples. Now history can hardly be considered as a science in the strict sense of the word. It becomes so only when it is strictly critical. But historical criticism can be free and independent only when three conditions are present: (1) No personal interest should be involved in the establishing of the facts; (2) there should be ample time for thorough research; (3) it should be possible to pronounce or reserve decision without inconvenience or harm. This is tantamount to saying that inquiry and verification can be entirely free if historical facts possess interest only for intellectual curiosity, but cannot be free if any practical consequences follow from them

Now the historical facts which form the basis of Christianity, like the dogmas of the Church, are not statements in the merely theoretical order; they have a practical bearing on life. Hence they should be tested by the practical rules which hold in matters of conduct rather than by the methods of scientific speculation. For religion is a life, a series of actual concrete deeds, of separate acts of intellect, will and heart. There is not a single religious action which is purely intellectual.

Religion, therefore, as having to do with life, belongs to the class of experiences which exclude neutrality and doubt. A man either is or is not religious, is or is not a loyal, practical Christian. No middle position is possible. One who withholds himself from the practices of religion acts in exactly the same way as one who denies the truth of religion. We must take sides, and at once, for there is no time for full and free investigation. In fact, even an absolutely impartial state of mind such as science requires, is quite out of question here. Before and during the inquiry I must act, and act as if I believed, and thus create in myself a tendency in favor of belief; or act as if I did not believe—stay away from Mass, for example—and thus produce in myself a trend towards unbelief.

Here then we see the impossibility of free-thinking, of theoretical free inquiry when face to face with the requirements of practical life. It is said that Catholic education prejudices the mind in favor of faith; Catholics can retort that so-called neutrality in education creates a prejudice in favor of unbelief. The conclusion from all this is that we must make up our minds to adopt in these matters, not the methods of science and free-thinking, but those of practice and action.

What are these methods? The very ones which we see man using constantly throughout his life. From the moment of his birth, led by the instincts of his nature, he performs such necessary actions as breathing, suckling, etc. Through these actions and the assistance of his parents, he lives, grows, develops. In later life he can speculate about these activities, and study the laws of his development. He can then demonstrate that breathing was the proper thing to do. But living does not depend on his speculations; on the contrary, the science which he acquires is science only in so far as it squares itself with the already experienced facts of life. One must live in order to know that air sustains life; the act of breathing must come before our knowledge of its necessity. *Primum vivere, deinde philosophari.* In matters of life and action, the only test of a truth is that it works. A medicine is good if it cures, a system of life is good if it answers the test of experience.

Now in matters of religion a believer forms his decision by a method analogous to this. Let us consider three different cases: (1) that of a man who passes from unbelief to faith without ever having been a believer; (2) of one who has lost his faith and returns to it; (3) of one who keeps the faith in which he was brought up.

In the first case, the converted unbeliever cannot be accused of mental slavery. He was free with regard to faith, and in a position to make the most minute and rigorous investigation. Of course, he could not expect to reach a scientific proof, since religion, as we have shown, both as faith and as practice, lies beyond the limits of scientific method. But his experience has taught him that there is something lacking in his inner life, intellectual and moral, and he has gone looking for something better. This new ideal of life he considers first from without, and afterwards from within. If he sticks to it, no doubt the reason is, that, all things considered, his last state is better than the first. By personal experience he finds that his inner life as a Christian is on a higher plane than it was before he believed. This experience is a proof of the validity of his new beliefs, just as recovery of health under a diet is a proof in favor of the diet. Some instances to the contrary might be adduced, but it is noteworthy that religious conversion is almost always followed by a striking moral betterment, which is evident to the friends of the convert, whilst loss of faith produces opposite effects on character.

Nor can our second class of converts—those who return to the faith they have lost—be accused of mental enslavement. They have set themselves free, and now they return to their former duties of their own accord. Here again the motive for conversion is experience of life. Such a man feels that without faith he is lacking in much of the purity, the loftiness of ideals, the roundness of development, the fulness of life, which religion brought to him. In fact, what other motives could influence him, granted that he is sincere and disinterested?

Now take the last case, where a man brought up in the Catholic faith, clings steadfastly to it. They tell us he cannot do it except by some atrophy or twist of brain. The training which he has received from his parents and teachers has made an indelible mark on him. He can never free himself from the links of habit which have been riveted on his thoughts, feelings, and actions. Neither his teachers nor his parents had any right to fashion him thus into a mere image of themselves. The child has rights which ought to be respected, rights to liberty, to the development of his own powers and personality. Consequently, the only form of education which is right is that which trains a child through freedom for freedom. The ineradicable rights of the child are respected only by free-thinking, and all other forms of education are unreasonable, inhuman, immoral. And the state has the right to protect the child against every attempt on the part of the father to encroach on his liberty.

Let us consider this claim. A father does not merely give life to his children. He must give them also the means to live, consequently he must teach them how to live. This duty begins as soon as the child is born, and grows with its growing capacities and needs. No doubt dominant tendencies are thus formed, but what other course is there to pursue? Whether the father acts or not, such tendencies are formed. The child can be made moral, or allowed to become self-seeking. The only question is whether it is better to have him develop along the lines of his own narrow and selfish instincts, or to give him the benefit of the accumulated experience of the race as represented by his father. Would it be well not to teach him how to talk or how to look after his health, on the ground that if left to himself, he might discover a better language or better rules of hygiene?

The same holds good of religion. A child will either pray or not pray—there is no middle term. To bring him up without a religion is to create in him a prejudice, just as much as bringing him up with a religion. We cannot escape the dilemma, since the laws of action preclude the policy of holding off. The whole question comes to this: whether a father who has tried for himself the worth of a way of living is wrong in teaching it to his children. His right and his duty will be the same, whether it be in rules of health, laws of morality, or religion. The choice is not between dogmatic and free education; it is between two dogmatisms, of those who frankly submit themselves to a religious dogmatism, and strive to inculcate tendencies or prejudices in favor of theism and supernaturalism, and of those who, under the deceptive guise of liberty, submit themselves to the dogmatism of irreligion, and are striving to create a prejudice in favor of atheism and naturalism.

Prejudices! Yes, let us not be afraid of a word. There are good and bad prejudices; they are harmful only when they are wrong. Breathing and eating were originally prejudices in the strict sense of the word, for we had to breathe and eat before we were able to judge concerning them. Ought we to have starved or suffocated out of devotion to the principles of free-thought? Make a thorough-going application of these principles to the whole of life, to everything we say or do, and life will soon cease to exist, slain to satisfy the supposed requirements of independent thought.

We must not suffer these false and narrow maxims to be applied to religious life, any more than to physical or moral life. True, in this sphere, the evidence of their absurdity is not so striking, because the consequences do not impress men as being so fatal. Man can live without praying; he cannot live without breathing. But here again, in this narrow conception of the needs of life, we have another instance of prejudice, the prejudice of the irreligious man. "Not by bread alone doth man live." With a large number of men, religion is as necessary to life as air or food. To such men, life without religion is incomplete, starved, stunted, not worth living.

It rests with us to take our choice. He that is not with religion, is against it. We can gather with Catholicity, or scatter with free-thought. We must take sides, and whatever side we take, we should remember that it is a matter of practical choice, and that our decision does not and cannot find an adequate motive in purely intellectual speculations and scientific methods. It is a decision in the formation of which all our vital powers are called into council. Reason is not left unheard, but ear is also given to the voice of our deepest personal experiences, to all the aspirations of the will, and to all the needs of the heart; so that if the believer seems to limit the use of reason, it is for reasons which lie deeper than reason can fathom.

George Fonsegrive.

SCOTUS REDIVIVUS

James J. Fox, D. D.

When that eminent adept in the art of defense, William of Deloraine, good at need, reached fair Melrose, he—so runs the *Lay of the Last Minstrel*—demanded of the churchman old the long-hidden book of the wondrous wizard, Michael Scott. The monk replied that, as he had sworn to do, he had buried the book along with its uncanny master, one bygone night, when the bell tolled one and the moon was bright.

> "The words may not again be said
> That he spoke to me, on deathbed laid;
> They would rend this Abbaye's massy nave,
> And pile it in heaps above his grave."

Nevertheless the sturdy knight insisted that the book be brought forth from its hiding place; for the fated hour had come when his liege Lady, sorely harassed, needed its help. Assume the old monk of the above episode to be the genius of scholasticism, and you have to hand materials for a pretty allegory, referring to another Scot and the meeting of a new need in contemporary Catholic thought.

The jubilee year of the Immaculate Conception dogma resulted in bringing forward honorably from comparative oblivion the fame of John Duns Scotus; and the present movement for his canonization is welcomed by everybody as the vindication of a name that, owing to the long reign of a rival influence, has borne much unmerited obloquy. Other causes, too, more silent and deeper, are contributing to give a new lease of life, in the intellectual world, to the great Franciscan Doctor.

When, in contradiction to Thomism, Scot curtailed the province of reason in the conquest of religious truth, maintained the supremacy of will over intellect, and applied this philosophic view to a great number of fundamental theological questions concerning God, free will, predestination, faith, the virtues and the sacraments, he enunciated a principle potent enough, if not to lay in ruins the fair edifice of Thomistic intellectualism, at least to weaken it with a mighty rent. Our traditional apologetic system, constructed on lines borrowed from Thomism, encounters an age more critical than Scot himself, on which it does not make sufficient impression; some serious breaches are said to have been made in it. And, on this account, many within the walls believe that the interests of faith require us to resort, at least provisionally, to a method of defense more in harmony with Scotist principles. The spell of the subtle wizard is on many tongues: *Intellectus pedissequa voluntatis.*

The purpose of this paper is to notice, in a cursory manner—systematic treatment is impossible within the limits of a magazine article—the reassertion of the characteristic Scotist position that is taking place in the movement, which, for want of a better term, has been called the New Apologetics. This revival of Scot does not consist in any deliberate attempt of admirers and disciples to exalt the teachings of a chosen master. The leaders have uttered no shibboleth resembling the cry of "Back to Kant" that was fashionable recently in non-Catholic philosophy. The doctrines have begun to bloom again in contemporary thought just as some plant spontaneously appears in a region where it had been hitherto unknown, because changes in climatic conditions and the quality of the soil have prepared for it a congenial *milieu.*

Our philosophy and theology, as they have been generally written for the last two or three centuries, and especially in the latter half of the nineteenth, have, rather by suggestion than by direct assertion, warned us to beware of Scot. He is dangerous company; if we trust him overmuch we run the risk of stumbling, unawares, into the camp, either of Kant or of agnosticism. The man from Down betrays a Celtic love of quarreling and an un-Celtic irreverence for tradition. If, however, we are on our guard against bias we shall remember that the efforts—and they were not puny ones—that were often made to secure ecclesiastical proscription of Scot's own opinions never succeeded.[1]

Furthermore, in the solitary instance in which dogmatic authority has in later years closed the debate upon matters of dispute between the followers of Scot and their opponents, judgment has gone in favor of the Dunces. Scholars have long since put aside as unworthy of notice the expressions of ancient prejudice found in such writers as Bzovius, echoes of battles long ago, representing Scot as actuated chiefly by a spirit of contention, and jealousy of St. Thomas; his independence sprung from a worthier root.

Cornelius à Lapide is authority for the story that when somebody once reproached Scot for disrespect towards a doctor so illustrious for learning and saintliness as Aquinas, he replied: "If he is a doctor let him argue with me; if he is a saint let him pray for me. For, if I dispute with him it is through love, not of contradiction, but of truth. Just as the spark flies out from the clash of two flints, so truth flashes from the shock of discussion. The argument of an opponent acts on the mind as flint on flint." Whether the story be true or not, it furnishes the key to the explanation of Scot's opposition to the Thomistic scheme of theology. His mind was eminently critical and exacting. It possessed, in a higher degree than any other scholastic mind, the characteristics which constitute what is called, to-day, the scientific spirit. This spirit will accept nothing as true and established until it is supported by reasons that compel conviction. It will not allow traditional standing to create prescription for an opinion; no name however celebrated may serve as a makeweight when proof is too light to bring down the scale. It will not permit the halo of sanctity to pass for the light of evidence. Many a time when St. Thomas is satisfied, with a *Dicit Philosophus*, to rest his case on a dictum of Aristotle, the Subtle Doctor's verdict is, Not Proven. In the *Theoremata* we find a compendium of critical appreciations on Aristotelian principles conducted in a way that the most exacting of moderns might learn something from. A mass of propositions, theological and philosophical, for which others offer rational proofs, he maintains are not susceptible of rational proof at all; and are to be reached only through revelation, grasped by an act of faith in which the will dominates the intellect.

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[1] "Quare non immerito sacræ Inquisitionis generalis Romæ Tribunal, ante annum 1620 præcepit doctrinarum aut librorum censoribus ut quidquid Scoti esse constaret, intactum involatumque permitterent."—CAVELLUS (*Opera Omnia Scoti Tom.* I., p. 8; *Vita Scoti,* Cap. v.).

The limitations which Scot attributes to reason in search of religious truth are, at first sight, little short of shocking to one who has been nurtured in the standard text-books of scholastic philosophy. They seem to be a surrender of the very principles which apologists have toiled to make good against the scepticism of the nineteenth century. Open the *De Creditis* and read: "*Non potest probari Deum esse vivum; Non potest probari Deum esse intelligentem; Non potest probari Deum esse volentem.*" We cannot prove the First Cause of the universe to be a living God with the attributes of intelligence and will; in other words we cannot prove the supreme Being to be a personal God! We read further to be told that, even if reason were able to do all this, which it cannot, it would still be powerless to prove that Divine intellect and will can reach beyond the Divine nature itself. And as reason fails in the case of the first great religious and moral truth, so does it also with the other; it is not possible to prove the immortality of the human soul, nor the existence of future reward and punishment. Are we not here in the company of Spencer, Huxley and Haeckel? Some have not hesitated to declare that the above statements are absolutely untenable in face of the Vatican Council's pronouncement that reason, unaided by revelation, may, from created things, reach with certitude a knowledge of God, the Creator. Even loyal members of the Franciscan school, which has never been afraid or ashamed to stand staunchly by its most illustrious leader, seem to feel that a word or two of extenuation or apology is called for in this matter. Before, however, coming to the conclusion that his positions are at variance with the Vatican decision, it would be necessary to show that there is no other kind of proof than demonstrative proof—for it is demonstration that Scot has in mind when he uses the phrase *non potest probari*. We should also have to assume that the soul itself is not included among "created things;" and that we can have a certitude only when we can put into dialectic form the grounds of our assent. To perform this multiple task, one must demolish the train of profound and cogent reasoning which Cardinal Newman has embodied in his *Grammar of Assent*.

II.

We have touched the point where present day thought finds itself in harmony with Scot. There prevails a widely spread impression that the dialectic objective proofs offered by our old apologetics, formed on the lines of intellectualism, cannot be depended upon exclusively for the defense of the fundamental truths of religion. The mind of the age subjects them to the same pitiless, unrelenting criticism that they underwent in the mind of Scot, with the same result. And, with the advance of knowledge, criticism has come into possession of an apparatus of tests far beyond those that were at his disposal. It must be remarked at the outset, however, that those Catholic thinkers who have withdrawn their confidence from the old method, do not, generally, impugn the objective value of the traditional system, but consider that, however perfect, judged by the standards of abstract reasoning, it may be, it does not attain its purpose, which is to convince.

Now let us listen to the Oxford deeps crying to each other across the gulf of six centuries. On the theistic problem Newman delivers himself exactly after the spirit of the *De Creditis*. The earliest manifestations of what may be called, in the sense that we have explained, the Scotistic revival, is to be found in Newman's *Apologia*. Exposing the grounds of his faith, the great thinker says:

"Starting with the being of a God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as

> the certainty of my own existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into logical shape, I find a difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my satisfaction) I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world simply gives the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is so full; and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself. This is, to me, one of the great difficulties of this absolute primary truth, to which I referred just now. Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked out into the world;"

and he proceeds to draw his appalling picture of that scene" which is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, 'full of lamentations, and mourning, and woe.'" It might be urged that, whatever Newman means here, he does not mean to agree with Scot, since he very soon adds:

> "I have no intention at all to deny, that truth is the real object of our reason, and that if it does not attain to truth, either the premisses or the process is in fault; but I am not speaking of right reason, but of reason as it acts in fact and concretely in fallen man. I know that even the unaided reason, when correctly exercised, leads to a belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in a future retribution."

There is, however, no real contradiction, for he adds: "But I am considering it actually and historically; and, in this point of view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion." Besides, his whole theory of certitude and the nature of assent, makes it clear that when he says right reason can reach a belief in God, he is as far as possible from meaning that this belief is the result of abstract demonstration. In fact he holds that outside the region of mathematical truth abstract demonstration can do scarcely anything, and least of all around the truths of religion. In the *Grammar of Assent*, he speaks to the point, as far as both natural and supernatural religion are concerned:

> "In thus speaking of Natural Religion [he writes] as in one sense a matter of private judgment, and that with a view of proceeding from it to the proofs of Christianity, I seem to give up the intention of demonstrating either. Certainly I do; not that I deny that demonstration is possible. Truth certainly, as such, rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demonstrative, but it does not follow that the arguments producible in its favor are unanswerable and irresistible. These latter epithets are relative, and bear upon matters of fact; arguments in themselves ought to do what, perhaps, in the particular case they cannot do. The fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true; but it is not therefore true irresistibly; else how comes it to be resisted? There is a vast difference between what it is in itself and what it is to us.. . . . I cannot convert men when I ask for assumptions which they refuse to grant me; and without assumptions no one can prove anything about anything." (p. 410.)

The above typical extracts exhibit the main idea in Newman's conception of Christian apologetics, and Newman is the inspiration of the entire movement. It is the *idée mère* of the method of immanence, as, from another point of view, the new apologetics has been christened. The mainsprings of this movement are two; first, the growing conviction, that, whatever may be the objective value of the traditional method, consisting of a system of dialectic, metaphysical and historical proofs, addressed to the logical faculty, conceived as sitting in a region of impassive, serene impartiality, undisturbed by the volitional element of personality, that method fails, in a great measure, to touch the modern mind. Secondly, a true analysis of the nature of religious belief, on its subjective side, reveals a chief reason for that failure, and supplies a remedy.

The new apologetics, therefore, faces toward Scot, in as much as it accepts and confirms his unfavorable estimate of the strength possessed by the objective arguments, marshalled in the categories of formal logic and dialectics, and addressed to the pure speculative reason, for establishing religious truth. But here the parallel between Scot and Newman is not to be pressed too far. The mediaeval doctor, of course, never dreamed of disparaging the dialectic method in itself. On the contrary, dialectic is the weapon, ground by his subtle mind to keenest edge, with which he reduces the bulk of demonstrable truths to very slim proportions. Newman, on the other hand, finds that a system of purely logical reasoning upon principles and facts, as a method of reaching religious certitude, follows a way so complicated and well nigh interminable, addresses itself so exclusively to one faculty and one aspect of the living man, that it fails to arrive at its destination. Intellectualism is a beautiful, highly complex instrument; but it is more suited for the cabinet or the museum than for everyday work; it is too easily thrown out of gear, subject to too many breakdowns. It is constructed on the theory that *ens rationale* being the definition of man, our active life is guided by abstract logic, mathematical certainty is the ideal of conscientious conviction, and on earth truth with peace comes to men of good will along a bridge of syllogisms built by the intellect.

The other method—call it what you will, Immanence, moral dogmatism, Action—holds with Newman that "Inference considered in the sense of verbal argumentation, determines neither our principles nor our ultimate judgments—that it is neither the test of truth nor the adequate basis of assent." Inference falls short of proof in concrete matters, because it has not a full command over the objects to which it relates. "Notions are but the aspects of things; the free deductions from one of these aspects necessarily contradict the free deductions from another. After proceeding in our investigations a certain way, suddenly a blank or a maze presents itself before the mental vision, as when the eye is confused by the varying slides of a telescope." Starting from received definitions, with the help of mathematical formulas, the mind of the scientist may work out *ad infinitum* various conclusions relative to the phenomena of time and space. But try to grasp analytically the nature of time and space, and whatever line of thought we may elect to pursue, reason soon finds itself lost in the darkness that surrounds the mystery of being. From the inadequacy of our ideas to represent anything but an abstract aspect of being, dialectic reasoning labors under the disqualification which Newman has described as follows:

> "Inference comes short of proof in concrete matters, because it has not a full command over the objects to which it relates, but merely assumes its premisses. In order to complete the proof, we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms in which the assumptions may be proved; and then, still farther back, we are thrown upon others again, to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms. Where is this process to stop? especially since it must run upon separate divergent and multiplied lines of arguments, the farther the investigation is carried back. At length a score of propositions present themselves, all to be proved by propositions more evident than themselves in order to enable them respectively to become premisses to that series of inferences which terminate in the conclusion which we originally drew."

Have we, even now, arrived at solid ground? No, indeed, for,

> "Even now the difficulty is not at an end; it would be something to arrive at length at premisses which are undeniable, however long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case, the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common measure of minds,—which are accepted by some, rejected by others,—in which, and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to truth,—and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates, because they are evident in no other way." (p. 269.)

So much for the inherent drawbacks of intellectualism. The system of apologetics founded upon it inherits all its weaknesses, and finds them aggravated when the historic argument for revelation and the Church is to be built up. Then, to follow the "separate, divergent and multiplied lines of argument" becomes the task of a lifetime. And now the principles and assumptions that will not be granted to us are encountered with perplexing frequency; to enlarge upon this topic would be to travel outside our theme; let it suffice to allude to the modifications in the traditional conception of Biblical inspiration that are coming into favor, and the extent to which the theory of development is calling for a restatement of theology.

> "More problems [writes an eminent advocate of Newmanism] are offered for solution now in three decades than were formerly offered in three centuries, with the result that now a greater burden of difficulty is laid upon the shoulders of a single generation than had then been divided over a whole series. As a consequence the energies of the professed defenders and exponents of belief are more and more absorbed by controversial interests; and for the layman in theology, amid the clang of hammer and anvil, the grinding of blunted blades, the furbishing of ancient armour, the riveting of loosened links, all possibility of 'peace in believing' seems to be well nigh departed."

Occasionally some of the new school handle the pretensions of the objective dialectic method with less ceremonious courtesy than Newman displays, though in fact they say no more than he did. For instance, a French writer of note says: To fancy that alone, by virtue of their demonstrative form, the proofs can give us God, and make us know Him, is a pretension so constantly contradicted by facts that one is astonished to find it advanced. Do we not know that many men, alas! are not touched by these proofs? And we know, too, that God has been conceived in various fashions. Who has not experienced various transformations take place in his own mind on this point? Nothing of the kind occurs in the case of truths demonstrably established by abstract reasoning. The demonstration impresses them on every mind alike, and they are, from the first, all they ever can be. God is not an abstract truth and cannot be brought home to our soul by an abstract demonstration.

III.

It is obvious from the above extracts that Newman and his followers, while going beyond Scot in their distrust of the dialectic method, have rejoined him at another point of the road. They unite with him in asserting the dominance of will over, and in, intellect. The apprehension of truth—at least of moral and religious truth—is an act of the entire moral personality rather than a function of the speculative intellect alone. They distinguish sharply between the certainty which is a property of abstract propositions and the certitude which is a quality of the living act of assent. The former may utterly fail to produce the latter; and, on the other hand, the latter may exist without the former. When demonstration falls short of complete perfection, the whole mind, intellect and will compenetrating each other in the unfathomable depths of living personality, so different from the abstractions of psychology, supplies or overrides the deficiency registered by formal logic. It is reasonable, says this system, to distinguish between the formal acts of intellect and will, but with Scot, we must protest against those who, mistaking an abstraction of reason for an actual reality, divide the mind, as it were, into two watertight compartments in which, respectively, the two entities, will and intellect, carry on their operations with nothing but a kind of telephonic communication between them. To assert the truth of a proposition is a purely intellectual act; to embrace, to take possession of, to consent to, truth is the prerogative of the will.

It would be interesting to examine whether some passages of St. Thomas do not support this view, even though he assigns preeminence to the intellect. However this may be, intellectualism, in apologetics, has not given due consideration to the rôle played by will and the whole moral side of the personality in religious beliefs. This psychological act of assent has been brilliantly analyzed by Ollé-Laprune in his work, *De la Certitude Morale,* from which we may borrow a page to illustrate the drift of his reasoning. Premising that in case the intellect sees the evidence, then the judgment formed is not, in its essence, under the control of the will, he continues:

> "Because faculties the most distant are united, not separated, because they mutually penetrate each other, the will here takes part in an act which in itself is purely intellectual. The *assent* is involuntary, but the *consent* which is joined to it, or rather, penetrates it, is voluntary. Consent is the acceptance of truth. It is not precisely the act of asserting or denying, which is dictated, so to speak, by the truth itself, but it is the response of the soul to this higher voice. The mere assent may be negatived by a will vainly but obstinately recalcitrant. . . . Consent remains under the will's control, and is something that springs from the depths of the soul; and the very *eclat* of truth which forces the assent of the intellect leaves free the acceptance of the will. We cannot help seeing; we cannot prevent ourselves from judging as we see. But to respond to truth with love is an act of the will."

The weakness ascribed to intellectualism is that it does not take into account this all-pervasive play of the volitional, moral element of personality. It addresses to an abstract isolated intellect a series of abstract reasonings, as cold and colorless as a set of mathematical theorems, and when its efforts fail to convince men, its exponents complain: We have piped and you have not danced. Absolute value is assigned to logical concepts, and logical reasoning is expected to exercise a power which lies in the moral and religious consciousness. Christianity is handled merely as a historical fact, whereas it ought to be treated as also, and above all, a set of living truths, to be appropriated by living souls responding to their appeal. "All the scientific apparatus," writes an exponent of the method of immanence, "necessary to justify Christianity before reason is incapable of producing conviction in a soul that depends exclusively on such proofs, somewhat as the finest theory of optics cannot make a blind man see. Between science and faith there is a mysterious abyss which cannot be bridged over by any process of intellect; however rigorously established for the apologist or the believer may be the motives of credibility, they cannot necessarily compel conviction in the unbeliever. Christianity is not only a representation, it is a life; it appertains not only to logic, but also to conduct; it belongs in the first place to the category of being, and only secondarily to that of thought. Hence the appropriation of religious truth demands something more than a passive attitude of intellect, the rigid energy of logical deduction, or the analytic ways of positive science." Intellectualism, says the new school, weaves together a set of logical abstract notions in a syllogistic synthesis, and, ignoring the part of the will, expects to capture the soul by securing the intellect. Or, to vary the metaphor, to the soul which asks for the bread of living truth that would fill its longings and aspirations, it offers a mass of stones, hewed indeed, and arranged in symmetrical fashion by dialectics, but, withal, hard stones, incapable of attracting the spiritual appetite.

IV.

The Scotistic position of the new apologetics might be briefly defined by stating that it would modify the intellectualist definition of truth, *adæquatio rei et intellectus*, to *adæquatio rei et animæ*. Truth—religious and moral—is the harmony between the objective thing and the entire personality, will as well as intellect. It would find the readiest arguments for God, the moral law, immortality, and a future sanction, not in laboriously constructed objective proofs, but in the proved harmony between these realities without and the moral element within us, in the experience of the soul that life organized upon these realities and actuated by them is the only life worthy of a rational being, and that in proportion as we live these realities so far forth do we rise to a higher moral and religious ideal. To bring the Gospel home to the soul it would count chiefly upon the appeal which the Divine Personality of the Master makes to that divine craving of our souls which St. Augustine put into words, when he said: "Thou hast made us, O God, for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee." And, similarly, the spiritual society of souls under the one supreme head in Jesus Christ, the entire system of doctrine, prayer, sacrifice, sacramental and other channels of grace, are all means to effect the union between the soul and God. Their proved power to fulfil this function is the guaranty that they have been instituted by Him to that end. The argument for the Church readiest at hand, is not script or monument, but herself and her spiritual efficacy as realized in the individual and in the race at large. To enquirers into her origin she can answer, as answered her Founder to the messengers of John: Tell them that sent you what you see and hear. The spiritually blind are made to see the way of righteousness; the deaf ear is opened to the voice of God; moral lepers renew their health; the dead in sin rise to the better life; the poor in the things of the spirit have the Gospel brought into their lives. And as the correspondence between the soul and reality is the confirmation of true doctrine, so it is the standard which exposes the false and fictitious.

"Only these beliefs," writes one who speaks as a leader, "which have been fruitful of eternal life, everywhere, always, with all men—as far as they have been put to the test—are demonstrably according to the ultimate realities of the supernatural order. Other beliefs may be useful for individuals or classes; for a certain period, for a certain type of character; and yet hurtful elsewhere and otherwise. Such have not the warrant of Catholicity; the life which they foster and formulate is not the life of the *whole* church of the mystical Christ. And there are beliefs which originate in mere theological curiosity, or in pious fancifulness; or in morbid sentimentality; or are dictated by religious decadence and laxity; beliefs which are enervating, or distracting, or frivolous—in no sense exigencies of the spiritual life—and those, not having root, are doomed to wither away."

V

One cannot read certain of the strictures passed upon the new method without coming to the conclusion that some of its critics have not quite mastered its meaning, nor correctly understood the claims that are made for it. It has been called rationalistic; and, again, it has been represented as a sort of blind, moral fideism, resembling the theories of Jacobi and Hutcheson. It implies, we have been told, that we abandon the pretension of showing a reasonable and reasoned basis for the faith that is in us. Faith is no longer a reasonable act but a blind impulse. Why should we abandon the traditional method which our predecessors have employed since the Protestant Reformation, in order to experiment with a novelty of questionable efficiency? The method which has been hitherto employed to meet the scepticism and agnosticism of the nineteenth century cannot be obsolete for the twentieth. Besides, this term, Immanence, is but a new word for an old error—Protestant individualism.

Anyone, however, who makes his observation from a point where no mists of misapprehension or prejudice distort the view, will find it difficult to discover any of the ugly features that are imputed to the new method. That it has been accused of the two opposite tendencies, rationalism and fideism, affords fair presumption that it contains neither one nor the other. Even the brief and imperfect exposition of its principles given above, sufficiently refutes the idea that it reduces religious assent to a mere movement of will or emotion, unguided by reason. When Newman declared that the basis of his belief in God and supernatural religion could not very easily be put into the categories of dialectic proof, he certainly did not mean he had no reasons for such belief; otherwise his prosecution of the subject and his elaborate apologetic would be nothing but a piece of amazing naiveté. Every page that has been written with a view to explain or apply the system, in whole, or in part, by Newman, Fonsegrive, Blondel, Tyrrell, Laberthonnière, Ward, Denis, Von Hügel, Spalding, Gerrard, Bremond, Mano, Ollé-Laprune, Ehrhard, and a host of others, stands a concrete answer to the imputation. Certainly the evidence for religious truth drawn from its correspondence with the soul and its effects upon personality and life, must, in the last analysis, be apprehended and applied by reason—by reason surveying and judging from the inner experience of the entire soul.

When we judge on the basis of experience that some things are good to eat, that others have value as medicines, and still others are poisons, our judgments are not an abandonment of reason. And this method of judging in matters relating to the life of the body, is parallel with the use of the selective principle employed by the method of Immanence in the concerns of the spiritual and moral life.

The Church's rôle, her doctrinal and juridical authority, are living realities of the divine order; as such, they correspond to a need of the religious consciousness. When viewed from this point, they are in no danger of wearing the appearance of a heterogeneous system imposed on the spirit from without. Proved, accepted, and ratified by conscience and the exigencies of our nature, they become the complement and the bulwark of the liberty belonging to the children of God. The Church guides us in the development of a healthy individuality; it supplements the narrowness of our personal experience by the universal experience of that great Catholic, divinely established society of souls who have apprehended and lived Christ's life. The Church, besides, guards for us and offers to us the authoritative external standard of belief and practice, by which our personal standard may be formed, and kept just and true. Here we are as far apart from Luther and Calvin as is pole from pole.

A glance below the surface into the old and the new, suffices to show that the new caters much less to rationalism than does intellectualism. What is our most general charge against the positivist, sceptic and agnostic? It is that they wrongly refuse to recognize that the evidence for moral and religious truth need not be, cannot be, of the same exclusively intellectual character as that required in speculative science. Give us evidences, they say, for religion and Christianity, for miracles and the supernatural, as clear as that which we demand and obtain in science, and we shall fall down and adore. "There is only one method," it is Huxley who speaks, "by which intellectual truth can be reached, whether the subject matter of investigation belongs to the world of physics or to the world of consciousness"—he means the "logical methods of science" furnished to an intellect passive, and uninfluenced by the moral life, evidence that compels conviction. The old method is constructed on lines that assume Huxley to be right. It accepts the enemy's conditions. When it fails to beat him to his knees with the sword of dialectic proof, it pleads that the same kind of objective evidence is not to be looked for in all matters. But he points to the rules of the tourney and, claiming the forfeit of battle, scornfully walks away.

But the method is new. Ominous word! that always suffices to condemn the accused without trial. Yet many things in Catholicism that are now old and venerable and revered, were once new and suspected and opposed. At its introduction, Aristotelian Scholasticism was denounced as a pernicious novelty; yet afterwards it did good service and reaped high honor. Sometimes, too, a doctrine that was very old, has been stigmatized as new when, at some particular moment, it has been thrown into bolder relief. Powerful voices accused Scot of heretically denying the doctrine of Christ's universal redemption, when he so gloriously defended the Immaculate Conception. After all is said, that movement cannot be a brand-new invention which can trace its genealogy to Scot, from Scot to Bonaventure, from Bonaventure to Augustine, and was compendiously enunciated by the Master himself when he said: "By their fruits ye shall know them: do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?"

Immanence does not aim to destroy, but to supplement intellectualism. Philip, who had come to know the Way, the Truth, and the Life, may tell Nathaniel: "We have found Him of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write." But the honest Nathaniel stands untouched by this external testimony, for—"Can any good come out of Nazareth?" Then Philip resorts to Immanence: "*Come and see.*" And when the soul without guile comes into personal contact with the presence of maieutic truth, new-born faith finds tongue in the confession: "Thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel."

Intellectualism has hitherto had a free hand to shape the campaign against modern unbelief. Its success has not been so complete as to justify it in rejecting any help that may be offered to it. Criticism—biblical, historical, philosophical—is making plain that many breaches are to be repaired, many weak points strengthened; that historical fact and historically demonstrable fact are not convertible terms. Modern knowledge and the scientific spirit have demolished so many ancient prepossessions, have reduced to natural proportions so many things that were once supposed to belong to the transcendental, that the age is extremely suspicious of the miraculous. The *a priori* is distrusted. The extension of the horizon of knowledge and a correlative clearer apprehension of the vastness of the unknown unite to weaken the force of many a conclusion, drawn from a *must be.* In sum, the difficulties which beset the method of intellectualism never were greater.

On the other hand there prevails in the age, a well marked tendency to put a high price on moral values, and all that is potent for the up-building of character. The moral element of the Gospel is cherished by great numbers who have little sympathy with dogma. Those who are not of us tell us that they find a clue to the Shepherd of their souls more easily in a Vincent of Paul trudging home through the streets of Paris, with a foundling in each arm, than in a Pius V. thundering forth his *Regnans in Excelsis* against Elizabeth of England; and, to them, a Damien amid his lepers on Molokai the desolate, is a more powerful argument than a whole library of metaphysics. It is to this spirit that the new apologetics addresses itself in the charity which hopeth all things—and which "never falleth away; whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed."

James J. Fox.

HOLTZMANN'S LIFE OF JESUS

Cornelius Clifford

The experiences of the past seven decades have taught scholars to be mistrustful of new lives of Our Lord. The final life, it is felt, is as remotely to seek as ever. Despite the ever-growing accumulation of those more or less definite results which we owe to the ungrudging labors of the handful of scientific investigators who have been at work on problems connected with the task in Germany, in England, and in France during the past twenty years, it is admitted that a satisfying synthesis, out of which the Jesus of history will appear in His habit as He lived, identical in all essential respects with the more familiar Christ of experience, is still practically unattainable. The outlines of the original Gospel, upon which the attempt at reconstruction must be based, are, confessedly, as difficult to determine to-day as they were a generation ago. There are not a few who would maintain, of course, that there is a deeper reason [1] for our hopelessness in this matter than the dull learned suppose. They would insist that this weariless and somewhat disedifying effort at reconstruction betrays an initial obliquity of view which is justly foredoomed to disappointment. Even if we authentically possessed, or were able to piece together, what probably never existed wholly apart from the collective consciousness—or, should we say, conscience?—of the first believers an initial and chronologically accurate Gospel, to wit, an absolute *Ur-Evangelium*, from which the bulk of the New Testament narratives could be shown to be derived, it would still be more than futile to look for a biography of Christ in any true or adequate sense. The intuitions of faith, they would urge, are not more likely to yield their secret to the scrutiny of the twentieth century historian than they were found to do to the speculations of the mediæval metaphysician. The psychology of belief is one thing;

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[1] *Cf.* Suarez, *De Fide*: Disp. 3 § 8. Disp. 6 § 6; Illingsworth, *Divine Immanence*, 2nd Edit. p. 87; Loisy, *L'Evangile et L'Eglise*, c. ii., *Les Sources Evang.*; Sabatier, *Religions of Authority*, p. 361; Laberthonniere, *Le Realisme Chretien*, etc., c. vi.; Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology*, c. vii.; Newman's *Oxford Sermons*, Serm. xiv., xv,. and § 15 of xiii.

the processes and temper of science are something altogether different. The positions of the one can never adequately be stated in terms of the other. Their affirmatives are reducible to no common category.

All this, we imagine, will readily be conceded, if with certain saving distinctions, even by the very hardiest of those investigators against whom it is sometimes so mistakenly urged. But it cannot and ought not to deter the student of history from pursuing his frequently thankless task in obedience to the rules of his own austere guild of knowledge, and in the clearer light furnished by latter-day ideals of research. Whatever metaphysic we may be tempted to adopt in explanation of the genesis and psychology of faith, we cannot afford to lose sight of the plain fact, that Christianity is, under one notable aspect of its many-sided nature, an historical religion with its beginnings set in a definite past, and its most important spiritual message indissolubly bound up with certain recorded teachings and events in the life of its Founder. From the very outset it has been an accepted note of that more considerable portion of it which we recognize as evolutionary Catholicism, that, however confidently it may have gone forward with the ages or unwittingly taken color from its environment, it has never ceased to inculcate the duty of looking backward. This instinct for tradition has been more than half the secret of its secular, as it has often enough, and ignorantly enough, been made the reproach of its religious, life. Theorize as we will, Christianity, in the persons of its most authentic interpreters, has never affected to disregard its own beginnings, or made the shamefaced avowal that it did not know how it came into the world. To pretend, therefore, as is sometimes done, that one may ignore as a thing of no religious consequence, the Church's feeling for what it has always held to be the cradle story of its own substantially ascertainable past, or to suggest that the innermost core of its earliest admitted accounts of itself may be retained, while the human husk, by which that core is thought to be enveloped, must be tossed aside as so much material for the study of mythopoetry,[1] to assert that the *incunabula* of the Christian faith, in a word, have no direct bearing either on its present value as a moral force upon earth, or upon the cogency of its actual claim to deal with the consciences of men, is to juggle alike with science and with common sense. A Christianity without Christ is hardly a less reasonable hypothesis.

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[1] *Cf.* Prof. P. Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*, c. xix; Id. *A Historical View of the N. T.*, Sect. viii.

It is not a rash assumption, therefore, to contend that Christianity is, in a true though qualified sense, an historical[1] religion. No doubt, it is a great deal more than that; but in its liminal or apologetic stage, the stage, namely, in which it endeavors to prepare the way for a sympathetic hearing, it deals frankly, and unyieldingly, with facts. Valuable as its teaching is to most of us as offering a "Philosophy of Salvation," it is found to be scarcely less valuable in that it involves a "Philosophy of History," too. The life of its Founder has deflected the march of the best races of the world. Is it possible for the scientific historian to know what that life in its most characteristic features was like? That is the question about which "our unbelieving age" has busied itself almost to distraction; and the work which has given a title as well as an inspiration to this essay, is, perhaps, the most significant, if not the most remarkable, of the many attempts to answer it in the spirit and temper of the time.

The author, Dr. Oscar Holtzmann, of Giessen, who is not likely to be so well known to the readers of this REVIEW as his more distinguished namesake, Professor H. J. Holtzmann, may be said to represent, both in his conclusions and in his general method of treatment, the more extreme views of modern German criticism. The present book, which is his most ambitious piece of work, appeared in 1901, and was translated into English and published in the autumn of 1904. To this English version Dr. Holtzmann has contributed a brief and characteristic preface in which he draws attention to the uniform drift of the themes upon which he has been engaged almost continuously during the past eighteen years. That he has made the materials for this remarkable biography peculiarly his own, nobody who examines his closely reasoned argument will be tempted to deny. His lucidity and his power of compact presentation are beyond praise. The spirit in which he approaches the profound issues involved is as reverential as could be expected. It was scarcely to be hoped, indeed, that the author should have avoided all ground for offense. Confessional susceptibilities are proverbially keen; and it is hardly less hazardous to disturb the equaminity of schools than it is to question the accepted values of the market. But the student familiar with the conditions under which the New Testament historian is obliged to work to-day will not be too ready to accuse our author of wantonness. Dr. Holtzmann, at any rate, explicitly repudiates any intention to offend, and we must, perforce, give him the benefit of his disclaimer. Science, as such, takes no cognizance of prejudice. It marshals its facts; it sums up its evidences; it moves without temper or bias to its conclusions. The wise reader, in turn, examines each step in the process and forms his own verdict on equally disinterested grounds. Many accept this method the more freely, because they are convinced that the appeal to scientific history will, in the long run, strengthen rather than weaken, the traditional and Catholic view of the Gospel story. The human intellect is so conditioned that it can, without doing violence to its own nature, reach forward to its object from two separate, but not necessarily opposed, planes of thought. Pre-occupation with the cramped barriers and changing conditions of the one need not blind it to the larger spaces and bolder flights of the other.

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[1] *Cf.* Westcott's *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, c. i.

What will the Catholic student say to Dr. Holtzmann's reading of the life-story of Jesus of Nazareth? That life, so conceived, shrinks to the compass of a blundering but heroic Messiah's career, sketched with characteristic German inference, and with complete disregard of rhetorical ornament or of spiritual insight of any sort, through a bulky book of some five hundred odd pages. Jesus, the Founder of Christianity, was a working builder (*Bauhandwerker*), born, not in Bethlehem, but in Nazareth in Galilee. He was the son of Joseph and Mary, having been the eldest of a family of five brothers and several sisters with whom he grew up, in comparative obscurity, until the call of John the Baptist to the children of Abraham roused him out of his mean, every-day life and spurred him to earnest self-examination. Having been urged by his mother and his brethren to be baptized, he at first refused, on the ground, as we gather from the Gospel of the Hebrews, that he was without consciousness of sin. Subsequent reflection, however, made him change his mind, for he saw the possibilities of sin even in the claim to sinlessness. He joined in the popular movement and submitted to the symbolic rite. The incident undoubtedly marked a grave crisis in his spiritual experience. From this time forth he began to know himself as the Messiah of Israel. The vision of the opened heavens and the descent upon him of the Holy Spirit, whose first-born he became, while apparently without objective reality to make it credible, indicates, nevertheless, the deep and ineradicable quality of Jesus' conviction as to the gradually unfolding purport of his call. This sense of destiny finds its obvious counterpart in the story of the temptation. It would be impossible for a Jew, living amid such political surroundings and in such an atmosphere as Jesus breathed, not to be drawn aside to the attempted achievement of more personal and less heroic ends. The thought of his predestined judgeship over the race was sure to run counter to the idea of the more immediate glory to be reaped by a fighting Messiah. There was real danger, too, that the spiritual beauty of the vision that came to him by the Jordan's banks might be obscured by the excesses and intolerance of the enthusiast. How this new crisis was met and overcome, we cannot know in detail. We possess a record of the self-wrestlings it induced in the parabolic narrative of the three temptations. Jesus' Messiahship was to assert itself, not exactly against, but somewhat aside from, the Jewish prejudices of the age. The first step towards its realization, therefore, was to preach, not himself, but the nearness of the Kingdom of God, and the consequent need of repentance as an indispensable condition for entrance into its joy. This was the burden of the Galilean ministry; this, too, afforded the motive for the creation of the little Apostolic college and school of disciples who accompanied him on his hazardous enterprise. At first no explicit claim to the personal element in his divine election was put forward. That came later on after men's minds had been prepared for it by familiarity with the austere views of religion that lay behind the parables and teachings of Jesus. In the course of this propaganda, though not necessarily in attestation of his Messianic claims, [1] Jesus undoubtedly wrought many cures.

He *was able* to do this "by the power of a personality possessed of strong assurance and of unshaken confidence in its own success." Dr. Holtzmann is careful to insist however, that there is no historic ground for maintaining that among these "miracles" we ought to include the three traditional stories of awakening from the dead. The case of the daughter of Jairus is dismissed with the reflection that, "if the event had happened among us, no physician would admit afterwards that death had already taken place." The two remaining instances are rejected as affording no evidence for their historicity. They are said to have been performed "in the presence of a gaping crowd;" and yet "they are not found to be recorded in the oldest Gospel."[1] After an interval of comparative retirement, made necessary by the opposition which his teaching excited among the intellectual and influential classes, Jesus left the heathen territory to which he had withdrawn, and passed rapidly on his way up to Jerusalem. This was the beginning of the end. The little company of followers felt themselves shunned on every side. On their arrival in the Holy City they experienced a sudden and extraordinary change in popular sentiment. They assisted their Master in a brief and breathless ministry—possibly only lasting a few days—during which Jesus openly accepted the responsibility of his great vocation. He declared himself to be the Messiah.

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[1] Miracles of Jesus, p. 191.

Then came a most sinister revulsion. The ruling party in the Sanhedrim was aroused. A deputation was sent to challenge the authority of this extraordinary preaching and these still more extraordinary prophecies. Jesus refused to compromise. A few days later he was arrested and tried on the technical charge of having foretold the destruction of the temple. The proceedings of his trial were curtailed beyond all precedent, for it was feared, owing to the sudden popularity which Jesus had acquired in Jerusalem, that a movement might be made in his favor. The Sanhedrim, therefore, met together in solemn session while it was still night and did its best to secure a conviction. The requisite number of witnesses not being at hand, the High Priest himself suddenly confronted his prisoner and asked him: "Art thou, then, the Messiah, the son of the Most Blessed?" Jesus seems to have answered with unflinching enthusiasm and without evasion. On this evidence, therefore, he was sentenced to death; though the real animus of the prevailing party in the tribunal was dread of his influence. The authority of the Roman governor having been invoked in order to secure a speedy execution of the sentence, Jesus was crucified on the eve of the Passover some time before three o'clock in the afternoon. Almost immediately after this tragic event the followers of the slain prophet began to circulate strange and conflicting tales about his resurrection. These stories must be discussed in any serious life of Jesus. They are best accounted for, not on the hypothesis of fraud—that would seem to be an impossible solution when we examine all the circumstances—but on the more rational basis, rather, of a contagious fit of enthusiasm, issuing in "visions." The character of these "visions" Dr. Holtzmann does not pretend to submit to psychological analysis. He contents himself with the reflection that they had, in all likelihood, "precisely the same degree of actuality as the 'vision' seen by Jesus at his baptism." At any rate the disciples believed in the apparitions; and it was the reality of this belief that constituted the strength of nascent Christianity. Compared with other religious teachers, with John the Baptist, Hillel, with the prophets of ancient Israel, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Jesus is found to rank higher than any one of them, because more inerrantly than any one of them, does he interpret the will of God to the individual soul. It is more difficult, of course, to compare him with Plato, with the teachers of the Stoa, with Kongste (Confucius), or even with other founders of religions. There is, it is true, a certain trend in the general outlines of his religious career which makes one prone to set him side by side with Gautama-Buddha; but Jesus surpasses all possible competitors in his intuitions of divinity, in the joy he instils into life, and in the enfranchisement from evil which he holds out to his followers. Indeed, it may be claimed, as our author does actually claim in a curious passage by way of conclusion of his work, that

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[1] Ibid p. 194.

> "religion offers to man in the person of Jesus Christ quite the sublimest gift it is within its nature to offer. In other words, it makes him completely independent of the world by teaching him to place his trust in the absolute Lord of this world as in a faithful friend. And it gives him as his object in the world something that alone makes life rich, happy and of worth, namely, unceasing labor for the general welfare. He who proclaimed this faith, not merely by preaching it, but by showing it forth in the first instance in his own person and realizing it in his own life, necessarily seems to the man who is gladdened by his Gospel to have moved into immediate proximity to God and to be exalted beyond comparison high above all other men." [1]

Notwithstanding the almost Pauline note of enthusiastic appreciation, which characterizes this extraordinary paragraph—for it is extraordinary when studied in connection with its context—it will be plain to the dullest-witted and least metaphysical of readers that in Dr. Holtzmann's process of scientific rehabilitation the Jesus of Catholic tradition has almost entirely disappeared, and that his place has been taken by a teacher who falls very far short of the religious stature that Christianity has hitherto reverenced in Christ. This is, surely, not the Christ of the Synoptic story, but just another and more pathetic specimen of those nebulous and tentative souls of exalted moral purpose—a kind of Socrates, Gautama and Swedenborg in one—whose illusions, as the Monists of belief would evidently have us understand, the veracious God of Scripture habitually uses to instruct mankind.

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[1] Conclusion: p. 528.

By what process, it may be asked, are results so unsatisfactory obtained? Dr. Holtzmann has prefixed to each stage of his argument a careful list of the "sources" from which his own special reading of the life of Jesus is derived. These "sources," be it noted, consist for the most part of a harmonized series of references to those several portions of the Synoptic Gospels which may be said to embody the earliest authentic outline of the Messiah's career. The Johannine tradition, as reproduced in the fourth Evangelist, and the Gospel of the Hebrews are also drawn upon to enable the author, it would appear, to bridge over gaps in the narrative and to piece out his own fundamental theory with convenient conjecture. Much insistence is laid upon the view that in the Gospel of the Hebrews, which exists now only in fragments, we have a true source of information, as valuable in every way as the statements of the Synoptists themselves. [1] The Marcan hypothesis in its most developed phase is also frankly adopted. [2] It is assumed that the primitive written version of an alleged event is invariably the truer version. Priority is thus made practically synonymous with superiority, [3] and the value of later redactions, which may have depended upon wider and more accurately sifted oral testimony, is, in that measure, impaired. The process, of course, as distinguished from its context, is as old as Christianity itself: though the earlier history of the Canon affords an illuminating commentary upon it. What scientific and present-day orthodoxy might object to, however, is the manipulation, so to call it, or refusion, to which certain incidents in the biography are naively subjected in order to eliminate whatever might be thought to have a supernatural aspect in the career of Christ. The author, it is true, nowhere avows his disbelief in miracles as such. Doubtless he would say that it is no business of the historian to hazard opinions on such debatable matters; he is concerned only with separating the nucleus of ascertainable fact from the mist of legend that surrounds it. Theories of metaphysics and anthropomorphic ideas of cosmology have nothing to do with such a process. Yet it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Dr. Holtzmann, in spite of his austere devotion to the cult of things as they are, is one of that soft-going school which maintains, not precisely that miracles do not happen, but that *they happen with a difference*; the difference being in their intelligibleness. The extraordinary occurrence is swallowed edifyingly and in the lump, as it were; but its miraculousness is made digestible for the "scientific" stomach by a patient after-process of regurgitation and mastication which divests it of its most significant details. That is why we think it will be evident to all who pursue an unfaltering way through the hard findings of this biography, that the Muse of Scientific History will justify it neither in its general verdict nor in its particular hypotheses. Not in its general verdict, assuredly; because, if one clear result has emerged from the uncompromising and intricate discussion to which the Synoptic problem has given rise in these latter days, it is this, that the Christ-stories of St. Mark, together with the *Logia* of St. Matthew, and, with due reservations, the fuller account of the artist-chronicler, St. Luke, embody in substance a true historic version of the cycle of events and sayings associated with the unique Personality whose claims they endeavor, with such convincing sincerity, to set forth. In other words, the Synoptic Gospels must be accepted on their face-value as material for authentic biography, because they embalm the impressions and, in a certain sense reveal the weighed and considered judgments on God and the individual soul and the Messiah's relation to both, which emanated from the inner circle of the first followers of Jesus. If it is impossible on scientific grounds to reject them, it is nearly as impossible to juggle with their separate elements in the hope of refining away what runs counter to certain naturalistic prepossessions of the age. That is why we hinted above that not even in the particular hypotheses to which it resorts will this bulkily jejune biography find justification for all its negative conclusions.

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[1] cf. p. 3. Introduction.

[2] cf. pp. 22 ss.

[3] cf. Moffat's *Historical New Testament, Prolegomena* p. 62 (Second Edition.)

Dr. Holtzmann's view of the character of St. Mark's account and its relation to the coincident narratives of the two remaining Synoptists is in essential agreement with the theories current among the more serious scholars of our time. There is nothing in it which the most conservative critics need not, and, as a matter of fact do not, in some notable instances, accept. Where Dr. Holtzmann fails, we think, is in the inferences he draws from St. Mark's curious silences. These silences, it might be urged, are entirely too voiceful for him. They instruct him with amazing sureness both in the psychological and in the chronological problems of the Messiah's career, and render him unduly mistrustful of the completer accounts supplied by later sources of Synoptic knowledge. The result is that his work, in spite of the patient industry and air of mental detachment it betrays in nearly every paragraph, is ill-balanced and fundamentally false. So far is it from being, as its author evidently designed to make it, a scientific sketch in outline, that it proves on minute investigation to be little more than an unilluminating discussion of misconstrued sayings and equally misinterpreted facts.

Recent speculation has raised four broad issues in the eternally renewed controversy about Christ, with regard to which orthodox scholars must be prepared to give an adequate answer. These issues are (1) the authentic teaching of Jesus; (2) his reported miracles and "signs"; (3) his view of himself; and (4) the counter-view of that little handful of contemporaries who accepted him and believed in his mission. Under the first of these heads will necessarily be included the problems of our Lord's eschatology and, as being necessarily connected with these, the idea of the Church he has established; under the second will come what will always have to be regarded as the Alpha and Omega of Christian evidences, the origin, namely, and authenticity of the Resurrection stories; and under the third and fourth there must be discussed that most difficult crux of all, the possibility, to wit, of a theoretic psychology—a thing never to be confused, observe, with Catholic dogma—which will enable us, not, indeed, exhaustively to understand, but to come into sympathetic touch with the human mind of Jesus himself and with the mental attitude both of his followers and of the Jewish environment in which he lived.

The answer of the Christian Church on three of these points has been unrelentingly uniform from the beginning.[1] It is the answer of St. Paul—a witness in one sense closer than any of the Synoptists in their present form—and its drift may be most conveniently gathered from his message to the Corinthian believers: *God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.* In other words, if we may legitimately restate the same truth in terms suggested by the Synoptists, Jesus preached to the Israel of his own generation, vaguely and enigmatically at first, but more explicitly afterwards, the nearness of the reign of

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[1] On the fourth, which is an issue created solely by the instincts of our own time, it may be admitted that the sense of extra-Palestine Christendom at large has become blunted. This was especially the case in Europe throughout the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance period, as is witnessed by the devotional books and the religious art of the day.

God and the consequent need on every side of a change of heart, (repentance). As an indispensable element in this evangel of preparation, he also expounded the principles of a more spiritual type of religion than the scribes currently enforced. He taught further, that, before God's rule could be realised, the Messiah's death and speedy resurrection must first intervene. Such was his teaching viewed in its barest and most significant outline, and considered in that outline, it affords a most convincing answer, out of the Synoptists themselves to the first of the four points of issue mentioned above. In the next place it can, admittedly, be shown, on the testimony of these same Synoptists, and more especially of the redactor whom we speak of as St. Mark, that Jesus worked "signs and wonders", and that, besides, on two specifically defined occasions, he restored the dead to life. Whether or not we accept Dr. Holtzmann's opinion that these miracles were not performed in attestation of his Messiahship, the fact still remains that the Synoptists bear witness both to the "signs" themselves and to the great and growing influence that redounded to Jesus from their actual publicity. If it be objected that some of these reported occurrences will not stand the test of scientific scrutiny, it must be remembered, in any discussion of their probative force, that they are not to be considered in isolated instances, but together, and *in catena*, as it were. Their effect, for all but the original witnesses at least, is cumulative, but not necessarily overwhelming. The apologists of Christianity, from St. Paul onward, have always insisted on linking them with the Resurrection. With that event they stand or fall. To examine them in chronological sequence, therefore, as Dr. Holtzmann does, is to begin the work of criticism irrationally and at the wrong end. Nor does it seem one whit more reasonable, even if we confine ourselves to purely scientific grounds, and leave theories of matter and psychology out of view altogether, to accept the testimony of the Synoptists to the *reality* of the Resurrection and then attempt to explain that necessarily baffling event by the faint-hearted adoption of a compromise between the old discredited "visionary" hypothesis of Strauss and Renan and the hardly less difficult solution of a "telepathic phenomenon" suggested by Keim. Dr. Holtzmann is far from being explicit, save in a negative sense, in discussing this most fundamental of the "miracles" associated with the name and influence of the Messiah. The most that he can bring himself to do is to group the entire set of "apparitions" under the convenient label of an edifying Greek phrase out of the Book of the Acts (οὐράνιος ὀπτασία, xxvi, 19), and then correlate them with the kindred experiences of Jesus at the Jordan bank and St. Paul on the way to Damascus. But this, after all, is only Keim with a difference. It is certainly not history and just as certainly not science.

With regard to the third and fourth points at issue, little need be said. Their adequate discussion would call for more space than can be spared within the limits of the present article; the scope of which, moreover, is narrowed by Dr. Holtzmann's admissions on the matter. He allows that Jesus was conscious of, and, towards the end of his public ministry, made open claim to his Messiahship.

We have preferred to deal rather with the main questions involved in Dr. Holtzmann's biography than with his special treatment of details in which the Catholic reader might find more interest. The virginal conception, the Davidic descent, the birth at Bethlehem, the limitations of Our Lord's knowledge, the creation of the Church, the institution of the Eucharist and its importance to the first Christian community, the significance of the crucifixion—on all these points Dr. Holtzmann furnishes material for grave debate, not merely on the score of traditional theology, which, of course, does not enter into his scheme, but on the score of that scientific ideal of historic learning and wise inference which he professes to follow with so much loyalty, and yet often realizes so poorly in practice, as to leave his reader, not questioning, but dumb.

CORNELIUS CLIFFORD.

THE CHURCH AND THE SOUL.

Joseph McSorley, C. S. P.

"The action of the Holy Spirit embodied visibly in the authority of the Church, and the action of the Holy Spirit dwelling invisibly in the soul form one inseparable synthesis"—FATHER HECKER.

The recent publications of France, Germany, Italy, and to a lesser extent, the English-speaking countries, present a phase of theological development which, when first perceived, is the occasion of astonishment to many minds and of alarm to not a few. This fact seems to justify, or rather to demand, a word of reassuring comment: for the suggestion of revolution is one to which the Catholic mind is so little accustomed that the ordinary sources of explanation may for the moment seem to be inadequate: Our people hear it said, and not without truth, that, at the present time, numerous assertions formerly regarded as indubitable are questioned by the most orthodox scholars; that controversies supposed to have been closed forever are reopened with surprising results; that many notions associated with the names of avowed enemies of Christianity, after having been for a while hotly contested, are now frankly adopted by the ecclcsiastical magisterium. It is asserted that the present age has evolved a new type of Catholicism; and for evidence, we are reminded of modern views on such points as the principle of evolution, the origin of man, the extent of the deluge, the character of inspiration, the relation of the ecclesiastical and the civil powers. To add force to the statement, we are told that the new views are advocated by representative men—members of the great religious orders, seminary professors, university lecturers, Doctors of Theology,—and that most of what they write has the double sanction of learned authorship and official approval. In short, we are fairly challenged to deny that a change of immense import is coming over the face of Catholicism; and that, as a great deal of our old mental furniture has been thrown aside, so the things which remain will some day have to be remodeled.

Now when properly appreciated, all this is much less alarming than a superficial estimate might lead us to believe. True enough, Catholicism is getting along very well without the support of a number of things on which many of us once supposed it in a measure to depend; but this simply implies that we used to be under something of a misapprehension in this matter. And after all, in what did our mistake consist but in a surrender to the very natural tendency of exalting the familiar to the rank of the necessary, of confusing the wrappings with the substance? For our comfort, history pictures nearly every generation doing much the same; men have always been prone to suppose accidental characteristics indispensable, and temporary stages of growth final. In proportion as we become familiar with the story of past ages, we see with increasing clearness how most of them were, in one way or another, summoned to lay aside forever what they had been used to regard as part and parcel of their sacred heritage; although it may be true that the summons was seldom so imperative and never so comprehensive as the call which we seem to have heard.

At the very beginning of Christian history, believers grew away from institutions which had held over from the Old Testament and appeared to possess the very best of claims to be retained in the New,—the Synagogue, the Sabbath, Judaic exclusiveness, Circumcision, the Levitical Laws of purification, abstinence from things strangled and from blood. Later on, other notions clung fast for a while and then gradually lost their hold on the minds of the faithful,—as for instance, belief in the near approach of the Second Advent, the Millenium, the universal salvation of the baptized and of communicants. Down through the centuries occurred numerous instances of customs and opinions which varied with the passing of years and the altering of circumstances,—the practice of holding all things in common, the Canonical Penances, Communion under both kinds, the Communion of Infants, the Ransom Theory of the Atonement, the Augustinian view of the fate of unbaptized children.

We recall these facts; but we recall, too, that in no instance did there result the harm which antecedently might have seemed inevitable. The outcome is always the same. After each crisis, the Church shows herself to be quite capable of independent existence; she gets on very well without that which has passed away. As no change of vesture alters the personality of a friend, as no revelation of scientific psychology destroys the love of human hearts, so no reconstruction of society, no political revolution, no variation of public customs, no advance of knowledge concerning the genesis or constitution of the present order of nature affects the vitality of religion. Hence the Church still possesses, and ever shall possess, her old divine power of engaging the deepest interests of the soul and of developing its highest possibilities.

This is not meant to imply that the progress of thought never shocks believers; but the shock need not be a fatal, nor even an unwholesome, experience. The race, like the individual, must necessarily go through a more or less painful process of mental enlargement, must strain and suffer as it endeavors to fit new conceptions into the old setting. The general mind must encounter and overcome difficulties similar to those which, as children, we had to meet, when, for the first time, the mystery of generation was disclosed to us; or when conscience began to awaken to a sense of the fact that the Bible could scandalize readers; or when first we learned of the admissions demanded by history with regard to the sanctity of Popes. Such experiences always involve something in the nature of a disturbance; but a healthy and well-trained mind soon reacts from the shock and is eventually none the worse for having attained the larger outlook at the cost of a momentary pain. The important thing is that an immature mind about to become acquainted with more or less trying difficulties in matters of religion, should be carefully prepared for its approaching experience, so that, if weak by nature, it may not suffer irremediable hurt.

The best method of educating our people to withstand the impact of current objections then, is not so much the mere repetition of apologetic arguments, as the infusion of spiritual nourishment through the instrumentality of the Church. Of course, the intellectual preparation is not to be foregone; but an indispensable adjunct of that preparation is the deepening and purifying of the religious sense in men's hearts. If, on the one hand, the number of those who fall away from religion as its accompaniments alter is not a negligible quantity, neither on the other hand can it be denied that very frequently these backsliders have been attached only to the accessories of religion, not to its substance; and that their defection happens because after some superstition has been shattered there is no living faith, no earnest love to take its place. If a mind accustomed to regard religion in a material, or a silly, or a foolish light, should reject it when things take an unexpected turn, this can offer no reasonable occasion for surprise. And in many of the cases which fall under our observation, we know that this is what has occurred. The dread discovery to which men attribute their change of faith in no wise affects the power of the Church to unite the soul with God; and the points which they declare to be at issue, have nothing whatever to do with the fulfilment of the Church's spiritual mission. Frequently, therefore, we are led to conclude that the present open repudiation of the faith is nothing but the manifestation of a condition which was always pathological; and that even in the very heyday of fervor the nominal Catholic was not at heart a Christian. Should we regret the commencement of an era of shaking-up and sifting-out, which with all its painful and unpleasant results, will also entail this blessed consequence, that many will awaken to a sense of the necessity of being Catholics in a religious way, or not at all?

Sooner or later the supreme struggle begins for each one of us; sooner or later we hear ourselves summoned to don our armor and go forth to battle; sooner or later, if we fail, we face the consequences of having surrendered the precious gift, purity, honor, faith, love, whatever it was which God gave us in our youth, but looks for vainly in our maturer age. Does it matter so much what form this struggle assumes? Is it not true that the real issue is always the same—God or self, loyalty or fickleness, the spirit or the flesh? And if on this generation, there be laid the necessity of clinging fast to the Church out of sheer fidelity to conscience whose voice is the voice of God, will it not be wise to face this trial with the sense that it is the decisive moment of life? Shall we not do well to prepare our souls for the test by purging out whatever is base and selfish, and by fostering carefully whatever is noble and holy and divine?

It is to this duty, then, that men's attention should most urgently be drawn. But to speak to them with any hope of being listened to, one must make it plain that he allows all their facts, recognizes all their difficulties, and at the same time exhibits a practical example of the devotedness he would require of them. Writers to discuss every thesis the human mind can originate, to weigh the pros and cons of every theory about to be abandoned or about to be introduced, we shall never lack. A more pressing need and one more rarely satisfied, is that of Catholics to convince men by word and by example that the Church does not stand or fall with the persistence or decay of any debatable opinion; that her proper province is spiritual holiness, not history, nor science, nor philosophy. Souls need to be warned that the Church guarantees nothing to those of her children who are devoted to the external and variable, as contrasted with the internal and enduring, adjuncts of her divine mission; that she professes no ability to keep fickle folk from being tossed about by every wind of controversy. They need to be assured that the unfailing antidote to unbelief is trustful love; and that waning faith revives, when hope and charity grow strong,.

Those who have gone to the heart of things and who look to the Church for the means of satisfying their soul-hunger and enlightening their spiritual darkness, suffer little harm from the rooting up of old notions. Never having confused the accidental accompaniments of religion with its substance, they are not desolate if the former elements should change or disappear. Not having been accustomed to look upon relevation as a means of quenching curiosity, they never draw from disappointments in science or philosophy any reason to disbelieve God or to doubt the Church. They take no scandal from the discovery that the laws of physical life were better known to Huxley than to St. Thomas; they are not horrified to find a legend in the Martyrology or the Second Nocturn; they smile serenely at the scholar crying out that his researches have been helped more by the publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund than by the pronouncements of eminent divines. So long as the Church remains the unchangeable teacher of divine truth and the supremely efficient instrument of holiness, the faith of such souls will be little disturbed; doubt will never spring up in them because of the insoluble problems of Hebrew literature and Egyptian archæology.

In fact, a mind of this truly religious kind is apt to benefit largely by the very same influences which tend to shake the decadent type loose from the Church. As lesser details of Catholicism alter or fade, the essentials are thrown into stronger relief and men are helped towards a truer appreciation of what religion really means. Outside the Church, they are awakened to a sense of the supreme importance of the great issue of life,—not the area of the flood, nor the origin of species, nor the age of man, nor the constitution of matter, but the opportunity of every conscience to exert itself in a struggle for virtue, nobility, perfection. Inside the Church, they are reminded that to be Catholic means more than the standing by family traditions, or the following of national customs, or the handing down to posterity of a philosophical heritage; it means the earnest utilizing of all the aid God has given the soul to help it in turning away from sin and in seeking Himself. When the Church appears in this light; when the best health of the soul is seen to be connected with the principles of sound faith; when supreme authority and irreformable doctrine are understood to be the accompaniments, indeed the historic foundation and the actual instruments, of the finest moral perfection; then it is that the appeal of the Church for recognition as an infallible teacher may most hopefully be addressed to men. And to corroborate by the evidence of daily example the witness of history as to the spiritual efficacy of Catholic belief and Catholic practice, will mean to lead every earnest seeker far along the road to the acceptance of the Church's divine authority.

That orthodox Christianity has done for the world what no other scheme of belief has done and what no false scheme could possibly do, is to-day the basis of a method of apologetics which includes some of the most distinguished minds of the century among its upholders, and some of the most notable conversions of recent times among its fruits. "Try to account for the spiritual experience of St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Francis of Assisi, and the great army of martyrs and confessors from St. Stephen onwards by the theory of unconscious self-deception, and you may as well try to balance a pyramid on the end of a straw." [1] This type of argument, advanced very tellingly in defence of the Resurrection, can be used with no little force in favor of Catholicity. So, too, we may say of the proof for the Church, what Newman says of the evidences of Christianity, that they presuppose "a belief and perception of the Divine Presence, a recognition of His attributes and an admiration of His Person viewed under them; a conviction of the worth of the soul and of the reality and momentousness of the unseen world, an understanding that, in proportion as we partake in our own persons of the attributes which we adore in Him, we are dear to Him; a consciousness on the contrary that we are far from exemplifying them, a consequent insight into our guilt and misery, an eager hope of reconciliation to Him, a desire to know and love Him, and a sensitive looking-out in all that happens, whether in the course of nature or of human life, for tokens, if such there be, of His bestowing on us what we so greatly need." [2] It is in the soul possessed of a firm grasp on the principles of natural religion and of a loyal devotion to the dictates of the moral judgment that the Church finds her most attentive listener and her most faithful disciple. We can say of the Church, therefore, what the last named author affirms of the Christian Revelation:

> "The Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement,—it can have but one complement, and that very complement Christianity. . . .
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> "Thus it is that Christianity is the fulfilment of the promise made to Abraham, and of the Mosaic revelations; this is how it has been able from the first to occupy

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[1] Rev. C. F. Nolloth, M. A.: The Resurrection of Our Lord and Recent Criticism. *Hibbert Journal,* April, 1905.

[2] *The Grammar of Assent,* Ch. x., s. 2.

> the world and gain a hold on every class of human society to which its preachers reached; this is why the Roman power and the multitude of religions which it embraced could not stand against it; this is the secret of its sustained energy and its never-flagging martyrdoms; this is how at present it is so mysteriously potent, in spite of the new and fearful adversaries which beset its path. It has with it that gift of staunching and healing the one deep wound of human nature, which avails more for its success than a full encyclopedia of scientific knowledge and a whole library of controversy, and therefore it must last while human nature lasts. It is a living truth which never can grow old.
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> "Some persons speak of it as if it were a thing of history, with only indirect bearings upon modern times; I cannot allow that it is a mere historical religion. Certainly it has its foundations in past and glorious memories, but its power is in the present. It is no dreary matter of antiquarianism; we do not contemplate it in conclusions drawn from dumb documents and dead events, but by faith exercised in ever-living objects, and by the appropriation and use of ever-recurring gifts." [1]

The power to bring Christ to men, and to take men to Christ, the God-given ability to save sinners and to fashion saints by means of the truth our Saviour has revealed, the institutions He has established, and the precepts and counsels He has promulgated, this is the irreducible minimum preserved to the Church in all stages of growth and adaptation. We need to have our attention drawn to this the more forcibly because in disputes about minor matters, we sometimes overlook or slight this most important point of all. And nowadays, such disputes grow frequent and impassioned. The sense of ecclesiastical limitations becomes keener and spreads wider every year. A previous generation was concerned mainly with the debarring of churchmen from the political field, and the rejecting of ecclesiastical supremacy. More than once, Newman had to protest against a fear that the Pope would interfere with the legitimate workings of government by the arbitrary exercise of religious authority. In our day, science manifests much the same degree of anxiety that the State displayed then. What the world is most insistent in claiming now, is the right to break away from scientific traditions, no matter how long they have prevailed, nor by whom they have been defended; and this claim becomes the basis of resistance to the Church. That resistance, of course, is logically at an end when we have shown that to decide upon a mere scientific opinion does not enter into the scope of the Church's office. Hence we must often and loudly reaffirm in the hearing of the present generation, that the Church is established for the eternal salvation and the spiritual perfection of humanity; that for the obtaining of this end alone does she profess to be equipped;

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[1] *Ibid.*

and that she will never throw the ægis of her divine authority over anything which is not of concern to the health of the soul. A declaration of this sort should not only allay suspicion but also excite new interest in the Church's claim to be the great spiritual teacher of mankind. In addition, it should so prepare the Catholic mind for approaching developments, as to render faith unshakeable. That the fundamental Catholic principle — facts never contradict doctrine—may be held unwaveringly, the faithful must realize that the Church commits herself only to matters of religious import, not to points of purely scientific interest; whereas true science willingly recognizes religious interests to be outside its jurisdiction, and consistently abstains from pronouncing upon the established means of reaching the kingdom of Heaven.

This does not mean that all will be plain sailing, that there will remain no mysteries and no realm of uncertain jurisdiction; but that amid the storm of intellectual difficulties, we shall have a fast principle to hold by, namely, the Church's commission to teach the means of spiritual salvation, and an efficient motive for loyalty, namely, the spell cast over our souls by her creative power of holiness. In the hour of mental darkness, a consciousness that to us and to other men the Church has been as a nursing mother in spiritual infancy and in moral illness, will make us feel that to cling fast to her is something eternally worth while; and to wait hopefully for her final vindication will be as clear a duty as to defend the innocence of a friend or a lover. Hence, what seems like unreasoning prejudice or mere bigotry in the constancy of the Catholic is in reality the behest of an inviolable instinct. A worthy motive lies behind his firmness. In virtue of that motive, the Catholic "is sure, and nothing shall make him doubt, that if anything seems to be proved by astronomer, or geologist, or chronologist, or antiquarian, or ethnologist, in contradiction to the dogmas of faith, that point will eventually turn out, first, *not* to be proved, or, secondly, not *contradictory*, or, thirdly, not contradictory to anything *really revealed*, but to something which has been confused with revelation. . . . Instead of being irritated at the momentary triumph of the foes of Revelation, if such a feeling of triumph there be, and of hurrying on a forcible solution of the difficulty, which may in the event only reduce the inquiry to an inextricable tangle, he will recollect that, in the order of Providence, our seeming dangers are often our greatest gains; that in the words of the Protestant poet,

The clouds you so much dread
Are big with mercy, and shall break
In blessings on your head." [1]

Who can deny that the Church will profit by the spread of understanding concerning her true relations to human life? And who can suppose that serious men, contemplating her efficiency as an instrument of holiness, will withhold their reverence? The ideals she teaches and the practices she inculcates give telling evidence of her divine origin. Her moral system trains men in the achievement of wonders beyond the power of nature; she provides spiritual exercises and instruments adequate to the needs of each child of Adam, be he emotional or intellectual, poetical or practical, reserved or affectionate in disposition; her asceticism brings out what are unmistakably the best possibilities of the human soul; and she makes real heroism a thing of every day in the lives of Catholic husbands and Catholic mothers.

These are the enduring activities, these the proper characteristics of the Church. All who realize that she is thus helpful to the race in its attempts to rise in the moral scale, will forbear to reproach her for not teaching the secrets of science and history. Brain-weary with study of the spiritual problems, which, like the scattered pieces of a puzzle-picture, lie strewn along the path of life, man is glad enough to sit down as a docile pupil at the feet of anyone capable of teaching him the truth about his soul. In the performance of this task the Church need never fear a rival. Most plainly she spells out the mystic handwriting; most convincingly she interprets the vision and the dream. And what she proclaims, our best instincts confirm,—we can hardly help recognizing it as true. Little matter if, after having taught us the most vital things, she leaves us to our own industry and personal gifts in questions which do not affect our redemption from sin and our conversion to God.

It is most necessary of all, then, that we should keep prominently in view the Church's power to promote moral healthiness and holiness, to bestow spiritual life and peace and beauty. The evil to be dreaded, is not the spread of critical views nor the decay of an old mentality, but the tendency to draw attention away from the most important issues of all,—the issues, too, where the Church has least to fear. The danger lies in the multiplication of defenders who perform the lesser things of the law, and neglect the greater; who censure mental disagreement more than moral fault; who would substitute intellectualism for holiness, and learning for a contrite heart. Though the advance of thought should explode innumerable old theses and hurry along every one of the sciences into amazingly new positions, little harm will result if we accept the Church at her own valuation; but to make her the embodiment of a party, to set up in her name a theory to which she shall be irrevocably committed—this is to court inevitable disaster.

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[1] NEWMAN, *Idea of a University*, II., VIII., 4.

Let those, then, who are concerned about the attitude for a Catholic to take in the face of the new learning, remember that the most important point of all is to identify Catholicity with what is holiest and noblest in human lives. Let the Church be revealed, in doctrine and in deed, as the indispensable aid of the aspiring soul. And if there be parading to-day under the shadow of her great name a spirit disposed to measure Heaven by the standard of bare intellectual agreement, to scour land and sea in the interests of external conformity and meanwhile to quench the smoking flax which might easily have been fanned into a sacred flame to make light of simple yearnings after goodness and untutored strivings for virtue, let this spirit be exposed and denounced as the merest travesty of Catholicism. So too, if there be among us a tendency to disregard the instruments of holiness which have sanctified unnumbered generations of the Church's children, to neglect the science of the saints, and to forget that Christianity is a call to perfection of life—then let such tendency be declared the most fatal of all the dangers we have reason to dread.

In view of what has been said, it seems probable enough that nothing would serve the Church better in this generation than a wide diffusion of knowledge concerning her function in the work of spiritual development. It is indeed, a matter of no little moment that people should appreciate the worth of those precious seeds of godliness which the Church has been cherishing for so many long centuries, that in this day they may be planted in human hearts and bring forth fruit a hundred fold. Were every man to find out what Catholicism has said and what Catholicism has done with regard to the things which concern mankind's spiritual interests, a new epoch of Christianity would begin; for surely such discovery would result in a renascence of affection for the old Church which has dealt with human aspirations more sympathetically and promoted soul-growth more effectually than any other influence known to history.

Joseph McSorley, C. S. P.

MAN VERSUS THE COSMOS.

Francis P. Duffy, D. D.

Underlying the present widespread attitude of hesitation or doubt with regard to the positions held by religion concerning man's nature and destiny, is an assumption or a state of mind, which, though seldom pushed forward in formal argument, is still in all cases an important, and in most, the principal element in the difficulty. Religious-minded persons are usually prone to discover pride of human intellect as the latent cause of unbelief; but here we meet with the seeming paradox that loss of faith proceeds from a deep and dismal humility. With the advance of knowledge concerning the extent in space and time of the physical universe, man has tended to lose his good conceit of himself; he finds the sense of his own importance in the scheme of things gradually fading away, and he is in a receptive mood for arguments, which aim to prove that, excepting in accidental complexity of arrangement, he is in no wise different from the rest of the universe. It is this point of view—in Professor Haeckel's language, the "cosmological," as opposed to the "anthropistic perspective"—which is the main factor in the failure of many men to see or to appreciate the evidence for the truths of natural religion.

It is easy to mark the successive grades of descent in man's supposed fall from his high estate in the universe, down, down into the primal cosmic mud. The first blow was given by the heliocentric theory in astronomy, which necessitated such a radical change of view concerning the place held by our planet in the solar system, and in the sidereal universe. Then came the theory of Kant and Laplace on the development of the present stellar universe, with its striking contrast between the untold ages in which the world has been making, and the few years during which our race has occupied this little portion of it. When, in addition to all this, the theory of biological evolution now offers a scheme of continuity for all forms of life, it is little wonder that the human imagination, fired with the vastness and magnificence of the plan, leaps boldly over the places where reason discovers barriers or chasms, and accepts the view that all is the result of the evolution of physical forces, that life is but a chance product, and consciousness an accidental and passing phase in the infinite processes of material change.

Judged by the standards of orderly and systematic reasoning, this monistic theory is found to be wofully lacking even in the sort of arguments which itself professes to demand. It acknowledges that, so far as proof goes, there are breaches in the continuity which the system requires,—in fact it is difficult to find stronger statements of the impossibility of explaining mind in terms of matter than can be culled from the writings of men more or less deservedly classed as materialists. But when the spell of magnitude is over them, in spite of their reason and their reasonings, they return to the feeling, that, after all, materialism will have to be admitted as the ultimate explanation of things. Back of an attitude such as this is a state of mind that is emotional rather than rational. The imagination of a man is overpowered by the greatness of the universe, and depressed by the vision of the comparative insignificance of humanity. Argument, it is evident, does not fully meet the needs of the situation. The reason may be satisfied, but the old difficulty keeps coming back with a power, vague, cloudy, but impressive, and to some minds, overwhelming. In order to deal with it, we must make a sympathetic study of the state of mind which produces it, and then see whether there be not at hand other standards of comparison and judgment which will relieve the oppressed intelligence of its dismal burden.

Let us then take our flight from off this planet and watch it as it rapidly recedes from view. Man and his works are quickly lost to sight, and the islet in space on which he lives dwindles to a ball, a gleam of borrowed light, a fiery point; then, as we sweep outward to distant solar systems, our gigantic sun gradually lessens to a coal of fire, and its train of attendant planets is no longer visible. We take our stand far off amongst the Pleiades, and view the universe. We peer through "the backward and abysm of time" to a period long before our little planet had burst its bonds and started on its independent course. We look through millions and millions of miles of ever-widening space, tenanted by gigantic worlds and the scene of tremendous activities. And as we turn our thoughts to the little home-planet which we have left so far behind, we see it as dwarfed into less than insignificance, and man, who seems so wonderful in his own eyes, is shrivelled into nothingness.

So far as imagination goes, our belief in one of the two primary truths of religion—the existence of God,—is helped rather than hindered by contemplation such as this. The manifestation of order, progress, majesty, and might, revealed in our modern conception of the universe, impresses on us more deeply than ever, a belief in an Omnipotent and Intelligent Creator. But if such be the case when we gaze upwards from our eyrie towards God, it is far different when we glance down at the planet earth, and its principal inhabitant, Man. The words of Preacher and Psalmist, of poet and saint, on the littleness of man and the vanity of human life, take on a new and more awful significance, for, as now interpreted, they leave no hope behind. The familiar phrases come unbidden to our lips:—"Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity"; "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" "What is it all but the trouble of ants, in the gleam of a million million of suns?" Shall this little being with his few short years of life, whose puny strength is made the plaything of the forces at work around him, shall he claim a higher nature or a more enduring existence than this broad world which stretches now beyond my ken until imagination fails in the effort to compass it?

Such is the cosmological perspective. It does not constitute an argument against the plain facts and solid principles on which a spiritual philosophy is reared; but it creates an attitude, a mood, a condition of receptivity, which makes fact and logic of little avail, and which inclines one to accept the position that man is, in every respect, of a piece with the rest of nature, a mere side-eddy in the whirling mælstrom of matter. We shall not here attempt to attack the positions of materialism with logical weapons. This task has been undertaken and accomplished over and over again by men of widely different philosophical beliefs. As a reasoned system of philosophy, materialism has no standing. Ours shall be the work of examining its underlying assumption, and presenting other points of view from which the universe can be considered.

The first answer that suggests itself to the pretensions of materialism is that of Berkeley. There is no cure for the nightmare of all-smothering matter equal to a friendly acquaintance with idealism. It lifts our head, and puts us on our feet, and says: See! the vague and terrifying monster which has oppressed you, is nothing but a dream. What is this matter, after all, that looms so large on the imagination—

> "When the light is low,
> When the blood creeps, and the nerves prick
> And tingle; and the heart is sick,
> And all the wheels of Being slow?"

It is nothing at all until some mind thinks it. Your own self, your mind is the only true Reality. This wonderful physical universe which overwhelms you with its vastness, has order, magnitude, sublimity, power, only in so far as minds put these attributes into it. Do not tremble before your own conception, like a boy that is frightened at a story invented by himself.

Other comforters, less radical in their methods, will say: At least what you are surest of is yourself. As a clever and thoughtful modern essayist expresses it:

> "He [Mæterlinck] discovers the one indestructible thing. This material world on which vast systems have been superimposed—this may mean anything. It may be a dream, it may be a joke, it may be a trap or temptation, it may be a charade, it may be the beatific vision: the only thing of which we are certain is this human soul."

What sense is there in being impressed by something that may be, for aught you can ever know, a creature of your own fancy? Turn your thoughts rather towards the realm of mind and ideas, the only world of which you can be certain. Seek there for nobility and greatness and power; your search will not be unrewarded, and the fruits of your seeking will be realities which are real beyond all doubt.

One may be an idealist or not, but it is an interesting and profitable experiment at times to see how easy it is to drop that realistic view of the extended world, on which the strength of the difficulty from vastness depends. At one moment we can take the normal view of our sense faculty as the sensitive plate of a camera on which the great real world of material objects imprints its forms; but it is surprising to see how easily and readily we get accustomed to a way of viewing that same faculty as a kinetoscope which projects its own creations, "magic shadow-shapes that come and go," on the dark background of the void. What is called "common sense" will reject the latter hypothesis offhand as absurd, but it may be remarked that the uncommon sense of the greatest thinkers of our race is, to say the least, by no means so ready or so absolute in its condemnation. And whatever be their solution of the logical question raised by the rival claims of idealism and realism, there is no hesitating note in their decision of the more important ontological question, in the

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[1] *Varied Types*, by G. K. Chesterton, p. 214.

dispute for supremacy between idealism and materialism. If we were limited in our philosophical catechism to a choice between these two answers: "What is mind? Mind is the temporary and accidental result of the arrangement of certain extended particles of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, sulphur, and potassium"; and "What is matter? Matter is an idea formed by minds," the overwhelming majority of philosophers would accept unreservedly the latter view. Nor is this decision the outcome of antiquated prescientific views of the relations between man and the cosmos. Modern philosophers, many of whom are themselves scientists, and all of whom show familiar acquaintance with the results of scientific investigation, are not a whit perturbed by the bugaboo of materialism; on the contrary, the whole trend of philosophic thought in the beginning of the twentieth century, is in the direction of an idealistic interpretation of the universe.

This is not here advanced as a final philosophical position. But when a man is falling prone under the impact of a heavy shock, there is advantage in even an over-strenuous push in the opposite direction. When he has recovered his balance, he can begin to look calmly about him for a safe and sure way out of his predicament. An intelligent man who has heard a strong and sweeping statement of the arguments in favor of any theory, say of collectivism, will find profit in going to hear an equally thorough-going defence of individualism. After mature deliberation, he will probably find some *Via Media*, which allows for the element of truth in both the opposing theories. In the supreme court of intelligence it is profitable to give ear to contradictory interpretations of the law. Or, to vary and strengthen the metaphor, a good allopathic dose of idealism is a wholesome medicine once in a while to drive out the soul-sickness of materialism. Or, finally, to speak without metaphor, when any man has considered the arguments to prove that the material universe possibly does not exist, and certainly does not exist for him, except as a process of his own thinking, he will be less impressed by that view of things which sees man and his history as "but a murmur of gnats in the gloom, a moment's anger of bees in their hive," and his last end to be "swallow'd in vastness, lost in Silence, drown'd in the deeps of a meaningless Past."

Another method of considering this problem, and one that must be adopted by those who hold to a realistic philosophy, and admit the extended world and the conclusions of science in regard to it, is to inquire whether the acknowledged superiority in size and duration of the physical universe constitutes any valid presumption against the claims of intelligent beings to a distinct nature and destiny. The question then resolves itself into something like this: Are size and duration the proper bases of judgment? If man were unimaginably greater than he is in mere physical strength and length of life, would his claims for distinction from the mass of matter be at all changed? Would man be, in any essential respects, *greater* than he is now, if he had in his body, at the disposal of his will, the major part of the matter and energy in the universe? It might be profitable to indulge in such a fancy, grotesque as it may seem, in order to appreciate correctly what constitutes the true greatness of man. Let us, then, invoke the genius of Swift, and consider such a being in such a world.

Imagine that the whole sidereal universe is brought together into a single sphere, or better, disk, in which our planets would be as pebbles, and our suns as coals of fire. And on this dwelling-place put beings resembling us in birth, growth, and death, and in all the perfections or limitations of mental and moral powers. But picture this Sidereal man as a huge creature, to whom our ocean is like a drop of dew, who can wear the sun as a jewel in his ring, to whom the swirling nebulæ which are the dust of worlds, are but as a puff of smoke, as he stalks like great Orion's self across tremendous fields of space. Let Perseus and Andromeda and their peers be real, not merely as they might have been to the imagination of the ancients, but with the gigantic proportions which modern scientific conceptions would give them.

Furthermore, in order not to omit any of the points in favor of the opposite side, in the case of man versus the cosmos, let us endow our imaginary beings with powers over the physical conditions of their environment immeasureably in excess of those which we possess over the powers of our planet. To keep with the just limits of our comparison, however, we must refrain from consideration of the increase in mental power and knowledge which they might be supposed to attain by reason of their superiority over the forces of the material world. If this element were allowed to enter in, we might be justly accused of shifting the issue, and of comparing the extended universe, not with man as we know him, but with a being that far transcends him in intellectual and moral endowments. If we ventured for a moment to indulge in speculation on the point we have raised, it would indeed be possible to construct an argument to show that such a race would, on account of its mastery over nature, be in a position to obtain far more knowledge than we possess concerning the powers of the physical universe, and thus to arrive speedily at a much higher state of perfection. On the other hand, however, there are strong grounds for the belief that, granted our present laws of the conditions of progress, the very ease with which nature could be controlled, would militate against mental progress, just as it does in the seemingly favored portions of this planet, and thus our Cosmic Giants would be a race of stupid savages.

But, as we have seen, our comparison can be more fairly made if we consider them as having exactly the same gifts of mind and heart as we ourselves possess. And this being the case, it would be possible to eliminate from the problem the whole question of the length of life which we should allow to them. There would seem to be a certain appropriateness in assigning to them an increase in duration proportionate to their increased bulk; but the difficulty in the way of our generosity is that it would not do them any good. They would probably never know that "the part of time they share" is extraordinarily long, according to terrestrial standards. If, during the tract of time at their disposal, they attain only to our degree of mental life, their lives will seem to them just as short or as long as ours do to us. In order to keep a standard chronometer, let us suppose that our solar system be left running as usual in the new universe. Then if the Sidereal infant, during seven quintillions of years, has arrived at the mental development of the earth child of seven, he has lived just as long as his terrestrial brother. For the sake of the imagination, we shall still preserve this element of æonian duration in our comparison; but it is a salutary exercise to note how far our mental life lies outside the category of time considered merely as a measurement of physical changes.

The question now admits of being fairly put. The imagination has been impressed by a sense of the vastness and hugeness of the physical world. We grapple boldly with the difficulty by imagining all that vastness and hugeness to be under the control of beings like us, or even under our own control. Now let us ask ourselves whether we really feel that we are essentially different or more important than when we were cooped up in the narrow confines of earth. Bigger and stronger, certainly we are—children are playing ball with extinct suns, prettily marked pebbles like Jupiter are passed from hand to hand as curiosities, and women are wearing necklaces of shimmering moons; friend reaches across inter-stellar spaces to grasp the hand of friend; and when enemies meet in conflict, the universe seems to tremble under the shock.

But in all else we are unchanged--in all that belongs to the domain of thought—in science, philosophy, religion, government, education, morals, passions, habits. On all this side of our nature we have the same powers and the same weaknesses, the trials, the defeats, the successes, which are experienced by humanity here and now. We are still beings that make progress, by slow degrees and through many failures, to deeper knowledge of ourselves and our world, to more peaceful social conditions, to a higher general level of morality. We are still mixed good and bad, knowing good and evil, and following our conscience or our passions, as the case may be. Our race is disgraced by the vile, the mean, the unjust, the brutal, but we find also many a deed of love and faith, of generosity and loyalty and self-sacrifice, and of devotion to duty even unto death. The best of us, and indeed nearly all of us at one time or another, are still swayed by motives higher than ourselves. We use our stupendous physical powers in the service of an ideal, a principle, a something which is not material, not personal, but which belongs to the world of the unseen and the unselfish—national liberty, justice, honor, faith, duty, holiness. In such causes as these we expend our gigantic energies, and submit our huge bodies to captivity, and gladly suffer that the long ages of our life should be cut in twain, feeling ourselves blest that we have a mighty and a glorious gift to offer as a sacrifice on the altar of the Ideal.

What would be the attitude of a thoughful-minded inhabitant of a world such as we have imagined? Would his realization of the amount of matter which his will controls, affect in any way, for better or for worse, his speculations on his own nature and destiny?

He would look back through the long history of his race, and find in it the brief record of men who were born, and lived out their lives, each in his own fashion, and being dead, are gone—whither? "*And all the time that Adam lived, came to nine hundred and thirty years, and he died. . . . And all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years, and he died. . . . And all the days of Lamech came to seven hundred and seventy-seven years, and he died.*" These shadowy men of ancient days are all fellows in mortality. And many whom he himself knew, the kindly generous friends he loved, and the foes he detested, the brave and devoted, and the base and mean, these also are dead. What matters it to him that their lives have lasted through countless æons, or that their huge bodies are now changed into the star-dust of constellations to be? Is there any ground in such thoughts as these, for hope or for despair? Does the memory of the long life past give assurance of an eternity to come? Does the sight of the enormous corpse, now turning to corruption, give evidence by its size, of the continued existence of the principle that made it man? No! even as we put the question, we see that there is no hope in clay, no matter how much of it we imagine; the elements of time and space, stretch them or spread them as one will, have no part for good or ill in the great problem of human destiny.

The Sidereal philosopher will face the problem with exactly the same data as his brother on earth. The same questions urge themselves on him as on us: Whence came this life, this consciousness, this intelligence, this sacred call of duty, and to what end? And now that we no longer see the manifestations of these things, have they ceased to be? Is this lump of corruption—great or small, it matters not—all that ever really was? And has that which seemed to rule it, to use it for higher ends than itself, to spend and destroy it for an ideal, has *that* ceased utterly from out the sum of existences, leaving nothing behind but this dissolving mass of lifeless clay? In his reflection on these questions, he can be free from the prejudices which encumber our thinking; but the real factors in the great problems of the origin and purpose of human life are the same for him as for us. Temporal duration and physical magnitude count as nothing; the sole factors are life and intelligence and conscience and the demand for justice. The only advantage he has is that he can consider the problem rationally, his imagination untroubled by the seeming preponderance of brute matter in his universe. He can see clearly the evidence which shows that life is not the mere grinding and whirling of particles of cosmic dust, that intelligence is not the product of cunningly fashioned clay, that conscience is not evolved from the clod, that there is, in that composite being, man, a something loftier and more enduring than the "muddy vesture of decay," in which it is temporarily clothed.

And indeed, even for us Liliputians of earth, there needs no Gulliver to come hither to tell us these things. We have had, and have, our clear-eyed men a-plenty, poets, philosophers, and saints, who have balanced mind and matter in the scales of reason, and have seen the Cosmos kick the beam. The soul is like eternity in Addison's vision of the golden scales:

> "Upon my laying this weight . . . in one of the scales, though I threw in that of time, . . . with many other weights, which in my hand seemed very ponderous, they were not able to stir the opposite balance, nor could they have prevailed, though assisted with the weight of the sun, the stars, and the earth."

The same estimate is shown in the saying of Coleridge that God made man so little and the physical universe so vast "to show that dirt is cheap."

Let us now return to our watch-tower in the skies and gaze once more at the stellar universe. What now impresses us is that these huge masses of matter have neither knowledge nor will of their own, that they go on in their appointed ways, blind, gross, stupid, without consciousness of their power or knowledge of their ends; while on the other hand, we, puny though we seem, know ourselves and know them. We weigh and measure them. We supplement our senses by perfecting instruments to unravel their secrets. In that part of space which our bodies occupy, the undaunted mind boldly accepts the contest with the brute forces of nature, and finds in their opposition a challenge to rise to ever new and higher efforts to bind them to its service. More than that, we have within us a power, a spark of that Divinity which made all things according to Wisdom and Law, by which we can go beyond the visible and tangible, and discover the inner nature and causes of things, the purpose, the plan, the laws by which they are governed, and further yet, the one infinite Lawgiver Himself, by whom and in whom and for whom are all the things that are.

Or to take another point of view, and a still more striking one—we can consider the contrast between physical and *moral* greatness. There is none whose soul is so bound with clay that he cannot feel that there is no greater or nobler thing in the universe than human heroism, whether it be shown against the physical might of the tyrant or the mob, or the destroying powers of nature. It is in comparison with these last that we have here to establish our position. Nowhere has been better expressed the contrast between the might of the ocean and the pettiness of man, than in the familiar lines in *Childe Harold*:

> "His steps are not upon thy paths,—thy fields
> Are not a spoil for him,—thou dost arise
> And shake him from thee; the vile strength he wields
> For earth's destruction thou dost all despise,
> Spurning him from thy bosom to the skies."

And yet both the writer and the readers of these awe-inspiring lines would be quick to acknowledge that there is a manifestation of a nobler and higher power in the struggles of a lifeboat crew, risking their own lives in the storm to save the lives of others. Their efforts may be weak and futile. The mighty ocean may toss their frail bark about, "spurning it to the skies"; it may beat out their lives among its breakers; but there has been shown forth in this world a nobler energy than the ocean's, something other and better than the "vile strength" of muscle, which coped so inefficiently with the same kind of strength in wind and wave. "They that go down to the sea in ships . . . have seen the works of the Lord, and his wonders in the deep"; they have seen no nobler work of the Lord, and no greater wonder in the deep, than the daring and devotion of man.

Did not the Roman soldier, standing by his post even until death, in the shower of ashes from Vesuvius, present a sublimer spectacle than all the might of that angry volcano? If man cannot always contend with the powers of nature, he is able to put forth a power they can never reach; as the Latin poet says, he can stand unterrified even though the rended earth should come crashing in ruins about his head.

Nor is it alone in such extreme and striking cases as these that we find exhibited the superiority of the moral over the material world, though in the examples given, the contrast is more vivid. Everywhere in human life that we find, in little things or in great, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, the surrender of self to the cause of the true and the holy, we have the expression of a higher energy than the whole inanimate world can command. If we measure forces in the golden scales of worth, a dying girl, motionless and speechless, by the mere expression of face by which she rejects evil counsel, or shows her willingness to make a sacrifice, puts forth a power, in comparison with which the crash of giant spheres is as nothing. For Kant, two things were sublime—the starry heavens and the human conscience—but surely the latter much more than the former. Indeed, no student of that great philosopher could doubt for an instant what his decision would be, if called upon to declare his judgment as to the relative worth of these two kinds of greatness. The forerunner of Laplace in the propounding of the nebular theory concerning the cosmos, has concluded, as the final result of all his thinking, that the one absolute and perfect thing in the universe, is the moral conscience of man.

It is only shallow and empty minds that will be permanently disturbed by the vision of the bulk and burliness of the cosmos; the clear-headed and noble-minded of our race will always re-echo the brave and sensible words of good old Sir Thomas Browne:

"The world that I regard is myself; it is the Microcosm of my own frame that I cast mine eye on; for the other, I use it but like my Globe, and turn it round sometimes for my recreation. Men that look upon my outside, perusing only my condition and Fortunes, do err in my Altitude; for I am above Atlas his shoulders. The earth is a point not only in respect of the Heaven above us, but of that heavenly and celestial part within us; that mass of Flesh that circumscribes me, limits not my mind; that surface that tells the Heavens it hath an end, cannot persuade me I have any: I take my circle to be above three hundred and sixty; though the number of the Arc do measure my body, it comprehendeth not my mind; whilst I study to find how I am a Microcosm, or little World, I find myself something more than the great one. There is surely a piece of Divinity in us, something that was before the Elements, and owes no homage unto the Sun."

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

RECENT VIEWS ON BIBLICAL INSPIRATION. (I)

James F. Driscoll, D. D.

Though most of our manuals of Introduction to Sacred Scripture contain what purports to be a dogmatic and apparently final discussion of the nature and extent of inspiration, the great majority of Catholic scholars of the present day will doubtless agree with Father von Hummelauer, S. J., when in a recent essay [1] of great interest and significance, he affirms that in his opinion, the time for a definite treatise on the subject is not yet come. They will feel rather, in endorsing the view of the learned Jesuit, that it has a general application to most of the issues raised by the critical studies of recent times as applied to the Bible.

From the apologetic view-point the Scripture problem is generally recognized to be the burning question of the hour. It is causing perplexity and alarm in many quarters, and not a few anxious souls who are perhaps not fully aware of the number and intricacy of the difficulties involved, are impatiently awaiting peremptory solutions, authoritative as well as scientific. They look expectantly towards authority for a series of dogmatic rulings that will settle once for all certain points of the controversy, and in a similar spirit they demand of the Catholic exegete and theologian clear-cut notions, accurately defined positions or theses supported by clinching, unanswerable proofs. In either case the expectation is premature. It is the well known custom of the Church guided by the Holy Ghost, and wise with the wisdom and experience of ages, to proceed with slow caution in such matters; and a clear indication of her intention not to depart in the present crisis from the same prudent policy may be gathered from the very opportune creation of a permanent Biblical Commission composed of members who are specialists in the field of biblical research, as well as of trained theologians. When one considers the complexity of the topics to be discussed by this tribunal of experts, together with the far-reaching importance of the decisions to which their findings will naturally lead, it is safe to assume that final authoritative pronouncements, at least on certain more difficult points, will not be forth-coming in the near future. Premature likewise, and for similar reasons, is the demand addressed to the theologians and exegetes. Although it is plain that the latter are now in possession of vast stores of information bearing on scriptural questions, which were unknown to the commentators of a century ago, it is none the less certain that the sources of this information are far from being fully exploited.

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[1] *Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage, mit besonderer Ruecksicht auf das Alte Testament, von* Franz von Hummelauer, S. J. Herder, 1904.

Historic science has indeed wrought wonders in our own day. With its brilliant discoveries and its searching critical methods it has simply revolutionized our knowledge of antiquity, reclaiming and reconstructing with living detail the tableau of those mighty civilizations of which there had survived only the vaguest and most shadowy remembrance. It will doubtless also be conceded even by the most conservative, that the labors of scholars in the field of textual and higher criticism have contributed not a little to our better knowledge of the Sacred Writings. Yet, in spite of all this—or rather because of all this—it behooves us to be slow and cautious in pronouncing a verdict. History and criticism, although they have achieved so much, are far from having said their final word. There is still more room for fresh advances and new discoveries, no less than for the correction or retractation of some more or less conjectural and fanciful theories. The scholars who are in most constant touch with the labors and results of modern scientific research are agreed in admitting that much of the available evidence is yet to be gathered in, to say nothing of the slow ulterior processes of collating, sifting and weighing. Just at present the new light, instead of elucidating the situation, seems rather to have a dazzling and confusing effect. Indeed, its unexpected projection on the scene is precisely the cause of all the difficulty. Its first effect was naturally to cause our apologists to lose for a moment their bearings, and even now, after some time spent in "orientation," the discussion with regard to many of the important problems at issue, has not yet emerged from the stage of tentative solutions and more or less plausible working hypotheses.

But though the time for definite scientific conclusions is yet in the future, the work of preparing for them is being carried on, and not a little has already been achieved in that direction. That the trend of modern critical investigation, while leaving intact and often confirming the substantial beliefs and doctrines of our religion, has in many respects run counter to generally received theological and popular opinions concerning the Bible, cannot be denied. But it is well to bear in mind, statements to the contrary notwithstanding, that the opposition is not between faith and science, but between the inferences, more or less scientific, of the critics, and those of the theologians; and no one who is conversant with the history of similar misunderstandings in the past, will have any serious misgivings as to the peaceful issue of the present conflict. When, with the help of the new knowledge and the guiding influence of authority, the respective fields of theology and criticism will have been properly delimited, ample room will doubtless be found for an amicable adjustment of differences. In the nature of the case, this *entente*, involving as it does, mutual concessions, can only be arrived at through the earnest co-operation of men who, being at once and in the true sense of the terms, critics and theologians, approach the questions at issue reverently, in a broad, irenic spirit, and with the trained capacity to understand the positions, and appreciate the arguments and difficulties of both sides.

It is gratifying to note, in contrast with a less promising state of things in the past, that such are, in fact, the qualifications possessed by the most eminent Catholic apologists and scripturists of the present day. Ever deferential to authority and maintaining firmly the just claims of the faith once delivered to the saints, they at the same time accept, without misgiving or *arrière pensée*, albeit in a spirit of keen scholarly discrimination, the facts and inferences of modern criticism on their scientific face value. Thoroughly alive to the need of an adjustment between these facts and certain traditional views, they are earnestly seeking to establish the basis of a more uniform solution of biblical difficulties on principles in harmony alike with the data of revealed truth and the scientific progress of the age. This group of writers who are now recognized as forming among Catholics, as it were, a new school of thought, counts an ever increasing number of adherents. It will suffice here by way of exemplification, to advert to the expressed views and scientific attitude of such eminent and accredited scholars as Lagrange, von Hummelauer, Schanz, Prat, Poels, Gigot and many others, several of whom are members of the Biblical Commission. Though working for the most part independently and in different intellectual surroundings, they have nevertheless been led by their careful investigations to adopt similar conclusions with regard to the main lines of Scripture apologetics; and it is also a circumstance worthy of note in this connection, that some of these writers began their biblical studies not in a friendly spirit towards the new science, but with the avowed purpose of disproving on scientific grounds those very conclusions to which they afterwards reluctantly subscribed. In the case of others, notably of Father von Hummelauer in his great work on the Pentateuch, a comparison between earlier and later writings reveals a similar marked change of attitude gradually brought about by a prolonged conscientious study of the situation. In fact, there is perhaps no instance worthy of note in the career of contemporary Catholic scholars, at least of the younger generation, in which an honest, painstaking, personal investigation of the problems at issue has not resulted in an increased deference for the substantial claims of scientific criticism, and a heightened esteem for the greater number of its promoters.

Be that as it may, the group of writers here referred to, feel the necessity of rejuvenating the apologetic methods in vogue among Catholics during the last century, [1] and, not indeed in a spirit of independence, but with deep loyalty to the good cause, they have set about drawing up new lines of defence. That their task is an arduous one appears plainly, not only from the complex and exceedingly delicate nature of the problems under consideration, but also from the necessarily reconstructive character of much of their work, for it is a fact of universal experience that those who venture to disturb the quiet atmosphere of received opinions, and set in motion new currents of thought, enter upon a way much like that of the proverbial transgressor. In many an historic instance such work has received a just appreciation only long after the workers had passed away.

Prominent and pioneer as it were, among the writers of the new school is Father M. J. Lagrange, O. P., Founder and President of the Catholic Biblical School of Jerusalem, a member of the Biblical Commission, and Editor of its official organ, *La Revue Biblique Internationale*. Under his able direction this periodical assumed from the beginning a highly scientific character which involved in many respects a departure from the views, methods and tone prevalent in the current manuals and in earlier publications of an apologetic nature. Those principles and theories of criticism which Father Lagrange has recognized as well founded, have been consistently applied by him in his excellent commentary on the Book of Judges[1] the first issued of a series of commentaries projected by the learned Dominican, which, if carried out on the same scientific lines, we desire, for the credit of Catholic scholarship, to see pushed on to a speedy completion.

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[1] The weak, wavering tactics of our Catholic apologists during the last century—tactics which have issued in a series of undignified retreats from one position to another in face of advancing science—have been fully described though not without bias, by Houtin in his *Question Biblique au XIXme Siecle.* Of this work an acute contemporary writer justly remarks that it is no less irrefutable in substance than unbearable by the sarcasm of its tone. This latter characteristic is sufficient to explain and justify the censures that have been passed upon the book.

In 1902 Father Lagrange gave a more systematic and *ex professo* formulation of his views on the biblical question in a series of lectures delivered before the theological students of the Catholic University of Toulouse. They were published later in book form, a second edition appearing in 1904 and bearing the printed sanction of the authorities in Rome as well as in Paris.[2] In this remarkable collection of essays, which it does not enter our present purpose to analyze or resume, he touches upon nearly all the important issues of the Scripture problem, with special reference, however, to their bearings on the Old Testament, and treats them in a broad, masterly fashion,—in a manner revealing at once the erudition of the critical scholar, and the philosophic acumen of the theologian trained in the School of Aquinas. While all the chapters are interesting and suggestive, the one dealing with the idea of inspiration viewed in the light of Biblical facts has a special claim on our attention, not only because of the fundamental character of the topic itself and its more or less direct bearing on all the others, but furthermore, because views very similar, if not identical with those here set forth, have been advocated also by other eminent scholars,[3] and have given rise to a considerable amount of wholesome discussion.[4]

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[1] *Le Livre des Juges*, par le P. Marie-Joseph Lagrange des Freres Precheurs. Paris, Lecoffre, 1903.

[2] *La Methode Historique*, par Marie-Joseph Lagrange. Directeur de l'Ecole Biblique Catholique de Jérusalem. Paris, Lecoffre, 1904.

Many of our readers will be glad to know that an English translation of this work has just been published by the London Catholic Truth Society.

[3] See von Hummelauer's remarkable study mentioned at the beginning of the present paper; also two articles entitled "History and Inspiration" in the *Catholic University Bulletin* (Jan. and April, 1905,) by Dr. Henry A. Poels, who, like Father von Hummelauer, is a member of the Biblical Commission.

[4] See various articles and communications in the London *Tablet* during the last half year, also articles and book-reviews in the *Month*.

It is hardly necessary to say that beyond the *fact* of inspiration, relatively little concerning it has been made the direct object of divine revelation. For Catholics, certain other points such as the canon of the inspired books, the extension of inspiration to all the parts of these books, etc., have been fixed once for all by the infallible teaching of the Church on whose authority they rest. The advantage of the Catholic position on this head is now being recognized by not a few outside the Church, for the farther we recede from the heated controversies which followed upon the rise of Protestantism, the plainer does it become to all, that the fact of inspiration regarding any particular book, or part of a book, is neither self-evident nor even demonstrable by any arguments that may be derived from the consideration of the books themselves.

As regards the nature or the notion of inspiration, nothing has been strictly defined beyond confirming by conciliary decrees the traditional doctrine that inspiration implies divine authorship. The mediæval formula: *"Deus est auctor Scripturæ,"* was sanctioned by the Council of Florence, and afterwards by the Council of Trent, which in its decree concerning the Sacred Scriptures, says: "The Synod, following the example of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal feeling of piety and reverence, all the books of both the Old and the New Testament, since one God is the author of both." However, as there are various ways in which it is possible to conceive of divine authorship, this notion leaves much to be determined by way of inference, as well as from direct observation of the inspired writings. The consequent task of completing our knowledge on this point, and rendering it more precise, devolves naturally upon the theologians and the critics, but as these approach the question professionally from opposite standpoints, we find ourselves in presence of two opposing tendencies, both legitimate within proper bounds —both having a claim upon our just consideration. The first—that of the theologian as such—aims at defining the nature and attributes of inspiration more or less exclusively by logical deduction from the revealed fact of divine authorship. The critic, on the other hand, starts with the examination of the ascertainable facts concerning the sacred books as we have them, and proceeds to frame a notion of inspiration with the sole view of making it harmonize with these facts and the inferences warranted by them. While either process is proper in its own sphere, if taken alone and independently, it is inadequate and misleading; each needs to be controlled and checked by the other.

If we proceed to examine the Sacred Writings on a merely rationalistic basis, without thought or pre-occupation as to their supernaturally inspired character, our analysis will naturally lead us to place them in the same category as other merely human productions —with perhaps a difference of degree—for the charisma of inspiration is not a factor experimentally discernible in its effects; it is a quality which eludes the efforts of our critical analysis, just as completely as does the spirituality of the human soul escape the scrutiny of the physiologist. If, on the other hand, we take as our starting point the revealed doctrine of inspiration, viz., that God is the author of the Sacred Volume, and proceed to deduce from this unqualified statement all the logical inferences it will bear, without due regard for the facts observable in connection with the text, it will be easy to arrive at conclusions utterly at variance with the plain, undeniable truth. Such for instance, was the logical conclusion reached by the Purists concerning the alleged classical purity and elegance of the New Testament Greek. Both processes have their respective rights and limitations, their mutual lines of demarcation, and neither should be definitely worked out without due reference to the other. That the subject of inspiration has in the past, like many others, suffered from excessive *a priori* treatment at the hands of well meaning but necessarily ill informed theologians, must be freely granted; but we must also as freely admit that in the heat of reaction a still greater harm might result from a too hasty and injudicious application of the historical and critical methods. Hence, while modern scholars imbued with the spirit of scientific research are naturally impatient, and show a very justifiable readiness to question freely many positions which have long since come to be regarded as settled theological doctrines, we can hardly be surprised, nor should we consider it as a useless hamper on the progress of knowledge, if we find the conservative theologian ever on the alert and quick to assert his prescriptive right of possession. His duty it is to guard jealously the rather ill-defined field of revealed truth with its numerous outposts, and whatever be our personal convictions on a given issue, we should be indulgent, considering the susceptibilities of human nature, if he be found disputing the ground inch by inch, and yielding with ill grace when obliged to surrender a position to the aggressor. Such has ever been the condition attendant upon all scientific progress in the world, and though this opposition of conservatism often appears only as an obstacle, it has at least the advantage of rendering our advances more circumspect, and consequently more secure.

To maintain the proper equilibrium between the claims of the two methods in presence of changing scientific conditions is the constant aim of the new School. In any attempt to define the nature and attributes of inspiration the *a priori* form of reasoning has assuredly its place, as Father Lagrange carefully points out, but however legitimate the principle, its application needs to be regulated by the exigencies of the observed facts; and indeed so great and manifold have these accumulated exigencies become within the last half century, that the whole question of inspiration may be said to have entered into a new phase.

The specific theories and principles of solution advanced by these recent writers will be set forth and discussed in subsequent articles.

James F. Driscoll.

STUDIES.

STUDIES ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

Francis E. Gigot.

I. The Preparatory Ministry of John the Baptist.

A Literary Analysis of Mt. iii, 1-12; *Mk. i,* 1-8, *and Lk. iii,* 1-20.

One of the most interesting sections in the literary analysis of the first three Gospels, is that which describes the preparatory ministry of John the Baptist. It begins the series of the parallel accounts which go to make up our earliest records of Christ's public life, and exhibits literary features of great importance to one who studies inductively the origin and method of composition of the Synoptic Gospels. It will, therefore, form the subject-matter of this, our opening Study on the manner in which the first three Gospels originated.

Before, however, examining the contents of this important section, we give in parallel columns a direct translation of it from the original Greek, placing Mk's account in the first column, because it is shorter, and, as we shall see, more primitive, than that of either Mt. or Lk.[1]

I. General Resemblances Between These Two Accounts.

Despite the obvious differences which exist between Mk. i, 1-8, Mt. iii, 1-12, and Lk. iii, 1-20, these three accounts are closely connected in respect to general contents, purpose, and literary form. They deal with one and the same general topic, John's ministry, and look upon John's person and mission as fulfilling a certain prophetical passage of the Old Testament (Isai. xl, 3). They describe his ministry as twofold, preaching and baptizing, and assign it to the same general locality, "the desert" of Judea. They also tell us that John was most successful in this work, and that he nevertheless proclaimed the inferiority of his person and of his baptism to those of the coming One. Again, they have for their common purpose to set forth John's ministry as an introduction to Christ's public life; for they agree in representing John's coming, person, baptism, and preaching, as those of the immediate precursor of the Messias. Finally, in regard to literary form, there are significant resemblances between Mk. i, 1-8; Mt. iii, 1-12, and Lk. iii, 1-20: the passage of Isaias xl, 3 is quoted in all three directly from the Septuagint Version, and indeed with the self-same deviation from the Septuagint rendering;[1] and the words whereby John disclaims every title to Messiahship are so given in the three records as to bespeak their literary connection (*Cf.* Mk. i, 7-8; Mt. iii, 11; Lk. iii, 16).[2]

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[1] See these three parallel columns on a special page at the end of this Study.

II. Mark's Account Examined.

On reading attentively Mk. i, 1-8 in the light of the general resemblances just pointed out between the three Synoptic accounts of John's ministry, one soon perceives that our second Gospel presents here, in regard to contents, very little besides what it has in common with the other two Synoptics. It is plain also, that, in this respect, Mk's account is very different from those of Mt. and Lk. which contain long and material additions to what is common to the three records. And this naturally leads one to infer with nearly all contemporary scholars, that Mk's description of John's ministry is primitive in comparison with that in Mt. and Lk. This view is further confirmed by a close examination of the peculiarities noticeable in Mk. i, 1-8. Thus, the title "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," shows that, differently from the other two Synoptics, our second Gospel began "the glad tidings concerning Jesus Christ" with the mission of the Precursor; and it is a well-known fact that in its earliest form, evangelical tradition began with the record of John's ministry.[3] Again, Mk's peculiar citation of two passages, the first from Malachy and the second from Isaias, under the single formula "As it written in Isaias the prophet,"[4] should be regarded as primitive in comparison with Mt's and Lk's more accurate form of quotation:

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[1] The three Synoptics have: "make straight *his* (αὐτοῦ) paths," instead of "make straight the paths *of our God* (τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν) found in the lxx.

[2] *Cf.* Ezra P. Gould, the Gospel according to St. Mk. p. 10.

[3] *Cf.* Acts i, 22; x, 37; xiii, 24.

[4] A probable account for Mk's introduction of Malach. iii, 1, with Isai. xl, 3, under

Mk. i, 2, 3.	Mt. iii, 3.	Lk. iii, 4.
As it is written in Isaias the prophet.	It is he that was spoken of by the prophet Isaias, saying:	As it is written in the book of the words of Isaias the prophet:
"Behold, I send my angel before thy face, who shall prepare thy way (Malach. iii, 1)."		
"The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths (Isai. xl, 3)."	"The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths." (Isai. xl, 3).	"The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths." (Isai. xl, 3).

For, the omission of Malachy iii, 1 by Mt. and Lk., is naturally explained by supposing that these two evangelists, being aware of a reading like that of Mk. i, 2-3, wished to ascribe to Isaias, only those words that were found in his prophecy.[1]

In like manner, the statement peculiar to Mk. (i, 4*a*) that John "was baptizing in the desert," *i. e.*: in the waterless district of Judea, is certainly primitive, and gave way naturally to smoother expressions in later accounts of John's ministry. (See for example, Mt. iii, 1, "cometh John the Baptist *preaching in the desert.*")

Finally, that the parallel lines:

I have baptized you in water,
But He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost,

which are thus coupled together only in our second Gospel (Mk. i, 8), stand there in their primitive position, is not only suggested by the laws of Biblical parallelism, but is moreover confirmed by the striking analogy of the parallel lines in Acts i, 5, and xi, 16:

John indeed baptized you in water,
But you shall be baptized in the Holy Ghost.

III. Matthew's Account Examined.

The features peculiar to Mt's account of John's ministry are much more numerous than those which can be noticed in Mk's parallel record of it, and a large number of them may be considered as variations from statements found in our second Gospel. This is certainly the case with Mt's first two verses. Mt's general expression

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the general formula: "As it is written in Isaias the prophet," is given by H. B. Sweete, The Gospel according to St, Mark, 1898, p. 2.

[1] That Mt. and Lk. were acquainted with Mk's quotation of Malachy (iii, 1) appears from the fact that Mt. xi, 10, and Lk. vii, 27, contain Malachy's words with exactly the same variations from the lxx as found in Mk. i, 2.

"*And in those days* cometh John" (Mt. i, 1*a*), when viewed in the light of the preceding chapters which tell of Jesus' generation and infancy, and represent Him as the "Christ" (*Cf*. Mt. i, 18), and "the Son of of God" (*Cf*. Mt. i, 20*b*; ii, 15), is a natural substitute for Mk's general title: "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." The opening title in our second Gospel which excluded all preceding narrative concerning Christ, had to give way in Mt. to a formula which would connect the precursor's ministry with what he had told already of the Messias (Mt. i, ii). Mt's following expressions "cometh John the Baptist, preaching in the desert of Judea and saying: Repent . . . ", remind us forcibly of Mk's parallel words: "John was baptizing in the desert and preaching the baptism of repentance" (Mk. i, 4). Indeed, as was suggested above, Mt's peculiar wording "John the Baptist *preaching in the desert*," is a natural and intentional deviation from Mk's primitive statement that John "was *baptizing in the desert*, and preaching." Again, in speaking of "the desert *of Judea*," Mt. wishes apparently to improve on Mk's simpler expression "John was baptizing in the desert:" by giving explicitly what is only implied in Mk's statement.

The wording of Mt's following sentences (verses 3-6) resembles far more than that of his two opening verses, Mk's parrallel record (i, 3, 5, 6). Hence, it is proportionately easier here to point out the chief peculiarities of Mt's account, and to show that they are variations from what is found in St. Mk's Gospel. The first of these peculiarities consists in the fact that verse 3 in Mt. does not contain the words of Malachy, which Mk. (i, 2) quotes together with a passage from Isaias, under the general formula "As it is written in Isaias the prophet":

Mt. iii, 3.	Mk. i, 2.
It is he that was spoken of	
by the prophet Isaias, saying:	As it is written in Isaias the prophet:
. . . . .	Behold, I send my angel before thy face,
. . . . .	who shall prepare thy way. (Malachy iii, 1).
The voice of one crying in the desert:	The voice of one crying in the desert:
Prepare the way of the Lord,	Prepare the way of the Lord,
make straight his paths. (Isai. xl, 3).	make straight his paths. (Isai. xl, 3).

This fact, as we already remarked, has its natural explanation in Mt. dropping deliberately Malachy's words, in order to ascribe to Isaias, only the passage that is found in that prophet's writings.

A more significant peculiarity in Mt's record consists in the place it assigns to the description of John's personal appearance: "Now he, John, had his garment of camel's hair," etc. Differently from Mk's Gospel, Mt. puts it *before* speaking of the Jewish multitudes which hastened to John's baptism:

Mt. iii, 4, 6.	Mk. i, 5, 6.
4. Now he, John, had his garment of camel's hair,	5. And there went out to him
and a leathern girdle about his loins,	all the country of Judea,
and his food was locusts and wild honey.	and all they of Jerusalem;
5. Then went out to him	and were baptized by him in the
Jerusalem, and all Judea,	river Jordan, confessing their sins.
and all the region about the Jordan;	6. And John was clothed in camel's hair,
6. and were baptized by him in the	and a leathern girdle about his loins,
river Jordan, confessing their sins.	and he ate locusts and wild honey.

As the two Gospels here present practically the same wording, their difference in placing the description of John's personal appearance is not accidental. Nor can this difference be plausibly referred to an inversion, on the part of St. Mk., from the narrative that would have contained a more primitive order. For nothing in the whole context of our second Gospel requires such an inversion. Everything, on the contrary, is intimately and most naturally bound together. Thus after speaking of "John baptizing in the desert, and preaching the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins" (verse 4), Mk. naturally mentions the multitudes as "going out" to that desert, and being "baptized by John, confessing their sins" (verse 5). Next, he no less naturally introduces the description of John's personal appearance and food, wishing to state at once how the very sight of the Baptist's austere life struck those multitudes with awe (verse 6), and prepared them for giving credence to John's message which Mk. now proceeds to record (verses 7-8). Thus, everything in Mk's account hangs so well together that nothing in the entire context supplies any ground for regarding the place at which John's personal appearance is now found in our second Gospel, as due to an inversion from an earlier order, such, for instance, as the one given in Mt's narrative.

The case stands very differently with Mt's context in St. Matthew. Here (Mt. iii, 7-10) we find a long record of John's rebuke to the Pharisees and Sadducees, of which Mk. possibly knew nothing.[1] Mt. inserted it as a valuable addition to Mk's short account of John's ministry, just as Lk. clearly made, for the same reason, a further addition to that rebuke of the Pharisees and the Sadducees, by recording the Baptist's special advice to various classes of people (Lk. iii, 10-16)

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[1] This is the view of Father E. Jacquier, Histoire des Livres du Nouveau Testament, Paris, 1905, p. 39.

Now it is precisely this addition to Mk. by Mt., which entailed an inversion of the description of John's personal appearance and food. Had this description been left where it stood in Mk., *i. e.*, at the end of the account of the Jewish crowds going to be baptized by John, it would not have formed a natural introduction for the intended insertion of the Baptist's rebuke to the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The passage would have then read as follows:

> Mt. iii.—5. Then went out to him
> Jerusalem, and all Judea,
> and all the region about the Jordan;
> 6. and were baptized by him
> in the river Jordan, confessing their sins.
> 4. And John had his garment of camel's hair,
> and a leathern girdle about his loins,
> and his food was locusts and wild honey.
> 7. But seeing many of the Pharisees and the Sadducees
> coming to baptism, he said to them, etc.

But by inverting the description of John's appearance, and placing it *before* he spoke of the coming of multitudes to John's baptism, Mt. put the coming of the Pharisees and Sadducees in immediate connection with that of the multitudes, and thus secured a transition which is natural between what was found in Mk. and the rebuke which he wished to add to it.

As the addition of John's rebuke to those whom he addressed as an "offspring of vipers" suggests a satisfactory motive for the inversion, the origin of which we have just examined, so does it also explain the fact that Mt. does not contain the opening words in Mk. i, 7, "And he (John) preached, saying." These words were, indeed, necessary in Mk., where John had not yet been introduced as speaking to those who came to his baptism. But they had become useless after Mt's insertion of John's direct rebuke to the Pharisees and the Sadducees. Since John was thus represented as already speaking, Mk's words, "And he preached, saying," became superfluous in Mt's record.

A few remarks will suffice concerning the chief peculiarities noticeable in the last two verses of Mt's section. The first of these verses runs thus:

> Mt. iii, 11.—I indeed baptize you in water to repentance;
> but he who is coming after me is mightier than I,
> whose shoes I am not worthy to carry,
> He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and fire.

Here, we may notice the separation of two lines,—the first and fourth,—which, primitively, as we have already shown, followed immediately each other as they are given in Mk. i, 8:

I have baptized you in water,
But he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.

Apparently, their present separation is due to Mt's wish to introduce in a fitting manner, (*a*) Mk's description of the inferiority of John's person and work to those of the Messias; and (*b*) his own addition concerning Christ's judicial activity, which now makes up Mt's concluding verse (Mt. iii, 12).

Again, the wording of these two lines (Mt. iii, 11*a*, 11*d*), seems to be a variation from Mk's primitive reading:

Mt. iii, 11*a*.	Mk. i, 8.
I indeed baptize you in water *to repentance*;	I have baptized in water, . . .
11*d*. He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost *and fire*.	But he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost. . . .

That Mt's longer text is not primitive, appears probable from a comparison of it with the parallel lines in Acts i, 5; xi, 16, where we read:

John indeed baptized you in water, . . .
but you shall be baptized in the Holy Ghost. . . .

Mt. makes John speak of his baptism as one "*to repentance*," in harmony with a detail which is found in Mk. i, 4: "John was preaching the baptism *of repentance*" and which he has not yet utilized. When he makes him say that the coming One shall baptize "*in fire*," he wishes thereby to introduce John's declaration regarding Christ's judicial activity:

Mt. iii, 12.—Whose fan is in his hand,
and he will thoroughly cleanse his theshing-floor,
and will gather his wheat into the granary;
but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.[1]

Further details peculiar to Mt. iii, 1-12 could also be pointed out, and shown to be variations from Mk. i, 1-8. But we think that the peculiarities of Mt's record we have examined, are amply sufficient to prove the general position that in narrating John's ministry, St. Matthew is all along dependent on the more primitive account of St. Mark.

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[1] As regards the source from which Mt's additions (iii, 7-10; iii, 12) are derived, nothing can be defined with certainty. Their tone resembles that of many other additions found in our first gospel, so that the question of their probable origin may be more easily studied later on.

IV. Luke's Account Examined.

The foregoing analysis of Mk's and Mt's opening section of Christ's public life makes it easy now, to determine the relation which Lk's parallel record holds to our first two Gospels. Lk's account begins like that of Mt., with a dropping of the general title found in Mk. "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God" (Mk. i, 1). In two preceding chapters Lk., like Mt., had already given an account of Jesus' infancy and childhood, and he consequently, like Mt., had to omit here Mk's title, which excluded any such previous narrative. But instead of Mt's vague indication of time, "In those days cometh John the Baptist" (Mt. iii, 1*a*), he substitutes a synchronous statement "Now in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea," etc. (Lk. iii, 1, 2), whereby he evinces a desire, foreign to the first two evangelists, to fit the Gospel history into the history of the world. As Mt's expression "In the days" is scriptural, so is also that used by Lk., for it is strikingly parallel to the introductory formulas in Ezechiel i, 1-3*b*).[1] Again, when our third evangelist speaks of John as "the son of Zachary," he deliberately makes an addition to what he found in Mk. and Mt., with a view to connect more intimately his own narrative of John's ministry, with what he alone has told of the annunciation of a son to Zachary, and of John's birth and circumcision (Lk. i).

After his solemn introduction, Lk. describes the Baptist's general mission (Lk. iii, 3) in terms which seem to be borrowed from Mk's and Mt's parallel accounts:

> Lk. iii, 3. And he (John) came into all the region about Jordan,
> preaching the baptism of penance unto remission of sins.

In that verse, the expression "And he *came*" reminds us of Mk. i, 1: "And in those days *cometh* John"; the phrase "all the region about the Jordan," is identical with Mt's iii, 5*c*; and the sentence "preaching the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins" is borrowed from Mk. i, 4 *b*. *c*.

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[1] Ezechiel i, 1-3*b*.	Lk. iii, 1-2.
1. And it came to pass in the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, in the fifth day of the month . . .	1. Now in the fifth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar . . . (the synchronous rulers are here named)
2. . . . which was the fifth year of the captivity of King Joachim,	
3. The word of Yahweh came to Ezechiel, the son of Buzi, in the land of the Chaldeans. . . .	2. . . . the word of God came unto John, the son of Zachary, in the desert.

In the next verse (verse 4) Lk. agees with Mt. in his omission of Malachy's words, and with both Mt. and Mk. in their deviation from the LXX reading of Isai. xl, 3, as we already stated. But differently from our first two evangelists he adds the quotation of Isai. xl, 4, 5:

> Lk. iii, 5, 6.—Every valley shall be filled,
> and every mountain and hill shall be brought low;
> and the crooked shall be made straight,
> and the rough ways smooth;
> and all flesh shall see the salvation of God.

In thus extending his quotation from Isaias, Lk. had probably in view to prepare the introduction of John's special advice to the multitudes, the publicans, and the soldiers, which he is alone to record (Lk. iii, 10-14). In these various classes of people willing to do John's bidding and thus prepare for Christ's coming, he apparently saw the fulfilment of Isaias' prophecy (xl, 4, 5) concerning those who were allegorically described under the figure of mountains and hills, crooked and rough ways.

Before, however, making this important addition of his own, Lk. embodies Mt's addition to Mk's account, relative to those whom the Baptist called "offspring of vipers:"

Lk. iii, 7-9.	Mt. iii, 7-10.
7. He said therefore to the *multitudes* that went out to be baptized by him: Ye offspring of vipers, who warned you to flee from the wrath to come."	7. But seeing *many of the Pharisees* and the *Sadducees* coming to baptism, he said to them: Ye offspring of vipers, who warned you to flee from the wrath to come?
8. Bring forth therefore fruit worthy of repentance. And begin not to say within yourselves: We have Abraham for our father. For I tell you that God is able these tones to raise up children to Abraham.	8. Bring forth therefore fruit worthy of repentance. 9. And think not to say within yourselves We have Abraham for our father. For I tell you that God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham.
9. And now the axe is laid at the root of the trees. Every tree therefore that does not bring good fruit, is cut down and cast into the fire.	10. And now the axe is laid at the root of the trees. Every tree therefore that does not bring forth good fruit, is cut down and cast into the fire.

The only important difference which exists between these two passages, is connected with the first line of Mt's record: instead of the "many of the *Pharisees* and the *Sadducees*" mentioned in Mt. iii, 7*a*, as coming to John's baptism, Lk. speaks of "the *multitudes* that went out to be baptized by him." The change was effected by our third evangelist who, by using the word "multitudes," made up for his omission of the fact stated in Mt. (and also in Mk),[1] that crowds from *Judea* and *Jerusalem* hastened to John's baptism. Besides, Lk.

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[1] *Cf.* Mt. iii, 5, 6, and Mk. i, 5.

rightly saw that the Pharisees and the Sadducees came mingled with the crowds, and that the Baptist's words, though primarily meant for the Jewish leaders, were actually addressed to all present. He therefore dropped Mt's direct reference to the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and spoke explicitly of the multitudes, among which they came with the apparent purpose of being baptized by John.

After thus describing the Baptist's general rebuke to those who came to his baptism, Lk. inserts John's special advice to the various classes of people, who had taken to heart his exhortation to repentance (iii, 10-14). He gives this special advice in three parallel strophes, and in words characterictic of his own manner of writing.[1]

Lk's insertion added, it is true, a valuable point of information to what he found in Mt's Gospel. It had the inconvenience, however, of breaking the immediate connection which Mt. had established between John's rebuke to the multitudes (Mt. iii, 7-10), and the Baptist's declaration of his own inferiority to the Messias (Mt. iii, 11). It is presumably on this account that St. Luke makes a further addition to Mt's record, before inserting Mt. iii, 11. He describes the people at large as surmising that John might be the Christ, and thus obtains a transition to Mt. iii, 11, which he represents as an answer of John to the popular expectation:

Lk. iii, 15.—And as the people were in expectancy,
and all were reasoning in their hearts concerning John,
whether he was not the Christ.
16. John answered, saying to all:
I indeed baptize you in water;
but he who is mightier than I is coming,
the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to unloose.
He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and in fire.

In quoting these words of the Baptist to the multitude, Lk. had before his eyes Mk's record of them:

Mk. i, 7, 8.	Mt. iii, 11.
7. He who is mightier than I is coming after me, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose. 8. I have baptized you in water; but he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.	11. I indeed baptize you in water to repentance; but he who is coming after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to carry. He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and in fire.

Like Mk. i, 8*a*, Luke simply speaks of John's baptism "in water," while Mk. speaks of it as "in water *unto repentance*"; like Mk. also

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[1] Compare in particular the question he puts here on the lips of the multitudes, of the publicans, and of the soldiers, with that he ascribes to the repentant Jews in Acts ii, 37*b*.

(i, *7bc*), he makes the Baptist declare that he is not worthy "to unloose the latchet" of the shoes of the coming One, while Mt. says that John proclaimed himself not worthy "to carry them." It is, however, with Mt's parallel passage, that Lk. iii, 16 has a closer connection: Lk. agrees with Mt. in separating the two parallel lines which make up Mk. i, 8, and which, as we have seen, primitively followed each other; like Mt. also, he has the addition "and in fire," after Mk's last sentence "he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost" (Mk. i, *8b*); and he thus introduces, as was done by Mt., a description of Christ's judicial activity, which is not found in Mk's narrative, but borrowed from Mt. himself.:

Lk. iii, 17.	Mt. iii, 12.
Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor, and will gather his wheat into the granary; but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.	Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor, and will gather his wheat into his granary; but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.

The last three verses in Lk. (iii, 18-20) are peculiar to our third Gospel. The first reads thus:

And exhorting many other things,
did he preach the good tidings to the people,

Lk. added it as a direct conclusion to his account of John's discourses, thus giving to understand that the foregoing are only samples of the numerous exhortations which the Baptist addressed to those who flocked to him.[1]

Lk's last two verses form a conclusion to the entire preparatory ministry of Christ's precursor. They are a summary of a much larger account in Mt. (xiv, 3-12) and Mk. (vi, 17-29) of the manner in which John's public ministry came to an end: he was shut up in prison by Herod, the tetrarch of Galilee. In giving this summary here, our third evangelist completes Mk's and Mt's description of the preparatory ministry of the son of Zachary; and his insertion of it, is in full harmony with Mk's statement (i, 14,) that it was only "after that John was delivered up," that "Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God." Of course, when Lk. comes in his narrative to the point where the first two Synoptics record in detail the imprisonment of John the Baptist, he deliberately omits what

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[1] Lk. iii, 18, resembles in style and purpose Lk. xxii, 65, which is also an addition by our third Evangelist to the other two Synoptics:

And blaspheming many other things,
did they speak against him.

Mk. and Mt. say of that event (*Cf.* Lk. ix, 7-10, with Mk. vi, 14-30, and Mt. xiv, 1-13).

V. General Conclusions.

The following are the general conclusions suggested by our study of Mk. i, 1-8; Mt. iii, 1-12; and Lk. iii, 1-20:

(1) A literary connection must be admitted between these three passages;

(2) In comparison to Mt's and Lk's records, Mk's account of John's preparatory ministry is primitive;

(3) Mt. iii, 1-12 is so dependent on Mk, i, 1-8 that many of its peculiarities are variations from the statements found in St. Mark's Gospel;

(4) Lk. iii, 1-20, presupposes both Mk. i, 1-8, and Mt. iii, 1-12, so that the order in which the three records have been composed is (*a*) Mk.; (*b*) Mt.; (*c*) Lk.;

(5) The literary dependence here of Mt. on Mk., and of Lk. on them both, is similar to that which an attentive examination of our first three Gospels discloses throughout their respective narratives of Our Lord's public life;

(6) Despite all the differences noticeable in Mk. i, 1-8; Mt. iii, 1-12; and Lk. i, 1-20, there is a wonderful agreement in regard to the substance of these three narratives, and none of the differences amounts to what might be called a contradiction.

Francis E. Gigot.

Mk. i, 1-8.	Mt. iii. 1-12.
1. The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. 2. As it is written in Isaias the prophet: Behold, I send my angel before thy face, who shall prepare thy way. 3. The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths!	1. And in those days cometh John the Baptist, preaching in the desert of Judea, and saying: 2. Repent; for the Kingdom of God is at hand! 3. For this is he that was spoken of by the prophet Isaias, saying: The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths!
4. John was baptizing in the desert, and preaching the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins.	
5. And there went out to him all the country of Judea, and all they of Jerusalem; and were baptized by him in the river Jordan, confessing their sins. 6. And John was clothed in camel's hair, and a leathern girdle about his loins; and he ate locusts and wild honey.	4. Now he, John, had his garment of camel's hair, and a leathern girdle about his loins, and his food was locusts and wild honey. 5. Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region about the Jordan; 6. And were baptized by him in the river Jordan, confessing their sins.
	7. But seeing many of the *Pharisees* and the *Sadducee* coming to baptism, he said to them: Ye offspring of vipers, who warned you to flee from the wrath to come? 8. Bring forth therefore fruit worthy of repentance. 9. And think not to say within yourselves: We have Abraham for our father. For I tell you that God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham. 10. And now the axe is laid at the root of the trees. Every tree therefore that does not bring forth good fruit is cut down and cast into the fire.
7. And he preached, saying: He who is mightier than I is coming after me, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose. 8. I have baptized you in water; but he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.	11. I indeed baptize you in water to repentance; but he who is coming after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to carry. He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and in fire. 12. Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor, and will gather his wheat into the granary; but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.

NOTES.

The great number of books and magazine-articles treating of various phases of the Scripture problem that have recently come from the pens of Catholic scholars is a fact well deserving of special notice, since it indicates a very widespread interest in matters of Biblical Criticism, a science which is, pre-eminently, the object of discussion at the present day. Many are the more remarkable, as foreshadowing the introduction among the people at large of principles and methods hitherto confined to more advanced scholars. For, while a large part of the work that has been done is of a technical nature, and intended only for those who are possessed of a deep and thorough knowledge of the subject, much of it also is in a popular vein, meant for persons whose notions are more general and less scientific. This is nothing but the world-old "filtering" process: when we see plainly stated in the popular magazines positions which, not so very long ago, were met with only in the more strictly scientific periodicals, we simply recognize the working of the law that "the paradoxes of one generation become the commonplaces of the next."

The work likely to occur most readily to the reader's mind is that of Fr. von Hummelauer, S. J., on Inspiration. It is not necessary to consider it in detail here, but we may remark that not the least notable feature of the book is that it comes from a scholar who, having been considered one of the strongest defenders of "Conservative" positions, must henceforth be ranked with the more "advanced" section of Catholic exegetes and critics. For his theory of Biblical Inspiration and of the Truth of Holy Writ, whether satisfactory or not, is founded on facts that are the offspring of modern methods of Scripture study.

From Holland to France, from France to Palestine, and from Palestine to England is a long journey, and the necessity for taking it shows how practically universal is this movement. In the Autumn of 1902, Fr. Lagrange, O. P., of "L' Ecole Biblique Catholique de Jérusalem," delivered at the University of Toulouse a series of conferences afterwards published under the title of "La Méthode Historique." The book attracted much attention; and criticism, both favorable and unfavorable, was passed upon it. Though all acknowledged it as a masterly treatment of the subject, there were some who considered parts of its teaching unsafe; while others thought that it is only along the lines therein laid down that a truly scientific defense of the Bible can be made. It is probably among these latter that we must reckon the English prelate, one of the leading members of the hierarchy in his own country, who suggested the translation of it that has recently been published by the Catholic Truth Society of London. While this was hardly necessary for scholars, the fact of its being deemed advisable by so high an authority proves that, as the people in general are becoming interested in these problems, it is a matter of prudence to see that they approach them through Catholic channels.

It is chiefly to the work of these two scholars that we owe the article by Fr. Sydney F. Smith, S. J., in *The Month* for January of this year. After setting forth the limits within which, in view of the official teaching of the Church, Catholics are free to speculate and to form their theories, he considers, in particular, the ideas on the inerrancy and inspiration of the Bible propounded, among others, by Frs. von Hummelauer and Lagrange. The article, while professing to be hardly more than an exposé of their teaching, in reality goes further, and becomes at the end a plea for fairness and patience on the part of all concerned. It is a timely paper, and will, no doubt, cause many to approach these subjects with fewer prejudices than might otherwise have possessed their minds.

Fr. Lagrange, however, is treated in different wise by a confrère of Fr. Smith, viz., the Rev. Père Delattre, formerly of the University of Louvain. In his book "Autour de la Question Biblique," published at Liege last year, he takes the new school of exegesis somewhat severely to task. Replying upon "La Méthode Historique" for a statement of the principles of this school, he disputes not only its right to claim the authority of St. Jerome and of Pope Leo XIII, but also the interpretation of certain Scripture passages proposed by Fr. Lagrange. The latter is accused of wishing to see in the Bible nothing but myths, legends, popular notions, etc., and even of making a Bible for himself! While a thorough critical handling of such positions as those of the Dominican scholar is to be welcomed, it can scarcely be expected that any ultimate good will come from over-severe attacks. The situation is difficult enough, and calls for a full measure of charity for the brethren and the long patience of faith.

Shortly after the appearance of Fr. Smith's article, *The Tablet* published a series of studies on Inspiration by the Abbot of Downside. They are, in one sense, strongly conservative in tone, evincing a desire on the part of the writer for a more general return to Patristic and Scholastic teaching on this question. But at the same time it is a conservatism that is united to a breath of knowledge and a candor and directness of statement that are often supposed to be the peculiar property of the "advanced" schools. Most probably it is through methods such as are here displayed that the settlement of the biblical problem is to come; for if we read the Abbot's article carefully, we shall find that it is not a slavish adherence to antiquity that he advocates, but rather a resumption of the freedom which, for three centuries past, Catholic scholarship, on account of the misdirection given by Protestant controversy, has almost entirely lost. What is in the minds of thinking Catholics is clearly evidenced by the lively discussion that has been carried on in the columns of *The Tablet*, as a result of these papers; and it is partly on this account that we are enabled to congratulate the Abbot on the medium he has chosen for the expression of his ideas.

On this side of the Atlantic also scholars have been busy. *The Messenger* is publishing a series of articles on "The Nature of Inspiration," by the Rev. A. J. Maas, S. J., who is professor of Sacred Scripture at the Jesuit Scholasticate in Woodstock. This last fact alone would lead us to expect something of value, and we are by no means disappointed. In the parts that have already appeared we have a careful and judicious treatment of the subject, considered in the light both of Catholic dogma and of contemporary critical science. But it is not quite apparent for what reason Fr. Maas gives so much prominence to the writings of Anglican divines. For clearness and convenience he sums up, at the end of the second article (May) the conclusions at which he arrives, which are: (1) Inspiration extends to all the books of Sacred Scripture, with all their parts; (2) it extends to all the biblical statements concerning matters of faith and morals; (3) it extends, furthermore, to all statements of the sacred authors;

(4) in the verbal expression of the sacred text it secures only their appropriateness and their inerrancy, without necessarily determining the very words of the writers. From the last of these propositions it will be seen that Fr. Maas rejects the "verbal inspiration" theory of such Catholic writers as Lagrange, Loisy and Abbot Ford.

Upon the historical aspect of the question Dr. Poels, of the Catholic University of America, has been contributing articles to *The Catholic University Bulletin* of the current year. After comparing the situation of our writers to-day with that of the early Fathers who introduced into the Church the Greek philosophy, the writer gives a general treatment of Scriptural Infallibility, and then traces the development of this doctrine down through the various ages of the Church, taking care to show the apologetic bearing of the facts he brings forward. The articles are careful and thorough, but their good effect is somewhat lessened by over-generosity in the matter of quotations.

This "specimen" list is already somewhat lengthy, but we cannot omit mentioning the publication in *The Catholic World*, of a correspondence between the Rev. James J. Fox, D. D., of St. Thomas' College, Catholic University of America, and a student in one of our non-sectarian universities. The young man, having come into contact with a number of persons outside the Church, had encountered a host of objections, chiefly from a biblical standpoint, and in consequence, while by no means losing his faith, had become somewhat disquieted. He sought advice in several quarters, and read books that were recommended to him, but all to no purpose; and so at last he decided to consult one of the professors at Washington. His state of mind, as described in his first letter, is not at all an unusual one, and so the replies he received could, *mutatis mutandis*, be made to apply to a number of cases of which his is a type. A friend of the author, seeing this, suggested their publication, and as a result this student has been an occasion of a great amount of good; for, apart from what we may reasonably expect *a priori*, we happen to know of not a few instances in which these letters have settled difficulties that had almost become doubts. Dr. Fox should now be persuaded to present them in book form, to a still wider public.

It is hardly necessary to mention any more of the writings of Catholics on this subject: those of which we have spoken will indicate what is being done along these lines. The fact that so much is being produced in this one department gives evidence of an increasing interest on the part, not only of scholars, but also, as we said in the beginning, of "the rank and file" of the people. It is a matter for felicitation that, at a time when they are so much in need, the Church has at her service spokesmen who, whether they address the learned few or the inquiring many, are singularly fitted for their task.

More important than any of these individual attempts at a solution of the difficulties which surround the question of Inspiration, is an official decision bearing on one of the theories advanced by Catholic scholars—namely, that of "implicit citations." The decision has been rendered by the Pontifical Commission for Biblical Studies, and is published in the April number of the *Revue Biblique*, which is the official organ of the Commission. As the answer has evidently been worded with great care, and will arouse a variety of comment and interpretation, we shall give it in its original form.

The question proposed to the Commission was as follows:

"Utrum ad enodandas difficultates quae occurrunt in nonnullis S. Scripturæ textibus, qui facta historica referre videntur, liceat Exegetæ Catholico asserere agi in his de citatione tacita vel implicita documenti ab auctore non inspirato conscripti, cujus adserta omnia auctor inspiratus minime adprobare aut sua facere intendit, quæque ideo ab errore immunia haberi non possunt?"

The answer of the Commission, with the approval of the Holy Father, runs thus:

"Negative, excepto casu in quo, salvis sensu ac judicio Ecclesiæ, solidis argumentis probetur: (1) Hagiographum alterius dicta vel documenta revera citare; et (2) eadem nec probare nec sua facere, ita ut jure censeatur non proprio nomine loqui."

The answer itself is perfectly clear, and leaves ample room and liberty for the labors of scholars who consider the theory of implicit citations as offering the best way out of the difficulties against Biblical inerrancy. But it throws upon these students the burden of proving, and by "solid arguments," that the sacred writer made use of the work of others (a task which, for many cases, they will consider easy to perform); and furthermore (what is evidently much more difficult) that the inspired author does not make the borrowed matter his own.

It is easy to see that there will be a wide diversity of opinion as to what are "solid arguments" on a point such as this. The most striking feature of the document is that it seems to indicate a determination on the part of the authorities to insist on having Biblical problems treated with patient and painstaking scholarship; and, this being secured, to grant a large measure of freedom to competent students—always, of course, "salvis sensu ac judicio Ecclesiæ."

Encouragement of a very substantial nature is given to Biblical studies by Lord Braye's prize for the best dissertation on a scriptural topic. This year it was divided between Rev. Cecil Delisle Burns, Professor in St. Edmund's College, Ware, and Rev. Wenceslaus Irus, a deacon in the Seminary of Prague. The thesis for 1906 is a comparison between the recently discovered Hebrew text of Ecclesiasticus and the Latin Vulgate Version. The dissertations are to be written in Latin, and are to be in the hands of the Consultors of the Biblical Commission before April next. The competition is open to all students in Sacred Orders, who are pursuing their studies in institutions which have the power to grant degrees in Theology.

Another sign of Catholic activity in intellectual matters, in a still wider field, is the project of publishing a Catholic Encyclopedia. There has never been any question as to the need of such a publication, but in matters such as this, no demand, however exigent, can create a supply. It must be the work of hundreds of scholars specially prepared for the handling of the various kinds of topics which a *Catholic* Encyclopedia must treat. The possibility of filling the need is the result of the zealous, and generally ill-requited labors of the large number of Catholic scholars who have been devoting their energies for a generation past, to the defence of the fundamental positions of Holy Mother Church. *The New York Review*, which is the outcome of the desire to concentrate the efforts of such students in a special field of work, gives a hearty welcome to the new project, and hopes to find in it a monument of Catholic faith and learning.

The centre of Catholic learning in America, the University at Washington, in spite of passing financial difficulties, is also proceeding confidently with a plan to widen the circle of its activities. In opening a department for undergraduate students, it is acting in accordance with the experience of other American Universities which were originally founded for purely graduate work. In addition to the obvious advantage that lies in a continuous and consistent course of studies for university students, there is the practical economical consideration of extending the fruits of the labors of our best teachers to a larger number of auditors. It is to be hoped that the success of this plan will obviate the criticisms of well-intentioned but short-sighted persons, who are prevented by their limitations from taking a proper view of what constitutes the functions of a University, and who are prone to judge of its success by standards of quantity rather than of quality.

Those interested in clerical training—and who is not in these days?—will find well worthy of perusal the *Historical Sketch of the Philadelphia Theological Seminary* issued by Rev. A. J. Schulte, of the Seminary Faculty. Overbrook has led the way in many of the improvements in the conditions of sacerdotal education in America, and its success is attested not only by the distinguished Alumni whom it has produced, but also by the excellence of the magazines, the Ecclesiastical Review and the Dolphin, which are edited by one of its professors, Rev. H. J. Heuser. To the historian, Father Schulte's work will appeal as a valuable contribution to the story of Catholic development in America; to the average American Catholic, whose face is set towards the future rather than the past, its record of successes will give pleasure as pointing to still more glorious triumphs in the future of Catholicity in this country.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Dictionary of the Bible—Dealing with its Language, Literature and Contents, including the Biblical Theology. Edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D: Vol. I., A-F., 863 pp; Vol. II., F-R., 870 pp; Vol. III., K.-P., 896 pp; Vol. IV., P-Z., 994 pp; Vol. V., (Extra Volume), 936 pp., with full Indexes and Maps. Edinburgh—New York. 1898-1904.

With the completion of the Dictionary proper, in four volumes, and the addition of an Extra Volume, Dr. Hastings may feel the satisfaction of having built up an enduring monument of scholarship. The Editor, in fact, as well as the contributors and publishers of this epoch-making work have earnestly and successfully endeavored to give us the best and most complete Dictionary of the Bible in existence, and, for this, they are fully entitled to the sincerest thanks of Jewish and Christian scholars and students alike.

It is not too much to say that the work, as a whole, embodies the best available information concerning Biblical and Oriental History, Archæology, Ethnography, Geography, Philology and Exegesis, and reflects a great deal of credit upon English, German and American scholarship. From its very first appearance, Dr. Hastings' Dictionary was unanimously commended as a real Thesaurus of sound and sober biblical learning. It is more than a dictionary. It is an encyclopedia, and a complete working library in itself. For the student of the Bible it should be a *Vade Mecum*; for the preacher it is indispensable, if he is anxious to have a thorough knowledge of the matters he must treat. To the scholar and teacher, furthermore, it affords an almost invaluable mine of information. The whole work, in fact, forms a veritable encyclopedia of biblical science, and probably the most complete and the best balanced of all that are at present in existence.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the immense progress made in biblical and oriental studies, there was a total lack of a thorough, reliable, exhaustive and up to date dictionary of the Bible. The need was deeply and universally felt, but none seemed to have dared undertake the arduous task. Dom Calmet's

"Dictionary of the Holy Bible," (Eng. Trans. by Taylor in five vols. in 4mo. London, 1829, 1848 and 1862); Eadie's "Biblical Cyclopædia," (London, 1848); Cassell's "Bible Dictionary," (London, 1866, in two vols.); Kitto's "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature," (London, 1847, in two vols., and later greatly enlarged and edited by William Lindsay Alexander in three large vols. Philadelphia, 1865, and also 1876), Schenkel's "Bibel-Lexicon" and McClintock-Strong "Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature," (in ten vols., 1867-'81, and with supplement, 1890), etc., etc. . . . had already become obsolete, useless and inte esting only from an antiquarian point of view. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," (1st ed., London, 1863, in three vols.; 2d ed., 1893; revised and edited in four vols. by Prof. H. B. Hackett and Ed. Abbott, Boston, 1868-1870), helpful as it was thirty-five years ago, is now out of date. Herzog's excellent "Real encyclopædia für Protestant Theologie," (of which a new edition is in course of publication under the direction of Dr. Hauk), and Dr. Kaulen's Catholic "Kirchenlexicon," notwithstanding their intrinsic value and scientific character, are necessarily inadequate to the needs of the biblical student on account of the wide field they cover.

The first real modern dictionary of the Bible was that projected and edited by the well-known Sulpitian scholar, Abbé F. Vigouroux, of Paris, assisted by several hundreds of Catholic scholars, most of whom are French. The work, colossal in size, and a model in execution and learning, is written from a strictly Catholic exegetical standpoint and reminds us of the wonderful productions of mediæval scholasticism. Fullness of detail, abundance of erudition, an almost unparalleled richness of biographical and bibliographical information, and a very conservative attitude towards the modern conclusions of biblical criticism are the characteristic features of this very useful work. The first part appeared in 1890, and up to the present time only twenty five fascicules, ending with the word Matthathias, have been published. When completed it will probably form five or six huge volumes of about twelve to fifteen thousand columns, each fascicule being equivalent to three volumes in 12mo. of 300 pages each.

In 1890, William Robertson Smith, the foremost Oriental scholar and Biblical critic of England, conceived the plan of a critical dictionary of the Bible. His untimely and much regretted death, however, cut short a career of unusual brilliance and originality. At his death he committed the execution of the plan to Canon Cheyne, the distinguished Oriel professor of Exegesis at Oxford, and one of the most original and suggestive biblical critics of our times. Assisted by Dr. Sutherland Black, formerly assistant editor of the "Encyclpædia Britannica," and with the collaboration of the most distinguished biblical and oriental scholars of Germany, England and America, he published his "Encyclopædia Biblica" in four volumes: Vol. I. (A-D, cols. 1-1144), London, 1899; Vol. II. (E-K, cols. 1145-2688), London, 1901; Vol. III. (L-P, cols. 2689-3988), London, 1902; Vol. IV. (Q-Z, cols. 3989-5444), London, 1903. It is undeniable that Cheyne's "Encyclopædia Biblica," as a whole, is a marvel of painstaking, conscientious and original scholarship. Many of its views and theories, however, are decidedly ultra-radical and extremely hazardous, while a great many of its conclusions, suggestions, emendations and results are hypothetical and doubtful in the superlative degree. This constitutes its most vulnerable and objectionable feature. Wincklerism, Cheynism, Babylonism, Jerahmelitism, North Arabian mania, mythology, imagination and conjectures have full sway, and this is especially true whenever an article is written by Cheyne himself, or, when he supplements, as he often does, the articles of others with his own views and suggestions. The work is admirable and almost unique for its originality, freshness of views, erudition and suggestiveness, but, as a whole, it fails to give us what it is supposed to give: *i. e.*, the latest and best *results*—and not theories,—of sound and sober biblical criticism. It is not a dictionary of the Bible, but rather an encyclopædia of biblical criticism, and consequently must be used with great caution, and "*cum mica salis*."

It was left to Dr. Hastings and his associates to give us a dictionary of the Bible that should occupy a middle position between the over strict conservatism of Vigouroux's "*Dictionnaire de la Bible*" and the ultra-radicalism of Cheyne's "*Encyclopædia Biblica*." That Dr. Hastings has succeeded, and wonderfully so, in this task, is unanimously admitted, and this is the chief merit and value of his Dictionary. His work is strictly scientific, eminently critical, entirely up to date, thorough and complete, and yet reverent in tone, sober in its criticism and, generally speaking, sound in its conclusions. It goes without saying that in a work of this kind the various articles cannot have the same value nor are they all exempt from those faults and defects that are necessarily inherent in the heterogeneous productions of this kind. Some of the articles are decidedly inferior to others; some are too lengthy. Of the writers, some seem over-cautious and fearful, while others are ultra-critical and advanced. But, as a whole, it is, undoubtedly, the best balanced dictionary of the Bible in existence.

Some of the articles are complete treatises in themselves, such as that on "*Jesus Christ*," by Sanday; "*God* (*in O. T.*)," "*Eschatology of the Old Testament*" and "*Prophecy and Prophets*," by the late Dr. Davidson; "*Canon of the Old and New Testament*," by Drs. Wood and Stanton respectively, etc. Among others, Dr. Driver contributes some of the finest articles in the Dictionary, such as "*Sabbath*;" "*Son of Man*," etc.

Assyriology, Egyptology and Oriental Archæology in general are well represented by the articles of Hommel, Sayce, Prof. Price of Chicago, Dr. Pinches, Prof. W. Max Muller of Philadelphia, Griffith, Whitehouse, Kennedy, Selbie, and others. Palestinian Geography and Archæology are extremely well dealt with by Lieut.-General Warren, Wilson, and Col. Conder, and their numerous contributions are amongst the most valuable in the whole Dictionary. Dr. Ramsay writes with his usual competency on everything connected with St. Paul and the geography and history of Asia Minor.

One of the cleverest and undoubtedly most original articles in the Dictionary is that on the "*Language of the Old Testament*," written by the well known Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford, Dr. D. S. Margoliouth. In it he gives us a comprehensive survey of the origin, linguistic affinities and historical development of the Hebrew language, and devotes a special section to biblical Aramaic. The most characteristic feature of the article consists in the fact that he regards Hebrew as the daughter of Arabic. He also contributes many other articles. The articles which have reference to the Hexateuch, by Ryle, Woods, and Harford-Battersby, are very well written. Dr. F. Brown's article on the "*Books of Chronicles*," is an admirable piece of work, and one of surprising freshness and originality. The chief linguistic peculiarities of the Chronicler and of the parallels to his narrative are discussed with great attention to detail. Equally satisfactory are the articles on the "*Genealogy of Jesus Christ*," by Dr. Bacon; "*Matthew*" (Evangelist, and Gospel of), by Dr. Bartlet; and those of Burkitt on "*Arabic Versions*," Chapman on "*Exodus and Journey to Canaan*" (jointly with J. Rendel Harris); Prof. Charles on "*Apocalyptic Literature*," and especially that on the "*Eschatology of the Apocrypha and Apocalyptic Literature*." Prof. W. T. Davison's articles on "*Job*" and

"Psalms" are well written and very conservative. Dr. R. S. Kennedy's numerous articles are very satisfactory, as are those also by Dr. James H. Moulton. There is some very good work by German scholars, of whom we note Dr. König, of Bonn; Dr. Nestle, of Maulbronn; Dr. Nowack, of Strassburg; Rr. Rothstein, of Halle, and the late Dr. Siegfried, of Jena.

The articles on the New Testament subjects are, as a rule, written from a more conservative standpoint than those the Old Testament, which is probably due to the general attitude of the more conservative elements of the Anglican Church.

The fifth and extra volume deserves, however, special mention and commendation. It was a very happy idea, that of publishing in an extra volume articles on subjects which though not properly a part of the contents of the Bible nor dealing directly with its language and its literature, nevertheless have such bearing on the interpretation and correct understanding of the Old and New Testament as to form an almost integral part of them. These articles deal mainly with the most recent archeological, geographical, epigraphical, and literary researches and discoveries made in Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Greece, Asia Minor as well as in the vast treasures hidden in the public libraries and museums of Europe. One leading and most elaborate article is that of Prof. Emil Kautzsch of the University of Halle, on the *"Religion of Israel,"* which has been justly described as a "star of the first magnitude." The article, which covers no less than 121 pages, is a complete treatise in itself. He spent on it, we are told, fully two years, and it is hardly necessary to emphasize the masterly and scholarly way in which the article is written. It discusses more than the religion of the Old Testament; it treats rather of the religion of Israel as one of the Semitic nations, and, consequently, from a historical and comparative point of view, which constitutes its real excellence and value. Prof. Ramsay's article on the *"Religion of Greece and Asia Minor,"* (47 pages) is another classical article of the extra volume. The ability of the author is beyond parallel and his charming style adds to its beauty. The article on the *"Races of the Old Testament,"* and *"Religion of Babylonia and Assyria"* are written by that accurate and competent scholar, Dr. Morris Jastrow, of Philadelphia, who is an acknowledged authority on the subject, and whose epoch-making book on the Religion of Babylonia and Assyria (published in 1898) is now being published in German. The same scholarly features are abundantly conspicuous in the articles

"Semites," by Prof. MacCurdy, of Toronto; *"Religion of Egypt,"* by Prof. Wiedemann, of Bonn; *"Talmud,"* by Dr. Schechter, formerly of Cambridge, and now president of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York; *"Diatessaron,"* by Prof. Stemming, of Oxford; *"Diaspora;"* by Prof. Schuerer, of Göttingen; *"Didache,"* by Prof. Bartlet, of Oxford, *"Papyri,"* by Dr. Kenyon, of Oxford; and the *"Style of Scripture,"* and *"Samaritan Pentatench,"* by our foremost living Hebrew scholar and grammarian, Dr. Eduard König, of Bonn. The article on the recently discovered "Code of Hammurabi," by Dr. Johns, of King and Queen's College, will be considered in an article on the same subject in the next number of this Review. Worthy of all commendation are the two articles on *"New Testament Times"* and *"Roads and Travels in the Old Testament,"* by Prof. Buhl, of Copenhagen, and *"Roads and Travels in the New Testament,"* by Dr. Ramsay, of Aberdeen. They are extremely accurate and valuable. The other articles are those on *"Agrapha,"* by J. Hardy Ropes, of Harvard; *"Apocryphal Gospels,"* by J. G. Tasker; *"Concordances,"* by Prof. Redpath, of London—this could be more exhaustive and satisfactory; *"Continental Versions,"* by Rev. J. M. Llewellyn; *"Development of Doctrine in the Apocryphal Period,"* by Rev. W. Fairweather; *"Greek Patristic Commentaries on the Pauline Epistles,"* by C. H. Turner, of Oxford—useful but out of place in the extra volume; *"Gospel According to the Hebrews,"* by Dr. Allan Menzies, of the University of St. Andrews; *"Philo,"* by Dr. Drummond, of Oxford; *"Revelation,"* by Prof. A. G. Garvie, of London; *"Sermon on the Mount,"* by C. W. Votaw, of the University of Chicago; *"Ships and Boats,"* by Rear-Admiral R. M. Blomfield; *"Sibylline Oracles,"* by Prof. Rendel Harris, extremely clever and valuable; *"Symbols and Symbolical Actions,"* by Dr. E. König, of Bonn; *"Textual Criticism of the N. T.,"* by Dr. I. O. F. Murray; *"Theocracy,"* by Dr. V. H. Stanton, of Cambridge; *"Trinity,"* by Dr. H. M. Scott, of Chicago; *"English Versions,"* by Dr. I. H. Lupton, of London; *"Wages,"* by Rev. W. H. Bennett, of London, extremely valuable and accurate; and finally the article on the *"Worship of Apollo,"* by L. R. Farnell, of Oxford—thirty-seven articles in all, with four maps and six indexes.

The importance and value of the extra volume are in some respects even superior to those of the Dictionary proper; and we heartily recommend the whole work to all biblical and theological students. It should be on the library table of all those who have at heart the interest of our Christian religion; and although we may differ with many of its views and conclusions, nevertheless it is safe to say that, as a whole, Dr. Hastings' Bible Dictionary is the best, safest and most complete dictionary of the Bible in existence.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

Le Livre d' Isaie—Traduction critique, avec Notes at Commentaires, par le P. Albert Condamin, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris, V. Lecoffre, 1905.

This work is a new translation of the Messianic prophet *par excellence.* It forms a worthy part of the critical commentary on the whole Bible, which Père Lagrange, O. P. undertook sometime ago, and two volumes of which—the one on Judges, by Lagrange himself, and the other on St. John, by Th. Calmes—have already been given to the public. While, however, Lagrange's and Calmes' volumes deal with all the topics appertaining to a critical commentary on a book of Holy Writ, Fr. Condamin's present work is limited to "a critical translation," with "notes and comments," of the prophecy of Isaias. For nearly all questions bearing on the higher criticism of the book, such as its authorship, date of composition, etc., the learned Jesuit refers us to his forthcoming *Introduction* to Isaias. This omission will perhaps appear to many readers of the present volume a serious drawback, but it is probably due to Fr. Condamin's fear lest his work should have proved too bulky, if he had treated in it those important questions with the fullness they naturally require. However this may be, we may feel assured that he will handle all such introductory topics in the second volume, with the same critical acumen and broad scholarship which he displays in the commentary before us.

In his "Preface" (pp. v-xiii), Père Condamin sets forth briefly the method of treatment he has adopted in his work. He intends to make a historical and critical study of the text,and thereby determine its exact literal meaning. This is why he has constantly made use of recent critical works, and has appealed but seldom to the works of the early Church Fathers; for, while the former deal directly, and almost exclusively, with such literary problems as confronted Père Condamin, the latter, if we accept St. Jerome, have hardly ever referred to them. Of course, in utilizing the labors of his predecessors in the critical field, the writer always acts as an independent Catholic scholar, willingly endorsing what he finds to be right, but also freely setting aside what he thinks to be inaccurate or arbitrary. In regard to the strophaic arrangement of the prophecies of Isaias, in particular, he claims to be very independent of his predecessors, and there is no doubt, that throughout his commentary he has investigated and applied valuable principles concerning Hebrew strophes, with a thoroughness peculiarly his own.

After stating the order in which, according to him, strophes succeed one another in Isaias, together with the means whereby it can be recognized, Père Condamin gives a complete list of the works, ancient and modern, which he has consulted, and then proceeds to the body of his work (pp. 1-400).

The translation contains, as might be naturally expected, two principal parts: chaps. i-xxxix, which is simply entitled "Isaias," and corresponds to what is commonly called by critics the "Proto-Isaias"; and chaps. xl-lxvi, to which is given the significant title of "Prophetical poems on the end of the Babylonian exile," and which corresponds to what usually goes under the name of the "Deutero-Isaias." In both parts, the translator renders an emended Hebrew text, subjoining, as he goes along, in short footnotes, his grounds for the readings he has preferred. In both parts, he breaks the text into groups of strophes which, according to him, may be distinguished in the book of Isaias. In both parts too, the symmetrical arrangement he advocates, leads him repeatedly to admit that transpositions, glosses, etc., have crept into the book, and to modify the text accordingly. In both parts, at the end of each poem or group of strophes he inserts two long sections, one of which discusses its literary structure, the other its historical reference. In both parts finally, he avails himself of the best sources of information, and treats the questions he takes up with a delicate faculty of literary and historical insight. So that his whole work is, what he intended it to be, "a critical translation," worthy of the best scholarship of the day.

Before concluding our remarks on this excellent volume, we wish to call attention to a few particular points. Père Condamin's study on the nature of the sign given by Isaias to Achaz (Isai. vii) is a valuable investigation of the meaning of a most important Messianic passage, and the same thing must be said in regard to his lengthy study on the Servant of Yahweh (Isai. xlii, 1-4; xlix, 1-6; l, 4-9; lii, 13-liii, 12). His rendering of Isai. xvi, 1*a*): שלחו־כר מושל־ארץ by "Send ye the daughter of the ruler of the land," reading בת instead of כר), is probably an improvement on the Vulgate rendering

"Emitte *agnum*, Domine, dominatorem terræ." His interpretation of לילית in Isai. xxxiv, 14*c* as having reference to a female demon, is no doubt, correct; and in rendering Isai. xi, 10*d* by "His dwelling-place shall be glorious," he rightly modifies St. Jerome's translation: "Erit *sepulchrum* ejus gloriosum."Again, his suggestion to translate Isai. liii, 8 *a b*, by

> Through an unrighteous judgment he was taken away,
> And who was concerned about his cause?

will probably be welcomed by many scholars, instead of the obscure lines of the Vulgate:

> De angustia, et de judicio sublatus est.
> Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?

It is likewise on good grounds that Father Condamin admits that Isai. ii, 2-4 and Micheas iv, 1-5 are both borrowed from an older oracle; and that Isai. xv-xvi is anterior to Jerem. xlviii, the latter "being a transcript or manifest imitation of the former."

For the sake of brevity we forbear giving even the principal points on which we would beg to differ from the learned translator. We heartily welcome this part of his work on Isaias, as the best "critical translation" so far attempted by Catholics, and we cordially hope that the publication of his *Introduction* to Isaias will not be long delayed.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

Early Hebrew History—Its Historical Background, by John P. Peters D. D., Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, London.—1904.

The six Lectures which constitute this little volume (pp. xii, 303, 12mo.) were delivered in November, 1903, before the Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me. "They deal with matters which have been much under discussion of late, particularly through the publication of Delitzsch's 'Babel and Bible,'—the origin of the stories of Creation, Eden, the Flood, the Tower of Babel, and the literary and religious dependence of the Hebrew version of these stories on foreign heathen, especially, Babylonian sources" (Preface, p. vii). They are a short study of the historical background of the early traditions of Israel recorded in Genesis, and are addressed in their printed form, "rather to the intelligent men and women who are interested in the Bible, in the early history of the world and the development of religion, than to scholars and theological students" (Pref., p. ix).

The author, Dr. John P. Peters, is an archæologist of note, and a literary critic of great ability. Throughout these Lectures he shows himself perfectly acquainted with the various questions he takes up, and the modern solutions they have received. He writes with simplicity, directness, and precision. His constant purpose is to do constructive work in biblical criticism. Oftentimes, however, one may well ask whether he has not utilized too freely the venturesome views of such scholars as Winckler, Gunkel, Cheyne, and others. In fact, the book will probably leave many a reader under the impression that Dr. Peters is a somewhat rash advocate of new theories in scriptural matters.

The opening Lecture sets forth the conclusions of biblical criticism concerning the date and origin of the literature in which early Hebrew history is contained, and also the best-ascertained results of archæological research in their bearing on the historical conditions of early biblical times. It forms an excellent introduction to the body of the work.

The next three Lectures are an inquiry into the historical background of the patriarchal period described in the second part of Genesis (chaps. xii-l). Dr. Peters deals first with that second part of Genesis, because its contents appear to him more grounded in fact than those of Genesis i-xi. This does not imply in the least that he ascribes to all the data of Genesis xii-l, one and the same historical value. The formation of Israel and the origin of the twelve tribes he willingly regards as going back to a "historical tradition" which is "in the main" preserved in Israel's writings. But, "the stories" of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and other personages of the period, have, according to him, much less reliable historical background: to a far greater extent, they are "the survivals of the legendary and mythical lore of the pre-Israelite period."

The fifth Lecture is devoted to the first eleven chapters of Genesis, the contents of which are chiefly "valuable as a study in religious and moral development." "Here," we are told, "there is little or no historical tradition. We have rather answers to the questions which exercise the mind of primitive man. . . . What is the cause of various phenomena which force themselves on his observation? How did the world come into existence? Where did man himself come from? Why does man have a sex consciousness and a sex shame which the beasts do not have? How did man acquire civilization? What is the reason of the differences of languages among men? . . . These and other questions are asked and answered in a *naive* and primitive fashion in the cosmogonies, genealogies and stories of these early chapters." The comparison which Dr. Peters makes between the contents of Genesis i-xi, and the cosmogonies and primeval traditions of other races, especially of the Babylonians, is interesting and instructive.

The book concludes with a Lecture, to our mind, the best of all, concerning "the moral value of early Hebrew study."

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

Outlines of the Life of Christ—By W. Sanday, L.L.D., Litt. D., pp. viii, 241, 12mo. $1.25 *net*. Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1905.

Owners of a copy of the Hastings' "Bible Dictionary," a valuable publication by Messrs. Chas. Scribner's Sons, will no doubt feel disappointed when they look into the present volume, if they have ordered it hoping to get new and up-to-date "Outlines of the Life of Christ," by Dr. Sanday. Instead of having purchased any such work,—as they might indeed expect from the announcement in Scribner's "Book Buyer," for March, 1905,—they will find that they have simply got a reprint of Dr. Sanday's article "Jesus Christ," in the second volume of the Hastings' Bible Dictionary, which appeared as far back as 1899. It is true that the article has received an addition in the map of Palestine which is placed at the end of the "Outlines of the Life of Christ." But far more than outweighing this advantage, the detailed survey of the contents which was at the beginning of the article, has been dropped, and no serviceable index has taken its place in this volume. The "Outlines of the Life of Christ," we are sorry to notice, has no reference to the various works on Christ's life and Christ's teaching, which have appeared since 1899, and they embody no new views of Dr. Sanday, since that date, anent the topics treated in the present volume.

Of course, Dr. Sanday's "Outlines of the Life of Christ" exhibits the same excellent features, as the article "Jesus Christ," of which it is a reprint. But it can lay claim to no special merit of its own, besides that of placing within the reach of those who are not in possession of Hastings' Bible Dictionary, one of its valuable articles.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

Sur les Chemins de la Croyance; Première Etape: L'utilisation du Positivisme. *Par Ferdinand Brunetière, de l'Académie Française. Perrin et cie, Paris,* 1905.

Since 1845, the memorable year in which John Henry Newman became a Catholic, the Church has gained the services of no more eminent man of letters than Ferdinand Brunetière. Since his conversion,—if that be not too strong a term to express his renewal of devotion to the faith of his baptism—he has consecrated to the aid of religion his remarkable gifts as scholar and writer—a keen intellect, marvellous erudition in many fields of knowledge, a strong nervous style, and a mastery of language which places him easily in the front rank of the literary men of the time.

Such men as he do not escape from bondage empty-handed; they come laden with the spoils of the Egyptians for the adornment of the Tabernacle of the Lord. Converts, whether to the Faith or to the call to a higher life, have most frequently brought to the aid of religion the stimulus of new ideas and new methods. It was so with St. Paul, with Justin Martyr, with Jerome and Augustine, with Ignatius and Ligouri, with Schlegel and Chateaubriand, with Newman and Brunetière—each has brought with him some fresh idea or method from his secular pursuits, or from seemingly antagonistic schools of Philosophy, to give new vitality or force to the cause of religion. It is in harmony with Catholic principles that this should be so. We maintain that whatsoever is good or true in the world is Catholic, and accordingly, we have always made free use of the principles of pagan philosophy and the methods of heretical religions to establish and propagate the truths of Catholicity.

At first glance, it is shocking and disquieting rather than comforting to find Positivism put forward as a means of helping the lost traveler along the road to faith. In the minds of many Catholics, Positivism is the strongest ally of the enemy, and we might as well look for help to Satan as to Auguste Comte. But M. Brunetière was a Positivist and is a Catholic; he has, in his own case, found that the principles of Comte lead to religion; he has followed those principles and returned to the Church of his baptism. Accordingly, he feels that he can serve those who stand where once he stood by proving that the best elements in Positivism lead to the acceptance of a religion. That his plan of Apologetics is a good one can hardly be denied even by those who seem to believe that salvation cometh by dialectics and religion is a matter of metaphysics. St. Paul, in his day, remarked on the rather obvious inutility, so far as others are concerned, of the practice of "speaking with tongues." It is much to be feared that many a zealous and learned defender of the Faith "edifieth himself, but not the Church of God."

In fact, as St. Paul gave warning, the faithful and the unbelievers have become "as barbarians" to each other, and he that holdeth the place of the unlearned cannot say Amen to our blessing, because he knoweth not what to say. It is not alone in the wilds of Asia or Africa that missionaries are confronted with the difficulties of an alien tongue. In older lands, too, we need interpreters to make our message known to large numbers of men who have forgotten our modes of speech. There will be much gained if in the beginning the interpreter can persuade them that when the priest raises his hand to bless, he is not shaking his fist at them; or that Baptism is not the cause of smallpox. The analogy may seem ludicrous, but in France to-day is presented a spectacle which bears it out almost to the letter—the expulsion from the community as enemies of society, of thousands of men and women who have embraced a life of self-sacrifice with the desire of being of service to humanity. Such a misunderstanding of the intentions of Catholicity evidently manifests a situation which calls for missionary interpreters. And when the interpreter is himself a convert, so much the better is the chance of his testimony producing an effect. M. Brunetière's purpose, in the present volume, is to show that the fundamental verities of religion flow from the principles and methods of that Positivism which was intended to do away with religion. His main theses are: (1) The philosophy of Comte resulted inevitably in a Metaphysics—that of the Unknowable—and a religion—the religion of humanity; (2) that from Comte's own principles and admissions it can be shown that "independent morality" is a delusion—it must be based on a sanction which is external and supernatural; (3) that at bottom, every social question is a moral question and every moral question is a religious question. The author promises to give us, if circumstances permit, two further volumes, one to lessen the difficulties of belief, and the other to establish the transcendent nature of Christianity as a religion.

M. Brunetière does not rank himself as a thorough-going Comtist, nor does he claim that Comte said or stated in their full force these conclusions from the Positive philosophy. As an apologist, he takes his good where he finds it. Wherever he sees an avenue which opens towards religion, he makes the direction more definite and the prospect clearer. Or to change the comparison, he goes quarrying in a pagan temple to find solid, well-hewn stones with which he constructs the foundation of a Christian Church. As may be expected, his undertaking has been attacked from various sides, but M. Brunetière, as many an adversary knows to his cost, is one who can work at his building with the trowel in one hand and the sword in the other. There is an exquisite bit of sword-play on the first page of the preface, where he meets the attacks of "*les agrégés de philosophie—lesquels, comme on sait, exercent officiellement dans notre pays de France le monopole de la pensée.*"

But while not a Positivist, M. Brunetière is a warm admirer, and on many points, a follower, of Auguste Comte. Positivism can be considered either as a method of scientific inquiry, or as a system of philosophy. In his use of Positivism as a method, both as applied by Comte, and as developed hy himself, to study the questions of morality and religion in the *facts* of human nature and history, M. Brunetière reaches his best results. His examination into the error of the eighteenth century—the notion that morals would become perfect if the laws were only perfect; and the chapters on the intimate connection between religious and social questions, are masterpieces in method and style. They should be carefully studied by everyone who undertakes the defence of religion in our day; and they will have a special value in the author's own country in view of the present attitude of the state towards religion.

The attempt to use Positivism as a system of philosophy is not so satisfactory in its results. These are good as far as they go, but they do not go far enough to serve as a basis for a religious synthesis. In fact, M. Brunetière relinquishes the attempt to build on Positivism when he rightly insists that morality, to be morality at all, must be absolute, must be conceived *sub specie æternitatis*. However, it is much to have shown that a system which began with scorn of metaphysics, and with the intention of supplanting religion, is forced by the logic of facts to develop a metaphysics and a religion of its own.

The work has run through seven editions; and we believe that its popularity is not due solely to the striking literary gifts of the author, but largely to the fact that he presents a view and a defence of religion which are of deep interest to a large number of his countrymen to whom other views and arguments make little appeal. It is to be hoped that he will soon be able to give us the two supplementary volumes which are to continue and develop his line of Christian Apologetics.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

Le Fils de l'Esprit **(Roman Social)**, *par Yves le Querdec, Paris, Lecoffre,* 1904.

Yves le Querdec is probably better known to English, and even French, readers than M. George Fonsegrive, professor of philosophy in the Lycée Buffon, and editor of *La Quinzaine*. That this is so is is a testimony to the practical good sense of this eminent philosopher and sociologist, who knows how to administer his potent medicines to a sick social organism under the sugar coating of a good story. His former works under this *nom de plume* dealt mainly with the attitude of the clergy in the present distressing conditions of the Church in France. In the present work, he discusses the duties of the land-holding class for the moral and material upbuilding of those dependent on them. It is a rather gloomy picture he paints, of a wealthy class without a sense of its obligations and opportunities, and a class of artisans and peasants with little or no religion. But the gloom is lighted up by a ray of hope, as we see how the practical Christian tactics of the hero, Norbert de Péchanval, gain for him the esteem and confidence of the little community in which he lives.

The author proves that Catholicity has still the ideals which alone will be able to regenerate a decadent society, and that France can be saved to religion if every earnest-minded Catholic, each in his own field of action, will keep before his mind the ideal of service, of social service in the name of Christ. If the men of position amongst the Catholics of France realize their opportunities, another glorious chapter may yet be written in the *Gesta Dei per Francos*; but before it is written, swords must in all literalness be beaten into reaping-hooks. "To uphold the Christ," in M. Fonsegrive's opinion, and for that matter, in the view of the One most concerned, it is not necessary "to break the heathen," but to show one's self a friend to him.

The author's solution of the problem is of prior interest to the Catholics of France. To those who have not first hand knowledge of the conditions, his work will be valuable and interesting as presenting some of the causes of the present lamentable condition of religion amongst a people which has done so much for the development and spread of Catholicity.

Incidental to the story there is a treatment of religious and ethical questions, which is as satisfactory as it is interesting. The author has learned from Plato the lesson that deep subjects can be made easy reading when expressed in conversational form, and suffused with the element of personality.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

One of the objects of this REVIEW, as stated in the Prospectus, is "to secure the united efforts of the most eminent Catholic scholars, lay and clerical, throughout the world, for the discussion and solution of problems and difficulties connected with religion." In this initial number are articles written by laymen and clerics, and amongst the latter, by members of religious congregations, of teaching faculties, and of the parish clergy. According to their present place of residence, these contributors represent three countries, England, France, and the United States; if birthplace be taken into account, Ireland, Canada, and Asiatic Turkey will be found to to share in the work; and if, in addition, we consider the claims of countries which have been intellectual mother-lands to these writers, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Belgium will deserve a prominent place in the list. During the course of the year, the majority of these countries, and others also, will have a more immediate representation.

Although most of our contributors have already done stalwart work for the cause which this REVIEW stands for, and are consequently well known to its readers, still, on account of the fact that their work has been done in languages and in publications not available to every reader, there will be an advantage in our giving, for the present at least, brief sketches of their academic qualifications and literary work.

There would have been something most appropriate in beginning this REVIEW—as we had expected, and indeed promised, to do—with an article from the pen of M. FERDINAND BRUNETIERE, of the French Academy. He has proved himself, during the past decade, a strenuous defender of "the ancient Faith"; he has a keen eye for what is of good and what is of evil in "modern thought"; he is pre-eminent amongst the literary men of the time, and is editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, a review which has strong claims to be ranked first amongst periodicals of its kind; and in addition, as a French Catholic, he would be a representaive of a Catholic body, to which, in spite of present, and, we hope, transient difficulties, the whole Church still looks for intellectual leadership.

Unfortuntealy, a prolonged siege of ill health, caused, we infer, by his taxing his powers unduly on account of the present situation in France, has prevented him from fulfilling his engagement with us, though he made a strong effort to do so. He has promised, however, that we shall receive his article on "*The Conditions of Present-Day Apologetics*" as soon as the state of his health will permit. We hope, and for reasons not altogether selfish, that this will be soon. We are sure that all of our readers join with us in the sentiment we express, when we say that our regrets are caused, not so much by our own disappointment—real though it certainly is—but rather by the news of M. Brunetière's poor state of health. We hope he will be soon able to take up once more, with his wonted vigor, his fight for religion and civilization in France.

The introductory article of the NEW YORK REVIEW is written by MR. WILFRID WARD, and treats of Cardinal Newman. For our purpose, it would be difficult to find a more representative writer, or a better subject. The author needs no word of introduction to our public, but for the satisfaction of those who like to know "facts" concerning a favorite author, we give below a brief sketch of his literary labors. As for the subject, it is of Mr. Ward's own choosing. Happily, his choice fell upon a theme, which, in his handling of it, is admirably suited to our needs, not only as an appreciation of the greatest modern leader in English Catholic thought, but also, and mainly, as outlining, better than we ourselves could do, the temper and spirit in which we purpose conducting this Review. There was no need of a formal editorial statement of aims and intentions, when we could offer as an introduction, Mr. Ward's article on *The Spirit of Newman's Apologetics.*

Mr. Ward is the second son of William George Ward. He was born at Old Hall, Ware, England, in 1856, and was educated at St. Edmund's College (Ware), Ushaw College (Durham), and the Gregorian University in Rome. His natural tastes, together with the circumstances of his family connections, have led him to take a deep interest in religious and intellectual matters, and he has consequently been especially prominent among the Catholic lay writers of England. His work has been mainly along two lines: Biography and Apologetics. In the former he is distinguished by "The Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman," (valuable not only for its history of that great prelate, but also as a picture of the Church in England at the middle of the last century) and by the two books on his father, "William George Ward and the Oxford Movement," and "William George Ward and the Catholic Revival."

But it is in the field of Apologetics that he is at his best. "The Wish to Believe," "The Clothes of Religion," "Witnesses to the Unseen," and "Problems and Persons," are works that have gained for their author a reputation extending beyond the English-speaking world. Throughout them all we can trace one main purpose—the endeavor to reconcile Catholic teaching with all that is best in the science of the day. In his method he is a follower of Newman, with whose writings he is probably better acquainted than any other person living, and a large part of his labor has been to work out to its logical conclusions the theory of "Development," as a basis for the defense and the strengthening of Catholic Christianity. In view of this, it is to be hoped that before long we shall be able to speak of him as the biographer of the great Cardinal.

Besides his literary work, he has been prominent in other lines, chiefly educational. In 1886 he became a member of the Council of the Catholic Union of Great Britain, and in 1890 he lectured on Philosophy at Ushaw College. In 1890-91 he was an examiner in Mental and Moral Science in the Royal University of Ireland, and in 1901 was made a Member of the Royal Commission of Irish University Education.

M. George Fonsegrive, whose name is second on our list of contributors, is, officially, professor of Philosophy at the Lycée Buffon, Paris; in a wider field, he is well known as one of the most distinguished of the lay defenders of Catholicity in France. He was born in the fifties, and received his early education in a *Petit Seminaire*, the impress of which training on a deeply religious nature has never been dimmed. He was appointed to teach philosophy when only 23 years of age, and, though he has never succumbed to the tendency of philosophers to become mere logic-machines, his work always manifests the influence of careful philosophic thinking.

He is an Aristotelian, but with his point of view broadened by the influence of Maine de Biran, Leibnitz, and, to a much less degree, of Kant. His principal works in Philosophy are *La Causalité Efficiente, Sur le Libre Arbitre, Elements de Philosophie,* and *François Bacon.*

His mental activity is not confined to Philosophy. He has been a frequent contributor to newspapers and magazines, his articles covering a large number of topics, philosophical, literary, social. As editor of *La Quinzaine,* he has striven, in spite of opposition from quarters whence it should least be expected, to carry out the directions of Leo XIII with regard to the acceptance of democratic institutions. Amongst his works bearing on the relations of Catholicity to modern conditions of thought and of government are: *Catholicisme et democratie, Le Catholicisme et la vie de l'esprit, Mariage et Union Libre, and La Crise sociale.* Under the *nom de plume* of Yves le Querdec, he has made good use of fiction as a method of spreading his ideas. The latest of this series is reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

REV. FRANCIS E. GIGOT was born near Bourges, France, and was educated at the Seminary of Limoges, and at the Catholic Institute, Paris. Shortly after his ordination to the priesthood, he came to the United States, where he has been engaged continuously in the work of teaching in theological seminaries. He has taught at Brighton and Baltimore, and now occupies the Mooney Chair of Sacred Scripture at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie. He has written a number of works on Scripture subjects, all marked by thoroughness of scholarship and clearness of presentation. They are: *Outlines of Jewish History, Outlines of New Testament History, Biblical Lectures, General Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures,* and Part I of a *Special Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament.* In addition, he has been a contributor to the *Ecclesiastical Review* and to the *Dictionnaire de la Bible.* He is a member of the American Oriental Society and of the New York Oriental Club. He is to be a member of the committee on Scriptural topics for the projected Catholic Encyclopedia.

The REV. JAMES J. FOX, born at Stewartstown, near Armagh, Ireland, made his classical studies in St. Mary's College, Dundalk, studied medical science in Dublin for two years, and then pursued courses in philosophy and theology in France and Switzerland. He received the degree of A. B. with First Class Honors and an Exhibition at the Royal University of Ireland in 1888, and the degree of Licentiate in Theology at the Catholic University of America in 1897. In 1899 he was made a Doctor of Theology at Washington, his dissertation—an important work of over 300 pages—being published under the title "Religion and Morality," and obtaining wide recognition for scholarship and impartiality. Since then he has been engaged in teaching philosophy in St. Thomas' College, the studentate of the Paulist Fathers, at the Catholic University, and he is a frequent contributor to various periodicals, including the *University Bulletin* and the *Catholic World.* Some of the articles in the *Encyclopedia Americana* are also from his pen.

REV. CORNELIUS CLIFFORD was born in New York, and received his elementary education in the Grammar Schools and College of his native city. In 1877, he was entered at Fordham, and was graduated B. A. two years later, being the "Honors Man" of his class. He also won in Senior year the *Biographical Medal* and the *Hughes Medal in Mental Philosophy.* His further studies in Philosophy and Theology were made at Woodstock, Innsbruck, and Louvain. During the years between 1885 and 1899, he filled the Chair of Rhetoric in various Colleges of the Society of Jesus in the

United States and England. In the latter year he made arrangements to return to America, where he accepted the invitation of Archbishop Ireland, of St. Paul, to the post of Lecturer in History and Logic at Merriam Park.

During the past five years, Father Clifford has devoted himself mainly to literary work, for which he is especially fitted by his talents and tastes. During the years 1900-1903, he was editor of the *Providence Visitor.* He is the author of *Introïbo,* a series of exegetical and homiletic studies on the Introits of the Roman Missal; and of *The Burden of the Time,* a work in which he applies the same method of interpretation that he has employed in *Introïbo,* to the Scripture lessons of the Roman Breviary. He is attached to the parish of the Assumption, in Morristown, N. J., in the Diocese of Newark.

REV. JOSEPH MCSORLEY, Paulist, received the degree of A. B. from St. John's College, Brooklyn, and the degree of S. T. L. from the Catholic University of America, in 1897. He is now stationed at the University as President of the Paulist House of Studies. He is connected with the staff of the *Catholic World,* to which periodical as well as to the *Catholic University Bulletin* and the *American Ecclesiastical,* he has been a frequent contributor. He is the author of a forthcoming volume on the spiritual teachings of the Church; and has edited the English editions of several works translated from the French.

ANNOUNCEMENT.

The Purpose of this Review

is mainly APOLOGETIC, with special reference to present-day religious and scientific conditions. It is intended to be, as its sub-title indicates, "A Journal of the Ancient Faith and Modern Thought." In character and method, it will be positive and constructive.

The Objects in View

in founding it are: 1) To treat in a scholarly fashion, yet in a manner intelligible to the ordinary cultured mind, topics of interest bearing on Theology, Scripture, Philosophy, and the cognate Sciences.

2) To draw attention to the needs of the present intellectual situation in matters of religious belief.

3) To secure the united efforts of the most eminent Catholic scholars, lay and clerical, throughout the world, for the discussion and solution of problems and difficulties connected with Religion.

4) To treat, by means of shorter STUDIES, important topics in Scripture, Archæology, etc.

5) To keep the readers informed on most recent developments of religious questions, by careful reviews or summaries of important books and publications.

The Present Need

of such a publication in English will doubtless be readily granted by all thoughtful and well informed persons. The strides made in scientific and historical research during the past half century have forced upon us the consideration of new problems, and have rendered necessary the restatement of many Theological positions.

The new issues thus raised cannot without ever increasing harm continue to be ignored by Catholics, as has too generally been the case in the past. They are currently discussed in reviews and newspapers by writers of every shade of religious opinion, and only too often the solution proposed is irreconcilable with any sane interpretation of historic Christianity.

It is true that many Catholic scholars, especially in Europe, are doing excellent work along the lines above indicated. But, as their productions are, for the most part, scattered through various reviews, many of which are not available for the average English speaking public, there will be a manifest advantage in bringing together in one special periodical the combined results of their scientific labors.

CONSENSUS FIDELIUM

George Tyrrell, S. J.

Father Delehaye, S. J., the Bollandist, has lately given us within the compass of 264 pages, a work of far deeper significance than appears at first sight.[1] The days of that specialism that spreads itself over the boundless wilderness of detail and loses all interest in the whole are fortunately gone by. Investigation and experiment are pursued only for the sake of induction. Else they are held for dilettante idlings, as aimless as the busy hoardings of a miser. Here at last, in these pages we cull the ripe fruit of the protracted collective labors of the learned compilers of the *Acta Sanctorum*, and are presented with inductions bearing directly indeed on hagiography, but indirectly on history in general, on theology, on philosophy.

It is with one of these indirect but more deeply and widely important bearings of the subject that I purpose to deal; namely, with the question, which will be forced on every reflective reader of the book, as to the trustworthiness of general or popular tradition as an instrument of education, as a witness and guardian of truth. In defence of the social and ecclesiastical, as opposed to the individualistic, idea of Christianity we rightly appeal to the analogy of general education and lay stress on the absolute insufficiency of the separate mind, and on its dependence on "authority," on the collected and communised experience of past generations, as preserved for it in the inherited language, opinions, beliefs, traditions, customs of the society into which it is born. But when we turn to M. G. Le Bon's book—*Psychologie des Foules*—which Father Delehaye quotes more than once, and of which his own is an elaborate and eloquent illustration, it might seem that this apologetic weapon bends in our hand. For the analogy, to have any value, must apply to tradition as tradition, and not as supernatural. But if the influence of popular tradition is rather a necessity than an advantage; if it is more often for evil than for good, for darkness than for light, there might seem to be a good case for protestant individualism.

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[1] Les Legendes Hagiographiques, par Hippolyte Delehaye, S. J. Bureau des Bollandistes, Bruxelles, 1905.

The "Crowd-psychology" of M. Le Bon deals primarily with the mob, the multitude in assembly; but its strictures are largely applicable to such a "crowd" as Father Delehaye has in eye,—the crowd that weaves the legends of saints and heroes; that shapes the purely receptive mind of the uneducated, unreflecting units of which it is composed.

Now the "mentality" of the crowd is, we are shown, of a deplorably inferior character to that of its units. It is not that of the lowest of them, still less of the highest; nor that of the majority, nor that of the average; but something quite different, if not contrary, in kind. It is not a resultant or combination of their conscious thoughts and opinions, of their ordinary moods, sentiments and purposes, but something as different from that as a man's hypnotic self is from his normal self. In moments of very great abstraction our action is often controlled by long-buried and forgotten habits; as, with the very aged, the past self displaces the present in consciousness. So, the swarming, buzzing, gossiping crowd hypnotizes itself; individual differences of normal mentality are put to sleep, and what surges up uniformly into the consciousness of all and binds them into one, is really the buried mentality of a past stage of civilization, something relatively childish, barbarous, savage.

And perhaps the secret of this transformation is to be found in that act by which, sometimes quite unconsciously, we merge ourselves into a crowd and suffer ourselves to be engulfed and swept along by it; an act of faith in the faith of others, whose faith again is one of the same kind; a resignation of our responsibility. and thereby of our personality and morality. For it is not numbers that makes the crowd. The crowd may exist in essence where but two or three are gathered together; or even where they are but morally united in their local dispersion. Let each singly hold the rest responsible in any matter, and the result is *a group in which no one is responsible*—an impersonal non-moral agency, a collective mind and feeling, subject to no controlling will, or sense of responsibility.

Hence, the entirely impersonal character of the crowd, or of the individual, while under its influence; as impersonal as a pack of wolves, a flock of sheep. Its action may be heroic or criminal, viewed externally; but inwardly, it is neither moral nor immoral; for its collective will is a fiction, its individual wills are paralyzed. Responsibility may rest with the demagogue who understands it and "plays" it as the angler plays and fools the fish; but, as leader, he is not of, but outside the crowd. The crowd is as non-moral as a dreamer. Hence, too, its unthinking mechanical responsiveness to forcible "suggestion;" the subjection of its judgment to the force of bare, unsupported, and especially of assiduously reiterated, affirmation; to the tyranny of "advertisement" in every form. Gregarious, imitative as a flock of sheep, it is the prey of panics, moods, fashions, fancies of which no one of its members could furnish a rational account; all leap at at the same spot, yet none knows why; the faith of each is in the faith of all the rest. The poverty of its mind is notorious. Images reign supreme. Principles and ideas in the strict sense it has none; only their empty husks, the now discarded formulas, phrases, catchwords in which they once lived. Like all narrow minds the crowd-mind is intolerant, extreme, fanatical, impatient of many-sided, well-balanced judgments. Like a child, the crowd confound facts and fancies, subjective and objective, in all simplicity. Uniformly mendacious in a negative, non-moral sense, its testimony as a witness is immeasurably worse than worthless; for it can neither see right, nor say right.

But there are crowds and crowds. And though the relative distance of the crowd to the rear of the sane intelligence of any place or time must be practically the same, yet within the limits of its essential laws the crowd-mind is capable of advance and is towed along slowly and from afar in the wake of civilization. It can no more be forced and hurried by the conscious efforts of lawgivers, educators and preachers, than the growth of a child's stature can be hastened by "taking thought." Sentiments, ideas and institutions for which it is not yet ready, lie on its surface as seed by the wayside.

Severe as M. Le Bon's estimate of the crowd-mind may be, it is fairly borne out by the evidence Father Delehaye's book affords of its influence, be it noted, precisely as an instrument of *religious* tradition and education. Sterile, senseless, tasteless, dead to all living principles and ideas, to all deeper and inward values of religion and morality, the crowd-mind can receive the Saint only on condition of forcing him into some one or other of its familiar traditional hero-categories; and how purely external, unspiritual and materialistic its notion of heroism is, we all know. Its unchecked influence in the cultus of the Saints is always and everywhere corrupt and debasing; dragging the Saints down to its own mental and moral level. And in liturgical matters, in our prayers, hymns, devotions, pictures, decorations, music, religious art; in our moral and ascetical tradition;

in the whole mentality of our religion, who can deny that the influence of the crowd-mind is altogether decadent and retrograde?

Yet some talk as though the Church made it her sovereign standard,—a rule, imposed by Popes and Councils, to the crushing out of all individuality and distinction. They will quote the wide-spread popularity of a cult, a belief, a devotion as unambiguous evidence of its soundness. "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*"

Plainly what we need is a careful distinction between the Christian populace (or crowd) and the Christian people; between uncontrolled tradition and controlled.

The "authority" of the crowd-mind over the individual has, indeed, its legitimate use and function; but the limits that separate its use from its abuse are soon reached. It is exercised and submitted to instinctively; being a natural rather than an artificial institution—as natural as are the parental and filial sentiments. Like all such instincts, its purpose is the more or less material welfare of the individual and the race; and it is efficacious for that end alone, and only under ordinary circumstances and as a general rule. Used for higher ends it becomes, in the same measure, an instrument of destruction. The authority of the crowd-tradition concerns the first and humblest and most universal necessities of social life. It lifts us, as we all must be lifted, to its own level; but it can lift us no further. Our nurse cannot always be our pope. For higher educational ends, artifice has to come to the relief of Nature. For the crowd is not society, but a factor in society—its raw material; nor is the crowd-mind identical with the public mind. Spontaneously, in regard to every interest or department of culture, society falls into classes—the progressive and the stationary, the active and the receptive, the original and the imitative. Needless to say, the original are few and the imitative many, for "many are called but few are chosen", is the law of Nature. But the law of Grace, if not also of rational Nature, is that the few are for the sake of the many; and those that have for the service of those that have not. *Confirma fratres* is the command imposed upon them by their gifts. The Greek ideal of an aristocracy preying on a serf-class failed because it did not rise above the law of mere animal nature, the law of egotistic competition. In a deeper sense, then, it is "natural" that the crowd-mind should be slowly educated, raised and controlled by the influence of the active-minded and progressive minority. But it is just here that artifice and the conscious organization of society can do so much to accelerate this natural process. Mediating between these two sections of society—the progressive and the inert—we soon find a system of educational machinery, whose function it is to bring the active minded into communication, to focus the scattered rays of their light, to collect and to distribute among the many the assured results of their co-operative labour. As of "middlemen," it is the office of teachers and educators to break the bread of knowledge to the multitudes, that is, to distribute it in small doses; to translate, symbolize, accommodate; to recognize that what is absolutely less true or less right may be relatively more true and more right; not to force growth, but to know and obey its laws. As a class, there is something of the crowd and the crowd-mind about them; for they are depositaries and guardians of a tradition. But it is a tradition of which each is, at least professedly (though by no means actually) a competent critic. He believes because he has seen; his faith is not supposed to be merely in the faith of others; he has not discovered, but he has verified. It is a tradition for which each holds himself responsible, and it is, therefore, not a crowd-tradition.

We must not suppose that the teaching-class is authoritative only in relation to the mentally inert multitudes; or that it is itself simply passive and receptive in relation to the active-minded minority. As holding in possession the accepted results of the best work done so far, it is, up to a certain stage, the teacher of its teachers. No one is fit to teach it who has not first been taught by it; who has not assimilated, before he has attempted to modify and perfect, the tradition of which it is the depositary.

On the other hand the teaching-class may easily degenerate and take on some of the characteristics of the crowd. It may, and often does, stiffly resist all modification and perfection of its tradition, and so cut itself off from the very sources of its life and fruitfulness. And it may, in consequence, try to rule the minority and the multitude by exactly the same methods, with the eventual result of losing credit and influence with both. Or, worse still, by a complete inversion of its function, it may become an instrument by which the crowd-mind is imposed on the minority, and "Folly, doctor-like," assumes the control of skill. But these are perversions of an institution whose general utility and excellence is beyond question.

When, therefore, we argue against individualism in faith, and in favor of ecclesiastical consensus and tradition, we should be careful to draw our analogy, not from the tradition of the crowd, but from that of the teaching-class. And, among ourselves, when we appeal to its popularity in favour of a usage or belief, we should consider whether the source of this popularity is from above or from below; for, in the latter case, we do not win an argument, but raise an objection.

It is certainly no detriment to our belief in the Church's supernatural character to see how closely the analogy between her constitution and that of civilized society may be pressed. Onwards, from the day that she put forth her canonical Gospels to check the mythologizing process that gave us the essentially "vulgar" apocryphal gospels, her teaching-class has striven assiduously to bring the crowd-mind under the purifying and elevating influence of her minority—of her Saints and Doctors. Her official hierarchy has existed to gather, dispense and communise the gifts and graces of her charismatic hierarchy; to collect the wealth of the rich and scatter it among the poor. While regarding the connection between personal gifts and ecclesiastical office as a desideratum, she has never admitted it to be essential; the teacher need not be a discoverer, nor the dispenser a producer. Thus she avoids that encouragement of hypocrisy which is given when office is supposed to be the guarantee of personal gifts of insight and holiness; and yet at the same time secures those public advantages of a teaching-class which Quakerism, with its purely charismatic hierarchy, would forfeit.

For all its concrete difficulties and limitations, we can hardly imagine any other system by which the religious education of mankind could be carried out on a large scale. The crowd and the crowd-mind will always be with us; not as something to acquiesce in or to defer to; but as something to combat, to purify, to elevate. Father Delehaye's book should make it impossible for us to confound Catholic folklore with Catholic teaching, or with the *Consensus Fidelium.*

George Tyrrell.

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN LIFE

John T. Driscoll, S. T. L.

"What think men of Christ? Whose son is He?" is a question put by Jesus Himself to His apostles. The answer came clear and prompt from the lips of Peter, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God." The divine personality of Jesus, revealed in the words and acts of His earthly life and especially in His resurrection from the dead, makes the Incarnation of the Son of God the fundamental truth of the Christian religion.

This question has not died away. In every age we hear it raised in various forms. It calls for a profession of faith, not to be satisfied by a vague admission, but grounded on strong and solid proofs. Christ in His church is the concrete object and vital reason of our Catholic faith. Thus it has been from the beginning of Christianity, and will be to the end of time. The history of 2000 years is an open witness to this truth.

The mission of Jesus was to teach mankind, and the prerogative of teaching is the essence of Christianity. The Gospels reveal our Divine Redeemer always appealing to the minds and hearts of His hearers. Whether with the apostles in familiar converse, or with the Scribes and Pharisees in Jerusalem, or with the crowds who followed Him as He walked by the wayside, we ever see Him striving to convince in varied ways, either by giving clear proofs of His mission, or by stirring the soul with the sublime harmony of His doctrine. Animated by this spirit, the apostles faced the learned scribes, the cultured Greeks, the philosophers of Rome, as well as the savage tribes, the ignorant and the outcast. In civilizing the barbarians, in overthrowing the most powerful religions of the world, Christianity enjoyed no privileges and claimed no immunities other than freedom "to bear witness to the truth." Its missionaries carrying the glad tidings to strange peoples in distant lands, craved no mercy and received none. The Catholic faith has ever been at the bar of the world's judgment. Her voice has never been silenced nor ever will be. She only claims an open hearing. Her words are addressed to the mind and the heart of humanity, sure of a ready response to the message of "glad tidings of great joy which shall be to all people."

The method adopted by Jesus in His earthly life is the method followed by the Church through all her history. Christ in His church rises before us as the great teacher of mankind. The teaching power of the Church is the continuation of the earthly mission of the Redeemer. The Church makes no innovations in her doctrine. Jesus not only prescribed the purpose of her mission in His last injunction to the Apostles; he also indicated the substance of her message, "teach all nations whatsoever I have commanded you." The divine command to teach clearly marks out the purpose and work of the Church, and constitutes the ground of faith for the multitudes of her children.

From the first, the method adopted by the Church at the command and after the example of her divine founder, is a challenge to the intellect of mankind. She appeals to men, bearing credentials of her divine mission. She expects and demands a searching examination. The problems of our origin and destiny, of our nature and personal dignity are a part of our human existence. Christianity did not create them, but it claims to give the best and the most complete solution. The effort to formulate this answer according to the varying needs of different peoples and of different times has resulted in the magnificent edifice of Catholic theology and has crowned with undying glory her Apostles, Apologists, Doctors, Martyrs and Confessors. Each age has its special difficulties. In presenting the answer we obtain a deeper insight into the human soul, and a larger grasp of divine truth reaching out into wider and nobler action. We face the spiritual problems of our time as a sacred duty to ourselves and to others, and regard them as offering an incentive for new and better service. The answer we obtain is not a mere satisfaction of abstract and speculative doubt; it teaches us "to know the gift of God," and serves as a guide and inspiration of our daily lives.

In the present study the aim is not to prove the divinity of Christ or the divine constitution of the Church by an appeal to the external credentials of miracle or of prophecy. These have their proper place and their own peculiar value. We shall simply regard Christ in His church as the great teacher of mankind and ask what is the distinctive message, the vital truth of His teaching. Looking out on the world around us struggling along in doubt and sorrow and darkness, it is natural to ask what can remove the doubt, and ease the sorrow, and dispel the darkness. The answer is to be found in the teaching of the Catholic Church. Nor is the purpose to enter into a detailed examination of Christ's doctrine. We shall take only one truth, but one which contains the substance of His teaching and which constitutes the essential character of Christianity.

II.

The history of Christian Apologetics during the XIXth century prepares the way and furnishes a solid ground for our study. The publication of "Leben Jesu" by Strauss, produced in theology an effect analogous to that caused in philosophy and science by the appearance of Darwin's "Origin of Species." But the mythical theory of the Gospels was no more original with Strauss than was the theory of evolution the creation of Darwin. DeWette and Baur had preceded Strauss, just as Lamarck had preceded Darwin. The merit of Strauss, as of Darwin, was that each in his respective field, took a theory broached by others, and by a wealth of argument and of illustration, proposed it in a strong and popular manner which served to carry conviction to the unscientific mind. But Strauss was more directly indebted to his teacher, Hegel, than to DeWette for the features which gave to his teaching its systematic and universal character; just as the reaction from Hegel's metaphysics in many minds gave rise to positivism which in its turn generated an atmosphere so favorable to the rapid growth and wide-spread influence of Darwin's scientific evolution. In both cases the result was a confusion of thought, through the intermingling of departments of knowledge which by the very nature of the processes involved in each, should remain clearly defined and distinct one from another. The great work of Christian Apologetics has been and is, on the one hand to unmask a philosophy masquerading in the form and guise of physical science and on the other to separate philosophy from theology by clearly showing the proper place and limitations of the former; to attack the principle, advanced by a contemporary writer, of the "renewed belief in Philosophy as the central interpretive principle of all sciences." [1]

The speculative basis and end of Strauss was Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute. The eternal process, i. e., the evolution of the Idea becomes the immanent God realizing Himself in the order of nature and in humanity. The Gospel narrative contained the sensuous form of truths which in themselves had a reality independent of and transcending the crude expression. The essence of the Christian faith centered in the eternal process and was thus entirely independent of criticism. The miraculous events of the life of Christ remain eternal truths as embodying the evolution of the idea, although their reality as historical facts may be questioned. Strauss maintained that we may give up "the historical reality of the narrative" and yet "hold fast to absolute truth." The eternal truth was the kernel, the historical account was the shell, which should be broken and cast away. The historical person of Jesus is dismissed in order to grasp the complete articulation of the idea. Jesus disappears and humanity assumes His place. The historical reality of the Gospels must be cast aside to prepare the way for the transcendental construction of his philosophy. This he attempts by denying the real and affirming the ideal truth of the Gospels. To him the Gospel facts were unconscious creations, the symbols or investitures of ideas. These creations, because unconscious, were described in good faith as historical. The myths were created by the normal action of the Spirit, and so while historically false, were ideally true. The Gospel writers developed the Messiah of their dreams and desires into the historical Christ. Jesus was an ordinary man invested in and interpreted according to the Messianic prerogatives of the Old Testament and tradition. The Messianic hope struggling for life and expression made Jesus into the Christ.

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[1] S. F. MacLennan in Amer. Jour. of Theol., Jan. 1905.

The transcendental philosophical theory of Strauss masquerading as a theological system produced disastrous results and unsettled the religious convictions of many. Yet it indirectly had a good effect. It served to make the historical reality of Christ and of the Gospel narrative the supreme problem of biblical study. Scholars arose on every side to defend the historical basis of their faith. A new impulse was given to historical criticism and saner methods and canons were promulgated. The New Testament became the battle-ground. By the help of historical criticism the historical character of the Gospels was proved, and the historical Christ reappeared with greater power over the mind, and with added lustre. The great principle was enforced that Catholic Theology was based on history. We cannot admit a separation or antagonism between history and theology without sapping the real basis of faith. Take away the historic testimony of the Bible and the whole edifice of Catholic teaching would rest upon nothing. Christ is a historical personage; and the Gospels, which reveal him, must be regarded not as dreams, or unconscious symbols, but as historical truths.

III.

The conviction is forced on the mind by a careful study of the New Testament, that in the person and mission of Jesus something altogether new has been added to the experience of mankind. This new element is regarded not as a combination or a simple interpretation of existing facts, but as objectively real in the sense that it exerts an uplifting and transforming power on the souls of men. The lives of the saints, the history of Christianity, the ideals and character of civilization furnish ample proofs of its strange and potent effects. The Christian religion has its basis in the Incarnation of the Son of God. But the incarnation is not presented as an isolated solitary fact; it is rather the initial act in a universal plan of redemption outlined in the teaching of Jesus and culminating in His resurrection from the dead.

Christianity is essentially a religion of redemption. The one luminous truth of the New Testament enforced by word and illustration, is that the eternal Son of God became man to save us from sin. Again and again Jesus is said to have died for our sins. Sin is the only explanation given by the inspired writers whereby we can explain the mystery of the Incarnation. He was called Jesus because He was "to save His people from their sins." He was the Lamb of God who was "to take away the sins of the world." Salvation was the keynote of His life, the explanation of His death. Salvation from sin, therefore, is the program and vital truth of Christianity.

The analysis of the word Salvation, reveals the very essence of the Christian Religion and enables us to grasp clearly that objective element or truth which gives to Christianity its distinctive character and marks its fundamental difference from and superiority to all others amongst the world's religions.

The word, Salvation, does not mean merely freedom from sin. This is its negative aspect. To restrict thus its meaning is to miss the substance and the spirit of the Christian faith. We must go to the Gospels for the true meaning. Jesus explains it by a word which penetrates into the inmost recesses of the soul. That word is Life. "I came that you might have life and have it more abundantly." Again and again Jesus repeats the word. Again and again it is presented in varied ways by the inspired writers of the Epistles. Life was the keynote and the substance of His mission. He appeared to men, who dwelt in the shadow of the valley of death. He was "the light which giveth life to the world." He is the vine, the disciples are the branches; unless they abide in Him, they cannot live. He is the shepherd who leaves the ninety-nine sheep in a safe place and goes in search of the stray one "lest it perish." He is the father who prepares a banquet for the repentant prodigal because "He was dead and is come to life again." He proclaims Himself to the Jews as "the way, the truth and the life," and promises that they who follow Him shall have the light of life. To the tempter He says that not in bread alone doth man live. He speaks of passing from death to life, of entering into life, and promises eternal life to them who are faithful. "Master, what must I do to gain eternal life?" is the question proposed in the Gospels. Does death remove one whom He loved? In words that have softened the grief and consoled the hearts of countless thousands, he says "I am the Resurrection and the Life; he that believeth in me, shall live."

This wonderful message of life is not confined to a particular section of the New Testament; it is found throughout. It is true that the teaching attains more clearness and point in the writings of St. John; but St. John does not advance a new doctrine. What he writes has its basis in the Synoptics, although he has emphasized it on account of the special purpose which prompted his Gospel. He wrote to prove the divinity of Christ, but he did not invent this truth. "These are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name" (xx, 31). Moreover St. Paul, whose Epistles are synchronous with the Synoptic Gospels, repeatedly by striking antitheses and in words full of meaning, insists upon and develops the Gospel message of Life. The words of Jesus on Baptismal regeneration, "unless a man be born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God" which is "life in the Holy Spirit," find strong and repeated echo in the writings of him who was the vessel of election to carry forth the light "for the illumination of the Gentiles." By the antithesis of death and life, he draws a contrast between the condition of mankind and the New Testament of God with men, cemented in the redemption of the Incarnate Son (Rom. v, 12 sq.); or in imitation of Christ, bids us "to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. vi, 11). It was God's purpose, "in the dispensation of the fulness of times, to establish all things in Christ" (Ephes. i, 10). For "in Christ all shall be made alive" (I Cor. xv, 22); and "even when we were dead in sins" God "hath made us alive" (Ephes. ii, 5). Hence it is that we are "cleansed, "sanctified," "justified," and become "a new creature." "For we are his workmanship created in Christ Jesus" (Ephes. ii, 10). And he hath "saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost" to the end "that being justified by his grace we may be heirs according to the hope of life everlasting" (Titus iii, 5). In writing to the Galatians he proves the inferiority of the Old Testament to the New, because the former could not give life. "If there had been a law given which could give life, verily justice should have been by the law" (Galat. iii, 21). He bids the Ephesians "put off the old man, and put on the new man, who, according to God, is created in justice and holiness of truth" (Ephes. iv, 24); and speaks of those who are "alienated from the life of God" (Ephes. iv, 18). Accordingly we are "to walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi, 4). "For the wages of sin is death. But the grace of God, everlasting life, in Christ Jesus, our Lord" (Rom. vi, 23).

This regeneration, or new creation, is effected by the reception of a new life. We are new creatures in Christ Jesus, of whose fulness we have all received. In this sense we are children of God and are sealed with the seal of sonship. For God "hath predestined us unto the adoption of sonship through Jesus Christ unto Himself" (Ephes. i, 5), (Rom. viii, 15). Thus it is, that St. Peter speaks of us as being "partakers of the divine nature" (II Pet. i, 4).

The new life bestowed by God on mankind through the supernatural covenant of His eternal Son, is a life of the soul, not of the body. The conscious life of the soul is manifested through its two great powers: intellect and will. These are modes or phases of the soul's conscious action. The intellect seeks the truth, the will strives to possess the good. Knowledge is the object of the mind, love is the fundamental and dominant motive power of the will. We are thus enabled to get a deeper insight into the doctrine of life which is the central truth of Christ's mission. Jesus teaches life not only in its fundamental character as a regeneration of the soul; He teaches life for the intellect and the will.

Jesus tells us that He came into the world "to bear witness to the truth" (John xviii, 37). In His mission of teaching divine truth, He appeals directly to the mind. The miracles of the Gospel have their great value in the conviction impressed upon the minds of the Jews that Jesus was the Messiah with divine power to teach the truths of

God. He came "to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death" (Luke i, 79). He is a "light for the revelation of the Gentiles" (Luke ii, 32). He proclaims Himself "the light of the world" (John viii, 12; ix, 5). The apostles who are appointed to continue His mission of teaching are in this sense also called "the light of the world" (Matt. vi, 16); and St. Paul writing to the Ephesians admonishes them that they "were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord" (v, 5). St. John expresses this truth in sublime language. Comparing the generation of the eternal Son to the process of human thought, he uses the term "the Word" and describes the Incarnation in the immortal phrase "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (John i, 14). Jn the Word, he tells us, "life was, and the life was the light of men" (John i, 4). The assent, under the illumination of the Holy Spirit, to the truth of Christ's mission and teaching, is divine faith. It is essentially an act of the mind. As by the Incarnation "the light is come into the world" (John iii, 19), and as Jesus "hath the words of eternal life" (John vi, 69), so "he that believeth in the Son, hath life everlasting" (John iii, 36), and "he that followeth me, walketh not in darkness, but shall have the light of life" (John viii, 12.)

Jesus therefore is the light for the life of our mind. But the analysis of this sublime truth does not end here. He furnishes the supreme motive power of the will in our regenerated life as children of God. This is had in the great precept of divine charity. In promulgating the commandment of love Jesus gives to mankind the great law and spirit of life. The new life of the soul thus becomes communion with God in faith and love. We grasp the meaning of St. Paul's words that "In Christ Jesus, neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith, which worketh by charity" (Galatians v, 6). Jesus is our true life in becoming Light for the life of our minds, and in becoming Love for the life of our hearts. As love is the essential life of the Father (I. John iv, 8); so it should be the supreme rule and spirit in the lives of His children. Jesus tells us that the love of God and of our fellowmen is the summary of the law. With St. Paul "love is the fulness of the law" (Romans xiii, 10), and it is he who unfolds the Gospel of Charity in the beautiful passage to the Corinthians (I. Cor. xiii). Repeated insistence of this truth is found throughout the writings of St. John and merits for him the title of the Apostle of Charity.

In the world of nature growth is a law of life; so also in the supernatural life of God's children. This is the lesson inculcated in the parables of the sower and of the vine. Divine grace is divine life, and growth in grace is holiness or Christian perfection. Hence Christ gave Himself as our model that by imitating Him we should grow into His likeness, and share to a larger and fuller measure in His divine life. The goal of our endeavor, according to St. Paul, is perfect manhood "to the measure of the fulness of Christ." In the beginning God made our souls after His own image and likeness, and the law of our redemption is to become like Jesus, His Incarnate Son, who is the "express image of the Father." The life of Christ is the norm and ideal of our lives.

The purpose of the Incarnation and Redemption, the aim of Christ's mission, the substance of his teaching, is Life. In this message of Life Christianity stands forth unique and supreme in the religious history of the human race. Of its essence Christianity is a religion of Life. It is a vital living faith, meeting all the eager longings and needs of the soul with a splendor of light and a reality of life. In this principle of life we find the explanation of its fundamental, permanent, transforming power over the world. This is the new element which entered into the surging mass of humanity and developed into individual saintliness and Christian civilization. The infusion of a new life and the uplifting of mankind to a higher plane and standard of life marks every step of its history. The basis of Christian faith is the Resurrection of Christ, and the central truth of the Resurrection is Life. Christianity recognizes sin as the supreme evil, and cures it by regenerating human nature and filling it with divine life. In teaching Christ, she presents, not an idea, but in real life and action a form and ideal type of human character which was a new thing to men. She makes us think of God as one who enters into communion with the human soul as the Source and Giver of that life and light and love which is alone is eternal life. Union with God in the Christian religion is a living reality. In preaching the salvation of the soul, the church preaches Life.

IV.

The message of Christianity therefore is the message of Life. This is the central truth of Christ's teaching, the explanation of His mission. It is the "glad tidings" which stirs the souls of men in every age and clime. Jesus marks the dawn of a new era by the manifestation of a new and higher life and by the revelation of the principles and laws of this life.

The truth of this is more clearly brought out by way of contrast. Within the past few years Buddhism, as a philosophy and as a religion, has attracted much attention. The fascinating character of Gotama, the singular charm of his moral system have led many to consider it more perfect than the religion of Christ. For this reason I select it as a term of comparison and I maintain that a clear grasp of the central truth of Buddhism shows that its real value is only superficial, and that it stands in direct opposition to the saving teachings of Christianity.

Before the rise of Buddhism, India possessed a voluminous literature. The principal periods are the Vedic, the early Brahmanic, the Upanishads and the late Brahmanic. No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between them. They run into each other and overlap. Viewed in relation to our subject the Upanishads are by far the most important. They are the earliest remains of Indian metaphysics.

The sole problem of the Upanishads is release from the miseries of life. The solution proposed is a transmigration which holds sway from the lowest forms of existence to the highest intelligence. The character of life in the present state shapes the conditions of its future existence: evil-doing leads to lower forms of life, while the good rise in the scale of existences. The highest stage, however, is not permanent. God and men are part of the world system. The purest intelligences and most blessed spirits must descend sooner or later to run again the course. There are stages, but no final resting-place, for the soul on its journey. Once the merit accumulated by acts of self-denial has been exhausted, the soul falls to a lower sphere to begin again its dark and painful ascent. Misery and vanity alone are found in life, and with no after-hope to cast a beam of comfort on the chill and gloomy present. It is not the fear of death that palls the Indian mind, but the dread of birth. Death brings no surcease to sorrow and suffering. As plants spring from seed, and seed falls from the ripened fruit, so birth and death, death and birth follow each other with the inexorable rigor of a physical law.

Buddhism is the natural and logical sequence of the principles set forth in the Upanishads. The same pessimistic theory of existence throws its gloomy shadows over both. The same dread of birth is the nightmare to be freed from. Gotama, however, inaugurated a change in the means employed to avoid a re-birth. In the Upanishads the student is drilled in lower wisdom, i. e., rites and sacrifices, as a preparation for the higher, i. e., abstraction and meditation.

Gotama abolished the distinction and opened the higher path to all. The highest purpose of the soul is to return to original nothingness and final extinction. All things have sprung therefrom; all things have this destination.

While seated under the Bo-tree of Benares in deep meditation upon the chain of causation, i. e., the unending cycle of birth and death, of death and birth, Gotama, in a flash, or by an inner illumination as his disciples are wont to say, perceived a solution for the dark veil of mystery and misery which envelops life. This solution is embodied in the famous Four Noble Truths, which form the kernel of his system. Around and from these his moral teaching is developed, and by them is adequately understood and explained.

In the first sermon by which the triumphant chariot-wheel of his doctrine is set in motion, the Four Truths are emphatically expressed. They are: 1. That sorrow is universal. "This, mendicants, is the noble truth of sorrow; birth is sorrow, old age is sorrow, richness is sorrow, death is sorrow, the presence of the unloved is sorrow, the absence of the loved is sorrow, all that one wishes for and does not get, is sorrow. Briefly, the five elements by which beings hold to existence is sorrow." [1]

In so far as Gotama states the fact of sorrow, the words are true. But they only express a partial view of life. Happiness is a fact also. The joy of hard-won achievement, of friendship, of childlike innocence, of well doing, cannot be ignored. To insist upon the sorrows of life to the utter exclusion of joy is a travesty of truth. To proclaim that sorrow is the primal, fundamental and universal fact of conscious existence is an unwarranted assumption and a perversion of the testimony of consciousness. We may well contrast this teaching with the Christian message of "glad tidings of great joy."

2. The cause of sorrow is desire. "This, mendicants, is the noble truth of the cause of sorrow. Desire that leads from birth to birth, and is accomplished by pleasure and pain, seeking gratification here and there, namely, desire of sensual pleasure, desire of existence, desire of wealth."

The three-fold division of desire can be reduced to the desire of existence. That sensual gratification leads to sorrow is a truth illustrated on every page of history. In giving statement to this, Gotama simply laid stress upon a fact; but again and again he assures his hearers that the desire of existence is the main and real cause of sorrow. If all existence is sorrow, as we learn from the first Truth, then desire of existence is the true source of sorrow. This desire perpetuates Karma and leads from birth to birth in ceaseless round. With Gotama there is no soul. Individual life is made up of a combination of the groups of elements or Skandhas. The soul is none of these Skandhas nor is it a result of their combination. In fact not only did Buddhism deny the soul; it branded belief in its existence a heresy. In place of soul, it teaches Karma which is conceived as formed from the Skandhas. There is no abiding principle in man. Karma is analogous to our term, character. In this sense desire causes the formation of the Karma which is perpetuated in other forms.

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[1] Buddha's Dhammapada, V, 190-192.

3. The cessation of sorrow is achieved by the eradication of desire. "When this fierce thirst (i. e., desire), overcomes one, then, full of poison, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana grass. This salutary word I tell you: Dig up the root of thirst, as he who wants the sweet-scented Usira root, must dig up the Birana grass."

The Third Truth follows from the second. It is true that the diminution of desire cuts off many occasions of disappointment and sorrow. At the same time it deprives us of the purest and noblest joys. Life is effort, and is shown forth in activity. A great and noble soul is filled with desire of good. Do not these desires enlarge life's action and furnish its truest joys? The very possession of desire reacts upon temperament and character. It gives elevation of mind, it broadens the horizon, it imparts firmness and resource amid the varying happenings of life. Or suppose I strive to put my desires into execution. There is energy and joy in the effort, but what exultation of spirit in the achievement! Happiness is found in action, and the cessation of activity cramps the heart and makes life cheerless.

4. The Fourth Truth teaches that the one means to destroy desire is the noble eight-fold way. "This, O mendicants, is the noble truth of the way of living which leads to the extinction of sorrow; it is the noble eight-fold way: right faith, right resolve, right speech, right effort, right action, right living, right recollection, right meditation."

At first sight these truths appear beautiful and excellent. We are apt to interpret them after our own manner of thinking and in the light of Christian teaching. This is to fail utterly in grasping their true meaning. The term "right" has not the same sense in Buddhism as in Christian ethics. The "right" views of life, e. g., are those set forth in the Four Noble truths. They are only right if we admit that atheism is true and pessimism is the only gospel of mankind.

In Buddhism the supreme effort of life was to cease to live. Nirvana, i. e., the extinction of desires, was the goal leading to Parinirvana, i. e., the extinction of being, "passing away in that utter passing away which leaves nothing whatever to remain."

The tone of Christian teaching is light and hope and joy, the dominant note of Buddhism is sorrow and pessimism. The essence of Christianity is life; the central fundamental truth of Buddhism is death. As Christians we labor and hope and strive for life eternal.

V.

In the teaching of Jesus we have a clear answer to the questions suggested by human existence. This line of thought is not an argument for the truth of Christianity based on its utility. The argument runs on a higher plane. It rests on the harmony of Christian revelation to the very nature of our being; it emphasizes the truth that God who made man, alone can redeem him; it serves to bring out the marvelous simplicity and profound significance of the Gospel message when placed in comparison with the fundamental desires and longings of our being. Christianity stands forth unique among religious beliefs and philosophical systems in the striking harmony of its teachings to the essential needs and activities of human nature.

The desire of life is fundamental. It springs from the depths of our being. Man longs to live. For life he willingly surrenders wealth and position. The conviction that the visible world does not include the sum-total of life is an inalienable possession of the human race. Man bridges the dark chasm of death and reaches out to a future existence with its untold possibilities, its larger scope and fulness of life. The expression of this desire is a fact of individual consciousness and finds abundant illustration in the religious history of mankind. From this desire springs our belief in immortality. To the human soul longing for life, Jesus came with a message of life. "I am the Resurrection and the Life." "I came that you may have life and have it more abundantly." So also the message of Christianity is Life. The history of 2000 years presents the Christian religion not as an abstract system, but as a vital power acting on the souls of men through an organized body.

To the human mind, restless in its boundless capacity to know the truth, Jesus appeals as the Light of the World. To the will swayed to and fro by affection in its many forms, Jesus promulgates the great commandment of divine charity. The potencies of our nature stretch out into the infinite. Jesus recognizes their place and value. Far from crushing our nature in promulgating a higher order and law of being, He aims only at uplifting and uniting the various activities of our being into a higher and more perfect synthesis. In the words and example of Christ we behold the supremacy of the ethical ideal, the perfect manifestation of the supernatural life. In the regenerated life of the soul, Jesus becomes our model and standard, and in imitating Him we rise to the full measure of perfect manhood.

John T. Driscoll.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAS, XL-LXVI.

I. Arguments in Favor of the Traditional View.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

A close study of the contents of Isai. xl-lxvi, or the "Deutero-Isaias," as it is usually called, has always suggested to scholars important questions, theological, exegetical, historical, literary, etc.[1] The Messianic and prophetical data supplied by chaps. xl-lxvi, have in all ages attracted the particular attention of the apologists of the Christian faith, and this all the more rightly because hardly any other part of the Old Testament Scriptures has been oftener utilized by the sacred writers of the New Covenant to establish or illustrate the Messianic character and mission of Our Lord.[2] Owing to the special interest which centered in all such data, it was only gradually that, side by side with the theological and exegetical questions concerning the "Deutero-Isaias," others, chiefly of a literary kind, assumed a real importance. But of late the questions which belong to a special introduction to chaps. xl-lxvi, to wit, the problems regarding the date, place, method of composition, author, etc., of the "Second Isaias," have chiefly engrossed the attention of scholars. One of these in particular, the question of authorship, around which the others naturally gather, is now felt to be of paramount importance. On that account we intend to set forth and examine in the present paper the arguments in favor of the traditional view.

Briefly stated, the view regarding the authorship of the last twenty-seven chapters of the book of Isaias, which prevailed well nigh universally till the middle of the nineteenth century, is as follows: These chapters describe indeed with great distinctness and as close at hand, the end of the Babylonian exile (538 B. C.), and in particular, name expressly Cyrus, as the deliverer of the Jewish captives. Now this does not imply necessarily that Isaias, the author of the first part of the work that bears his name, is not also the writer of the remainder of that sacred book. To account for such clearness and accuracy in describing events which were to take place one hundred and fifty years later than Isaias' time, it suffices, as has indeed sufficed for centuries to Christian thinkers, to admit that the prophet was carried forward by the spirit to that distant future, and thus enabled to utter the warning and comfort which would then be needed by the Jewish people. Hence implicit believers in tradition, both Jewish and Christian, think it reasonable to cling to the view that these twenty-seven chapters belong to Isaias, the Messianic prophet *par excellence*.

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[1] Many of these questions, especially those which pertain to theology, exegesis, and textual criticism, have been very recently treated in a careful and scholarly manner by A. Condamin, S. J., *le Livre d'Isaie* (Paris, 1905).

[2] Thus, for example, the servant of Yahweh is constantly identified with Christ, *Cfr.* Isai. xlii, 1-4 with Matt. xii, 17-21; xlix, 6 with Acts xiii, 47; lii, 15 with Rom. xv 21; liii, 1 with John xii, 38; Rom. x, 16; liii, with Matt. viii, 17; I Pet. ii, 24 sq.; etc., etc.

These defenders of the Isaianic authorship appeal first of all to external evidence as proving their position. The earliest testimony they set forth is that of Ecclesiasticus. In chapter xlviii the writer of that deutero-canonical book reviews the history of the kings and prophets of Israel, and in verses 20-28 speaks of King Ezechias and the prophet Isaias. He says:

(Verse 20.) In his [Ezechias'] time Sennacherib came up,
And he sent Rabsaces, and he departed,
And lifted up his hand against Sion. . . .
(23.) And they called upon Yahweh, who is merciful;
And quickly the Holy One heard them out of heaven,
And delivered them by the hand of Isaias.
(24.) He overthrew the army of the Assyrians,
And the angel of Yahweh destroyed them
(25.) For Ezechias did what pleased Yahweh,
And walked valiantly in the ways of David, his father,
As Isaias the great prophet,
And faithful in his vision had commanded him.
(26.) In his days the sun went backward,
And he lengthened the king's life.
(27.) With a great spirit, he saw the last things,
And he comforted those who mourned in Sion.
(28.) He showed what should come to pass for ever,
And the secret things before they came.

The prophet so highly praised in this passage is no other than Isaias, the son of Amos, who beheld a "vision" under Ezechias, and was a faithful friend and adviser of that king. What is recorded of him in verses 20-26 points distinctly to the historical appendix to the first part of Isaias, since the same facts are mentioned in both Isai. xxxvi-xxxix and Ecclesiasticus, and in the very same order, for Rabsaces is the only messenger spoken of as sent by Sennacherib in both Ecclesiasticus and Isai. xxxvi, 2, whereas several messengers are mentioned in the parallel narrative in IV Kings xviii, 13, 17, etc. The statements in the following verses of Ecclesiasticus (verses 27, 28), on the other hand, have a direct reference to Isai. xl-lxvi, for the *comforting of the mourners in Sion* (verse 27) reminds us of the general purpose of the "Deutero-Isaias" set forth in its opening words, "Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people . . .";[1] while the seeing *of the last things* (verse 27) and the *showing of the things that will come to pass* (verse 28) are repetitions of expressions in Isai. xlvi. 10, and xli. 22. Whence it is inferred that Jesus, the son of Sirach, writing about 180 B. C., had before him the book of Isaias as it stands at present, and had no misgiving in regard to the Isaianic authorship of either of its parts. Yea, more: his testimony, it is claimed, should be regarded as embodying an earlier Jewish tradition to the same effect. In fact at the present day unbiassed scholars grant that the son of Sirach bears witness to the Isaianic authorship. [2]

The second external witness in favor of the Isaianic authorship is Josephus (born about 40 B. C.) In his *Antiquities of the Jews*,[3] this celebrated historian, after having quoted after his own fashion Cyrus' decree of restoration[4] in behalf of the Jewish exiles, says: "This was known to Cyrus [that Yahweh wanted him to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem] by his reading the book which Isaias left behind him of his prophecies; for this prophet said that God had thus spoken to him in a secret vision: 'My will is that Cyrus, whom I have appointed to be king over many and great nations, send My people back to their own land, and build My temple.' This was foretold by Isaias one hundred and forty years before the Temple was demolished. Accordingly, when Cyrus read this and wondered at the divine power, an earnest desire seized him to fulfil what was so written." Whatever, therefore, may be thought of the fact affirmed by Josephus that Cyrus was influenced by reading Isaias' prophecies to free the Jews and rebuild the Temple, it is plain that the Jewish historian knows of the prophet Isaias as the author of chaps. xl-xlvi, wherein alone Cyrus is distinctly named as the future liberator of Yahweh's people.

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[1] The same Hebrew verb נחם (to comfort), is employed in Ecclesiasticus and Isaias.

[2] *Cf.* for instance, G. Wildeboer, the *Origin of the Canon of the Old Test.*, p. 133 (Engl. Transl.). Samuel Davidson, who denies in the words of Ecclesiasticus even a reference to distinct parts of the book of Isaias, is clearly biassed (Introd. to the Old Test., vol. iii, p. 45).

[3] Book xi, chap. i, Secs. 1, 2.

[4] Into Cyrus' decree as recorded in II Paralip. xxxvi, 23, and in I Esdr. i, 2 sqq. Josephus inserted deliberately "for He [God] foretold my name by the prophets."

The third external testimony concerning the authorship is furnished by the New Testament writings. Passages quoted therein from the second part of the book are repeatedly ascribed to Isaias as their author. Thus we read in Matt. iii, 3, "This is he that was spoken of by Isaias the prophet," prefixed to Isai. xl, 3; in Matt. viii, 17, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet Isaias," introducing Isai. liii, 4; in Matt. xii, 17, "That it might be fulfilled which is spoken by Isaias the prophet," prefixed to Isai. xlii, 1; in John i, 23, "As said the prophet Isaias," appended to Isai. xl, 3; in Rom. x, 16, "For Isaias says," introducing Isai. liii, 1; in Rom. x, 20, 21, "Isaias is bold and says," prefixed to Isai. lxv, 1, 2, etc. In connection with these direct quotations, two indirect references to Isai. xl-lxvi are usually set forth as bearing witness to the Isaianic authorship. The first is found in Luke iv, 17, where we are told that in the synagogue of Nazareth "the book of Isaias the prophet was delivered unto Him [Jesus]. And as he had unfolded the volume, He found the place where it was written: 'The spirit of Yahweh is upon me' . . ." (Isai. lxi, 1 sq.) The second passage is in Acts viii, 28 sqq., where we read that the Ethiopian eunuch "was returning reading the prophet Isaias. . . . And Philip, running thither, heard him reading the prophet Isaias. . . . And the place of the Scripture which he was reading was this: 'He was led as a lamb to the slaughter.' . . ." (Isai. liii, 7, 8). Whence it is readily inferred that the New Testament writers take it for granted, as it was certainly done by their contemporaries, that chaps. xl-lxvi were written by Isaias.

To confirm the foregoing external testimonies, the advocates of the Isaianic authorship appeal to the ancient lists of the Old Testament books. Not only in the Vulgate, but also in the Talmud of Jerusalem, in Josephus, and even in the Septuagint Version, we find Isaias named as one distinct book, and placed first among the greater prophets, manifestly because anterior in the order of time to the other major prophets. It is true that the Talmud of Babylon places Isaias after Jeremias and Ezechiel, but besides naming it as one distinct book, and thereby implying that both of its parts belong to the same prophet, that Talmud states explicitly that this arrangement (Jeremias, Ezechiel, Isaias) is due to the affinity of the contents, not to the time at which the three prophets wrote.[1]

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[1] The Talmudic passage reads as follows: "But why is not Isaias placed before Jeremias and Ezechiel, since he is anterior to them?—[Answer] The book of Kings

Lastly, it is the practical unanimity and constancy of the Jewish and Christian tradition just set forth in favor of the Isaianic authorship which seems most to make against the opposite view. For if such a tradition is not reliable, we are told, how did it come to pass that "a writer of transcendent genius, admitted by all competent judges to surpass even the greatest writers among the Hebrews, with the exception alone, if exception it be, of Isaias, grew up among the exiles in Babylon, necessarily attracted the attention of his contemporaries, and yet afterwards dropped so entirely into oblivion that his very name and memory perished—not a suspicion or whisper of such separate existence being ever breathed till the thirteenth century of the Christian era"?[1] "In a time when Aggeus and Zacharias so carefully dated their prophecies, how could the name be lost of the seer who had unquestionably done most toward the revival of the theocratic spirit and the home-coming of the faithful ones? The question might be answered if the author appeared pseudonymously under Isaias' name; but no trace of such intention is found anywhere. Whereas in the 'First Isaias' the person of the prophet comes out in different ways, here [in the 'Deutero-Isaias'] all name, even all heading, is wanting! Criticism should honestly confess that the special reason of this anonymity remains in utter obscurity."[2] The only way out of this and other such difficulties, it is concluded, is to admit the validity of the external testimony in favor of the authorship. From the very beginning, the prophecies of Isaias were rightly ascribed to the son of Amos, the prophet who beheld visions under Kings Ozias, Joatham, Achaz, and Ezechias, and tradition ever since has faithfully attributed the writing of them to him.

The second argument brought forth to prove the Isaianic authorship is drawn from the intimate connection of ideas between the two parts of the book of Isaias. It is extremely improbable, it is said, that Isaias should have ended his prophecy with the first part, for

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ends in the desolation; Jeremias is wholly occupied with it, Ezechiel begins with it and ends with the consolation, and Isaias is wholly occupied with the consolation: thus is the desolation joined with the desolation, and the consolation with the consolation." (The rabbinic text is given by L. T. Wogue, *Histoire de la Bible et de l'Exégèse biblique*, p. 17.)

[1] Prof. Jno. Forbes, the *Servant of the Lord*, p. 2. Eben Ezra (†1167), the celebrated Spanish rabbi, was the first to insinuate that chaps. xl-lxvi had been written by Jechonias, at the time of the Babylonian Captivity.

[2] Orelli, the *Prophecies of Isaiah*, p. 215 (Engl. Transl.) It should be borne in mind that this learned writer (Von Orelli) is one of the contemporary critics who stand against the Isaianic authorship.

this would cast the greatest dishonor on his memory, as a prophet unfaithful to his calling. Israel's corruption and departure from God had become so inveterate as to be incurable by any except the most severe judgments (Isai. i). To testify this was the occasion of Isaias' calling from the first (chap. vi, 8-13); and now in the chapter immediately preceding this prophecy (i. e., chaps. xl-lxvi) Isaias is commissioned, on the occasion of Ezechias' showing all his treasures to the ambassadors of Merodach-Baladan, king of Babylon, to announce to him and Israel that "all should be carried to Babylon" (xxxix, 6). With such a denunciation he could not conclude without belying the special functions of the prophetical office. For this office implied two things: the interpretation of the purpose of God's dealings with his people, and also the upholding of their faith under the severity of predicted judgments, by the assurance that they were intended to subserve the accomplishment of the high destiny promised them as God's people. The second part of the book opening with the words: "Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people" (xl, 1), was therefore the indispensable sequel to the judgment just pronounced.[1] The prophet who sustained the faith of the godly Jews for nearly half a century, constantly promising security to the house of David amidst its greatest perils, foretelling the birth of Emmanuel and the laying of a sure foundation in Sion (Isai. xxviii, 16), would not, did not, break off his predictions with the abrupt announcement of the Captivity in Babylon, without adding a single word of comfort for his people in this the direst of all the threatened calamities.

Besides this general connection, many correspondences of ideas, thought to be latent and unobstrusive in themselves, have been pointed out by Dr. Kay[2] as testifying clearly to the unity of authorship of both parts of the book of Isaias. Here are, according to him, minor links that bind Parts I and II indissolubly together:

(1) God abhorred a heartless ritual worship: i, 11-13—lxvi, 3.

(2) The Lord of Hosts, the Holy One, sat enthroned in "the High and Holy Place": vi, 1—lvii, 15; lxvi, 1.

(3) Yet he regarded the lowly soul that trembles at His word: vi, 5, 6, 7—lvii, 15; lxvi, 2.

(4) Hereafter, He would found a House on His holy mountain for all nations to resort to: ii, 2, 3—lvi, 7; lx, 12-14.

(5) Before Him, every high thing (every mountain and hill) should be made low: ii, 11, 17; v, 15, 16—xl, 4.

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[1] *Cfr.* John Forbes, loc. cit., p. 5.

[2] In the *Speaker's Bible*, Isaiah, p. 15 sq.

(6) This is in pursuance of an all-wise Plan, which is far beyond the reach of man's thoughts, and stands firm in spite of man's opposition: v, 19; xiv, 24, 27; xix, 12; xxiii, 8, 9; xxviii, 29—xl, 13, 14; xliv, 26; xlvi, 10; lv, 9; lxiv, 4.

(7) He overrules even human pride and violence to the working out of His righteous chastisements: x, 5, 7; xxxvii, 26—xlvii, 6; liv, 16.

(8) Israel must be chastised, for they were rebellious children: i, 2, 5; xxxi, 1, 2—lxiii, 8, 10.

(9) The nation, sick and wounded, could be healed only by God: i, 5, 6; vi, 10—liii, 4; lvii, 18, 19.

(10) The people and land are forsaken: vi, 12; xvii, 9; xxvii, 10; xxxii, 14—xlix, 14; liv, 6, 7; lxii, 4, 12.

(11) They are given over to judicial deafness and blindness for a season: vi, 10; xxix, 18; xxxii, 3; xxxv, 5—xlii, 7, 18.

(12) A Remnant should be converted and saved: i, 27; iv, 2, 3; x, 20, 22; xxxvii, 31, 32—xlviii, 10; lix, 20; lxv, 8, 9.

(13) God Himself would come and save them: xxxv, 4—xl, 10; God, their King: vi, 5; xxxiii, 22—xliii, 15; xliv, 6.

(14) One should be born to the house of David, in whom the "sure mercies" promised to David through his son should be realized, and "an everlasting Covenant" established: vii, 14; ix, 6, 7—lv, 3, 4.

(15) In xi, 1 it is foretold of this scion of David's house that "the Spirit of the Lord should rest upon him." The fulfilment is described in lxi, 1.

(16) Israel was to be made fruitful by God's Spirit being poured out upon them: xxxii, 15—xliv, 3, 4.

(17) In v, 2, 7, God has planted a Vine to be "His pleasant *plant*," but laid it waste because it brought forth no "fruit of *righteousness*:" in lx, 21 we read: "Thy people shall be all *righteous* . . . the branch of *My planting*"; and in lxi, 3: "that they may be called trees of *righteousness*, the *planting* of the Lord."

(18) In lxiii, 17: "*Why hast Thou* . . . hardened our hearts from Thy fear?"—a strange challenge, if we had not vi, 10 (comp. xxix, 10) to account for it.

(19) In lxiv, 4 an acknowledgment of God's inconceivably great goodness to "him that waiteth for Him" is followed in verse 7 by "*Thou hast hid Thy face from us*." This striking yet obscure combination is explained when we recall the fundamental passage, viii, 17: "And *I will wait for the Lord*, that *hideth His face from the house of* Israel."

To these correspondences in ideas and expressions Dr. Kay adds several others, and thinks he has thus made a cumulative and convincing argument for the unity of authorship of both parts of Isaias. Most scholars admit, however, that these and all such connections between the "First" and "Second" Isaias can be accounted for otherwise than by unity of authorship. Many of those correspondences are simply due to the fact that the prophets of Israel proclaimed substantially the same message to the chosen people; others which bespeak an intimate acquaintance with thoughts peculiarly Isaianic can be explained by the great familiarity of a later prophetical writer with the prophecies of Isaias contained in the first part of the book; others, again, perhaps point to the unity of authorship of individual sections, but for the simple reason that the sections wherein such correspondences occur are due to one and the same prophet living during the Exile or after the Exile, as the case may be. In view of these and other such explanations, it is hard to maintain that this second argument, in so far as it is cumulative, carries conviction. In regard to the general contention stated above—viz., that the prophet Isaias who denounced the crimes of Israel and foretold their punishment must also, as a prophet faithful to his mission, have predicted the Return—it may be said that it is one of those *a priori* arguments the proving force of which may well be doubted.

The third argument, oftener insisted on than the one just stated, is grounded on a textual comparison of Isai. xl-lxvi with those "prophetical writings of the Old Testament the authorship and date of which are clearly determined and universally recognized." [1] It is strongly claimed that this comparison of the Deutero-Isaias with the exilic writers Jeremias, Ezechiel, Daniel, and also with the pre-exilic prophets Micheas, Nahum, and Sophonias, establishes the pre-exilic date of Isai. xl-lxvi. It is claimed, first of all, that while Jeremias, who lived at the time of the Babylonian exile, seems to be unknown to the Deutero-Isaias, the latter is clearly acquainted with the prophecies of the former. For instance, Isai. li, 15 is reproduced word for word in Jerem. xxi, 35; again, in Jerem. vi, 15 compared with Isai. lvi, 11, and in Jerem. xxxviii, 3 compared with Isai. xlviii, 6, it is plain that Jeremias simply gives—according to his custom—a different turn to the original passage in Isaias by a slight change of letters; [2] in like manner Jerem. x, 1-16, a passage concerning the nothingness of idols, "is strongly Isaianic in tenor" [3] (*Cfr.* Isai. xli, 7; xliv, 12-15; xlvi, 7;) a similar resemblance exists between the words of consolation in Jerem. xxx, 10, 11, and xlvi, 27, 28; "we shall find also in parallels like Jerem. iii, 16 and Isai. lxv, 17; Jerem. iv, 13 and Isai. lxvi, 15; Jerem. xi, 19 and Isai. liii, involuntary Isaianic reminiscences in Jeremias"; [4] etc.

The appeal to another exilic prophet, Ezechiel, in favor of the pre-exilic date of Isai. xl-lxvi, has been eloquently set forth by Prof.

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[1] Wm. Urwick, the *Servant of Jehovah*, p. 23.

[2] *Cfr.* Franz Delitzsch, the *Prophecies of Isaiah*, vol. ii, p. 131 (4th edit.)

[3] Delitzsch, loc. cit., p. 130.

[4] Delitzsch, loc. cit., p. 131. We refer to Delitzsch all the more willingly because in the fourth edition of *The Prophecies of Isaiah* we have quoted from, that distinguished scholar gives up the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi. See also Knabenbauer, S. J., *in Isaiam Prophetam*, vol. ii, p. 9 sqq., and authors referred to there.

Wm. Urwick[1] in the following terms: "Ezechiel prophesied during the early years of the exile, and we should expect to find some points of resemblance between a work written then and one (the Second Isaias) written in the later years of the Exile. But what we most remark is the striking contrast. We pass into different scenes and times as we pass from our chapters (Isai. xl-lxvi) to Ezechiel. Ezechiel is careful to note repeatedly the year and month of the captivity (*Cfr.* Ezech.xxiv, 1; xl, 1). Three times he mentions Daniel (xiv, 14, 20; xxviii, 3), and frequently speaks of the King of Babylon, naming Nabuchodonosor, xxix, 18, 19; xxx, 10. 'The atmosphere which Ezechiel breathes,' says Dean Stanley,[2] 'the visions by which he is called to his office, are alike strange to the other period; no longer Hebrew, but Asiatic. No longer the single simple figure of cloud or flame, or majestic human form, which had been the means of conveying the truth of the Divine presence to Moses or Isaias, but a vast complexity, wheel within wheel, as if corresponding to the new order of a larger, wider, deeper Providence now opening before him. The imagery that he sees is that which no one could have used unless he had wandered through the vast halls of Assyrian palaces, and there gazed on all that Assyrian monuments have disclosed to us.' Here is graphically described just what we might expect in a prophet living during the exile. But how totally different from what we find in Isaias' later chapters. No reference to Daniel, no mention of Nabuchodonosor, no reckoning of the weary years of exile, no reflection or shadow of the great country in which the exiles lived."

A similar contrast, it is claimed, exists between Isai. xl-lxvi and the book of Daniel. Whichever of the two widely-separated dates (the period of the captivity and the time of the Machabees) be assigned to Daniel, the book is full of historical allusions and descriptions appropriate to the circumstances of the Jewish exiles, whereas the reverse is the case with the second part of Isaias. Hence "the entire absence"[3] of such features from the Deutero-Isaias must point to a period anterior to the Exile.

It must be freely conceded that were the contrast between Isai. xl-lvi and Ezechiel and Daniel as striking as it is affirmed to be by the defenders of the Isaianic authorship, their argument drawn from a comparison between the Deutero-Isaias and the prophets would appear very strong. In reality the contrast is described in an exaggerated manner. "Signs of acquaintance with the nature and customs of Babylonia are not wanting in Isai. xl-lxvi. For example, xliv, 27; xlv, 1 sq., bespeak knowledge of the country which is intersected by main and branch rivers; xliii, 14, knowledge of the traffic enlivening these waterways; chap. xlvii, knowledge of the capital, with its luxurious living, its organized astrology and magic, its markets, the resorts of merchants from far and near; xlvi, 1 names Bel and Nabo as gods of Babylon, in reference to processions with images";[1] etc. Indeed the fact that numerous allusions of the writer to Babylon and Babylonia are both incidental and definite goes a great way toward proving that he lives in Babylonia and addresses fellow captives acquainted with that country. As regards the conclusion in favor of the pre-exilic authorship drawn from a comparison of chaps. xl-lxvi with the prophecies of Jeremias, it should not be considered as truly solid. The original text of Jeremias passed through several important stages in its composition and transmission. It is therefore possible that the verbal resemblances between it and the text of the Deutero-Isaias are due to the working of passages from chaps. xl-lxvi into the prophecies of Jeremias by a post-exilic editor.

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[1] *The Servant of Jehovah*, p. 28 sq.

[2] *Jewish Church*, vol. ii, p. 565.

[3] Wm. Urwick, loc. cit., p. 29.

There remains to set forth the inference for the pre-exilic date which is drawn from Isai. xl-lxvi as compared with the pre-exilic prophets Micheas, Nahum, and Sophonias. In the prophecy of Micheas, "a prophecy undeniably written under King Ezechias,"[2] we have a book which, like the Deutero-Isaias, foretells the Babylonian captivity and deliverance from it (Mich. iv, 10); describes the devastation of Jerusalem and Juda (i, 9, 12; ii, 4, 10); predicts the restoration (ii, 12; iv, 1 sqq.); "has a predominance of comfort, and is large and flowing in its descriptions of mercy to come."[3] Whence it is inferred that Isai. xl-lxvi should be considered as pre-exilic, just as well as the book of Micheas. A similar conclusion is drawn from the prophet Nahum, who lived shortly after Isaias, and seems to have been acquainted with Isai. xl-lxvi, as is shown by a comparison of Nahum i, 15 with Isai. lii, 7; Nah. iii, 4, 5, with Isai. xlvii; Nah. iii, 7, with Isai. li, 19; etc. It is also maintained that Sophonias, who lived under King Josias, and who is wont to quote and gather from other prophets before him, has distinct points of resemblance with the Deutero-Isaias (compare Sophon. ii, 15 with Isai. xlvii, 8; Sophon. iii, 10 with Isai. lxvi, 20; etc.)

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[1] Delitzsch, loc. cit., pp. 124 sq. See also Driver, Isaiah (in *Men of the Bible*, p. 189 sqq.)

[2] Wm. Urwick, loc. cit., p. 27.

[3] Ibid.

Despite the confident manner in which these minor prophets have been appealed to, with a view to establish the pre-exilic date of Isai. xl-lxvi, the reasoning based on them can hardly be urged against the opponents of the Isaianic authorship: their compilatory character should, as it seems, be admitted, together with the post-exilic date of several parts of their contents.

A fourth and apparently much stronger argument in favor of the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi, is derived from what is considered as the actual standpoint of the writer. The defenders of the traditional view take up those prophetic chapters, and affirm that, as witnessed by the prophecy itself, the writer's standing-place is in Palestine. They remind us that in Isai. xliii, 22-24, the prophet reproaches Israel with neglecting the offering of holocausts and sacrifices—a reproach which is suited only to people still in Palestine and within reach of Temple-worship. That the Temple of Jerusalem is still standing is inferred from Isai. lxvi, 20 and lxiii, 18.[1] Again, in lvi, 9—lvii, 10, the allusions of the writer to the dreadful persecutions under Manasses; to the criminal neglect of Israel's rulers and "shepherds," which, as we know from other sources, existed before the Babylonian exile; and to idolatrous acts practised in Manasses' reign by the people of Jerusalem in the valley of Hinnom, prove that the author, who always speaks in the present, lived in an age long before the Captivity. Many other traits concerning the social and moral condition of the Jews in Isai. lii, 5; lviii, 4; lix, 3 sqq.,[2] or referring to their defective worship of Yahweh (*Cfr.* Isai. lviii, 1-3, etc.), are described in a manner more appropriate to the people still in Juda, than to exiles in Babylon. The exact place where the author writes cannot be Babylonia, since in lii, 11, he says "depart *thence*" (had he been in the land of exile at the time of writing, he would have said "depart *hence*"); and since in lvii, 9-11, he addresses Jerusalem as still standing, as still running after the favor of the Babylonian king. Finally, the prophet, in proof of the divinity of the God of Israel, appeals frequently to *fulfilled predictions*, and in particular claims *fore*knowledge of the deliverance by *Cyrus.*[3] Now, it is said, this is of no value if the prophecy dates from the period of the Exile.

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[1] *Cfr.* Meignan, *les Prophètes d'Israel et le Messie*, p. 247.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[3] *Cfr.* Isai. lxi, 21, 29; xlii, 9; xliii, 8-10; xlv, 21; xlvi, 9, 10; xlviii, 3-8.

Capital has been made of this last part of the fourth argument in favor of the Isaianic authorship. To serve as an unquestionable proof of Yahweh's divinity, it is affirmed, the predictions appealed to as fulfilled, especially those which concern Cyrus' coming and victories, must needs have been made long before the Babylonian captivity.[1] "This reasoning would be of weight if it could be shown that the predictions alluded to were those constituting the prophecy itself: but if the passages are read attentively, it will be seen that they contain nothing which lends support to such a supposition. The prophet's standpoint is indicated in xlii, 9: 'The things that were first, behold they *are come to pass*; and new things do I declare; before they spring forth, I cause you to hear them' (*Cfr.* xlviii, 3); on the ground of prophecies which, as he speaks, *are already fulfilled*, he rests his claim to be heard in the *new* anouncements now made by him. The new announcements are, primarily, the capture of Babylon by Cyrus and the release of the Jews, topics to which the prophet repeatedly reverts in the course of chaps. xl-xlviii. What the 'former things' are is not distinctly stated. . . . As Cyrus is alluded to as already 'stirred up' (xli, 2, 25; xlv, 13) at the time when the prophecy opens, it is probable that they were prophecies relating to the early stages of Cyrus' career (*Cfr.* xli, 22, 26 sq.; xliii, 9; xliv, 7; xlviii, 14). These had been spoken some time before; they had been fulfilled (*Cfr.* xlviii, 3-6*a*); and now *fresh* prophecies are delivered by him relating to events very soon to take place, (*Cfr.* xlviii, 6*b*-8)."[2] As regards the assertion that the author of the prophecy claims *fore*knowledge of the deliverance by *Cyrus*, it cannot be substantiated. The prophet introduces Cyrus as *known*, and only claims *fore*knowledge of what he will do, precisely as Isaias does in the case of Sennacherib (*e. g.*, xxxvii, 33). And this view of the prophet's language is in harmony with every passage in which he either names or alludes to Cyrus. Thus, according to xli, 2; xlv, 1, that prince is *already* in movement, and has been taken by the hand, and *will* prosper in his own undertaking.

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[1] *Cfr.* Knabenbauer, *in Isaiam*, vol. ii, p. 6, and writers referred to there.

[2] Driver, *Isaiah, his Life and Times*, p. 188 sq.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 189 footn. 2. This simple manner of interpreting the various passages where Cyrus is spoken of disposes fully of Bp. Hanneberg's supposition that Cyrus' name is a later insertion from the margin into the sacred text (*Histoire de la Révélation Biblique*, vol. i, p. 337. French Transl.).

Most of the passages appealed to as describing pre-exilic circumstances, moral, social, and religious, of the Jews, prove perhaps that some sections in chaps. xl-lxvi were written before the Exile. But the very reason for which such passages may be considered as pre-exilic, viz., the fact that their primary and natural meaning seems to point to a time before the Captivity, forbids most contemporary critics to assign other sections, or rather the great bulk of of the Deutero-Isaias, to pre-exilic times. The only theory which seems to many of them to be in harmony with all the facts of the case is that which considers the Deutero-Isaias—like the First Isaias—as a compilation made up of prophecies belonging to various periods of Jewish history.[1]

The resemblances of style and language noticeable between the two parts of the book of Isaias are a last argument in favor of the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi. It is affirmed that these resemblances are closer than those which exist between any two independent writings of the Old Testament, that they greatly preponderate over the diversities between the two parts of Isaias, and that in consequence they point to Isaias as the writer of both i-xxxix and xl-lxvi.

The most striking features of style and language, which are considered as distinctly Isaianic and yet are common to both parts of the book of Isaias, are the following: (1) The phrase "the Holy One of Israel," applied to Yahweh, which appears everywhere in chaps. i-xxxix,"[2] runs also through chaps. xl-lxvi; (2) The introduction of divine words by: "Yahweh saith" (*Cfr.* i, 11 18; xxxiii, 10; xl, 1, 25; xli, 21; lxi, 9), and their confirmation by the formula: "the mouth of Yahweh hath spoken"[3] (i, 20; xl, 5; lviii, 14; (3) "The frequent recurrence of the word *Tohu* (the *chaos* of Gen. i, 1) (three times in the First Isaias, and seven times in the Second Isaias), almost, as it were, the catchword of both books, much as some modern writers are characterized by the use of phrases like 'the absolute' or 'the eternities'";[4] (4) In both parts of Isaias God is often called "King"

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[1] The peculiar expression "depart *thence*," in reference to Babylon, in lii, 11, may indeed be understood—in view of the general context (verses 7-12),—as simply the outcome of the fact that the prophet places himself in spirit at Jerusalem, and thus speaks of Babylon as a distant place. But the parallel expression in the second part of verse 11: "go out in the midst of HER," seems to imply that primitively, instead of "depart *thence*," the Hebrew had "depart from *Babylon*," as it still reads in xlviii, 20. In Hebrew, *Babel*, the proper name for *Babylon*, is feminine. It may have been omitted in lii, 11, through hatred for that famous city (*Cfr.* Ps. cxxxvi, 8).

[2] This is true only in reference to the acknowledged prophecies of the "First Isaias.

[3] This confirmatory formula is found nowhere else in Scripture.

[4] E. H. Plumptre, *Isaiah*, in *Old Test. Introductions*, edited by C. J. Ellicott, p. 253.

(vi, 5; xxxiii, 22; *cfr.* viii, 21; xli, 21; xliii, 15; xliv, 6), and His royal dominion is celebrated (xxiv, 23; lii, 7);[1] (5) In both parts, too, the divine omnipotence is incidentally called "Yahweh's arm" or "His arm" (xxx, 30; xxxiii, 2; *Cfr.* ix, 20; xvii, 5; xl, 10, 11; xlviii, 14; li, 5; etc.); (6) The figure *epanaphora, i. e.* the repetition of words at the beginning and end of sentences,[2] runs throughout the book of Isaias; as a favorite rhetorical phrase (i, 7; iv, 3; vi, 11; xiii, 10; xiv, 25; xiv, 8 xxx, 20; xxxiv, 9; xl, 19; xlii, 15; 19; xlviii, 21; etc.); (7) The same holds good of *anadiplosis*, a figure in which the ending of a sentence, line or clause is repeated and emphasized at the beginning of the next, and which occurs in viii, 9; xxix, 1; *Cfr.* xxi, 9; xl, 1; xli, 27; xliii, 11; 25; li, 9, 12, 17; etc.; (8) "In the same way, the crowding together of short sentences, as in i, 17; xxiii, 10; xlvii, 2—everywhere the same breathless haste in the movement of thought. But there are still more intimate lines of connection. How strikingly, for example, xxviii, 5 and lxii, 3 rhyme together, and also xxix, 23 and v, 7 with lx, 21! And does not the fundamental thought, heard in xxii, 11; xxxvii, 26 (*Cfr.* xxv, 1), that everything realized in history pre-exists as idea, *i. e.*, a mental picture, in God, run through chapters xl-lxvi as a constant echo? And is not what is said in xi, 6 sqq.; xxx, 26; and other places, of the future glorifying of the earthly and heavenly creation, repeated in the second half of the book in grand, elaborate pictures, and partly in the same words, a not un-Isaianic feature, lxv, 25? Also the designation of God as 'Saviour,' found everywhere in chaps. xl-lxvi, has its roots in the sayings of the first part, such as xii, 2; xxxv, 4."[3]

From these and other such forms of thought and expression,[4] which are common to both parts of Isaias, some contemporary scholars (however in a decreasing number) have inferred unity of authorship. They have endeavored to account for the diversities disclosed by a comparison of the two portions of the book by appealing to the different circumstances of composition. "As he grows old," says Plumptre in this connection,[1] "a writer of genius [like Isaias] develops new thoughts, enlarges his vocabulary, varies his phraseology and style, according to the occasion which leads him to write or the intensity of his emotions. Many, if not most, New Testament students find no difficulty in accepting the Pastoral Epistles as written by St. Paul, in spite of the long list of words found in them which are not found in his other writings, and the peculiarities of style and thought which characterize them." And yet the same scholar, though he admits the unity of authorship, adds significantly: "On the other hand, the history of all literature shows that one writer may, either from pure reverence and love, or from a deliberate purpose of personation, so imbue his mind with the thoughts and language of another, adopt his phrases, reproduce the turns and tricks of his style, that it will not be easy, even for an expert, to distinguish between the counterfeit and the original." More important still than these words of Dean Plumptre are those of Franz Delitzsch, who, after having long maintained the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi, and the value of the argument in its favor drawn from the language of the book, wrote thus in the last edition of his valuable Commentary on Isaias:[2] "We may say that the second half of the book of Isaias (chaps. xl-lxvi) is in course of progressive growth as to its theme, standpoint, style, and ideas throughout the first part (chaps. i-xxxix). But, on the other hand, it is also true that all this does not prove the identity of the two Isaias, but only that the Second Isaias is a disciple of the first, outstripping the master, on whom he is formed."

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[1] *Cfr.* Delitzsch, loc. cit., p. 127.

[2] Here is an example of *epanaphora* (Isai. i, 7):

Your land is *desolate*,
Your country, *strangers* devour before your face,
And it is *desolate*,
As overthrown by *strangers*.

[3] Delitzsch, loc. cit., p. 127 sq.

[4] For fuller information in that regard, see Wm. Urwick, the *Servant of Jehovah*, p. 36 sqq.; Wm. H. Cobb's Essays in *The Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, Oct., 1881, and Jan., July, 1882; and the Commentaries of Kay, Cheyne, etc., on Isaias.

The foregoing is a rapid survey of the grounds which the defenders of the Isaianic authorship still bring forth in favor of their position. To certain minds some of them will no doubt appeal powerfully, while to others, they will, neither singly, nor collectively, appear conclusive. Back of them all, there is the implicit belief in the value of the Jewish tradition which in the present case, can hardly be shown to go back close to the time of the author of the Proto-Isaias. And this is why many contemporary scholars feel free to pursue a different line of thought and study, and have reached what seems to them a more satisfactory solution of the problem concerning the authorship of Isai. xl-lxvi. But we must postpone to a future issue the setting forth and examination of their reasons for ascribing Isai. xl-lxvi to a different time and author, than those admitted by the advocates of the traditional view.

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[1] Plumptre, *Isaiah*, p. 253.

[2] Biblical Commentary on the *Prophecies of Isaiah*, vol. ii, p. 128 (Engl. Transl.)

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

ST. VINCENT OF LERINS

Wendell S. Reilly, D. D.

"We must take great care to hold fast to what has been believed everywhere, always, by all, for this is truly and properly Catholic." This famous definition of what is distinctively Catholic, more familiar to most readers in its Latin form: *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est,* expresses the leading idea of the *Commonitorium* of St. Vincent of Lerins. He explains, expands and applies it; he pleads most eloquently with his contemporaries for the maintenance of those doctrines which come up to its requirements.

The work may be regarded as the first systematic answer to the question: What must we believe? When the Reformation had opened up the discussion on the rule of faith, no writing of Christian antiquity was scrutinised with more interest than that of the monk of Lerins. Forty editions of it were published between 1528 and 1688. It was as popular with Protestants as with Catholics. While the latter found in it a strong defense of their doctrine concerning ecclesiastical tradition, the former saw in the *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus* an instrument well adapted to retrench from the Christian system of thought and practice, all that they did not consider as belonging to that system in its primitive simplicity.

More recently attention has been called to the *Commonitorium* chiefly on account of the passage in which St. Vincent enuntiates the law of the development of doctrine.

What is the value of St. Vincent's views on this subject?

In a review of Bardenhewer's Patrology,[1] Prof. Ehrhard protested against the traditional praise bestowed on the author of the *Commonitorium.* He allows that a true sense *can* be given to Vincent's definition of orthodox doctrine; but he maintains that, as understood and inculcated by Vincent, it did not leave sufficient room for development. His call for a careful study of the question is partly responsible for this endeavor to determine what was really the mind of St. Vincent on the rule of faith in general, and especially, to interpret, by their context, the well-known figures of Ch. xxiii, on the progress of the Church's doctrine.

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[1] *Hist. Jahrbuch,* 1897, s. 866 ff.

In order to understand just what Vincent *means* by his rule of faith, it is important to take into consideration the circumstances which called it forth.

The island of Lerins, off the coast of Provence, in southern France, was, in the fifth century, the home of a great monastic family founded by St. Honoratus in 410. Montalembert tells us that this monastery was characterized, as compared with the institutions of St. Martin on the banks of the Loire, by the devotion of its inmates to the pursuits of the intellectual life. It was protected by its position from the devastating invasions of the barbarians; and furnished an asylum which did much to save the arts and sciences of antiquity, as well as to foster the spiritual life of the new society which was being built up on the ruins of the old Roman world.

Many of those who withdrew to this "favored and happy isle of Lerins," as it is called by St. Cesarius of Arles, remained there all their life, as did St. Vincent, in contemplation and study; but it is particularly interesting as a seminary which furnished to the Sees of Gaul many saintly bishops, like Saint Cesarius himself and St. Eucherius of Lyons. St. Patrick is said to have spent nine years there during his preparation for his work in Ireland.

It was in the peaceful abode of learning and holiness that the *Commonitorium* was written. It appeared, according to its author, three years after the council of Ephesus, that is to say, in 434. There can be no doubt in regard to its authorship, although the work was issued under the pseudonym of *Peregrinus*. It is attributed to Vincent of Lerins, towards the end of the fifth century, by Gennadius, in his *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*. We learn from this historian that Vincent was a Gaul by birth, and a priest. He tells us that he was learned in the Sacred Scriptures, and "sufficiently instructed" in dogma. St. Eucherius mentions Vincent as one of those to whom he had entrusted the education of his son. He calls him "a holy man, alike pre-eminent by his science and his eloquence."

The style of Vincent is correct and elegant. There are in his work frequent allusions to the classics. Ebert, in his history of the literature of the Middle Ages, pronounces his Latin the best that was written in the fifth century.

In his first chapter, Vincent tells us that he writes principally for his own personal profit. In conformity with the behest of the

Bible to meditate on the sayings of our fathers, he wishes to have at hand a writing which will come to the help of his memory, by recalling what he has learned from his ancestors in the faith. He does not manifest any intention to enter into the arena of controversy, or to combat, in the minds of his contemporaries, opinions which he considers heterodox. One would not think that the motive which induced him to write was pre-occupation caused by new heresies. That such, however, was the case, is an impression that grows on one as he pursues Vincent's argument for the defense of antiquity against the encroachments of profane novelty. The *Commonitorium* is not a collection of choice sayings of the Fathers, destined to nourish the meditations of a solitary, nor is it the academic composition of a man who was indifferent about the doctrinal questions of the day.

In the second chapter, he says himself that it is to undo the artifices of *new* heretics that he lays down the criteria for discerning true doctrine; and, in ch. xxviii, that his rule is not intended for the refutation of inveterate heresy.

What are these doctrinal innovations which the writer has in view? We can hardly think of the errors of Nestorius or of Pelagius. He deals with them as heresies of the past. He simply recalls their fate as a warning to those tempted to leave the path trodden by the Fathers. On the other hand, we know that when the *Commonitorium* appeared, a contest was going on, in southern Gaul, between those who defended the doctrines of St. Augustine on predestination and grace, and those who were opposed to them.

Augustine had died four years before, in 340. Thanks to his efforts, and to those of the North African Church, Pelagianism had been vanquished; but the doctrine advanced by the great bishop of Hippo was far from meeting with full approval in all parts of the Church. His teaching gave rise to protest, even in the ranks of those who were opposed to the heresy of Pelagius.

This opposition broke out even before Augustine's death. In 428 or 429, his two faithful disciples, Hilary (Tyro) and Prosper, call the attention of their master to the unfavorable reception which his latest works had met with in Gaul.[1] It was indeed there that the controversy reached its highest pitch and that it lasted longest. Among those opposed to Augustine were men who have left a great name in the Church, although they fell into errors afterwards characterised as semi-Pelagian. Such were John Cassianus, the founder of the monastery of St. Victor in Marseilles, whose writings have ever been considered one of the most remarkable codes of the monastic life; St. Hilary, bishop of the metropolitan see of Arles, one of the alumni of Lerins; Faustus, bishop of Riez, the most ardent champion of the semi-Pelagian cause, who wrote his work on grace and free-will after the council of Arles, in 475 (?). Faustus had been a monk of Lerins. He was abbot in 434, when Vincent wrote the *Commonitorium.*

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[1] Epp. 225, 226, inter Epp. Aug.

Was St. Vincent a semi-Pelagian?

Many learned men have favored the view that he was.[1] It is the one that best accounts for all the phenomena presented to one who studies the *Commonitorium.*

From what has been already said, one can appreciate the force of Tillemont's remark, that "there is some reason to suspect all that comes from Lerins, of not being favorable to St. Augustine, and of favoring, on the contrary, the semi-Pelagians." St. Hilary of Arles and Faustus were from Lerins. Besides, we know that St. Honoratus, the founder of the abbey, was a close friend of Cassianus. We can see, in the dedication which the latter makes to him of seven of his *Collationes* (xi-xviii), that the monks under his direction were fed on the writings of the Abbot of St. Victor.

The suspicion aroused by the name of Lerins is not dispelled by the way Vincent handles the questions which were under discussion. Dom Cellier insists on the fact that Vincent speaks of the Pelagians as heretics justly condemned. He points out that Vincent could not show greater disdain for them than by comparing them to "dying flies," and that he has so much horror for their doctrine that he does not deem it possible to undertake to refute it, without committing a crime.[2] But if one remembers how bitter the semi-Arians were in their denunciation of the Arians, he is not likely to consider the hostility of St. Vincent to the Pelagians as a proof of a similar attitude towards the semi-Pelagians; and indeed when he looks in the writings of Vincent for a condemnation of the mitigated form of that doctrine, he meets nothing that is formally opposed to it.

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[1] Card. Noris, *H. du Pélagianisme,* l. II., ch. II., ip. 330-334; Natalis Alexander, *H. E.*, t. V., p. 53-55; Berti, *Opus de theologicis disciplinis*, vol. II, ch. xlix; Pagi, *Crit.* ad ann. 434, nn. 15-19; Tillemont, *H. E.* vol. XV., p. 862; Hefele, *Beitraege zur kirchengesch., Archæologie und Liturgik*, B. I., p. 145-174, Tübingen, 1864; Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*, s. 490 ff.

Arguments on the other side can be found in the *Bollandists*, at the date of May 24; in Dom Cellier, *H. g. des Auteurs Ecclesiastiques*, (notice on St. Vincent, in vol. VIII; in Gorini, *Défense de l Eglise*, vol. I, p. 104 ss).

[2] *Commonitorium*, ch.ix.

He teaches, indeed, that grace is necessary for every good act. But the semi-Pelagian John Cassianus said as much,[1] and so did the other opponents of Augustine's doctrine, as we learn from Prosper's letter. Their distinctive error was the denial of what theologians call *gratia praeveniens*, which precedes, and is independent of, the action of man's free-will; and which is necessary even for the first step in the way of salvation. There are different kinds of grace and different kinds of necessity. Vincent does not say enough to prove that he held the true doctrine.[2]

Not only does the author of the *Commonitorium* fail to condemn the distinctive tenets of semi-Pelagianism, but he has a passage, in ch. xxvi, which seems to indicate his hostility to the teaching of Augustine. He speaks of heretics who dare to teach that "in their church . . . there is a great and special and altogether personal grace of God, so that, without any effort, . . . even if they do not ask, seek, knock, whoever belongs to their number is so provided for by God that he cannot be led into sin." Bardenhewer[3] sees here a clear allusion to St. Augustine and his adherents.[4] It is upon this passage that Hefele forms the main basis for his conclusion that Vincent was, in all likelihood, a semi-Pelagian. He points out that the monk of Lerins gives of the *heretics'* doctrine of grace, a notion which closely resembles the concept the semi-Pelagians had of the doctrine of Augustine, or, at least, the repellent form they were wont to give it in their writings.

It is hard to see whom Vincent can have in view if not the Augustinians. We do not know of any ancient sect which held such opinions on grace; and, on the other hand, the arms the author of the *Commonitorium* uses against his heretics are those used by the semi-Pelagians against their opponents. No one can deny that the grace which Augustine attributed to the elect was *great, special and altogether personal*. The semi-Pelagians could not conceive how this could be. The munificence of God must be the same for all.[5] St. Prosper's letter tells us that there was a general tendency among them to make the grace necessary for salutary works depend on the will of man. It is true that Vincent attributes to the grace he rejects certain effects which were not attached to grace as Augustine conceived it; but they are precisely the effects which the semi-Pelagians connected with his doctrine. Thus, St. Prosper tells us, they accused Augustine of taking away from the fallen all care to rise, and of giving to the saints a temptation to lukewarmness "because in either case effort is useless, if one who is rejected cannot enter heaven, and one who is of the elect cannot fail to do so by any negligence."[1]

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[1] *Collationes*, iv, 5.

[2] *cf*. Vasquez I, p. disp. 91, ch. viii, n. 43.

[3] *Patrologie*, s. 491.

[4] *cf*. v. g. *De Dono Perseverantiæ*, xxiii (64): Falluntur qui putant esse a nobis non dari nobis, ut petamus, quæramus, pulsemus.

[5] *cf*. Faustus of Riez, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, B. I, ch. xv.

But Vincent's position in the semi-Pelagian controversy is indicated still more clearly by the nature of his work as a whole. It is a plea in favor of respect for tradition. Now, strange as it may appear, it is more natural to attribute such a plea to an opponent of Augustine's teaching, than to one of his disciples. Novelty was the principal charge brought against the latter. Thus we read in St. Prosper's letter: "Many of the servants of God who live in Marseilles think that whatever is said, in the writings of your Holiness against the Pelagian heretics, concerning the calling of the elect according to the grace of God, *is contrary to the opinion of the Fathers and the mind of the Church*."[2] And St. Hilary tells him that at Marseilles and other places in Gaul it is openly declared that his teaching is *new*.[3]

Augustine devoted his last two books[4] to answering his Gallic antagonists. It is to be remarked that, though called upon to answer difficulties raised especially in the name of tradition, the holy doctor bases his argument chiefly on Scripture. Hilary had told him that an appeal was being made against his latest works, to his own earlier writings. He answers that he had indeed at one time fallen into the error of attributing to our own efforts that faith with the help of which we can live piously and justly; but he had been drawn from it "by meditating on the text: *What hast thou, that thou hast not received*.[5]

He acknowledges that it would be hard to find, in the writings of the Fathers, passages in which they clearly teach the doctrine he upholds. He himself had *progressed* in his views. The "Catholic commentators of the divine oracles" who had preceded him had not been called upon to deal *ex professo* with this difficult question, being wholly taken up with other aspects of the Christian life. They had touched on it briefly as occasion demanded. The *sense* of the Church is indicated by her prayers.[1] Besides, his teaching is contained, in principle, in the doctrine, common to him and his opponents, on original sin and the need of the Saviour's grace.[2]

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[1] Letter c., n. 3.

[2] Ep. 225, l. c. n. 2.

[3] Ep. 226, l. c. n. 2.

[4] *De prædestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiæ*.

[5] *De præd. sanct.*, n. 3.

St. Augustine saw clearly that his view was not contrary to tradition; but he was on the defensive in regard to the argument taken from the Fathers. Hence we infer that the *Commonitorium* was not written by a disciple of his; and what we have seen of the semi-Pelagian contentions makes it natural to think that it was a book after their own heart. It was an argument that would help them in what they considered to be the fight for the old Catholic doctrine against novelties propped up by a false interpretation of Scripture. Vincent is particularly forceful when warning his readers against such a snare, more particularly when the one suspected of departing from the rule of interpretation fixed by the Fathers, is a doctor of great personal qualities.

This feature of the *Commonitorium* obviously marks it as especially well adapted to the purpose of opposing the influence of St. Augustine. There is good reason to see an allusion to him in St. Vincent's long dissertation on Origen and Tertullian, in his warnings not to follow a doctor who departs from the traditional faith, even though he be holy and learned, though he be a bishop, though he be a martyr.[3]

Vincent nowhere mentions Augustine or his disciples. He does not accuse them of heresy; though doctrines which he appears to attribute to them are denounced as heretical. Less reserve would have been unsafe in 434. Two or three years before, Celestine I had written to the bishops of Gaul, defending the memory of Augustine, and censuring those who accused his disciples of preaching wrong doctrine. Vincent uses this letter to prove his thesis on the necessity of adhering to antiquity. The Pope reproaches the bishops with leaving freedom of speech to *inventors of novelty*. He asks the question, which would scarcely occur to a partisan of Hilary and Prosper: "Who are those to whom freedom of speech is forbidden?" He lets its answer depend on the answer given to the other question: "Who are the innovators in Gaul?" It is interesting to remark that while he uses the words of the Sovereign Pontiff with the greatest respect, he does not seem to be convinced about their application to the case aimed at. The Pope had said, speaking of the state of affairs in Gaul: "*Si ita res est, desinat incessere novitas vetustatem.*" St. Vincent thrice repeats this: *Si ita res est.*

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[1] *De præd sanct.* n. 27.

[2] Ibid. n. 3.

[3] *Commonitorium*, ch. xxviii (39).

The three points we have dwelt upon, namely St. Vincent's connection with Lerins, his way of dealing with the question of grace and finally the general nature of his work in the circumstances in which it appeared, can scarcely leave any doubt that the *Commonitorium* was written in defense of the semi-Pelagian cause.

The question came before Benedict XIV. In his *Constitutio de Nova Editione Martyrologii Romani,* he says that errors of which Vincent may be suspected find an excuse in the circumstances of a period when the doctrines afterwards rejected as semi-Pelagian were not as yet fully threshed out.

We have spoken of other saintly men, men "*meritis et honoribus clari,*" to use the words of St. Prosper, who are now called semi-Pelagians. St. Augustine deals with them as "brothers." Their intentions are above suspicion. As we have seen, most of them attributed too much to man's natural powers, too little to grace, in the work of salvation. But it may be mentioned, as an extenuating circumstance, that in his zeal against the Pelagians, Augustine sometimes inclines too much towards the opposite extreme. This is, at least, the view of a great many. It is well expressed by St. Bonaventure: *Ut pelagianos reduceret ad medium, abundantius declinavit ad extremum.*[1] Bonaventure thinks the exaggeration is simply in the language. "Being the first to write *ex professo* on the subject," says M. Gaillard in his historical study on Grace, "St. Augustine is not always sufficiently precise and exact. Certain notions and certain distinctions are wanting, particularly in what is said about *sufficient grace.*"[2]

It would imply no disrespect for the illustrious *doctor of grace* to say that some of his *ideas* on grace are not quite exact. At any rate, some things taught by him have never been defined as matters of faith by the Church.

This being the case, the mere fact of manifesting opposition to some of his doctrines does not detract from the respect we owe to Vincent as a saint. Even Faustus, whose above-mentioned work is clearly semi-Pelagian, was greatly venerated in the church in his time. It was not until the Council of Orange (530) that what was unacceptable in the semi-Pelagian teaching was definitely rejected.

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[1] In Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theol. Dogm.*, vol. II, p. 43.

[2] A. Gaillard, *Etudes sur l histoire de la doctrine de la grace, depuis S. Augustin,* p. iv. Lyons, 1897.

But while his being a semi-Pelagian does not derogate from his holiness, it may be asked whether it does not weaken his authority as an exponent of the true way to distinguish what is really Catholic from what is heretical. In all probability he himself used the *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus* against doctrines which the Church regards as orthodox. It *may* have been the false application of a true principle; it would seem more likely that his requirements as regards the consensus of the Fathers were too exacting, that his view of the development of which a doctrine is susceptible, was inadequate.

We shall reserve for a future article a study on doctrinal progress as it is dealt with in the *Commonitorium* itself.

WENDELL S. REILLY.

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI

KING OF BABYLON (Circa 2250. B. C).

Gabriel Oussani

Oriental Archæology and the Old Testament.

The wonderful archæological discoveries made in Western Asia in the last fifty years have so completely revolutionized our historical knowledge of its ancient peoples, that we may safely affirm that not only a new world but new worlds, which had disappeared from the scene of history for more than six thousand years, and were entirely forgotten, have been brought before our view in all their greatness and majesty. Long before Greece and Rome had attained any political or literary importance these West-Asiatic empires had already ended their brilliant political, social and literary career, and had given up the last breath of their national existence. All that was left of their past glory remained buried for thousands of years beneath the fertile soil of those plains and oases which once resounded with the echo of their exploits and triumphs, and from which civilization and art, science and inventions, law and morals spread out to the utmost ends of the earth.

It was reserved to the second half of the last century to accomplish the laborious task of disinterring from the deepest strata of mounds and ruins the glorious remains of those well nigh forgotten peoples. Their cities and capitals, temples and palaces, libraries and schools, have been excavated, and their historical records and inscriptions deciphered and studied by a legion of competent Western scholars and archæologists, to whose genius, learning, indefatigable zeal and painstaking scholarship we are all deeply indebted. Through the hard and successful labors of these distinguished scholars we are now well acquainted with the history, chronology, religion, mythology, language, literature and life of the ancient Sumerians, Chaldeans, Babylonians, Assyrians, Elamites, Medians, old Persians, Hittites, Syrians, Arabians, old Armenians, and a number of other tribes and nations which once moved within that classic land which lies between the Persian Gulf on the south, Mount Taurus on the north, Media and Elam on the east and the Mediterranean on the west.

Fifty years ago the records and even the name and existence of many of these glorious nations were totally unknown to us, or the little we knew about them had come down to us, either in legendary form or in traditions handed down by a few not very trustworthy Persian, Greek and Roman historians. Even the few allusions scattered in the historical and prophetical books of the Old Testament were either too vague or too meagre to be of much value. Frequently they were written several hundred years after the events they are supposed to narrate, and very often in a language and style which are most obscure. But to-day, thanks to the successful efforts of our scholars and archæologists, we can penetrate into the dimmest and remotest periods of those West-Asiatic civilizations with far clearer vision than we have of the primitive history of Greece and Rome. Many periods of their history are now better known to us than certain epochs of Greece, Rome and even of mediæval Europe. The nineteenth century, indeed, as Dr. Price, of Chicago, aptly remarks, has been the century of romance—romance in exploration, in discovery, in invention, in thought, in science, in art and in life. We have discovered vast tracts of history, and that science now goes back through a period of more than four thousand years before the Christian era. This history has been dug out of mounds, tombs and pyramids. It has been found written on granite, alabaster, wood, clay and papyrus. It has been translated from tablets, rolls, cylinders, statues and temples. Through a series of marvelous discoveries and romantic happenings we have been granted a vision of the life of hitherto unknown peoples.[1]

The archæological discoveries made in Babylonia and Assyria, however, have eclipsed in magnitude, number, and importance all others made in Western Asia. Here, thanks to the intelligent and successful labors of explorers and archæologists, such as Botta, Lyard, Rawlinson, Rassam, Loftus, Smith, de Sarzec, Haynes, Peters, Hilprecht, Koldewey and others, we have discovered the priceless literary and artistic treasures of the two most powerful and civilized nations of antiquity. We are in possession of their historical records, inscriptions, monuments, schools, temples, palaces and libraries. We have deciphered their languages and writings, and we have become acquainted with their history, religion, mythology, literature, customs, arts and civilization. The hundreds of thousands of inscriptions, so far discovered, have revealed to us the immense advance made by the savants of Babylonia and Assyria in astronomy, geography, medicine, grammar, lexicography and ethico-philosophical literature, and the still greater number of inscriptions yet to be deciphered and studied will certainly fill us with still greater admiration.

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[1] *The Monuments and the Old Testament.* Chicago; 3d edit. 1902; p. 17.

Assyriology is a comparatively young, but very promising science. The results already attained have reached such gigantic proportions that we may safely predict a complete revolution in our past and present knowledge of ancient history and civilization. Even many of our religious conceptions and beliefs have been deeply affected by this branch of Oriental archæology. It has already placed biblical exegesis and criticism on a far more scientific basis than was possible ten or twenty years ago; and the conclusions derived from it, arbitrary in some cases, doubtful in others, discouraging to certain minds, and to some unacceptable, have proved to be, nevertheless, of very real benefit to the scientific study of Old Testament history, literature, and theology. We are far from accepting as proved all the conclusions of a certain school of young and enthusiastic Assyriologists and Biblical critics, such as Delitzsch, Winckler, Gunkel, Jeremias, Cheyne and others; but we are still much less disposed to accept as true, or even as probable, the conclusions of the opposite school, headed by Hommel and Sayce, and a few others, that Oriental archæology in general, and Assyriology in particular, have dealt a death blow to the modern school of Biblical criticism, or that they have even demonstrated, in any degree, the untenability of the main conclusions of that science.[1]

Discovery and Description of the Code.

In the annals of Assyriology, if we except the memorable year 1857 in which, for the first time, the Cuneiform inscriptions were properly deciphered, no event has caused more sensation than the discovery of the Code of King Hammurabi, the oldest code of laws in the world. Neither George Smith's epoch-making discovery of the Babylonian account of the Deluge, in 1872, nor that, not less memorable, of the Tel-el-Amarna Tablets, in 1888, notwithstanding their immense importance, can in any degree compare with that of the finding of the Code in question, an event which marks not only a new era in Assyriological researches, but also a distinct advance in Biblical and Oriental studies. It is, in fact, as the great German Assyriologist of Berlin, Dr. Hugo Winckler, rightly observes, the greatest and most important discovery we have made so far in the East.[1] And the distinguished English Assyriologist of Queen's College, Cambridge, does not hesitate to say that the discovery and deciphering of this Code is the greatest event in Biblical archæology for many a day. In fact, containing as it does the laws which were enacted by a King of Babylonia in the third millennium, B. C., whose rule extended over the whole of Mesopotamia from the mouths of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates to the Mediterranean coasts, we must regard it as one of the most important monuments in the history of the human race.[2]

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[1] In a future article the writer hopes to discuss and refute the baseless assertions of Sayce, Hommel and other Biblical apologists as to the imaginary antagonism between Oriental Archæology and the conclusions of the modern school of Biblical criticism. *Cf.* Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament.* London 1899; pp. XVII, XVIII; and in same author's *Commentary on Genesis*, London, 1904; pp. LIII ff., as well as his admirable essay on *Hebrew Authority* in Hogarth's *Authority and Archæology, Sacred and Profane.* London, 1899; pp. 143 ff; and 149 ff. G. B. Gray in *The Expositor*, May, 1898; pp. 337 ff. G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament.* New York, 1902; pp. 56 ff. A. A. Bevan, *Critical Review*, 1897; pp. 406-415; and Vol. IV; 1894; pp. 123-127. *Cf.* also Expository *Times*, 1897; pp. 433 ff; 499 ff; and 1898; pp. 54 ff; 96 ff; 221 ff; 273 ff; and 362 ff.

The discovery of the Hammurabi Code of laws was made in December, 1901—January, 1902, at the great mound of ruins known as the Acropolis of Susa, the ancient city of the Persian kings, by the French archæological expedition, under the auspices of the French Government and the superintendence of M. J. de Morgan, who had previously distinguished himself by his discoveries in Egypt. The expedition started for the East in 1897, and in the course of four years had already made very important discoveries.[3] A day or two before the end of December, 1901, the workmen came upon a large fragment of black diorite. A few days later, two other fragments were unearthed, and the three pieces, when joined together, were found to form a complete whole in the form of a round pillar, shaped like an elongated sugar-loaf, which measured 7 feet 4 inches in height, 5 feet 4 inches in circumference at the top, and 6 feet 2 inches at the bottom. On the obverse side of the stone there are sixteen columns of writing with 1,114 lines. There were five more columns on this same side of the monument, but they have been erased and the stone repolished. This was no doubt, the work of the Elamite conqueror, (probably Sutruk-Nahunti, about 1100 B. C.), who removed it from Babylon, and who meant to inscribe his own name and titles on it.[1] On the reverse side there are twenty-eight columns of writing, comprising more than 2,500 lines. The monument, accordingly, in its present condition, contains 44 columns of writing, making 3,700 lines, while in its original shape it must have contained 49 columns of writing, or more than 4,000 lines. The inscription is in rows of short columns, the characters in the columns being read from top to bottom, and the columns themselves running from right to left. In the other Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions, and especially on the clay tablets, the inscriptions ordinarily read in horizontal lines, running from left to right. The style of writing is that of the Hammurabi period, archaic, monumental and very elaborately executed; and the hard quality of the stone has kept the original writing remarkably clear and well-defined. The monument is at present in Paris, in the Louvre, where it forms one of the most valuable treasures of that famous museum.

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[1] *Cf. Biblia.* Vol. XV, No. 12. 1903; p. 382.

[2] C. H. W. Johns. *The Oldest Code of Laws in the World.* Edinburgh, 1903; p. III.

[3] Morgan, J. de. *Délégation en Perse. Mémoires.* Tome I. *Recherches archæologiques.* Premier serie. *Fouilles a Suse en* 1897-1898 *et* 1898-1899. Par. J. de Morgan, G. A. Taquier et G. Lampre. Tome II. *Textes Elamites-Sémitiques.* Premier série. Tome III; *Textes Elamites-Anzanites.* Premier série. Tome IV; *Textes Elamites-Sémitiques.* Deuxième série. Par. V. Scheil. Paris, 1900-1902; pp. x-202; xvi-135; viii-146; iii-200 in 4o. A popular and instructive description of Susa and its ruins, in English, is given by Madame Jane Dieulafoy, an intrepid French lady who, together with her distinguished husband, were the first to call attention to the important mounds and ruins of the capital of Elam, by their successful excavations in 1884 and after. *At Susa; the Ancient Capital of the Kings of Persia,* translated from the French. Philadelphia, 1890, with illustrations. The account of the Dieulafoy expedition and excavations at Susa has been published in French in four sumptuous volumes. Paris, E. Leroux.

On the upper part of the monument there is engraved the image of the Babylonian sun-god, Shamash, "the God of law, whose children are called, "Justice" (*Kettu*), and "Right" (*Mesharu*), from whom Hammurabi claims to have received the laws in question, just as Moses is said to have received his laws from Jahweh, and Mohammed from Allah through the Angel Gabriel. "The sun-god is seated upon a raised throne. He wears the well-known swathed head-gear, and a flounced robe. Behind his shoulders rays spring out, and in his right hand he clasps a sceptre, the symbol of authority, and a wheel or ring. The King stands before Shamash in an attitude of reverent obedience.

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[1] Sutruk-Nahunti appears to have overrun Babylonia and sacked several important cities. The trophies of his victories were carried to Susa and placed, in all probability, in the temples and public buildings of that capital. No less than five Babylonian monuments have been discovered at Susa by the de Morgan expedition. One of them is a fragment of another pillar bearing a few lines of the Code. It is certain that the original Code of Hammurabi was erected at Babylon, in the great temple of Merodach, called E-Saggil; but copies were made and placed in other temples in Babylonia and Assyria. It is quite probable that the discovered Code was not the original one, but a copy set up either at Larsa or at Sippara.

He is clothed in a long tunic, which is hemmed in at the waist and hangs down in folds, and upon his head he wears a cap with fillet. His right hand is at his mouth, his left hand rests against the waist, precisely as in the familiar portrait sculpture of the King in the British Museum. Like the sun-god, he wears the familiar artificially plaited beard." [1]

From the fact that mutilated portions of copies of Hammurabi's Code have been found in Ninive, in the library of Assurbanipal, and a small duplicate fragment of the beginning of the Code was discovered among the ruins of Susa itself, it is natural to infer that the Code in question was accepted in many adjacent countries and cities as a standard code of laws, and that, consequently, copies of it were made and set up in many of these cities, including Ninive and Susa.

The text of the Code was first published in heliogravure, at the expense of the French Government, in a magnificent volume, entitled *Textes Elamitiques—Sémitiques*, Paris, 1902, being tome IV of the *Mémoires de la Délégation en Perse*. To Father V. Scheil, the eminent French Dominican, who was the Assyriologist of the Expedition, is due the honor and credit of having published the text in a splendid and accurate manner, as well as of having given to the public the first translation of the Code, within the short time of ten months after its discovery.

Ingenious and accurate as it was, Father Scheil's translation was necessarily in many cases imperfect and provisory. Dr. Hugo Winckler, of Berlin, gave, a few months later, an improved German translation of the Code; this was followed by Dr. John's English translation which contained several improvements on the two former ones. A few months later, Rev. Dr. Francesco Mari issued an Italian translation with a very useful introduction and notes. In the meantime Scheil, Winckler and Johns revised and improved their first translations of the

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[1] S. A. Cook. *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi.* London, 1903; pp. 4-5. According to Jeremias and Orelli, the sceptre in the right hand of the sun-god is to be taken as a stylus, the symbol of wisdom; while according to Dr. Ball, *Light from the East*, London, 1899, it indicates the straight course of the sun across the heavens. *Cf* Cook. op. cit., loc. cit. The portrait of Hammurabi can be seen in many frontispieces of the books and pamphlets concerning the Code, such as those of Scheil, Johns, Boscawen, Harper, Pinches, Mari, Edwards, D. H. Müller, Peiser-Köhler, Winckler and others. Another portrait sculpture of Hammurabi is in the British Museum (see the frontispiece in L. W. King's *Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*, London, 1900, in three vols.) A fragment of another statue of the same king was found at Susa by M. de Morgan. (*Textes Elamites-Sémitiques*, I. 84; Paris, 1900).

Code, while D. H. Müller, of Vienna, and Drs. J. Köhler and F. E. Peiser, of Leipzig, gave out new and independent German translations of the same, the former being accompanied with an excellent Hebrew rendering, the other with a juristic version. But the latest and best edition of the text is that published by Dr. Harper, of Chicago, with a very accurate and intelligible English translation, variants, full indexes, and notes.[1]

The number of books, pamphlets and articles, however, devoted to the discussion of the Code itself as well as its relation to other legislations and especially the Mosaic have been so numerous and instructive that we have collected a bibliography of the principal ones, which will be found as an appendix to this article.

Analysis of the Contents of the Code.

We cannot expect to find in the Code of Hammurabi, promulgated some 4,150 years ago, an exhaustive treatise on legislation, jurisdiction, etc., or even a collection of laws and regulations that would adequately cover the many phases of life in any highly organized community. Three hundred laws would hardly cover one single aspect of our complex and modern society. However, when we consider the age of our lawgiver and the comparatively simple life of his community, we may expect that such a collection of laws as this would fairly cover the every-day life of the people. Nor shall we find a continuity of thought or logical connection between the different ideas embodied in this long and interesting collection of laws. In many cases the penalties inflicted are extremely barbarous, and altogether out of proportion to the crime. In others, they are plainly inefficacious, while on the other hand, some are extremely wise and effective. In a word, we may say that in the Code of Hammurabi we meet with those same defects which are to be found in all ancient legislations, including the Mosaic and the Roman.[2]

The forty-five columns of inscriptions which cover the monument are divided into three distinct sections or divisions: I, The Introduction, or Prologue; II, The Code itself; and, III, The Conclusion, or Epilogue.

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[1] *Cf.* Dr. John's article *Code of Hammurabi* in the extra volume of Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible,* 1904. pp. 584-585.

[2] *Cf.* Orelli. *Das Gesetz Hammurabis und die Thora Israels,* Leipzig, 1903; p. 10; and D. H. Müller, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis und ihr Verhaeltniss zur mosaischen Gesetzgebung sowie zu den XII Tafeln,* Wien, 1903. Dr. D. G. Lyon, in *The Structure of the Hammurabi Code,* in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Vol. XXV; 1904; pp. 248 ff., tries, with more ingenuity than success, to trace through the whole Code a line of logical arrangement of the material.

In the Prologue, Hammurabi devotes considerable space to his titles and to the enumeration of his glorious and beneficent deeds for his country and people. He commences by saying how Anu, the supreme God, and Bel called him as the shepherd, and the elect of Bel, to bring about the happiness of men. Then he begins to enumerate his achievements, how he enriched the city of Ur, protected Larsa, enlarged Cutha, etc. . . . Then he states further how he gave new life to the city of Uruk by providing its inhabitants with abundant canals and waters, enlarged the agricultural lands of Dilbat, granted pasturage and watering-places to Lagash and Girsu, and fostered the inhabitants of Ninazu in their distress. He, the shepherd of men, who proclaimed right and upheld law, vindicated the rights of several deities, and restored their temples and worship. He concludes the Introduction with the following words: "When the God Marduk sent me to govern men, to sustain and instruct the world, right and justice in the lands I established; I brought about the happiness of men."

"The Prologue and Epilogue," as Dr. Johns rightly observes, "are very difficult to translate. Often the phrases are simply stock expressions which occur in most of the royal inscriptions. The meanings of many of these have degenerated to mere titles of courtesy and their original significance is obscure."[1]

The Prologue runs thus:

> When the most high God (Anu), king of the spirits of heaven (Anunnaki), and Bel, lord of heaven and earth, who settles the fates of all, allotted to Marduk, the first-born of Ea, the lord of right, a rule over men and extolled him among the spirits of earth (Igigi), then they nominated for Babylon a name above all, they made it renowned in all quarters, and in the midst of it they founded an everlasting sovereignty, whose seat is established like heaven and earth; then did God (Anu) and Bel call me by name, Hammurabi, the high prince, god-fearing, to exemplify justice in the land, to banish the proud and oppressor, that the great should not despoil the weak, to rise like the sun over the black-headed race (mankind) and illumine the land, to give health to all flesh. Hammurabi the (good) shepherd, the choice of Bel, am I, the completer of plenty and abundance, the fulfiller of every purpose. For Nippur, and Durili (epithet of Nippur or part of it?) I highly adorned E-KUR (the temple of Bel there). In powerful sovereignty I restored Eridu and cleansed E-ZU-AB (temple of Ea there). By onslaughts on every side (the four quarters) I magnified the name of Babylon and rejoiced the heart of Marduk my lord. Every day I stood in E-SAG-GIL (the temple of Marduk at Babylon). Descendant of kings whom Sin had begotten, I enriched the city of Ur, and

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[1] *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters*, 1904; pp. 389-390.

humbly adoring, was a source of abundance to E-NER-NU-GAL (the temple of Sin at Ur). A king of knowledge, instructed by Shamash the judge, I strongly established Sippara, reclothed the rear of the shrine of Aya (the consort of Shamash), and planned out E-BAB-BAR (temple of Shamash at Sippara) like a dwelling in Heaven. In arms I avenged Larsa (held by the Elamite, Rim-Sin), and restored E-BAB-BAR (temple of Shamash at Larsa) for Shamash my helper. As overlord I gave fresh life to Erech, furnishing abundance of water to its people, and completed the spire of E-AN-NA (temple of Nana at Erech). I completed the glory of Anu and Ninni. As a protector of my land, I reassembled the scattered people of Nisin (recently reconquered from the Elamites) and replenished the treasury of E-GAL-MAH (temple of Nisin). As the royal potentate of the city and own brother of its god Zamama, I enlarged the palace at Kish and surrounded with splendor E-ME-TE-UR-SAG (the temple at Kish). I made secure the great shrine of Ninni. I ordered the temple of Harsagkalama E-KI-SAL-nakiri, by whose assistance I attained my desire. I restored Kutha and increased everything at E-SID-LAM (the temple there). Like a charging bull, I bore down my enemies. Beloved of TU-TU (a name of Marduk) in my love for Borsippa, of high purpose untiring, I cared for E-ZI-DA (temple of Nabu there). As a god, king of the city, knowing and farseeing, I looked to the plantations of Dilbat and constructed its granaries for IB (the god of Dilbat) the powerful, the lord of the insignia, the sceptre and crown, with which he invested me. As the beloved of MA-MA (consort of IB), I set fast the bas-reliefs at Kish and renewed the holy meals for Erishtu (goddess of Kish). With foresight and power I ordered the pasturages and watering-places for Sirpurla and Girsu and arranged the extensive offerings in E-50 (the temple of "the fifty" at Sirpula). I scattered my enemies. As the favorite of Telitim (a god), I fulfilled the oracles of Hallab and rejoiced the heart of GIS-DAR (its goddess). Grand prince, whose prayers Adad knows well, I soothed the heart of Adad, the warrior in Bit Karkara. I fastened the ornaments in E-UD-GAL-GAL (temple there). As a king who gave life to Adab, I repaired E-MAH (temple at Adab.) As hero and king of the city, unrivalled combatant, I gave life to Mashkan-Shabri and poured forth abundance on SIT-LAM (temple of Nergal there). The wise, the restorer, who had conquered the whole of the rebellious, I rescued the people of Malka in trouble. I strengthened their abodes with every comfort. For Ea and DAM-GAL-NUN-NA I increased their rule and in perpetuity appointed the lustrous offerings. As a leader and king of the city, I made the settlements on the Euphrates to be populous. As client of Dagan, who begat me, I avenged the people of Mera and Tutul. As high prince, I made the face of Ninni to shine, making the lustrous meals of NIN-A-ZU secure. I reunited my people in famine by assuring their allowances within Babylon in peace and security. As the shepherd of my people, a servant whose deeds were acceptable to GIS-DAR in E-UL-MASH (temple of Anunit) in the midst of Agade, noted for its wide squares, I settled the rules and set straight the Tigris. I brought back to Asshur the gracious colossus and settled the altar (?). As king of Nineveh I made the waters of Ninni to shine in E-DUP-DUP. High of purpose and wise in achievement for the great gods, descendant of Sumu-lail, eldest son of Sin-muballit, long descended scion of royalty, great king, a very Shamash (or sun) of Babylon, I caused light to arise upon Sumer and Akkad. A king who commanded obedience in all the four quarters, beloved of Ninni am I. When Marduk brought me to direct all people and commissioned me to give judgment, I laid down justice and right in the provinces, I made all flesh to prosper.

The Prologue is followed by the Code itself, which contains 282 laws.[1] For the sake of completeness and brevity, we here give an exhaustive analysis of its contents, according to sections and numbers:[2]

§§ 1-2. On witchcraft.
§§ 3-5. On witnesses and judges.
§§ 6-8. On theft.
§§ 9-13. On stolen property found in the hands of another.
§ 14. On kidnapping.
§§ 15-20. On fugitive slaves.
§§ 21-25. On burglary and brigandage.
§§ 26-41. A series of laws dealing with the duties and privileges of gaugers and constables.
§§ 42-56. Land-laws and provisions relating to the cultivation of fields.
§ 57. On the responsibilities of herdsmen.
§§ 58-65. Various enactments concerning gardeners. . . . The next five columns, containing about thirty-five sections or laws, are wanting, having been, as was stated above, erased by the Elamite plagiarist king, Sutruk-Nahunti.
§§ 100-107. A series of laws, partly mutilated, dealing with merchants, their rights and that of their agents.
§§ 108-111. A series of laws relating to wine-merchants and the regulation of the price of wine and other liquors.
§§ 112-126. On debts and deposits.

Next comes the most important part of the whole Code, which contains no less than 66 laws about family and family relations, about women in general, husbands, wives, children, marriage, divorce, etc. . . . which may be subdivided in the following manner:

§ 127. On slander.
§ 128. On the marriage contract.
§§ 129-132. On adultery, rape and suspicion of unchastity.
§§ 133-143. On separation and divorce in their various aspects.
§§ 144-149. Laws regulating the taking of a second wife or concubine.

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[1] It must be noted that the Code has no external marks separating the laws one from another, or indicating where the groups of laws end. The division into separate laws and paragraphs was introduced by the first editor, V. Scheil. The indications of such divisions are supplied almost invariably by the preposition *shumma,* "if", as well as by the connection of the thought. Although in some cases Father Scheil's division is not altogether satisfactory (as in paragraphs 39 and 40), his division is generally accepted as well founded.

[2] The following analysis is that of Dr. S. A. Cook in his book *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*; pp. 8-10. A much more elaborate and skilful analysis is that of Prof. D. G. Lyon in his article sup. cit. pp. 254-265; where the Code is presented as a masterpiece of logical arrangement, and in which it is claimed that "Hammurabi's eminence as lawgiver does not surpass his eminence as logician," and that "In the skilful arrangement of its material, the Code has never been excelled, and it has probably never been approached." (p. 254).

§§ 150-152. Three sections relating to women's property.
§§ 153-158. Laws bearing upon various forms of unchastity.
§§ 159-164. Laws and regulations respecting the purchase-price of the bride, and her marriage-portion.
§§ 165-184. A long series of laws about inheritance, rights of wife, children, maid-servants and slaves and their children, widows, and a particular class of women.
§§ 185-193. This part of the Code contains the last section of the family laws and it relates to the adoption of children and their respective rights.
§§ 194-214. A series of laws regarding responsibility for death, assault, etc. . . .
§§ 215-225. Regulations fixing penalties, and defining fees for doctors and veterinary surgeons, both in their successful and unsuccessful operations, etc.
§§ 226-227. On the branding of slaves.
§§ 228-233. On the duties and responsibilities of builders and general contractors.
§§ 234-240. Responsibilities of boatmen.
§§ 241-274. A long series of laws relating to agricultural life, dealing, mostly, with oxen, their hire and care, wages of agricultural laborers and artisans; as well as with the responsibilities for the loss or damage of oxen and other agricultural implements.
§§ 275-277. Three laws about the prices for hiring boats.
§§ 278-282. This last section of the Code contains five laws or regulations relating to the buying of slaves, and the terrible penalties to be imposed on those who repudiate their masters.

The Corpus of the laws is followed by the Epilogue, which is an admirable specimen of Oriental literary and religious style. In it the monarch enumerates his beneficent deeds and public works, extols his own virtues, pronounces the blessing of himself and of the gods upon those who observe the laws, and utters a series of terrific denunciations against the disobedient. It is of great interest to read the whole Epilogue, which breathes, from beginning to end, a keen religious feeling, together with a consciousness of despotic power.

The judgments of righteousness which Hammurabi, the powerful king, settled, and caused the land to receive a sure polity and a gracious rule.

I am Hammurabi, the superb king. Marduk gave me to shepherd the black-headed race, whom Bel had assigned me. I did not forget, I did not neglect, I found for them safe pastures, I opened the way through sharp rocks, and gave them guidance. With the powerful weapon that Zamama and Ishtar granted me, by the foresight with which Ea endowed me, with the power that Marduk gave me, I cut off the enemy above and below, I lorded it over the conquered. The flesh of the land I made to rejoice. I extended the dwellings of the people in security. I left them no cause to fear. The great gods chose me and I am the shepherd that gives peace, whose club is straight; of evil and good in my city I was the director. I carried all the people of Sumer and Akkad in my bosom. By my protection, I guided in peace its brothers. By my wisdom, I provided for them. That the great should not oppress the weak, to counsel the widow and orphan, in Babylon, the city of Anu and Bel, I raised up its head (the stele's) in E-SAG-GIL (temple of Marduk there), the temple whose foundation is firm as the heaven and earth. To judge the judgment of the land, to decide the decisions of the land, to succor the injured, I wrote on my stele the precious words and placed them before my likeness, that of a righteous king. The king that is gentle, king of the city, exalted am I. My words are precious, my power has no rival. By the power of Shamash, the judge supreme, of heaven and earth, that judgment may shine in the land; by the permission of Marduk, my lord, I set up a bas-relief, to preserve my likeness in E-SAG-GIL that I love, to commemorate my name forever in gratitude. The oppressed who has a suit to prosecute may come before my image, that of a righteous king, and read my inscription and understand my precious words; and may my stele elucidate his case. Let him see the law he seeks and may he draw in his breath and say: "This Hammurabi was a ruler who was to his people like the father that begot them. He obeyed the order of Marduk his lord, he followed the commands of Marduk above and below. He delighted the heart of Marduk his lord, and granted happy life to his people forever. He guided the land." Let him recite the document. Before Marduk, my lord, and Sarpanitum, my lady, with full heart let him draw near. The colossus and the gods that live in E-SAG-GIL, or the courts of E-SAG-GIL, let him bless every day before Marduk, my lord, and Sarpanitum, my lady.

In the future, in days to come, at any time, let the king who is in the land, guard the words of righteousness which I have written on my stele. Let him not alter the judgment of the land which I judged nor the decisions I decided. Let them not destroy my bas-relief. If that man has wisdom and is capable of directing his land, let him attend to the words which I have written upon my stele, let him apprehend the path, the rule, the law of the land, and so let him guide forward the black-headed race; let him judge their judgment and decide their decision, let him cut off from his land the proud and violent, let him rejoice the flesh of his people. Hammurabi, the king of righteousness, to whom Shamash has granted rights, am I. My words are precious, my deeds have no rival. Above and below I am the whirlwind that scours the deep and the height. If that man has hearkened to my words which I have written on my stele and has not frustrated justice, has not altered my words, has not injured my bas-reliefs, may Shamash make lasting his sceptre; like me, as a king of righteousness, let him guide his people in justice.

But if that man does not hearken to my words which I wrote on my stele, forgets my curses, fears not the malediction of God, sets aside the judgment which I judged, alters my words and destroys my bas-reliefs, effaces my inscribed name and writes in his own name; or, for fear of these curses has charged another to do so; that man, be he king, lord, patesi, or noble, whose name is ever so renowned, may the great god (Anu), the father of gods, who named my reign, turn him back, shatter his sceptre in pieces, curse his fortunes; may Bel the lord who fixes the fates, whose command is not set aside, who extended my sovereignty, cause for him an endless revolt, an impulse to fly from his home, and set for his fortune a reign of sighs, short days, years of want, darkness that has no ray of light and a death in the sight of all men. May he decree with his heavy curse the ruin of his city, the scattering of his people, the removal of his sovereignty, the disappearance of his name and his race from the land. May Beltu, the great mother, whose command is weighty in E-KUR, the lady who made my plans prosperous, make his words in the matter of justice and law to be hateful before Bel. May she bring about the downfall of his country, the loss of his people, the efflux of his life like water, by the order of the Bel, the king. May Ea, the grand prince, whose destiny takes premier rank, the messenger of the gods, who knows all, who has prolonged my life, distort his understanding and intellect, curse him with forgetfulness, dam up his rivers at their source. In his land may Ashnan (the deity of wheat), the life of the people, not grow. May Shamash, great judge of heaven and earth, who governs the creatures of life, the lord of help, cut off his sovereignty; judge not his judgment; carry away his path; annihilate the march of his armies; cast an evil look upon him to uproot his rule, and fix for him the loss of his land. May the evil sentence of Shamash quickly overwhelm him; deprive him of life among the living above; and below in the earth, deprive his ghost of water. May Sin, the lord of the sky, the god who creates, whose ray is splendid among the gods, deprive him of crown and throne of kingship; surround him with a great shirt of pain, a heavy penalty, that will not leave his body, and make him finish his days, month by month, through the years of his reign, in tears and sighs. May he multiply for him the burden of royalty. May he grant him as his lot a life that can only be likened to death. May Adad, lord of abundance, great bull of the sky, and the earth, my helper, withdraw the rain from the heavens, the floods from the springs; destroy his land with hunger and want; thunder in wrath over his city, and turn his land to deluge mounds. May Zamama, great warrior, first born of E-KUR, who goes at my right hand on the battlefield, shatter his weapon and turn for him day into night. May he place his enemy over him. May Ishtar, the lady of conflict and battle, who prospered my arms, my gracious protector, who loved my reign, in her heart of rage, her boundless fury, curse his sovereignty; turn all his mercies to curses, shatter his weapon in conflict and battle, appoint him trouble and sedition, strike down his heroes, and make the earth drink of their blood, scatter the plain with heaps of the carcasses of his troops, grant them no burial; deliver himself into the hands of his enemy, cause him to be carried in chains to the enemy's land. May Nergal, the powerful one of the gods, who meets with no rival, who caused me to obtain my triumphs, burn up his people with a fever like a great fire among the reeds. With his powerful weapon may he drink him up, with his fevers crush him like a statue of clay. May Eristhu, the exalted lady of all lands, the creator-mother, carry off his son and leave him no name. May he not beget a seed of posterity among his people. May Nin-karrak, the daughter of Anu, the completer of my mercies in E-KUR, award him a severe malady, a grievous illness, a painful wound, which cannot be healed, of which the physician knows not the origin, which cannot be soothed by the bandage; and rack him with palsy, until she has mastered his life; may she weaken his strength. May the great gods of heaven and earth, the Anunnaki, in their assembly who look after the halls and the courts of this E-bar-ra (temple of Shamash at Sippara, where the stele was clearly set up), curse with a bitter curse his dynasty, his land, his soldiers, his people, and his subjects. May the judgments of Bel, which in his mouth are irrevocable, curse him and quickly overcome him.

The Code ends with these tremendous maledictions, which reveal in the monarch a sense of justice based on the supernatural. In his legislation he has left to posterity a glorious name as one who, although absorbed in political and military struggles, did not neglect to provide for his people the laws of justice and righteousness.

Hammurabi, The Great King and Lawgiver of Babylonia.

Hammurabi, although the sixth king of the first Babylonian dynasty, was in reality, the first king of a united Babylonia and, consequently, the real founder of Babylon and the Babylonian empire. Great statesman as he was, Hammurabi became the reformer and organizer of the internal conditions of Babylonia, and the great ruler and lawgiver of Chaldea. It is rather phenomenal that, as Dr. Boscawen remarks, notwithstanding his many glorious deeds in war and in peace, "No cycle of myths had grown around his name preserving to subsequent generations his traditional greatness as the 'father of law,' as the name of Minos had been preserved in Greek tradition."[1]

Hammurabi was the son of Sin-muballit. He reigned about the years 2285-2250 B. C. or, as other Assyriologists prefer, 2193-2150, B. C. The dynasty to which he belongs was inaugurated in Babylonia by Sumu-abu, who probably ascended the throne about 2295 B. C., his successors being as follows:

B. C.				
2295,	Sumu-abu,	founder of the dynasty,	reigned	14 years.
2281,	Sumu-la-ilu,	his son,	reigned	36 years.
2245,	Sabium,	his son,	reigned	14 years.
2231,	Apil-Sin,	his son,	reigned	18 years.
2213,	Sin-muballit,	his son,	reigned	20 years.
2193,	Hammurabi,	his son,	reigned	43 years.
2150,	Samsu-iluna,	his son,	reigned	38 years.
2112,	Abi-eshu,	his son,	reigned	28 years.
2840,	Ammi-ditana,	his son,	reigned	37 years.
2047,	Ammi-zaduga,	his son,	reigned	22 years.
2025,	Samsu-ditana,	his son,	reigned	31 years.

Altogether eleven kings with 301 years of uninterrupted reign.

Prior to the establishment of this so-called first Babylonian dynasty the great cities of Southern Babylonia were more or less independent; every now and then some one of them rose to pre-eminence, and acted as suzerain over the others for a greater or lesser period of time. The dominant element was non-Semitic; and although the Semitic element was beginning to show a greater influence over the probably aboriginal Sumerian population of the land, the powers and influences which worked for civilization among the priests and nobles were still under non-Semitic guidance and control.[1] After a series of more or less successful struggles, the supremacy of Babylon was established over all the other cities of Babylonia; and by the overthrow and complete defeat of Rim-Sin (probably the Arioch of the fourteenth chapter of Genesis) by Hammurabi, the Elamite domination was totally extinguished. Hammurabi, encouraged by his first overwhelming victories, succeeded, finally, by a masterly stroke of wisdom and diplomacy, in amalgamating Northern and Southern Babylonia into one state, and later on, extended his dominion as far west as Syria and Palestine.

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[1] *The First of Empires*, 1903; p. 162.

From the beginning of his reign Hammurabi devoted himself to the internal improvement of his country, and during his long reign Babylonia with its capital city, Babylon, rose to such a preponderance that it soon became the mistress of all the surrounding nations, and the center of progress, civilization, arts and sciences. His acts and correspondences are very numerous and they have been lately published in three handsome volumes by a competent English Assyriologist, Dr. L. King, of the British Museum. The success and influence of his internal and external policy and administration can be easily traced through all the successive historical, political, religious and literary periods of Babylonia, as well as of the adjacent countries. Great warrior, powerful ruler, skilled statesman, wise and just administrator, lover of arts and science, he built and restored temples and palaces, and dug canals and rivers, which brought life and happiness to his people. He can justly and without any exaggeration boast of the title of "father, protector and life-giver of his country and people."

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[1] "The period of expansion and unification (of Babylonia) occupies more than two millienniums (about 4500-2250 B. C.) Three stages may be distinguished in what may truly be called this wilderness of years. (1) The first is marked by the struggles of cities within Babylonia for local supremacy. The chief rivalry lay between those of the North and those of the South. (2) With the career of Sargon I, (3800 B. C.), a new era opened, characterized by the extension of authority beyond the borders of Babylonia as far as the Mediterranean and the northern mountains, while yet local supremacy shifted from city to city. (3) The third epoch, which is, at the same time, the termination of the period and the opening of a new age, saw the final consolidation of Babylonian authority at home and abroad in the city-king of Babylon, which henceforth gave its name to land and government and civilization." G. S. Goodspeed, *History of the Babylonians and Assyrians*, New York, 1902; pp. 58, 59. *Cf.* also Rogers' *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1901; Vol. I, Book II, Chap. I and II; and the history of the same countries by Tiele (1886-1888); Hommel (1885-1888); Winckler (1892); Mürdter-Delitzsch (2d edit. 1891); Radau (1900); and the articles *Babylonia*, in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, (by Hommel); and in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* (by L. W. King).

In connection with Hammurabi, the questions of his origin, nationality, date of reign, etc., are of great importance. Unfortunately, however, they are far from settled. The majority of Assyriologists are of the opinion that the first dynasty of Babylon is of foreign origin. Hommel, Sayce, Jeremias, Ranke and others are in favor of an Arabian decent, while Delitzsch and Winckler hold that it was of a Canaanite origin, and, consequently, akin to the West-Semitic group of nations such as Hebrews, Phœnicians, Moabites and Aramæans. Both schools base their arguments on linguistic evidences. These, however, considering the remote antiquity of the period and our imperfect knowledge of the different Semitic dialects, especially proto-Arabic, as well as the fewness of the materials at our disposal, are mostly hypothetical and unconvincing. One thing seems to be sufficiently demonstrated, i. e. that the first dynasty of Babylon, to which Hammurabi belongs, was Semitic, but not Babylonian, and that it was the outcome of one of those immigrations of Western and Southern Semites, traces of which can be sufficiently detected in the formation of many Babylonian proper names of the Hammurabi and pre-Hammurabi periods. The exact date of Hammurabi and of the several kings of this first dynasty is likewise doubtful, although it is certain that he flourished at the end of the third millennium B. C., and consequently more than 2,000 B. C. According to an inscription of King Assurbanipal, of Assyria, (668-626 B. C.) we learn that this Assyrian monarch, in the early part of the year 652 B. C., sent an embassy to the King of Elam, asking the restitution of a venerated image of Nana, the goddess of Erech, which, he tells us, *had been carried away to Susa* 1635 years before by King "Kudur-Nankhundi, the Elamite, who the worship of the great gods did not fear." Consequently, at about the year 2287 B. C., there must have been an Elamite invasion in Southern Babylonia; but we know that King Rim-Sin, who was defeated by Hammurabi, was also of Elamite origin; accordingly Rim-Sin and Kudur-Nankhundi must have both belonged to that same period of time when Southern Babylonia was invaded by the Elamite hordes. As Rim-Sin reigned at least thirty-seven years and was overthrown in the thirty-first year of Hammurabi's reign, he must have begun his sovereignty over Babylonia seven years before Hammurabi. Consequently, Hammurabi must have reigned over

Babylonia between the years 2250 and 2100 B. C. Nabonidus, the last King of Babylon, (555-538 B. C.), puts Hammurabi seven hundred years before Burnaburiash; but we know from the Tel-el-Amarna tablets that Burnaburiash was one of the correspondents of Amenophis III, and Amenophis IV., and consequently about 1450 B. C. Adding to this the number of years between the time of Nabonidus and the Christian era we have, in round numbers, the year 2150 B. C. as that of Hammurabi. The King-lists, however, if taken in their integrity, would put the beginning of the first dynasty of Babylon at 2454 B. C. and that of Hammurabi at 2342 B. C. According to Berosus, the priest-historian of Babylon, however, the beginning of the first dynasty is to be placed at about 2232 B. C. From all these data it clearly appears that although we cannot fix with certainty the exact date and year of Hammurabi's reign, or of his predecessors and successors, we can nevertheless place his reign with reasonable certainty between 2150 and 2250 B. C.[1]

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Bible" Controversy, which has been furiously raging in Germany for the last three years. *Cf.* also the several articles and notes on the subject in the *Expository Times*, Vol. XIV, pp. 141 ff; 257 ff; 259 ff; 363 ff; 432 ff; and Vol. XV, pp. 525 ff. *Biblia* (a monthly Journal of Oriental Research): Vol. XV, No. 12, pp. 382-386, and Vol. XVI, No. 6, pp. 174-181. *The Interpreter*, (a Church Monthly Magazine)1; Vol. I, No. 1, 1905; pp. 53-65.

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Gabriel Oussani.

RECENT VIEWS ON BIBLICAL INSPIRATION. II.

James F. Driscoll, D. D.

The Historical versus the Theological Approach.

The mental attitude of the thoughtful believer towards the various issues involved in the modern Scripture problem must, from the nature of the case, be shaped and conditioned by preconceived notions of divine inspiration and its assumed exigencies. The underlying concept of this fundamental point naturally dominates the whole field of inquiry and when it is question of gauging the value of this or that scientific conclusion, there is a tendency on the part of many to pass lightly over the objective evidence in the case and narrow the issue down to the one point, viz: Is such a conclusion compatible with inspiration—with the divine authorship of the Bible? Properly qualified and within certain limits, this attitude is legitimate as well as logical. For not only are a certain number of conclusions implied obviously and necessarily in the notion of divine authorship, howsoever that doctrine be understood, but furthermore, the revealed fact of inspiration has come down to us accompanied by certain traditional inferences, which though not pertaining to the substance of the doctrine, nor all of equal theological or scientific value, are nevertheless worthy of great respect, nor may they be lightly set aside without endangering belief in the dogma itself. On the other hand, facts are accumulating which can only with ever growing difficulty be made to fit in with certain aspects of the traditional view; whence in many minds an uneasiness very akin to doubt, together with a vague conviction that the gap between science and religion has become too great to be satisfactorily bridged over.

In view of this situation it becomes the duty of the apologist not only to scrutinize the alleged facts which are the cause of alarm, in order to control their scientific value, but also to examine closely the current notion of inspiration in order to ascertain if the doctrine of divine authorship really does imply all that has been educed from it by traditional theology. This arduous and delicate task is taken up by Father Lagrange in his chapter on the idea of inspiration viewed in the light of Biblical facts,[1] and the object of the present paper is mainly to set forth and discuss some leading features of that masterly treatise. After touching briefly upon the Catholic position as regards the acceptance of the belief in inspiration and of the canon of the sacred books on the authority of the Church, the learned Dominican takes up the notion of inspiration and discusses it in the careful discriminating spirit characteristic of the acute theologian who is at the same time a thoroughly informed critic. With reference to the method to be followed in approximating to a correct notion of divine authorship, he remarks that "reason and observation should be duly combined," but that from the nature of the case, the two processes will in their application be confined to different aspects of the question. The former will predominate in our analysis of the concept of inspiration subjectively considered, while the latter must be decisive in shaping our views with regard to the object of inspiration and its influence as manifested in its results. Thus are traced the broad lines of demarcation between the rival claims of the deductive method prevalent in theology, and of the critical or historic method which obtains almost exclusively in the field of modern research. Nor is it likely that any theologian, however conservative, would take exception to the principle thus formulated, though there might be a divergency of view as to the application to be made of it.

The nature of inspiration in itself and its subjective conditions, viz., the manner in which it affected the personality of the sacred writers, are points which are obviously beyond the realm of scientific observation, like the gift of prophecy or any other transient supernatural prerogative. The inspired authors themselves have bequeathed us little or no information on the subject, nor have we any sufficient reason to assume that they were even conscious of the special divine influence under which they are believed to have written. In any attempt therefore to describe or analyze the intimate nature and workings of this influence, it is necessary to proceed chiefly (if not solely) by way of logical inference from the data of revelation and the principles, more or less certain, of psychology. Arguing from these, the theologian is able to establish among other conclusions, that inspiration must involve a special illumination of the intelligence (though not necessarily or even habitually a divine revelation) as well as a supernatural impulse imparted to the will; that the divine assistance is antecedent to the composition of the inspired work, etc. In these and similar matters the chief rôle belongs to deductive reasoning, and the conclusions arrived at may be affirmed without fear of their being seriously disturbed by any subsequent facts of observation. "But," the learned writer goes on to say, "it is proper that greater reserve be maintained in applying this mental process to the divine historical fact itself." In other words, the action of divine inspiration, like that of revelation, is a great historic fact made manifest to our faith in permanent tangible results, and since the best means of finding out the nature of an efficient cause is through a knowledge of its effects, it is precarious to reason confidently *a priori* on the nature and extent of inspiration without having gathered all the light we can from the examination of what inspiration has produced. Manifestly our knowledge of God and of His works is too imperfect to warrant its being made an exclusive basis to decide upon what He must or must not have done, and instead of speculating on what, according to our theological ideas, was befitting the divine efficiency in a given case, it is rather our duty to study with reverence and humility the visible results of its action. "When, therefore," the writer continues, "it is a question of affirming what may or may not be the object of divine inspiration, or to whom it was proper that the gift should be imparted, though we may not lose sight of the exegencies of reason (for instance, it would be absurd and blasphemous to admit that error as such could be the object of divine teaching), we should be cautious in concluding by way of inference as to what is or is not fitting." In a word, this phase of the inquiry is one in which we must be content to be guided by the Biblical facts; and in our appreciation of the evidence, these facts should outweigh our preconceived ideas regarding the supposed fitness of things.

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[1] La Méthode Historique. III me Conférence.

Such is in substance the position maintained by Father Lagrange toward the two opposite methods whereby the problem of inspiration may be approached. The principles thus formulated have been judiciously applied by him in his writings, and in fact, both principles and application are being endorsed by an ever increasing number of Catholic scholars, though of course, not without some divergence of opinion in applying the principle to certain more delicate aspects of the problem. It is chiefly in the applications made that the views advocated by these scholars constitute a new departure, and their differences even more perhaps than their agreement will be serviceable in bringing out and sifting the elements of truth which all are honestly seeking. Truth is not the exclusive possession of any individual or school, and one of the things most to be desired in the present apologetic situation is a frank open discussion of this and other kindred topics by competent Catholic writers.

In illustrating his application of principles, Father Lagrange begins with matters referring to the personality of the sacred writers, and the points mainly insisted upon are the following: (1) An inspired book may be anonymous, or even pseudonymous, and (2) it may be the joint work of several authors. The reasons alleged in support of the conclusions, though not exhaustive, are solid and convincing. What idea should we conceive of the men upon whom it pleased God to bestow the gift of inspiration? We know that many of them were apostles, prophets, wonder-workers—mighty and renowned leaders in the carrying out of the divine plan for the salvation of mankind. But, are these prominent characteristics essential qualities to be met with in every inspired writer? Arguing solely from our antecedent ideas as to the fitness of things we might answer in the affirmative, but our conclusion would be premature and unwarrantable if drawn without due attention to the ascertainable facts in the case. Doubtless the lawful claims of reason must be respected here as elsewhere; thus we may confidently infer that every inspired author must have been a true servant of God. The contrary supposition (which, for that matter, would be entirely gratuitous) though not involving an absolute impossibility, would shock too rudely our legitimate sense of what ought to be. But other questions in this connection cannot he answered so peremptorily by logical inference from accepted premises. For instance, were the inspired authors always known as such to their contemporaries, or, at least, were they known when their writings were first accepted as a part of Holy Writ? It is frequently assumed that they were. From the views expressed or implied by certain theologians, one would infer that according to them, the Old Testament canon must have been formed in a very solemn, official manner. One would imagine that at a given moment "some great recognized servant of God presented himself and submitted his inspired manuscript to a competent tribunal; and after duly satisfying the authorities as to the reality of his divine mission, his work was officially accepted and added to the list of the sacred books. That such was by no means the case with regard to the New

Testament every scholar is aware"; nor, indeed, is there any valid historical reason to affirm a more formal mode of procedure in the selection of the Old Testament writings. It is not here the place to treat of the growth and formation of the canon, but with reference to the particular point at issue, not a few Biblical facts go to show that the authors of certain inspired books were not known when their writings were accepted as canonical. The chief proof of this lies in the fact that certain inspired books are pseudonymous, i. e., ascribed to authors by whom they were certainly not composed. This is doubtless a proposition which, with our modern ideas of literary ethics, we would never have conceived as credible *a priori*, but our preconceived ideas on the subject must of necessity yield to the evidence of the facts. Even such a thorough-going conservative as Vigouroux admits in his classical *Manuel Biblique* that the Book of Wisdom was wrongly attributed to Solomon, because the real author, speaking fictitiously, expresses himself as if he were the son of David. Here the case is clear beyond cavil, and the rectification of the erroneous attribution is due to the plain exigencies of Greek philosophical scholarship. But Hebrew scholarship demands a similar verdict in the case of Ecclesiastes likewise attributed to Solomon, and historical criticism is no less exigent with regard to the Book of Daniel. It is true that these last instances are contested by writers of the ultra-conservative school, but whatever may be thought of the various reasons alleged, since the "fiction" is confessedly clear in the case of the Book of Wisdom, the conclusions of modern scholars in similar instances cannot be rejected on the plea that the pseudonymous character of a book is something incompatible with divine inspiration. In point of fact and apart from *a priori* considerations, the only reason for maintaining v. g. the Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes is the "Jewish tradition" to that effect. But the untrustworthiness of the so-called Jewish traditions has often been demonstrated, and those who have any doubts on that score, would do well to examine the fantastic and puerile "traditions" connected with Scriptural personages and topics as presented in the volumes of the Jewish Encyclopedia.

Doubtless much of the seeming incongruity involved in the admission that an inspired book may be pseudonymous, is removed by a consideration of the times and *milieu* in which the Old Testament writings appeared. The canons of literary ethics as now understood, are a recent development in the intellectual world, and many things that to us appear repugnant, were not so considered in ancient times, when, in order to lend greater weight and authority to his work, a writer was almost expected to attribute it to some ancient worthy whose authority could not be gainsaid. This aspect of the case is briefly touched upon by Father Lagrange, who shows how natural it was for an author of the later Jewish period—and legitimate from his point of view—to attribute to Solomon, the classical type of the wise King, the Book of Wisdom, and especially the prayer contained in chapter ix. Solomon was also looked upon as the type of the disenchanted pleasure-seeker, and he was naturally chosen as the authoritative exponent of the rather pessimistic views contained in Ecclesiastes. It was only by means of a similar process of appropriate attribution that Moses, the typical legislator, came to be credited with all the later developments of the Jewish law and with the entire contents of the Pentateuch; and in like manner David, the traditional sweet singer of Israel, was proclaimed the author of all the sacred songs contained in the Psalter. In fine, so common was the custom then in vogue, of attributing writings of a religious and didactic character to renowned personages of bygone generations, that in all probability, intelligent contemporaries were not thereby deceived. It constituted, so to speak, a commonly received mode of imparting instruction, and consequently it would be beside the mark and unjust on our part, to brand it as falsification or forgery in the odious sense attached to these words in modern times. The word "apocryphal" did not then imply the unfavorable signification which it bears at present. Books dealing with contemporary situations and composed by contemporary authors were currently ascribed to famous personages of a remote antiquity. These were assumed to have written with prophetic insight in reference to future events, but in the meantime their writings were supposed to have been kept hidden (whence the word "apocryphal") until the opportune moment arrived. The motive underlying this mode of procedure was to inculcate more forcibly the idea that the principles formulated in earlier ages were applicable to present conditions. Among the known apocryphal productions belonging to the later Old Testament period are the *Assumption of Moses*, the *Book of the Jubilees*, the *Book of Enoch* (ascribed to the antediluvian patriarch of that name even by the New Testament writer, St. Jude), etc., and though these books cannot be compared with the inspired writings, their existence and popularity prove at least, that the fictitious attribution of such works to renowned personages of antiquity was then a commonly received literary artifice.

In proof of the second conclusion, viz., the compatibility of divine inspiration with composite authorship, Father Lagrange appeals to the well known passage in the Book of Proverbs (xxiv, 23,) where the contents are noted as coming from certain "wise men," the names of whom the writer does not seem to know; and to another passage in the same book (xxv, 1), where mention is made of proverbs of Solomon, collected by "the men of Ezechias." In such cases, whom should we consider as the inspired author, the "wise men" or the compiler of their sayings—the original author or the "men of Ezechias"? The answer to this question might well be a little evasive, but none the the less true viz. that these collections as we now possess them, are canonical, and therefore inspired, whatever be the literary process through which they passed in reaching their present canonical shape, and consequently it is not necessary for us—nor may it be possible—to dete mine whether the inspired agent, was the original author or the compiler, or both. The work in its present form is inspired, and there is no valid reason why this characteristic should be limited to any particular mode of literary composition.

Very true, but then consistency demands that the same broad principle be applied in analogous cases where composite authorship, though not expressly mentioned, is nevertheless plainly revealed by a critical examination of the text. Now, there is perhaps no fact more solidly established by contemporary scholarship than that of the compilatory character of many—not to say the most—of the Old Testament writings, and consequently it is beside the mark and illogical to reject *a priori*—as is sometimes done—the composite structure of the Pentateuch, for instance, on the plea that divine inspiration cannot be conceived as compatible with the existence of the various sources or strata which critical analysis recognizes in the work. That the nature of inspiration is not essentially adverse to this mode of literary composition may be legitimately inferred from the analogous cases explicitly stated in Proverbs. It should not, therefore, be assumed as antecedently impossible that an anonymous writer should have compiled and pieced together the several accounts discernible in the historical books of the Old Testament—accounts which originally may, or may not, have been inspired

The ancient commentators allowed that documents in themselves not inspired might be incorporated into the Bible, a classical instance being the letter of the Spartans (I. Macc. xii, 20-23); and on the other hand, it was fully admitted that certain works now lost but utilized by our canonical writers and frequently mentioned in that connection, may have belonged to the category of the inspired books. In respect to the mode of composition, as well as in the matter of fictitious attribution, the process of book-making was very different in antiquity from what it is in our own day. Our ideas concerning the manner of writing history and the use of implicit quotations, as well as those pertaining to the use of pseudonyms and literary ethics generally, are not the same as those of the ancient Hebrews. It may, indeed, at first blush seem irreverent to ascribe to the sacred writers modes of procedure which to us appear indelicate, but it is well to recall that they did not appear so to them. After all, there is much that is merely relative and indifferent in such matters, and surely it will not be out of keeping with what we can gather from analogy, to admit that God adapted the grace of inspiration to the literary customs of the period.

It is a commonplace in apologetics to affirm that God in the working out of His plans in the world, proportions his light and grace to the limited capacity and manifold imperfections of those whom He wishes to draw nearer to Himself. Thus, the moral code of the Old Testament, though recognized as having explicit divine sanction, is confessedly imperfect in many respects, viewed from the Christian standpoint, yet God, who in Himself, is just as perfect in the Old dispensation as in the New, made use of it for His own good purpose, and, as the most conservative theologians must consistently admit, made Himself directly responsible for its provisions. May we not, therefore, without incurring censure of irreverence, allow that He likewise adapted His responsibility and supernatural action in connection with the sacred writings, to the somewhat crude literary methods of the age? Judging from analogy it is likely that the subtle grace of inspiration was as imperceptible in its mode of action as it is now in its results, and we may confidently assume in the light of the Biblical facts, that with regard to the mode of composition, the inspired writings were produced, at least with respect to all external and observable conditions, in a manner quite similar to those of other books written at that time.

Father Lagrange next turns his attention to the object of inspiration, but this topic, which involves the more difficult and delicate problem of Biblical inerrancy, will be taken up in subsequent studies.

JAMES F. DRISCOLL.

STUDIES.

ST. JUSTIN MARTYR. I.

Joseph Turmel

LIFE.

Justin, son of Priscus, grandson of Bacchius—so he speaks of himself in the beginning of his first Apology—was born at Flavia Neapolis, the ancient Sichem, now called Nablous, about the year 105.[1] He was brought up in the worship of idols, a fact which, taken with other indications, makes us believe that, notwithstanding his birthplace, he was of Greek origin.[2]

When he arrived at manhood's years, Justin found himself face to face with the great problems of human existence. He saw that his ancestral religion could not solve them, so he turned to philosophy. Having asked in vain of the Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Pythagoreans, for the guidance he sought, he knocked at the doors of the school of Plato.[3] There he learned that, above and beyond the visible world, there is an intelligible world, into which the soul alone can penetrate; and the new horizons which broadened out before him filled him with wonder and admiration. "The knowledge of incorporeal things transported me," he says in later life, "and the contemplation of ideas gave wings to my thought. I felt that in a short time I should become a sage, and in my simplicity, I hoped soon to have the vision of God—for that is the aim of the Platonist philosophy."[4] No doubt Justin remained for a long time in the school of Plato.[5] But his quest for truth was not yet finished. Little by little, the ardent disciple of the author of Phædo noticed that not all the teachings of his master were equally well established; that there were weak points in the system; that the doctrine of pre-existence, in particular, was chimerical;[1] and, without ceasing to admire Platonism, he no longer found in it the adequate expression of truth.[2] At times, too, he happened to be present at the trial of Christians, and he was profoundly impressed by the nobility of their attitude, the accent of conviction which rang in their answers, and the courage with which they faced torments and death.[3] He set himself to study the faith of the Christians.[4] They taught him that Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified in Judea under Pontius Pilate, was the Son of God, who had become man in the womb of a virgin, and had come to teach mankind, to cleanse them from their sins, to deliver them from the yoke of demons and to save them from death. In proof of their assertions, they put into his hands the "Memoirs of the Apostles," in which was related the life of Jesus of Nazareth, and the Scriptures (our Old Testament) in which, they asserted, the whole history of Jesus had been described long centuries before by men inspired of God. Justin read the prophets, and found that in their writings was actually contained the substance of the "Memoirs of the Apostles." Struck by this remarkable agreement, he became a disciple of Christ.[5]

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[1] Otto agrees with Fabricius and Bollandus in placing Justin's birth in 89 A. D. This date implies that the great apologist wrote the *Dialogue with Trypho* when about 70 years old, which is not probable. It is generally given up at the present day.

[2] He speaks of himself as "an uncircumcised man" (Dial. 28); he is neither a Jew nor a Samaritan (*cfr. Apology* i, 53).

[3] Justin gives this information in the opening pages of his *Dialogue*.

[4] *Dialogue* 2.

[5] This Justin gives to understand in the following words: "When I was delighting in the doctrines of Plato." (*Apol.* ii, 12).

The Christian faith found in this philosopher-convert an ardent apostle, an intrepid defender. It was then being attacked on various sides by the persecution of the public authorities, the objections of the Jews, the jibes of the philosophers, and the destructive teachings of the Gnostics. With voice and pen, Justin took up the contest with all these adversaries. He addressed to the public authorities two apologies for the Christian faith; he carried on a number of discussions, now with the Jews, now with the pagans, and sometimes, no doubt, with the heretics. Jews, pagans, heretics were refuted and enlightened by him in various works. The field of his activity varied between Asia [1] and Rome. He was in the capital of the Empire about the year 150, when he wrote his first Apology. We find him there once more about 160, after an absence the length of which we cannot determine. He carried on frequent and warm discussions with the philosophers. One of these, the Cynic philosopher Crescentius, denounced him to the prefect. [2] Being arrested and brought before the representative of the emperor, Justin gladly made profession of the Christian faith, and was straightway beheaded by the executioner. [3] This took place about 165 A. D.

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[1] *Dialogue* 4.

[2] *Ibid.* 4 and 6.

[3] *Apol.* ii, 12. See also *Apol.* i, 16, where Justin speaks of the moral change he had noticed in earlier converts from paganism. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der alterkirchl. Litteratur.* (i, 191) seems to refer Justin's conversion exclusively to these last two motives.

[4] In his *Dialogue* (3-8) Justin narrates that he was made acquainted with the Christian faith by an old man whom he met while walking on the sea shore. That mysterious old man who points out to the young philosopher, not without a touch of irony (as shown from the play upon the word (φιλολογος) in *Dial.* 2) the weak points of Plato's philosophy and explains to him the Old Testament prophecies, is a fictitious character after the manner of the personages introduced into the dialogues of Plato. The conversation recorded at the beginning of the *Dialogue with Trypho* must be considered as a dramatic description of the manner in which Justin was gradually led to accept the Christian faith.

[5] *Ibid.* 8.

The only titles which tradition gives to St. Justin are those of Philosopher and Martyr.[4] Moreover, there is nothing in any of his writings to give us the idea that he was a priest. We must, therefore, conclude that this brave defender of the faith was not a member of the clergy. [5] During his stay in Rome, he met with Tatian, who became his follower. [6] Sometimes the conclusion is drawn from this that Justin opened in the imperial city a school, somewhat like the *Didascaleion,* which Pantenus founded some years later in Alexandria, or which, indeed, might already have been started there. But this has no basis. The *Didascaleion* of Alexandria was a real school in which pupils were formed; and it was, moreover, an official enterprise under the control of the Church. [7] St. Justin held no official position under the Church of

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[1] Eusebius (*Ecclesiastical History* iv, 18) says that the Dialogue with Trypho took place at Ephesus. He, no doubt, found that information in the Preamble, now lost, to the work which gives that dialogue. It is true that the setting of the events recorded in that work is not historical. Yet, the fact that Justin speaks of Ephesus as the place where he had discussions with the Jews, implies that he had resided in that city.

[2] See Tatian, *Oratio* 19.

[3] See the *Acts* of Justin's martyrdom (P. G. vi, 1565), the historical value of which is hardly questioned at the present day (Harnack, *die Chronologie,* p. 282).

[4] Tertullian (*Adv. Valent.* 5) calls him "a philosopher and martyr." St. Jerome (*De Viris* 23) says "Justinus philosophus." Eusebius (*Hist.* iv, 11) tells us that he wore the mantle of the Greek philosophers.

[5] Dom Maran holds a different view (Præf., pars iii, cap. ii, 1). He rests his opinion on *Apol.* i, 65, and on the *Acts* of Justin's martyrdom. The texts which he quotes, however, prove, if anything, that Justin was not a presbyter.

[6] This is affirmed by Irenæus (Book I, chap. xxviii, 1). Tatian (*Oratio,* 18 and 19) gives plainly to understand that he was acquainted with Justin; but he does not give any details.

[7] Harnack, *Alexandrinische Katechenschule,* in the Real-Encyclop. (3d edit.).

Rome, and he did not open a school. His apostolate consisted in refuting the Jews and the pagan philosophers in public discussions.

WORKS.

St. Justin wrote about a dozen books, of which only three have come down to us. Posterity attributed to him several others of which he is not the author. The lost writings are: *Treatise Against All the Heresies* (mentioned by Justin himself); [1] another *Treatise Against Marcion*, of which Irenæus recalls one phrase, perhaps two; and, finally, the following works, whose titles have come down to us through Eusebius: [3] *Address to the Greeks; Refutation of the Greeks; On the Sovereignty of God; On the Soul; Psaltes.* The other works ascribed to him are: *Discourse to the Greeks; Hortatory Address to the Greeks; On the Monarchy*; *On the Resurrection* (of which we have only a few fragments); *Epistle to Zenas and Serenus; An Exposition of the true Faith; Replies to the Orthodox; Christian Questions to Gentiles and Gentile Questions to Christians; A Refutation of Certain Doctrines of Aristotle*, and, finally, *An Epistle to Diognetus.*.

The three works of St. Justin, which have come down to us, are the two *Apologies*, and the *Dialogue With Trypho.*

The First Apology. This work is addressed to the Emperor Antoninus, to his two adopted sons, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, to the senate and the Roman people. It could not have been written before 138, the time when Antoninus became head of the Empire after the death of Hadrian. Nor could its date be later than the year 161, in which Antoninus died. Formerly, it was generally placed around 138. This opinion was based on the authority of Eusebius, who, in his *Chronicle*, records the work in question at the year 141; and on the fact that in the opening address of the Apology, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus are not given the title of Cæsar. To-day, however, it is generally agreed to put it between 150 and 153; and this for the following reasons: (a) Justin declares that one hundred and fifty years have passed since the Christ was born under Quirinius; [4] now this chronological indication, which evidently refers to the data furnished by St. Luke, as the mention of Quirinius shows, points to exact reckoning, and should not be considered as a round number. (b) The address gives to Marcus

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[1] *Apol.* i, 26.

Hær. Book IV, chap. vi, 2; Book v, chap. xxvi, 2.

Hist., iv, 18.

Apol. i, 46.

Aurelius the title of "philosopher," and to Lucius Verus that of "friend of letters;" now these titles would have been ridiculous in 138, when Marcus was seventeen years old, and Lucius eight. (c) In the course of the Apology, Marcion is spoken of as a man who has been before the public for a long time;[1] but this heresiarch did not begin to arouse comment until after the death of Pope Hyginus, that is to say, after 142. The *Chronicle* of Eusebius is too often wrong for it to be of avail as an offset to the weighty reasons we have indicated. As for the omission of the title of Cæsar from the address, it was an oversight, or perhaps a deliberate omission, from which no conclusion can be drawn. Moreover, the address has come down to us in a poor text, and there are reasons for thinking that Justin really gave the title of Cæsar to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus.[2]

It is customary to distinguish three parts in the Apology. The first, which comprises the first twenty-two chapters, is devoted to the task of establishing the innocence of the Christians, and of proving, as a consequence, the injustice of the laws which proscribed them. The second (Chaps. 23-60) is an attempt to prove that the Christians alone are in possession of the truth (23-29); that the Son of God became incarnate (30-53); and, finally, that the fables of pagan mythology were invented by demons in order to cast suspicion on the Incarnation of the Son of God (54-60). The third part, which covers the last eight chapters (61-68), has for its aim to make the Christian worship known to the pagans.

This division, in fact, is that which Justin himself gives in his book; for, in Chap. 23, the three sub-divisions of the second part are stated, and this plan is followed out in the sections mentioned above. However, the logical order of the thoughts is not attained by this division. The reason is that Justin has thrown his materials together in haphazard fashion, without troubling himself greatly about their arrangement.

In point of fact, here is what he is trying to show: (a) The Christian dogmas, even if granted to be fabulous, are no more so than the tales of pagan mythology; the morals of the Christians, even if granted to be abominable, are no more so than the morals of the pagans. By what right, then, are the former persecuted, and the latter left untouched? (b) The Christian teachings inspire reverence for God, love of neighbor, and hatred of wickedness; and Christians conform their conduct with their beliefs. In their meetings, far from giving themselves up to the abominations of which they are accused, they praise God and practise charity. In their private life, they are pure; they do good as far as they are able, they obey the laws, and look forward to the future Kingdom. No doubt, criminals can be found who call themselves Christians, but such men have nothing of the Christian except the name, and it would be unfair to make the Christians responsible for misdeeds committed under their name. (c) The Christian dogmas are the expression of truth. In particular, the Divinity of Jesus is proven by numerous prophecies. Hence it follows that all should embrace the Christian religion. (d) The resemblances which exist between Christian worship and pagan rites, as well as the similarities of doctrine, are explained by the contention that demons borrowed them from Christianity.

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[1] *Apol.* i, 26, 58. In both passages he is spoken of as teaching *still* (καὶ νυν), which implies that he has been already teaching for a long while.

[2] Harnack, *die Chronol.*, p. 279.

In my opinion, that is pretty nearly the real plan of the Apology. But the elements of it are scattered through various parts. The denunciation of pagan wickedness is found in Chap. 27, it is hard to say just why. The comparison of pagan myths and philosophical theories with Christian dogmas is found in Chaps. 7, and 20 to 22. Chaps. 6, 9 and 13 defend the Christians from the accusation of Atheism, which was leveled against them. Chaps. 11, 12, 14, 17 and 29 contain descriptions of their private life, while the final chapters give an account of their public meetings. The proof from prophecy of the Divinity of Jesus is, by exception, concentrated in Chaps. 30 to 53, but not even it is free from digressions. The efforts of the demons to discredit or warp Christian dogmas are exposed in Chaps. 54, 56 and 58. This point is again brought up in the final chapters which are intended to describe the Christian worship. In conclusion, we may remark that Justin's intention is above all to protest against the calumnies to which Christians are exposed, and to maintain their right to liberty.

Second Apology. This work, which is much shorter than the preceding one, comprising as it does only fifteen chapters, was written just after the condemnation to death of three men, whose only crime was that they had declared themselves Christians. This sentence, pronounced by the Prefect Urbicus, proved beyond cavil that Christians were being persecuted on account of their faith. Justin denounces this injustice, knowing that in doing so he is imperilling his life (Chaps. 1 to 3). He next answers two objections urged by pagans. He explains especially, in his answer to the second objection, that if God prolongs the duration of this wicked world, which, at the instigation of demons, persecutes the Christians, it is in order to give the well-disposed an opportunity of being saved (Chaps. 5 to 7). He adds that persecution has always been the lot of the virtuous (Chap. 8). Then resuming the line of thought of his first Apology, he contends that the Christian doctrine is superior to all the systems of philosophy; that the Christians are innocent of the enormities with which they are charged; and that these abominations are actually committed by the pagans (Chaps. 12, 13). He concludes by demanding the official publication of his book to dispel the prejudices from which Christians suffer.

The date of this second Apology is a point on which sufficient light has not yet been thrown. On the one hand, the complete absence of an exordium, and the very brief formula which Justin uses in three different places to refer to the preceding work,[1] lead us to consider the second Apology as a mere appendix of the first.[2] And this conjecture finds support in Eusebius, who distinguishes, it is true, two Apologies, and who even places the second under Marcus Aurelius,[3] (that is to say, after 161), but who cites extracts from this work as belonging to the first Apology.[4] On the other hand, Justin has here the presentiment of being on the threshold of martyrdom,[5] and the Prefect Urbicus, whose injustice is denounced, does not seem to have become prefect before the year 156.[1] So we are in presence of two lines of argument, of which one leads to a date around 150, and the other to a date ten years later.[2]

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[1] "As we have before stated." This formula is found in Apol. ii, 4, 6, 8, and refers back to Apol. i, 20, 23, 46, 63.

[2] This view, maintained by Zahn (*Theolog. Litteraturzeitung*, 1876, p. 443) has been adopted by Harnack in *Texte und Untersuch.*, vol. I, i, pp. 130, 142, 171, and with modifications in *die Chronologie*, p. 274. Contrary to Veil who regards the second Apology as simply a continuation of the first, Harnack thinks that it is a *supplement* added at a later date on the occasion of a new occurrence (the condemnation mentioned above) which had followed very soon on the publication of the first Apology, perhaps even had preceded that publication.

[3] In his *Chonicle*, Eusebius speaks of only one Apology. In his *Ecclesiastical History* (iv, 18) he says: "There is a certain discourse of his in defense of our doctrine addressed to Antoninus surnamed the Pious. . . . Another work contains his second Apology in behalf of our faith, which he offered . . . to Antoninus Verus (Marcus Aurelius)." Elsewhere (iv, 16) he writes: "About this time Justin, after he had addressed a *second* work in behalf of our doctrine . . . was crowned with divine martyrdom."

[4] See *Ecclesiastical History*, iv, 8, 17. In the first passage, he quotes first two texts from the first Apology, and next a text from the second, saying that he draws it from "the same work." In the second passage, he givesa text from the second Apology, saying that he takes it from the first. Harnack was formerly of the mind that, under the name of the second Apology, Eusebius designated the apologetical work of Athenagoras. In the present day, he is not far from giving up that position.

[5] Apol. ii, 3.

Dialogue with Trypho. This book is the account of a long discussion in which the Messiahship and Divinity of Jesus are defended against the objections of the Jews. The scene is laid in Ephesus, just before the breaking out of the war of Bar-Cochba, that is, around the year 135.[3] As for the publication of the book itself, that must be after the first Apology, which is mentioned in the Dialogue;[4] consequently it must be dated, at the very earliest, around 155. Between Chap. 78 and the end, there are four references to things that were said "yesterday."[5] So the discussion is considered to have lasted two days. It is manifest that in a composition such as this, there is much that is merely stage setting. We have in it a work of literary fiction, modeled after the dialogue of Plato. The basis of truth in it lies in the fact that Justin here resumes and condenses numerous controversies carried on with the Jews. In this sense, the *Dialogue With Trypho* answers to a reality which, instead of lasting only two days, was spread out over many years.

The book is dedicated to a certain Marcus Pompeius, who may be referred to in Chap. 8, but is not named until Chap. 142. This proves that the beginning of the Dialogue has not come down to us. At Chap. 74 can be noticed another manifest gap, the length of which is uncertain. Dom Maran, who reduces it to two or three words, brings in favor of his opinion some weighty reasons.[6] But on the other hand, the mention of a conversation held the day before, which appears in Chap. 78, supposes a stopping-place between the days, which is nowhere indicated in our present text, and which was probably made at the point where the gap occurs. Moreover, Chap. 80 leaves us to understand that the question of Millenarianism had been touched on during the first day. As we look for it in vain in the preceding chapters, there is room to conjecture that it formed a part of the same missing section.

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[1] The only point solidly made out is that Lollius Urbicus, consul in 133 A. D. was sent as a legate to Britain between 140 and 145 A. D. But, as under Antoninus the office of legate was usually held for 7 or 8 years, and as one had to fill that office twice before he could become prefect of Rome, it is supposed that Urbicus remained in Britain till the year 152, and that, after his return to Rome, he must have waited some time before being made a prefect of that city. See Noel des Vergers, *Essai sur Marc-Aurèle*, p. 54.

[2] Notice that in two passages of the first chapter, Justin states that the fact of which he complains occurred under *Urbicus*; whence it is inferred that the Apology was written after Urbicus' death. This conjecture, however, seems to go against the opening words of the Apology, to the effect that the facts in question have quite recently happened.

[3] See chap. I. "And having escaped from the war lately carried on there." We are indebted to Eusebius (iv, 18) for the information that Justin represents Ephesus as the scene of the discussion. He probably drew this information from the first part of the *Dialogue*, which is no longer extant.

[4] Chap. 120.

[5] Chaps. 78, 88, 92, 118, 122.

[6] See his note in Patr. Gr., vi, 649.

It is customary to distinguish in the Dialogue an introduction and three parts. In the introduction, which takes up the first nine chapters, Justin relates first of all his mental journey through the systems of philosophy; then he gives a dramatic account of his conversion to Christianity; and he concludes by promising happiness to Trypho if he becomes a follower of "the Christ of God." Trypho, on his side, invites Justin to be circumcised; then he declares that the Messias (the Christ) has not yet manifested himself; and, in any case, the Christians take for the Messias, one who has no claims to the title. This reply sets the bounds of the problem, and the discussion begins.

The first part (Chaps. 10 to 47) is given up to the work of proving that Jesus is the Christ announced by the Scriptures; and that the Mosaic Law, which was never more than an accidental and worthless institution, is now abolished. This second thesis takes up almost entirely the efforts of Justin, who contents himself with establishing in summary fashion (Chaps. 13, 14), that the Christ, on the testimony of the Scriptures, was to appear first in lowliness, and to return later surrounded with glory and majesty. He takes as a demonstrated fact that Christ is come, and that this Christ is Jesus, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate. Trypho, without making open acknowledgment of it, leaves it to be understood that he is convinced on this thesis.

But in the course of his argument, Justin has spoken of the pre-existence of Jesus, and of His virginal conception. The Jew draws back from these two assertions, which seem to him to be incredible. He is well enough disposed to acknowledge Jesus as the Christ, but he is inclined to hold that this Christ acquired his dignity by his merits; he does not want to hear of a pre-existing Christ, or of a Christ born of a virgin. Hence, the second part (Chaps. 48 to 86.) It comprises two sections: one (48 to 62), in which Justin establishes by numerous Scripture texts that, below the Infinite God, there has been since the beginning of the world, a being called God who has been the minister of the Supreme Being; the other section (63 to 86), which is intended to prove the virginal conception of Jesus by the aid of the text of Isaias.

This line of proof, which Justin does not seem to consider possible except by use of the Septuagint, draws him off into a long digression on Jewish interpolations in the Scriptures. And so, although the line of argument is announced in Chap. 67, it is not taken up until Chap. 77.

When it is finished, Trypho has no further objections to make, but only explanations to seek (Chap. 87). He then asks the Christian teacher to show him how the pre-existence of Christ can be reconciled with the text of Isaias, where there is question of the descent of the Holy Ghost on the Messias; and above all with the crucifixion of Jesus. Justin then solves these difficulties. The third part (87 to the end) is distinguished from the preceding ones by the attitude, first respectful, then sympathetic, of the Jewish interlocutor. Beginning with Chapter 109, Justin, who has given copious answers to the questions put to him, seems to have nothing more to say. He continues, however, to speak, with the consent of Trypho, who declares that he listens with pleasure,[1] and who, at any rate, listens without interrupting.[2] Finally, Justin ceases, as he has to take a boat, and must be on board in a short time. He bids farewell to Trypho, promising to pray for his conversion. The latter, deeply moved, wishes the Christian teacher a happy voyage.

Transmission and Evidence of Authenticity. Almost all the manuscripts which claim to give the writings of St. Justin contain only doubtful or spurious ones. Two manuscripts alone have handed down to us the two Apologies and the Dialogue, viz., the *Codex Parisinus* n. 450, and the *Codex Claromontanus*. The latter is merely a copy of the former, which itself was written only in 1364. So it is to a single manuscript of the fourteenth century that we owe our collection of the works of St. Justin. A few fragments we get from other sources, the two principal ones being the *Codex Ottobonianus* and Eusebius. The *Codex Ottob.* (of the fifteenth Cent.) has transmitted chapters 65-67 of the first Apology. Eusebius has inserted in his *Ecclesiastical History* twelve extracts from the Apologies and two from the Dialogue.[3] One of these latter is a mere resumé. Tatian, Irenæus, Methodius, and the *Sacra Parallela* of St. John Damascene have given us other short fragments, almost all of which are taken from works other than the Apologies and the Dialogue, which works are evidently lost.[4]

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[1] Chap. 118.

[2] The interruption at chap. 123 is insignificant.

[3] The Codex Paris., has a lacuna in the second Apology (ii, 2). It is supplied by Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.*, iv, 17.

[4] See *Patr. Gr.*, vi, 1591; Harnack, *Gesch der altchr. Litter.* p. 220; Holl, *Fragmente vornicamsher Kirchevater aus den Sacra Parallela*, p. 32 sq.

The Fathers before Eusebius who speak of Justin, mention only his books against the heretics, which, as we have seen, are no longer extant. None of them affords proof for the Apologies and the Dialogue. But we must not infer from this that these books were unknown to them. The *Apologeticum* of Tertullian is evidently inspired by the first Apology of Justin, and he borrows freely from the Dialogue in his *Adversus Marcionem.*[1] There are good reasons to believe also that Athenagoras and Theophilus have constructed their books with the help of the first Apology.[2] However, Eusebius is the first to give witness to the three books of St. Justin which remain to us. And in a certain sense, he is the last, for the founder of apologetics soon ceased to be read. From the way in which St. Jerome speaks of him, it is manifest that he owes his information to Eusebius, and that he has never had in his hands a single one of the writings of the "philosopher martyr."[3] In the ninth century, the scholar Photius speaks at length of Justin, and gives a list of his works,[4] but his list contains only works ascribed to Justin.

Editions and Translations. The works of St. Justin were printed for the first time by Robert Etienne (Paris, 1551); then by Silburg (Heidelberg, 1593); by Thirlby (London, 1722); by Dom Maran (Paris, 1742); and by Otto (Jena, 1842). The edition of Maran was reproduced by Migne (P. G. 5); although inferior to Otto's, it has nevertheless a great value. Besides complete editions, there are numerous editions of the Apologies. The latest is issued by Krüger (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891).

The first Latin translation of the works of Justin was made by the Benedictine Perionius (Paris, 1554) Then followed the translations of Gelenius (Basle, 1555), of Lang (Basle, 1565), and finally of Maran. This last was adopted by Otto. The first Apology was translated into French by Chanut, at first under the pseudonym of Fondet (1670) and afterwards under his own name (1686).

Joseph Turmel.

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[1] See the resemblances pointed out by Maran in his Notes, on the *Dialogue*: 16, 20, 33, 35, 39 (?), 40, 42, 75, 76, 77, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 97, 106, 110, 113; and on the *Apology* I, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 18, 55.

[2] Harnack, *Gesch. der altchr. Litter.*, p. 200.

[3] In the *De Viris ill.*, 23, he reproduces, with but insignificant alterations, the data supplied by Eusebius. In the same work (9), he relates that Justin commented on the Apocalypse, an erroneous position due to the fact that he has misunderstood a passage of Eusebius (Harnack, *loc. cit.*, p. 104).

[4] *Biblioth.*, 125.

STUDIES ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

Francis E. Gigot.

II. The Baptism of Jesus.

Literary Study of Mk. i, 9-11; *Mt. iii,* 13-17: *Lk. iii,* 21-23.

After setting forth the preparatory ministry of John the Baptist, the first three Gospels describe briefly the circumstances connected with the baptism of Christ. They record how after Jesus' baptism, the heavens were opened, the Holy Spirit came down upon Him, and a heavenly voice proclaimed Him the beloved Son of the Almighty. These wonderful occurrences are fittingly placed by the Synoptists in close connection with John's announcement that one mightier than he was near at hand (Mk. i, 7, 8; Mt. iii, 11; Lk. iii, 16), for such divine signs plainly marked Jesus as the person in whom the Baptist's prediction received its fulfillment.[1] Hence, it is only natural that since we examined in our foregoing Study on the Synoptic Gospels, the section referring to the preparatory ministry of the Precursor, we should devote the present paper to what the same Gospels tell us anent the Baptism of Jesus.

A direct rendering from the original Greek of the three parallel accounts which we intend to examine will be found on a special page at the end of this paper.

I. Primitive Character of Mk's Account.

Of the three accounts that of St. Mark, which we have placed in the first column, exhibits manifest and numerous traits of primitive simplicity. Its opening verse (Mk. i, 9) is the direct and artless continuation of what Mk. has told in the preceding section of the preparatory ministry of John (Mk. i, 2-8). It begins with two simple Hebraisms: "And it came to pass," and "In those days,"[2] the second of which refers back directly to the time when John was baptizing and proclaiming the near coming of one mightier than he. The second part of the verse names explicitly "Nazareth of Galilee" as the town from which Jesus came to the baptism of John. Now this is due to the fact that Mk's Gospel, in conformity to the earliest form of the evangelical tradition, has begun the record of Christ's life not with an account of Jesus' early years, but with the preparatory ministry of John,[1] and consequently has had as yet, no opportunity to mention the exact place where Jesus spent His boyhood and youth.

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[1] *Cf.* Acts xix, 4.

[2] *καὶ ἐγένετο* (ויהי), *ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις* (בימים ההם).

The primitive character of Mk's next statement: "And [Jesus] was baptized by John in the Jordan" (Mk. i, 9*c*), is manifest. It is the plain statement of the fact of Christ's baptism, and it is worded exactly in the same *primitive* terms as both Mt. iii, 6*a*, and Mk. i, 5*c*, have used to describe the fact of the multitudes' baptism by John: "And [they] were baptized by him in the river Jordan." From this primitive form of Mk's statement concerning the fact of Christ's baptism, a most important conclusion may be drawn. It follows that Mk's absolute silence in his record of Jesus' baptism, about the confession of sins which was the natural accompaniment of the reception of baptism at the hands of John ("And were baptized by him in the river Jordan, *confessing their sins*:" Mt, iii, 6; Mk. i, 5), must also be regarded as primitive in comparison with Mt's distinct mention of a contest between John and Jesus, at the moment when the latter presented Himself for baptism:

> Mt. iii, 14. But John stayed Him, saying:
> I need to be baptized by Thee,
> and comest Thou to me?
> 15. But Jesus answering, said to him:
> Yield now, for thus it becomes us
> to fulfill all righteousness.
> Then he yields to Him.

The opening sentence of Mk. i, 10: "And straightway coming up out of the water," is decidedly Marcan, both in its use of the adverb εὐθὺς (straightway), and in its graphic description of Jesus as "rising up from the water," so that it cannot be considered as borrowed from either of the other Synoptists. Moreover, its immediate connection with the previous line in Mk.: "And [Jesus] was baptized by John in the Jordan" (i, 9*c*) is most natural, and manifestly primitive.

In like manner, the following lines in Mk. i, 10:

> He saw the heavens rending asunder,
> and the Spirit as a dove
> descending upon Him,

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[1] *Cf.* Acts i, 22; x, 37; xiii, 23, 24.

because of their evident simplicity, and of the graphic mention of the heavens as σχιζομένους (rending asunder),[1] must be regarded as vested with their primitive originality. It may also be noted that Mk's explicit statement to the effect that Jesus Himself "saw" the heavens rending asunder, hangs perfectly with the whole tenor of Mk's narrative which, from the beginning to the end, has directly to do with what happened to Jesus on the occasion of His baptism.

The primitive character of Mk's concluding verse (i, 11), can also be easily established, for it is most intimately connected with the preceding verse. Like verse 10, it begins with the simple conjunction καί; the voice that was heard, "came out of the heavens" which were represented as "rending asunder" in verse 10*b*, and the solemn declaration:

Thou art my beloved Son,
in Thee I am well pleased,

was directly addressed to Jesus just as the apparition of "the Spirit like a dove," in the preceding verse, had been seen by Him and the Spirit had descended upon Him.

Thus, then, throughout Mk's narrative of the baptism of Christ, literary analysis does not disclose anything that must needs be considered as derived from the parallel accounts in Mt. and Lk. The three sentences of which it is made up, are introduced in the most primitive manner (by the conjunction καί), and are intimately bound together in style and contents. Their statements are plain, and present absolutely nothing that would bespeak a later reflection upon the facts narrated. In fine, and above all, Mk's explicit mention of "*Nazareth* of Galilee," as the place from which Jesus came to John, actually connects,—as we have seen,—his whole narrative of Our Lord's baptism with what modern scholars justly regard as the earliest form of the evangelical tradition.

II. Mt's and Mk's Accounts Are Closely Allied.

This primitive character of Mk's account of the baptism of Christ appears still more evident, when we compare with it the narrative of the same event in St. Matthew's Gospel. Apart from the dialogue between John and Jesus, which is given by Mt. alone (Mt. iii, 14, 15), the two accounts run on closely parallel lines:

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[1] The verb σχίζω is applied by the three Synoptists to the rending of the veil of the Temple (Mk. xv, 38; Mt. xxvii, 51; Lk. xxiii, 45).

Mk. i, 9-11.	Mt. iii, 13-17.
9. And it came to pass in those days, Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee, and was baptized by John in the Jordan.	13. Then cometh Jesus, from Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him.
	14. But John stayed Him, saying: I need to be baptized by Thee, and camest Thou to me? 15. But Jesus answering, said to him: Yield now, for thus it becomes us to fulfill all righteousness. Then he yields to Him.
10. And straightway coming up out of the water He saw the heavens rending asunder, and the Spirit as a dove descending upon Him.	16. And Jesus having been baptized came up straightway from the water; and lo, the heavens were opened, and He saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove and coming upon Him.
11. And a voice came out of the heavens: Thou art my beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased.	17. And lo, a voice out of the heavens, saying: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

Both Mt. and Mk. agree (over against Lk.) in mentioning the place from which Jesus came to the baptism of John; both again,—over against our third evangelist—speak of Jesus coming up straightway from the water, and seeing the Spirit descending upon Him; both also have twice the plural form οἱ οὐρανοί in speaking of the skies, while Lk. uses twice the singular ὁ οὐρανός. In fact, several other, and even more minute, traits of resemblance could be pointed out between the first two Synoptists, so that their narratives of Christ's baptism must be considered as very closely allied to each other. Hence it becomes relatively easy to notice the differences which exist between Mk. i, 9-11, and Mk. iii, 13-17, and to realize how constantly they tell in favor of the primitive character of St. Mark's account.

III. Derived Character of Mt's Account.

The simple Hebraism: "And it came to pass" with which Mk's narrative opens, and which is coupled in a primitive manner with the aorist of the verb ἔρχομαι (*came* Jesus),[1] has given place in Mt. iii, 13, to the far less Hebraic phrase τότε παραγίνεται. As regards the second Hebraism: "In those days," which is found also at the beginning of Mk. i, 9, and which forms a most natural complement of the expression, "and it came to pass,"[1] it has been omitted here by Mt., for a reason which can still be pointed out. When St. Matthew departed from the earliest form of the evangelical tradition embodied in our second Gospel, by prefixing to the record of Christ's public life an account of His earlier years, he had naturally to omit the ἀρχὴ τοὺ εὐαγγελίου of Mk. i, 1, and to connect his own history of Our Lord's public life with his foregoing narrative of the infancy and youth of Jesus. This connection he apparently made by placing at the beginning of the preparatory ministry of John (Mt. iii, 1) the general formula "in those days" which was found at Mk. i, 9, and when he came to utilize Mk's narrative of Christ's baptism (Mk. i, 9-11), he naturally dropped the words "in those days," as already employed.

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[1] The use of καὶ ἐγένετο with the historical tense of the following verb, is the literal Greek rendering of the Hebrew ו . . . ויהי.

It is owing to the same departure from the earliest form of the evangelical tradition, that Mt. speaks of Jesus as coming from "Galilee" to the Jordan to be baptized by John. His introduction of a record of Christ's early life had given him an opportunity to mention explicitly "Nazareth" as the Galilean town where Jesus had resided previously to His baptism (Mt. ii, 22, 23). Hence, when in agreement with Mk's account of Our Lord's baptism, he wished to tell his reader the place from which Jesus came to the Jordan, he needed no longer to use the explicit mention of "Nazareth of Galilee" found in Mk. i, 9*b*, and simply spoke of "Galilee" (Mt. iii, 13) because this sufficiently suggested to the reader the town of Galilee already named as Jesus' exact place of residence. It is plain, therefore, that Mk's sentence: "Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee," is more primitive than Mt's shorter parallel clause: "cometh Jesus from Galilee."

We have shown already the primitive character of Mk's statement: "And [Jesus] was baptized by John in the Jordan." And our arguments for that position can be confirmed here—though this is hardly necessary—by a short examination of the parallel words in Mt: "to the Jordan [cometh Jesus], unto John, to be baptized by him." Evidently, Mt. has not here the simpler form, and his distinct mention of Jesus' desire "to be baptized by John" as bringing Christ from Galilee to the Jordan, gives expressly what is implied in St.

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[1] That the expression "in those days" is the natural complement of the expression "and it came to pass" at the beginning of a narrative, may be seen from Lk. i, 5 ;ii, 1; as also from Ruth i, 1, and especially from Esther i, 1, 2, where exactly the same Hebrew formula as underlies Mk. i, 9, is to be found: ויהי . . . . בימים ההם.

Mark's matter-of-fact statement, in order to prepare the insertion of the dialogue between John and Jesus:

> Mt. iii, 14. But John stayed Him, saying:
> I need to be baptized by Thee,
> and comest Thou to me?
> 15. But Jesus answering, said to him:
> Yield now, for thus it becomes us
> to fulfill all righteousness.
> Then he yields to Him.

It will be noticed that this mention by Mt. of Jesus' desire for the baptism of John, and more particularly his insertion of the contest between John and Jesus, interfered materially with Mk's direct connection between i, 9*c* and i, 10*a*:

> 9*c*. And [Jesus] was baptized by John in the Jordan.
> 10*a*. And straightway coming up out of the water. . . .

Now it is precisely this interruption in Mk's sequence of ideas, which led to Mt's insertion of the sentence of transition: "And Jesus having been baptized" (Mt. iii, 16*a*)[1] after which Mk.'s narrative and wording are taken up again:

Mt iii, 16*a* Jesus having been baptized 16*b* came up straightway from the water:	Mk. i, 9*c* And [Jesus] was baptized by him in the Jordan. 10*d* And straightway coming up out of the water . . .

Thus, then, the literary differences hitherto observed between Mt. iii, 13*c*-16*b*, and Mk. i, 9*c*-10*a*, make for the derived character of Mt's account in respect to the points it has in common with Mk's record. To this it may now be added that the probable object of the dialogue which is recorded by Mt. alone (Mt. iii, 14-15), points in the same direction. Mk's primitive and bare statement that Jesus was baptized by John in the Jordan, led many, and at an early date, to ask why the sinless One, actually received the baptism of *penance unto the remission of sins*. To this, Matthew, the apologist anxious to prove that Jesus is the Messias, and as such fulfilled the Law and the Prophets,[2] pertinently replied that it really behooved both John and Jesus to act as they did: the Messias at His coming was expected by the Jews to conform most strictly to all divine ordinances, and John, the minister of one of them, was in duty bound to confer baptism upon the sinless Messias, when requested by Him to do so.

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[1] It was because of this interruption that the name of Jesus had to be repeated in Mt. iii, 16*a*, after the insertion of the contest between Him and John.

[2] *Cf.* in particular, Mt. v, 17:

> Think not I came to destroy the Law or the Prophets;
> I came not to destroy but to fulfill.

The remaining differences between Mk. i, 9-11 and Mt. iii, 13-17 can also be naturally accounted for as deviations from the primitive account of Mk's Gospel. The form ἀνήβη ("came up"), for instance, in Mt. iii, 16*b* was introduced instead of Mk's participial form ἀναβαίνων ("Coming up"), because the clause 16*b* had to be connected with Mt's previous line; and so ,instead of Mk's statement "And straightway coming up out of the water," Mt's account was made to read:

Mt. iii, 16. And Jesus having been baptized
came up straightway from the water.

Again, the graphic expressions in Mk. "coming up *out* of the water," "the heavens *rending asunder*" have given place here, as is often the case in St. Matthew's Gospel, to less descriptive terms "came up *from* the water," "the heavens *were opened*." The phrase "the Spirit *of God*" in Mt. iii, 16*d*, looks like an apologetical specifying of "the Spirit" spoken of in Mk. i, 10*c*. And it is impossible to read attentively Mt's redaction in iii, 16, without feeling that its slight additions or other changes have greatly weakened the terseness and vividness of Mk's parallel verse:

Mt. iii, 16.	Mk. i, 10.
And Jesus having been baptized	
came up straightway from the water:	And straightway coming up out of the water
and lo, the heavens were opened,	He saw the heavens rending asunder,
and He saw the Spirit of God descending	and the Spirit as a dove
as a dove, and coming upon Him.	descending upon Him.

The most important difference to be noticed in the concluding verse of the parallel passages under consideration consists in the fact that the words heard from heaven, were, according to Mk, directly addressed *to* Jesus, whereas according to Mt., they were simply said *of* Him:

Mk. i, 11.	Mt. iii, 17. [saying:
And a voice came out of the heavens:	And lo, a voice came out of the heavens,
Thou art my beloved Son,	*This is* my beloved Son,
in *Thee* I am well pleased.	in *whom* I am well pleased.

And here, it is beyond doubt, especially in view of Lk's parallel reading:

Lk. i, 22. *Thou art* my beloved Son,
in *Thee* I am well pleased,

that Mt's indirect form: "*This is* . . . in *whom*," is not primitive as compared with that in Mk.

IV. General Cause of Mt's Variations.

Having thus shown that the differences which pervade Mt's account of the baptism of Jesus are deviations from Mk's record, there remains to us to trace them back to their general cause; while Mk's narrative is distinctly objective, simply stating facts, that of Mt. is apologetical, adapting Mk's primitive account to the circumstances and needs of his readers. It was for an apologetical purpose, as stated above, that Mt. inserted the dialogue between John and Jesus (Mt. iii, 14, 15), and was thereby led to substitute for Mk's single sentence "and [Jesus] was baptized by John in the Jordan," two separate lines:

Mt. iii, 13*c* to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him.
16*a* And Jesus having been baptized. . . .

The first of these lines served to introduce the justification of Jesus' receiving the baptism of repentance unto the remission of sins,[1] and that of John's administering it to Him, while the second was necessary after the insertion of the dialogue, to connect the following facts (the opening of heavens, the descent of the Holy Ghost, etc.) with Christ's coming to the baptism of John. All these modifications by Mt. made it plain to the early readers of his Gospel, that the fact of Christ's baptism went in no way against His messiaship: John conferred baptism upon Jesus although he looked not on Him as a sinner in need of it; and Jesus went to receive John's baptism, and actually received it, simply because being the Messias, it behooved Him to conform to this as to all other divine ordinances.

The principal changes introduced into Mk's next verses (i, 10, 11) by our first Synoptist, and disclosed by the literary analysis of Mt. iii, 16*b*-17, are also traceable to Mt's apologetical purpose. It is because Mt. wishes to convince his readers that Jesus is the Messias, that (1) he gives to understand much more than Mk., that the wonderful opening of the heavens was not beheld by Jesus alone; and (2) modifies the words "*Thou art* my beloved Son, in *Thee* I am well pleased" (Mk. i, 11) into "*This is* my beloved Son, in *whom* I am well pleased," whereby Jesus is expressly pointed out to all by heaven as the Christ of God.

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[1] This apologetical preoccupation appears also in the Gospel according to thee Hebrews, of which St. Jerome spoke as the Hebrew original of our Gospel according to St. Matthew. That apocryphal Gospel is quoted by St. Jerome (adv. Pelagianos, lib. iii, 2. Migne, P. L. vol. xxiii, col. 570) as containing the following words: "Ecce mater Domini et fratres ejus dicebant ei: Joannes Baptista baptizat in remissionem peccatorum: eamus et baptizemur ab eo. Dixit autem eis: Quid peccavi, ut vadam et baptizer ab eo?"

V. Peculiarities of Lk's Account.

If we now compare Lk. iii, 21-22 with the parallel accounts in Mt. (iii, 13-17) and Mk. (i, 9-11), we notice at once its great difference in regard to literary form from the other two Synoptics. Mk's narrative is made up of three Hebraic sentences each of which begins with the simple conjunction ו καί (and)

Mk. i, 9-11.

9. *And* it came to pass in those days, Jesus came
from Nazareth of Galilee,
and was baptized by John in the Jordan.
10. *And* straightway coming up out of the water
He saw the heavens rending asunder
and the Spirit as a dove
descending upon Him.
11. *And* a voice came out of the heavens:
Thou art my beloved Son,
in Thee I am well pleased.

This is likewise the case with Mt's narrative, apart from the inserted dialogue between John and Jesus in Mt. iii, 14, 15:

Mt iii, 13, 16-17.

13. *Then*[1] cometh Jesus
from Galilee to the Jordan
unto John, to be baptized by him.
(*Verses* 14, 15 *give the inserted dialogue*).
16. *And* Jesus having been baptized
came up straightway from the water;
and lo, the heavens were opened,
and He saw the Spirit descending
as a dove, and coming upon Him.
17. *And* lo, a voice out of the heavens, saying:
This is my beloved Son,
in whom I am well pleased.

In Luke, on the contrary, there is but one sentence which in respect to both matter and form, reads like an independent account of the facts recorded in Mt. iii, 13, 16-17 and Mk. i, 9-11:

Lk. iii, 21-22.

21. Now it came to pass,
after all the people had been baptized,
and Jesus had also been baptized,
and was at prayer,
heaven was opened,

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[1] In Mt's Gospel τότε very often takes the place of καί found in the other Synoptics: *Cf.* Mt. iii, 5; iv, 1, 5, 10, 11; viii, 26; ix, 14, etc., with the parallel passage in either Mt. or Mk.

22. and the Holy Spirit descended
in a bodily form, as a dove, upon Him,
and a voice came out of heaven:
Thou art my Son,
in Thee I am well pleased.

It is in Lk. alone that we find mention made of Jesus "at prayer," of His being baptized "after all the people had been baptized," of the Holy Spirit appearing "in a bodily form." It is Lk. alone who says nothing of Jesus coming from Galilee to the Jordan, of His "coming up straightway" from the water; and who, in particular, avoids mentioning the name of John in connection with Our Lord's baptism.

Besides these peculiarities in regard to the contents of Lk. iii, 21-22, there are other features in regard to its literary form, which seem likewise to make for the independent character of Lk's account. By its length and freedom of construction,[1] the single sentence whereby Lk. narrates the baptism of Christ, reminds one of the single long sentence whereby our third Gospel begins (Lk. i, 1-4), as also of the peculiar clause wrtiten for the sake of connection, which we have noticed in our foregoing Study on the preparatory ministry of John the Baptist (Lk. iii, 15): and it is beyond doubt that in these two sentences Lk. is independent of either Mt. or Mk. Again, Lk. iii, 21-22 has several terms or forms of expression,—such as the word ἅπας [2] the expression to τὸ. πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, [3] the construction ἐν τῷ with an aorist infinitive to express the time *after* which something came to pass,[4]—which are justly considered as characteristic features of the style and vocabulary of our third evangelist.

Perhaps what contributes most to make the long sentence in Lk. iii, 21-22 appear like an independent account of Our Lord's baptism, is the fact that our peculiarities in respect to both contents and form, have their counterpart in Lk's next clauses whereby he introduces a genealogy of Christ which is unquestionably his own:

Lk. iii, 23*a* And Jesus himself beginning . . .
23*b* was about thirty years of age, etc.

It is universally allowed that for the statements contained in these clauses our third Gospel does not depend on the first two Synoptics; and it is no less certain that such expressions as καὶ αὐτὸς at the beginning of sentences or independent clauses,[1] and the verb αρχομένος used idiomatically, are[2] distinctive features of St. Luke's style.

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[1] Concerning Lk's freedom of construction, see A. Plummer, Comm. on St. Luke, Introduction, p. LI.

[2] *Cf.* Lk. iv, 6; v, 26; viii, 37, etc.; frequently Lk. has πᾶς or ἅπας where the other Synoptists have nothing.

[3] *Cf.* Lk. i, 15, 35, 41, 67; ii, 25, 26; iv, 1; x, 21, etc.

[4] *Cf.* Lk. ii, 27; ix, 34, 36; xi, 37; xiv, 1, etc.

Whence it would seem that as Lk. is independent of Mt. and Mk. in these clauses (Lk. iii, 23*a-b*), so he must also be in the immediately preceding sentence which tells of the baptism of Christ (Lk. iii, 21-22).

VI. Lk's Dependence on Mt. and Mk.

Of course, since the genealogy of Jesus given by St. Luke is not taken from either Mt. or Mk., the sentence which he wrote with a view to introduce it, is rightly considered as of Luke's own making:

> Lk. iii, 23. And Jesus himself beginning . . .
> was about thirty years of age,
> being the son (as was supposed) of Joseph,
> the son of Heli, etc., etc.

But must this total independence of St. Luke of the other two Synoptics be also claimed for his preceding sentence (Lk. iii, 21-22)?

> iii, 21. Now it came to pass,
> after all the people had been baptized
> and Jesus also had been baptized
> and was at prayer,
> heaven was opened
> 22. and the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily form,
> as a dove upon Him,
> and a voice came out of heaven:
> Thou art my beloved Son,
> in Thee I am well pleased.

Is it true that the account of Jesus' baptism in the third Gospel is so entirely original that for its redaction St. Luke did not make use of Mk's and Mt's records of the same event? We think not, and chiefly for the following reasons:

First of all, an intimate connection between Lk. iii, 21-22, and Mt. iii, 13-17 and Kk. i, 9-11, may well be regarded as antecedently probable. Lk's. account of the baptism of Jesus gives the same wonderful occurrences as are set forth in Mt's and Mk's records. Again, our third evangelist places his narrative of that event in the same historical setting[1] as is found in Mt. and Mk., that is, between a description of John's preparatory ministry and that of Our Lord's temptation. Above all, as it is certain that in the wording of his statements concerning John's ministry and Christ's temptation, St. Luke depends on Mt's and Mk's parallel accounts,[2] it becomes antecedently probable that he depends in a like manner on them with regard to the intervening narrative of the baptism of Jesus.

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[1] *Cf.* Lk. i, 17, 22; iv, 15; v, 37; vi, 20; xv, 14; xvi, 24; xvii, 16, etc. Lk. uses also καὶ αὐτή and καὶ αὐτοί in the same peculiar way. (For examples, see W. F. Moulton, and A. S. Geden, A Concordance to the Greek Testament, N. Y., 1897).

[2] For the idiomatic use of ἄρχω, see Lk. xxiii, 5; xxiv, 27, 47; Acts i, 22; viii, 35; x, 37.

In the second place, a careful comparison between Lk. iii, 21-22, and Mk. i, 9-10 and Mt. iii, 13, 16-17 confirms this probability of Lk's dependence, or rather transforms it into a certainty. Throughout Lk's account of Our Lord's baptism, there are terms, forms of construction, etc., directly traceable to an actual influence of Mk. and Mt. upon it. Lk., like Mk., opens his record with the Hebrew formula ויהי (Lk: ἐγένετο δε Mk: καὶ ἐγένετο), and adds to it a reference to the time when John baptized the Jewish multitudes (Lk: ἐν τῷ βαπτισθῆναι ἅπαντα τὸν λαὸν refers to the same time as Mk: ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις; Lk., like Mk., says that a voice *came out of* heaven (the verb γίνομαι is used in both records), and makes it address directly to Jesus the words:

Thou art my beloved Son,
in Thee I am well pleeased.[3]

So much for Lk's dependence on Mk's account of the baptism of Christ, His dependence on Mt's narrative of the same event is likewise certain: Lk's clause "and Jesus having been baptized" (καὶ 'Ιησοῦ βαπτισθέντος) can be traced back to Mt. iii, 16*a*, "And Jesus having been baptized" καὶ βαπτισθεὶς ὁ 'Ιησους a phrase which, as we stated above, was composed by St. Matthew for the purpose of connecting the two parts of Mk's primitive narrative after it had been interrupted by the insertion of a dialogue between John and Jesus; Lk., like Mt., says that heaven was *opened*, using the same Greek verb ἀνοίγω as Mt., and preserving in an aorist *infinitive* form, of his own making,[4]—

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[1] The historical setting is certainly the same, for the insertion by St. Luke of Our Lord's genealogy after the narrative of His baptism does not interfere materially with the sequence of events.

[2] Lk's close dependence on Mt. and Mk. in his account of John's ministry, was examined in the preceding Study; his actual dependence on the same evangelists in his record of Christ's temptation, will be shown in our next paper.

[3] Compare also Lk's: "And the Holy Spirit descended as a dove upon Him" with Mk's parallel expressions.

[4] The aorist *infinitive* form was required in Lk. by the general construction of his sentence.

hence Lk's altogether anomalous form ἀνεῳχθῆναι,—the double augment of Mt's ἀνεῷχθησαν; like Mt., in fine, who speaks of "the Spirit *of God*," Lk. modifies the simple expression "the Spirit" found in Mk., and uses his own favorite phrase "the *Holy* Spirit."[1]

In the third place, even the principal differences between Lk. iii, 21-22, and Mk. i, 9-10, and Mt. iii, 13-17, point in the same direction, inasmuch as they appear to be intentional deviations on Lk's part, from the parallel accounts of Our Lord's baptism. Instead of the very natural and primitive introductory words in Mk. i, 9, "And it came to pass *in those days*," St. Luke writes: "Now it came to pass, *when all the people had been baptised*," because Mk's expression "in those days" if simply transcribed by our third evangelist, would have been misleading to the reader after Lk. had just completed his record of the precursor's ministry by mentioning the later imprisonment of John by Herod the tetrarch (Lk. iii, 20): to express the same note of time as is conveyed by Mk's clause "in those days," Lk. rightly gave an explicit reference to the earlier period when the Jewish multitudes had received baptism. Again, Lk's distinct statement that that Jesus "was praying" when heaven opened, reads like an interpretative addition of Our Lord's personal attitude implied in Mt. and Mk., when they say that "He saw" the heavenly wonders they describe: Jesus had then His eyes lifted up towards heaven, that is, was in a prayerful posture.[2] In like manner, when St. Luke alone states that the Spirit descended "in a bodily form," he simply adds to the picture in Mt. and Mk., a trait which their words naturally imply: the Spirit could not be *seen as a dove*, unless it appeared "in a bodily form."

As regards Lk's silence concerning important particulars which are given in Mt. and Mk., it may likewise be explained as an intentional deviation on his part from the parallel accounts of Our Lord's baptism: St. Luke had a special purpose in recording the Baptism of Jesus, and this purpose entailed the omission of those particulars. In the dedication of his Gospel to Theophilus, we are told explicitly that Lk. composed his work to confirm the faith of that illustrious convert from paganism,[3] and from the general structure and contents of Lk. iii, 21-22, we may easily gather that this was Lk's special purpose when he wrote the long sentence corresponding to Mk. i, 9-10 and Mt. iii, 13-17:

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[1] In view of Lk's dependence in iii, 21-22, on Mt. and Mk., it seems probable that Lk's αρχομένος in iii, 23, was suggested by Mk's ἀρχὴ (i, 1), and Mt's ἤρξατο (iv, 17).

[2] *Cf.* Lk. xviii, 13; Acts vii, 55; John xvii, 1.

[3] Lk. i, 1-4. *Cf.* E. Jacquier, Histoire des Livres du Nouveau Testament, vol. 2, p. 474, (Paris, Lecoffre, 1905).

Lk. iii, 21-22.
Now it came to pass
when all the people had been baptized,
and Jesus had been baptized
and was at prayer,
heaven was opened,
and the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily form,
as a dove upon Him,
and a voice came out of heaven:
Thou art my beloved Son,
in Thee I am well pleased.

It was because he had in view a pagan convert whose mind was particularly at the time when St. Luke wrote, but little, if at all, conversant with the distinctly Jewish notion that the Messias should abide by all the divine ordinances, that our third evangelist omitted the dialogue between John and Jesus found in Mt. alone (iii, 14-15), together with its previous introductory clause: "Jesus cometh . . . *to be baptized by him*" (John). It was because his chief aim was to confirm the faith of the one to whom he dedicated his work, that St. Luke referred to the fact of Our Lord's baptism only in a passing way, by an incidental participial clause: καὶ 'Ιησοῦ βαπτισθέντος, and subordinated the whole first part of the sentence "Now it came to pass *when* all the people had been baptized and Jesus had been baptized and was at prayer" to the second part, wherein are told the wonders calculated to strengthen the faith of the reader in the One who then received such signs of divine recognition and authentication: "heaven was opened, and the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily form, as a dove, upon Him, and a voice came out of heaven: Thou art my Son, in thee I am well pleased." In this way also, is explained the fact that St. Luke preferred Mt's incidental clause "and Jesus having been baptized" (iii, 16*a*) to Mk's direct statement "and Jesus was baptized by John" (i, 9*c*); dropped the particular detail directly concerned with baptism, and recorded in both Mt. and Mk.: "straightway coming out of the water"; described more objectively than Mt. and Mk.,—by omitting all reference to Jesus' seeing,—the wonderful occurrences recorded in our first two evangelists; and felt no need whatever to name "John" as is done by both Mt. and Mk. in connection with the baptism of Jesus. Indeed, the more Lk's sentence is studied, the more it is found to present the particulars of Mt's and Mk's narratives just to the extent and in the manner in which they were of some avail for the special purpose of his apologetics.

VII. Concluding Remarks.

The foregoing examination of the Synoptic accounts of Our Lord's baptism shows conclusively that though "it is difficult to define which contains the primitive form of narration," [1] yet this is not impossible: it proves that Mk. has that primitive form in comparison with the records of the event in Mt. and Lk. It shows also that Mt's narrative is not only closely allied to, but dependent on Mk's account, while Lk., although at first sight apparently unconnected with the other two Synoptists, is really dependent on them both.[2]

Again, it is plain that however great the variations here between our first three Gospels, their harmony can be fully vindicated by a close examination of their records. One has simply to examine impartially all the differences that can be pointed out, and to view them in the only light in which they can be rightly appreciated, viz.: in the light of the circumstances of time and place in the midst of which the Synoptic accounts were composed. This we have tried to do in the literary study we are now bringing to an end, and we have seen that in the three narratives of the baptism of Jesus there is a deep and unquestionable harmony as to the facts described, inasmuch as the differences in Mt. and Lk. are simply those which we would naturally expect from writers subsequent to Mk. and adapting their presentation of the facts to the needs of their respective readers.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

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[1] E. Jacquier, Histoire des Livres du Nouveau Testament, vol. II, p. 41. (Paris, Lecoffre, 1905).

[2] Carpenter's view that Mt. depends here on Lk. is certainly incorrect (*Cf.* J. E. Carpenter, the First Three Gospels, p. 163, sqq).

NOTES.

The old problem of the origin of life is being brought up once more, this time in connection with that strange element, radium, which has already done so much to disturb settled conclusions in other branches of science. The experiments which have brought the question again to the front are described by the investigator, J. Butler Burke, of Cambridge University, in an article in *Nature*, May 25, 1905, on "The Spontaneous Action of Radio-Active Bodies on Gelatin Media." In addition to our natural interest in the scientist himself (whom the *Tablet* refers to as a Catholic), we shall find that his experiments and inferences possess a wider interest, religious as well as scientific, which demands that they should be treated at length.

Ordinary "bouillon" of the bacteriologist, consisting of beef extract, gelatin, and small quantities of peptone and common salt, was placed in a test-tube, and with it a bit of a radium salt (radium bromide or chloride) sealed in a small glass tube. The test-tube containing the bouillon and the radium tube were sterilized by heat, and the test tube was plugged with cotton to prevent entrance of bacteria after the process of sterilization. The sterilization complete, the tube containing the salt of radium was broken, thus allowing the radium to come into contact with the cooled bouillon.

The effect of the radium was that "after twenty-four hours or so, a peculiar culture-like growth appeared on the surface, and gradually made its way downwards, until after a fortnight, in some cases, it had grown fully a centimeter beneath the surface." That is, the substance produced behaved very much like a growth of bacteria—a "culture."

"On heating the culture and re-sterilizing the medium, the bacteria-like forms completely disappeared: but only temporarily, for after some days they were again visible when examined in a microscopic slide." "When washed they [the cultures] are found to be soluble in warm water, and however much they may resemble microbes, they cannot for this reason [on account of their solubility] be identified with them." The bodies formed seem to have, in the case of the largest, four nuclei, and these largest bodies divide, somewhat as bacteria.

Prof. Burke's inferences from these facts, as stated in his first exposition of the matter, are as follows: "A careful and prolonged examination of their structure, behavior, and development leaves little doubt in my mind that they are highly organized bodies, although not bacteria. . . . They are clearly something more than mere aggregates in so far as they are not merely capable of growth, but also of subdivision, possibly of reproduction, and certainly of decay."

THE BAPTISM OF JESUS.

Mk. i, 9-11.	Mt. iii, 13-17.	Lk. iii, 21-23.
9. And it came to pass in those days, Jesus came	13. Then cometh Jesus	21. Now it came to pass,
from Nazareth of Galilee,	from Galilee to the Jordan,	after all the people had been baptized,
and was baptized by John in the Jordan.	unto John, to be baptized by him.	
	14. But John stayed Him, saying :	
	I need to be baptized by Thee,	
	and comest Thou to me?	
	15. But Jesus answering, said to him :	
	Yield now, for thus it becomes us	
	to fulfil all righteousness.	
	Then he yields to Him.	
	16. And Jesus having been baptized	and Jesus had been baptized
10. And straightway coming up out of the water	came up straightway from the water ;	and was at prayer,
He saw the heavens rending asunder,	and lo, the heavens were opened,	heaven was opened,
and the Spirit as a dove	and He saw the Spirit of God descending	22. and the Holy Spirit descended in a
descending [1] upon Him.	as a dove and coming upon Him.	bodily form, as a dove, upon Him,
11. And a voice came out of the heavens :	17. And lo, a voice out of the heavens saying :	and a voice came out of heaven :
Thou art my beloved Son,	This is my beloved Son,	Thou art my beloved Son,
in Thee I am well pleased.	in whom I am well pleased.	in Thee I am well pleased.
		23. And Jesus himself beginning . . .
		was about thirty years of age, etc.

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[1] The ordinary Greek Text omits, and indeed rightly, the words καὶ μένον found in some MSS., and borrowed from John i, 33.

Since then he has expressed somewhat more definite views in a statement in the London *Daily Chronicle*: "What I have obtained seemed in the first instance to have been either microbes or crystals; or neither of them, but something in the border line between them, and to my mind they appear now to approximate more closely to bacteria than crystals as ordinarily understood; though, strictly speaking, they appear to differ largely from both, but I make this statement with all due reserve. Until more powerful instruments, for which I am at present waiting, are at hand, I should prefer to withhold further opinions on this subject. The third possibility is at present the most probable, that they are in the critical state of matter between the mineral and the vegetable kingdoms, possessing not all the qualities of either, but many of the properties of both . . . . . that critical state, in a word, in which matter may, through some hitherto unknown source of energy, have sprung into life, or fallen into absolute inertness. If it were pressed upon me at present to say whether these forms I have obtained are living or not-living matter. . . . I should be obliged to admit that for aught that I at present know they seemed to convey to my mind and those of many others the border line between the living and the dead."

In spite of the remarkable resemblances of these "radiobes" to living organisms, there is a seemingly insuperable objection to considering them as possessing life—the fact that they are soluble in water. And this not only because of our knowledge that, as at present constituted, no living substance, small or large, is soluble in warm water, but also because all that we know of the past history of this planet leads us to conclude that life must first have begun in water. It is difficult, therefore, to believe that we shall discover the beginnings of life in a compound which meets with destruction when placed in that very medium in which incipient life must originally have found its habitat. However, it is well not to dogmatize too soon, if at all, in such matters. It will require much further investigation, and the careful study of our best biologists before we shall know whether Prof. Burke has discovered the secret of life, or whether he has stumbled on a mare's nest, like Huxley with his *Bathybius Haeckelis*.

Meanwhile it will be an interesting spectacle for the philosophical-minded to observe the different ways in which the facts will be received and discussed. "Scientists" of the Loeb type, with a genius for self-advertisement may be expected to blow the prophetic trumpet (and, incidentally, their own), announcing signs and wonders—to a generation which, happily, is beginning to demand that inferences shall not travel too far beyond the data. The popular newspapers have, of course, already announced the discovery with the usual thrilling headlines. Atheists of the microcephalic type, without bothering their minds with the labor of investigation, will hail the discovery as completely established, and proclaim it as the last blow to that many-lived phenomenon, religious belief. And we may expect, too, that some good well-intentioned apologists for religion will with equal sturdiness refuse to trouble themselves about the facts, and will look on Prof. Burke himself as being somewhat worse than an atheist for dabbling in such things.

It is a peculiar fact, by the way, that although spontaneous generation was freely admitted by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, the arguments against it have been the choicest weapons of modern apologists of a certain sort. In fact, some of them at times seem to make the cause of religion stand or fall with the theory of the "immediate creation" of life—a style of combat which has frequently produced most disastrous reverses in the past. It is too much like the tactics of the missionary who staked the veracity of the Mosaic account of the creation of woman on the supposed "fact" that man still lacks the normal quota of ribs. The heathen, being a cannibal, had a more "scientific," or, at least, a more empirical knowledge of the human anatomy than the preacher, and once more "religion" received a setback from "science."

No doubt the argument from the failure to produce (or, perhaps better, *evoke*) life, in any other way than from pre-existing life, has been in so great favor because it affords such a clean-cut proof of the need of a Creator, and also of the ultimate duality of being—and with a certain class of minds the argument was most effective, and perhaps the only kind of argument that they would be able to grasp. More than that, it has really served an excellent purpose in diminishing the importance of self-satisfied positivists who have been lecturing us so magisterially about the necessity of sticking to the "ascertained facts," posturing the while on a platform of guess-work.

It is idle to find fault with apologists who do an excellent and necessary, though temporary, service in keeping the empty-headed and the impulsive sane in times of special trial; but it must be evident to everybody who sees the whole situation, and who is anxious, not to construct a line of defense which will serve for an emergency, but to establish a thorough-going and lasting system, that we are here only on the skirmishing line. The dangerous element in the situation is that of disheartenment of the rank and file if the position has to be abandoned. The whole tendency of the past half-century has been to push back the argument for creation, design, etc., to the beginning of things. The process is, undoubtedly, far from being complete, and the defender of new creative acts has still by far the best of it, on the basis of known facts; but still our ablest thinkers would do well to leave to others the building of trenches to stay the enemy, and busy themselves with constructing inner fortifications before which the most hostile will lay down their arms.

We often hear of what St. Thomas would do if he were with us now. It is here, perhaps, more than anywhere else, that we regret that we have not a man with his too rare combination of breadth of knowledge, keenness of intellect and intense realization of God in the world. The theory of spontaneous generation and the moderate evolutionism which came down to him from St. Augustine did not disturb him. He found room for them without difficulty in his system of philosophy. Could he find room for a wider theory of evolution? That is a question which only a St. Thomas could answer to our perfect satisfaction. Be that as it may, this much seems true—that if evolutionism ever works out for itself a system of philosophy which will include all the facts to be accounted for, it will have to be some system of cosmic dualism in which Aristotle and St.

Thomas would be able to detect many of their favorite conceptions, such as latent potentialities, etc.

The desired reconciliation of theistic philosophy with scientific theories will probably come in the long run through a gradual approximation from both sides. Signs of such a *rapprochemont* have not been wanting. Tyndall and Huxley, Wundt, Virchow and Du Bois-Reymond of the past generation proved the untenability of the old-fashioned materialistic explanation. The main tendency of present-day philosopher-scientists is to recognize the "increasing purpose" manifested in evolution. And we may feel confident that scientists are too practical a set of men to remain satisfied with the idealistic interpretation of phenomena which is now prevalent in the schools of philosophy. Science, as well as religion, demands a more "common-sense" philosophy as a basis; and this will be hard to find better than in the philosopher of Stagira, who was the father, not only of logic and metaphysics, but of that empirical method which has produced such glorious results during the past three centuries of human thought.

And on the other side, the great Pontiff, Leo XIII, who turned us all from logic-chopping textbooks to the broad-minded philosopher-saint of Aquino, has shown how deeply he has imbibed of the spirit of that master by his recommendation "Vetera novis augere et perficere." Our Scripture scholars, moreover, have done much to settle difficulties which were thought to exist from the standpoint of revealed religion. The time, therefore, seems ripe for a great synthesis which will "amplify and perfect" the old. Evidently what the situation demands are men who possess Aristotle's keen realization of the factor of purpose in the world, with St. Thomas' appreciation of the value of the spiritual element, especially as it manifests itself in man, and in addition, a thorough knowledge of the whole field of scientific discovery.

A great mind such as this does not come at the asking; but in this age of combinations good results may be attained by a "pooling" process. Many minds have been active in an endeavor to solve, or at least, to state the problem. The very latest attempt is that of Mr. Mallock in the July *Contemporary*. It is a rare pleasure to find his over-critical genius in a constructive mood. It may be said of Mr. Mallock, as Mme. Daudet said of Renan, that he lacks "the sentiment of affirmation." But in this article he makes an attempt to point a way to reconciliation. Readers will find him quite satisfactory on certain points, notably his argument that the evidences of design point to an Intelligent God, and that the existence of mind in the present order of things cannot he accounted for in any theory which begins with nothing but cosmic dust. He does not attempt to solve the whole problem, so the metaphysical basis of his theory remains vague, between a double-aspect theory and a dualism—with a tendency, it would appear, to the latter system.

Amongst other articles in the July magazines of interest to Catholic students is one in the *North American* by Dr. Charles A. Briggs, of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, on *Reform in the Roman Catholic Church*. In a letter to a Catholic friend, written last year before his departure for Rome, Dr. Briggs stated that he intended to devote his efforts during his remaining years to Irenics. His article written in the *American Journal of Theology* on *Catholic: the Name and the Thing* was certainly a good evidence of the sincerity of his resolve. The *North American* article shows equal signs of good-will, although the members of the Curia would probably classify his attitude towards them as polemical.

The title of his article is not a fortunate one. The word "Reform" has a sixteenth-century ring about it, and seems to carry an implication of a rather bad state of affairs which needs instant remedying. Needless to say, Dr. Briggs is not giving us an exposé of the "errors and iniquities of Rome." The "reforms" which he sees in sight are a more intense devotion to Christ, in harmony with the battle-cry of this pontificate: "Reestablished all things in Christ;" and changes in ecclesiastical procedure which will lessen the influence of the Roman Congregations and extend that of the bishops of the Church. But if one may judge from his silence, he is entirely removed from the old Protestant point of view, which discovered a low moral state among Catholics.

As for reforms in doctrine, Dr. Briggs himself remarks that it is noteworthy that in this movement, little if anything is said of Christian dogma; and seems to imply that it is better so. He thinks that dogmatic differences had originally little to do with the separative movement of the 16th Century. His remarks on Papal Infallibility, the Immaculate Consception, and the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas are interesting—perhaps significant.

But the most manifest result of his stay in Rome is an unqualified admiration for the character and purposes of the Holy Father, whom he characterizes as "a Pope of spirituality, simplicity, and open-mindedness; a man who impresses those admitted to his presence and converse as being possessed of unusual grasp of mind, insight, and real moral power." He believes that if the faithful respond to the spirit of this holy Pontiff, "there will be ere long the greatest revival and reformation known to history."

Amongst the numerous signs of the practical zeal which are the fruit of this pontificate may be mentioned the plan to prepare a universal catechism. There will be many advantages in a work such as this, at least if its authors are men who will be anxious to produce a catechism which will be perfect from the viewpoint, not only of theology, but of pedagogy—which is a more difficult task. In a matter of this sort, experienced teachers, or a woman of sympathetic insight into the child mind, like Mother Loyola, could render better services than a whole synod of theologians. In view of this project we have all the more reason to regret the death of Bishop Bellord, whose efforts in the line of reforming the methods of religious instruction are so well known.

We have to chronicle another gap in the ranks of Catholic scholars. Father Denifle, O. P., Archivist of the Vatican, died rather suddenly while on his way to Cambridge, England, where the University was to confer the honor of LL.D., on him and on his fellow-historian, Father

Ehrle, S. J., the Prefect of the Vatican Library. In Father Denifle, death has taken away a man of great historical knowledge, especially of the mediæval and Renaissance periods. His works on the mediæval Universities, especially his *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, are monumental; and his recent work on Martin Luther aroused the interest of friend and foe.

In the field of Biblical studies, the most important event is another decision by the Biblical Commission. It is thrown into the traditional, if cumbersome form of a *Dubium.*[1] The question to be settled is whether it can be admitted that Books of the Bible, considered as historical, may sometimes, in whole or in part, be not really historical, but are only put in the form of history in order to convey a meaning other than that contained in the literal sense of the words.

The answer is that the opinion is not to be admitted, excepting in cases where it can be proved by solid arguments that the sacred writer did not intend to give history in the strict sense of the word, but to use the historical form for parable or allegory, or to put forth a meaning not conveyed in the words when taken literally. Such cases, however, are not to be easily or rashly admitted, and must be interpreted in accordance with the sense of the Church, and in dependence on her judgment.

This answer, like the former one, is a quiet step forward, cautious, conservative in the best sense of the word, leaving workingroom for scholars who are trying to do careful and conscientious work, but checking too hasty generalizations. Of course it will always be difficult to penetrate the intentions of authors so long since passed away, but at times indications of the allegorical use of history are evident in their writings; and, moreover, on the generally received theory of inspiration, it will be a valid inference that the author did not intend to write history, if it be shown by solid arguments that his work, in whole or in part, is actually not in accordance with history.

We have received the announcement of a new French review, which is intended to cover much the same field as the New York Review. It will appear in October next as a bi-weekly, under the title *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique.* It will be edited by two young priests of Paris, with the backing of a "Comité de Patronage," which contains such well known names as Batiffol, Baudrillart, Boudinhon, Guibert, Lepin, Pechenard, Peillaube, Portalié, Tanquerey, Tixeront, Vacandard. As there are already in French a number of Catholic periodicals which discuss modern difficulties in a scientific way, and as these questions form in France the subject of popular conferences and discussions, special features of the new review will be a sort of Question Box, and hints for sermons against unbelief. The NEW YORK REVIEW extends a hearty welcome to its co-laborer in a field where competent hands are all too few for the harvest to be garnered. Subscriptions (12 francs a year) should be sent to Beauchesne et Cie., 117 Rue de Rennes, Paris.

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[1] Utrum admitti possit tamquam principium rectæ exegeseos sententia quæ tenet S. Scripturæ Libros, qui pro historicis habentur, sive totaliter, sive ex parte, non historiam proprie dictam et objective veram quandoque narrare, sed speciem tantum historiæ præ se ferre ad aliquid significandum a proprie litterali seu historica verborum significatione alienum? *Resp.*: Negative, excepto tamen casu, non facile nec temere admittendo, in quo, ecclesiæ sensu non refragante, ejusque salvo judicio, solidis argumentis probetur Hagiographum voluisse non veram et proprie dictam historiam tradere, sed, sub specie et forma historiæ, parabolam, allegoriam, vel sensum aliquem a proprie litterali senu historica verborum significatione remotum proponere.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Histoire des Dogmes: I. La thèologie antenicèene—Par M. L'Abbe J. Tixeront, doyen de la Faculté catholique de théologie de Lyon. Deuxième edition, 475 pp. Paris: Lecoffre. F. 350.

"The science of a thing is its history." So wrote a prominent thinker of our day, and in these words he aptly expressed what may be called the point of view of modern scholarship. Evolution, growth, development, all these ideas are being adopted and applied in a manner and to an extent hitherto unknown. Old as Philosophy itself, they are nevertheless new in their bearing on science, for we now realize that nothing which can be the object of study is dead, or at a standstill: *παντα ῥει*— everything of value in the world has a life of some kind, and life means growth, and growth means history. The Catholic Church, as being pre-eminently a living organism, has pre-eminently a growth and a history; so when scholars, Christian or rationalistic, bid us "study the present in the past," she gladly accepts their challenge. For, however it may have been in former times, the best Apologetics she possesses to-day is derived from the results of modern Scriptural and historical research. Accordingly a work such as the one before us is especially opportune; for, while being in the strict sense a "History of Dogmas" and not a formal work on Apologetics, it nevertheless provides, by the recognized methods of the scholarship of our time, the means for a vindication of the development of Catholic dogma, and its position to-day.

The book is the first of a projected series in four volumes, in which the history of the dogmas of Catholicity is to be traced from their very origin to the present time. The author of Vol. I is to write its immediate successor also, in which he will continue the history from the Council of Nicæa to Charlemagne. Vol. III and IV will be entitled respectively: *La Théologie du Moyen Age* and *La Théologie Catholique depuis le xvi eme Siècle.* If Vol. I is an indication of II, III and IV, we may expect an important contribution to the literature of the subject; for this part of the undertaking has been accomplished in a thoroughly scholarly manner. We easily recognize from the critical method pervading the whole book, the learned but too long silent author of *Les Origines de l'église d'Edesse*, (Paris, 1889). It is first of all candid and honest—primary requisites in a work of history. There are no pre-conceived ideas, no pet theories, no suppression of facts or straining of texts, in a word no "views," but the writer keeps himself in the background, and lets the truth speak for itself. These qualities alone would be ample recommendation; for, in a time like the present, when we have to put up with so much, especially from Germany, of what might be termed "dream-science," a sort of juggling with historical data, we heartily appreciate a writer who is content to let the facts speak for themselves, instead of ventriloquizing by means of them.

But besides, the book is a learned work, based on careful and minute inquiry, and gives ample evidence of the writer's long experience in the handling of this subject. The fruit of many years' teaching in the Theological Seminary and the Catholic University of Lyons, it possessses clearness and order indicative of one accustomed to dealing with students. This is shown, not only in the general arrangement of the book, but especially in the grouping of Scriptural and Patristic references to a given subject, as instanced in the chapter on *The Heresies of the Second Century. A propos* of this, we might note the prudence and moderation of the author's position on Biblical problems (pp. 63-64, notes), while the chapter on St. Cyprian exhibits the fairness as well as the erudition of a writer abreast of his time. But will everyone understand the distinction between the history of theology and the history of dogmas explained on pp. 4-5? For students of Apologetics or of Church History it is a work of the first importance, and would serve excellently as a starting-point for further investigation of any of the subjects whereof it treats. For these reasons, among others, we should be glad to see it translated into English.

A summary of the titles of the chapters will give an idea of the importance of the work. Religious, philosophical and moral doctrines amidst which Christian dogma was born and developed. First stage of Christian dogma: the preaching of Christ and the Apostles. The testimony of the Apostolic Fathers. The first alterations of Christian dogma: the heresies of the second century. Doctrinal struggle against heresy. St. Irenaeus. The first theological systems in the East. Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Christological and Trinitarian controversies in the West, at the end of the second century. The founders of Latin theology: St. Hippolytus, Tertullian, Novatian. The penitential question in the third century. St. Cyprian and the baptismal controversy. Western theology from Origen to the Council of Nicæa. Eastern heresies and Western theologians at the end of the third century. The state of doctrine and theology at the rise of Arianism.

The mere reading of this last chapter will show how the book is simply invaluable to theologians—who needed it—shall we say badly?

JOSEPH BRUNEAU.

Jésus, Messie et Fils de Dieu d' après Les Evangiles Synoptiques avec une Introduction sur l' onigine et la Valeur Historique de ces Trois Premiers Evangiles—par M. LEPIN, Prêtre de Saint-Sulpice, Professeur au Grand Séminaire de Lyon. Deuxième Edition, Paris, Letouzey et Ané, Editeurs, Rue des Saints-Pères, 76. 1905.

It is an encouraging sign of the growth of interest in problems connected with the *New Apologetics* that M. Lepin should find it necessary to issue a second and revised edition of the admirable work which he published a little more than a year ago. The memory of the success that waited so unexpectedly upon that first and somewhat hazardous venture is doubtless still fresh in the minds of those of our readers who are accustomed to follow the progress of scholarship and the current of theological ideas in the Old World. Investigators as far removed from one another in temperament and scholastic training as Père Lagrange and Père Rose, P. de Grandmaison and Monsignor Batiffol, welcomed the book in terms that would have read like a careless out-pouring of ill-considered praise, if they had not been safe-guarded and supported by acute and intelligent criticism. This new edition, we make bold to predict, will secure the respectful hearing of even a more fastidious circle of readers. The Introduction has been practically re-written and the Synoptic Problem discussed much more fully in what may be called its *psychological phase*, as conditioned, namely, by the views which more advanced exegetes, like Schmiedel, Jülicher and Loisy, bring to bear upon the question of the true historical significance of the more important New Testament documents. If M. Loisy's opinions loomed somewhat large in the earlier publication, the disproportion will be found to have been wisely reduced in the new edition by the attention which the author devotes to the pronouncements of other exponents of recent exegetical opinion, notably, of course, to those of German schools of thought, though the distinguished French scholar, naturally enough, still engages a large share of M. Lepin's attention.

Much of the excellent material that had been unavoidably relegated to two appendices in the former arrangement of the book, has been incorporated into the text of the present edition. As thus revised the work consists of an *Introduction* of nearly sixty pages in which the nature and limits of "the Synoptic Problem," together with a solution which commends itself to the author's evident feeling for conservatism, are set forth with a lucidity and breath of present-day knowledge that are as informing as the temper of it all is edifying and full of charm. It is a rare, if radically Gallic, grace, and one that needs urgently to be commended to those among us who are disposed too querulously to ask what the New Learning has to teach the Old Orthodoxy to-day. Seldom have we read a more urbanely fortifying defense of what must turn out, on examination, to be, after all, ancient and venerable positions. In the course of some six chapters, subdivided into sections, after the French manner of book-building, and further diversified by an eager disarray of foot-notes, clinched with candid references to authors, whose names it is sometimes considered by the devout and indolent among apologists to be a sort of "fifth note" of orthodoxy to ignore, M. Lepin carries the reader over the field of one of the most disquieting controversies to which the defenders of fundamental Christianity have been committed since Father Alexander Geddes first scandalized the unsuspecting by seeming to make common cause with Eichhorn and his followers, now little more than a century ago. If the attacks of the Higher Critics on the received interpretations of the Old Testament filled our theological elders with dismay until scholars of courage and insight, scarcely two decades of years back, furnished them with the beginnings of a reply, what shall we say of the objections urged by a hardly less uncompromising school of exegetes to some of the current interpretations of the New? The issue is certainly not a dead one; and the cycle of controversies that has been raised by its various attempted solutions finds its justification in the Synoptic references to Our Lord's consciousness of His Messiahship and in the still more recondite, if inevitably cognate, questions of psychology which that mysterious consciousness involves. Where shall we find the synthesis which will enable us to formulate a coherent unifying explanation of all the disparate and often apparently contrarious statements about Our Lord's Messianic consciousness, which may be instanced from a score of Gospel passages outside the account ascribed to St. John? A synthesis, assuredly, we must find, if we are to meet the objections levelled at orthodox Christianity to-day; and the synthesis must be more than a verbal one. It must be based rather on the known facts of scientific history and psychology than evoked mist-like from a cloudland of metaphysics, which few have the training to understand, and fewer still the courage to discard when a too trustful devotion to glibly-repeated formulae leads them into moral quagmires of secret doubt and unrepentant disingenuousness.

That M. Lepin's treatment of this very vital problem is final, or exhaustive enough to furnish the synthesis that all thinkers are in quest of, he himself would be the first to deny; that his contribution contains much, however, that goes far towards outlining a more satisfactory theory than we have hitherto been accustomed to, will be evident to every fair-minded reader of this painstaking and unaffectedly erudite book. If we were asked to specify in detail the chapters which we think will be found most helpful to the present-day student of Apologetics whether in the seminary or out of it, we should call attention to the clear-cut and unshrinking discussion on the source of Our Lord's sense of His mission (*D'ou vient en Jésus sa conscience d'etre le Messie*?) which the author carries on towards the close of the third chapter,[1] (with due reservations, for which we can hardly do more than indicate the grounds); and the final paragraphs,[2] which deal with the purely psychological problem of the nature and limitations of Our Lord's human knowledge.[3] It is here that the author's method of treatment achieves its full efficacy. That method is, indeed, a very simple one in outline. It moves, for the most part, along a smooth and unresisting plane of categories: first, the accepted statements of Scripture; then "the dear prejudices of faith" as inspired by these statements; and, last of of all, an elaborate array of recent opinion—some of it frankly rationalistic and other some merely liberal-orthodox—which is examined with the view of appraising its real value to the scholar. It is, as we have said, a very simple method of procedure. What really saves it from lapsing at times into the untroubled and lisping simplicity of presentation betrayed in many an academic seat of Moses that some of us could name, is the courage and amplitude of knowledge it reveals. M. Lepin is a master who has not merely kept in touch with his age, but has thought deeply enough on the problems he discusses to be accounted a true leader and guide in speculative exegesis. In all these essential matters he moves with a sureness which it would be difficult to over-praise. We are not so persuaded, however, that his statements on the range and quality of Our Lord's human knowledge will be found satisfying to the student who approaches him in the hope of discovering new or suggestive ideas. Stimulating as these latter pages must undoubtedly prove to the unbiassed enquirer outside of the pale of traditional Catholic opinion, it will be seen that he has been content merely to focus what may be called the scattered conjectures of post-Tridentine thought as they have manifested themselves in Suarz, De Lugo, Billuart, Petavius and Franzelin. But this is to look backward, not forward. Deep as is the debt of modern Catholicism to these thinkers, it may be doubted whether a mere restatement of the opinion they have helped to build up really tends to clarify minds that have become bewildered under the stress of notions imbibed directly from the new science of psychology. Of the five whom we have named, it is from Petavius, perhaps, more assuredly than from any of the others that we may expect a clue to guide us amid the labyrinth created alike by the native mysteriousness of the subject and the baffling variety of the solutions hazarded thereon from age to age in the development of the Church's Christology. The instinct for historic continuity and the curious and positive bias of Father Petavius' mind make him, in spite of the lapse of years that separate him from our time, a modern of the moderns. When it is recalled, too, how acute a reasoner he could be, our readers ought not to be surprised at the suggestion we venture to make that M. Lepin would have added appreciably to the value of his chapter on this recondite and almost fundamental point, if he had added to his paragraphs on the three-fold kinds of knowledge postulated for Our Lord's human intellect alike by the exigencies of the Hypostatic Union and the statements of the Evangelists, a syllabus of patristic pronouncements out of the great French Jesuits' arsenal which would seem to indicate the possibility, at least, of another and less baffling hypothesis. Christian speculation seems doomed forever to oscillate, in seeking a way of escape from this mystery, between the poles of a too Docetic and a too Nestorian conception of Christ. But this, it might be objected, is to hint a fault for which it would be mere captiousness to hold M. Lepin to blame.

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[1] § iii, pp. 152-210.

[2] (Chap. iv, §§ v and vi).

[3] *La reservé du Christ a manifester sa divinité*, pp. 364-372: *La perfection de la science du Christ*, pp. 372-432.

The work is excellently printed and amazingly cheap, as most French books are, in price. If it lacks the convenience of an index, it is enriched, it is only fair to add, by a very complete and illuminating *résumé* of its subject-matter in the shape of an analytical table of contents. We sincerely pray that the book may create for itself a wide circle of readers; and as a step to so desirable a consummation in one not ignoble idiom, at least, we venture to give expression to the further hope that M. Lepin will speedily make arrangements, either here or in England, to find for it a wise and sympathetic translator.

CORNELIUS CLIFFORD.

Histoire des Livres du Nouveau Testament.—By E. JACQUIER. *Tome second. Paris, Lecoffre,* 1905.

This volume forms the second part of a historical study on the books of the New Testament, begun a few years ago, by Father E. Jacquier, a distinguished professor in the Catholic Institute of Lyons, France. It deals with the important problems which pertain to the literary criticism of the first three Gospels, in the same competent manner in which the preceding volume treated of those relating to the Epistles of St. Paul. It is the work of a well-informed and careful scholar. The style is precise and clear. The tone is moderate, and the general tendency conservative. The method of treatment is historical and critical, and the inferences cautious and usually correct. The present volume sums up well the results of modern research as to the origin, authorship, date of composition, leading features, etc., of the Synoptic Gospels. All in all, it is the best handbook of introduction to the study of those earliest records of Our Lord's life.

After a rather lengthy introduction (chaps. i-iii), the writer deals with what is known as "the Synoptic Problem" (chaps. iv-v). On the basis of the original Greek, he makes a brief, though careful analysis of each section of the first three Gospels, pointing out as he goes along, the resemblances and differences suggested by the comparison of the three records, together with his own inferences as to the primitive, or on the contrary, derived character of the sections examined. Then he proceeds to set forth and discuss the principal theories propounded during the nineteenth century to account for the resemblances and differences which exist between the Synoptic records. The Tubingen hypothesis with its *a priori* conceptions as to the early Christian parties (Paulinism; Petrinism) he rightly discards as altogether insufficient to explain the literary features of our canonical Gospels. Even oral tradition alone, or mutual dependence of Mt., Mk., and Lk., seems to him inadequate as a solution of the Synoptic Problem. The Documentary hypothesis, under its various forms, takes up much of his attention (pp. 313-354), yet fails to satisfy him. And he concludes that to account for all the facts brought to light by the literary analysis of the first three Gospels, we should admit (1) the existence of a primitive oral tradition in Aramaic, but soon translated into Greek; (2) the use by the evangelists of documents unknown in numbers, which embodied more or less fully that oral tradition and other fragmentary teachings of the apostles; (3) the work of adaption by the evangelists to their respective purposes of all the materials at their disposal, both written and oral.

In the next part of his work (chaps. vi-viii), Fr. Jacquier treats of each Synoptic Gospel separately. According to him, St. Matthew's Gospel may have been written by that Apostle in the Aramaic language. He grants, however, that "even though we should suppose that Matthew is the author only of the Logia, or sayings of Jesus (which many scholars regard as the kernel of our first Gospel), and that part of his Gospel is derived from that of St. Mark, yet we could rightly ascribe our first Synoptic record to Matthew, as to its principal author" (p. 367). With regard to the historical features of St. Matthew's Gospel, Professor Jaequier admits that its narrative portion aims at proving the Messiahship of Jesus, and that everything is subordinated to this purpose. He thinks that, particularly in chaps. iii-xxv, the didactic element is greatly in excess over the historical; that the writer has wished to make a collection of our Lord's discourses, and has given only a minimum of facts, which moreover he has not arranged in a chronological order. The final redaction and publition of our canonical Gospel according to St. Matthew, he apparently ascribes to a date a little earlier than the destruction of Jerusalem (pp. 402, 404).

After admitting the influence of both St. Peter and St. Paul upon the contents of our second Gospel, Fr. Jacquier gives a good description of St. Mark's vocabulary and diction. "To sum up," he says (p. 417), "Mark's style, though monotonous enough because of his often repeated expressions, yet is vivid and full of graphic touches. It has a popular appearance, and exhibits many well defined and precise features. The writer, on the other hand, does not always avoid prolixity, useless repetitions and details. Sometimes he is diffuse, sometimes too concise. The style of the second Gospel bespeaks therefore the popular origin of its narrative; it is simple, never aims at effect, and pictures correctly the primitive impressions of Christ's witnesses." Among the historical features of St. Mark's Gospel, Fr. Jacquier numbers "a certain artificiality in the arrangement of the events narrated" (p. 418); "a presentation at times of the character and intelligence of the Apostles under a rather unfavorable light" (p. 423); and also the presence of certain details "which seem to be amplifications due to the proxility of the writer," and of others "which are even idle" (p. 424). He thinks that "St. Mark has utilized the preaching of St. Peter, though without following it very closely, and that he has disposed with great skill the materials he had selected" (pp. 429-430). He regards as probable that our second Gospel was written about 64-67 A. D.

St. Luke was a much better writer than St. Mark, and "his Gospel is a literary production "(p. 458). He is a historian modelled after the great Greek writers of history: Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius. He follows the order of events, refrains carefully from giving dates when he does not know the exact date of an occurrence (p. 461), and supplies a much more complete biography of Christ than the other two Synoptists. His Gospel is pervaded throughout with the doctrine of the universality of salvation, and is distinctly marked by "Luke's selection of those sentences of Jesus which told most in favor of the poor. The evangelist gathered them up apparently from the lips of the Christians of Jerusalem, who had been especially struck by such teachings of Christ, and had even endeavored to live up to them" (p. 467). St. Luke's Gospel is an apologetic work as can be inferred from his general tendency, plan, and selection of materials (pp. 474-sqq). It was written for the Gentiles "towards 60-70 A. D." (p. 484).

The concluding chapter (chap. ix) deals with "the Text of the Gospels." It contains valuable, though summary, too summary, information concerning the textual criticism of our Synoptic records. In particular, it examines five interesting readings which are especially discussed at the present day, viz.: Mt. i, 16, referring to the virgin-birth of Our Lord; Mt. xxviii, 19, which contains the formula of baptism in the name of the three Divine Persons; Mk. xvi, 19-20, conclusion of St. Mk., the authorship of which Fr. Jacquier inclines to acsribe to the presbyter Aristion; Lk. i, 46, where the variant "Et ait Elisabeth" seems to refer to her the canticle *Magnificat;* and lastly, Lk. xxii, 43, 44, describing the appearance of the Angel of Our Lord, and His sweat of blood in the garden of Gethsemani.

The foregoing analysis of the general contents and leading positions of the volume before us, gives but a faint idea of the number of questions treated therein, as also of the judicious manner in which they are dealt with. The work is decidedly more scientific than any other puhlication of the kind which has come from Catholic hands during the last thirty years. Unfortunately, it has no topical index; the library references are not as full as might be desired; the conclusions are at times too conservative; and the analytic examination of the text of the Synoptics is not as thorough and reliable as one would wish. All in all, however, as we already said, Professor Jacquier's volume appears to us the best handbook of Introduction to the study of the Synoptic Gospels that we have seen.

Francis E. Gigot.

Christian Character: Being Some Lectures on the Elements of Christian Ethics:—By J. R. ILLINGWORTH, M. A., D. D. London, MacMillan & Co., Limited. New York, The MacMillan Co. (8 vo.)

"The fundamental nature of the Christian character, as exhibited by its best representatives," Dr. Illingworth reminds us, "has always remained the same. And that character," he goes on to observe, (*Preface* p. v.), "has been essentially dependent upon belief in the cardinal doctrines of the Christian creed." That is a somewhat old-fashioned doctrine, frankly and unaffectedly expressed; but it needs especially to be insisted upon at a time when the comparative study of historic cults and creeds, together with the passion for toleration and the new feeling for psychology, brings home to men's minds, as never before, that, if a handful of the elect among us are better than their beliefs, the majority are still pathetically and enigmatically worse. Students of Christian Ethics will welcome, therefore, this attempt on the part of one of the most suggestive, and certainly not least inspiring, writers among the Anglican body of our time "to recall the claim—the continuous claim—of Christianity to be the adequate guide of all human development, the adequate goal of all human desire, and *this only on account of its further claim to be a divine revelation,*" (*Preface* p. vi). The words which we have ventured to print in italics express tersely and adequately the real purport and scope of Dr. Illingworth's book. An examination of the headings of the ten chapters which make up the bulk of the work will reveal, perhaps better than a protracted analysis could do, both the essential ideas and the method of treatment by which the main argument hinted at in the preface is sustained. These ten chapters (which, as we gather from the author's admission and from the rhetorical form of easy illustrative exposition in which they are cast, were originally thought out as lectures) touch upon the following fundamental considerations: The nature of Christian Ethics as conditioned by the concrete gift of Life which Christianity offers to those who conform to its definite rules of conduct; individualism in Christ, or Christian character as moulding personality and giving new and particular meanings to that Life; discipline, as the instrument of personal development, and the part played in consequence by the ascetic principle in the career of the single-hearted disciple; faith, hope, love and the cardinal virtues; prayer, and the sacraments as completing prayer and bringing it into touch in various ways, social and personal, with the religion of the Incarnation; mysticism, both as a fact and as a theory in the religious life; and, last of all, the sense in which the Christian life as thus outlined is rightly called "Supernatural."

In his main contentions the author will be found to be in essential agreement with those who hold that it is in historic and Catholic Christianity, as manifested in a liturgy-loving and sacramentally minded Church, rather than in those partial and somewhat too negative aspects of evangelical teaching which have come into prominence since the Reformation period, that we must look for the principles that give definition to what is really distinctive and most compelling in Christian character. It would be far from just, however, to infer from this remark that Dr. Illingworth weakens the claims of a good thesis by expounding it in a controversial spirit. Nothing could be more alien to his manner. Both in temper and treatment he betrays the instinct of the philosopher who believes that the case for the old-fashioned view of Christian conduct is so good that it deserves to be re-stated in terms of modern thought; and who is content so to re-state it without having recourse to the showier methods of the sectarians and the religious debater. If he touches upon controverted points at all it is with a sweet reasonableness that disarms even when it fails to convince. His method of exposition reveals a wide acquaintance with the historic masters of Catholic theology; and those who have had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of his earlier publications, and notably of the work on *Divine Immanence* and of the essay in fundamental apologetics known as *Reason and Revelation*, will recognize his spiritual kinship with the followers of Bonaventura and Scotus, to name but two schools (which are really one) among the ancient, and with Père Laberthonniére and M. Blondel, to name two others who are among the most stimulating of all the more reflective exponents of recent Catholic thought. The first chapter, to which Dr. Illingworth has given the title of *Life the End of Christian Ethics*, contains some striking remarks on the nature of actual sin as contrasted with the master-need of the Christian life, which students of theology will do well to compare with the well known *loci* in Suarez (*De bon. et mal. act. hum.* Disp 7, § 5, n. 13), Vasquez (*in I et II*, Disp. 95), DeLugo (*de Incarn.* Disp. 5, n. 75), and, to cite a modern but really original work, Father Louis Billot's pamphlet *de Peccato*. The remarks are so good that they will bear quoting *in extenso*:

> This, then, is the essence of the Christian view of sin, that it consists in alienation from God; and further, that all unrighteousness is sin; that is to say, that vice or wrong done to our own nature, and crime or wrong done to society, only are what they are because ultimately they are sins, or acts of disobedience to God. Sin, therefore, is the fundamental category which includes all moral evil. And "sin is the transgression of the law"; its seat, that is to say, is in the will. It is not inherent in our material body, as the Manichæans thought, or the result of ignorance, as maintained by many of the Gnostics; or to be identified with desire, as among the Buddhists; it is wilful disobedience, and bodily disorder, and moral ignorance, and inordinate desire, though they may be predisposing conditions of sin, yet are in the first instance, its consequences, not its causes. For just because sin resides in the will, it affects the whole and not merely a part of our being, since our will is our personality in action, the expression of our very self. A perverted will, therefore, implies a perverted or wrong personality. And as acts gradually become habitual and one bad habit leads to another, as it invariably does, the entire personality grows more and more evil, more and more alienated from its source of life in God. And this works for death in two ways in consequence of the twofold nature of personality. Socially the evil person becomes a harmful influence and example, making for the disturbance, the disorder, the disintegration, the ultimate destruction of society. While as an individual he undergoes a similar process of dissolution within himself. For with the loss of his spiritual self-control he loses all his inner unity. "The horses," as Plato puts it, "of the soul's chariot pull different ways." The man grows double-minded, his various faculties come in conflict with each other; and moral anarchy leads to mental distortion and physical disease.

The eighth chapter which deals with the Sacraments will likewise be found to be rich in stimulating, though sometimes debatable, material. We are not so sure that those who are familiar with the Tridentine controversy on the nature of sacramental efficacy will be altogether satisfied with the passing reference (p. 150) to certain views which were at one time powerful for much mischief in the Church, but which have since, happily, disappeared from the Catholic consciousness.

We shall not be thought ungracious, we hope, if we venture to point out an habitual defect—we should not like to call it a vice—of much of Dr. Illingworth's writing, with which we are sometimes tempted to lose patience. While he is variously if luminously allusive in manner, as is inevitable, perhaps, in a widely read thinker, and while he shows a power of succinct exposition that is wholly admirable, he betrays at times a readiness to confound mere illustration with argument, and a proneness to find in picturesque metaphor a substitute for more exact thought, which must be fatal to his complete usefulness as a theological guide. But those of our readers who will be interested in his books will doubtless know how to pick a cautious way over these perilous places in his plea for "the things that are more excellent in the ethics of the ancient faith.',

CORNELIUS CLIFFORD.

The Sacrifice of the Mass: An Historical and Doctrinal inquiry into the Eucharistic Sacrifice.—By VERY REV. ALEX. MACDONALD, D. D. V. G. New York: Christian Press Association Publishing Company, 1905.

In a little book consisting of 99 pages and an appendix, the author of the recent work on "The Symbol of the Apostles" endeavors to treat this difficult subject of the Catholic doctrine of the Mass. In the words of the *Prefatory Note*, his purpose (or one of his purposes) is to "clarify the traditional Catholic conception of the Holy Mass as being identically the same Sacrifice once offered in the Last Supper and on Calvary," and from his own point of view he has certainly succeeded. We say "from his own point of view," for throughout he takes the position of those who hold to the "immolation" theory of the Sacrifice, which he defends in the opening chapters against the School which would make the essence of sacrifice to consist in *offering*. This part of the book gives too one-sided a presentation of the question at issue. Instead of going to its classic defenders for a statement of the theory in question, he contents himself with the one found in Mortimer: "*The Eucharistic Sacrifice*" pp. 33-34. Then the very weakest arguments in favor of it are mentioned and of course are easily shown to be either unsound or even capable of being adduced in support of his own position. It should be remembered that this view of sacrifice (which is not at all "modern") is one which is growing in favor among Catholic theologians, and can reckon among its adherents names more honorable than even those of Wilhelm and Scannell, or of Dr. Schanz. It is also one which is being applied now-a-days, and with no small success, to our notions of the Redemption, and on this account, as well as by reason of its immediate bearing on the present subject, it deserves a consideration far more careful than that given it by Dr. MacDonald.

The author's remarks (pp. 26, 27) on the abuse of arguments from etymology suggest a really good argument against his adversaries, to which he might have alloted some of the space that he wasted on other "refutations." The quotation from St. Ambrose, as given on p. 37, seems rather to tell against his position than for it. Then, the sentences on pp. 75-76, on the creation of the human soul, would need a little alteration to bring them into line with the accepted doctrine of our own time.

Apart from these defects we welcome the book as, if not an important, at least a useful, contribution to the study of the Theology of the Holy Eucharist, especially for those who, like the majority of ecclesiastical students, must be content with receiving their data in large measure at second hand.

EDWIN RYAN.

Ernest Renan—By WILLIAM BARRY, D. D. Chas. Scribner's Sons: New York, 1905.

It is hard to imagine a higher compliment to a man's breath and fairness of mind than that paid to Dr. Barry by the eminent editor of *Literary Lives* in selecting him to write the life of Ernest Renan. The remarkably fine work he had done on the *Cardinal Newman* (by far the best study in the series thus far) had no doubt much to do with determining his selection, but it remains none the less a striking indication of broad-mindedness—in the editor as well as in the author—that a Catholic priest most prominent as a defender of his faith, should be chosen to write the literary life of one who was "un prêtre manqué," and who is considered by many as the most hurtful adversary of Christianity during the past century.

It is needless to say that Dr. Barry's work will not be a disappointment to his readers, nor, presumably, to his editor. He has scored another success. The nature of the task assigned to him called for a preponderance of the element of literary criticism, but it is a literary criticism that is vital and personal which he gives us. It goes back of form and style, and enters into the man and the ideas for which he stands. This is always a delicate task, made more so in this instance by the danger of suspicion of prejudice on account of the strong divergence of view between the French writer and his critic. But Dr. Barry performs his task in such a way that even the hostile-minded reader will find his positions, if not convincing, at least impartial and ably sustained. Not that he makes the mistake of effacing himself and his own convictions in order to secure the appearance of impartiality. He gives us what we most desire to get—the judgment of a broad, cultivated, and earnest mind on the work of an illustrious thinker with whose conclusions he does not agree. The fact is not obtruded on the reader, but a Catholic priest wrote this book. There is, however, not the slightest trace of *odium theologicum* in it. Nor are there any gibes, or sneers, or imputations of false motives, which are too frequently found in the estimates passed by men on those who disagree with them on points of belief, religious or other.

In fact, in dealing with the great crisis in Renan's life which ended in his loss of Christian faith, Dr. Barry's attitude is one of sympathy. There is in his struggle at this time an element of moral earnestness which appeals strongly to his biographer. "The awkward pensive student holds us by the heartstrings; when he gives up his vocation, we suffer with him as in a catastrophe where the whole man succumbs." Dr. Barry believes that the shipwreck of the young student's faith was not due to his Oriental studies so much as to his acceptance while still a student at Issy, of principles of philosophy incompatible with religious belief.

It is with sadness that the biographer chronicles the evidences of a steadily growing decay of mental and moral earnestness shown in Renan's writings as life went on. As for his life itself, it was beyond serious reproach. Naturally industrious, genial and domestic, he seems to have been free from many of the temptations which ruin the career of others. But when he lost his faith, he lost more than positive religion. His anchor and compass were gone, and henceforth he was to float aimlessly through uncharted seas. A mental career that began with austere devotion to Truth ended in doubt as to whether truth or morality are more than mere names for illusions. "We may watch this fine intellect losing its grasp on reality in proportion as it loses its moral earnestness." He becomes "the newest Abelard, setting in parrallel phases the 'Yea and Nay' of a spirit essentially incoherent." And, commenting on the ethical positions of the *Abbess of Jouarre,* Dr. Barry sadly remarks: "We cannot but see in all this the dissolution of a soul which was originally destined to enlighten the world."

Dr. Barry agrees with the general opinion that Renan's position in the ranks of authorship is due to his style rather than to his scholarship. Of his style, indeed, he has no words of praise which seem to him sufficient. But of his originality as a scholar he has this to say:

> "It is significant that, whether dealing with Old Testament or New, not a hint drops from his pen which has proved fertile of undiscovered truths regarding either. He waits upon the Germans, Baur or Strauss or Wellhausen, from whose conjectures he may glean for his poetry of the Bible. He has cleared up no difficulties, started no investigations, fixed no disputable points of custom or language. His contribution to the Gospel is a dissolving view where the hallucinated writer infects with his fancies a reader who is taken by delightful words."

Dr. Barry is particularly happy in his selection of men with whom to compare, or contrast, Renan—his fellow-Bretons, Abelard, Chateaubriand and Lamennais, also Pascal, Voltaire, and of course, Cardinal Newman—men whose lives, widely different as they were, all agreed in this, that they centered, for good or ill, around the Catholic Church. The comparison with Newman is one that suggests itself to everyone. Mr. Wilfred Ward has treated it in admirable style in an essay in his *Problems and Persons.* A portion of Dr. Barry's study of these two men is so quotable, and sums up so admirably certain of his final judgments on Renan that we cannot forbear giving it here:

> "Newman is a Mystic, Renan a Rationalist. To Newman his conscience makes known a present Deity; but to Renan it is a human invention without echo in the heights or the depths. The one enlarges on the 'ventures of faith'; by the other we are warned not to be dupes of our better feelings. Prayer is the philosophy on which Newman feeds his mind; to Renan prayer has become absurd, for what is it more than talking to oneself? Reverence, adoration, shame and holy fear betoken that the one is face to face with a Supreme Judge, in whose kindness he revives, under whose frown he wastes away. The other sees no intellect superior to his own, reveres no divinity; suppresses the idea of sin; loses the delicacy of feeling which protects all exquisite virtue; and writes his page in the scandalous chronicle of French letters.
>
> With Newman, learning, style, eloquence, are but means to a nobler end; he is always intent on religion, even when he comes down to a school-master's exercises. But Renan, who began at the same starting-point, turns all this another way. The lowest knowledge is the only real truth; art loses its former interest; religion is a

pretty make-believe, ethics a lottery, life itself an entertainment. Thus, to the meditative Newman things eternal grow more and more vivid; as he realizes the Divine attributes, man takes on him grander proportions, becomes the heir of infinite hopes and is called to heroic deeds. The golden key of personality unlocks doors which remain obstinately barred when the Parisian science beats upon them. In such a way is absolute negation met by no less resolute assertion. But the denials that scatter Renan's philosophy to the four winds leaving him the wreck of his own fancies, cannot have much to commend them since all his wonderful endowments do not avail to save him from incoherence and despair. In one word, Newman has found Jesus, Renan has lost Him."

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

This number of THE NEW YORK REVIEW opens with an article by the Reverend GEORGE TYRRELL, S. J. Father Tyrrell is an Irishman, a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, a convert to the faith, and for more than twenty years, has been a member of the Society of Jesus. He has taught at Malta, and at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst. Since 1896, he has been attached to the "Domus Scriptorum" of the English Province of the Society. His present address is St. Francis Xavier's, Richmond, Yorkshire. His published works are: *Nova et Vetera*, a collection of informal meditations; *Hard Sayings*, also bearing on the spiritual life; *External Religion: Its Use and Abuse*; *Lex Orandi*, which bears on Apologetics; and *The Faith of the Millions*, a two volume work formed by selection of articles written for the *Month*, the *American Catholic Quarterly*, and the *Ecclesiastical Review*. He has also written articles and reviews for various other periodicals in England and America.

Father Tyrrell's work is so well known that comment on it seems well-nigh superfluous. His labors lie principally in the two fields of spirituality and apologetics. For him, indeed, these two fields are adjacent and unfenced. In ascetics, he stands for sincere and personal religion, which combines the direct action of grace with the work of the Holy Spirit in the Universal Church. In apologetics, he is the principal English exponent of the school of "immanence" which finds the most striking proof for Christian truth in the experience of the aspiring soul, and in observation of the results of Christianity in individuals, and in the moral and social order. His logical position is, naturally, a voluntaristic one, similar to that held, in different ways, by such thinkers as Scotus, Kant, and Newman. When he touches on the purely rational or "intellectual" side of principles or facts, he is in favor of the most honest and thorough treatment of them. Since John Henry Newman laid down his pen, we have had no Catholic writer in English superior to Father Tyrrell in originality of thought, fertility of expression, and all-prevading sense of religion.

The Rev. JOHN T. DRISCOLL received his elementary education in the schools of Albany, New York, his native city. In 1885 he graduated with the highest honors at Manhattan College, being then in his nineteenth year; and after studying for four years at the Troy Theological Seminary, he was ordained to the priesthood in 1889. His brilliant career and studious habit of mind had attracted the attention of his superiors, and he was selected to make a thorough and more advanced course at the Catholic University, which was then about to be opened, and he entered that institution as a pioneer student. There he remined for two years, receiving successively the degree of S. T. B. and S. T. L., the former being the first degree ever conferred by the University. For three years Father Driscoll taught the philosophical branches in the Theological Seminary at Brighton, Massachusetts, and for several seasons he has been a regular lecturer at the Plattsburg Summer School. His principal philosophical works thus far published are his two treatises, entitled respectively: *Christian Philosophy: the Human Soul*, and *Christian Philosophy: God*. At present Father Driscoll is pastor of the church at Fonda, N. Y., in the diocese of Albany.

WENDELL S. REILLY, D. D., was born in Sherbrooke, in the Province of Quebec, in 1875. After being graduated from Sherbrooke College, he took up his studies for the priesthood in the "Grand Séminaire," Montreal. His course there was supplemented by three years' work at the Institut Catholique, in Paris where he received the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology. Another year was spent at St. Austin's College, Washington, D. C., as a student at the Catholic University of America. He has taught in St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, and is at present professor of Scripture and Hebrew in St. John's Seminary, Brighton, Mass. He has made a special study of the subject he has chosen for his present article, and we hope to be able, in the near future, to offer contributions from him on the still more important topic of the bearing of the famous Canon of St. Vincent on modern theories of doctrinal development.

M. l' Abbé JOSEPH TURMEL was born at Rennes, in Brittany, in 1859. In 1882, at the age of twenty-three, he was ordained to the priesthood. Right after his ordination, he was called to the Chair of Fundamental Theology in the "Grand Seminaire" of his native city. This position he held for five years, discharging its duties so ably that at the end of that period he was made professor of Dogmatic Theology. In 1892, after ten years as professor, he retired from the work of teaching, and accepted a chaplaincy in Rennes, in order to devote his whole time to research work and authorship. He has written a compendious *Histoire de la Théologie Positive depuis l'origine jusqu 'au Concile de Trente*, and various other works, including *Histoire du dogme du péché originel; Essai sur le livre de Daniel*, etc. But his favorite outlet for his activities is through religious periodicals. All readers of the scholarly *Revue d'Histoire et des Questions Religieuses* are familiar with his work.

We are happy to announce that M. TURMEL has agreed to become a steady contributor to THE NEW YORK REVIEW. We are glad, for the honor of Catholic scholarship, to be able to present to the English-reading public, work of the kind that M. Turmel produces—learned, lucid, honest, objective. The casual reader may not be attracted by this kind of work, but he will find it useful for reference, and, if he be "of the household," he will rejoice with us in the assurance that scholars of all faiths and of none will find proof in the thorough studies of this modest chaplain, that the Catholic Church is not lacking in *savants* of the first magnitude.

The article on *St. Justin Martyr*, which we offer in this issue is only the first—and least important—section of a study of that great apologist of the Early Church. This REVIEW welcomes these studies on one who, when our now ancient Faith was comparatively new, took up the task of making its doctrines acceptable to the thoughtful men of his day. Moreover, there is no line of study, excepting, perhaps, that of Holy Scripture, which attracts more general attention to-day than Early Church literature, and M. Turmel's work will lie mainly in this field. His favorite method is that of presentation rather than of explanation or theory, since he possesses the confidence that when all the facts are clearly stated, the divine and ever-living authority of the Church of Christ will be shown as the sole power to perpetuate revealed truth and solve the difficulties of mankind in varying ages of human thought. If we had five hundred men like him working at our early literature with all the resources of modern scholarship, and half a dozen keen intellects engaged in formulating the development theory, we are confident that one set of the problems which confront us to-day could be solved by this generation in favor of the claims of the Church Catholic.

The REV. GABRIEL OUSSANI was born in Bagdad, in Babylonia, in the year 1875. His earlier studies were pursued in the Patriarchal Seminary at Mossrul (ancient Ninive) in Mesopotamia, where he took up classical Arabic, Syriac, Turkish and French. During this period, the impression made on him by his visits to the ruins of Babylonia and Assyria determined his future course of studies. After his extensive travels through the Levant countries, he went in 1891 to the College of the Propaganda, Rome, where he continued his linguistic studies, and took up philosophy and theology.

After his ordination in 1900, he came to the United States, where his family had already made their home. In order to continue his Oriental studies, he entered Johns Hopkins University, where he took up work under the direction of the distinguished scholar, Dr. Paul Haupt. A year later he was appointed Fellow in Semitic Languages at the same University, with the prize of $500. After holding a fellowship there for three years, he went to New York, where he has been active as professor of Hebrew and lecturer on Oriental History and Biblical Archæology at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, and also as professor of Latin and of Italian at the Cathedral College, New York.

Dr. Oussani is a member of the New York Oriental Club, and of the American Oriental Society. In the Journal of the latter organization, he has published several articles on Oriental topics. Some of his studies appear in the *Johns Hopkins University Circulars* of 1903-4. He has also contributed to the Chicago *Open Court*, and various other periodicals.

CATHOLICITY AND SOME ELEMENTS IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE

William L. Sullivan, C. S. P.

We are becoming every day more familiar with the thesis that the proofs of religion must appeal not merely to man's intellect, but to his entire concrete personality. A school of apologists has risen up and grown strong in the Catholic Church, who are calling our attention to other human needs over and above the need of the pure reason for logical verification. We are reminded that men in investigating religion do not ascend into some third heaven of speculation, there to balance rival theories and arrive at a conclusion without having once set foot upon solid ground or opened their eyes upon the customary course and environment of their lives; but that in coming to the practical judgment that such and such a religion is true, they are influenced by a great number of non-speculative elements, such as impulses of will, necessities of the moral sense, intimations of conscience, aspirations of the affections, and many others of a similar scope and tendency. Subordinate to reason though these influences are, they are nevertheles of very great importance for both the speculative and practical life of man, and often in the casting up of arguments and the weighing of probabilities, theirs may be the final voice which determines choice and prescribes conduct. Since, then, they have so large a share in the complex act of assent to religious doctrine, religion must appeal to them, conciliate and satisfy them. In pursuance of this view of the wider meaning of apologetics, a new literature is appearing from such men as MM. Fonsegrive and Blondel, P. Laberthonnière and Father Tyrrell, and along with it is proceeding a revival of older works of like method and spirit, as the *Grammar of Assent* of Cardinal Newman, *La Certitude Morale* of Ollé-Laprune, and the writings of Maine de Biran and P. Gratry.

With the strictly philosophical problems involved in this system this article is not concerned. My purpose in mentioning this new school of philosophers is merely to direct attention to the non-speculative side of personality on which they justly lay so much stress, in order that I may indicate an important element of it which is often overlooked. I refer to that element in human character, that stamp of mind, that set of sympathies and prepossessions which come from one's country, age and civilization. Surely it is no slight influence which these accidental conditions of existence exert upon us. The law of environment holds in the moral and social order as in the physical. If the body has been modified by its surroundings, why should not mind and will be correspondingly affected by theirs? Has democracy, for example, produced no effect upon our American character, and given no new bent to our personality, no color to our thoughts, no direction to our hopes, no point to our antipathies? Will not this influence of our country's spirit and traditions have something to say about the religion which the American people will profess? And ought not this spirit and these traditions to be taken into reckoning, and to a certain extent at least, appealed to, by any religion which hopes to prevail in the United States? The right answer to questions like these is obvious to everyone. Of course our country's genius and civilization have affected us; no other human influence has sunk deeper into our hearts. And undoubtedly a religious system which hopes to take permanent hold here must respect them, and show, at the very least, that it does not oppose them. Small profit would it be to any religious teacher or apologist, if after having listened to his arguments a fair-minded man were to say: "I cannot answer the intellectual arguments with which you support your religion; but nevertheless I cannot sympathize with it because I consider it opposed, if not radically, at least in its practical working, to the spirit of this age and the traditions of my country." While in that state of mind, this man might never be converted to the religion in question, for the reason that the graver judgments of life proceed, not from an intellect which is silenced, but from an entire personality which is conciliated and won.

There exists, then, in all but exceptional men a mental attitude which has been fashioned by contemporary civilization, and it is through the medium of this attitude that the ordinary man will view many of the higher interests of life, including religion itself. Consequently, it is by falling in with this peculiar temper of a people's mind that religion will call forth respect and good-will, and ultimately elicit allegiance and assent.

Considerations of this sort should have some meaning for all of us, who, in one way or another, are spokesmen for Catholicity in this age and country where our lot is cast. It will not be enough to address the pure reason of our contemporaries, by showing them the strong intellectual foundation of the faith. Once more let us say it, intellect is not the sole element of human personality which religion must satisfy. We must show—and this is the point of this paper—that Catholicity besides being reasonable and logical, is also not opposed to, but on the contrary helps and safeguards the just and lawful spirit and aspirations of this progressive, independent and liberty-loving people.

What is the use of speaking of such a thing? someone may ask. Why urge us to do what there is no need of doing, of showing what is plainer than the light of day? Do we all not know that the good and true spirit of every age and country is in harmony with genuine Catholicity and cannot possibly come into collision with it? Yes, I answer, *we* know this. *We* feel sure that our religion when rightly understood, will satisfy every just demand of humanity and will conflict with none. But it is eminently worth our while nevertheless to give thought to the issue just outlined, for the very good reason that it is precisely upon this ground that the most prevalent and pernicious objection to Catholicity is based to-day. We cannot understand it too well. The chief difficulty to the progress of the Catholic religion is not on the score of doctrine, but in the name of civilization. The commonest admission we hear from non-Catholics is that the Church's scheme of dogma is marvelously compact and coherent, so that if its first premiss is allowed, the ultimate conclusion irresistibly follows. But equally common with this concession is a criticism which frustrates all good that might come of it, namely, that Catholicism, despite its speculative strength and spiritual attractiveness, is opposed to the spirit of modern times and free peoples.

It may seem to us strange that so fatal an importance should be attributed to this objection. For is not Catholicity incomparably fit to enlarge, enrich and sanctify the entire life and personality of man? Has it not all through its history gone before the race to break open new paths of progress, and to point out higher ideals, so that men might become, from age to age, not only more holy, but more cultured and more free? Catholicity is the mother of chivalry; she has created a mysticism; she has inspired a poetry; she has imprinted her fair image upon unequalled canvases and incomparable cathedrals; she weaves about the lot of her humblest children a vesture of beauty, dignity, purity and mystery; and she opens to loftier spirits her homes of solitude and prayer where her saints have learned the deep secrets of the Kingdom of God and left illustrious memories that quicken and inspire the world. Rich, indeed, and warm and all-embracing is the ancient faith, and she has shed a loveliness upon the earth like that which shone upon the pathway of the Son of God. No one that has ever known her but has felt within his soul an impression that can never die. No one that has ever left her but has despaired of looking upon her like again.

Why, then should Catholicity be said to-day to stand in the way of human progress, and to menace those social, educational and patriotic aspirations which are making for a higher and wider life through equality, freedom and enlightenment? Does not such a charge arise from some terrible misconception? and can it be sustained and propagated by any other means than flagrant misrepresentation? Misconception there has certainly been and misrepresentation manifold. But let us pass these over for the present, since our main purpose is not to investigate origins that lie far in the past, but to deal with a condition that confronts us to-day. Our first plain duty is to look this grave obstacle in the face and to give our best thought and endeavor to the removal of it. If we disregard it, or, far worse, if our conduct as Catholics gives verisimilitude to it, vain will be our dogmatic demonstrations, vain our logic and skill in argument. Until we completely win the good and lawful sympathies and aspirations which spring from the soil of our age and country,—and there is only one way of winning them, that is by act and behavior; talking will not avail for the purpose—our missionary enterprises among our fellow-Americans will be paralyzed, and their results therefore comparatively insignificant. We have then no duty that is more sacred or more urgent than to impress upon our contemporaries, those within as well as those without the Church, that true Catholicity is opposed to no worthy hope or achievement of humanity; that it rejoices to behold all men more cultivated and free; that it has no political theories or social schemes to set over against the rational spirit and institutions of any country in the world; and that its sole wish and endeavor is to lead all peoples to the perfect truth and grace of Christ.

The accusation that we are speaking of is not by any means modern or new. The Reformation was propagated by it. It was dinned into the ears of the German people from the sixteenth century on that the great conflict with Rome was a fight for independence, self-government and self-respect. One of the mock litanies bawled in the streets of Wittenburg in Luther's time contained the invocation: "*A tyrannide Italianorum libera nos Germanos Domine!*" In England the change of religion was again largely and even pre-dominantly effected on the similar pretext of preserving individual rights and safe-guarding national liberties. And from that time to the present, from the Spanish Armada to the Syllabus, the cry has been passed along that Rome is opposed to intelligence and liberty and cannot be reconciled with democracy. If to-day the charge is less bitterly and ostentatiously flung against us, it is nevertheless as deep and tenacious in the popular mind of England and Germany as it was 300 years ago. And so far as the United States is concerned, a similar feeling toward the Church, however courteously concealed it generally is, is here also widespread and profound.

It may be well to give point to these observations by considering one or two features of the national temperament of the United States which are often made the basis of this species of objection. We are an intensely democratic nation, and it is as a cornerstone of democracy that there shall be no silenced and suppressed minorities. Owing to the sovereign place that is held in our national life by public opinion, minorities must be heard, their principles considered, their remonstrances respectfully received. We abhor the idea of a sullen discontent that is smothered from legitimate expression by the heavy hand of authority. We love candor, respectful independence, and the canvass of varying views. And short as our history is, it is long enough to show that this sort of freedom is no detriment to the sanctity of authority and does not diminish reverential obedience to law. Now this element of our civilization is turned against us Catholics in the common charge that public opinion has no place among us, and that we are cowed into abject timidity by an all-embracing clerical autocracy. The objection is not against the hierarchical constitution of the Church as such; nor is it intended as a reproach to that profound respect for authority which is so distinctly Catholic a virtue. But rather it would make out that in open and lawfully discussable questions we are habitually frightened about speaking out our mind. lest we utter some word that would be unwelcome to this or that cleric; that our press is shut tight against the least freedom of view; that Catholics who do proffer suggestions are likely to be crushed in the act of speaking them and suspected forever after; and that as a natural result Catholics must repress all initiative, forfeit all hope of a sound and active public opinion, and cultivate a state of mind that is wholly opposed to the spirit of their time and environment.

We may be permitted to indicate two ways in which this objection may be answered; the first is by appeal to past history, the second is by the argument of present practice. So far as history is concerned, there is hardly a more conspicuous feature of the administrative side of Catholicity than its constant care to elicit public opinion and its earnest endeavor to give it consideration and respect. In the early Church, to which many look back rather than to the mediæval, as the golden age of Catholicity, the people were consulted and their racial and national prepossessions deferred to in a manner which could proceed only from the highest conceptions of the dignity of democracy. The ordinary faithful had even a voice in the election of bishops. Listen to Leo the Great prescribing the manner of choosing bishops: "Teneatur subscriptio clericorum, honoratorum testimonium, ordinis consensus et plebis. *Qui præfuturus est omnibus, ab omnibus eligatur.*" (*Ep.* 6 (10) *ad. Ep. Vien. Prov.*) When was the fundamental principle of democracy ever better expressed than in these last words: "A man who is to govern all, ought to be chosen by all." Yet all students of Church history know how thorough-going a Pope was Leo, and how energetically he vindicated the rights of the See of Peter. Again, the needs and wishes of the people were amply attended to by the frequent holding of provincial synods. This same Leo was strict in requiring of metropolitans that they hold two councils a year, a measure which obviously made inveterate abuses impossible and responded to necessities as soon as they arose. And finally the love of independence and the dislike of unnecessary outside interference, which are natural to all free men, were very candidly uttered in the early church by the people of various nations, and very deferentially respected by the Supreme Pastor at Rome. Of this the African councils are a classic illustration. In various ways that springtime of Catholicity saw great Popes and General Councils humanely thoughtful of the common people's rights and wishes, wisely regarding the great body of the Lord's believers as, in the words of the first Pope, a "*gens electa*," who, having received from Christ the royal gift of faith, merited from His representatives paternal confidence and fraternal love. I think that our historical scholars could do no greater service than by giving us books which would describe those early days and the men who lived in them; men who were so of devoted a faith and so sturdy an individuality, whose apology for their apostolic intrepidity is expressed in the sublime words of one of them: "Utor Catholicæ fidei libertate." (S. Leo I, *Ep.* 44, (156), *ad Leon. August.*)

In the course of history, public opinion continued to be cultivated in the Church, but its ordinary organ changed from *plebs* to *princeps*. The holding of frequent synods unfortunately fell into disuse; the popular element behind ecclesiastical legislation faded away; and with the incoming of the theocratic idea which underlies the mediaèval union of Church and State, kings instead of the populace became the spokesmen of the laity. Some will think that this change was deplorable; many maintain that it was necessary; but in any case the principle endures that the Church listens to those whom she governs and gives heed to their just grievances and legitimate requests. How far she yielded to public opinion as thus voiced from the lips of kings was startlingly brought home to us when in the late conclave the Emperor of Austria vetoed the nomination of Cardinal Rampolla to the Papacy. However out of date such an act seems, it was not a tyrannical usurpation at all, but in accordance with a recognized privilege long ago conceded by the Church to the more powerful Catholic sovereigns of Europe.

The charge therefore that public opinion has no standing in the Catholic system is completely refuted by the history of the Church. It may indeed happen that during a period of transition from one mode of expressing public opinion to another, there appears to be some loss and retrogression from a democratic standpoint. Possibly we are in such a period now when civilized mankind want not even a royal spokesman to represent them, but prefer to declare their own wishes in their own words. But such transitions the Church has always happily made; and if she is confronting a new one at this moment, we have every assurance that she will pass through it to her greater advantage and prestige. She will undoubtedly listen again in this age as she listened of old time, under the first Leo and the first Gregory, to the will of the people speaking for themselves; and once more she will show herself amenable to their just petitions and legitimate complaints.

But our answer to this objection will not be final, and our conciliation of the mental attitude from which it arises will make little progress, if we confine ourselves to arguments drawn from ages far distant from, and states of civilization radically opposed to our own. We shall also have to show by our practical action that we Catholics possess all the advantages of a wholesome public opinion; that we hold in good repute the organs and men that give it utterance; that along with our traditional deference to established powers, we cultivate true initiative and vigorous individuality; that we allow even our minorities the right to speak; and that we maintain our splendid external uniformity without any element of legitimate discontent which has been thrust back into sullen silence by the hand of heedless authority. It is not likely that we shall misuse such independence. The use of liberty best teaches how to exercise it; and at all events it would be to our advantage to suffer from an occasional excess of freedom rather than by the opposite defect to alienate ourselves from our age, and nourish unrest and revolt within our household. It seems proper therefore to say that in questions wherein we are not from the nature of the case definitely forbidden to speak, we should expect and welcome divergent views, and allow them fair expression in a free and fearless press. This, not to speak of other advantages, will be the best and healthiest means for preventing precipitous action, and for frustrating the undue pretensions of any party or cabal.

Besides this matter of cultivating and giving fair field to public opinion, there are other elements in the national life around us which are fitted into the same general accusation that the Church is ill at ease in the presence of modern civilization. We have space only for the bare mention of one of these elements. Our country, like every other nation of free men, is deeply impressed with what we may call a sense of national individuality. That is to say, we Americans fully realize that our form of government and general temperament as a people differ widely from those of past centuries, and indeed find but few resemblances among the polities and peoples of to-day. Knowingly and willingly we have cut away from those older forms, believing that the spirit and constitution of this Republic are the best expression of popular government yet put forth by man, and convinced, with that sense of destiny which is so vital a factor in the American mind, that just as we are, and because of what we are, we are called to do a vast and holy work for the uplifting and progress of mankind. Needless to say we Catholics enter heartily, joyously, and unconditionally into this pride of country and into these hopes for her future. How potent the proof of our sympathy is, the pages of our history will tell to whosoever reads them.

Little less than monstrous we must designate it that there should be any slightest suspicion of our whole-hearted American spirit. But since this paper is trying to face facts, let us face this fact also, that an impression is fixed in many minds around us that Catholics look to other ages, other lands and other civilizations for a practically desirable government from which ours in some way or another is considered to fall short. And—so this objection might be put, and in fact often is put—some representatives of the Catholic press bear out this impression, by frequently seizing upon unfortunate but accidental features of our national life, such as divorces, lynchings, and murders, and with these things as a pretence, sneer at our civilization as a whole and decry the patriotic pride and expectation which lie close to the nation's heart. This is to create an insidious un-Americanism and to hinder the progress of that loyal good-will and righteous public sentiment which will ultimately destroy those blemishes or greatly diminish them.

Naturally we are indignant at such an imputation; but better than expressing indignation will be demonstrating by our practical action that the charge is unfounded and false. That action will consist first in taking every proper occasion to give utterance to our patriotism. We should not fear to speak such sentiments as Bishop Spalding voiced a few years ago in Rome before an audience which included many who misunderstood our country, and, some, no doubt, who had no good-will toward her. American Catholics, said the Bishop, hold sacred the government and constitution under which they live, and have not the semblance of a wish to see any change in either. It is true there is no need of, and no sense in talking patriotism without end or purpose. But for all that, it is a subject that we ought to speak of a great deal. There is a sanctity in patriotism; and exhortations to love of country come with peculiar fitness from lips that are consecrated to preaching the love of God. Then, with an earnest spirit of co-operation in all purposes for the common good; with cordial help for all public beneficences; with unpurchasable courage in denouncing corruption in city, State or nation; and with steadfast resistance to any tendency which would set us apart and aloof from the general life of our country, we shall not be long in overcoming an unjust suspicion and refuting an ill-founded charge. I do not say that we have been remiss in these respects, but simply that we shall do well to recognize the need of the specific private and public action just outlined, in order to destroy a prejudice which is doing harm to the general cause of religion and truth.

The points aimed at in this paper may thus be summarized in conclusion: (1) There exists in the minds of the people around us certain legitimate prepossessions which result from the spirit of our age and the type of our civilization; (2) if our religion is to prosper in this country it must show that between its teachings and general spirit on the one side and those prepossessions on the other, there is and can be no conflict; (3) however, at the present time, there is a widespread impression that there is such a conflict; (4) therefore, it is our duty as Catholics to show by voice and pen, and, above all, by act and conduct, that we are one with our country, flesh of its flesh, and spirit of its spirit; and that we should abhor any tendency, did such at any time appear, which should wear an alien look, or should aim at congregating us into a separate colony aloof and alone.

To establish and extend the Kingdom of God is the sole reason of the Church's existence. To that great end all spiritual energies should be directed, and for it no sacrifice should be refused. The saddest pages of history are those which tell how often this heavenly purpose has been frustrated by misconceptions of the spirit of an age and the temper of a people. A similar misfortune must not happen here!

William L. Sullivan.

THE "DOGMATIC" READING OF HISTORY

George Tyrrell, S. J.

The Christian tradition incorporates a certain reading of history with which modern historical criticism finds itself frequently in conflict. To mitigate this conflict some apologists insist plausibly on the comparative indifference of religion to history as such; they point out, for example, that as far as the religious significance is concerned it matters nothing whether Christ's ascent into Heaven be taken as a fact or as a prophetic vision. The same may be said of his descent into Hell, of his session at the Father's right hand, of His re-descent to judgment; and if we ask: "Why not, therefore, of His resurrection, of His miraculous birth?" their principle provides no answer.

By this method of defense the sceptic is pardonably reminded of that allegorizing of popular beliefs or myths which marked the passing of the Homeric faith, or he thinks of the Philonian volatilizing of the Old Testament folk-lore. He will agree with the orthodox opponents of the same system that Christianity so interpreted may still have great practical worth as a philosophy in symbol, as a guide to life, as an expression of religious, ethical and æsthetic ideals, but that it is no longer "historical Christianity."

The orthodox, following the lines of Augustine, and especially of his exegesis of the fourth Gospel, admit (perhaps too readily) that it is the spirit, the religious and moral value, of the Gospel history which quickens, that the flesh, the letter, the history-value, profits nothing; but that nevertheless the flesh is the organ and vehicle and pledge of the spirit; that whatever "might have been" in the abstract, yet in the concrete God has chosen to speak to us by the symbolism of deeds and facts rather than by that of visions and parables. Whence the inevitable conclusion that certain matters of fact and history as such belong directly to the very substance of the Christian revelation and are to be believed with divine faith, and if need be in the teeth of criticism, part of whose territory is thus brought under the double, and possibly conflicting, jurisdiction of faith and science. In the event of conflict, faith claims precedence; and this claim is vindicated either on "intellectualist" lines, by proving that the testimony of an omniscient and absolutely veracious witness vouches for the facts in question, or on moral lines, by showing that they are inextricably bound up with the sovereign interests of our moral and spiritual life, as part and parcel of the religion by which we live.

Between the new apologists who would save Christianity from the conflict with criticism at the risk of raising it up into the clouds, and those who would treat sacred traditions somewhat profanely as instruments of detailed historical criticism; or, in other words, between those who deny and those who affirm that we can settle historical particulars through divine faith independently of natural methods, there is, I venture to suggest, a plausible *via media* which ought to be reckoned with.

Although we may have no right to look for a precise, point for point agreement between (what I may call) the "dogmatic" reading or construction of history, and the scientific reading of the same; although we may not at once use separate points of sacred tradition as so many historical arguments; yet the truth of Christianity requires that in its entirety the "dogmatic" reading of history should be true to the scientific, in much the same way that the artistic idealization of an episode, its dramatic or poetic treatment should be substantially true to fact.

In brief elucidation of this position let me say that by the "scientific reading of history" I mean that determination of the bare order and connection of events in time and place which is prior to all discussion of their inward meaning and connection, and which for the historian[1] is an end in itself, an independent interest, prosecuted according to the rules of evidence. In "the dogmatic reading of history" the arrangement of events is not sought for its own sake, nor according to the principles of scientific history.

That matters of fact are often ascertained otherwise than according to such principles cannot well be denied. Without recourse to the rare and perhaps abnormal phenomena of clairvoyance; or building too much on the apparent divinations of animal instinct, we can point to a faculty of perfectly natural divination in man, a sagacity equivalent to intuition which enables him, as it were *a priori* and independently of all historico-critical investigation, to determine, with varying measure of inerrancy, matters of fact beyond the range of his direct experience. Nor does it affect my contention to admit that this "feeling" of the truth may be at root an unconscious complex inference from an infinity of unformulated premisses. It is enough that it evades all possibility of critical analysis and justification.

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[1] I am conscious here of using the word "historian" somewhat improperly for one whose science is really subordinate to history, for one who collects the materials out of which historical constructions are to be built by which they must be criticized and checked. His search requires, no doubt, a philosophy of evidence and therefore of human nature and is not independent of presuppositions. Nor is the positivist ideal of "objectivity" coherent. Bnt the aim of the historical critic is not construction, but the criticism of constructions whether prospective or finished. He tells the historian proper what materials are sound, what suspicious or worthless.

Assuming that the Divine Will is the root and the immanent cause of the whole universe and of the process of human history, a process by which the Ideal, "that which ought to be," is endeavoring gradually to realize itself, it follows that a perfectly sympathetic understanding of "that which ought to be" applied to an adequate information as to existing facts and conditions would serve as a principle of historical divination as to the past and the future; and that the said divination becomes fallible just in the measure that sympathy with the Divine Will (the Ought-Judgment) or information as to existing conditions (the Fact-Judgment) is defective. Every Ought-Judgment is of course relative to certain hypothetical facts and conditions, whose existence and reality is the object of the Fact-Judgment.

From the strictly historico-critical standpoint the inference from the Ideal to the Actual; from what ought to have happened, to what did happen; is as irrelevant as any other sort of divination or prophecy. Yet perhaps no other form of divination has had more to do with the reconstruction of the past in pre-critical times. In the realm of hagiography its license has been almost unfettered; and there accordingly its methods are best studied. Thus we have *a priori* biographies of the Virgin, of St. Joseph, or St. Anne, etc., written in all good faith, with no conscious mendacity—though doubtless with no adequate sense of the requirements of truth. Starting with certain fixed dogmatic assumptions and with certain unquestioned devout sentiments, the writer arranges and supplements the loose conflicting traditions he finds to hand in accordance with what his religion and his conscience tell him *ought* to have happened.

The actual worthlessness of such legends does not affect the contention that, were the Ought-Judgments and the Fact-Judgments correct, the inferences from them would be valid and that it is; only because such correctness is never attainable that *a priori*, or prophetic, history can never yield certainty in matters of detail, but must always be subject to historical criticism. The cogency of the "potuit; decuit; ergo fecit" argument is undeniable—if only the premises be verified.

When we turn to that religious reading of history that is incorporated in the Christian Tradition, it must be observed in the first place that the errors and deficiencies of the prophetic spirit in the individual, are in a great measure eliminated in a divination determined by, and proceeding from, the collective spirit of the entire religious community; and that this latter possesses all the authority of collective over individual experience. Nor is it only the Ought-Judgment but also the Fact-Judgment that is thus raised in value. Let us call this more or less authoritative divination the "dogmatic" reading of history, to distinguish it from that of the private individual. With a very important difference its relation to the critical reading of history is analogous to that of an artistic or dramatic rendering of some verifiable episode. We should not go to Shakespeare to determine some disputed point of history relating to the reign of John or of Richard III or of Henry VIII. Yet we recognize these plays as avowed idealizations, in the dramatic interest, of presupposed matters of fact; and this, with no certain internal principles of distinction between the facts and the idealization by which they are transfused. These facts are told us not strictly as they *did* happen, but rather as they *ought* to have happened had the dramatist been guiding history solely in the interest of drama. We recognize that interest as a principle of bias, of historical falsification, in the cause of greater dramatic truth. We know that correspondence with the bare order and external connection of events in time and place is quite a secondary, subordinate end; that the dramatic and the historic interests are different and at times hostile; that it is for the historian alone, by means of extrinsic criteria, to draw the line between the matter idealized and the idealization. The result therefore is a substantial, or *in globo*, correspondence which renders all inference from dramatic to historical particulars formally invalid but allows us to speak rightly of these plays as historical.

But whereas the poet, painter, or dramatist knows very well that history is not guided primarily in the artistic interest, and that he has no right whatever to attach any historical value to the idealization postulated by his art, or to argue from the æsthetic "ought" to the historical fact, the man of religious faith and hope rightly believes that the process of events is shaped ultimately in the interests of morality and religion, and that "what ought to be" so far as it is judged rightly, is identical with what is, has been, or will be. His uncertainty is as to the purity of his ideals and his acquaintance with the existing facts; not as to the general principle. If his interpretation is wrong he feels that it is saved in, and transcended by, the truth, as far as its religious value is concerned; an assurance which the dramatist in analogous circumstances has no business to feel. Hence his comparative recklessness, his sense of being under rather than over the religious truth of the matter; his too easy indifference to the rights of history. The motive of the "dogmatic" idealization of history is, of course, religious and not artistic; it is the effect of Hope; of the Wish to Believe; of a too impatient desire to see God's Will already done on earth as it is in heaven; to trace His presence and operation everywhere; to give a premature completeness to those designs which are spread out over the immensities of time and place far beyond the compass of our narrow experience.

If in the imperative interests of truth and therefore eventually of religion itself, this dogmatic reading of history needs to be continually opposed and corrected by historical criticism, yet on the other hand the mere sequence and external connection of events is barren of all fruit for human life without such a key to their inward truth and meaning as it is the office of religion to furnish; so that the dogmatic and the critical readings of history are needed to check and complete one another, each in its own order of truth.

For if superfluous and largely ineffectual as a guide to the external connection of events, the dogmatic reading of h story reaches a deeper order of truth, not merely in spite of, but because of, and through, its partial infidelity to bare fact, just as drama so often does. By his infidelities to fact the poet or dramatist gets at the secret heart of life, at the immanent spirit or will which seeks to objectify itself in the histories of men and peoples; and yet never finds adequate utterance therein. To seize the idea imperfectly uttered in facts and to give it more adequate utterance is the work of the artist. To be true to the idea he must be untrue to the facts. For the knowledge of "man," as distinct from knowledge "about men," Schopenhauer very rightly commends us to poetry rather than to history; to the dramatic rather than to the critical historian.[1]

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[1] *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.* Drittes Buch § 51

Owing to the narrowness of even our widest critical outlook and to the partial character of even the fullest evidence attainable, the true inward meaning and import of history may at any given moment be not only obscured from us, but perverted altogether, very much as may the sense of a sentence prior to its completion; or as the beauty of a sculptured figure arrested at some grotesque stage of its fashioning. In such case when the bias of Faith and Hope falsifies facts in order to make them a truer vehicle and expression of their inward meaning, it proceeds by a method directly inverse to that of the critic; and yet not without a justification analogous to that of artistic bias. Apologetic zeal, of the old-fashioned discursive sort, delighted in childishly one-sided arrangements of evidence from Nature in proof of the Goodness and Wisdom of God. However false to external facts, this idealization was truer to the deeper realities than perhaps a more critical presentment of the available evidence would have been. "Good" people have always delighted in moral rather than in veracious readings of history; in moral tales of virtue steadily rewarded and vice ever put to confusion. They have striven at all times to interpret history in all its details as evidence of a moral government, and have tried to anticipate the Day of Judgment to construct systems of Divine Justice out of the chaos of difficulties and perplexities offered by the spectacle of human life.

As fact-truth all such results may be ludicrously inadequate; as ought-truth or ideal-truth they may be, and mostly have been, far truer than an exact statement of available fact-truth could have been.

And so of what I called the "dogmatic" reading of history incorporated in the Christian Tradition—the idealization of facts effected by specifically Christian faith and hope in the collective mind of the communion of the faithful. As fact-truth, it is necessarily defective in detail in the interests of ought-truth, and it is for criticism gradually to determine the limits between the idealized matter and its idealization. There have been and there may yet be many capitulations to criticism on the part of theology; and yet the theologian will be justified in holding to the substantial fact-truth of the dogmatic reading of history. Between such beliefs as that in the existence and crucifixion of Christ on the one hand, and that in his session at the Father's right hand on the other, there are some whose exact degree of fact-truth may be matter of long and bitter dispute; but we can rest assured that their religious truth is proof against all assaults and that they are organically one with a creed whose incorporated reading of history is substantially true to the facts of time as well as to eternal realities. Is there not after all some danger in the abstract or methodic articulation of the creed; in treating each several, or rather severed, member of the organism as an independent object of faith, instead of finding that object in the whole presentment of God and man and Christ and their relations as set forth mystically, and therefore with some avowed degree of inexactness in the entire complexus of beliefs? And if it seems that we must determine certain fact-truths to be necessary elements of the historical core or substance of the Creed, let us distinguish carefully between "the substance of Christianity" and "the substance of some particular theologian's statement of Christianity"—for the two are by no means coincident. A particular theological construction may be ruined by a negation which leaves God on his throne unmoved; nor did the stars fall with the Ptolemaic system. In conclusion, the view here put forward, if not quite a truism, cannot claim to be new in substance or otherwise than in mode and emphasis; for we are already implicitly committed to the principles on which it rests. In dealing with the fact-value of the Messianic predictions, in pointing out their subsequent historical verification we have always been content with a substantial, or *in globo* correspondence between the prophecy and its fulfilment; we have allowed for the idealization of the prophetic spirit; we have admitted the right of historical criticism to determine the precise fact-value of those utterances; we have never dared to assert a point for point agreement between the enigmatic vision and the subsequent events. When we consider that the authority of the Creed is, on our own confession, that of a revelation, of a prophetic reading of history, shaped by a Christian sense of "what ought to be," and is not that of historico-critical principles, it is plainly indifferent whether the prophetic history relates to the past or to the future as far as its fact-value and interpretation are concerned.

Still it will always be for the Church herself to determine what is or is not of the *substance* of her "dogmatic" reading of history. Belief in herself as an historical religion implies her assurance that there are parts of her traditional history against which criticism will, as a fact, never prevail. Yet this assurance is grounded in faith, not in historical criticism. Were she, for the time, worsted by the latter on its own ground and with its own weapons, yet she would not yield without suicide, but must wait for criticism to correct itself. A complete indifference to and independence of all abstractly conceivable results of criticism is impossible on the part of a religion that claims to be historical.

G. Tyrrell.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAS, XL-LXVI.

II. Arguments Against the Isaianic Authorship.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The second part of the book of Isaias (chaps. xl-lxvi) begins without any indication whereby its authorship would be ascribed to another than that prophet of the eighth century B. C. And yet, it differs confessedly both from the prophetical part of the "First Isaias," and from the historical appendix (xxxvi-xxxix), which for some time marked the close of the then existing book of Isaias. The aim and general theme of the Deutero-Isaias[1] are stated in the two opening verses:

xl, 1. Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people,
Says your God.
2. Speak ye to the ears of Jerusalem,
And cry unto her:
That her time of affliction is come to an end,
That her guilt is forgiven,
That she has received from Yahweh's hand
Double for her sins.[2]

The purpose of Isai. xl-lxvi is consolatory, and the message it conveys is that of a speedy deliverance from severe, but too well-deserved punishment.[3] No such a thing can, of course, be pointed out with regard to Isai. i-xxxix.

Besides this general difference in purpose, many other variations in respect to contents, structure, style, etc., could be easily mentioned between the two main parts of the book of Isaias. Scholars of the day are well aware of them, but fail to view them in the same way. According to the defenders of the traditional position concerning authorship, all such differences are of little account, and should not prevent us from thinking that chaps. xl-lxvi are the work of the prophet

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[1] The expression "the Deutero-Isaias" should not be understood as implying that the author of chaps. xl-lxvi was also called Isaias; it simply indicates that they are usually regarded as an *independent* second part of the book of Isaias.

[2] The poetical divisions and textual emendations we will adopt in this paper, are mostly those advocated by A. Condamin, S. J., *le Livre d' Isaie.* (Paris, 1905).

[3] Cfr. Card. Meignan, *les Prophètes d' Israel.* p. 245 sq.

Isaias, who flourished under Achaz (735-727 B. C.), Ezechias (727-698 B. C.), and perhaps also under Manasses (698-644 B. C.) Advocates of the modern view, on the contrary, tell us that these are material differences, and that a due appreciation of them must lead one to reject the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi. Both opinions are beset with numerous and great difficulties, and on that account, the readers of THE NEW YORK REVIEW cannot expect us to define which is the true position. But they can none the less desire that, after having given and examined the principal grounds in favor of the traditional side, we should now deal in the same manner with the reasons set forth by supporters of the modern view. This we shall endeavor to do in the present paper with the care and fairness which such an important subject naturally demands.

In the eyes of those who reject the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi the strongest argument for their position is drawn from the historical background of these chapters understood in their obvious sense. With the exception of a few sections, which may be considered as pre-exilic in date on account of their tenor,[1] the historical position of the Deutero-Isaias is, as we are told, "plainly and throughout exilian."[2] The Babylonian captivity is not predicted in chaps. xl-lxvi, but assumed as having already taken place. Those whom the prophet addresses *in person* (cfr. xl, 21, 26, 28; xliii, 10; xlviii, 8; l, 10 sq.; li, 6, 7, 12 sq.; lviii, 3, sqq.) are not the men of Jerusalem, contemporaries of Ezechias, or even of Manasses; they are the exiles in Babylonia, to whom he says:

xlviii, 20. Go ye out from Babylon,
Flee ye from the Chaldeans;
With a ringing cry
Announce ye, publish ye this,
Cause it to go forth to the end of the earth;
Say ye: Yahweh redeems
His servant Jacob.[3]
lii, 11. Depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from Babylon,[4]
Touch no unclean thing.

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[1] We have already spoken of those sections, in connection with the standpoint of the writer as appealed to by the defenders of the Isaianic authorship. See the NEW YORK REVIEW, Aug.-Sept., 1905. Instead of pre-exilic, the sections in question might be post-exilic (cfr. G. A. Smith, art. Isaiah, in Hastings, Dict. of the Bible, vol. ii, p. 494).

[2] Orelli, the Prophecies of Isaiah, p. 211. (Engl. Transl.)

[3] In reference to this passage, Father Condamin pertinently remarks: "The prophet addresses to the exiles this pressing exhortation" (Le livre d' Isaie, p. 317).

[4] Instead of "go ye out from *Babylon*," the present text has "go ye out from *thence*" (משם). But the parallel expression in the same verse "go ye out of the

Go ye out of the midst of her,
Cleanse yourselves, ye who carry the vessels of Yahweh!
12. But ye shall not go out in haste,
Neither shall ye go out in flight,
For Yahweh will go before you,
And Yahweh is your rearward.

The purpose of the prophet is to comfort those whom he addresses by the assurance that the time of punishment is coming to an end (xl, 2; xlvi, 13; etc.) Jerusalem and its temple lie still in ruins but will soon be rebuilt:

xliv, 26. [I am Yahweh] who confirm the word of my servants,
And accomplish the counsel of my messengers,
Who say of Jerusalem: She shall be inhabited. . . .
28. Who say of Cyrus: He is my shepherd,
And shall perform all my pleasure;
Who say of Jerusalem: She shall be built,
And of the temple: Thy foundation shall be laid.
li, 3. For Yahweh comforts Sion,
He comforts all her waste places.
He will make her wilderness like Eden,
And her desert like the garden of Yahweh;
Joy and gladness shall be found therein,
Thanksgiving and the sound of melody.
lii, 9. Break forth into joy, sing together,
Ye waste places of Jerusalem;
For Yahweh comforts His people,
He redeems Jerusalem.[1]

Judea is described as ravaged and depopulated.

xliv, 26c. [I am Yahweh] who say of Jerusalem: She shall be inhabited,
And of the cities of Juda: They shall be built,
And I will raise up the waste places thereof.
lxii, 4. Thou shalt no more be called "Forsaken,"
And thy land shall no more be called "Desolate."
But thou shall be called "Well-pleasing,"
And thy land "Married."

The nation is still in captivity:

lii, 2. Shake thyself from the dust, arise,
Captive people of Jerusalem!
Unloose the bonds of thy neck,
O captive daughter of Sion!

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midst of *her*," seems to imply that primitively, instead of "go ye out from *thence*," the Hebrew had "go ye out from *Babylon*," as it still reads in xlviii, 20 a. In Hebrew, *Babel*, the proper name for *Babylon*, is feminine. Fr. Condamin prefers, however, to preserve the reading (משם), and thinks that the writer makes a voice from Jerusalem address the words to the exiles in Babylon (Le livre d' Isaie, p. 316). In either case, the writer's standpoint is that of the Babylonian exile.

[1] Cfr. also Isai. lviii, 12; lx, 10; lxiii, 18; lxiv, 9-11.

3. For thus says Yahweh:
Ye were sold for nothing,
And not with silver ye shall be redeemed . . .
5. And now what have I to do here? says Yahweh;
For my people has been taken away for nothing.[1] . . .

Numerous are the allusions to the sufferings which the Jews have experienced, or are experiencing, at the hands of the Chaldeans (lxii, 25; xlviii, 6; lii, 5*cd*). The time of the Assyrians lies far behind (lii, 4 sqq.), and the desolation of Jerusalem is of long standing:

lxi, 4. And they shall build the old waste places,
They shall raise up the ruins of old,
And shall repair the ruined cities,
The desolations of past generations;[2]

but the prospect of the return is imminent:

xl, 2. Speak ye to the heart of Jerusalem,
And cry unto her:
That her time of affliction is come to an end.
That her guilt is forgiven,
That she has received from Yahweh's hand
Double for her sins.
xlvi, 13. I bring near my righteousness; it is not far off;
And my salvation will not tarry:
I will give salvation in Sion,
And my glory in Israel.[3]

The Persian conqueror who is to deliver Israel is a well-known hero of the day, whom one needs not mention by name to be understood when alluding to him (xli, 2sqq.; 25); only afterwards is his name given, as it were, casually:

xliv, 28. [I am Yahweh] who say of Cyrus: He is my shepherd;
He will perform all my pleasure;

and this prince is spoken of as *already* in movement, and as blessed with success by Yahweh:

lxi, 2, Who has stirred him up from the east?

. . . .

Who surrenders nations before him,
And makes him trample upon Kings? . . .
3. He pursues them, and passes on safely,
By a way untrodden as yet by his feet.[4]

It should also be noticed that "as part of an argument for the unique divinity of the God of Israel, Cyrus, alive and irresistible, and already accredited with success, is pointed out as the unmistakable proof that *former* prophecies of a deliverance for Israel are already coming to pass. Cyrus, in short, is not presented as a prediction, but as a proof that a prediction is being fulfilled."[1] This implies that chaps. xl-lxvi spring from the last period of the Babylonian exile: Cyrus has already appeared, and is about—according to a *new* prediction—to capture Babylon (xlviii, 5, 6; xlv, 1-3), and release the Jews from their captivity:

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[1] Cfr. also Isai. lxviii, 20; lii, 11, 12, we have already quoted.
[2] Cfr. Isai. lviii, 12, a passage closely parallel with lxi, 4.
[3] Cfr. also Isai. xlviii, 20; lvi, 1; etc.
[4] Cfr. also Isai. xlv, 1.

xlv, 13. I have raised him up in righteousness,
And will make straight all his ways.
He shall rebuild my city,
And send home my exiled ones,
Not for price, nor for reward,
Says Yahweh of Hosts.

It is because the return from exile is so near at hand, so absolutely certain, that the prophet bids those whom he addresses to be comforted, to dispose themselves to accept the approaching salvation, and be ready for departure from Babylon (li-lii, 12; liv-lv; xlviii, 20, etc.) Even the impenitent, hardened sinners are threatened, not with exile, but with exclusion from the coming deliverance (xlvi, 12 sq.; xlviii; lxv, 11 sq.)

Lastly, the prophet implores God's mercy upon the exiles, among whom he numbers himself:

lxiii, 17c. Return for the sake of thy servants,
The tribes of thy inheritance.
18. Why have the wicked penetrated into thy temple?
Our adversaries trodden down thy sanctuary?
19. We are become such as those over whom thou hast not ruled for a long time. . . .
lxiv, 8. O Yahweh, be not angry exceedingly,
Neither remember iniquity for ever;
Behold, see we are all thy people.
9. Thy holy cities have become a desert,
Sion has become a wilderness,
Jerusalem is a desolate place.
10. Our holy and glorious house,
Where our fathers praised thee,
Is burned with fire,
And all our pleasant places are laid waste.
11. Wilt thou refrain thyself in spite of these things, Yahweh,
Wilt thou be silent, and afflict us to the uttermost?[2]

All these data supplied by the second part of Isaias (chaps. xl-lxvi) suggest, it is claimed, to the mind of the unbiased reader the period of the Babylonian exile as that of the writer and of his contemporaries no less effectively than do the following words of Psalm cxxxvi (Heb. cxxxvii):

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[1] G. A. Smith, art. Isaiah, in Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible,* vol ii, p. 493. Cfr. Isai. xlii, 9, and the preceding article on Isai. xl-lxvi, in THE NEW YORK REVIEW, vol. 1, No. 2, p. 164.

[2] Cfr. also Isai. li, 9-11.

> By the streams of Babylon we sat down and wept,
> When we remembered Sion;
>
> . . . .
>
> How shall we sing Yahweh's song
> In a foreign land?
>
> . . . .
>
> O daughter of Babylon, thou doomed one,
> Happy he that pays thee back
> For what thou hast done against us!

In both the Deutero-Isaias and Psalm cxxxvi the captivity is presupposed, not foretold. Both chaps. xl-lxvi and Ps. cxxxvi are without inscription in the original text, and belong to a large collection which has been ascribed to great names in Israel—Isaias and David respectively; but in neither case is the fact of such a union, as indeed of the ascription of the whole collection either to Isaias or to David, sufficient to counterbalance internal evidence which distinctly points to a later period as the date of composition. In neither case, therefore, is recourse necessary to such a supernatural intervention that either writer[1] was actually transported in vision out of his own time onwards to the time of the exile, and being thus placed by the Spirit of God in an ideal present, describes the circumstances around him in vision, and makes that ideal present a standpoint for his words relative to the past or to the future. This theory of *rapture* has indeed been advocated, in regard to the Deutero-Isaias, by several conservative scholars of the nineteenth century; but as William Urwick—himself a defender of the Isaianic authorship—writes: "It seems too much like an expedient to meet a difficulty; and Dean Stanley justly describes it as 'a hypothesis without any other example in the Scriptures.' Hengstenberg does indeed refer to Deuter. xxxii, to the earlier portions of Isaias, and to the minor prophets, where he considers this theory illustrated. But the places he refers to can be explained without it. It is, in fact, a bold conjecture introduced to meet an apparent difficulty."[2]

The conjectural character of the theory of rapture appears in the strongest light when the historical standpoint of the writer of chaps. xl-lxvi is judged by the "Analogy of Prophecy." "The prophet," says Driver,[1] "to whose thrilling words we listen has no interest in the events of Isaias' age; the deliverer, Cyrus, rivets his gaze; the prospect of return to Zion absorbs his thoughts. Judged by the *analogy of prophecy*, this constitutes the strongest possible ground for supposing that the author actually lived in the period which he thus describes, and is not merely (as has been surmised) Isaias immersed in spirit in the future, and holding converse, as it were, with the generations yet unborn. Such an immersion in the future would be not only without parallel in the Old Testament;[2] it would be alien itself to the nature of prophecy. As has been before observed, the prophet *speaks primarily to his contemporaries*, and his predictions rest upon the basis of the history of his time. This principle of prophecy can be exemplified most readily in connection with the Isaianic prophecies in chaps. i-xxxix: Isaias' greatest prophecies have, one and all, as their human occasions, the crises and circumstances of his own age. The same principle is observed equally in the case of the other prophets. Jeremias, for instance, predicts the restoration of Israel; but how? He predicts first the exile, then the restoration (chaps. xxx-xxxiii); but he never abandons his own historical position; he speaks uniformly from the period in which he lives; exile and restoration are alike viewed by him as future. Ezechiel, in prophecies written *before* the fall of Jerusalem, does the same (chaps xvi, xvii). There is no analogy for the case of a prophet transported in spirit to a future age, and predicting *from that standpoint a future still more remote.* In the prophecy before us (chaps. xl-lxvi) there is no *prediction* of exile; the exile is not announced as something yet future, it is *presupposed.* Had Isaias been the author, he would, according to all analogy, have predicted *both* the exile *and* the restoration. He would have represented *both*, as Jeremias and Ezechiel do, as lying equally in the future."[3]

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[1] Such a divine intervention as would have enabled David to write Ps. cxxxvi is now commonly rejected as "a groundless conjecture." (Cl. Fillion, les Psaumes, p. 609. Paris, 1893).

[2] William Urwick, the Servant of Jehovah, p. 11. Cfr. also Card. Meignan, les Prophètes d' Israel et le Messie, p. 246.

But as the writer of chaps. xl-lxvi lives during the Babylonian captivity, he, according to the "Analogy of Prophecy," and indeed most naturally, presupposes the exile, and speaking to his contemporaries, rests his predictions upon the basis of the history of his time. Thus, he addresses Jewish captives in their present circumstances of discouragement, fear, faithfulness or unfaithfulness to their God: proclaims the inanity of the Babylonian idols however magnificent the worship then paid to them; claims that Cyrus, the hero of the day, has been raised up by the only true God, and that nothing will stop his victorious advance because Yahweh continues to be with him: and takes former prophecies now fulfilled as the basis of further predictions. Besides, as Yahweh's people have been delivered up, so to speak gratis, the God of Israel has no interest to keep them in exile; as he has redeemed them aforetime, so he can soon release them, and his goodness toward his servants, may be depended upon for a prompt deliverance of all those who are faithful to him. Yahweh stands by the word of his messengers, now as in the past, and in his name, the prophet foretells the ruin of Babylon, the release of the Jews, the rebuilding of Jerusalem and its temple; so sure in fact, is he of the coming deliverance, that he bids a way to be prepared through the wilderness that separates Babylonia from Judea, for the triumphal march of Israel's king bringing to Jerusalem and its cities now desolate, his redeemed people.

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[1] Isaiah, his Life and Times p. 185 sq.

[2] "The writings of the prophets supply no analogy for such a *sustained* transference to the future as would be implied if chaps. xl-lxvi were by Isaias, or for the *detailed* and *definite* descriptions of the circumstances of a distant age." (Driver, Introd. to the Literat. of the Old Test., p. 238).

[3] It will be remembered that the prediction of the exile in Isai. xxxix is treated as borrowed from iv Kings, together with almost all the Historical Appendix to the First Isaias.

Viewed in this light, chaps. xl-lxvi take their organic place in the history of God's providential dealings with the Jewish race. Towards the end of the Babylonian exile, as towards the end of the sojourn in Egypt, as towards the setting in of any new and important stage in Israel's history, Yahweh intervenes in behalf of his people. Through one of his messengers he warns them of what is soon to come to pass, and bids them correspond to his designs of mercy in their regard. As Yahweh's accredited prophet rests his appeals to his contemporaries on the basis of God's past mercies to their forefathers, and also of present circumstances well known to them, the Jews are supplied at each step with an actual means of understanding God's merciful purposes and of responding to them. This the prophets of Israel have always done on behalf of their contemporaries, and the prophetic writer who argues with the exiles in Isai. xl-lxvi, is no exception to the rule.

Such, briefly stated, is the strongest argument set forth by the opponents of the Isaianic authorship. To many a mind it has appeared conclusive, because it corresponds well to the general purpose of the writer of chaps. xl-lxvi:

> Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people,
> Says your God.
> Speak ye to the heart of Jerusalem,
> And cry unto her:
> That her time of affliction is come to an end,
> That her guilt is forgiven,
> That she has received from Yahweh's hand
> Double for her sins; (xl, 1-2).

and also because it interprets in their obvious sense the descriptions, exhortations, prophecies, etc., which go to make up the Deutero-Isaias.

Defenders of the Isaianic authorship, however, deny its proving force. They claim that, as stated, the argument ignores a large number of passages in which the writer—Isaias, according to them—returns to his own present, and betrays by allusions to it the age in which he really lives. The principal passages they appeal to are: xliii, 22-24; lii, 5; lvi, 9-lxii, 12; lviii, 1-3, 13; lix, 1-15; lxv, 2, 7, 11, 12. In these, and similar places, the writer charges Israel's rulers—judges, priests, prophets—with criminal neglect of duty, and his contemporaries at large with the idolatrous practices of Manasses' time, together with the omission of legal sacrifices which could be offered only in Jerusalem and its temple. All this, it is claimed,—as is indeed granted by some opponents of the Isaianic authorship—must be understood as referring to a time when the Kingdom of Juda still existed, and when the author of xl-lxvi and those whom he addresses lived in Palestine and within reach of temple-worship. It is only right, then, according to the defenders of the traditional view, to admit that the writer of xl-lxvi is no other than Isaias, who, while he foretells the Babylonian exile, the exploits of Cyrus, and the future deliverance of the Jews from Babylon, nevertheless does not lose altogether sight of his present surroundings.

The point *may seem*, indeed, but yet *is not*, well taken, as we have had an opportunity to show in our preceding article.[1] In chaps. xl-lxvi, the writer does not foretell, but presupposes the Babylonian exile as a fact known to all, and the exploits of Cyrus as having already taken place and as fulfilling older prophecies, and it is on the basis of those facts that the author comforts his contemporaries with the assured hope of a near coming deliverance. Besides, as rightly pointed out by Driver,[2] the objection "forgets that whatever difficulties these passages (the passages above referred to) present, the difficulty is the same whether the author of chaps. xl-lxvi be Isaias or a prophet writing towards the close of the exile. For even those who hold these chapters to be Isaias' admit that they are designed for an age other than his own, and are, in fact, implicitly addressed to the generation of the exile. This being so, the *unity of the prophet's work* requires it to be accommodated throughout to this situation; and indeed, the passages quoted are brought expressly into connection with the return (lvii, 13*b*, 14; lix, 19 sq.) If, now, the author be Isaias, and he refers exclusively to the practices and social condition of (say) Manasses' time, such passages would have no connection with the main theme of the prophecy and would be out of place in the argument. The sins of Manasses' age might form for Isaias, as they did for Jeremias (Jerem. xv, 4), the ground for an announcement of impending exile: they can, *in themselves*, have no bearing on the future of the exiles more than a century afterwards. They can only have a bearing upon this, in so far as the exiles have identified themselves with their forefathers, and have not disowned their idolatrous tendencies. Whether, therefore, it be Isaias or an exile prophet who speaks, these allusions to the idolatry and other sins of the nation, whilst in Palestine, must be accommodated to the situation of the exiles. This accommodation is—to say the least—as readily conceivable on the part of the exilic prophet as on the part of Isaias, and in the judgment of many, it will appear to be more so. There are frequent allusions in these chapters which show that the exiles, as a whole, were far from being as spiritually minded as the prophet would have desired to see them;[1] and sins such as those which Jeremias and Ezechiel attest as prevalent in Juda till the very eve of the exile,[2] imply tendencies which would not be generally extirpated 40 or 50 years later. The prophet, we may suppose, borrows here passages written originally in the age of Jeremias, and *applies* them to the generation of the exiles, in so far as these are the true children of their fathers, and in so far as they may see in the mirror which he thus holds up before them, their own image reflected."[3]

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[1] Cfr. The New York Review, vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 163-165.

[2] Isaiah, his life and times, p. 187 sq.

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[1] Chap. xlii, 19; xlvi, 8, 12; xlviii, 1 f.; l, 11; lxv, 3-5, 11; lxvi, 5.

[2] Jer. ii, 20, 23, 27; iii, 6, 13; xix, 4 f.; xxxii, 35; xliv, 8 (of the exiles in Egypt), 15-19; Ezek. v, 11; viii, (in the precincts of the temple itself); xi, 21; xiv, 1-11 (idolatry among the exiles); xxii.

[3] In lxv, 7, which has been cited similarly as evidence of authorship in Palestine it has been overlooked that those who "offered incense upon the mountains" are described as the *fathers* of the persons addressed. And in xliii, 22-25 the *fact* of no acrifices having been offered by Israel during the exile, especially if, as the prophet

Finally, even though we should admit that most of the passages appealed to as describing pre-exilic circumstances, moral, social, religious, of the Jews, prove that some sections in chaps. xl-lxvi were written before the exile, the inference that the *entire* second part of Isaias must belong to that prophet would not be borne out. The very reason for which such passages may be considered as pre-exilic, viz., the fact that their primary and natural meaning seems to point to a time before the captivity, would still forbid scholars to assign other sections, or rather the great bulk of the Deutero-Isaias, to pre-exilic times. The only theory which would then be in harmony with all the facts of the case, would be the one that takes them all into account, and treats the Deutero-Isaias as a compilation made up of prophecies belonging to various periods of Jewish history, and much later in date than Isaias' time.

Other objections have, of course, been urged by the defenders of the Isaianic authorship against the foregoing argument in favor of the modern view. But as these objections are much weaker[1] than the one we have just set forth and found wanting, it may be safely said that the first argument brought forward by the opponents of the Isaianic authorship is not yet disproved.

With a view to strengthen their position, the scholars who deny that Isaias is the author of chaps. xl-lxvi, appeal in the second place, to the evidence of language and style. Like almost all Biblical writers, they contend,—like Osee, Jeremias, Ezechiel, in the Old Testament; the Synoptists, St. John, in the New—Isaias exhibits in the prophecies which possess an evident reference to the circumstances of his time well-marked individualities of style. He has a preference for particular words and turns of expression, many of which are used by no other writer of the Old Testament. So that it is only natural to admit that the chapters in the book of Isaias, from which such distinguishing features are absent, and in which new phrases and images repeatedly occur instead, bear the impress of different authorship. In this case "such coincidence cannot be accidental. The subject of chaps. xl-lxvi is not *so* different from that of Isaias' prophecies (e, g.) against the Assyrians as to necessitate a new phraseology and rhetorical form: the differences can only be reasonably explained by the supposition of a

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holds (xlii, 24 f.), the exile was due to the nation's sin, is a sufficient ground upon which to base God's free offer of pardon.

[1] These objections have been well presented and disposed of by Driver, *Isaiah: his life and times*, part ii, chap. v.

change of authors. Isaias, in his earliest, as in his latest, prophecies (chaps. xxix-xxxiii; xxxvii, 22-32, written when he must have been at least sixty years of age), uses the same style and shows a preference for the same figures; and the change of subject in chaps. xl-lxvi is not sufficiently great to account for the marked differences which show themselves, and which indeed often relate to points, such as the form and construction of sentences, which stand in no appreciable relation to the subject treated."[1]

The following are examples of words and phrases occurring repeatedly in Isaianic chapters, and therefore characteristic of Isaias' style, but never found in chaps. xl-lxvi:[2]

1. *The Lord* (Heb. *'Adon*), Yahweh of Hosts: i, 24; iii, 1; x, 16, 33; xix,4.†
2. *Not-gods* (*'elilim*): ii, 8, 18, 20; x, 11; xix, 1, 3; xxxi, 7.
3. The figure of Yahweh showing Himself *exalted* (ii, 11, 17; xxxiii, 5), or *lofty* (v, 16), or *arising* (ii, 19, 21; xxviii, 21; etc.; or *lifting Himself up* xxx, 18; xxxiii, 3, 10).
4. *To mourn* (*'abal*, unusual word): iii, 26; xix, 8.†
5. *The escaped* (or *body of fugitives*): iv, 2; x, 20; xv, 9; xxxvii, 31, 32.
6. A *trampling down*: v, 5; vii, 25; x, 6; xxviii, 18.
7. The glory of a nation, especially with figures signifying its disappearance or decay: v, 13; viii, 7; x, 18; xvi, 14; xvii, 3, 4; xxi, 16; xxii; 18.
8. *Rottenness*: iii, 24; v, 24.†
9. *Hay*: v, 24; xxxiii, 11†
10. *Dust* (not the usual word): v, 24; xxix, 5. Rare besides.
11. The figure of Yahweh's hand *stretched out* against a nation or part of the earth: v, 25; ix, 12, 17, 21; x, 4; xiv, 26, 27; xxiii, 11; xxxi, 3. A figure used also by other writers (e. g. Exod. vi, 6), but applied by Isaiah with singular picturesqueness and force.
12. *To hiss* (as a signal): v, 26; vii, 18.
13. *To smear*, of the eyes, i. e. to blind them: vi, 10; xxix, 9; xxxii, 3.†
14. *To be ruined* (unusual words): vi, 11 *bis*; xxxvii, 26 (II Kings xix, 25).†
15. Figures borrowed from *harvest*: ix, 3 [Heb. 2]; xvii, 5, 11; xviii, 4.
16. *Burden*: ix, 4; [Heb. 3]; x, 27; xi, 25.†
17. *To spur* or *incite*: ix, 11 [Heb. 10]; xix, 2.† A remarkable word.
18. *The thickets of the forest*: ix, 18 [Heb. 17]; x, 34.†
19. The proverbial phrase, "*head and tail, palm-branch and rush*": ix, 14 [Heb. 13]; xix, 15.†
20. The figure of *the fat* reduced to leanness: x, 16; xvii, 4.†
21. *Garden-land*: x, 18; xvi, 10; xxix, 17; xxxii, 15, 16; xxxvii, 24. Very rare besides.
22. *Remnant*: x, 19, 20, 21, 22; xi, 11, 16; xvi, 4; xvii, 3; xxi, 17; xxviii, 5; and in the proper name, *Shear-jashub*, vii, 3. The term ex-

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[1] Driver, Introd. to Literat. of Old Test., p. 238.

[2] This list is substantially the one given by Driver. "Isaiah, his Life and Times," p. 194 sq. The expressions that are marked † are used only by Isaiah.

pressing Isaiah's characteristic teaching, used by no other prophet except (in less special applications) chap. xiv, 22; Soph. i, 4; Mal. ii, 15; and occuring elsewhere in the Old Testament only in Chron., Esdras, Neh., Esther. (The term used generally for *remnant* is different.)

23. *A consummation and that determined*: x, 23; xxviii, 22. A peculiar phrase; only, besides, borrowed from Isaias, in Dan. ix, 27.

24. The figure of the *scourge*: x, 26; xxviii, 15, 18.

25. The *swinging* of Jehovah's hand: xi, 15; xix, 16: cfr. xxx, 32, ("battles of *swinging*").

26. A *flying fiery serpent*: xiv, 29; xxx, 6.†

27. *The devastator*: xvi, 4; xxi, 2; xxxiii, 1. So *devastated*: xv, 1 *bis*; xxiii, 1, 14. (Not very common besides, except in Jeremias.)

28. *Many* (an uncommon word, not the one usually employed in Hebrew): xvi, 14; xvii, 12; xxviii, 2. Only seven times in Job besides.

29. A *treading down*: xviii, 2, 7; xxii, 5.†

30. *To wither* (not the ordinary word): xix, 6; xxxiii, 9.†

31. *To war* (uncommon word): xxix, 7, 8; xxxi, 4.

This list might be readily increased. The expressions which follow are found also in chaps. xxiv-xxvii, and therefore, so far as they go, tend to support the conjecture that these chapters embody elements derived from Isaias; but they never occur in chaps xl-lxvi.

32. *Storm* (prop. *streaming rain*): iv, 6; xxviii, 2 *bis*; xxx, 30; xxxii, 2. Also xxv, 4 *bis*. Only twice besides in the Old Testament.

33. *Briers and thorns* (an alliterative phrase): v, 6; vii, 23, 24, 25; and figuratively, ix, 18 [Heb. 17]; x, 17. Also xxvii, 4. (*Briers* also in xxxii, 13; neither word elsewhere in the Old Testament.)

34. *Little* (not the usual word): x, 25; xvi, 14; xxix, 17. Only xxiv, 6 besides. A diminutive, derived from the same root: xxviii, 10, 13; only besides in Job xxxvi, 2.

35. *To flee* (not one of the words most commonly used to express this idea): x, 31; xvi, 2, 3; xxi, 14, 15; xxii, 3; xxxiii, 3. In an intensive form, xxiv, 20.

As there are numerous features characteristic of Isaias' style absent from chaps. xl-lxvi, so, conversely, many words and phrases appear exclusively in these chapters (sometimes also in chaps. xiii sq., and xxxiv sq.), and are never found in the prophecies which give independent evidence of belonging to Isaias' own time. Thus:[1]

1. *To choose*, of God's choice of Israel: xl, 8, 9; xliii, 10; xliv, 1, 2; (cfr. xlii, 1; xlix, 7; of the *ideal*, individualized nation); *my chosen*, xliii, 20; xlv, 4; lxv, 9, 15, 22. So xiv, 1.

2. *Praise* (subst. and verb): xlii, 8, 10, 12; xliii, 21; xlviii, 9; lx, 6, 18; lxii, 7, 9; lxiii, 7; lxiv, 10.

3. *To shoot* or *spring forth*: xliv; lv, 10; lxi, 11a; esp. metaphorically —(*a*) of a moral state, xlv, 8; lviii, 8; lxi, 11b; (*b*) of an event manifesting itself in history (not so elsewhere), xlii, 9; xliii, 19.

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[1] The list given is taken from Driver, Introd. to the Literat. of Old Test. p. 238, sqq. For fuller information, see T. K. Cheyne, Introd. to the Book of Isaiah, pp. 255-271 (London, 1895).

4. *To break out into singing*: xliv, 23; xlix, 13; lii, 9; liv, 1; lv, 12 Also xiv,7. Only Ps. xcviii, 4 besides.

5. *Pleasure*: (*a*) of Yahweh's purpose, xliv, 28; xlvi, 10; xlviii, 14; liii, 10; (*b*) or human purpose or business, lviii, 3, 13. More generally, liv, 12; lxii, 4.

6. *Good will, acceptance* (God's): xlix, 8; lvi, 7; lviii, 5; lx, 10; lxi, 2.

7. *Thy sons*—the pronoun being feminine and referring to Sion: xlix, 17, 22, 25; Ii, 20; liv, 13; lx, 4, 9; lxii, v; cfr. lxvi, 8. Isaias, when he uses the same word, always says *sons* absolutely, the implicit reference being to God (Dt. xiv, 1): so i, 2, 4; xxx, 1, 9.

8. *To rejoice*: lxi, 10; lxii, 5; lxiv, 4; lxv, 18, 19; lxvi, 10, 14. Also xxxv, 1.

9. The phrases, *I am Yahweh, and there is none else* (or *besides*): xlv, 5, 6, 18, 21, 22; *I am the first, and I am the last*: xliv, 6; xlviii, 12; cfr. xli, 4; *I am thy God, thy Savior*, etc.: xli, 10, 13; xliii, 3; xlviii, 17b; lxi, 8; *I am He*, i e., He who *is*, opp. to the unreal gods of the heathen (from Dt. xxxii, 39): xli, 4b; xliii, 10b, 13; xlvi, 4; xlviii, 12. No such phrases are ever used by Isaias.

10. The combination of the Divine name with a particular epithet (in the English version often represented by a relative clause): e. g. *Creator* (or *stretcher-out*) *of the heavens* or *the earth*: xl, 28; xlii, 5; xliv, 24b; xlv, 7, 18; li, 13; *creator or former of Israel*: xliii, 1, 15; xliv, 2, 24; xlv, 11; xlix, 5; *thy Savior*: xlix, 26; lx, 16; *thy* (*your, Israel's*) *redeemer*: xliii, 14; xliv, 24; xlviii, 17a; xlix, 7; liv, 8; comp. xl, 22f; xliii, 16f; xliv, 25-28; xlvi, 10f; li, 15; lvi, 3; lxiii, 12f. Isaias never casts his thought into this form.

The following words, though found once or twice each in Isaias, are destitute there of any special force or significance, whereas in chaps. xl-lxvi they occur frequently, sometimes with a particular *nuance*, or shade of meaning, which is foreign to the usage of Isaias:

1. *Isles* or *coasts*: used *representatively* of distant regions of the earth: xl, 15; xli, 1, 5; xlii, 4, 10, 12, 15; xlix, 1; li, 5; lix, 18; lx, 9; lxvi, 19. In Isaias, xi, 11; (also xxiv, 15), where it is used in its primary sense (Gen. x, 5) of the isles and coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. The application in C. xl-lxvi is a marked extension of the usage of Isaias.

2. *Nought* (not the ordinary word): xl, 17; xli, 12, 29; xlv, 6, 14; xlvi, 9; xlvii, 8, 10; lii, 4; liv, 15. Also xxxiv, 12. In Isaias, v, 8, only; (where, however, the original signification of the word is still perceptible).

3. *To create*: xl, 26, 28; xli, 20; xlii, 5; xlv, 7, 8, 12, 18; liv, 16; lvii, 19; lxv, 17, 18. In Isaias, only iv, 5, in a limited application. The prominence given to the idea of creation in C. xl-lxi is very noticeable.

4. *Offspring*: xlii, 5; xliv, 3; xlviii, 19; lxi, 9; lxv, 23. In Isaias, xxii, 24. Also xxxiv, 1. Rather a peculiar word. The usage in C. xl-lxvi is wider and more general than that in xxii, 24, and agrees with the usage of the book of Job, v, 25; xxi, 8; xxvii, 14; xxxi, 8. The word does not occur elsewhere.

5. *Justice* emphasized as a principle guiding and determining God's action: xli, 2, 10b; xlii, 21; xlv, 13, 19; li, 5; cfr. lviii, 2b. The peculiar stress laid upon this principle is almost confined to these chapters; comp. however, Hos. ii, 19; [Heb. 21].

6. *The arm of Yahweh*: li, 5b. 9; lii, 10; liii, 1; lix, 16b; (cfr. xl, 10), lxii, 8; lxiii, 5, 12. Hence Ps. xcviii, 1; (see lix, 16; lii, 10). In Isaias, xxx, 30. But observe the greater *independence* of the figure as applied in C. xl-lxvi.

7. *To deck*, or (in the reflexive conjunction) *to deck oneself*, i. e., *to glory*, especially of Yahweh, either glorifying Israel, or glorifying Himself in Israel: xliv, 23; xlix, 3; lv, 5; lx, 7, 9, 13, 21; lxi, 3. In Isaias, only x, 15, of the saw *vaunting itself* against its user.

8. The future gracious relation of Yahweh to Israel represented as a *covenant*: xlii, 8; (xlix, 8); liv, 10; lv, 3; lix, 21; lxi, 8. In xxviii, 15, 18; xxxiii, 8, the word is used merely in the sense of a treaty or compact. Isaias, often as he speaks of a future state of grace, to be enjoyed by his people, never represents it under the form of a *covenant*.

9. *Yea*, used with strong rhetorical force 25 times from xl, 24, to xlviii, 15. In Isaias, only xxxiii, 2. Elsewhere in the book, xxvi, 8, 9, 11; xxxv, 2.

There are in addition several words and idioms occurring in chap. xl-lxvi, which point to a later period of the language than Isaias' age, for which it must suffice to refer to Cheyne, *Isaiah*, ii, 257 f. (more fully *Introd.* pp. 255-270), or Dillmann[1] p. 353. . . .

As features of style may be noticed:

1. The *duplication of words*, significant of the impassioned ardor of the preacher: xl, 1; xliii, 11, 25; xlviii, 11, 15; li, 9, 12, 17; lii, 1, 11; lvii, 6, 14, 19; lxii, 10 *bis*; lxv, 1. Very characteristic of this prophecy; in Isaias the only examples—and those but partly parallel—are viii 9b; [xxi, 9]; xxix, 1.

2. A habit of repeating the same word or words in adjacent clauses or verses; thus xl, 12f, (regulated); v, 13 end, and v, 14 end, (taught him); v, 14, (instructed him); xl, 31, and xli, 1, (renewed strength): v, 6f, (courage encourage); v, 8f, (have chosen thee); v, 13f, (I have holpen thee); xlv, 4f (hast not known me); v, 5f, (and none else); l, 7 and 9, (will help me) liii, 2, (despised); v, 3f; (esteemed him); v, 7, (opened not his mouh); lviii, 13, (thine own pleasure); lix, 8, (peace); lxi, 7, (double). The attentive reader of the Hebrew will notice further instances. Very rare indeed in Isaias; cfr. i, 7, (desolate); xvii, 5, (ears); xxxii, 17f, (peace).

3. Differences in the structure of sentences, e. g. the relative particle; omitted with much greater frequency than by Isaias.

Finally, in order, as it were, to clinch the argument from style, the opponents of the Isaianic authorship point out many literary features of a more general character marking off the writer of chaps. xl-lxvi from the prophet Isaias. The style of the Deutero-Isaias they describe as more flowing; his eloquence is warmer and bursting out more easily into a lyric strain. His imagery, we are told, is drawn particularly from the sphere of human emotion, and his fondness for figures taken from such sources is most evident in his numerous examples of *personification*: of Sion, for example, as a bride, a mother, a widow, etc.[1]

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[1] The reference is to A. Dillmann's Comm. on Isaias (Der Prophet Jesaia, 5te Auflage, 1890).

Whoever admits such differences in language and style between chaps. xl-lxvi and the prophecies of Isaias as to bear out the view that an interval of nearly a century and a half elapsed between the composition of the two writings will naturally expect to find proportionate differences between them with respect to theological ideas. As a matter of fact, opponents of the Isaianic authorship think that, when closely examined, the two parts of Isaias are found to differ in such a way as to imply a real development of religious doctrines, which points to two different periods of Jewish history. The following words of one prominent among them[2] contain a short but substantial presentation of this third argument: "The *theological ideas* of chaps xl-lxvi (in so far as they are not of that fundamental kind common to the prophets generally) differ remarkably from those which appear, from chaps. i-xxxix, to be distinctive of Isaias. Thus on the nature of God generally, the ideas expressed are much larger and fuller. Isaias, for instance, depicts the majesty of Yahweh; in chaps. xl-lxvi the prophet emphasizes His *infinitude*; He is the Creator, the Sustainer of the Universe, the Life-Giver, the Author of history, (xli, 4), the First and the Last, the Incomparable One. This is a real difference. And yet it cannot be argued that opportunities for such assertions of Yahweh's power and Godhead would not have presented themselves naturally to Isaias whilst he was engaged in defying the armies of Assyria. But, in truth, chaps. xl-lxvi show an advance upon Isaias, not only in the substance of their theology, but also in the form in which it is presented; truths which are merely *affirmed* in Isaias being here made the subject of reflection and argument. Again, the doctrine of the preservation from judgment of a faithful remnant is characteristic of Isaias. It appears both in his first prophecy and in his last (vi, 13; xxvii, 31 sq.): in chaps. xl-lxvi, if it is present once or twice by implication (lix, 20; lx, 8 sq.), it is no *distinctive* element in the author's teaching; it is not expressed in Isaias' terminology (Heb. *She'ar*: x, 20-22; xi, 11, 16; xvi, 4; xvii, 3; xxi, 17; xxviii, 5; cfr. vii, 3), and it is not more prominent than in the writings of any other prophets. The relation of Israel to Yahweh—its choice by Him, its destiny, the purpose of its call—is developed in different terms and under different conceptions[1] from those used by Isaias: the figure of the Messias *King* (Isai. ix, 6, 7; xi, 1 sqq.) is absent; the prophet associates his view of the future with a figure of very different character, Yahweh's righteous Servant,[2] which is closely connected with his own distinctive view of Israel's destiny.[3] The Divine purpose in relation to the nations, especially in connection with the prophetic mission of Israel, is more comprehensively developed.[4] The prophet, in a word, in whatever elements of his teaching are distinctive, moves *in a different region of thought* from Isaias; he apprehends and emphasizes different aspects of divine truth." "He is a later writer expanding and developing, in virtue of the fuller measure of inspiration vouchsafed to him, elements due, perhaps, originally to a predecessor."[5] Finally, to a certain point, a relation may be traced between the truths which that later writer emphasizes and his historical situation. Throughout chaps. xl-xlviii, for instance, the prophet's aim is to vindicate, as against the pretensions of idolatry, Yahweh's true Deity, and he carries out his purpose with a vigor hardly equalled in any other writing of the Old Testament. The reason of this is naturally found in the circumstances of the time and place: idolatry was practised in Babylon with an imposing magnificence and completeness, and idolaters boasted that their gods were more powerful and wise than Yahweh, whom they considered as conquered, together with His people, by the Babylonian deities. In like manner the peculiar features noticeable in Israel's mission to the nations and in the picture of "Yahweh's Servant," etc., in the Deutero-Isaias are manifestly in relation with the corresponding conditions under which chaps. xl-lxvi were composed. And all this points to a later period in Jewish history as the special period in which the author of the second part of Isaias lived and carried out his mission of consolation to Israel.

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[1] For details, cfr. Driver, Introd. to Literat. of Old Test., p. 241 sq.; Cheyne, Introduction to Isaiah; etc.

[2] Driver, loc. cit., p. 242 sq. For particulars, see Driver's Isaiah, his Life and Times, pp. 168-180; A. B. Davidson, in "the Expositor" for 1883 and 1884; G. A. Smith, the Book of Isaiah, in "the Expositor's Bible"; etc.

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[1] Israel is Yahweh's servant, entrusted by Him with the discharge of a sacred mission, and hence cannot now be disowned by its Divine Lord (xli, 8-10; xlii, 19 sq. xliii, 10; xliv, 1 sq., 21; xlv, 4; xlviii, 20).

[2] Isai. xlii, 1 sqq.; xlix, 1 sqq.; l, 4-9; lii, 13-liii, 12; lxi, 1-3.

[3] To say that the figure of the ideal Servant of chaps. xl-lxvi is an *advance* upon that of the Messianic King of Isaias is not correct. It should not be considered as a direct continuation, though perhaps fuller, of one and the same idea. It starts from a different origin altogether: it is *parallel* to it, not a continuation of it. Both representations meet and are fulfilled in the person of Our Lord Jesus Christ, but in the Old Testament they are distinct.

[4] Israel in its *ideal* character is to be the medium of religious instruction to the world: xlii, 1, 4, 6; xlix, 6; etc.

[5] Driver, Isaiah, his Life and Times, p. 207.

The foregoing exposition of the arguments which are nowadays appealed to *for* or *against* the Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl-lxvi suggests a few general conclusions. In the first place, it is, to say the least, misleading on the part of certain conservative writers baldly to affirm that the arguments set forth against the authorship are not worth taking into account, that the true reason for which the authorship is rejected is rationalistic bias, etc. Arguments which have been tested and accepted by the great majority of contemporary scholars should not be set aside so lightly; and indeed the foregoing exposition of such arguments, however brief, proves that they are worthy of serious consideration. Many sections in chaps. xl-lxvi bear the distinct impress of the Babylonian exile, so that it is no less difficult to ascribe them to the prophet Isaias than it would be to consider David as the writer of the Psalm "Super Flumina Babylonis" (Ps. cxxxvi). Again, certain differences of style and thought must needs be granted between the two parts of the book, and the question is certainly worth considering which of the resemblances and of the differences in language, thought, etc., are truly predominating, and therefore telling either *for* or *against* the Isaianic authorship. And let it be borne in mind that, once several large sections are granted to be exilic, the whole second part, as it now stands, cannot be regarded as Isaianic. It is indeed true that, chiefly in the early infancy of Biblical criticism, some Rationalists have simply denied the authorship because the second part of the book, if granted to be Isaianic, would contain true, supernatural prophecies. But all genuine scholars of the day have discarded such rationalistic bias and simply weighed the arguments *for* or *against* the authorship on their own merit. Besides, it is clear that to admit that the second part of the book of Isaias is the work of an author writing toward the close of the exile, and predicting the approaching conquest of Babylon by Cyrus, just as Isaias predicted the deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib, far from impairing the theological value of the prophecy, rather enhances it. It enables one to point out in a more convincing manner how the whole tone of the prophecy of the future capture of Babylon is a firm ground for admitting that it is *prior* to the events which it declares to be approaching.[1] Nor are the Messianic predictions contained in chaps.

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[1] For valuable remarks on this particular point, see Driver, Introd. to Literat. of

xl-lxvi done away with or even weakened by the denial of the Isaianic authorship. For, as Father Corluy, S. J.,[1] well says: "Even though those chapters should not be ascribed to the son of Amos, but to some 'Great Unknown' contemporary with the return from Babylon, it would remain true, all the same, that in those sacred pages the life, passion, and violent death of the Messias are foretold several centuries before they came to pass, and that consequently the finger of God is there."

In the second place, several defenders—and even some opponents—of the Isaianic authorship have remarked that to put the composition of chaps. xl-lxvi in immediate connection with the Babylonian captivity is to make it impossible to explain how the name of the author of such magnificent prophecies was allowed to drop into oblivion. The prophetical writings of the Exile and of the period immediately after the Exile are, it is said, not anonymous, and a mistaken ascription to Isaias of chaps. xl-lxvi by Ecclesiasticus so near the supposed date of composition is well-nigh inconceivable. Whence it is inferred that the external evidence in favor of the authorship should be considered as valid. And yet, when it is borne in mind that Jewish tradition oftentimes ascribed to the great men of Israel, such as David, Solomon, Esdras, etc., works which, in whole or in part, they certainly never wrote, its testimony for the Isaianic authorship loses much of its apparent cogency. As we shall see in the sequel, the value of the traditional title to the prophecies of Zacharias is not beyond question, and this seems also to be the case with the contents of other prophetical writings whose authorship was formerly taken too easily for granted, seeing that internal evidence clearly points to their compilatory character. The testimony of the sacred writer of Ecclesiasticus, which is the oldest on record in regard to the Isaianic authorship, does not necessarily prove that authorship. It may be understood as simply bearing witness to the fact that the two parts of this book were already put together as they are in the present day, and regarded at that late date—about 180 B. C.—as written by the great prophet Isaias. Even granting that the compiler of the second part of Isaias did not purposely imitate Isaias' style, and omit his own name, in order that his work of compilation might enjoy greater authority in the eyes of his contemporaries, it is not improbable that the resemblances of

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Old Test., p. 243. Cfr. also A. Condamin, le livre d' Isaie, *passim*.

[1] *La Science Catholique* for March, 1889. See also Bp. Hanneberg's remarks to the same effect (Histoire de la Révélation Biblique, vol. i, p. 336), (French Transl.)

style and thought between the two parts of the book, together with other less important reasons, led the editor of the whole work to put side by side the Deutero- with the Proto-Isaias, and to include them all under the same common title of Isaias, as one single work: parallel cases exist in regard to other Old Testament writings, and in all such cases the compilatory character of a book is chiefly made out by a careful study of internal evidence.

Lastly, whatever may be thought of the value of the arguments set forth by the opponents of the authorship, it must be granted that the question itself is not one settled by the authority of the Church. "It does not matter," says Card. Newman in this connection, "whether one or two Isaias wrote the book which bears that prophet's name; the Church, without settling this point, pronounces it inspired."[1] And in like strain Card. Meignan,[2] whose words are quoted by several Catholic scholars, writes: "One can, without being open to the charge of heterodoxy, defend the thesis against which we have declared ourselves."

Francis E. Gigot.

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[1] J. H. Newman, on the Inspiration of Scripture, in "the Nineteenth Century," February, 1884, p. 196.

[2] Card. Meignan, les Prophètes d' Israel et le Messie, p. 259 sq.

COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL RELIGION: A SYNTHESIS.

Albert Reynaud, Ph. D.

For a mind, by fortunate inheritance safely anchored to a body of beliefs, and yet lovingly alive to the ever-moving efforts and achievements of human progress, there is at once a pleasing and a disquieting apprehension at the thought of the relations between those beliefs and the positions of modern thought. Comforting, in the sense of one's security amid the shifting changes of Time; troubling, with the insistent lapping query of the surrounding waves, whether there is conflict between the two—whether there is some irrepressible antagonism between the conditions which actually environ us, by which in such large measure we in fact modulate our lives and to which our pulses instinctively and glowingly respond, and that secure old anchorage to which we render, more or less faithfully and fully, the tribute of our highest homage—our Faith.

And are there some among our fellows, the orthodox as well as the unorthodox, who would tend to create a conflict, and an irreconcilable one, between them; to demand from us either a repudiation of Modern Life, or an abjuration, or at best a halting tenure, of our Faith ?

In the course of reflections on this grave and vast subject, there occurred one thought among others, which seems to lead to fields wider even than that of Religion; and which gave rise to the title affixed to these lines. The thought appears to reach out to social, political and economic problems, and to point to some differing predispositions in approaching their consideration. But a brief study of the religious import of those mental attitudes may serve as an interesting note of suggestion. The main general fact which it is intended to bring out is that there is a two-fold aspect in which we may regard the subject of religion, and two subjective attitudes in considering it in its external application—either one of which may be over-emphasized to the detriment of the other.

The Protestant Reformation (without reference to other dogmatic and doctrinal divergences from the ancient truth), perhaps somewhat unconsciously—certainly with lack of logical and practical consistency in its earlier sectaries—struck its main note in what has been called the right of private judgment.

Philosophically, if it meant anything, it meant a sovereign emphasis, not only on individual religion in the sense of practice and conduct, but in the sense of the relation of religious truth to the individual intellect. And the centuries have worked out the premisses to their logical conclusion. So that there is scarcely a religious opinion which may not find shelter under the garb and formula of Protestantism; and in a very true sense the religion of any of its adherents—both in belief and practice—may be called his own individual religion. And, indeed, up to a half century ago, the whole trend of modern thought, in political government, in social life, in economics—yes, in the aspirations and developments of modern liberty—has partaken somewhat of a similar spirit, and has impressed with individualism almost all the activities of modern life. Latterly, indeed, as we shall see, the pendulum has been swinging in the other direction, but for three centuries the whole movement of modern thought was strongly individualistic in trend.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church unquestionably is a strong collective entity or organism, as it has been called. There is perhaps no more striking presentation of it than as one *body*, whose head is Christ, and of whom the individuals are *physical* members; the one vine of which individuals are branches fed by the same sap. The very dogma of the Fall of man and the solidarity of each of us in original sin, is a collective idea, and (with the Redemption), the highest affirmation of a collective reality. Such, also, is the Kingdom of God preached by Christ; and the communion of saints extending to the very souls in Purgatory and in Heaven. And the general purposes as well as the methods of salvation, through the many instrumentalities of the Church, are collective as well as individual. The great religious orders exemplify another aspect of sub-collective entities, in organization, object, spirit and method. Leaving aside for a moment the sacraments—so equally administered to the lofty and to the lowly in things of the spirit—many of the Church's practices and devotions further evidence what we may briefly term this collectivist spirit. In the very matter of organized devotions it is scarcely acceptable to believe that the idea in merging the units into aggregate bodies is simply to benefit a few individual units with foreknown uselessness to the whole.

Now to come to the core of the subject as affecting Catholic minds and Catholic schools of thought in their relation to certain modern principles—for it is not intended to go into the problems which call for answer from our separated brethren to their own selves.

There are, beyond a doubt, differences of intellectual attitude among sincere Catholics towards many trends of modern thought. And one of these lies largely, we believe, in the views which the extremists of either school—the collectivist and the individualist, as we have termed them—hold of the practical relation of religion to human society; not of course in dogma, nor the immediate corollaries which flow therefrom; but in subsidiary and humanly worked-out derivatives and applications of those truths.

One school, almost wholly carried away with the individualizing spirit which seemed to have prevailed, is not satisfied with keeping ever before its eyes such maxims as "the individual guidance of the Holy Spirit," but feels a disparaging disposition towards "enregimented piety." The other extreme tendency puts perhaps over-emphasis upon organized forms of religious life, with ultra-subservience to what we may call, without offense, bureaucratic guidance, generalized formularies of devotion, resulting in some discouragement of individual initiative, and a general suspicion of modern individual liberty in other human activities. Being Catholics, neither fails theoretically to recognize the true side of either view; and neither forgets for a moment that religion, like salvation, is in a sense a personal, that is, an individual thing; and also that in another aspect it is an organic, that is, a collective thing. Yet by force of their different bias they do in fact, in attitude towards modern thought and social activities, in likes and dislikes with regard to actual realities of modern life, find themselves at odds with each other, one overswayed by the individual note, the note of liberty, and the other by the collective note, which implies the note of authority.

It has been stated that the modern trend, the keynote of modern thought, has been, at least till recently, that of individualism and liberty. Indeed if we would picture it by any single symbol in its many activities, it would be by putting the liberty cap on its head. And how thrilling it is in its enticements in every relation of life, political, social, scientific, industrial—and we had almost dared to say, religious, in many of its humanly derived applications. Of what gross abuses of authority it has purged human existence; and in how many ways it has ennobled the dignity, and advanced the comfort and welfare of the individual man. Who that has read, that is open to any sense of individual freedom, individual worth, character, and relation to his fellowmen, would return to conditions and times in which a contrary spirit and atmosphere prevailed? In religious life itself, and within easily remembered times, who does not know the different atmosphere in which religious truth and its relation to other human interests is presented to him to-day, and breathed by almost everyone—at least by every English-speaking Catholic?

And yet the influence of what we have called the collectivist camp within the Church has certainly stood in the way at every step. That school has been reactionary at every stage, and yielded but morosely to the conquests of liberty, which were the triumphs of individualism. The extremists do so now—witness the results in France. And in every Catholic country they have succeeded in permitting an indistinct feeling to prevail of antagonism on the part of ancient truth against modern thought, modern democracy and modern liberty.

But now there is growing a new tendency and a new problem. Individualism is threatened from an entirely different source with resistance, impairment, and possible destruction. The element of truth, as we dare call it, in socialism, in organized association, in subordinating individual units to collective units—the truth that humanity is not only a number of personalities, but a collectivist whole, and made up of many similar subsidiary organisms, is taking shape and occupying new grounds every day. What are the trades unions but that? What, in a different way, are great agglomerations of capital? What the many agitated, and partially effected, takings-over by the State and municipalities of so-called "public utilities?" What the paternity of so many paternal theories of governmental help and intervention in the very strong-holds of individualism and liberty?

It is the feeling, the brief experience, that individualism does not spell nor fill the whole account of the welfare and progress of human society; that human society is a great organic whole, a collectivism, greater, more important than any individual in it, than any rights, at least on earth, that he may have as an individual. The *res publica* has been reinterpreted in new and broader meanings, with new emphasis not on the common rights of each, but on the general rights of the whole. The word "public" is being raised to a new pedestal in human thought, and differentiated from that older democracy which was to be the apotheosis of individual liberty.

And this throws its light also upon religious activity. It reflects one side of the fact that we are not merely detached units, but that in some intrinsic way, and therefore by some intrinsic method, the lot of human beings is more or less bound up together; that its organic life as a whole—we might say in a religious sense that its organic prayer—is as necessary as the individual life and prayer of its individual members; that its organic action as a whole and as made up of sub-collective agencies, has powers and virtues which no individual can supplant or supply—in a French phrase, that Humanity is a collectivism. It will not do with an easy sneer to say that this is only another way of stating that man is a social animal; that society is the natural state of man; that society implies government. It means more. It implies, to deeper thought, the truth and the fact that in some wondrous way, the human race is, as it were, one generic entity, (with the sub-organisms within it) only well-fared by a higher generic life and generic principles of action, beyond individual life, individual interests and individual action. And Religion as a Reality—the tie connecting us with God and immortality, through the Creation, the Fall and the Redemption—Religion as a real living Church, is as essential a fact and a factor as the individual conduct in morals and the intellectual opinions of the units that compose it.

The danger confronting us from the standpoint of religion, is whether the new lesser sub-organisms, the newly projected forms and theories of collective life, shall be anti-religious or not. The Church, that divinely constituted organism, has happily in itself the full recognition of both factors of the problem.

"What will it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" is certainly an intensely individualistic proposition.

That no one outside the Church will be saved; that baptism is necessary; all the public ceremonies of the Church, the Holy Mass itself as a *public* homage to the Creator—these are as surely evidences of a collective existence and of collective action. Indeed, we might almost believe that in that transcendent act of Holy Mass, the participation from our side of the leastworthy present were in a way as full of general import, as the general grace and benefit which the great act itself supplies.

Briefly, to conclude the suggestions intended: There is need, and pressing need—in view of the quickly progressing developments of modern life and times—of all the most intense individual effort and of all the organic and collective power and agencies of religious-minded men to assert and enforce the harmony of ancient truth and modern thought, to imbue new longings with old truths, and impress upon new activities the permanent reality of religion; to keep Liberty, that alluring modern goddess, in love with Faith.

Democracy (and so modern thought) has done this much: It has increasingly advanced not simply the emancipation of the individual from the collective thraldom of blind authority, but the personal and intelligent ability of the units to participate in the collective energies of the whole. It has made every one of us doubly responsible. It has enlarged and ennobled the right, and the corresponding duty, of each of us to understand, to be sharers in, and to advance the harmony between ancient truth and modern thought, between liberty and authority, between faith and reason—to fit the individual freeman for active value in the collective cause of God's Kingdom.

Albert Reynaud.

THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST. I.

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.

Those who venture to treat doctrinally any phase of the profound mystery of the Incarnation must ever bear in mind the warning with which St. Leo I begins his seventh Christmas sermon,[1] viz., that while the glory of the only begotten of the Father must in no wise be obscured, it is equally dangerous to deny due prominence to the earthly life and human character of him "who, when he was in the form of God, emptied himself," who, in the form of a servant, was touched with a feeling for our infirmities, and "tempted in all points, as we are, yet without sin." Some modern theologians have doubtless pressed too far the consideration of the human element in Christ's life—even to the point of losing sight of the divine, while others in their eagerness to insist upon divinity, have not mayhap been sufficiently mindful of the human in Christ. And what is true of the Incarnation in general applies in particular to doctrinal theories concerning the human intellect and human knowledge of the Savior. Here, likewise, either extreme is dangerous, yet the matter is so deeply mysterious that it is hard to define the happy mean—perilous even to attempt it. The writer of these notes believes the time has not yet come for a perfect synthesis, for a complete and final theological treatise on the human knowledge of Christ; but he hopes that the notes may serve as a contribution to the study of a question which is interesting in itself, practical in helping to get a better understanding of the Life of Christ and, consequently, important in its bearing upon New Testament exegesis.

History of the Question.

The question of the human knowledge of Christ is no new one. It exercised the minds of the Fathers in the second and third centuries; it was a living, burning problem at the time of the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; Eulogius, Patriarch of Constantinople, referred it to St. Gregory the Great; concerning it the illustrious Damascene wrote copiously, and the Scholastics from Peter Lombard, Albert the Great and St. Thomas, down to the time of the Reformation, made it the object of their subtle disquisitions. In fine, from the time of the Reformation down to our own day, Protestants and Catholics alike have considered it as most important in theology.

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[1] Festivitatis hodiernæ verus venerator est et pius cultor, qui nec de incarnatione Domini aliquid falsum nec de Deitate aliquid sentit indignum; pari enim periculo malum est illi aut naturæ nostræ veritas aut paternæ gloriæ negatur æqualitas. (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* liv, col. 216.)

Prior to the seventh century, the great Christian writers studied the question as a matter of positive rather than speculative theology, insisting particularly on certain texts of Scripture (John i, 14-18; Mark xiii, 32; Luke ii, 40, 52), in vindication of divergent views. With them the question was whether or not our Lord's human knowledge had any limitations except those which the finite character of the created intellect necessarily imposes. Was it, they asked, a part of his supreme humiliation to lack a knowledge of some things? or did not the divine and human make such limitation inconceivable, impossible? The words of St. John (i, 14), declaring the Word made flesh to be full of grace and truth, and similar texts (v. g. ibid. v, 18), were naturally adduced in favor of the latter view, while other passages, especially Luke ii, 52: "And Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and man"—(cfr. ibid, v, 40),—and Mark xiii, 32, where the Savior seems to restrict the knowledge of the day of judgment to the Father alone to the exclusion even of the Son, led some of the Fathers to insist upon growth from the imperfect to the more perfect, to infer also that of some things Christ as man might not have had fulness of knowledge. St. Basil, St. Amphilochius, Didymus, St. Gregory Nazianzen would not admit limitation in Christ's human knowledge, and they interpreted Mark xiii, 32, as an allusion to the mystery of the Trinity, where to the Father is assigned a pre-eminence because he eternally communicates all knowledge to the Son. But other great writers such as Tertullian, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Athanasius, St. Jerome, Theodoret, Leontius Byzantinus did not hesitate to affirm that Christ as man knew not the last day, and that he grew in wisdom as he grew in stature; while others equally renowned, such as St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great interpret Christ's silence in Mark xiii, 32, as simply "*economice,*" i. e., he said he knew not, simply because he was not commissioned by the Father to reveal such truth to men.

From the days of Gregory the Great down through the great scholastic age, Catholic theologians have followed almost unanimously the doctrine which denies any limitation in the human knowledge of Christ other than that necessarily inherent in every created intelligence.

But the question has taken a new form, at least in modern non-Catholic theology, because of the so-called *Kenosis* question.[1] The Reformation had hardly begun, when on the Protestant side there arose a controversy between Zwingli and Luther about the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Zwingli maintained a spiritual presence only, while Luther asserted that the body of Christ was in, with and under the bread. It was an easy step from this particular point to the discussion of the presence of Christ in general. In fact, after Luther's death, from Buntz to the "Formula of Concord," the debate centered around the Person of Christ, and the union of the two natures in that Person, with a view to a basis for the doctrine of Christ's presence in the Eucharist. Then it entered on the stage known as the "Giessen-Tübingen Controversy," where the discussion, confined strictly to the Lutheran side, was chiefly concerning the earthly humiliation of Christ, and how to adjust the Lutheran theory with historical facts of the life of Christ. Dr. Bruce in the *Humiliations of Christ* treats this whole subject with remarkable fulness, and concludes with these words (p. 113): "Lutheran Christology in its zeal for the deification of Christ's humanity, really robs us of the Incarnation. If, as Lutheran theologians taught, the personal union necessarily involves the communication of divine attributes to the humanity, then, in so far as Christ's humanity was like ours it was uninformed with the Deity—Christ *qua* real man was mere man. The Incarnate God was not to be seen in Jesus of Nazareth; he was an airy, ghostly personage, as invisible as God himself, omnipresent, after an illocal manner, intangible, superior to all human needs and infirmities, immortal, omniscient, omnipotent." If the Lutheran attempted to glorify the majesty of Christ's humanity, the Reformed insisted more on its reality. The *Kenosis* of St. Paul was applied by them to the divine nature—not that they denied the "*insepara-*

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[1] For the benefit of those who are not students of theology it may be well to explain in connection with "*Kenosis*" and "*Kenotic*" that the term as well as the notion it represents, is derived from the Epistle to the Philippians (ii, 6 seq.) where St. Paul represents the mystery of the Incarnation as involving a certain self-limitation or abasement on the part of the Eternal Word, "Who being in the form of God thought it not rapine to be equal with God. But *emptied* (ἐκένωσεν) himself, taking the form of a servant."

biliter" and "*inconfuse*" of Chalcedon, but the divinity was robbed of its splendor. Their favorite illustration was that of the sun obscured by a cloud. In *De Incarnatione*, Lib. i, p. 34, Zanchi writes: "Under the form of a servant the form of God was so hid that it scarcely appeared any longer to exist, as is also the light of the sun when it is covered by a dense cloud." Here the more difficult question arises as to what is meant by this occultation? How did it affect the divine nature? What was the influence of the human on the divine? Zanchi did not deny that in his human nature Christ was possessed of the beatific vision, seeing all things in God—while Hulsius later on made Christ like us in all things, even in limitation of knowledge. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the attempt was made to unite the opposing branches of the German Protestant Church. Connected with this union-movement in origin as well as aim, was the Christology of the *Kenosis*.

All the theories involved in this controversy emphatically affirm the reality of the human nature in Christ, and have endeavored to square themselves to the historical Christ as depicted in the gospel story. Thus, naturally, arose the question, how did this perfect humanity co-exist with fulness of divinity? Some, in order to save the perfect man in Christ, have simply denied the Incarnation in the Catholic sense, and advocated purely Kenotic views. Bruce[1] divides them into five classes:

> "First, there are those who take their stand on absolute, thorough-going naturalism, refusing to recognize miracle in any sphere, physical or moral, and thus declining to accept even the old Unitarian view of Christ, according to which, while only a man, He was yet a perfect man. There are others, who, while naturalistic in their philosophic proclivities, shrink from the thorough-going application of the principles with which they secretly sympathize, and though readily consenting to banish the supernatural from the physical sphere, at the expense of philosophic consistency retain it in the ethical, and with the Catholic Church confess the sinlessness of Christ. A third party, though really at one with the first school in opinion, sides with the latter in feeling . . . and endeavors in its whole delineation of Christ's life and character to embrace in the picture as much as possible of the extraordinary and wonderful. . . . To these three phases . . . may be added a fourth . . . characteristic of those who, while imbued with the scientific spirit of our time, and paying great deference to the incredulous attitude of science towards the miraculous, can scarcely be regarded as occupying any definite philosophic position. Men belonging to this school are quite willing to accept the account Jesus gave of himself, as far as they can gather it from the evangelic records. Turning away from all controversy concerning the

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[1] *Op. cit.*

person of Christ, as from something they cannot understand, . . . they go back to the fountain-head and try to put themselves in the position of those who were eye and ear witnesses of the Word, and to form for themselves an impression of him at first hand. The impression they form is much the same as that expressed by Peter: "Thou art Christ the Son of the living God." When asked what they mean by such words, they reply in effect: 'We cannot tell; the power of Christ is to be felt, not explained.' Finally, the fifth class embraces all those who, while agreeing with naturalistic theologians in rejecting the Catholic doctrine, do so, not on speculative grounds, but on the grounds of positive exegesis."

But leaving these aside, there are others who have attempted to build up what may be called Kenotic theories on the old foundation, viz., that Christ is God and man. Different solutions have been suggested. Scheneckburger[1] hardly does more than restate the old Reformed position. Dorner[2] hints at something which Dr. Schaff calls the theory of a gradual or progressive Incarnation. But these theories are not strictly Kenotic, for in modern days the dominant idea in Kenotic theories has been that in order to make the actual historical Christ possible, the eternal pre-existent Logos annihilated himself to the measure our humanity. Dr. Bruce in his enumeration counts four distinct types: (1) The absolute dualistic, of which he makes Thomasius the representative; (2) the absolute metamorphic type represented by Gess; (3) the absolute semi-metamorphic type taught by Ebrard; (4) the real or relative upheld by Martensen; and since Dr. Bruce, we have the views represented by Canon Gore in *Lux Mundi* and the *Bampton Lectures*, and others. In the theory of Thomasius the Incarnation is a self-emptying of the divine manner of existence, and of the divine glory manifested in the ruling of the world. Taking the example of Christ sleeping during the storm, he asks: "What sleep could there be for Him, who as God, not only was awake, but as ruler of the world brought on the storm?" When pressed further by the question: how can even a self-limited God be really God? he answered: "Self-limitation is an act of the will—therefore an affirmation of existence, and the essence of God is will and light and action. Delitzsch[3] regards *Kenosis* much in the same light. He also considers the question as the holiest of problems, but cannot conceive the twofold nature in the unity of Person tenable in view of the utterances of Holy Writ, except in so much as the Logos gives up his eternal mode of existence, gives up omniscience, omnipresence, etc., etc., while he still retains the identity of his eternal Being. This opinion of Thomasius is shared by Kahnis. In the theory of Gess there was a real depotentiation of the Incarnate Word, and he is followed by both Reuss and Godet.

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[1] *Fur Kirchlichen Christologie,* and also *Vergleichende Darstellung des Lutherischen und Reformisten Lehrbegriffs.*

[2] *Doctrine of the person of Christ.*

[3] *System der biblischer Psychologie.*

This type is thoroughly Appollinarian in its Christology; and Gess, though he stated that the Church was right in considering Apollinaris a heretic, did not hesitate to say that the Church did not see that the Logos himself was the soul of Christ. Consequently the Logos did not assume but really became a human soul, making the presence of another soul simply superfluous.[1]

Hofmann is seemingly of the same school, though a trifle more reticent in his expression of Apollinarian theology. In the *Kenosis* of Ebrard the divinity was disguised, not in the old Reformed sense of occultation, but in the sense that the divine properties, while held by Christ, were so held only in the time-form appropriate to a human mode of existence, in a word, an exchange of the eternal for a time-form of existence.[1]

Those who follow Martensen, whose ideas are expressed in *Die Christliche Dogmatik*, admit not only a relative, but at the same time a real *Kenosis*. There is a real depotentiation of the Logos in the Man-Christ, while in the *world at large* the Logos carries on the work of Mediator and Revealer. Of a consequence there is a double life, a pure divine Logos working throughout the kingdom of nature, a depotentiated Logos working within the compass of humanity. This type of *Kenosis* seems to be favored by Mr. Hutton in his *Theological and Literary Essays*. Godet of Neufchatel, whom Canon Gore seems to follow, at least in part, makes the *Kenosis* consist in laying aside not only the metaphysical attributes of God, as omnipotence and omniscience, but also the moral attributes of immutable holiness and perfect infinite love, and most surprising of all, his personal consciousness: "He knew himself as Son with that knowledge with which the Father himself knew him eternally, and here is the self-stripping on which all the foregoing depends—that consciousness of Sonship which was his light, he let it be extinguished within him." Through this abasement, "he was able to enter into a human development, completely similar to ours."[3] Canon Gore's thought is more difficult to catch Holding as he does. the council of Chalcedon, he finds no little trouble in expressing his Kenotic ideas. In the 6th of the *Bampton Lectures* (1891) p. 147, he writes of Christ: "He does not appear to teach out of an absolute, divine omniscience, but rather as condetained by human nature," and though he attempts to correct this by the statement that Christ's knowledge was indeed extraordinary —was indeed a supernatural illumination—still "all such illumination, if of a higher quality, was analogous to that vouchsafed to prophets and Apostles. It is not necessarily divine consciousness and it coincides in our Lord with apparent limitations of knowledge."

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[1] *Die Lehre von der Person Christ*, ii, p. 321.

[2] Vid. *Das Dogma von heiligen Abendmahl*; also *Christliche Dogmatik*

[3] *Gifford*, pp. 157, 158.

The serious diffculty here is in the idea of a depotentiated Logos. Nor is it a question whether such a theory is within the realm of possibility as conceived by our limited intelligence; it is rather a question of fact to be settled by such data of revelation as we have at hand. All who have espoused Kenotic theories have had recourse to St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians ii, 6. In view of these words some kind of *Kenosis* must be admitted; but commentators, Protestant and Catholic alike, are far from agreed as to the interpretation to be placed upon this difficult passage, some seeing in St. Paul a most rigid theological orthodoxy, others recognizing almost a pure humanism. Dr. Gifford[1] has given us a brief history of the interpretation of the text. Those interested in the question will find it to their advantage to run over these well ordered notes, in which he has discussed one after the other, the interpretations of Baur, Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Luther, Dorner, Chemnitz, Daneau, Zanchi, Ottley, Pfleiderer, Hilgenfeld, Ritschl, Harnack, Powell and Godet. (See also Bruce, note, p. 357). It would seem far from wise to formulate a theory which is basic in the mystery of the Incarnation on a text, in the interpretation of which the wisest commentators so widely disagree; and we have here but another indication of the fatality of pure private judgment in matters of faith. Further on I shall endeavor to trace what seems to be the mind of St. Paul in the text, but for the present let the very difficulty of the matter keep us humble, and keep us from formulating a theory to explain the Incarnation on a single text so confessedly difficult and obscure. One can see readily how the accepted Kenotic theories affect the question of the human knowledge of Christ and how a "depotentiated Logos" theory must give us in Christ only a human consciousness even though such consciousness is supernaturally illuminated to the highest degree.

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[1] *Study of the Philippians* ii, 5-11.

But is the "depotentiated Logos" in conformity with the facts of the Gospel story? and does it not, while explaining the limitation in the knowledge and powers of Christ, run counter to other facts which remain unexplained, yea and inexplicable in such a theory? Held by such men as Delitzsch, Hofmann, Godet, and Gore, the theory is one of extreme importance and is animated by an interest at once religious and scientific; religious because they see in this self-limitation of the Word the depths of his love for man; scientific, because it is but an attempt to show a harmony between Christ's person and the facts of Gospel history, an attempt not unthought of by the Fathers, Irenaeus,[1] Cyril,[2] Hilary,[3] Tertullian,[4] etc.

With us there is little question whether or not such depotentiation is possible. It seems indeed quite irreconcilable with our views of divine immutability, views which Cyril of Alexandria voiced centuries ago in his *Apol. contra Theod. pro* xii. *Capit.* "Being confessedly unchangeable in nature, he was not converted into the nature of flesh, laying aside his own propei nature, but he remained what he was—God." However, there is so little agreement as to what God can do that we must prefer to face the question as one of fact. Can the Kenotists' interpretation be given to the life of Christ as we know it in the recorded history of his sojourn on earth? as we know Christ in the Gospels and other apostolic writings? as we know him in the earliest interpretation of the mystery of the God made flesh? What does St. Paul really mean in Chapter II of his Epistle to the Philippians?[5] He is encouraging his loved ones at Philippi to the practice of humility and self-denial, and he urges upon them the example of Christ in the mystery of man's redemption. Christ was in possession of all things by divinely inherent right. He abased himself in becoming man, and as man lowered himself to the condition of outcast and no man. He begins by exhorting them to have the mind which was also in the Savior. Then follow the words concerning which commentators have so disagreed: "Who being in the form of God counted it not a prize (literally a thing to be grasped) to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant". . . . Do the words, (μορφῇ θεοῦ) (in the form of God) refer to the divine glory visible at the throne of God, the dazzling radiance of which was put off by Christ in the mystery of the Incarnation? Or can they mean form in the sense of appearance, figure, outline? Or does form here signify the nature, the very essence of the Godhead, which need not necessarily include peculiar modes of manifesting the same? Certainly classical usage is not opposed to the latter sense, as one may see by consulting Bishop Lightfoot on the *Philippians* and Dr. Gifford in his admirable essay on this passage of St. Paul. Usage then being not hostile, it seems to us more conformable to the doctrine of St. Paul—more conformable to early tradition to translate μορφῇ Θεοῦ as the very essence of the Godhead. On this Cornelius a Lapide writes (*In Philipp.* ii, 6):

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[1] *Adv. Hæres*, iii, 6.

[2] *Quod unus sit Christus.* Migne 75. Col. 1348.

[3] *De Trinitate*, xi, 48.

[4] *De carne Christi*, v; and *adv. Praxeam*, xxviii.

[5] Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων ὀυχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκνένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών· . . .

> "Verum dico hic et alibi ἡ μορφὴ non significare specimen, exemplum, argumentum sed *formam quæ dat esse rei;* forma ergo Dei est natura Dei, divinitas et Deus ipse. Ita Chrysostomus, Theophylactus, Oecumenius, Hilarius, Augustinus et passim Patres contra Arianos, ut fatetur Erasmus."

Christ, then, being the very God, "did not deem it a prize (to be grasped at) to be on an equality with God," alluding here not to a change of nature, or being, which was impossible, but to a change in mode of being which recalls the sentence of St. Paul to the Corinthians (I. Cor. viii, 9): "Though he was rich, yet he became poor." Stripping himself, therefore, of the trappings of majesty was the first great step in *Kenosis*, in humiliation, which step came in taking the form of a servant. St, Paul explains still further his idea of *Kenosis* by adding: "Being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man"; that is, in form and bearing and language and mode of life, found as other men. But the Apostle sees still greater depths. It was not enough to be found in fashion as a man. Christ must go still lower, and humble himself to death, and not to an ordinary death, but the most abasing sort—death on a gibbet. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross."

And does not such an interpretation seem to be in conformity with St. Paul's doctrine in the Epistle to Timothy (I. Tim. ii, 3-6), where he speaks of Christ as the great God, who gave himself for us? And again in Colossians (i, 15), emphasizing the divinity of Christ against the attacks of the early heretics, he says He is the "image of the Invisible God, the first born of all creation; for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth . . . and in him all things consist," in whom it pleased the Father, that "all fulness should dwell," i. e., all that the divine essence is, all the divine attributes;[1] or, as expressed more clearly further on, in whom "all fulness of the Godhead dwelleth corporally," and this Christ, one with God has made peace for us through his death upon the cross. In I. Cor. ii, 8, he speaks of him as the "Lord of Glory" whom they crucified. Surely these and similar passages can hardly be reconciled with the idea of depotentiation. But be that as it may, no one will venture to deny that at least the writer of the Fourth Gospel considered Jesus equal to the Father. Jesus answered those who persecuted him because he did these things on the Sabbath: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." (John v, 17). And the Jews then sought to kill him, because "not only had he broken the Sabbath, but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God." Further on in the same chapter he asserts his present divinity by declaring (v, 21), that he "quickeneth whom he will"; that he should receive the same honor as the Father (v. 23), (not surely a depotentiated life is that of the Father). This is doubtless Peter's impression when he asserts: "Lord, thou knowest all things" (xxi, 17). Surely in John x, 30, it is asserted with all boldness "I and the Father are one," and when they would cast stones at him, he asked them the reason, and their answer comes clear: "That Thou being man, *maketh thyself God.*" Does he not assert again (John x, 15) that he knows the Father, even as the Father knows him; does he not say boldly to Philip: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father"? (xiv, 9). Further on (v, 23), he places himself on an equality with the Father, saying: "We will come unto him and make our abode with him;" and if this clear statement of the trend of Scripture convince not; if men still see in the expressions of Holy Writ a limited divinity, it is natural to appeal for a decision to the early council of Chalcedon, which, treating the question *ex professo*, and summing up the wisdom of the Fathers of the first centuries, declares: "Following the Holy Fathers we teach and confess . . . the distinction of natures being by no means abolished by the union, but rather what is proper to each being preserved and combined into one person and one hypostasis."

Catholic theology concerning the human knowledge of Jesus Christ has hardly varied since the days of St. Gregory the Great, who in writing to Eulogius against the Agnoetæ expressed his approval of their condemnation and asserted that the teaching of Eulogius was in conformity with the great Western tradition. (*Ep. ad Eulog. xxxix*). The doctrine of Gregory which ascribed all knowledge to Christ was in turn taught by St. John Damascene (*De Hær. Migne xciv, col.* 756,) by St. Anselm, by the great Master of the Sentences (*Lib. iii, Dist.* 13), by St. Bernard (*Migne Pat. Lat.* 182, *col.* 974) and by the great mediæval doctors. St. Thomas Aquinas places in Christ a knowledge which results from the beatific vision; a knowledge which he terms "*infusa*", whether "*per se*" or "*per accidens*"; and in order to meet the difficulty which arises from such texts as Luke ii, 52, insists on giving to Christ what he is pleased to term "*Scientia acquisita.*" (*Summa Theol. iii,* Q *q., x, xi, xii.*) Following St. Thomas, Suarez teaches the received doctrine in his commentary on the *Summa Theol. ad x. Quæst.* De Lugo placed in Christ all the knowledge granted by St. Thomas, although he seems doubtful as regards Christ's cognition of all things possible. The greatest theologian since the Reformation, Petavius, says little or naught of infused or acquired knowledge, but insists that Christ had the beatific vision from the dawn of his human existence (*De Incar.*). He is not loth to grant that there is little indication of this doctrine either in Scripture or early tradition (including the Councils); he even allows that some of the Fathers can hardly be interpreted in this light; still he is firm in holding that Catholic theologians may not depart from the doctrine he espouses, without a certain temerity. (*De Incarnat. Lib. xi, cap. iv.*)[1] Most of the Catholic commentators on Scripture agree with the position put forward by Petavius. See Maldonatus, Cornelius a Lapide, Knabenbauer, etc., in Luke ii, 52, and Mark xiii, 32. See also Schanz, Schegg, etc.)

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[1] See Bishop Ellicott on Philipp. and Coloss. *in loco*, also Bishop Lightfoot in commentary, appended note.

Catholic theologians of our day are almost unanimous in sustaining the traditional position. (Cfr. Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarnato*, p. 426; cfr. Hurter, vol. II, *De Scientia Christi*). The illustrious Innsbruck Professor, Father Stentrup, maintains in a scholarly fashion the ordinary Catholic position, though he candidly admits that there has been in late years a breach in the unanimity of Catholic opinion, and aside from Günther, Baltzer and other scholars, he cites Dr. Klee and also Bishop Laurent, who finds it impossible to reconcile the beatific vision with the passion, or to insist too dogmatically on what is seemingly not clear in Scripture and early tradition. Stentrup is of a consequence not as strong in his condemnation of Klee as Card. Franzelin, who would consider Klee's position as heretical condemned in the Agnoetæ.

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[1] Facile tamen assentiar Theologis qui, licet nondum hoc ad fidei dogmata pertinere dicunt (quod locus in Scriptura sit nullus qui id perspicue declaret; nec ullius auctoritate Synodi generalis aut alia quapiam fidei regula decretum et constitutum fuerit) errori tamen et hereticæ impietati proximum censent, etc., etc.

Non-Catholic theologians since the Reformation have taught some one doctrine, some another. The early Reformed like Zanchi, admitted in Christ the beatific vision. Hulsius (*System Controvers. Theol.*) denied it. All who have espoused Kenotic theories, both on the continent and in England, have taught real limitation in the knowledge of Christ, as is done by the Ritschlian school in all its exponents. Hooker and the earlier Anglican divines are quoted by Powell in his *Principles of the Incarnation*, pp. 318-329, and he concludes by saying: "If there have been any English divines previous to the present century who have given any sort of sanction to the theories maintaining any limitation whatever of the Godhead itself in Jesus Christ our Lord, the present writer can only say that he cannot guess who they can be." Powell himself in the work above quoted, does not grant, in a general way, any limitation in Christ's human knowledge, though he is inclined to admit "ignorance of the last day" as a proof of the real humanity of Christ. "We may suppose," he writes, (p. 42) "our Lord withheld the communication of this one particular from his human mind, in order that its human verity might be thereby conclusively manifested. One instance was quite enough to establish this, just as one statement that he grew in wisdom was enough to show that the law of growth . . . was followed in Him as it is in us." Among other English writers of our epoch, Swayne, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man;* Sanday, *Oracles of God;* Forrest, *Christ of History and Experience;* Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation;* Dale, *Christian Doctrine;* Bruce, *Humiliations of Christ*, etc., all admit more or less tentatively both the gradual development of Jesus' human mind, and a real limitation of his human knowledge. What is said of theologians is also true of modern commentators on the New Testament, especially when giving the exegesis of Luke ii, 52, Mark xiii, 32, and Matthew xxiv, 36.

The question of the breadth and scope of Christ's knowledge has in our time received particular attention, because of special studies in the life of our Lord and on the meaning of the Gospel, but particularly because of the critical work now being done by Protestant and Catholic alike on the Books of the Old Testament. The vast majority of critical scholars are being led by what seems to be the logic of observed facts to recede not a little from the formerly received theories concerning the date and authorship of many of the Old Testament writings, and it is often asserted that Christ's knowledge of the same is involved in the conclusions reached. What, it is asked, was Christ's view of the Old Testament when referring to Moses and Jonah; what was his view of the 110th Psalm, when he attributed it to David? These difficulties are noticed and tentatively discussed by modern Catholic writers, v. g., Howlett in the *Dublin Review*, April, 1901; Lagrange in *La Revue Biblique.* Moreover, there are certain noticeable indications in the New Testament (even apart from the classical instances above mentioned) which at first sight at least, would seem to point to a limitation of Christ's knowledge, particularly in connection with the words attributed to Him concerning the *Parousia*, a problem ever fraught with difficulty to the Scripture worker. However that may be, it certainly seems inadmissible—no less contrary to sound reason than to the data of revelation—to seek a solution through any of the modern Kenotic theories involving a depotentiation of the Logos. For, to quote St. Cyril of Alexandria:

> "God being confessedly unchangeable in nature, he was not converted into the nature of flesh, laying aside his own proper nature; but he remained what he was—God. How, then, did he become poor? Thus, in that being God by nature and Son of the Father, he became man, and was born of the seed of David, according to the Flesh, and subjected himself to the servile, that is to the human measure of things, and having become man, he was not ashamed of the measure of humanity." (*Apol. Contra Theod. Anath. x. Migne, Tom. ix, p.* 440).

There arises, then, the question: can a man holding the fullest orthodoxy admit any limitation in Christ's knowledge? To illustrate: Can St. Luke ii, 40 and 52, be understood as meaning a real growth in knowledge and wisdom? Can Mark xiii, 32, be interpreted literally as it stands? Petavius, Suarez and De Lugo hold such a position to be rash though not against faith; some modern theologians, such as Cardinal Franzelin, think it already a doctrine "condemned in the Agnoetæ," but this is far from certain. Nay, more, the opposite appears to be nearer the truth, and Natalis Alexander writing anent the case of the Agnoetæ does not hesitate to say:[1] "Their error, however, did not consist in simply ascribing ignorance of some things to Christ as man, but in their contention that his absolute knowledge was confined within the limits of his human knowledge, for they recognized in Christ but one composite nature." In support of this view the learned writer refers to St. Isidore (*Lib.*8, *De Orig.*), to St. John Damascene (*Lib. de Hœres.*), and also to Leontius whom he quotes as saying: "It is our opinion that a subtle inquisition into such questions is quite out of place, nor was the Council of Chalcedon anxious concerning the question." Then he asserts that almost all the Fathers believed in a certain limitation of Christ's human knowledge and cites Luke ii, 52, in that connection.

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[1] Natalis Alexander. *Selecta Hist. Eccles.* vi, cap. iii, art. iii.

This much at least is sure: Catholic faith acknowledges in the Savior perfect divinity and perfect humanity united in the unity of the divine Person. Against Apollinaris it has been defined that in Christ there is a perfect human soul; against the Monothelites, a perfect human will. The human soul of Christ as a created thing is necessarily *finite*; as finite, necessarily limited. So true is this that the doctrine asserting that the soul of Christ saw God as clearly as God sees himself, was condemned in the Council of Basle. Whether the soul of the Redeemer enjoyed the beatific vision, whether all manner of infused and acquired knowledge belonged to him as man, are not questions which can be settled exclusively on *a priori* grounds; they are questions of fact, which can only be known from the data of divine revelation. In the revelation, then, of the mystery of the Incarnation, in the revelation of the hypostatic union, is there necessarily contained a revelation of the beatific vision in Christ from the dawn of his existence; of the fulness of all knowledge even from his mother's womb? Seemingly the Church has given no definite decision. It is a question, then, that must be settled so far as may be for the present, through a careful study of the Scriptures, the Fathers and the theologians.

Edward J. Hanna.

THE NEW KNOWLEDGE AND THE OLD PHLOSOPHY

I. THE QUESTION OF SPECIES IN THE INORGANIC WORLD

Walter McDonald, D. D.

The controversy raised by Darwin made the term "species" familiar to the last generation; yet I doubt whether many of the nineteenth century disputants were aware of the full meaning which the term conveyed to philosophers of former ages—a meaning which it still retains in many of the Catholic schools.

Thirty or forty years ago the question of specific distinction was restricted, practically, to living organisms, and seemed to be altogether one of origin and efficient cause,—of how species are produced rather than of what they are. Yet the latter is the more fundamental form of the question; which is probably the reason why it was under this aspect it appealed to the great philosophers of the past, from Thales to Descartes.

Almost as far back as there is any record of philosophical teaching, there were two great divisions of opinion, according as the difference between species was believed to go down into the very substance or to be merely one of shape and structure. Aristotle taught that bodies are substantially different; that if we could divest them of shape, structure, and accident of every kind, leaving only the crude stuff of which we are wont to think as underlying and sustaining phenomena, we should find this stuff still differing in kind, gold being gold, and iron iron; the differences between them being the result of the quality or nature of the stuffs or substances themselves. This teaching of the Stagyrite succeeded in capturing the mind of the world that was influenced by Greek thought; and, deriving new life from the genius of St. Thomas, held absolute sway for more than four hundred years in the philosophical schools that were influenced by the teaching of the Catholic Church.

There was, however, another opinion, apparently older, which maintained that difference of species is due altogether to diversity of structure; so that if it were possible to take a piece of gold and a piece of iron and divest them of all internal arrangement of parts, there would be discovered a single kind of stuff, neither gold nor iron, but something homogeneous in itself, and different from both these metals. It wou'd be found, moreover, that this uniform stuff could be converted into gold or iron if it could be made to assume the mode of structure whereby either of these bodies is characterized. According to this view, all species are the same one substance under various structural forms, specific distinction being altogether due to the structure. This holds not only of inorganic matter but of living organisms—and even of man, according to many extreme advocates of the general doctrine. This view of nature, long banished from the schools, was restored by Descartes, and may be said to hold now a sway as absolute as that which the genius of St. Thomas secured for the teaching of Aristotle. The age-long struggle has been waged with wavering success, and possibly the final victory is not yet secured. Let us examine both these opinions more closely and see what they have in common and how they differ.

Framework of the Scholastic Theory. In the teaching of those close students of Aristotle, the Schoolmen, four main features arrest attention: (1) first matter; (2) substantial form; (3) dispositions for this form; and (4) actions whereby these dispositions may be modified.

(I) First matter may be roughly described as an absolutely uniform, or rather structureless semi-substance. It is a reality, not nothing; in itself void of all structure, but capable of receiving any structure whatsoever; and, though a reality, incapable of existing unless completed or backed up by a complementary semi-substance; somewhat, though not quite, as motion cannot be actually separated from a rate of speed, or figure from some definite form or shape.

Being void of structure of any kind, even the most elementary, this first matter is of itself absolutely uniform -in the sense of being formless; it may, however, get or lose any form of structure whatsoever; and according as it has one structure or another,—say, that of gold or of iron,—it will help to form the substance or species of which the structure in question is characteristic. In this way first matter passes unchanged from species to species; from the oxygen of the air into carbonic acid and the tissues of plants and animals; remaining throughout unchanged in itself, but changing structure with the various species which it helps to constitute.

(2) The substantial form is the other semi-substance whereby

first matter, according to the Scholastic concept, is completed and enabled to subsist. It is not a form in the sense of figure or mode of structure; though, as we shall see, its continued existence depends on the continuance of a peculiar mode of structure in the first matter whereby it is completed, and which itself completes. It is a substance rather than an accident; that is, it underlies and supports rather than is supported by something more fundamental; so, however, as to be a half rather than a full substance; seeing that, except in one case—that of the human soul—it needs to be not so much supported as backed up and completed by first matter, in order that both may subsist together, though each is incapable of subsisting apart. The great difference between the two is that whereas the first matter may, under different forms of structure, pass from species to species, each true species has its own peculiar substantial form whereby it is made specific; so that when water is formed by an electric spark from a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen, a totally new substantial form—that of water—is produced; whereas the first matter remains the same in the liquid as it was in the gases, though now under a different mode of structure.

(3) It is the constant teaching of the Schoolmen that before any kind of form can be united to first matter, this must have acquired what they called the dispositions for that special form. They do not seem to have had very definite notions as to what these dispositions are in themselves; in whatever notions they had, however, they seem to have identified dispositions with arrangements of parts; which in the language of the moderns would be translated as modes of structure. Accordingly, it will not, I fancy, be far from the truth if we regard it as a part of the Scholastic system that before first matter can receive a particular kind of substantial form, it must have received a mode of structure adapted to the form in question; and, correlatively, that a substantial form of any kind, say that of water, cannot combine with the first matter of oxygen and hydrogen to form water, until the oxygen and hydrogen structures have disappeared and the first matter has assumed the mode of structure adapted to the water-form.

Modern advocates of the Scholastic philosophy who may read this may, I fear, be inclined to call it in question, and to maintain that no accident, such as structure, intervenes, according to the theory, between the first matter and the substantial form, the latter being antecedent to all accidents, at least logically. No doubt this was often said; but it was no less the constant teaching that first matter must be disposed for the reception of the form. Are not these dispositions logically antecedent to the form? And since the Schoolmen represented them as arrangements of the parts of the quantified first matter, shall we not conceive them best if we represent them, according to modern notions, as modes of structure?

(4) It was acknowledged that external agents could act on a body so as to modify the dispositions of its first matter, necessitating the disappearance of the substantial form hitherto existing, and the production of one or more others to suit the new mode or modes of disposition resulting. Fire acts thus on wood, or a mortal wound on a vegetable or animal, altering the structure and thereby rendering the first matter at once incapable of junction with the old form and capable of a new.

What to the mind of the Schoolmen were these actions in themselves? I have discussed the question at great length in a special treatise, and have come to the conclusion that, however obscurely they may have thought and written, the teaching of the Philosopher and some of his ablest disciples was that the actions of inorganic agents such as we contemplate here—those actions which modify the structure whereby first matter is disposed for the reception and retention of substantial forms—are identical with local motion. This has been called in question; but all that I have heard or seen since the treatise referred to was published tends to confirm me in the conviction of the truth of the teaching.

Theory now Prevalent: Comparison. Modern writers on chemistry are wont to classify in two divisions—as either elements or compounds—all the forms of matter of which they have any knowledge. The elements, seventy or more in number, were till recently regarded as simple; that is, as incapable of being converted into one another, or, indeed, of being made anything but what they are. Not only was there no philosopher's stone whereby the baser metals could be turned into gold, but even the conversions that do take place were not regarded as true substantial conversions, since whatever change occurred affected merely the arrangement of the parts of the substances concerned, the substances themselves remaining unchanged. This, it is true, was formally set forth merely as an hypothesis; but it can hardly be denied that till recently most chemists regarded it as a statement of objective fact.

It must be confessed, however, that at least since the time of Prout (A. D. 1815) a suspicion had been growing, especially in the minds of chemists and physicists of the very first rank, that elements and compounds are still made up of some one uniform elementary substance,—that they are all but the same one stuff under different shapes or modes of structure.

This conception of the nature of matter is now universal, owing to the discovery of new forms of radio-activity and certain peculiarities of radium and other substances; so that the theory of the constitution of matter now universally accepted by chemists and physicists may be said to be constructed on the following framework: (1) matter, in itself absolutely homogeneous; (2) different modes of structure, to correspond with the different species of elements and compounds; (3) actions whereby these modifications of structure may be produced. A brief comparison of the two theories will help to a clearer conception of both.

(1) Matter in both theories is in itself absolutely uniform—more strictly, formless; it is the same in all things, gases, liquids, inorganic solids, plants, and animals. It remains unchanged throughout all manner of changes, not only in the inorganic world, but in living organisms. It is capable of structure, and its species or character varies with the different modes of structure which it assumes.[1] The moderns, however, regard it as a full substance, capable of self-subsistence; whereas, according to the Scholastic theory, it is but a sort of semi-substance, and needs always to be backed up by its fellow and complementary semi-substance, the substantial form. Apart from this difference—of full or part substantial character—the concept of matter in both theories is practically the same.

(2) Moderns take no account of substantial forms; matter, with its accidents of mode of structure and movement, exhausts the sum of the reality; the matter itself being the full and only substance and self-subsisting. The spiritual soul of man, if such there be, is but, as as it were, locally united with the body, in this view; whereas it enters with the first matter into the constitution of the body, according to the philosophers of the School.

(3) Structure and its various modes are practically the same in both theories,—with a noteworthy restriction as to corpuscular, atomic, and molecular condition, to which I shall call attention later on.

(4) Moreover, as to the nature of the actions whereby the different

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[1] The last assertion has to be taken with a certain restriction, inasmuch as there are changes of structure such as liquefaction and vaporization, that do not affect the specific type. It is, nevertheless, true that every species has a mode of structure peculiar to itself, in the theroy of the Schoolmen as well as in that of the moderns.

modes of structure are produced, there need be no difference between the two theories; this, however, is denied by many advocates of the Scholastic view.

Accordingly, the essential point of difference is the substantial form. If for every truly distinct species there is a semi-substance which differs in kind, the formless matter is incapable of independent subsistence; and specific difference is rooted in the substance and not merely in the structure. If, on the contrary, the advance of knowledge now makes it a more tenable theory that all the phenomena of inorganic matter may be explained without having recourse to these semi-substances, every true philosopher will rejoice at the prospect of their disappearance from the world of thought.

Losses and Gains. The progress made during the last century in determining the nature of sound, light, and heat, and especially the recent discoveries in connection with radium, have had the effect of modifying considerably the views of both parties to this celebrated controversy.

(1) For instance, it can no longer be maintained with appearance of reason that elements retain their nature in the compounds which they form,—that the water molecule is composed of atoms of oxygen and hydrogen as such. For it seems to be now recognized by chemists and physicists that even hydrogen atoms are composed of very many tiny corpuscles related to one another in a certain spatial order,[1] and that the same holds *a fortiori* of the atoms of all the elements. Moreover, there is reason to suspect, if not even to believe, that these tiny corpuscles are all alike in substance and form, so that the atoms of the various elements would be differentiated only by reason of the number of corpuscles whereby they are constituted and the different spatial relations of the corpuscles to one another in each. Accordingly, the atom of hydrogen is a certain number of corpuscles arranged in space in a certain order; the oxygen atom a larger number of the same corpuscles with a different spatial arrangement; water a combination of the two, the number of corpuscles in the composite molecule being the sum of those in the three atoms of which it is composed, but the spatial arrangement assuming a new pattern. Inasmuch, there-

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[1] Strictly speaking, the atom is supposed to consist of a number of corpuscles negatively electrified and set in a certain order within a sphere of positive electrifition. The nature of this sphere is impossible to determine; analogy, however, would lead us to suppose that it also is a mode of the one homogeneous substance. For present purposes we may attend merely to the negatively electrified corpuscles without fear of error.

fore, as an atom means not only a certain number of corpuscles but a definite spatial arrangement, it is plain that with the cessation of its peculiar mode of structure in the molecule of the compound, the atom of the component must cease to exist as such. Accordingly, the Schoolmen, who always maintained this disappearance of elements in combination, must be allowed to have scored a point.

(2) As against this their opponents have scored by directing attention to the importance of the different types of structure as explaining the different properties of all the species we know. The Schoolmen, as may be remembered, insisted on a change of what they called the dispositions; whereby, in every case of chemical decomposition and combination, the first matter is made unsuited to the old form or forms and adapted to the new. As a result of modern research, both parties now seem to agree in regarding these dispositions as different modes of structure, very possibly after the analogy of the different kinds of "set" assumed by the floating magnets experimented on by Mayer. As far as an outsider can form an opinion, it would appear that further progress is most likely to result from a pursuit of mathematical and other investigations as to the generation and decomposition of these modes of structure. Here, then, the moderns seem to have shown the way to the disciples of the School, who, however, must get credit for admitting the truth of their opponents' contention.

(3) The same, as I think, applies to the actions of the agents whereby changes of structure are affected,—with the restriction that the identification of these actions with local motion is not allowed by some of the most zealous advocates of the Scholastic doctrine. Moderns are unanimous in holding that these actions—usually light, heat, electricity, and even mere shock—consist altogether of different modes of local movement; whereas the later Schoolmen had come to believe that every true action emanates in some way, not very definitely described, from forces and motive qualities; being conditioned or accompanied by local displacement, but differing in its entity from the movement itself. As already mentioned, I have tried to show that the great masters of the School had glimpses, to say the least, of the modern doctrine; and I believe their disciples will make little progress and must be involved in nebulosity and contradiction till they freely admit that in this matter the more recent view is the correct one.

Individual Unity. There is one other point which deserves special attention, as it is the basis of what may prove to be one of the strongest arguments of the moderns: the unit of individuality in material things. The Schoolmen were wont to regard even air as a continuous substance. This does not mean that they made no allowance for vacant spaces, but only that the continuity which they contemplated was that of a sponge to the ordinary uneducated mind, as distinguished from the discontinuity of a gas to the mind of the modern chemist.

Present-day advocates of the Scholastic doctrine admit that in gases the various molecules are separate individuals; so that in a cubic foot, say, of air, the substantial forms present would be as numerous as the molecules of the mixed gases. As far as I can learn, writers of the same school are agreed that throughout inorganic matter, liquid and solid, the molecules have a separate existence and are distinct individuals; some even go so far as to make the atoms of elements separate individuals; this last, however, was a moot point, at least till recently. It will be seen, accordingly, that here again modern philosophers of the School have modified ancient views to suit new discoveries.

Can they, under the new light that has been thrown on the constitution of the atom, give way further without striking their flag completely? To the mind of the modern chemist not only are the molecules of compounds, such as water, made up of parts set each at a spatial distance from its fellows, but even the atoms of all elements are similarly constructed. What room does this leave for substantial forms? If, owing to the distance between the molecules of a gas such as air, each molecule must have its own individual, substantial form, must not each corpuscle in an atom of hydrogen have a form of its own, seeing that between it and its nearest fellow the spatial separation is as real, though not so great, as between the molecules of a gas? But if the substantial form is restricted in this way to the corpuscle, there is no place for a hydrogen-form as a distinct substance; and the specific difference between that element and oxygen or water becomes one of structural arrangement. The advocates of the Scholastic theory will find it necessary to deal with this aspect of the question.

Further, it seems inconsistent to regard the molecules of a solid, such as limestone or a bar of iron, as separate individuals, somewhat like a greatly condensed gas, and not to hold the same of the molecules found in the tissues of living organisms. Is there complete spatial separation between the molecules which go to form an oak or a dog? If not, it would seem to be necessary to indicate some reason for assigning so different a mode of structure to the matter found in living bodies. If, however, the molecules of organisms should be completely out of contact with one another, what becomes of the argument from the unity of the organism in proof of the necessity of a unifying principle? With this point also the advocates of substantial difference of species will have to deal more explicitly.

Specific Properties and Finality. Apart from the argument just mentioned, the doctrine that specific difference is substantial is based mainly on the difference of properties manifested by the different species, the constancy of these properties while the same specific cast continues, the total change of properties which results from chemical action, and the wonderful order that is manifested amid so much variety. If the entire world is constructed of homogeneous matter in motion, how, it is argued, are we to account for this difference, this order, and this constancy?

Those who reason thus seem to forget structure and its modes. The question is correctly stated in this way: If matter, in itself formless, is capable of assuming certain forms, after types such as those suggested by Mayer's experiments on floating magnets, may it not be that these forms have a peculiar constancy under movement? And would not the motions received by matter while it remains under any peculiar type of structure, necessarily participate in the mode of the structure, and issue from the agent so modified as characteristic actions?

Certainly the very peculiar forms of structure assumed by Mayer's needle-points have a characteristic permanence, in the sense that though very little action brought to bear on the needles will move them from their regular places, they invariably return to these when the pressure is removed. Moreover, the forms of structure they assume do not vary indefinitely, by insensible changes; but stability is secured only when the needles have taken a somewhat regular geometrical formation, analogous, as far as our knowledge goes, to the forms taken by loose sand on a plate that has been made to vibrate to sound, or those taken by polarized light when it passes through double-refracting films; both of which, remarkably enough, remind one of the petals of flowers and the curious shapes assumed by water when it solidifies as snow.

As to the question of order and finality, it is plain that such variety of beautiful forms could not arise with so much constancy unless the movements from which they result were in order from the beginning. The question, however, is: Could it not be that the motion possessed by matter from the beginning was rythmical enough to result in good time in these forms and no others?—that, for instance, the pulsations of the hottest stars may now be such as must of necessity, as they diminish in intensity, result in the regular forms to be witnessed in the matter found on earth?

Most of us believe that the present physical universe with all its variety of species is the result of an evolution of matter from a much simpler state, possibly even form a state of uniformity. This implies that the more or less permanent modes of structure by which even on the Scholastic hypothesis, species are conditioned, have been and are the terms of the process of development; that their diversity, constancy, and beauty, are effects produced by an activity which, in germ at least, belonged to matter from the beginning of movement. Moreover, there is reason to believe that these various specific modifications of structure, so far from being due to the action of special forces emanating form corresponding semi-substantial forms, were and are in every case antecedent to these forms—if there are such—as conditioning their existence. Hence, the admission of a substantial form does not save its advocates from the duty of explaining how the structure of matter has come to be modified, not by indefinitely small diversities, but along definite lines separated by intervals more or less regular. The facts undoubtedly suppose the structured matter to have been moving from the beginning, not casually or indefinitely, but with a regularity however germinal. Until it is shown that such germinal order, of structure and movement, could not result in the variety and constancy which we witness in the species of inorganic matter, the argument from finality will not prove the substantial character of specific distinction.

In this paper I wish merely to point out to the present champions of the doctrine that so long prevailed in the Catholic schools, the points that seem to me, a sympathizer, to need elucidation. Their opponents insist on matter, structure, and movement. Those who stand up for the mediæval conception should not lose sight of structure and its modes, in their efforts to show that something more—in the nature of what I have called a semi-substance—is necessary to explain the phenomena which the different species present.

Walter McDonald.

STUDIES.

ST. JUSTIN MARTYR. II.

Joseph Turmel

DOCTRINES.

God. Providence. Creation. God, "the Absolute God,"[1] (we shall see later on the bearing of this term) is "unbegotten and ineffable."[2] To Him "there is no name given";[3] the terms which we use to designate Him, express only His relations with us.[4] He is "the universal Father,[5] the Demiurge of the world."[6] The Jews imagined that he showed Himself to the patriarchs and conversed with them.[7] But this is a crude error. The Supreme Being "dwells always above the heavens; no man has seen Him; never has He spoken directly with anyone."[8] True, the Scriptures frequently mention interventions of God in human affairs. They relate, for example, that God spoke to Abraham, to Moses; that He came down to see the tower raised by men at Babel; that He shut the door of Noah's Ark. But "you must not imagine that the unbegotten God Himself came down or went up from any place. For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, whatever that is, quick to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a spot, or even to the whole world, for He existed before the world was made. How, then, could He talk with any one, or be seen by any one, or appear on the smallest portion of the earth?[1] . . . He who has but the smallest intelligence will not venture to assert that having left His supercelestial dwelling, He was visible on a little portion of the earth.[2] Neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other man, saw the Father and ineffable Lord of all."[3] Such is the doctrine concerning God which is set forth by the author of the *Apologies* and the *Dialogue with Trypho.*

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[1] First *Apol.*, 13.

[2] These two epithets (especially the second one "ineffable") are often applied either conjointly or separately, to the Supreme God, (cfr. First *Apol.*, 9, 61; Second *Apol.*, 10, 12, 13; *Dialogue with Trypho*, 126, 127, etc.) The first of the epithets is derived from Plato's definition of God as "one beyond all essence" (*Dialogue with Trypho*, 4.)

[3] Second *Apol.*, 6.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Cfr. *Dial.*, 114, 127; Second *Apol.*, 6; First *Apol.*, 13, 46. The expression "Producer of all" in First *Apol.*, 13, is worthy of notice.

[6] Τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ.

[7] *Dial.*, 114; First *Apol.*, 63.

[8] *Dial.*, 56. Moses declared that the one who appeared to Abraham "was sent from the Lord who remains in the heavens, the Maker and Father of all."

Justin reproaches the pagan philosophers with the denial of Providence, or at least with a tendency to admit only a general Providence which has regard for races only and not for individuals.[4] The reproach is sufficient to show that the great apologist believes in a particular Providence. But this God, who remains eternally motionless in the supercelestial heights, and who has never had direct relations with mankind, can exercise His Providence only through agents. Who are these agents? "God," we read in the Second *Apology,* committed the care of men and of all things under heaven to angels whom He appointed over them."[5] Hence we see that in the Justinian theology, God's Providence is exercised by means of angels.

"We have been taught that God in the beginning did of His goodness, for man's sake, create all things out of unformed matter."[6] This text of the First *Apology* seems to conceive God as an architect whose work is restricted to establishing order in uncreated matter. And this impression is much strengthened by this other passage from the same work: "It was from our teachers—we mean the account given through the prophets—that Plato borrowed his statement that God, having altered matter which was shapeless, made the world.[7] Hear the very words spoken through Moses. . . . 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was invisible and unfurnished.' . . . So that both Plato and they who agree with him, and we ourselves, have learned, and you also can be convinced that, by the Word of God the whole world was made out *of those elements* spoken of before by Moses."[1] Here, Justin does not restrict himself, as in the foregoing text, to speaking of the "unformed matter" and the "elements" which God used to fashion the world; he declares that Plato derives from Moses his teaching on the origin of the universe, and that Christians are in agreement with the author of *Timæus* in his explanation of the existence of the world.[2]

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[1] *Dial.,* 127.

[2] *Dial.,* 60.

[3] *Dial.,* 127.

[4] *Dial.,* 1.

[5] Second *Apol.,* 5.

[6] First *Apol.,* 10.

[7] First *Apol.,* 59.

How could he use such language if he admitted the doctrine of Creation? How could he stop at the *unformed matter*, and not go further? He was so ready and successful in noting the superiority of the Christian system over philosophical theories, even when they have Plato for their author,[3] that we may well ask how it is that he neglected the opportunity of making a point which here presented itself. There is reason to suspect that the founder of apologetics was not aware of the doctrine of Creation, and that he himself held to a dualism.[4]

Angels. Demons. The Devil. The Problem of Evil. We have already seen that from the beginning God made the angels the agents of His Providence, and entrusted them with the government of the world. The results of this arrangement were not entirely satisfactory. St. Justin tells us that "one of the princes" of the angelic host "deceived Eve."[5] And this betrayal of trust was not an isolated case. "The angels," we read in the Second *Apology*, "trangressed this appointment, and were captivated by the love of women, and begat children who are those that are called demons."[1] The "prince" who led Eve astray was good until the day when our first mother was an occasion of sin to him. From that moment he "fell,"[2] and under the name of "Satan," or "Devil," or "Serpent," he became a rebel.[3] The demons also whom the lustful angels had begotten were of the same evil mind. They put themselves under the leadership of Satan and became his soldiers; and this wicked host set itself to oppress the human race, to lead it astray into the practice of magic, to make it worship its deceivers, and to plant discord and lust in its heart.[4] Socrates strove to enlighten men, and to save them from the yoke of the demons. His noble enterprise brought upon him the hatred of these perverse spirits, who had him condemned to death.[5] What Socrates essayed in vain, the Christians have accomplished. They have turned the human race from the worship of idols, under which the demons held themselves concealed. Every day they drive these maleficent beings from the bodies of men in whom they have taken up their abode.[6] And for this reason they are exposed to the rage of the whole demoniac host.[7] Here, then, is the secret of the persecutions which the disciples of Christ have to undergo. And here too is the explanation of the origin of evil. Wars, adulteries, all the calamities which afflict the earth come from demons, and from Satan, their chief.[8] Evil does not come from God, as the philosophers believed.[9]

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[1] *First Apol.*, 59.

[2] The following text is also worthy of notice: "Sunday is the day on which we all hold our common assembly, because it is the day on which God, having wrought a change in the darkness and matter, made the world." (First *Apol.*, 67).

[3] We shall adduce later, examples of that frame of mind.

[4] As a rule, theologians have not taken up the task of examining Justin's teachings on the origin of the world. Maran, by exception, saw that they presented a problem, which he tried to solve, (*Præfatio*, ii, 2). He grants that the illustrious apologist makes "nullam vel levem hujus creationis mentionem." But he ascribes this silence to the circumstances, which, he says, did not require him to mention creation. And to settle all doubt, he quotes the *Cohortatio*, which teaches creation. This latter argument would be decisive if the *Cohortatio* were Justin's, but, as it is generally agreed nowadays that it is not his, the argument is valueless. To the first argument may be answered: Justin's thesis, as we shall see further on, is that Christian doctrine on the Logos and the Trinity is neither altogether opposed nor altogether similar to that of Plato; and that this philosopher frequently misunderstood the Biblical texts, with which he was acquainted. It is evident that this thesis can be solidly established only by showing the contrasts existing between Platonic and Christian doctrine on the origin of things. It would be a matter of surprise if Justin were to conceal the dissimilarities, and put in relief only the points of agreement of the two doctrines.

[5] *Dial.* 124.

To sum up, those who were to have been the protectors of the human race, and to lead it to happiness, have been the cause of its downfall. Does this mean that the ruin of the Creator's plan has been complete? No, God has found a way to repair, at least in part, the wrong done by the demons. Henceforward the reign of evil spirits, if not altogether destroyed, is at least set tottering to its fall—evidence of which is given by the exorcisms just mentioned. And the defeats they now undergo are only preliminary to the final overthrow that awaits them. After the general Judgment, the host of demons, including their leader, the Devil, will be cast into hell. At present these evil beings people the air, when they are not squatting under the statues of idols or in the hearts of evil-doers. But after the resurrection of the dead they will burn in fire.[1] They are not ignorant of the fate which awaits them; at least Satan knows it ever since Christ came to the earth, and that is why he, who formerly did not dare to curse God, now gives himself up without restraint to blasphemy.[2]

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[1] Second *Apol.*, 5. See also First *Apol.*, 5.

[2] *Dial.*, 124. He fell *because* he deceived Eve. Justin is not aware of the doctrine which ascribes the fall of the devil to a sin of pride committed before the creation of man. It is difficult to say what notion he has of the sin into which Satan led Eve. In the first two centuries we meet with different texts which consider it as having been carnal intercourse. It is not impossible that Justin shared this opinion. But this remains only a conjecture.

[3] Concerning the names of "Satan" and "serpent," see *Dial.*, 79, 103, 124.

[4] First *Apol.*, 5, 10, 58; and Second *Apol.*, 5.

[5] First *Apol.*, 5, 46.

[6] First *Apol.*, 9, 10; *Dial.*, 116.

[7] *Dial.*, 30; Second *Apol.*, 6.

[8] *Dial.*, 18, 39, 46, 131; First *Apol.*, 12.

[9] Second *Apol.*, 5.

Moreover, the rebellion of the angels was not general. A part of the heavenly spirits remained faithful to God. Being especially taken up with the demons and the ruin they wrought, Justin has little to say about the good angels. He refers to them only in passing, and his teachings concerning them can be reduced about to this—that the angels dwell in heaven,[3] where they live on manna;[4] and whence they will return at the end of time to assist at the general Judgment.[5] In only one place does he stop to speak of them. It is to tell us that the 24th Psalm[6] is an account of the dialogue held between the Holy Spirit and the angels on the day of the Ascension; that the latter, not knowing who He was who presented Himself,[7] let the Saviour arrive at the gate of heaven without opening to Him; that they did not come to their senses even after the first order given by the Holy Spirit; and that they carried it out only after receiving the explanation: "It is the Lord of hosts who is come."

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[1] First *Apol.*, 28, 45; Second *Apol.*, 8. In these passages Justin states that God has not yet struck the devils. So they are still on the earth.

[2] This is according to a text quoted by St. Irenæus (v, 26): "Truly has Justin remarked: that before the Lord's appearance Satan never dared to blaspheme God, inasmuch as he did not know his own sentence . . . ; but that after the Lord's appearance, when he had clearly ascertained from the words of Christ and His apostles that eternal fire had been prepared for him . . . he now blasphemes . . . as being already condemned." We read in the First *Apology*, 40, that "the devils strive to escape the power of God the Father and Lord of all, and the power of Christ Himself."

[3] *Dial.*, 85.

[4] *Dial.*, 57. Justin notes further that Holy Writ calls the manna, the bread of angels. See also *Dial.*, 131.

[5] *Dial.*, 31.

[6] Ps. xxiii of the Vulgate. The reference is to the verses: "Be ye lifted up, O eternal gates, and the King of Glory shall enter in. Who is the King of Glory? The Lord of hosts, he is the King of Glory." Justin (*Dial.* 36) teaches that the command to lift the gates was given by the Holy Ghost, speaking "in the name of the Father and in his own name;" and that it was given to the angels who were in heaven. The angels answered: "Who is the King of Glory?" The same doctrine is found with less detail in *Dial.*, 85, 127.

[7] *Dial.*, 36.

These are slender indications, but still sufficient for us to reconstruct on broad lines the angelology of Justin. And first of all we notice that the author of the *Dialogue* ascribes to the angels ethereal (or aerial) bodies, since he considers that they use manna as food in heaven.[1] We notice also that the angels do not leave heaven, and remain completely detached from earthly events, since they do not recognize the Saviour when He returns to heaven, and they learn the truth about Him, not from any one of themselves, but from the Holy Ghost.[2] Justin seems then to believe that the demons are the only spirits that come into contact with man, and that the good angels live exclusively in the society of God. However, he pays homage to them, without troubling himself as to how they are to obtain knowledge of it. "Both Him (the Father of righteousness) and the Son who came forth from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good angels who follow and are made like to Him, and the prophetic spirit, we worship and adore."[3]

The Logos. God has never come into direct and immediate union with men—that is the foundation, and, so to speak, the cornerstone of St. Justin's theology. But do not the Scriptures attest numerous divine interventions in human affairs? Do they not teach us that the ark of Noah was closed by God, that the rain of brimstone that wiped out Sodom was sent by the Lord, that the patriarch Abraham conversed with God?[4] And does not Scripture here give a formal refutation to theodicy?

"There is, and there is said to be, another God and Lord subject to[5] the Maker of all things; who is also called an Angel, because He announces to men whatsoever the Maker of all things—above whom there is no other God—wishes to announce to them."[1] Such is the thesis which Justin sets himself to prove to Trypho and by means of which he solves the difficulty just mentioned. Thanks to a convenient exegesis, which interprets texts according to the needs of the case, he reaches the following conclusion: "He who is said to have appeared to Abraham, and to Jacob, and to Moses, and who is called God in the Scriptures, is distinct from Him who made all things—numerically, I mean, not [distinct] in will. For I affirm that He has never at any time done or said anything which He who made the world—above whom there is no other God--has not wished Him to do or say."[2]

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[1] His explanation of the fall of the guardian angels also clearly supposes that they had bodies.

[2] He admits, however, that angels have at times been sent among men (*Dial.*, 57). But, according to him, such angelic journeys are exceptional occurrences.

[3] First *Apol.*, 6.

[4] *Dial.*, 56, 127, etc.

[5] *Dial.*, 56. In the preceding chapter (*Dial.*, 55), Trypho says: "Show us that the spirit of prophecy admits another God besides the Maker of all things." To which Justin replies: "I shall attempt to show from the Scriptures that there is, and there is said to be, another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things."

St. Justin, then, distinguishes two deities—One who dwells beyond the heavens and never leaves His august abode, the Other whose special function is to enter into relations with man, and who is the author of all the theophanies spoken of in Holy Writ. But whence comes this other God, and what has been His mission? Justin states in several places that the Logos (one of the names of this second God) was begotten by the *Will* of the Father,[3] that he is the work of the *Will* of the Supreme God. He says also in his Second *Apology*: "The Logos, who also was with Him and was begotten before the works *when* at first God created and arranged all things by him."[4] This last text teaches that the Logos was born just before the universe was formed, and that He was begotten for the purpose of performing this work and executing the plans of the first God. The latter is frequently called by Justin "the Author" or "the Father of the world."[5] And these titles belong to Him because the world exists only because He has willed it. But His majesty prevented Him from leaving His dwelling-place above the highest heavens; and so when He decided to fashion the world, He first brought forth the Logos, through whom as intermediary, He realized His plan.

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[1] *Dial.*, 56.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Dial.*, 61. "God begat before all creatures a power who is called: the Son, Wisdom, an angel, God. . . ." See also *Dial.*, 76, 100, 127, 128.

[4] Second *Apol.*, 6. Note the word "when" which refers to the time when the Logos was begotten, and the expression "by Him" which ascribes to the Logos the part of an instrumental cause. Note also in the expression "*and* was with Him *and* was begotten" the two conjunctions "and," as implying two distinct and successive states of being. The Logos was first in God, and next begotten. The begetting took place in the moment which preceded the shaping of the world. As "being first in God" the Logos existed no doubt from all eternity.

[5] See above: God.

Minister of the Supreme God in the work of organizing the world, the Logos has also been His minister whenever there was question of enlightening men and teaching them truth. We have seen that all the theophanies of the Old Testament were effected by the Logos in the name and by the command of the first God. We may add that the educational work of this divine Teacher has not been limited to these theophanies. It is the Logos who inspired the prophets;[1] nay, more, it is He who has enlightened all men of good will, of whatsoever nation they may have been. "He is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers, and those who lived with the Logos are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them."[2] And elsewhere Justin speaks, now of a "seed" of the Logos, now of a "seminal"[3] Logos, spread abroad in every human heart in order to communicate some portion of truth; he shows us Socrates trying to instil into others the teachings which he himself received from the Logos.

Since He was begotten by God, the Logos is His Son. Indeed, St. Justin frequently designates Him by this name.[4] Frequently, too, he calls him the "First-born" of the Father,[5] and in one place he gives Him the title of "Son by pre-eminence."[6] These two formulæ leave it to be understood that the Logos is not the only son of God, but only the first of a series. They are moreover cleared up by the expression "universal Father," which is often met with in the writings of Justin when there is question of the Supreme God.[7] And the formulæ themselves help to clear up the text of the First *Apology*, where we read of "the other good angels who follow the Son and are made like to Him."[1] God has, then, other sons than the Logos. And these sons are the angels, as well as human souls, of whom God is the Father because He has begotten them. This is confirmed by the following remark of Justin, who speaks of the incarnate Logos as one who: "Even if only a man by ordinary generation, yet, on account of His wisdom, is worthy to be called the Son of God."[2] Nevertheless, He is the eldest-born of the Heavenly Father; He has labored to organize the universe; and, from the beginning, He has taught the human race; He cannot therefore be confounded with angels or human souls. He is the Son "by pre-eminence," a prerogative which entitles Him to be called without qualification, "the Son."[3]

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[1] First *Apol.*, 36; Second *Apol.*, 10.

[2] First *Apol.*, 46

[3] Second *Apol.*, 8. As Christians have a full knowledge of the whole Logos, they are in opposition to those who have possessed but "a part of the seed of the Logos." In the same Apology (Second *Apol.*, 13), we read: "Christ's teachings are neither in all respects similar, nor in all respects dissimilar, to those of Plato, the Stoics and other writers. For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic divine Logos"; and, again, (Second *Apol.*, 20): "Whatever either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated by finding and contemplating some part of the Word. But since they did not know the whole of the Word, they often contradicted themselves."

[4] *Dial.*, 127, 128 and *passim.*

[5] First *Apol.*, 46. See also First *Apol.*, 21, 22, 33, 53; *Dial.*, 100, 129.

[6] Second *Apol.*, 6. Justin explains that the Logos is alone called *Son* because He is such *par excellence*.

[7] See above: GOD.

As Son of God, the Logos is, by that very fact, completely distinct from His Father. There are some who conceive His relation with the Father on the analogy of the relation between light and the sun. But this is erroneous. Between light and the sun there is only a distinction of name, whilst God and the Logos are two different beings.[4] But meanwhile it must not be imagined that by producing His offspring,[5] the Father has been lessened. The external word which we give forth does not at all diminish the internal word of which it is the expression. When we light one fire from another, the first one loses nothing; and so the Father has brought forth His Logos without undergoing any diminution or change.[6]

But how could Justin give the title of "God" to one who received existence only just before the formation of the world, who holds His existence only by the free will of the Author of the world, and who is only one of the children of the universal Father? To answer this, we must set aside the habits of language which govern us. To-day we reserve scrupulously the title of "God" for the Supreme Being. This exactness was unknown in the first centuries of the Christian era. In a time when the emperors and all great men were deified, was it not quite natural to grant the same honor to one who from the beginning of the world had been the minister and representative of the Supreme Being? The word "God" had then no more exact bearing than has to-day the term "divine," which the Church itself has not feared to use in speaking of the Blessed Virgin. It is this which explains the terminology of St. Justin.

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[1] "We worship the Son . . . and the *other* good angels who are *made like* to Him." From this it follows that the Son is an angel, and that the angels (who are like to Him) are Sons. In *Dial.*, 105, the Logos is indeed called Only-begotten. But Justin, who borrows that expression from tradition, does not take it literally, for he calls God (First *Apol.*, 13,) the Father γεννητὼρ of the universe. The Logos is consequently for him "Only-begotten" in the sense that He is the Son *par excellence*.

[2] First *Apol.*, 22.

[3] See above the text quoted from Second *Apol.*, 6.

[4] *Dial.*, 128.

[5] *Dial.*, 62. See the same expression in *Dial.*, 76.

[6] *Dial.*, 61.

Besides, if he teaches that the Logos is God, he is careful to explain at the same time that this Logos is the "servant"[1] of God, that he is "below"[2] the Author of the world, that he comes "after" Him, and that he is the "finger"[3] of God. "The Logos," we read in the First *Apology*, "than whom, after God, who begat Him, we know there is no ruler more kingly and just."[4] In another passage of the same work we learn that the Logos is the highest power *after* the Father.[5] And the Second *Apology* contains this profession of faith: "Next to God, we worship and love the Word who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God."[6] It is clear therefore that Justin never dreamed of making the Logos the equal of the Supreme God.[7] Confirmation of this is given by the qualifiers which he adds to the word "God", when he uses it to designate the Father of the Logos. He calls the Logos "God", but he speaks of His Father as the "ineffable God", the "God above whom there is no other God,"[8] God "strictly speaking."[9]

Christology. "Our teacher is Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judea in the times of Tiberius Cæsar . . . the Son of the God strictly speaking."[10] Even if He were only an ordinary man, He would still deserve to be called the Son of God by reason of His wisdom;[11] but He is not born as other men, for He is the Logos of God,[12] His first-born Son. Socrates was taught by the Logos, who has dwelt moreover in all men in a partial way. But Jesus Christ is the whole Logos, the Logos incarnate, the "Logos become man."[1] In this connection Justin acknowledges that there are Christians who take Christ for an ordinary man invested with a divine mission, but he energetically regrets this doctrine as false and opposed to the general belief of Christians.[2]

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[1] Ὑπερέτης. This word and its corresponding verb (ὑπερετεῖν) are often employed to designate the condition of the Logos in relation to the Father. See *Dial.*, 56, 57, 60, 61, 76.

[2] *Dial.*, 56.

[3] *Dial.*, 114. The text: "I shall behold the heavens, the works of Thy fingers, means that the heavens are the work of the Logos.

[4] First *Apol.*, 12.

[5] First *Apol.*, 32.

[6] Second *Apol.*, 13.

[7] He often calls him "the angel" of the Father. See First *Apol.*, 63; *Dial.*, 56, 59, 93, 126, 127.

[8] *Dial.*, 56.

[9] First *Apol.*, 13. In all the foregoing remarks we have simply followed Petavius, *de Trinitate* 1-3; and *Ibid.*, *Praefatio* 1-11.

[10] First *Apol.*, 13.

[11] First *Apol.*, 22.

[12] *Ibid.*, 46.

He adds that the Logos owes His name of "Christ" to His mission as organizer of the world at its beginning.[3] And this makes it possible for him to declare that the Logos was "Christ" before the Incarnation; he can also say without metaphor that Socrates knew Christ in part.[4]

The Christ Logos who formerly showed himself to men in divers forms, notably under the form of fire,[5] has clothed Himself in human flesh and become man. In this, as in all things else, He has acted in conformity with the instructions of the Supreme God. And the author of the *Dialogue* states in different places that the Logos became incarnate "by the Will of the Father."[6] But how did He become incarnate? Did He submit Himself to the laws which govern human birth? No, answers Justin, to effect his coming on earth the Son of God did not have recourse to the union of the sexes; He was born of a virgin, a daughter of David, named Mary.[7] Do not the Scriptures teach us on every page that the conception of the Incarnate Logos was to be virginal? Do we not read in Isaias: "Who shall declare his generation?"[8] And again, in the same prophet: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son"?[9] When the patriarch Jacob says of the Christ that he shall wash his garment (that is, the human race) in the blood of the vine, does he not leave it clearly to be understood that as the vine receives its sap directly from God, so also Christ must receive His blood not from man, but from God?[1] When the prophet Daniel speaks of a stone hewn without hands, is he not teaching that the incarnation of Christ is the work of God alone?[2] When God says to His Son: "From the womb before the day-star I begot thee," is He not announcing that the human birth of the Logos will have the Universal Father for author?[3] And when Christ calls Himself the "Son of man," is He not hinting that He has no other ancestors than those of His mother, namely, the patriarchs, and especially Abraham?[4] The virginal conception of the Christ is attested by numerous texts of Scripture, and cannot be gainsaid. And besides, what serious objection can be taken against it when it is remembered that the Logos took various forms in appearing to the patriarchs?[5]

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[1] First *Apol.*, 5; Second *Apol.*, 10, where Christ is represented as the integral Logos.

[2] *Dial.*, 48. Justin refers here to those who were called Ebionites at a later day. From his expression "of our race," it cannot be inferred that he was in communion with them; for we find elsewhere (*Dial.*, 82) a similar expression "among us" to designate the Gnostics, whom Justin expressly excludes from the true followers of Christ.

[3] Second *Apol.*, 6. In the same place we read that the name "Jesus" ("Saviour") is the proper name of the Logos made man. So that the Logos was Christ before the beginning of the world. He became Jesus from the moment of the Incarnation. In *Dial.*, 113, however, Jesus is said to have appeared to the Patriarchs

[4] Second *Apol.*, 10.

[5] First *Apol.*, 63; *Dial.*, 75.

[6] First *Apol.*, 63; *Dial.*, 23, 43, 64, 76.

[7] *Dial.*, 23, 43, 76, 100.

[8] *Ibid.*, 43, 76, 63.

[9] *Ibid.*, 43, 66, 67, 77. It is to this text that Justin chiefly refers.

How did this virginal conception take place? Here we come to the celebrated text of the First *Apology*: "It is wrong to understand the spirit and the power of God as anything else than the Logos, who is also the first-born of God . . . and it was this which, when it came upon the virgin and overshadowed her, caused her to conceive, not by intercourse, but by power."[6] Justin, who is trying to combine his theory of the Logos with the text of St. Luke, represents the Logos as the efficient cause of the conception of which He was to be the fruit.

Being especially taken up with identifying the Logos with Christ, and proving His virginal conception, the author of the *Dialogue* gave no thought to the problems which, three centuries later, stirred so deeply the Church in the East. He distinguishes in the Saviour of the world a divine and a human element, without ever bringing up the question of how the two are united. Some of his texts are susceptible of an Apollinaristic interpretation,[7] but this interpretation is not altogether certain. And though there is noticeable in his writings an undeniable tendency to conceive the humanity of the Saviour as a mere vesture in which the Logos has clothed Himself, this tendency never goes so far as to become a definite and conscious Monophysism.[1] At any rate, he has avoided Docetism, for he professes his belief that Christ incarnate felt suffering,[2] and that He was without beauty.[3]

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[1] *Dial.*, 54, 63; First *Apol.*, 32.

[2] *Dial.*, 76.

[3] *Dial.*, 63.

[4] *Ibid.*, 100.

[5] First *Apol.*, 63.

[6] First *Apol.*, 33. This observation is contrary to the Gospel text: "Thou shalt conceive of the Holy Ghost."

[7] Second *Apol.*, 10, where Justin distinguishes in Christ incarnate: (Σῶμα, λόγον, ψυχὴν) As the νοῦς is not spoken of, it may be inferred that the Logos took its place.

Redemption. "The sign of the scarlet thread which the spies sent to Jericho by Josue, son of Nave (Nun), gave to Rahab the harlot, telling her to bind it to the window through which she let them down to escape from their enemies, manifested the symbol of the blood of Christ, by which those who were at one time harlots and unrighteous persons out of all nations are saved, receiving remission of sins, and continuing no longer in sin."[4] This text attributes the salvation of the human race to the blood of Christ. And it is not an isolated text. Frequently, in the *Dialogue* as well as in the *Apologies*, Justin teaches that the Logos incarnate has cleansed by His blood those who believe in Him, and that the blood of the Saviour delivers believers from death.[5] He adds that Christ was laden with the maledictions to which our sins had condemned us.[6] But he explains at the same time that it is by the will of the Universal Father, that is, the Supreme God, that His Son suffered and shed His blood for us.[7] Hence it follows that the Supreme God was not angered with us, and the death of Christ was not intended to give satisfaction to the divine justice. Moreover, this latter interpretation of the tragedy of Calvary is never mentioned by the illustrious apologist. But why then did the Logos shed His blood, and what part does His death play in the work of our salvation? The Second *Apology* tells us that Christ came to overthrow the demons;[8] and we read in the First that the Saviour suffered in order to overcome death by His death and resurrection.[9]

The Trinity. The Holy Ghost. We read in the First *Apology*: "Both Him, (the most true God) and the Son who came from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good angels who follow and are made like to Him, and the prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore."[10] And a little further we meet the following declaration: "Our teacher of these things is Jesus Christ . . ., who was crucified under Pontius Pilate; . . . we reasonably worship Him, having learned that He is the Son of the true God Himself (lit.: of the God strictly speaking), and holding Him in the second place, and the prophetic spirit in the third."[1] These two texts join to the God strictly speaking and to the Son a third Person, to wit: the prophetic Spirit.

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[1] In First *Apol.*, 63, and *Dial.*, 75, he likens the Incarnation to the Old Testament theophanies.

[2] See *Dial.*, 103, and also *Dial.*, 41, 70, 99

[3] *Dial.*, 100, and also 88.

[4] *Dial.*, 111.

[5] First *Apol.*, 32; *Dial.*, 13, 54, 91.

[6] *Dial.*, 95, 111.

[7] *Dial.*, 103, and also, 95. Cfr. First *Apol.*, 63; Second *Apol.*, 6.

[8] Second *Apol.*, 6. See also *Dial.*, 41, 94.

[9] First *Apol.*, 63. See also *Dial.*, 100.

[10] First *Apol.*, 6. Justin's enumeraton includes, therefore: (1) God; (2) His Son

St. Justin, then, knew of the Trinity—a Trinity, as is evident, whose members are of unequal rank, since the Son is only the chief of the angelic host, and the Father alone is the Supreme Being. Justin claims, moreover, that Plato also had learned of the Trinity in the school of Moses. "Plato," he writes, "had in view in the *Timæus*, the Son of God, where he says: 'He placed him in the form of the letter X upon the universe' . . . which things (the account of the making and lifting up of the brazen serpent in the book of Numbers) Plato reading, and not accurately understanding, and not apprehending that it was the figure of the cross, but taking it to be a X, he said that the power next to the first God was impressed in the form of X upon the universe. And as to his speaking of a third power, he did this because he read that which was spoken by Moses, 'that the Spirit of God moved over the waters.' For he gives the second place to the Logos of God who he said was impressed in the form of the letter X upon the universe; and the third place to the Spirit who was said to be borne upon the water, saying: 'And the third around the third.'"[2] It goes without saying that in this passage of the First

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who came to teach us; (3) the other good angels; (4) the prophetical Spirit. Harnack (*Dogm. Gesch.*, vol. I, 3d edit., 489,) calls this text "höchst auffallend," and is inclined to consider it as an interpolation. He is almost the only scholar to set forth such a suspicion. Several critics, however, have given explanations that would make Justin agree with the theology of the Council of Nice. The only attempt at reconciliation whch seems worthy of notice is that made by Grabe (which is adopted by Moehler). According to him Justin's meaning would be: "We worship . . . the Son . . . who came to teach *us and* the host of other good angels." But Dom Maran (*Præf*. ii, 4, *Patr.Gr*. v, 42,) fearlessly regards this as an absurdity (perabsurde statuit). Such a rendering, in fact, in view of the context, simply means that Christ came to teach us and the other good angels not to worship demons. The learned Benedictine uses still stronger language against another solution proposed by Bullus. He defends the rendering we have adopted, which is, in fact, the only acceptable one. Maran's subsequent assertion, however, that Justin's text is not surprising, is rather astonishing. He does not take sufficiently into account the words: "others" and "made like to" which imply that the Son is simply the first of the Angels.

[1] First *Apol.*, 13.

[2] First *Apol.*, 60.

Apology all is arbitrary—the interpretation of the text of Numbers, which does not mention a cross, but only a brazen serpent; the explanation of the *Timæus*, where there is no question of the Son of God, but only of the soul of the world; ascribing to Plato the *Epistle to Dionysius* from which is drawn the last text cited by Justin; the identification of the third principle mentioned in that letter with the Spirit which moved over the waters; and finally, the statement that Plato must have read the Books of Moses. All of St. Justin's erudition does not prove that the author of *Timæus* knew of the Trinity, but it does prove, what is more to our purpose here, that the author of the *Apologies* did. And he could not be ignorant of it, since the ternary formula, sanctioned by St. Ignatius, by St. Clement, by the Gospel of St. Matthew, had already been long in use in the Christian worship.

On the other hand, Justin affirms in a text already noticed that "the Spirit and the power of God who is nothing else than the Logos . . . came upon the virgin and overshadowed her."[1] He says likewise that it is the Logos who inspired the prophets.[2] This goes to show that in his eyes the Holy Spirit is only a function of the Logos and that although he admits a Trinity in order to be in accord with the ternary formula, he sees in the Trinity only two Persons, namely, the Supreme God, and His minister, the Logos, who is chief of the angelic host. And this explains the passage in the First *Apology* where we read that Christians worship and adore God, His Son, the host of angels like unto the Son, and the prophetic Spirit. Justin mentions the angelic spirits after their leader, and before the Spirit, who might indeed have been passed over in silence as representing merely an aspect of the Son, and who receives mention only out of respect for the ternary formula.

Present and Primitive Condition of Man. In the beginning men were endowed with free will. That gift they still retain.[3] No doubt we have within us a tendency to evil, but that tendency need not master us.[4] Every man has the power to go to the right or to the left, to choose between good and evil. To deny this would be to deny the rewards and punishments which God is going to apportion to men at the end of the world; it would be to destroy the foundation of all human laws, by depriving them of the right to apply sanctions, without which they are empty words; it would be to suppress the distinction between good and evil. Now this distinction is engraven on the conscience of every man.[1] And the proof is that with the exception of certain cases of diabolical possession or of corrupt training, even those who do wrong are fully conscious of the wrongfulness of their deed.[2] Free will has also been strongly proclaimed by the prophets, and Plato but reechoed Moses when he said: "He who does wrong, does it of his own free will. God is not responsible."[3]

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[1] First *Apol.*, 33.

[2] Second *Apol*, 10. The passage in *Dial.*, 36, where we read that the Spirit speaking "in His name or in the Father's name," bids the angels to open the heavenly gates to let the risen Christ enter, does not yield any new element, and must be understood in the light of the preceding texts.

[3] First *Apol.*, 28, 43, 44; Second *Apol.*, 7; *Dial.*, 88.

[4] First *Apol.* 10.

When God made Adam, He put in him a divine breath, that is to say, the spirit of life. This spirit of life is distinct from the soul, which it inhabits as the soul inhabits the body. Should it depart, the soul would remain inert.[4] But God does not permit this separation, which would be all to the advantage of the wicked.[5] Moreover, He wished to exempt man from death, and to give his body the privilege of incorruptibility.[6] In return, He asked of him nothing but obedience. Unfortunately, Eve let herself be deceived by the devil;[7] she begot disobedience and death.[8] Adam, who also sinned, was like Eve, condemned to die;[9] and he underwent his punishment the very day of his sin, as God had foretold; that is to say, before he had reached his thousandth year.[10] Now the divine plan always remains unchanged. Just as to Adam and Eve, so to us also God offers bodily immortality; He is ready to exempt us from death if we are only faithful to His law. But, like Adam, we all let ourselves be caught in the snares of the serpent, and that is why all of us die.[11] Justin does not speak of original sin in the Augustinian sense, nor even of the Fall.

Salvation. The Jews imagined they would be saved by keeping the Sabbath and other prescriptions of the Mosaic Law, and especially by circumcision. They were in error. The regulations concerning worship in the Mosaic Law were imposed on the Jews solely for the purpose of putting them on their guard against idolatry, to which they had a perverse tendency.[1] As for circumcision, it is, in the divine plane, only a mark intended to designate the Jews.[2] It never had any connection with justification.[3] Enoch and the other righteous men who lived before Abraham, were saved without it.[4] And on the other hand, the Egyptians and other peoples among whom circumcision was practised received no advantage from it.[5] The means of obtaining salvation has been at all times, faith, belief in Christ. It is by faith in Christ that Abraham was justified; it is by faith in Christ that Enoch was made pleasing to God; it is by faith in Christ that barbarous peoples who know nothing at all of circumcision obtain salvation.[6] And this faith has been within reach of all men, for the Logos who is none other than the Christ, has given Himself at least in some degree to all intelligences and has enlightened them.[7] There were Christians long before the incarnation of the Logos. Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias were Christians. So too were Socrates and Heraclitus. And in general, all those who have "lived" by the Logos,[8] that is, who have not closed their eyes to His heavenly light have been Christians, no matter to what age or people they belonged.

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[1] First *Apol.*, 43; Second *Apol.*, 7; *Dial.*, 141, 88, 102.

[2] *Dial.*, 93.

[3] First *Apol.*, 44.

[4] *Dial.*, 40. This text must be understood in the light of *Dial.*, 6.

[5] *Dial.* 5.

[6] *Dial.*, 88, and chiefly *Dial.* 142.

[7] *Dial.*, 124.

[8] *Dial.*, 100.

[9] *Dial.*, 94.

[10] *Dial.*, 81. Adam died when 930 years old. Now Ps. xc (Vugl. lxxxix), 4, says that a thousand years are as one day before the Lord. Hence Adam died on the day of his sin.

[11] *Dial.*, 124.

Not that a mere mental assent to the existence of the Logos is sufficient to obtain justification. A man must repent of his misdeeds, practise "the eternal law,"[9] and turn to well-doing.[10] Saint Justin, who has just asserted so strongly the uselessness, from a moral or a religious standpoint, of Mosaic circumcision[11] asserts no less strongly the need of a circumcision which is spiritual, and performed in the heart by the law of Christ. But what connection does he establish between faith and virtue, between the enlightening of the mind and the rectitude of the will? That remains to be seen.

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[1] *Dial.*, 16-19, 27, 43, 46.
[2] *Dial.*, 23, 16.
[3] *Dial.*, 92, 23.
[4] *Dial.*, 27, 43, 92.
[5] *Dial.*, 28.
[6] *Dial.*, 44, 113, 28.
[7] See above: LOGOS.
[8] First *Apol.*, 46.
[9] *Dial.*, 28.
[10] First *Apol.*, 28.
[11] *Dial.*, 43.

Grace. We read in the Second *Apology*: "No one trusted in Socrates so as to die for his doctrine; but in Christ who was partially known even by Socrates . . . not only philosophers and scholars believed, but also artisans and people entirely uneducated, despising both glory, and fear, and death; since He is a power of the ineffable Father, and not the mere instrument of human reason."[1] On the other hand, we read in the *Apology*: "In order that we may follow those things which please Him, choosing them by means of the rational faculties He has Himself endowed us with, He both persuades us and leads us to faith. And we think it for the advantage of all men that they are not restrained from learning these things, but are even urged thereto. For the restraint which human laws could not effect, the Word, inasmuch as He is divine, would have effected, had not the wicked demons put obstacles in His way."[2] The first of these texts ascribes to the Christian faith a subtle influence distinct from human reasoning, an influence which Justin calls "the power of the ineffable Father"; the second shows us the Logos leading souls to the faith after having suggested to them the practice of virtue. He believes therefore that man is led to faith by the action of the Logos, and not by unaided human reasoning; he believes in the grace of faith. But he believes also in a trial sent from God in order to give us a love for the good, and he seems to present the grace of faith as being a reward given for fidelity in following the inspiration that leads to virtue. His Logos conducts man through the practice of virtue to Christian belief. "Even they who lived before Christ and without the Logos, were wicked and hostile to Christ. . . . On the contrary, they who have lived and are living with the Logos are Christians.[3]

"No one is forsaken," says one of the texts which we have just seen. Grace, then, is offered to everybody. But it is not imposed on anyone; it solicits our free will, but without forcing it. This explains why many men show themselves refractory, and prefer to listen to the demons, who flatter the evil instincts of our nature.[4] The Logos makes His appeal to all, and still all do not "live" by Him,[5] because all do not follow with docility His divine inspirations. Justin evidently subordinates grace to the good will of man. At the same time, he reduces divine election, of which he makes mention in various places,[1] to a phase of prescience. "If the Logos of God foretold that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, He did so because He foreknew that they would be obstinately wicked, but not because God had created them so."[2] In short, the founder of Apologetics cannot be ranked amongst the forerunners of the school of Augustine.

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[1] Second *Apol.*, 10.

[2] First *Apol.*, 10.

[3] First *Apol.*, 46.

[4] First *Apol.* 10.

[5] First *Apol.*, 46.

The texts we have just seen consider man before the advent of Christianity. We may add in closing that Justin does not leave the Christian to the resources of his own strength. "Though the devil," he says, "is ever at hand to resist us, and anxious to seduce all to himself, yet the angel of God, i. e., the power of God sent us through Jesus Christ, rebukes him, and he departs from us."[3] And elsewhere he declares that Christ is present by His power in those who have received the remission of their sins.[4] He believes therefore, that the action of the Logos, who leads the man of good will to the practice of virtue and then to faith, comes also to the aid of the Christian and protects him from the assaults of Satan.

Prayer. Divine grace is offered to all; but whether it be the grace which makes the Christian or the grace which protects the believer against the demon, it respects the freedom of the will, and cannot be used without good will. Now good will, by the very force of the words, is that which precedes grace, which desires it, which asks for it. God therefore wishes us to pray. This is the sole condition on which He gives the grace of faith to the pagan or the grace of strength to the Christian. "But above all things," says the old man to the young disciple of Plato, who for the first time had heard the name of Christ uttered, "above all things pray that the gates of light be opened to you; for these truths can be perceived and understood only by the man to whom God and His Christ have imparted wisdom."[5] And the author of the *Dialogue* teaches us that Christians ask of Jesus to shelter them from the attacks of the devil.[6] A man, therefore, is a Christian only because he has desired to be so; and when he is a Christian he resists the demons only in so far as he offers up his prayers that he may escape their wiles.

JOSEPH TURMEL.

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[1] *Dial.*, 119.
[2] *Dial.*, 141.
[3] *Dial.*, 116. See also *Dial.*, 30.
[4] *Dial.*, 54.
[5] *Dial.*, 7.
[6] *Dial.*, 30; First *Apol.*, 65.

STUDIES ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

Francis E. Gigot

III. The Temptation of Jesus.

A Literary Analysis of Mt. iv, 1-11; Mk. i, 12-13; Lk. iv, 1-13.

The narrative of Our Lord's temptation forms one of the most mysterious sections of our first three Gospels. Is general conception of Christ being tempted, "like as we are" (Heb. iv, 15), by "the prince of this world," has seemed, and seems still to many, an occurrence almost incredible. The pictorial description of the Tempter's approach, of a high mountain from the top of which all the Kingdoms of the earth would be visible, of Christ carried from place to place in Satan's arms, etc., etc., adds much to the strangeness of the fact itself.[1] And yet, the temptation of Jesus in the desert is part and parcel of the Synoptic narratives, that is of our earliest records of His mortal life. It obviously reads as a statement of actual fact, no less than the narrative of Our Lord's baptism by which it is preceded, or that of His preaching and miracles by which it is followed. It therefore deserves to be examined in regard to its literary features just as much as any other section of the Synoptics.[2] Nay, more, the stranger the fact and the description of the temptation of Jesus appear, the more it behooves us to investigate and determine the precise relation in which our three records of it stand to one another. Only in this way, can a solid basis be secured for the scientific study of the historical value of the fact and its particulars as embodied in the Synoptic tradition.

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[1] In view of the strangeness of these particulars Fr. V. Rose, O. P., has recently denied the strict historical character of the narrative. According to him, "the temptations did not occur outwardly, but took place in the mind of Jesus. Only in imagination He saw Satan approaching him; only in spirit He was transported to Jerusalem, and set on the pinnacle of the Temple, and taken up to a high mountain. . . . Jesus alone could tell His disciples the manner in which He was tempted by Satan, and He apparently described to them, under the form of a parable, the trials to which He was subjected as the Mesias and the Son of God." (Rose, Evangile selon St. Matthieu, p. 23. Paris, 1904). And again (p. 24) Fr. Rose writes: "Only in imagination was the Savior carried to the high mountain; such a mountain never existed, and is merely ideal."

[2] To facilitate the literary study of this section, we give in parallel columns, on a special page at the end of this paper, a direct translation of it from the original Greek. Mark's account is placed in the first column, because it is shorter, and also more primitive, than the narrative of either Mt. or Lk.

I. Primitive Character of Mk's Account.

St. Mark's narrative of the temptation of Jesus exhibits traits of primitive simplicity scarcely less numerous and significant than those we pointed out in our preceding Study on his record of Christ's baptism. Its first verse, which reads as follows:

> Mk. i, 12. And straightway the Spirit drives Him out into the desert.

is the direct and artless continuation of what Mk. has told in the preceding section of the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus at His baptism (Mk. i, 10). Its opening expression "and straightway" is made up of the simple Hebrew conjunction ו καὶ (and), and the distinctly Marcan adverb εὐθὺς (straightway). At the beginning of verse 12—as at that of verse 10 in the preceding section—it denotes an immediate connection between two facts mentioned by the evangelist: hardly had the Spirit taken possession of Jesus when he drove Him out from the banks of the Jordan into the wilderness.[1] This direct connection of Mk's narrative of the temptation of Our Lord with the Spirit's manifestation at His baptism, is further confirmed by the following facts (1) in verse 12, St. Mark speaks simply of "the Spirit," exactly as he does in verse 10 of the preceding section ("and *the Spirit* as a dove, descending upon Him"); (2) in verse 12 also,—as in verse 10,—Mk. uses the personal pronoun "Him" in speaking of Christ ("and straightway the Spirit drives *Him* out into the desert"), while the other two Synoptists repeat the name "Jesus" to introduce their own account of the temptation (Mt. iv, 1: Then *Jesus* was led up by the Spirit . . . ; Lk. iv, 1: And *Jesus*, full of the Spirit . . .); (3) and more particularly, our second evangelist has the verb of his opening sentence, in the present tense: "the Spirit *drives* Him out (ἐκβάλλει)," which taken together with the preceding adverbial expression "and straightway," must needs be regarded as setting forth the most intimate connection between the two facts contemplated by the narrator.

A last particular in this first verse of Mk's account of the temptation remains to be mentioned, and it tells powerfully in favor of the primitive simplicity of that account. To describe the action of the

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[1] In the first line of verse 10: "And straightway coming up out of the water," the opening words "and straightway" place Jesus' rising up in immediate connection with the fact just stated in verse 9*c*: "and was baptized by John in the Jordan."

Holy Spirit upon Jesus, St. Mark employs the verb ἐκβαλεῖν which the Vulgate renders literally, and to all appearance accurately, by *expellere*.[1] Such a strong term is indeed natural enough in a very primitive record of the temptation of Jesus like that of Mk. But as it seemed to subsequent writers hardly to become the dignity of the One who at His baptism had been proclaimed the Son of God, later narratives of the temptation, to wit, those of Mt. and Lk., no less naturally did away with it, and used a softer expression (Mt. iv, 1: Then Jesus was *led up* by the Spirit; Lk. iv, 1: And Jesus . . . was *led* by the Spirit).[2]

The primitive character of the second and concluding verse of Mk's account of Our Lord's temptation can also be easily shown. It is connected in the simplest way, by the Hebrew conjunction ו καὶ (and), with the preceding sentence, and the three clauses of which it is made up are introduced in the same primitive way:

Mk. i, 13. *And* He was in the desert forty days
tempted by Satan,
and He was among the wild beasts,
and the angels ministered to Him.

Again, its first line: "and He was in the desert forty days," is an artless repetition of the locality mentioned in the preceding verse, as the place whither Jesus had been driven forth by the Holy Spirit, coupled together with a general indication of the length of His sojourn therein. Mark's following statement: "tempted by Satan" contains the Hebrew, and doubtless primitive name (השטן=ὁ Σατανᾶς) of Christ's adversary.[3]

In the next line we are told that "Jesus was among the wild beasts." This, as Dr. Swete justly remarks,[1] is "a peculiarly Marcan touch." On the one hand, such a graphic expression could not be suggested to the writer of our second Gospel by anything found in Mt's and Lk's narratives; and on the other, it is in perfect agreement both with the wildness of the desert of Judea, and with the usual picturesqueness of our second Synoptist.[2] Furthermore, the description of Jesus living during forty days *among the wild beasts*, is of a piece with the strange, not to say crude, statement in the preceding verse: "and straightway the Spirit *drives Him out* into the desert;" and this is why the later form of tradition embodied in Mt's and Lk's narratives of the temptation has dropped a trait apparently so unworthy of the person and dignity of the beloved Son of God.

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[1] *Cf.* Mk. i, 34, 39; iii, 15, 22, 23; vi, 13; vii, 26; ix, 18, 28, 38; xvi, 9, where the verb ἐκβαλεῖν is used of the casting *out* of devils. In Mk. i, 43, the same Greek verb is consistently rendered in the Vulgate by *ejicere*. Dr. Swete's efforts (Commentary on St. Mk., p. 10) to show that the word means "only a pressure upon the spirit" of Jesus, are only an attempt to minimize the force of the expression when applied to Our Lord.

[2] A similar toning down of a somewhat harsh, but clearly primitive, expression in Mk. iii, 5, is found in Lk. vi, 10. Mk. says that Jesus looked around about with anger, μετ᾽ ὀργῆς; Luke preserves the *looking around about*, but suppresses μετ᾽ ὀργῆς. (*Cf.* E. Jacquier, Hist. des Livres du N. T., vol. ii, p. 423. Paris, 1905).

[3] In one section of the Synoptics, the primitive name "Satan" has been retained by them all (*Cf.* Mk. iii, 26; Mt. xii, 26; Lk. xi, 18), while in another it is found only in Mk., and an equivalent of it has been diversely supplied by the other two Synoptics: thus, Mk. iv, 15: cometh *Satan*, has become in Mt. xiii, 9: cometh the *wicked one*, and in Lk. viii, 12: cometh the *devil*. The use of Satan in the direct form of address: "Begone, Satan"! (Mk. viii, 33; Mt. iv, 10; xvi, 23), points also the word "Satan" as a primitive term in the evangelical tradition.

The primitive character of the line with which Mk. brings to an end his account of the temptation can hardly be questioned. It has all the simplicity of the statements by which it is preceded in that account. Like them—as stated above—it begins with the conjunction ו καὶ (and). Like them, too, it is a plain matter-of-fact statement: "and the angels ministered to Him." And further, in writing it, St. Mark made use of the imperfect διηκόνουν (ministered) exactly in the same manner as he had employed that tense in the preceding lines: "He was tempted," "He was among the wild beasts," thus referring equally to the entire period of forty days Christ's temptation, His sojourn among the wild beasts, and the services tendered Him by heavenly messengers.[3]

Nothing, therefore, in the two short verses which make up Mk's narrative of the temptation of Jesus needs be considered as derived from the parallel accounts of Mt. and Lk. Nothing is found in them but what is decidedly primitive as regards both style and conceptions: the sentences are built and connected in primitive Hebrew fashion; "Satan" is a primitive Hebrew name; the driving out of Jesus by the Spirit, His stay among the wild beasts, and the duration of forty days ascribed to the temptation bespeak, each and all, a very early manner of thinking and speaking of the beloved Son of the Almighty. The statements are plain, and present absolutely nothing that would betray a later reflection upon the facts narrated. Finally, even the absence of details concerning the nature of the trials to which Jesus was subjected while in the desert, makes for the primitive character of Mk's account, for such additional information would very likely have been recorded, if at hand, because naturally desired by the readers of this wonderful episode in the mortal life of the Savior.[1]

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[1] Comm. on St. Mk., p. 11.

[2] See remarks on Mk. i, 10, in THE NEW YORK REVIEW, Aug.-Sep., 1905, pp. 218, 219.

[3] Dr. James Moffatt (in Encycl. Biblica, vol. iv, col. 4959, footn. 3), says: "The angelic service is eivdently part of the primitive tradition, for Mk. never mentions angels elsewhere in narrative."

II. Literary Connection Between Mt. and Mk.

The primitive character of Mk's record of the temptation appears still more manifest, when we compare with it the narrative of the same event in St. Matthew's Gospel. Here, as in his preceding section concerning the baptism of Christ, our first Synoptist, apart from the element of dialogue which he has introduced (Mt. iv, 3-10*a*), has a close literary connection with Mk's account:

Mk. i, 12-13. [Him out	Mt. iv, 1, 2, 11*b*.
12. And straightway the Spirit drives into the desert.	1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the desert
	to be tempted by the devil.
13. And He was in the desert forty days	2. And having fasted forty days and forty nights
tempted by Satan, and He was among the wild beasts,	
	afterwards He was hungry.
	(*The three dialogues between Jesus and Satan are here given*).
and the angels ministered to Him.	11*b* And, lo! the angels came and ministered to Him.

Both Mt. and Mk.,—differently from Luke,—narrate the temptation of Jesus immediately after describing His baptism.[2] Both again, —over against Luke,—open with the statement that under the guidance of the Spirit, Our Lord betook Himself "into the desert." In both, too,—differently from Lk's narrative,—the fact that the angels ministered to Christ is distinctly mentioned; and in both,—contrary to what we notice in our third Gospel,—this mention is used as a conclusion to the record of the temptation. Finally, prescinding from Mt's dialogues between Jesus and Satan, Mt's and Mk's narratives are found, despite their important variations, to fill up about the same number of lines, and to present several traits of resemblance in regard to both style and contents.

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[1] It may not be amiss in this connection to state that the three assaults which are detailed in Mt. and Lk. are in the form of dialogues, and that consequently Mk. may have known nothing of them. (*Cf.* Fr. E. Jacquier, Hist. des Livres du N. T., vol. ii, p. 39; and the NEW YORK REVIEW, June-July, 1905, p. 93).

[2] St. Luke has inserted the genealogy of Jesus between the narrative of His baptism and that of the temptation.

III. The Derived Character of Mt's Account.

The literary connection just pointed out between Mt's and Mk's accounts of the temptation of Jesus makes it easy to notice the differences which exist between them, and to realize that those differences tell in favor of the primitive character of Mk's narrative.

The adverbial expression "and straightway" which introduces Mk's account and which points directly back to the primitive conjunction ו wherewith Hebrew narrations usually begin, has given place to the distinctly Matthean and less Hebraic form τότε (then).[1] As Mk's record of Our Lord's temptation does not mention at all the name of Jesus, but uses instead the personal pronoun αὐτὸς, Mt. supplies that name—as is his wont in such cases—[2] at the beginning of the narrative ("Then *Jesus* was led up," etc.), and places it as the subject of the sentence because he intends to add to Mk's account the statement that Christ went into the desert "*to be tempted*" by the devil.[3] The verb ἀνάγειν (to lead up) employed by St. Matthew is, as was said above, a softer, and hence later expression than the verb ἐκβαλεῖν (to drive out), used by St. Mark. According to the first Synoptist, Jesus was led up into the desert, "*to be tempted by the devil.*" This ascription of a purpose for Our Lord's withdrawal into the desert is exactly parallel to what we read in Mt's preceding section: Jesus went unto John "*to be baptized by him.*" (Mt. iii, 13*c*). In both cases, Mt. alone of the Synoptists speaks explicitly of a special object in Our Lord's manner of acting. In both cases, the statement of that object in Mt. corresponds to, and takes the place of the statement of a fact in Mk's parallel narrative:

Mk. i, 9*c*.	Mt. iii, 13*c*.
And was baptized by John in the Jordan.	[Cometh Jesus] unto John to be baptized [by him.
Mk. i, 13*a b*	Mt. iv, 1*c*.
And He was . . . tempted by Satan.	To be tempted by the devil.

In both cases again, the object in view is expressed by means of a telic aorist infinitive in the Greek text of St. Mt's Gospel. It is only natural, therefore, to think that since Mt. iii, 13 is a clause derived from Mk. i, 9*c*),[1] so is also Mt. iv, 1*c* derived from Mk. i, 13*ab*. The view that Mt. iv, 1*c*: "to be tempted by the devil" is not primitive in comparison with Mk. i, 13*ab*: "and He was tempted by Satan," is further confirmed by the two following facts: (1) Mt's statement alone betrays a later reflection upon the fact narrated; (2) in Mt., the the word "devil" is,—as above stated,—less primitive than the name "Satan", found in Mk's narrative.

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[1] In the narrative, τότε is found 60 times in Mt., never in Mk., only twice in Lk. (Hawkins, Horæ Synopticæ, p. 7). In many places Mt. uses it as equivalent to the simple conjunction "and;" here (Mt. iv, 1) he uses it as equivalent to both καὶ and εὐθὺς.

[2] *Cf.* Mt. viii, 14, with Mk. i, 29; Mt. ix, 9, with Mk. ii, 14; Mt. xiii, 1, with Mk. iv, 1; Mt. xv, 21, with Mk. vii, 24; Mt. xv, 29, with Mk. vii, 31; Mt. xv, 32, with Mk. viii, 1; etc., etc.

[3] This accounts also for Mt.'s *passive* construction (Jesus *was led up* into the desert) instead of Mk's *active* form (the Spirit *drives* Him *out* into the desert).

Thus, then, Mt's clause: "to be tempted by the devil" (Mt. iv, 1*c*), is a later modification of a part of Mk. i, 13, viz: "and He was tempted by Satan." It is a change made for the purpose of introducing the three dialogues between Jesus and the tempter (Mt. iv, 3-10), just as Mt's change of the words of Mk. in the preceding section "and was baptized by John in the Jordan" (Mk. i, 9*c*,) into "unto John, to be baptized by him" (Mt. iii, 13*c*,) was made for the purpose of introducing the contest between Jesus and John (Mt. iii, 14, 15), which is recorded by our first Synoptist alone.

This adaptation of a part of Mk. i, 13, by St. Matthew renders it probable that the second verse of Mt's account of the temptation:

> Mt. iv. 2. And having fasted forty days
> and forty nights
> afterwards He was hungry,

is also an adapted equivalent of other words of St. Mark in i, 13:

> Mk. i, 13. (And He was) in the desert forty days
> (tempted by Satan)
> and He was among the wild beasts.

In point of fact, both Mt. and Mk. regard Jesus' stay in the desert as lasting forty days, and both admit His lack of food during that period. In Mk. this lack of food is implied in the statement that during His forty days *in the desert* Jesus was *among the wild beasts*, while in Mt., it is spoken of in the most explicit manner "and having fasted forty days and forty nights," so as to justify the inference that "*afterwards* He was hungry" and thus prepare for the introduction of the *first* temptation:

> Mt. iv, 3. If Thou art the Son of God,
> tell these stones to become loaves.

That Mt. dropped Mk's statement that Jesus "was with the wild beasts," was, as we have already said, because he considered the mention of such companions as unworthy of the person and dignity of the beloved Son of God.[1]

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[1] See the New York Review, Aug.-Sept., pp. 221, 222, 224.

We may, therefore, conclude that Mt. iv, 2, corresponds to Mk. i, 13*ac*, and that the differences noticeable here in Mt. are intentional variations on his part from Mk's parallel words. And this conclusion is powerfully confirmed by the fact that Mt. knows of the last line of Mk. i, 13, and gives it at the end of his own record of Our Lord's temptation in such context and with such changes as were naturally required by the insertion of the three distinct onsets to which, according to our first Synoptist, Jesus was subjected in the desert:

Mk. i, 13*d*.	Mt. iv, 11.
	[Then the devil leaves Him]
And the angels ministered to Him.	and the angels *came and* ministered to [Him.

In Mt's concluding verse, the first line "then the devil leaves Him," points back to the line with which St. Matthew begins his description of the onsets: "and the tempter approaching Him, said." (Mt. iv, 3). Of itself it forms indeed a sufficient and natural conclusion to that entire description: the devil had come to tempt Jesus, and he left Him when the temptations were over.[2] But Mt. knows of the angelic service in Mk. i, 13*d*, and he now mentions it,[3] modifying Mk's simple and primitive statement: "and the angels ministered to Him" by the addition of a significant detail: the angels *came* and ministered to Him. The detail is a pictorial trait thoroughly in keeping with Mt's pictorial description of the three onsets—of the tempter approaching Jesus, of the devil taking Him up into the Holy City, carrying to a very high mountain, finally leaving Him and thus allowing the angels to *come* and minister to Him—so that the Matthean and derived character of the trait must be admitted.

IV. Mt's Greatest Difference Explained.

There still remains to explain the greatest difference between Mt. iv, 1-11, and Mk. i, 12, 13—viz: Mt's insertion of the three onsets into Mk's narrative of the temptation of Jesus. This insertion accounts indeed for the minor differences thus far pointed out between Mt. iv, 1-11, and Mk. i, 12-13. But how is the insertion itself to be accounted for?

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[1] Mt's addition of the words "forty nights" to Mk's simpler expression "forty days" is probably due to the fact that our first Synoptist speaks explicitly of Our Lord's fast during His *entire* stay in the desert, and hence describes it after the same manner as Moses' fast in the wilderness is described in Deuter. ix, 9.

[2] *Cf.* St. Luke's conclusion (iv, 13): "And having ended every temptation, the devil departed from Him."

[3] It will be remembered that Mt. dealt in the same manner with Mk's account of Christ's baptism. After inserting the contest between Jesus and John, he took up again Mk's record at the point where he had left off.

A probable answer to this question is found in the apologetical object of Mt's Gospel which we stated in our preceding Study on the baptism of Christ.[1] St. Matthew, we said, inserted the contest between Jesus and John into Mk's narrative of that event in order to convince his readers that Our Lord's reception of John's baptism really befitted the person and dignity of the Messias. Jesus had wished to receive that baptism because it behooved Him to comply with all divine ordinances, one of which was the baptism administered by His precursor. And by so doing He had simply acted as the Jews expected the Messias would do at His coming.

In like manner, St. Matthew inserted the narrative of the three onsets into Mk's narrative of the temptation of Jesus, to show that such an event was not derogatory to His messianic character. He had gone into the desert to battle with the prince of the world and vanquish him, and was not this the essential object of the mission of the Messias? Had Jesus acted according to the suggestions of the evil one, He would have set Himself in opposition to the passages of the Jewish Law which He distinctly brought forth in His replies to Satan.[2] Had He yielded to such temptations He would have "savoured not the things that are of God, but the things that are of men."[3] Scarcely, therefore, were the suggestions made to Him by the tempter, than He perceived the snare laid therein by Satan, and at once chose to abide by God's holy will as manifested in the Mosaic Law. Hence, by inserting the narrative of the three onsets St. Matthew clearly proved to his readers that the fact of the temptation mentioned by St. Mark, was not unbecoming the messianic dignity of Jesus. They could easily see through Mt's fuller record of the event, that He had really acted as it behooved the Messias to act, since it was the universal expectation of the Jews at the time that their great Deliverer would be in all things faithful to God and to the Law.[4]

V. Lk's Opening Verses Examined. Let us now turn to Lk's account of the temptation of Jesus, and compare first its opening verses (1-2) with the parallel lines in Mt. and Mk. They begin with a statement: "And Jesus full of the Holy Spirit returned from the Jordan," (Lk. iv, 1*ab*), which bears the distinct impress of Lk's style (notice in particular the Lucan expression "*Holy* Spirit," and the use of the verb ὑποστρέφειν "to return" found twenty-one times in St. Luke's Gospel and twelve times in the Acts,[1] but nowhere found in the other Gospels) and having no direct equivalent in the other two Synoptics. In both these respects Lk. iv, 1*ab*, resembles strikingly the sentence by which our third evangelist introduced his genealogy of Our Lord:

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[1] See the NEW YORK REVIEW, Aug.-Sept., 1905, p. 224.

[2] The passages quoted by Jesus are all taken from the book of Deuteronomy.

[3] *Cf.* Mt. xvi, 23; Mk. viii, 33, and the context of these two verses.

[4] *Cf.* Mt. v, 17, 18; xii, 2 *sqq.*; Lk. xvi, 17; John ix, 16; xii, 34; etc. See also *Outlines of New Testament History*, by the present writer, p. 29.

> Lk. iii, 23. And Jesus Himself beginning,
> was about thirty years of age, etc.

Like Lk. iii, 23, the statement: "And Jesus full of the Holy Spirit returned from the Jordan" (Lk. iv, 1*ab*), should therefore be regarded as of Lk's own making. In fact, as St. Luke composed iii, 23, with a view to insert the genealogy of Christ between the record of His baptism by John, and that of His temptation in the desert, so after the insertion, he composed iv, 1*ab* to indicate the same direct connection between these two events as existed in both Mt. and Mk. where they follow each other without interruption, and where the immediate connection between the baptism and the temptation is indicated in Mk. by "and straightway," and in Mt. by "then."

Having thus by means of his opening lines, distinctly placed what he intends to say of Our Lord's temptation in exactly the same connection as existed in Mt. and Mk., St. Luke now proceeds to utilize the other data supplied by the first two Gospels. He says that Jesus "was led by the Spirit," a clause which reminds us forcibly of Mt's statement "Jesus was led up by the Spirit:" he has adopted Mt's softer expression "to lead" in preference to that of Mk.: "to drive out." (And straightway, the Spirit drives Him out: Mk. i, 12*a*), and also Mt's passive construction instead of Mk's active form. And yet, he has introduced two differences worthy of our attention. First of all, Lk. used the simple ἄγειν "to lead" in preference to Mt's compound verb ἀνάγειν 'to lead *up*." Apparently he considered that his own statement in the preceding lines—

> Jesus full of the Holy Spirit
> returned from the Jordan,

conveyed sufficiently Mt's special shade of idea that Jesus was led *up* from the plain of the Jordan to the higher land of the wilderness. In the second place, St. Luke substituted the imperfect ἤγετο instead of the aorist form ἤχθη employed by St. Matthew. The change was due to his desire to set forth expressly the fact only implied in the other two Synoptists, that Our Lord being endowed with the fullness of the Holy Spirit, continued (hence the imperfect tense) under that divine influence, during His whole stay in the desert. According to him, Jesus was guided by the Spirit not only when He "was led up into the desert to be tempted by the devil" (Mt. iv, 1),[1] but also while "He was in the desert forty days tempted by Satan" (Mk. i, 13*ab*).

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[1] *Cf.* besides the present passage Lk. i, 56; ii, 20, 43, 45; iv, 14; vii, 10; viii, 37, 39, 40; ix, 10; x, 17; xi, 24; xvii, 15, 18; xix, 12; xxiii, 48, 56; xxiv, 9, 33, 52; Acts i, 12; viii, 25, 28; xii, 25; xiii, 13, 34; xiv, 21; xix, 1; xx, 3; xxi, 6; xxii, 17; xxiii, 32.

In thus representing the matter, Lk. naturally dropped Mt's clause "to be tempted by the devil," which was not found in Mk., and adopted Mk's view that Jesus was tempted during forty days:

Mk. 1, 13.	Lk. i.
[He was] in the desert	1*d*. [Was led] in the desert
forty days	2. forty days
tempted by Satan.	tempted by the devil.

He adopted also Mk's wording—as is plain from a comparison between the parallel columns just given—[2] but with the exception of the word "Satan," preferring to it the word "devil" which he borrowed from St. Matthew "to be tempted by *the devil*" (Mt. iv, 1*c*). Indeed that St. Luke should here speak of "the devil" and agree in this with Mt. over against Mk., is readily explained by the fact that he intended to describe the three onsets which are recorded not in Mk. but in Mt., and in the account of which our first Synoptist uses often the expression "the devil."[3]

As might well be expected, Lk. follows Mt. in his omission of Mk's statement that Jesus "was among the wild beasts;" for such a statement seemed hardly befitting the dignity and person of Jesus, in the eyes of later readers of the evangelical narrative.

St. Luke follows also St. Matthew's Gospel in recording the prolonged fast of Our Lord in the desert, and in saying that He felt the pangs of hunger at the end of that rigorous fast:

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[1] In the very first verse which follows his narrative of the temptation, St. Luke (iv, 14) writes: "And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit, into Galilee," which implies that Our Lord was guided in His various steps by that Holy Spirit. See also in Lk. iv, 18, the quotation from Isaias: "The Spirit of Yahweh is upon me, wherefore . . . He hath sent me," applied to Jesus by Himself.

[2] St. Luke makes no mention of the forty *nights* spoken of by St. Matthew (having fasted forty days *and forty nights*. Mt. iv, *ab*.) After having used the verb "to lead," our third Synoptist had clearly to drop all reference to the forty *nights*. He could hardly say that Jesus "was led by the Spirit forty days *and forty nights*."

[3] *Cf*. Mt. iv, 5, 8, 11; and also Lk. iv, 3, 5, 13*b*.

Mt. iv, 2.	Lk. iv, 2*cd*.
And having fasted forty days	And He ate nothing in those days,
and forty nights,	
afterwards He was hungry.	and when they were ended, He was hungry.

Here again, however, he modifies somewhat the language of the document before him. Thus, Lk's expression "He (Jesus) ate nothing" is plainer to his readers than that used by Mt. "and having *fasted.*" When he says that Jesus ate nothing "in those days" he further departs from Mt's hebraic description "having fasted forty days and forty nights," and intentionally refers back to those forty days of Our Lord's sojourn in the desert of which he has just spoken: "in the desert, forty days tempted by the devil" (Lk. iv, 2*ab*). Lastly, when he writes "and when they were ended" he employs a genitive absolute construction συντελεσθεισῶν αὐτῶν, which is a decided literary improvement on Mt's awkward use of the adverb ὕστερον (afterwards.)

VI. Lk's Account of the First Onset, Examined.

In the second part of his narrative of the temptation, St. Luke records the same three onsets as St. Matthew has inserted into Mk's account of Our Lord's stay in the desert. And this makes it antecedently probable that in this second part also, he is dependent on Mt., as his source.

In fact, Lk. places first the onset which is described first in Mt., and he so narrates it as clearly to show that his differences are intentional variations from Mt's account. The two narratives run on closely parallel lines:

Mt. iv.	Lk. iv.
3. And the tempter approaching Him said:	3. And the devil said to Him:
If Thou art the Son of God,	If Thou art the Son of God,
tell these stones to become loaves.	tell this stone to become a loaf.
4. But He answering said:	4. And Jesus answered him:
It is written: Not by bread alone man shall live	It is written: Not by bread alone man shall live.
but by every word proceeding from the mouth of God.	

In his first line, St. Matthew naturally describes *the tempter* as *approaching* Our Lord to suggest evil to Him, because having so far simply mentioned that Jesus had gone into the desert *to be tempted,* he has now to speak of the first meeting of Christ and His tempter. In his parallel line "and the devil said to Him," St. Luke no less naturally drops Mt's remark concerning the tempter's approach because he has already represented *the devil* as having approached Jesus, and indeed as having tempted Him *forty days* (Lk. iv, 1*d*, 2*ab*).

In the next lines, the tempter's words are so nearly identical in Mt. and Lk., that the two records stand manifestly in a literary relation:[1]

Mt. iv, 3*b*. If Thou art the Son of God,	Lk. iv, 3*b*. If Thou art the Son of God,
3*c* tell these stones to become loaves.	3*c* tell this stone to become a loaf.

The only difference worth noticing between them consists in the fact that while Mt. uses the plural form: "tell *these stones* to become *loaves*," Lk. employs the singular: "tell *this stone* to become *a loaf*;" and it can hardly be doubted that the difference was introduced by St. Luke. The tempter's suggestion as recorded by Lk. betrays reflection upon Satan's words as given by Mt.: "tell these stones to become loaves." A single loaf was obviously all that Jesus needed to produce to relieve His hunger when about to leave the wilderness, and in suggesting that He should turn into bread only one stone, the devil made the temptation apparently more acceptable, thus implying that the miracle be confined within the strict limits of the present necessity. Hence Lk's graphic statement: "tell this stone to become a loaf," a statement in no way contrary to, because implied in, Mt's words in the plural form: "tell these stones to become loaves."

The opening line of Mt. iv, 4, "But He answering said," is also modified by Lk., "and Jesus answered him:" for the sake of greater clearness Lk. introduces the name "Jesus" instead of Mt's pronoun "he"; and (2) though he uses the same Greek verb as Mt. ἀποκρίνομαι, yet he constructs it with πρός, a construction which is distinctly Lucan.[2] The only difference of any importance in the remainder of verse 4, consists in the shorter form under which the quotation from the book of Deuteronomy appears in Lk.:

Mt. iv.	Lk. iv.
4*b*. It is written: Not by bread alone man shall live,	4*b*. It is written: Not by bread alone shall man live.
but by every word proceeding from the mouth of God.	

This shorter form is very likely due to Lk's reflection upon the passage as quoted by St. Matthew. For, the first line "not by bread alone shall man live" was sufficient as a direct answer to Satan's suggestion: "tell this stone to become a loaf;" and further, the line "by every word proceeding from the mouth of God," quoted in Mt., repeats in a positive way what is stated in a negative form in the preceding line, so that St. Luke could easily drop it as redundant.[3]

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[1] The literary resemblances are very close in the original Greek.

[2] *Cf.* A. Plummer, Comm. on St. Luke, p. lxii.

[3] It is true that the ordinary Greek text contains Mt's second line; but textual

VII. Lk's Account of the Second and Third Onsets Examined.

The next two onsets are given by Mt. and Lk. in a different order. St. Luke places second the temptation which St. Matthew places last. This divergence between the two Gospels can hardly be accidental. First of all, the two records have up to this point run on parallel lines to each other. Again, they have striking resemblances in their wording of the last two onsets. It is also significant that while Mt. assigns a *distinct* order to the onsets ("Then," in verse 5; and "Again," in verse 8), Lk. refrains from using temporal particles, and introduces these two onsets by the simple conjunction "and" (See verses 5, 9), as though conscious that he was doing away with the order of succession found in Mt's parallel account. In fact, this dropping of Mt's temporal particles by Lk. is but one of the numerous differences between the two evangelists which are due to Lk's intentional change of Mt's order, and which we now proceed to point out together with many others, because they all make for the dependence of Lk. iv, 5-13, on Mt. iv, 5-11.

We shall compare first Mt. iv, 5-7, with Lk. iv, 9-12, which run on closely parallel lines as follows:

Mt. iv.	Lk. iv.
5. Then the devil takes Him into *the Holy City* and sets Him on the pinnacle of the Temple,	9. And he brought Him to *Jerusalem*, and set Him on the pinnacle of the Temple,
6. And says to Him: If Thou art the Son of God,	and said to Him: If Thou art the Son of God,
cast Thyself down, for it is written:	10. cast Thyself down *from here*; for it is written:
He will give his angels commands about Thee,	He will give his angels commands about Thee,
	to protect Thee,
and on their hands they shall bear Thee up,	11. And on their hands they shall bear Thee up,
lest ever Thou strike Thy foot against a stone.	lest ever Thou strike Thy foot against a stone.
7. Jesus said to him:	12. And Jesus *answering* said to him:
Again it is written:	It is *said*:
Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.	Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

There are several differences worthy of notice in the opening line of these two accounts: in Mt. iv, 5*a* we read "then the devil takes Him into the Holy City," whereas in Lk. iv, 9*a*, we have "and he brought

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criticism proves beyond doubt that this addition in Lk. has been borrowed from Mt., as is the insertion of "the devil" and "to a very high mountain" in verse 5. (*Cf.* Knabenbauer, in Lucam, pp. 175, 176).

Him to Jerusalem." The temporal particle "then" was naturally dropped, as we stated above, when Lk. inverted Mt's order of thy temptations, and he no less naturally wrote "Jerusalem," for he composed his gospel for pagan readers, in preference to Mt's "the Holy City," an expression only fitted for Jewish readers.[1] Instead of Mt's present tense: παραλαμβάνει (takes), Lk. uses the past: ἤγαγεν (brought); this is the tense which St. Luke employs throughout his narrative of the temptation, improving thereby the style of St. Matthew, who uses sometimes the present (*Cf.* iv, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11), and sometimes the past (*Cf.* iv, 1, 3, 4, 7*a*). Lastly, St. Luke substitutes ἄγειν (to lead) instead of Mt's παραλαμβάνειν (to take), and thus softens the primitive expression in Mt., because it was less reverent towards Our Lord.

In Satan's suggestion recorded by both Mt. and Lk. in the following lines, St. Luke modifies St. Matthew's wording (1) by using the past tense for the reason we have just pointed out; (2) by adding the expressions "from here," and "to protect Thee," the first of which renders Satan's suggestion recorded by Mt., "cast Thyself down" more graphic, and the second of which makes the same suggestion more tempting: Jesus can cast Himself down all the more securely because the angels have received the divine command *to protect Him.* Of course by making these additions St. Luke simply brings out what is implied in St. Matthew.

Our Lord's answer to Satan's second suggestion is introduced in Lk. by the words "And Jesus answering said to him" (Lk. iv, 12*a*), a formula which is longer than that in Mt. "Jesus said to him." (Mt. iv, 7*a*). Apparently the difference is due to St. Luke who, through respect for Our Lord, introduced His words by that longer form of expression (*Cf.* iv, 4, 8, 12), and reserved the shorter form "he said to Him" for introducing Satan's words (*Cf.* verses 3, 6, 9*c*). The quotation from Deuteronomy (vi, 16), is made by Jesus in exactly the same manner in Mt. and Lk. Both have "*Thou* shalt not tempt the Lord *thy* God," although the Hebrew text reads "*You* shall not tempt the Lord *your* God." St. Luke adopts therefore the singular "Thou," "thy," found in St. Matthew instead of the plural "*you,*" "*your,*" in the original Hebrew. He seems, however, to have been conscious that this was not a strict quotation of the original. For, he did not introduce the words "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God" by the formula "it is *written*" which is used by Mt. (iv, 6*b*), but by the expression "it is *said* (Lk. iv, 12*b*), and reserved the ordinary formula "it is written" for word for word quotations from Holy Writ (*Cf*. Lk. iv. 4*b*, 8*b*).

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[1] Of course, if it be admitted with many recent critics—Sanday, among others—that St. Luke composed his Gospel after the destruction of Jerusalem, he had then a further reason not to call it "the Holy City": Jerusalem lay in ruins, accursed by God.

As we stated above, Mt's third onset appears second in Lk., so that Mt. iv, 8-10, corresponds to Lk. iv, 5-8:

Mt. iv.	Lk. iv.
8. Again the devil takes Him to a very high mountain,	5. And having led Him up,
and shows Him all the Kingdoms of the world	he showed Him all the Kingdoms of the earth
	in a moment of time.
and the glory of them,	
9. and says to him:	6. And the devil said to Him:
All these I will give Thee	To Thee I will give this authority
	and the glory of them,
	for to me it has been delivered
	and to whom I will, I give it.
if prostrating, Thou wilt worship me.	7. It Thou therefore wilt worship before me,
	it shall all be thine.
10. Then Jesus says to him:	8. And Jesus answering said to him:
Begone Satan! for	
it is written: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God	It is written: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God,
and him only shalt thou serve.	and him only shalt thou serve.

Several differences between Lk's opening statement "And having taken Him up," and Mt's corresponding line "Again the devil takes Him to a very high mountain," have already been explained as variations from St. Matthew's Gospel. These are: (1) the dropping of Mt's particle "Again" which was replaced in Lk. by the simple conjunction "and" when he did away with Mt's order of the second and third onsets; (2) Lk's use of the past tense "having led Him up" in preference to Mt's use of the present "takes Him", which is due to his desire to employ the past form throughout his narrative of a past event; and (3) Lk's use of the verb ἄγειν (in its composite form ἀνάγειν "to lead up") which he employed to do away with Mt's less reverent expression παραλαμβάνειν "to take." The only important difference that remains to be explained in regard to this first line, consists in the fact that Lk. has no distinct reference to Mt's very high mountain" from the top of which all the Kingdoms of the world were shown to Jesus. This is apparently an apologetical omission on the part of St. Luke. As he wrote for pagan converts he knew that they would find it hard to believe that so high a mountain existed in Palestine anymore than in their own country. He, therefore, dropped all explicit reference to such a mountain and set forth what he thought to be implied in Mt's narrative; however high the mountain to which Satan took Jesus, the tempter could not *show* Him *all* the Kingdoms of the world without having recourse to some manner of magic artifice. In view of this, St. Luke added to St. Matthew's clause: "and shows Him all the Kingdoms of the world" (Mt. iv, 8*b*), the explicit statement that Satan did so "in a moment of time" (Lk. iv, 5*bc*). It will be further noticed that the upward movement spoken of in Mt's first line "Again the devil takes Him to a very high mountain," has been carefully preserved in St. Luke's wording "And having led Him up," and can be hardly understood without referring back to Mt's primitive statement. Indeed, Lk's first line appeared so incomplete to several transcribers of the passage, that they added to it Mt's words "to a very high mountain."[1]

When in his second line, St. Luke wrote: "he showed Him all the Kingdoms of the *earth*" οἰκουμένης, literally: the whole inhabited earth), he deliberately used the word "earth" in preference to Mt's less precise term "world," (and shows Him all the Kingdoms of the *world* τοῦ κόσμου). In fact, the word οἰκουμένη is a favorite expression with St. Luke,[2] and he employs κόσμος only in three quotations of Christ's words,[3] apparently to give without change those weighty sayings of *the Lord.*

The clause "and the glory of them" (the Kingdoms) is found in its primitive place in Mt. iv, 8*c*, where it completes naturally Mt's description of the scene beheld by Jesus:

> Mt. iv, 8. Again the devil takes Him to a very high mountain,
> and shows Him all the kingdoms of the world
> *and the glory of them.*

This place, however, ceased to be natural after St. Luke had inserted the clause "in a moment of time" in immediate connection with the showing of Jesus of all the Kingdoms of the world:

> Lk. iv, 5. And having led Him up,
> he showed Him all the kingdoms of the earth
> *in a moment of time.*

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[1] The rules of textual criticism when applied to this passage, prove clearly that the words "to a very high mountain" are a later insertion into Lk's text. The words are rejected by Knabenbauer, S. J., in Lucam, pp. 175, 176, and by critics generally.

[2] *Cf.* Lk. ii, 1; iv, 5; xxi, 26; Acts xi, 28; xvii, 16, 31; xix, 27; xxiv, 5.

[3] These quotations of Our Lord's words are found in Lk. ix, 25; xi, 50; xii, 30.

Hence, our third evangelist omitted it here, and postponed it to Mt's next verse (iv, 9,) which gives Satan's suggestion to Jesus in reference to the glorious scene set before Him:

Mt. iv, 9. And says to Him:	Lk. iv, 6. And the devil said to Him:
all these I will give Thee,	To Thee I will give all his authority
	and the glory of them,
	for to me it has been delivered
	and to whom I will, I give it.
if prostrating, Thou wilt worship me.	7. If Thou therefore wilt worship before me
	it shall all be Thine.

The differences between Mt. iv, 9, and Lk. iv, 6-7*b*, are numerous and point all to Lk's later redaction. In his first line, Mt. had used the present tense "says;" Lk. prefers the perfect "said," for a reason we have already pointed out. Mt's second line "all these I will give Thee" is a very short but primitive statement of Satan's promise to Jesus, the emphasis being naturally laid on *all the Kingdoms* just spoken of as shown to Him.

Lk's corresponding line "To Thee I will give all this authority" sets forth indeed the same promise as Mt's second line: Satan intends to *give all* to Christ. But it contains an inversion which was, to all appearance, introduced by our third evangelist. He lays the emphasis on the one *to whom* all the splendor of the contemplated Kingdoms is destined, and therefore places first the words found last in Mt.: "*To Thee I will give*" (Σοὶ δώσω). This inversion allows him to introduce Mt's postponed clause "and the glory of them" as the continuation of the object of the verb "to give."

To Thee I will give all this authority
and the glory of them.[1]

It allows him also to add expressly what is only implied in St. Matthew's narrative, viz.: Satan's positive mastery over all that Jesus beheld. Because of that mastery he could promise it all to Jesus; and its explicit mention was calculated to tempt Christ the more to accept the condition under which Satan was willing to pass it over to Him:

Lk. iv, 6*c* *for* to me it has been delivered
and to whom I will, I give it.

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[1] As justly remarked by A. Plummer (St. Luke, p. 111), "the expression 'of them' after 'the glory' is a *constructio ad sensum,* referring to the kingdoms understood in 'all this authority'." But, as it seems to us, that construction was used by St. Luke directly in view of Mt's iv, 8*c*, which our third evangelist utilizes here.

This view of Lk's addition explains his further insertion of the "therefore" in verse 7*a*, and of the entire next line 7*b*.

Mt. iv, 9*c*.	Lk. iv, 7.
If prostrating, Thou wilt worship me.	If Thou *therefore* wilt worship before me,[1] *it shall all be thine.*

It is also in perfect harmony with Lk's general method of redaction. As we have pointed out several times already, and as we will have many opportunities to show in our subsequent Studies, our third evangelist is wont to set forth expressly what he regards as implied in his sources.

Our Lord's answer to the suggestion of the devil runs as follows in our evangelical records:

Mt. iv, 10.	Lk. iv, 8.
Then Jesus says to him:	And Jesus answering said to him:
Begone Satan! for	
it is written: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God	it is written: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God,
and him only shalt thou serve.	and him only shalt thou serve.

Lk. has dropped the temporal particle τότε found in St. Matthew, consistently with his desire to do away with such particles in the narrative of the temptation. He has employed the longer introductory formula here as in preceding cases, through respect for Our Lord whose words he is about to quote. He has deliberately omitted the dismissing formula: "Begone Satan!" (together with the casual particle "for" which naturally goes along with it) because, while it was most natural here in Mt's record which is about to bring to an end the narrative of the three onsets, it had become absolutely out of place in Lk's account which, through the inversion of Mt's second and third onsets, had as yet to give the narrative of one of them.

VIII. Lk's Last Verse Examined.

The last verse in St. Luke (iv, 13,) is parallel to the last verse in St. Matthew (iv, 11). They both are intended as conclusions to the respective narratives of Our Lord's temptation in our first and third Synoptic Gospels:

Mt. iv.	Lk. iv.
	13. And having ended every temptation, the devil departed from Him till a fit opportunity.
11. Then the devil leaves Him, and lo! the angels came and ministered to Him.	

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[1] Lk's substitute in iv, 7*a*, for Mt's "prostrating" (Mt. iv, 9*c*), is his favorite expression ἐνώπιόν "before." He omitted the idea of a prostration because already conveyed by the verb he used from St. Matthew (προσκύνειν).

As was shown above, St. Matthew's last verse was worded in view of his insertion of the three onsets into Mk's narrative. The temporal particle τότε "then" is naturally used by St. Matthew, who, throughout his description of the three onsets, has carefully noted the sequence of events. The devil is spoken of as *leaving* Our Lord at the end of the three onsets, because he had been described as *approaching* to submit Him to these three trials (Mt. iv, 3). Finally, St. Matthew has utilized in his own way Mk's information as to the ministry of the angels, transforming Mk's simple line, "and the angels ministered to Him", (Mk. i, 13*d*,) into the elaborate statement: "and lo! the angels came and ministered to Him."

Turning now to Lk's last verse, we find that it is worded chiefly in view of the inverted order which our third evangelist has introduced into Mt's narrative of the three onsets. It is clearly in view of this that Mt's concluding reference to the ministry of the angels is dropped by St. Luke. Such an event could take place in the desert to which St. Matthew had Our Lord brought back from the Holy City, to undergo a third and final trial (*Cf.* Mt. iv, 5, 8, 11); but obviously it could hardly occur in Jerusalem where,—through his inversion of Mt's second and third onsets,—St. Luke left Jesus at the end of the three assaults (*Cf.* Lk. iv, 9, 13). St. Luke, therefore, omitted all reference to the angelic ministry, and substituted for it the significant little trait: "till a fit opportunity," to secure a natural completion for his statement "the devil departed from Him," which corresponds to Mt's "the devil leaves Him."

Again, the temporal particle "then" in Mt's clause: "then the devil leaves Him," was indeed most fitting in close connection with Our Lord's dismissing rebuke: "begone Satan!" recorded in Mt's third and final assault (Mt. iv, 10*b*). But this fitness evidently disappeared with the rebuke, when St. Luke suppressed the words "begone Satan," owing, as we showed above, to the fact that Mt's third, became Lk's second onset. Instead, therefore, of Mt's particle "then" which placed the devil's departure in immediate connection with the third temptation in St. Matthew's record, he wrote a clause of his own: "And having ended every temptation."[1] This placed Satan's departure in a general connection with the three assaults irrespective of their actual order, and therefore avoided all possible contradiction with Mt's explicit statements concerning that order.

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[1] The Greek verb here used to indicate the end of all the temptations, is the one found in Lk. iv, 2*d*, where it is characteristic of Luke's own wording. The use of πᾶς "every" is also a characteristic feature of Lk's style.

IX. Lk's Order of the Onsets Explained.

The foregoing examination of St. Luke's narrative of the temptation proves that our third evangelist deliberately did away with Mt's order of the second and third onsets. He had for doing so a reason which can still be pointed out. His narrative betrays his special purpose to give the line of travel adopted by Our Lord to *return into Galilee.* It is with this view that at the very beginning of his narrative of the temptation he mentions the starting point of His journey and speaks of Jesus leaving the Jordan as of a *return* from it:

> Lk. iv. 1 And Jesus full of the Holy Spirit
> *returned from the Jordan.* . . .

It is with this view, too, that scarcely has he finished his narrative when he states the final goal of the journey and likewise in the terms of a *return*:

> Lk. iv, 14. And Jesus *returned* in the power of the Spirit
> *into Galilee.* . . .

The body of the narrative betrays the same purpose. On His way back Jesus did not repair directly from the Jordan to Galilee, but wandered a long time in the desert:

> Lk. iv, 1*bc* And [He] was led by the Spirit in the desert
> 2 forty days tempted by the devil.

When the forty days are over, St. Luke naturally preserves Mt's place for the first onset. Jesus was still in the desert, when Satan regarding Our Lord's pangs of hunger as a fit opportunity to tempt Him in a special manner, suggested that He should change a stone into a loaf. So that our third evangelist had no reason to displace the first onset. But the case stood differently in regard to the second and third assaults. St. Luke was aware of an early tradition detailed in our fourth Gospel[1] and implied in the first two Synoptics,[2] which told of a ministry of Jesus in Jerusalem before John the Baptist was cast into prison, and consequently before Our Lord's return into Galilee. Now reflecting on Mt's arrangement of the second and third onsets he easily saw that by inverting them he would give the places in the order in which they succeeded each other and leave Jesus in Jerusalem for His ministry there before returning into Galilee. In consequence he inverted Mt's order of the second and third assaults, dropped the temporal particles of Mt's narrative, and substituted for them the simple conjunction "and" which sufficiently suggests the succession of places which he intended to point out.

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[1] *Cf.* John ii, 13-iv, 3.

[2] St. Mark says (i, 14*a*): "And after that John was delivered up, Jesus came into Galilee;" and St. Matthew writes (iv, 12): "And when Jesus had heard that John was delivered up, He retired into Galilee." (Compare with these statements John iii, 24, and iv, 1-3)

X. Concluding Remarks.

The following are the conclusions which come clearly out of our study of the Synoptic accounts of Our Lord's temptation. Our first three Gospels exhibit here substantially the same literary relation that we have recognized between them in our preceding Studies. St. Mark's narrative is distinctly objective in his statements and primitive in comparison to the other two Synoptics. St. Matthew depends on St. Mark into whose narrative he inserts for an apologetical purpose of his own, an account of three distinct onsets in the form of a dialogue. St. Luke combines and modifies for reasons which can still be made out the records of both Mt. and Mk. Again, despite the differences in respect to style and contents which exists between the three parallel accounts, a careful literary analysis proves that they nowhere amount to a contradiction.

As regards the special source to which we should refer the three onsets inserted by St. Matthew into Mk's narrative of the temptation, only this much can now be stated. In form (that of a dialogue) and purpose (apologetics against the Jews), they resemble Mt's insertions into Mk's narratives of the Preparatory ministry of John (Mt. iii, 7-10,) and of Our Lord's baptism (Mt. iii, 14-15,) which we have already noticed in our preceding Studies. So that these three additions of St. Matthew may well be referred to one and the same source. What that precise source was will be examined later.

Francis E. Gigot.

Mk. i, , 13.	Mt. iv, 1-11.
[out	
12. And straightway the Sipirt drives Him	1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit
into the desert.	into the desert,
	to be tempted by the devil.
13. And He was in the desert forty days	2. And having fasted forty days
	and forty nights,
tempted by Satan,	
and He was among the wild beasts,	
	afterwards He was hungry.
	3. And the tempter approaching Him, said:
	If Thou art the Son of God,
	tell these stones to become loaves.
	4. But He answering said:
	It is written: Not by bread alone man shall live,
	but by every word proceeding from the mouth of G
	5. *Then the devil takes Him into the Holy City,*
	and sets Him on the pinnacle of the Temple,
	and says to Him: If Thou art the Son of God,
	cast Thyself down, for it is written:
	He will give his angels commands about Thee,
	and on their hands they shall bear Thee up,
	lest ever Thou strike Thy foot against a stone.
	7. *Jesus said to him:*
	Again it is written:
	Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.
	8. Again the devil takes Him to a very high mountain,
	and shows Him all the Kingdoms of the world
	and the glory of them,
	9. and says to Him:
	All these I will give Thee,
	if prostrating, Thou wilt worship me.
	10. Then Jesus says to him:
	Begone Satan! for
	it is written: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God,
	and him only shalt thou serve.
	11. Then the devil leaves Him,
and the angels ministered to Him.	and lo! the angels came and ministered to Him.

NOTES.

In the field of Theology, the most interesting development during the past few months has been the appearance of a number of articles in the French reviews in answer to the question: "What is a Dogma?" The enterprising editor of *La Quinzaine*, wishing to elicit the opinions of his readers on important religious questions, has begun in his magazine a series of "Enquêtes," of which this is the first to be treated. The question is stated in an article by M. Edouard Le Roy, a Catholic layman who has achieved distinction as a mathematician and philosopher.

M. Le Roy does not restrict himself to putting a question to the professional theologians; in a tentative way, he offers the solution at which he himself has arrived, and asks those who take up the question: (1) whether he is right or wrong in his way of meeting the difficulties offered by modern opponents, and (2) what better method theologians can suggest. He feels that the traditional answers are lacking in convincing force for minds impregnated with modern ideas of what constitutes proof, and that to reach such minds we must take a new point of view of doctrinal propositions.

He warns his readers that in speaking of a dogma he has reference, not to the reality back of the formula of faith, but to that formula itself and its intelligibility or worth to us. He discovers four "motifs de répulsion" of modern thought when brought into face with dogmas. (1) They are not susceptible of demonstration, since they are not capable of direct and decisive rational justification. (2) They cannot be received, because the proofs offered being based on testimony, are not of the same nature as the propositions the truth of which they claim to guarantee; and, moreover, since they are wholly extrinsic, and since we are without anything in our nature or thought by which we can apperceive them, they can find no point of insertion into the body of our ordinary beliefs, that is, they cannot become a part of our knowledge. (3) They are not intelligible to the modern mind because they are expressed in the terminology of an antiquated system of philosophy. (4) They stand out of relation with the other elements of human knowledge and cannot contribute, as these do, to the progress of mankind.

To these difficulties M. Le Roy offers the following solution: On the purely intellectual side, dogmas have only a negative sense; they are rejections of hurtful interpretations of religion, as is proved by the history of their origin; they give no positive knowledge of the unknowable realities with which they deal. We must seek the positive force and value of dogmas only in the practical order. "They affirm under the veil of metaphors and images that the supernatural Reality contains a something which renders it obligatory upon us that our attitude and our conduct in its regard should have such and such characteristics." Without such an interpretation as this, he contends, the dogmas become mere verbal formulas without religious value; they cannot be held by men of different mental preconceptions; and they cannot be successfully defended against gainsayers.

To consider first the reply which seems best to cover the ground of M. Le Roy's difficulties, we turn from the letters in the *Quinzaine* to an article in the *Revue Biblique* of July, 1905, by M. J. Wehrle. He discusses one by one the objections proposed. To the first he answers that "demonstration," even in the opinion of modern scientists, is not limited to any single form of proof, such as that used in mathematics; and, since there are special kinds of demonstration proper to different sciences, it is reasonable that theological science should have its own.

The second difficulty he acknowledges to be a serious one, at least in its insistence on the seemingly disparate character of the body of experienced and inferred truths which constitute our knowledge, and the extraordinary and supernatural truths which doctrinal propositions present for assimilation. But it is precisely this difficulty which M. Blondel's system of apologetics has been framed to meet, and does in fact meet triumphantly. The theory of immanence shows the point of insertion of religious truth into our nature. M. Wehrle considers that the most regrettable feature in the article of M. Le Roy is that it compromises the cause which it is intended to aid. His half-blind moral empiricism will only provoke a reaction toward intellectualism, which will be baneful to the remarkably well-balanced system of M. Blondel.

In answer to the third difficulty, he says there is no question of the need of becoming converted to a system of philosophy, but only of understanding and preserving the truths which have become formulated and systematized in the terms of the Scholastic philosophy with more precision and order than would have been possible in popular forms of speaking and thinking. The divine Personality, the Resurrection, the Real Presence—although, being mysterious, they cannot be adequately known—have all a real and intelligible meaning, even if one does not hold the Scholastic philosophy. He objects to M. Le Roy's dilemma of "tout ou rien"; our knowledge of divine things, though not adequate, is valid as far as it goes. The final reproach made against dogma he does not consider justified. Our religious beliefs do commingle with our scientific knowledge in the field of action. Moreover religion has its own definite goal—the salvation of men, and in this makes a most important contribution to human progress.

Of the answers which have appeared in the *Quinzaine*, we shall consider only that of Père de Grandmaison. He regrets the impression of mental inquietude which will be produced by Le Roy's article. No doubt, contemporaneous philosophy forces us to modify traditional positions, but overhaste and contentiousness are evils to be avoided. In order to escape the personal element entirely, he approaches the general question from his own standpoint, and considers dogma in its historical aspect, in its relation to the human mind, and in its bearing on the conduct of the believer.

Having traced back through history the meaning of the word "dogma," he shows that the most authentic Christian tradition assigns to dogma an intellectual value which is positive and special. Now if a dogma makes a statement concerning the nature of a mysterious object in some of its phases, does it follow that believers are reduced to a choice between agnosticism and a childish anthropomorphism? No! by the method of analogy we can learn something of God, by which we may at least distinguish Him from all other beings.

The fact that dogmatic propositions are not the outcome of our own processes of thought; that they are proposed to the mind from without, and attested by witnesses rather than by syllogisms, does not appear as a difficulty to P. de Grandmaison. If the indirect proof is sufficiently established, it constitutes a demonstration, as it does in so many other facts of human knowledge. He gives an excellent and instructive resumé of the requisites preparatory to the act of faith, of the motives for belief, and of the kind of certitude, moral or vital, which faith engenders.

Between dogmatic tenets and human conduct, he discovers a reciprocal interchange of influence. As is evident from the Epistles of St. Paul, dogma is the foundation of Christian morality, and remains its objective standard and rule. Action, conduct helps towards the understanding of the dogma, towards a fuller realization of the depth and bearing of the truths it inculcates, but doctrine always holds lordship over conduct, and not *vice versa.* At times the doctrine is latent, implicit, undefined. Then indeed the *Lex orandi* is a help to the determination of the *Lex credendi.* But its worth as a determinant of right human conduct is no general test for the validity of a dogma. What effect can the *Filioque* have on human conduct? And yet it is a well established dogma of the Church.

On the other side, M. l'Abbé Sertillanges (until the recent suppression of his Order in France, Père Sertillanges, O. P.), writing in the *Quinzaine*, gives his approbation, with some few reserves, to the positions of M. Le Roy. M. Sertillanges has been taken to task rather sharply by M. Franon in an article under the piquant title *Un scholastique anti-intellectualiste*, in the *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* for June. M. Sertillanges has answered; M. Franon has replied . . . and neither has been convinced.

In the *Revue du Clergé Français* (Sept. 1, 1905), M. Dubois, who has recently taken charge of the theological chronicle of that review, examines the system of Le Roy and Sertillanges. He remarks in the first place that there is an evident relationship between this theory and certainl views of writers, such as M. Laberthonnière, M. Loisy, and Father Tyrrel on the religious value of dogma. They are right in insisting that dogmas have a practical value. But they are not mere symbols; they are expressions of a reality; and they have value as such independent of their practical bearing. The criterion of moral worth is vague, shifting, and sometimes entirely inapplicable. M. Le Roy's attempt to find a *Via Media* between pure agnosticism and the traditional intellectualism seems to him fruitless. The only thing to do is to go back to the old theory of analogy which "respects the transcendance and the incomprehensibility of the mystery, safeguards the rights of reason, and opens before it the vista of a progress in the understanding of the dogma, the end of which will not be reached until the day of the beatific vision."

In this strife of opinions, we miss one voice, once lifted in the forefront of every fray when the cause of religion was in dispute. On June 14 last, M. l' Abbé Charles Denis, for the past ten years editor of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, passed "to where beyond these voices there is peace." Under his management, the *Annales* had taken a leading place as the exponent of very modern views in Catholic apologetics. An ardent controversialist, he had broken many a lance with those in his own camp as well as with the enemy, but all for love of the fight or of the cause, never out of rancor or ill-will. Like many a path-seeker through new wildernesses, he sometimes found himself out of accord with the views of the official guides, but he always submitted with the obedience of the priest and the docility of the Christian.

His place as editor of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* is filled by M. l' Abbé Laberthonnière. Under such able editorship, we may feel assured that the periodical will not fall below its present standards of interest and modernity. Père Laberthonnière (he was a member of the French Oratory up to the time of their recent suppression) has already taken a prominent place among French Catholic writers as a champion of the New Apologetics. One of his works, his *Théorie de l'éducation* has been translated into English and published by the Cathedral Library Association, of New York. A review of his latest book, *Réalisme chrétien et l' idéalisme grec,* will appear in our next issue.

Death has also been busy in the ranks of Catholic editors nearer home. During the month of August, the Rev. James Conway, S. J., of the *Messenger* staff, died rather suddenly in New York City. Father Conway was well known to the clergy of the United States for his pamphlets on the rights of the parent and the State in the education of children, and for his translations from the German, notably of Father Cathrein's work in refutation of Socialism. In the Archdiocese of New York, his presence will be missed at the theological conferences, of which he has been moderator for the past four years. The NEW YORK REVIEW extends to the editorial board of the *Messenger* its condolence on the loss of their esteemed *confrère.*

The distinguished editor of the *Revue Biblique* has issued a program of work to be covered during the coming year in the Biblical School at Jerusalem of which he is the president. The courses offered to students include the ordinary theological branches as well as the special studies in Holy Scripture for which the school provides exceptional advantages. These latter branches include Exegesis of Exodus (by Father Lagrange himself) and of Romans; philological studies on Isaias and the Synoptics; Palestinian topography and Oriental archæology; with Hebrew, Aramaic, Coptic, Arabic, Assyrian, and Sabaean. There are weekly and monthly trips for the study of archæology; and the announcement is made that the triennial journey to Sinai and the surrounding country will begin in February, 1906. Those who wish to take part in it are warned that applications must be in by November of this year.

An announcement of still greater interest to English-speaking Catholics is that which comes from the Irish National Seminary of Maynooth of the project to begin in the coming year a Quarterly which will be edited by the professors of that institution. It is no exaggeration to say that Ireland has been the Mother Church of Catholicity in almost every land that has the use of English speech; and all will welcome the news that Irish genius is providing itself with a medium for defending the religious ideals which Irish faith has done so much to plant throughout the world. The effect of such a periodical will not only be to provide a means of offering to a wider public the intellectual labors of the Maynooth staff; it will be an incentive to its brilliant graduates, present and future, to take their proper place in the great world of Catholic thought. The NEW YORK REVIEW extends a hearty welcome to this new periodical, being confident that it will soon take a foremost place as an exponent of the faith once delivered to the saints.

One might consider that in France, at least, there is no lack of organs for the expression of Catholic opinion, and yet it is there that Catholic periodicals are most readily begun, and as a rule, most ably carried on. The latest plan that comes to our notice is one to organize at Lyons a new weekly which will have the significant title *Demain*. In outward appearance, as well as in the class of subjects treated, it will resemble the well known English Catholic organ, the *Tablet*. The list of names given under the heading "Patronages et Collaborations," shows that the projected weekly has strong supporters, and gives hope that it will do excellent work along the lines marked out by its founders. Subscriptions (12 fr. 50) should be sent to M. Pierre Jay, *Quai de la Charité*, Lyons, France. The first number appears this month.

We have received notice of another French enterprise which will be of interest to Catholic students and teachers. It is to publish a series of monographs, of about 200 pages each, on the most important topics treated in the curriculum of the seminaries. In each "tract" studied, there is generally some question of capital importance, which, however, cannot be treated satisfactorily within the limits of a text-book. It is now proposed that these should be discussed in a series of special studies, which will serve to supplement the class manuals, and will also form a handy working library of Theology and Philosophy for the priest or educated layman. They will be written in French, and the price is set at 1 fr. 50.

The plan is excellent, and if the work be done by the most competent men, it is sure of success. It is to be hoped that it is a sign which marks the end of the deluge of text-books. Until recently, a professor who has had a measure of success in teaching his branch, has seemed to feel that he fulfilled his duty to his craft by arranging his notes—some of them original, but most of them copied from others—in the form of a new class-book. This custom has been the cause of a deplorable waste of energy. For example, three-fourths of the manuals of Philosophy "ad mentem Divi Thomae" have no reason for existence. If the writers had devoted their attention to some phase of Scholastic Philosophy in which they had a special interest, scholars would now have at their disposal a collection of studies of real value on the main points of the Thomistic system. No new Latin class manual will ever help "the Neo-Scholastic movement" to move beyond the confines of the cloister.

Announcement is also made of a new *Bibliothèque de l' enseignement scripturaire* to be edited by two Biblical scholars who have had experience as teachers, one of the Old Testament, the other of the New Testament—M. Touzard, S. S., professor of Scripture at the Catholic University of Paris, and P. Rose, O. P., professor at the Catholic University of Fribourg. The project, considered of itself, is to be welcomed, but we greet it with some reserves on account of a fear that it will hamper the progress of the *Etudes Bibliques*, that series of excellent commentaries inaugurated by Father Lagrange. Mgr. Batiffol assures us that this difficulty will be avoided, as the *Bibliothèque* will be less scientific in treatment, and will make its appeal to a different class of readers. The main difficulty, however, is that the *Bibliothèque* and the *Etudes* will have to call upon the energies of the same writers, with the possible result of diminished efficiency for both enterprises.

There are two recent articles of Mgr. Batiffol which are well worthy of notice. One is in the July number of the *Correspondant*, on *Le clergé anglican et la question biblique.* He considers that they are between two dangers, that of agnosticism, coming from hyper-criticism of the Bible, and the other extreme of a too rigid conservatism. If the Anglicans can find a way between these dangers "they will have given an example to any of the other churches which are under the heavens." The parable is not hard to apply. It is evidently a way of describing a state of affairs in another Church "quæ sub cœlo est." The warning should not be necessary. The good example in matters affecting the future of Christianity ought by rights to come from our side.

He has also, in the *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* for June, a comprehensive article entitled *Pour l' histoire des dogmes*, in which, apropos of recent publications on history of dogma, he shows that theologians should make a more liberal use of such works, in order to arrive at a more natural as well as more correct solution of difficulties. One cannot go into the study of these matters, he avers, without speedily discovering that the development of dogma is more than a mere word. He acknowedges his own mental indebtedness to both Franzelin and Newman, but it is to Newman, primarily, we must look for guidance now.

The latest Catholic magazine in English to reach us is a fruit of the enterprise of women who are interested in higher education. It is a well-printed little quarterly called *The Crucible.* Its object is to form a bond of union amongst members of teaching communities, which at present are lacking in the advantages of mutual co-operation and criticism. It is gratifying to find that three of the contributors to the initial number are members of sisterhoods. The enterprise deserves encouragement, as it has a good field for useful work. Subscriptions ($1.20 per annum) may be sent to Miss Margaret Fletcher, 89 Woodstock Road, Oxford.

Padre Semeria, the distinguished Barnabite, who forms one of a group of writers—Mercati, Ginnocchi, Fracassini, Minocchi, Bonaccorsi,—who have done so much to rehabilitate Catholic scholarship in Italy, has recently published a volume of conferences on the Mass: *La messa nella sua storia e nei suoi simboli* (Pustet). In it he treats historically the origin of the Mass, its different parts, the sacred vestments, etc. The book is a model of its kind, combining the erudition which appeals to the scholar with a grace of style and facility of presentation which will make it acceptable to a wider class of readers.

A rather rare compliment for an English spiritual writer has been paid to Bishop Hedley, O. S. B., by the translation of his *Retreat* into French (Lethielleux, Paris, 1905). In the interchange of spiritual literature, it is we who have usually been indebted (or otherwise, as the case may be) to the French. It is to be hoped that a good reception will be given to this excellent work, which possesses that earnestness and solidity which are said to be characteristic of English piety, and which certainly are in accord with the spirit of St. Benedict. The translation is the work of the Reverend Dr. Bruneau, S. S.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Moral Discipline in the Christian Church—by H. HENSLEY HENSON, B. D., Canon of Westminster, and Rector of St. Margaret's, Westminster, sometime Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. Longman's, Green & Co. London, New York, and Bombay. 1905. pp. 270.

Canon Henson has published in book form, and with the addition of sixteen appendices, his series of popular lectures delivered on Lenten Fridays at Westminster Abbey. Facing the fact that at present the practice of private confession is more general in the English Church than at any time since the Reformation, and convinced that the methods of English confessors, as increasingly drawn from Roman sources, are deserving of decisive and effectual condemnation, the lecturer draws from a consideration of Christian moral discipline various arguments in favor of a reaction. It is his opinion that the confessional should be extirpated; though at the same time the practice of confessing sins—apart from any sacerdotal theory of the Christian ministry—is something to be recommended.

Beginning with the *Provinciales* of Pascal, proceeding to the *Morale des Jésuites* of Paul Bert, and appealing for confirmation to the highly authorized and generally used *Theologia Moralis* of St. Liguori, the Canon has come to believe that the confessional, as administered in the Catholic Church, is debasing, and that its tendency is to discredit and enfeeble the individual conscience. Mr. Lea's *History of Auricular Confession* makes clear to him that St. Liguori is representative of the great army of casuists; and the testimonies of Blanco White and others unnamed, confirm the bad impression made by the official literature.

On the one hand a primitive conception of theology and psychology, and on the other hand a sacerdotal conception of the Christian ministry—with consequent insistence on compulsory confession—help to explain the spread and the hold of the confessional. Further, the confessional answers to known spiritual needs of the human heart—which needs, however, might be better met by the promotion of genuine spiritual friendship as an element of Christian life. It is to the recommending of this "effective substitute" in place of the confessional that the Canon's work is directed.

The good of the book before us lies in its emphasis on the necessity of honest and practical moral effort as an indispensable element of religion. Sham repentance and irresolute promises are held up in their true colors as useless and demoralizing absurdities. The author also comments on possible and actual abuses in a way well worthy of consideration; nor should our disagreement with his conclusions prevent us from profiting by his presentation of premises, valuable if insufficient. But with this the usefulness of his book as a contribution to religious literature seems to end. Probably the disinterested reader will see in these pages nothing stronger than an emphatic protest against a system historically identified with certain abuses and theoretically capable of begetting monstrous corruptions. That sacramental confession is a divine institution, that the sum of its influences upon humanity makes powerfully for good, that its achievement has not yet been equalled, not to say surpassed—these propositions are quite compatible with all the facts and truths urged by Canon Henson.

So that, in so far as derogatory to Catholicism, these lectures present an outside aspect of confession as seen from the author's viewpoint, and judged under the influence of the doubts and fears which weigh upon a Liberal Churchman, examined by the help of study rather than of actual experience. Anyone familiar with confession from the inside, will readily detect the theoretical flavor of the Canon's arguments. We speak of that which we know. And though the Catholic discipline *has been* open to misuse, and though the wisdom and the virtue of the priests *are* limited, and though the penitent *is* sometimes shallow and sometimes half-hearted, nevertheless practical Catholics possess first-hand evidence of the actual moral value of the sacrament of Penance, such as a much weightier treatise than this present volume would be totally unable to shake.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

The Student's Old Testament, Logically and Chronologically Arranged and Translated: Vol. I. *Narratives of the Beginnings of Hebrew History*. Vol. II. *Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives*—by CHARLES FOSTER KENT, PH. D. New York. Scribners. 1904-1905. pp. xxxv, 382; xxxi, 506.

These are the first two volumes of a monumental work, to be completed in six vols., undertaken, some years ago, by the indefatigable Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University, Dr. Charles Foster Kent. The remaining four will deal respectively with the following topics, viz. Vol. III, Prophetic Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses of the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek and Maccabean periods. Vol. IV Laws and Traditional Precedents such as Constitutional, Criminal, Private, Humanitarian, Religious and Ceremonial Laws of Israel. Vol. V, Songs, Psalms and Prayers. Vol. VI, Proverbs and Didactic Poems, or the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament. Although the generic title of the work indicates that it is destined mainly to be a student's Old Testament, nevertheless its thoroughness and sobriety will undoubtedly make it of real service to scholars and, indeed, of interest and value to the general reader.

The aim of the work is (1) to rearrange the writings of the Old Testament in a logical order; (2) to indicate their approximate dates and the classes of writers from whom they come, and the more important reasons for the critical analysis of the different books; and (3) to introduce the reader by means of a literal and clear translation to the beauty and thought of the original. As further aids to a clear understanding of the sacred text, there are numerous notes and discussions, critical, exegetical, historical, philological and archæological, and also valuable introductions, appendices and tables. Brief suggestions are often offered regarding the vital significance and value of certain stories and popular legends which have found their way into the Old Testament.

The Old Testament is essentially and distinctly an Oriental production, a production consisting of a heterogeneous collection of historical and religious literature in which logical connection between the different parts is entirely wanting. These unique and wonderful literary and religious writings of the Chosen People have come down to us from the ancient East where, as the author aptly remarks, "men arrived at conclusions by intuition and not by the obvious, systematic processes of reasoning that alone appeal to the modern Occidental." In this respect there is an analogy and a literary resemblance between the Old Testament and the Koran of Mohammed and the other sacred books of Egypt, India, China and Persia, where stories, legends, oral traditions, prayers, moral precepts, laws, ceremonial and liturgical institutions, enigmas, parables, fairy-tales and history are promiscuously grouped together. The present order and arrangement of the different books of the Old Testament into historical, poetical and prophetic, is chiefly due to its later compilers or editors, and especially the translators of the Septuagint and the Vulgate; but no principle of arrangement is applied consistently throughout, nor was it possible to do so, since the individual books in the form in which they have come down to us, are not always homogeneous in character. In the first five books of the Old Testament, prophetic and priestly traditions, ancient songs, ethnological tables, patriarchal stories, traditional derivations of proper names, genealogical lists, prophetic exhortations, laws, judicial precedents and historical narratives, written by different authors ,in different styles, in divers times and places, and from varying standpoints, are all mingled together, sometimes with, but often without any effort at logical or artistic arrangement. In such books as Proverbs and Psalms the lack of systematic order is still more conspicuous. Maxims, practical observations, prayers, and hymns, on the greatest variety of themes, and written from many different and often divergent points of view, follow each other in close succession, so that one idea is no sooner fixed than it is displaced by another entirely different. "The inevitable result is that no complete and definite conception is gained regarding the teachings either of the book or of the Old Testament concerning any one of the subjects treated," and, since systematic classification is the first step towards the practical use of any library, it is evident that Dr. Kent's work, which aims at supplying Bible students with such a classification, will receive a hearty welcome from all Old Testament students.

The first volume begins with a lengthy and masterly introduction, of 48 pages, in which the author deals successfully with the following topics: (1) Israel's Heritage of Oral Traditions (pp. 3-12); (2) Transmission and Crystallization of Israel's Traditions into Literature (pp. 13-20); (3) The Present Literary Form and Contents of Israel's Early Records (pp. 21-30); (4) Characteristics, Dates, and History of the Different Prophetic and Priestly Narratives (pp. 31-48). We then find, in chronological order and according to their different sources (such as the early and late prophetic narratives of supposed Judean origin—known among scholars as J, and J^s, or J^2, J^3, or J^b and J^c, etc.—the Ephraimite, early and late, prophetic narratives—known as E, E^s, E^2 or E^b, E^c, etc.—and the early and late priestly narratives—known as P, P^2, P^3 or P^b, P^c, etc.), the strictly historical parts of the Pentateuch, Joshua and Judges, dealing with the beginnings of Hebrew history till the end of the period of the Judges. The English translation is based on the standard Hebrew text, and the difficult passages are often elucidated by brief notes which form a valuable collection of historical and archæological data, textual emendations, exegetical commentary, etc. At the end of the volume are found nine valuable appendices on bibliographical references (p. 349-356); words and expressions peculiar to the different narratives (pp. 357-360); Babylonian accounts of creation (pp. 360-370); parallels to the story of Paradise and of the Fall (pp. 370-373); Babylonian parallels to the story of the flood (pp. 373-378;) ancient Babylonian laws regarding marriage with household slaves (pp. 378-379); Esau's descendants and the early Edomite Kings (pp. 379-380); the location of Sinai-Horeb (pp. 381-382), etc., etc.

The second volume deals with Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives from the establishment of the Hebrew monarchy to the end of the Maccabean struggle, including such books as I and II Samuel, Chronicles, I and II Kings, portions of Jeremiah, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, as well as I and II Maccabees. The different documents and sources are carefully selected and conveniently classified under the following titles: (1) The early Judean Saul and David narratives; (2) The later Ephraimite Samuel narratives; (3) Very late popular prophetic traditions; (4) Popular Judean David stories; (5) The Book of the Acts of Solomon; (6) The Israelitish and Judean Royal chronicles; (7) The early Ephraimite Elijah narratives; (8) The Gilgal cycle of Elisha narratives; (9) The Samaria cycle of popular Elisha traditions; (10) The Isaiah stories; (11) The final editing of the Books of Samuel and Kings, etc. . . . The notes are numerous and excellent, while the appendices on bibliographical references, Hebrew chronology, the Moabite stone, the Western campaigns of Shalmaneser II; Sargon's capture of Samaria, the Siloam inscription, Sennacherib's invasion of Judah, the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus, etc., etc., are very satisfactory. The volume, furthermore, is preceded by a scholarly Introduction, of 50 pages, on the history of Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives under the following headings: (1) The origin and present literary form of the Old Testament historical and biographical narratives (pp. 3-9); (2) The earlier histories and biographies incorporated in Samuel and Kings (pp. 10-21); (3) The Chronicler's ecclesiastical history of Judah and the Temple (pp. 22-28); (3) The original sources and historical value of Ezra-Nehemiah (pp. 29-34); (5) The records of the Maccabean age (pp. 35-40); (6) The recovery of the original text of the historical books (pp. 41-48), etc.

It is needless to say that the work, as a whole, is a marvel of painstaking industry, both in conception and execution, representing an immense amount of biblical erudition and learning happily combined with advanced but sound and sober criticism. In the arrangement of the different sources of the biblical narratives the method adopted by our author is excellent, while the lengthy introductions and the copious critical, exegetical, historical and archæological notes and discussions are extremely valuable. The work, in fact, should be in the hands of all Old Testament students, beginners and advanced alike; and the author and the publishers are to be highly complimented for the undertaking as well as for the rapid progress of the work.

Gabriel Oussani.

The Freedom of Authority: Essays in Apologetics—by I. Macbride Sterrett. New York. The Macmillan Company.

This volume of essays, which borrows its title from the first and most important one of the series, is held together in somewhat loose-jointed unity by the dominant thought running throughout, formulated, on page 154, in these terms: Better the man nurtured in any form of "a religion of authority" than the man without any religious nature. If the statement were amended by substituting the word *profession* for *nature*, it would, perhaps, express more accurately the author's thesis. Defining authority as "the power or influence through which one does or believes what he would not of his own unaided powers," the writer proceeds to show that authority is an indispensable and all-pervading factor in all life that rises above the level of individual savagery. Freedom consists, not in the unlimited assertion of lawless individualism, but in the voluntary conformity of man to authoritative standards which he acknowledges. Hence spiritual freedom is conformity to God's authority. Where is the expression of this authority to be found? Investigating this question, Dr. Sterrett takes up, successively, Sabatier, Harnack, and Loisy. The theories of the two former, which would reduce Christianity to the merest individualism, he uncompromisingly rejects as contradictory of original Protestantism, and of historical Christianity. "The note of authority," he declares, "belongs to the whole of historical Protestantism, and it is not too much to say that when this note goes, Protestantism will cease to be religiously educative." Then the writer proceeds to examine the objective view of Christianity as presented by Abbé Loisy in *L'Evangile et l'Eglise.* The long chapter of desultory criticism devoted to Loisy comes to no very definite conclusion. In the course of it acknowledgement is made of the presence in Catholicism, in a high degree of efficiency, of the essentials of authoritative religion,—polity and discipline, creed and doctrine, cult or worship. From the remaining portions of the book we gather that the professor considers the Nicene Creed as a suitable, in fact, the only legitimate basis of belief for a united Christendom; and he considers authority to be now lodged in the entire Catholic Church. By the Church he means the whole body of professing Christians, of whatever church, sect, or denomination. The significance of the book lies in the strong argument it makes for a visible society, united in polity, creed and worship, as the only form that Christianity ever has assumed or ever can.

Francis P. Duffy.

The Logic of Human Character—by Charles J. Whitty. New York. The Macmillan Company.

It is uncertain to what extent the increase of works dealing with moral development discloses a deepening interest in the practical improvement of human conduct; nor can one easily discern the exact nature of the underlying assumptions and the unexpressed convictions of every author who speaks in favor of patiently investigating the value of human character, and extols the importance of the will. It may be that la tendency, or a publication, in partial harmony with Christian philosophy, is from another aspect antagonistic. Hence one praises prudently, and with reservations.

So far as the essay before us is concerned, we have nothing but commendation for its painstaking analysis of the elements of conduct, and its instructive sketch of the development of personality, as well as for its strong words about ideals, conscience, and the will. The essay is a model of careful and logical discussion, or rather description, for it maps out, and traces without any attempt at demonstration the ideal succession of the psychical factors of character as conceived by the author. In other words, it is a contribution toward the enumerating of the names and the sequence of faculties which in some inexplicable way are simultaneously present at the first dawn of consciousness, and later on emerge visibly in varying degrees and at different phases of the moral life. Such enumeration must of course be largely arbitrary, largely imperfect and fallacious. The author's work is of respectable merit, however; and his affirmations profitably suggestive. As a help in the analyzing of the process of moral growth his pages are worthy of the student's consideration. There are a good many hard words—needlessly hard words; and a number of obscure sentences—painfully obscure; and a curious qualification of immortality as "no mere dream but a mythical statement of the conservation of energy, as exemplified in the evolution of humanity." (p. 200). But then those things—like the thrice repeated suggestion of Determinism,—do not really affect the main purpose of the book, nor lessen the value ascribed to it above.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

Man and the Incarnation, or Man's Place in the Universe as Determined by his Relations to the Incarnate Son—by SAMUEL J. ANDREWS. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

This book is intended to assist and strengthen the position of co-religionists of the author who are troubled in their faith by the anti-Christian influences of the day. The author, who has written a Life of Christ, full of deep Christian sentiment, observes in his introduction, that the partial disbelief in the divinity of our Lord, which is invading so many minds, is due chiefly to a growing disbelief in the authority of the Bible. But, he pleads, the remedy for this disease is to hold fast to the fact of the Incarnation, through faith. Then the question of the accuracy of the Old Testament becomes a very subordinate matter indeed: "If faith is to be restored, it will not be by learned discourses about Him, much less by criticisms of the Scriptures, but by having our eyes annointed with eye-salve that all may see Him in His Divine majesty." As a contribution to this end the book aims at setting forth the place of Jesus Christ in the entire divine economy. The plan follows lines familiar to the student of Catholic theology. The place of Christ as the Logos, relative to creation, and, as the Incarnate Son and Redeemer, the center of the universe, or the *principium reductivum*, through which man, angels and all the universe are referred back to God. While in minor points the reasoning and views are inconsistent with Catholic theology, its main position would satisfy the strictest orthodoxy. The earnest piety, personal devotion to our Divine Lord, and staunch faith in his divinity, which animate the book, render it eminently fitted to be useful to those for whom it is intended; and, to-day, every effort, from whatever quarter, to keep alive in the minds of men the fundamental tenet of Christianity, the divinity of Christ, must claim our warm sympathy, and good wishes for its success.

JAMES J. FOX.

La Morale Chretienne et la Moralite en France—CLODIUS PIAT, Professeur a l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris, Victor Lecoffre.

Catholics all over the world observe with grief and with a surprise that almost amounts to consternation, the religious situation in France. They see an implacable foe steadily advancing towards the achievement of his professed purpose, to exterminate the Church in that country. They have, for years past, been confidently awaiting the moment when French Catholics, lay and clerical, shaking off their apathy or paralysis, would rise in their strength and crush the enemy. But things have continued to go from bad to worse, while the oppressed have done little but hurl eloquent denunciations against Freemasonry, or emit pathetic yearnings for the restoration of the Bourbons, and then submit, in a spirit of Eastern fatalism, to the most drastic persecution at the hands of a body which, they assure us with iteration, is, numerically, but a contemptibly small minority. American Catholics have reason to know that an outside critic, however well-meaning, may grievously misinterpret features of religious conditions in a country about which he has only secondhand or superficial information. Nevertheless some facts in the present crisis in France are so obvious that they suggest one reflection which one feels cannot be far from correct. If a minority is in a fair way to turn the most Catholic country in Europe into a nation of infidels, pagans and atheists, to ruin in a generation the Church of the Crusaders, of St. Louis, of Bossuet, Fenelon, and St. Vincent de Paul, surely the results must be attributed not entirely to the strength of the attack, but also to the weakness of the defense. If this thought has ever presented itself to the French clergy as a body, it has never inspired any action. On the contrary, the few courageous men who now and again ventured to insinuate it were treated as traitors to sacred tradition. To-day, however, continued adversity is producing a chastened spirit conducive to self-searching, and a willingness to listen to unpalatable advice. Encouraged by the change, many are coming forward boldly to declare, what hitherto could not be safely whispered behind closed doors, that one of the causes of the present trouble has been the inadequate instruction of the clergy, and a reliance upon mediæval methods to cope with the world of to-day. Such is the gist of the thoughtful little volume before us. It deserves to be read, for its lesson will, in a restricted measure, stand application beyond the country to which it is addressed.

James J. Fox.

The Light of Faith—A Defence, in Brief, of Fundamental Christian Truths—by Frank McGloin. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. 1905. pp. 283.

There is something very hope-inspiring in coming upon a book like this,—and for several reasons. It is a collection of lectures in semi-popular style on difficulties presented by modern scientific theories. The lectures are written by a Catholic layman, a judge in New Orleans. And some of them were delivered in response to an invitation issued by a number of prominent Christian citizens of that place, most of whom, if one may judge by their names, are non-Catholics. All of these facts show that the defense of religious truth in this country is not something which is being left to the efforts of professional clerical supporters, but that the laity are personally interested in the matter, and that they are ready to sink their differences for the time being, to unite against the common foe.

Not less encouraging is the skill of the chosen champion in meeting the kind of adversary he is called upon to face. Judge McGloin has evidently given thought to the questions he discusses, and the solutions he offers, even when not his own, show evidence of having passed through a mind that has worried over the problems. A closet-student might complain that some of the arguments used are not as certain or conclusive as they are made to sound, but something may be forgiven in a speaker who is trying to present truths which are certain, in a way to be appreciated by his audience. The style is forensic—arguments succinct, pointed, and direct, with here and there a burst of very sincere feeling (cfr. pp. 161, ff). Judge McGloin shows a wide acquaintance with the literature bearing on his topics which is accessible in English. He is a courteous adversary, though his legal training has taught hlm how to force a point home. Whilst his work cannot be considered as an important contribution to philosophy or science, it is a welcome addition to our meagre stock of popular theistic apologetics.

Francis P. Duffy.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, Duchess of Thuringia, by the COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT; translated by FRANCIS DEMING HOYT. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, London, and Bombay. 1904. pp. 491.

At the Deathbed of Darwinism: A series of Papers by E. DENNERT, PH. D. Authorized Translation by E. V. O'HARA and JOHN H. PESCHGES. German Literary Board, Burlington, Iowa. 1904. pp. 146.

The Inquisition: An Essay Extracted from Devivier's Christian Apologetics; edited by REV. JOSEPH C. SASIA, S. J. Cath. Truth Soc., San Francisco; Internat. Cath. T. Soc., Brooklyn, N. Y. 1904.

Letters on Christian Doctrine, by F. M. ZULUETA, S. J. Benziger Bros., New York. 1905.

The Epistles and Gospels for all Sundays and Holy Days of Obligation in the year, and other Important Feasts, according to the Douay Version. Arranged and Edited by the VERY REV. RICHARD A. O'GORMAN, O. S. A, Prior of Hythe, Kent. R. & G. Washbourne, 4 Paternoster Row, London. Benziger Bros, New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago. 1905. pp. 263

Outline Conferences for Children of Mary, by FATHER J. DAHLMANN. Translated from the German with a Preface, by MADAME CECILIA. Benziger Bros., New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago. pp. 142.

Certainty in Religion, by REV. HENRY H. WYMAN, C. S. P. The Columbus Press, New York. 1905. p. 119.

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

The Rev. William L. Sullivan, C. S. P., was born in Quincy, Mass. He was educated in the schools of his native town, and afterwards in Boston College. After his graduation, he took up his studies for the priesthood in St. John's Ecclesiastical Seminary, Brighton, where he made a brilliant course in Philosophy and Theology, Before his ordination, he joined the Paulist Fathers, and pursued his further studies at the Catholic University of America. After his ordination he was appointed professor of theology in the studentate of his community, St. Thomas' College, at the Catholic University, a position which he still holds. His literary productions, all of which bear the marks of personality and sincerity, have been published for the most part, in the *Catholic World*.

Mr. Albert Reynaud is a Catholic layman of a kind that has too few representatives in America—one whose professional duties do not prevent him from taking an intelligent and active interest in questions of faith. He is a graduate of Seton Hall College, and for over thirty years has been a practicing lawyer in New York City, being at present a member of the law firm of Reynaud and McKinney. He has been honored with official position, having been for a few years a Justice of the Municipal Court of New York City. His literary work has been along various lines from poetry to philosophy, but the religious interest predominates throughout. Most of his work has appeared in the *Catholic World*; he has lately published in the *Dolphin* some articles under the heading *Ancient Truth and Modern Thought*—a caption which is akin to the sub-title of this Review. His merit has been recognized by Catholic educational institutions; his Alma Mater conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Laws in 1902, and a year later Villanova College granted him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

We present in this number of the New York Review the first of a series of studies on a very timely and important topic, by Rev. Edward J. Hanna, D. D. Dr. Hanna was born in Rochester, N. Y., and received his early education in the schools of his native city. Whilst still very young, he was sent to Rome, where he finished his classical studies, and then took up the courses in Philosophy and Theology at the Propoganda as a student of the American College. He was elevated to priest's orders in 1885, and in 1886, after a brilliant examination, he received his degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology, along with his distinguished competitor and friend, Dr. Pace, now of the Catholic University. Dr. Hanna even during his student days, was marked out as a professor. He was selected for the duties of "*Repettore*" in his own College, and was also chosen by the eminent Doctor (now Cardinal) Satolli as his assistant at the Propaganda. On the opening of St. Bernard's Seminary in his native diocese of Rochester, Dr. Hanna was called to fill the Chair of Dogmatic Theology, a position which he still holds.

The Rev. Walter McDonald, D. D., received his classical education at St. Kieran's Diocesan Seminary, Kilkenny, and his training in philosophy and theology at the great national college of Maynooth. While at Maynooth his professors of theology were Dr. Murray, whose scholarly and exhaustive treatise *De Ecclesia* has not lost its pre-eminence with the lapse of time; Dr. Crolly, the author of a learned work, *De Contractibus*; Dr. Gerald Molloy, famous in his day for his book on *Geology and Revelation*, an efficient apologist according to the lights and the needs of his times; Dr. William Walsh, whose slender volume *De Actibus Humanis* has gained him renown among Catholic moralists, but who has since achieved a wider fame as an authority in economics and a wise leader in social and political questions in his exalted position as Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland; and Dr. Carr, whose abilities have also been directed into the work of administration and government since his appointment, first as Bishop of Galway, and then as Archbishop of Melbourne.

FATHER McDONALD's tastes and abilities marked him out so clearly for the work of teaching that right after his ordination, he was appointed professor in the diocesan seminary of Kilkenny. Here for two years he taught philosophy and theology, and with such success that he was then promoted to a chair of theology at Maynooth. Since his appointment in 1881, he has taught at that famous seat of learning; and for the past seventeen years he has been Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment, the post-graduate department of Maynooth.

Despite his many duties, professional and administrative, he has always been active as a writer. He has published two volumes, one on *Motion: Its Origin and Conservation*, and a more recent one on *The Principles of Moral Science*. In addition to these he has written a number of articles on theological and philosophical subjects. which have appeared mainly in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* and the *Dublin Review*. It is to be expected that he will take a prominent part in the work on the forth-coming Quarterly to be issued by the Maynooth professors, (a notice of which will be found in our department of NOTES); but his sympathies for all that makes for the advancement of religion and sound learning are so wide that he has consented to supply for the NEW YORK REVIEW a number of articles on *The New Knowledge and the Old Philosophy*, the first of which appears in the current issue.

Dr. McDonald is a Scholastic in training and sympathies, but he feels, as indeed Leo XIII pointed out in his Encyclical on the matter, that the new Scholasticism must take into consideration the new facts acquired by scientific investigation. It is evident to all who are versed in the "new knowledge" and in "the old philosophy," that if such an undertaking be thoroughly carried out, it will result in the modification or abandonment of many a view once commonly received in the Schools. But the value of Thomistic philosophy as an aid to religion will be far from being lessened if it be purged of positions which make it unintelligible or ludicrous to modern thinkers.

LOGIC AND FAITH

Vincent McNabb, O. P.

One of the essential and most valid objections against the act of faith is that it is irrational, inasmuch as it offends against the syllogistic rule that the conclusion of an argument shall contain nothing more than the premisses. Catholic apologists for the act of belief are ever ready to maintain that faith is a gift of God—that it depends more on the Giver Whom we should petition by our prayers than on ourselves whom we may perplex by our reasonings. Moreover, they fearlessly profess that the things of faith, the mysteries of faith, the "divina non visa," as St. Thomas calls them, are such as human reason cannot prove—that the so-called proofs of faith do not prove the necessity but the likelihood or expediency of the faith—and that although the arguments brought to lend support to faith only prove its probability, the faith they are meant to support is to be accepted not with probability, but with absolute certainty. When, then, they are asked how a man can come by faith, they reply that it is a gift; and, to use the words of St. Augustine, if a man is not drawn that way, he must pray to be drawn.

I am not condemning this manner of statement and reply, which, indeed, I hold to be thoroughly sound. But to reply that faith as a conclusion is not proved by the arguments on which it rests—or to assert that probability in the premisses grows to certainty in the conclusion is apparently to maintain that faith is an irrational, or if you will, an unrational act. And though many men would be content to follow Christ by taking up their cross, few would be willing to follow Him by denying their reason. For it would seem to them that if they must accept the account of faith given by Catholic apologists, the conclusion of faith is reached by no intellectual process; and that, consequently, it can scarcely be called rational knowledge. Nor can its apologists be said to know the things they believe.

This is, in brief, the noetic problem of faith, which has occupied some of the best minds of Europe for the past three centuries. Three modern writers may be taken as representative of the various lines of defence against this objection: Kant, Newman and Lotze. The Philosopher of Königsberg insisted on the distinction between the pure reason and the practical reason. Considering that the dogmas God, Free-will and Immortality were the corner-stones of faith, he conceded that these could not be conclusively proved by the pure (or speculative) reason, but were conclusively accepted by the practical reason. No doubt the distinction of pure and speculative reason throws light on the problem. Yet men are still troubled by the thought that to accept as conclusive what the speculative reason has proved to be inconclusive is little less than to be disloyal to our higher mental processes; in other words, it is to solve the rational problem by an appeal to mysticism.

The *Grammar of Assent* is Newman's attempt to solve the problem by an appeal to what he calls the Illative Sense. There is no reason to suppose that the Oxford or the Birmingham of Newman's days knew and cared much for German philosophy. Yet it is strange to recognize the relationship and perhaps identity between the Illative Sense of Newman and the Practical Reason of Kant. Newman's Sense like Kant's Reason is a faculty for arriving at certitude in concrete matters, which are not subject to syllogistic expression, but are supported by circumstantial and converging evidence. It was characteristic of Newman's mind that in the *Grammar of Assent* when writing on such fundamental doctrines as the existence of God and of the Trinity, he was at great pains to show *what* and *how* he believed, and at no pains to show *why* he believed In the second part of his work, when dealing with the dogma of the Incarnation his chief contention is the fact that the early Christian Church had a clear concept of Christ; but he spends little time in accounting for or justifying the fact. It would perhaps be hard to distinguish between Newman's doctrine and that of Descartes, who maintained that clear ideas were true ideas. However that may be, it would appear to some that Newman has given us the matter rather than the motive of his belief, and that, like the Philosopher of Königsberg, he has avoided rather than solved the problem of faith.

Both Kant and Newman were on the right path in endeavoring to meet the logical problem by an appeal to psychology. But Kant was too careless of traditional psychology, and Newman too unacquainted with it, to do more than point out from what side a solution of the problem would eventually come. The psychology which Lotze commanded was a blend of all that was best in the old writers and the new. There had been too much partition of the mental faculties in the theories of Kant and Newman. It was the greatness of Lotze to recall men to the solidarity of human faculties by reminding them that faith is not the act of one department of the intellect, nor indeed of the intellectual side alone, but of the whole spirit. To his mind, faith is the act of a person towards a person; or, in other words, it is a transcendental relationship between the created and the Uncreated Spirit.

What Kant and Newman and Lotze had succeeded in discovering, St. Thomas had already analyzed from his own scholastic stand-point as early as the 13th century. With sureness of vision he had seen that the act of belief was not a mere intellectual act, but included an emotional or volitional element. He had been led to this point of view by St. Paul's doctrine that faith without love is dead, and by the Master's mysterious blessing upon "the clean of heart, for they shall see God." Nor should there be any doubt that this is the solution of the difficulty. A thinking mind must come at length to recognize that truth is not a matter of one department of the understanding, nor even of the intellect in its totality. Every afferent faculty is an avenue of truth. Just as there are true facts and true ideas, so there are true affections, true imaginations, true sights, sounds, touches and the rest. Again, even as there are true ratiocinations, so there are true intuitions; and as the understanding may be true in its operations, so may the imagination and the personal will. Moreover a mutual activity is not necessarily condemned because it is rightly called unrational. Mutual processes are rational in two ways: (1)essentially, as the act of reasoning is rational; (2) implicitly, as the act of trusting of senses is rational. Now the act of accepting a truth on the word of another, though not rational in the first sense, is rational in the second sense. For it is no more irrational for the mind to take the word of the Eternal Word, than for the eye to use light and for the ear to welcome sound.

Still, after all this is recognized, there remains the teasing doubt that faith is not merely a transcendence of rational processes but an explicit or implicit negative of them, seeing that the ratiocinative element included in the act of faith denies the syllogistic law of finding no more in the conclusion than we find in the premisses. And to this problem we now turn.

The first step towards settling minds disturbed by the problem is to insist on the distinction between logical methods and psychological processes. It is true that logic should rest on psychology; but to assert their relationship is at the same time to imply their distinction. Logic is a method; and a method for eliminating error rather than for finding out truth. And as a method it is so closely allied to mechanical processes that clever instruments have been made, after the pattern of counting machines, for drawing logical conclusions from any kind of premisses. No doubt the careful study of this mechanical accompaniment of thought is not without its value. And now-a-days, when the biology of ratiocination is being deeply studied, the mechanism of ratiocination should not be neglected. But it should be remembered that Logic is an abstraction, like Mathematics or Geology. And just as nature supplies us with no abstract mathematical quantity or no abstract fossil, so nature nowhere provides us with an abstract syllogism.

This should lead us to avoid confounding a logical with a psychological principle. All syllogistical ratiocination contains at least one "general principle," as it is called, which cannot be found in a more general way, or as it is said, with greater extension in the logical conclusion. But we should bear in mind that abstract mathematics are not adequate to concrete realities. Mathematically speaking, a straight line is the shortest way between any two points; but speaking practically, the shortest way between two points is seldom a straight line. So, too, a logical principle is an abstraction, artificially isolated from every other principle, and never found in its isolated state in any intelligence. Take such a principle as "All phenomena obey law." As an abstract premiss it is of the most satisfactory character. Yet objectively speaking there is no isolated phenomenon, but inter-related phenomena; nor is there a law, but almost countless laws. Moreover, there is no intellect in the world where this principle is not associated with and limited by countless other principles. Nor is this principle as held by X—— quite identical with the principle as held by W——. When it is stated that the conclusion of a syllogism shall contain no more than the premisses we must not consider that the conclusion of a mental act shall not contain more than its principles; for this would be to confuse a logical premiss with a psychological principle.

Light is thrown on the whole question by a thoughtful consideration of the mental process called induction, which logicians, rightly or wrongly, distinguish from deduction It is commonly admitted that in inductive processes the conclusion is wider than the premisses. Minds of the deductive type will answer that induction is but a veiled deduction wherein there is a suppressed major of greater universality than the conclusion. But it may be questioned whether this is not again to confuse a logical premiss with the intellectual energy or intuition which detects the substance under the phenomenon and the general under the particular. Thus it would seem imperative to hold that induction, even as conceived by logicians, is a logical method wherein the conclusion is of greater extension than the premisses.

Now even if we grant that a real distinction must be made between induction and deduction, it may well be questioned whether the "process of assimilating" new truths does not approach nearer to the inductive than to the deductive type of mental activity. The deductive reasons for a course of action usually follow rather than precede the course of action. Thought follows life. If faith is the assimilation of new truths it may well be looked on as akin to that mental process which even logicians conceive as a movement from the particular to the general.

Yet it would be hard to show that the central doctrines of Faith are "general statements." Only by an abuse of language can the two fundamental doctrines of Supernatural Theology, the Trinity and Incarnation, be called general statements. As regards the three fundamental truths of Natural Religion, viz., God, Free-will, Immortality, it is remarkable that St. Thomas denies we can prove the existence of God *a priori*. Yet God's existence can scarcely be called a general statement. And as regards free-will and immortality, it may not unreasonably be held that the conviction of free-will is an intuition, and of immortality an instinct, rather than a proof.

We are thus led to conclude that the things of faith, in so far as objects of proof, are somewhat withdrawn from the jurisdiction both of deduction and of induction; they are not deducible as particular from general propositions; nor are they discoverable as general propositions are discoverable in particular. In so far as they may be said to be patient of proof, they seem to come under that mental process called analogy, whereby the mind argues from one particular proposition to another. But this is still an unexplored region of psychology which we willingly hand over to our younger readers interested in research.

We have been hitherto arguing that there is a logical method called induction which allows the conclusion to be wider than the premisses. And though we are quite willing to grant that the mental process accompanying belief is not strictly inductive, we are unwilling to grant that it is strictly deductive. This is but to prepare the mind to recognize that the act of belief may be no more irrational than the act of induction, seeing that induction is no less contradictory of the syllogistic law that conclusions shall be no wider than their premisses.

But we have also laid down a distinction between logical methods and psychological processes, which we think needs further development. And this we will attempt to give by reminding ourselves that psychological processes are vital processes; they are not mere abstract relationships but relationships of life, that is, they are or can be essentially growth. Spencer has, somewhat incompletely, defined life as the adjustment of internal to external relations. Taking this as an approximate statement, we assent to the fact that at the end of a vital act adjustments are multiplied. If at the beginning of a vital act the existing relationships are (a † b † c † d), at the end of the act the existing adjustments are, or may be, (a † b † c † d) † e. Now unless we assume that deduction is not a vital act, it is clear that at the end of a deductive process our mind has grown. There is more in our mind than there was before.

Nor need it be objected that the question is not about the logical "extension" of the premisses and of the conclusion, but about their formal certitude; that it is not about the quantity but the quality of the ratiocination. Our argument would be equally conclusive. For a vital action regarding the quality of a proposition is a vital action, and we can see no reason why the adjustments regarding certitude should not be multiplied with the exercise of a vital function.

We do not come into being with logical premisses ready-made in a syllogistic cabinet. Logic pre-supposes an abstract evolution of thought, as precise and verifiable as algebraic evolution. But just as things in the world do not evolve in algebraic formularies, neither do thoughts in the mind evolve in logical formularies. Logical premisses are complete in their extension and certitude. Syllogistic evolution is but a mechanical evolution of the premisses. Someone has wittily defined Logic as the "art of filling a hole with what has been taken out of it." But psychological evolution starts from psychological principles which can only be approximated to logical premisses either in extent or certitude. In a logical evolution the premisses are fixed. In a psychological process they are plastic. Not only the conclusion grows, but the premisses. The premisses become known with greater understanding and certitude, until at length, on the process being ended the understanding has, so to speak, moved away from its principle and has won a new and wider and surer point of view.

It is strange that this view which may not recommend itself at first sight, is accepted without a protest in the sphere of the will. Accepting volitional habits as corresponding to mental principles, there are few who do not grant that by the very exercise of a habit, the habit increases. And St. Thomas teaches that this increase may be not merely in extent, as when a man temperate in food grows temperate in drink; but it may also be in what scholastics call "radicatio in subjecto," as when a man becomes more and more master of his free-will through habitual temperance in either food or drink.

We look upon vital processes of the mind somewhat in the same way. They are essentially and normally a growth. And whilst it may be sound logic to assert that the conclusions of a logical evoluion shall contain nothing more than was in the premisses, it would be false psychology to assert that at the end of a vital process of deduction, induction or analogy, the mind shall contain no more than it did in the beginning.

And it would be as irrational to blame the believer for rising from probabilities to certainty, and from the world to God, as it would be to blame the fruit for being greater than its seed and flower.

VINCENT MCNABB, O. P.

THE RULE OF FAITH IN VINCENT OF LERINS

Wendell S. Reilly, D. D.

In an introduction to his critical edition of the *Commonitorium* Professor Juelicher concludes that St. Vincent's call to arms for the defense of the traditional faith against the "*novitates profanorum*" was directed against the disciples of St. Augustine. Thereupon, he remarks: "The interests and first principles of Catholicism are called into the field in the interests of semi-Pelagianism; no single writing of antiquity offers such a favorable opportunity to judge of the proper nature of both."[1]

That the monk of Lerins was, like a good many other able theologians of his time in Southern Gaul, an adherent of certain doctrines afterwards called semi-Pelagianism, can, as we have seen,[2] hardly be contested. But it is wrong to conclude from the fact that he considered his views to be in accordance with tradition, and accused his opponents of novelty, that his position was really the Catholic one, as the distinguished writer just quoted seems to infer. As Dr. Fox remarks in a recent number of this review:[3] "Sometimes a doctrine which is very old, has been stigmatized as new when, at some particular moment, it has been thrown into bold relief." "Powerful voices," he adds, "accused Scot of heretically denying the doctrine of Christ's universal redemption, when he so gloriously defended the Immaculate Conception." The teaching of St. Augustine is another case in point. Some of the ideas he developed with regard to the part of God in man's sanctification and salvation may not have been in the most exact agreement with St. Paul and the earlier Fathers; but he was much nearer to them than the semi-Pelagians. Few will now be found to deny that there was a genuine progress towards the right understanding of grace when he retracted his early semi-Pelagian view that the first steps in the way of salvation, the beginnings of faith, were due to man alone. Though the Church never adopted as official his views on predestination *ante prævisa merita*, though she has supplemented his system by her teaching on "sufficient grace" and other points, she has never ceased to consider him as the most eminent authority on the doctrine of grace. The fact that Vincent wrote in favor of semi-Pelagianism has not, therefore, the significance which Professor Juelicher seems to attach to it. This much, however, is true: that the object of the *Commonitorium* and the circumstances in which it appeared cannot be neglected in a study of the method used by its author in determining orthodox Catholic doctrine. One hardly expects to find in the midst of a heated controversy that calm impartiality required to lay down laws applicable to all parties, and good for all times. And there is all the more reason for being on our guard in this case, since it is very likely that the author of the *Commonitorium* made use of his method to reject doctrines which the Church has since declared her own. However, without yielding overmuch to the influence of this adverse presumption, we shall endeavor to determine the mind of St. Vincent on the rule of faith as set forth in his work.

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[1] Mohr, Freiburg im B, und Leipzig, 1895.

[2] New York Review, Aug.-Sept., 1905, pp. 169, ss.

[3] *Scotus Redivivus*, N. Y. R., June-July, 1905.

I. The Church.

The answer to the question: "What are we to believe?" as given by our fifth century theologian is dictated by the notion he has of God's part in our religious instruction; and the concept is, in its main features, thoroughly Catholic. If, as Scripture teaches and Catholics believe, there has been a special revelation, if God, "who having spoken on divers occasions and in various ways, in times past, to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days hath spoken to us by His Son," then we cannot claim autonomy in the things of faith; we cannot reject His saving truth Outside the domain of relevation we may indulge in free thought; but nothing inconsistent with God's teaching can find a place in the mind of one who has accepted it as such. God's word is the objective rule of the Christian's faith; and if he believes that God has entrusted His doctrine to the safekeeping of the Church, she becomes for him the organ and interpreter of that word.

This fundamental concept of the Catholic system is eloquently expounded by Vincent of Lerins. The Vatican Council borrows some of the energetic words with which he condemns the presumption which would treat Christian dogma as a human philosophy, standing in need of additions, retrenchments, and changes. As for the Church, he takes it for granted that her authority will be accepted as final. He writes for her dutiful children. His one purpose is to help them to determine her doctrine. He comments on the text of St. Paul (Gal. i, 8) concerning the duty of rejecting any other doctrine than that which has been received, and draws from it the conclusion that it is never allowed to give credit to a doctrine which the *Church* has not always taught.[1] He will not let anyone say that the Church has erred, or that she is now in error.[2] His contention is that she has never ceased to inculcate the truth entrusted to her from the beginning.[3]

If this is his view why is it necessary to appeal from the present to the past? Why refer to the writings of the Fathers? To answer this question it will be necessary to examine briefly the notes of a truly Catholic doctrine as St. Vincent conceives them.

> "Within the Catholic Church itself," he writes, "we are greatly to consider that we hold that which has been received *everywhere, always, and of all men*: for that is truly and properly *Catholic* (as the very force and nature of the word doth declare) which comprehendeth all things in general after a universal manner; and that shall we do if we follow *universality, antiquity, and consent.* Universality shall we follow thus, if we profess that one faith to be true which the whole Church throughout the world acknowledgeth and confesseth. Antiquity shall we follow, if we depart not any whit from those senses which it is plain that our holy elders and fathers generally held. Consent shall we likewise follow, if in this very antiquity itself we hold the definitions of all, or at any rate almost all, the priests and doctors together."[4]

The three notes universality,, antiquity, and consent, we may reduce with our author himself,[5] to two: (1) the actual faith of the universal Church of the present, and, (2) a consensus of doctors of the past.

Dr. Hugo Koch is of opinion[6] that Vincent considered the first note—the universal belief of the Church at any given time—to be of itself insufficient. This contention, however, is not borne out by a careful study of Vincent's position. In the first place, it is a well known fact that faith in the infallibility of the Church was universal when St. Vincent wrote. As Harnack has said, it is at the very basis of the argument from tradition.[7] If St. Vincent has no hesitation in accepting what has been believed "everywhere, always, and of all men," it is because he relies on the Church's unerring teaching. That he does not mean she is infallible only in the long run, but rather at all times, is sufficiently clear from the passages of the *Commonitorium* above referred to. Such being his mind on the Church's authority, it would be strange indeed if he should teach that an erroneous doctrine may at times be presented to us with that note of universality which is the first of his criteria. It is certain that such a theory is nowhere explicitly stated by him; nor can it be inferred from anything in the *Commonitorium.* He acknowledges, it is true, that universality of teaching or the unanimous consent of the Church, may be at times an insufficient source of guidance on account of the difficulty of determining it. He knows that great obscurity may sometimes exist, as during the Arian controversy after Rimini and Seleucia.[1] He is aware that the attempts of heresy may be felt by the whole Church.[2] This causes uncertainty as to her real teaching, and necessitates a study of the Fathers. But this is not equivalent to saying that the note of *universality* may be found in false doctrine. On the contrary, in dealing with Donatism[3] he makes it quite clear that the note "universality" of itself, without support of "antiquity," is sufficient to prove the truth of a doctrine. The Donatists are shown to be in error by the very fact that they were at variance with the Church at large.

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[1] *Commonit.* ix, 13.

[2] *Ibid.* xxxi, 42.

[3] *Ibid.* xxxiii, 43.

[4] *Ibid.* ii, 3. Translation by Newman, *Historical Sketches*, vol. I, p. 383.

[5] *Commiton.* xxxi, 41.

[6] *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1891, p. 431.

[7] *Dogmengeschichte*, vol. III, p. 85.

This attitude of St. Vincent differentiates him from all Protestants. Whatever use some of them may make of his dictum, "*Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus,*" he himself, in his efforts to determine "some general and ordinary way to discern the true Catholic faith rom false and wicked heresy" is only striving to get at the mind of the Church. The argument by which he condemns Donatism is the same as that used by Dr. Wiseman in the *Dublin Review,* in August, 1839, in an article on *The Anglican Claims*; it is, indeed, but another form of St. Augustine's contention: "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*" At the time, Newman did not think that the case of Donatism was parallel to that of the Church of England; but the assumption of St. Augustine that the judgment of the universal Church "is a prescription and a final sentence against such portions of it as protest and secede", set him to reconsidering the right of his church to count herself as a part of the Church Catholic.[1]

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[1] *Commonit.* iv, 5.

[2] *Ibid.* iii, 4.

[3] *Ibid.*

The author of the *Commonitorium* says little about the organs of the Church's infallible teaching. He clearly states that the decision of a universal council is binding and definitive;[2] but he is almost silent on the ordinary teaching of the Pope and Bishops. We must remember, in this connection, that St. Celestine had intervened in the semi-Pelagian controversy in favor of the disciples of St. Augustine; and that St. Augustine, whose authority was under discussion, was a bishop. This fact would of itself explain why a semi-Pelagian writer would not dwell much on papal and episcopal authority. Some writers[3] have inferred too much from Vincent's silence on this point. He makes clear mention of a body composed of prelates, who must hold and teach the "science of divine worship,"[4] since they are the inheritors of Catholic and apostolic truth.[5] It is they who speak in the General Council; and nothing indicates that St. Vincent considers that such an assembly derives its authority less from the character of its members as bishops than from their knowledge as scholars versed in the tradition of the past. It is not merely to the ancient teachers that he refers us. He calls attention to the authority which the episcopal that character gave to the witnesses quoted by Ephesus.[6] He even says —and this alone would show that he is far from contradicting St. Cyprian's teaching on the episcopacy—that to fight for the old faith is to follow the decrees and definitions of the bishops of Holy Church.[7]

St. Vincent speaks of the Pope as the "bishop of the apostolic see." He praises the zeal of "the blessed succession of the blessed Apostles", particularly of St. Xystus and his predecessor St. Celestine, in behalf of "the integrity of a teaching revealed once for all".[8] He does not speak of the Bishop of Rome as the supreme arbiter in controversies. In the *Commonitorium*, he is presented simply as the foremost champion of that which has been believed "everywhere, always, and of all men". The limited space devoted to the Pope and the bishops is partly accounted for, as we have said, by the peculiar circumstances of the time; but, nevertheless, it seems to indicate that St. Vincent had not an adequate notion of the role of these authorities in the settlement of dogmatic questions. Development of doctrine has brought into stronger light Catholic truths on this point which were not so definitely held or understood in Vincent's day.

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[1] *Apologia*, ch. iii, p. 116. (Edit. 1902).

[2] *Commonit.* iii, 4; xxviii, 39; xxix, 41. In regard to the Council of Ephesus, it may be noted that St. Vincent seems to attribute to it only that authority which it derives from the Fathers cited as "judges and witnesses" (xxx, 42). Notwithstanding his great respect for this assembly, it may be doubted whether he regarded it as an "infallible representative of the infallible Church" in the same sense as Nicæa. Harnack (*op. cit.*) calls attention to the somewhat tardy recognition of the full authority of Ephesus (vol. II, p. 90).

[3] e. g., Harnack, *op. cit.* II, 109.

[4] *Commonit.* xxii, 27.

[5] *Ibid.* v, 18.

[6] *Ibid.* xxix, 41, 42.

[7] *Ibid.* v, 8.

[8] VI, 9; xxxii; xxxiii, 43.

II. Scripture.

It must be kept in mind that it was not St. Vincent's object to examine the questions as to who are the official guides and teachers of the Church. He is giving a method for settling controverted questions, in the absence of a formal pronouncement of ecclesiastical authority. The two standards which we possess, he says, are Scripture and Tradition.[1]

He finds that it is unnecessary for him to dwell on the authority of the Bible. The question he chooses for discussion is one that is frequently urged by Protestants:

> "Here some man perhaps may ask, seeing the canon of Scripture is perfect and most abundantly of itself sufficient for all things, what need we join unto it the authority of the Church's understanding and interpretation?"

He gives a reason that has not lost its weight with time:

> "The reason is this, because the Scripture being of itself so deep and profound, all men do not understand it in one and the same sense; but divers men diversely, this way and that way, expound and interpret the sayings thereof, so that to one's thinking, so many men, so many opinions almost may be gathered out of them . . . and therefore it was necessary for the avoidance of so great windings and turnings, of errors so various, that the line of expounding the Prophets and Apostles be directed and drawn, according to the rule of the Ecclesiastical and Catholic sense."[2]

In the recapitulation of his doctrine,[3] he makes it quite clear that he considers Scripture to contain the whole Christian doctrine, and to be of itself sufficient for all things. This statement is an exaggeration of the extent of Scriptural teaching. The Bible was not written with the design of telling us all we must believe; and the teaching authority of the Church which, in the beginning, caused the Scriptures to be accepted as the inspired word of God, continues to fulfil its mission without stopping to examine whether a doctrine is or is not formulated in the inspired writings. It is true that there is no dogma for which theologians do not find some kind of Scriptural authority; and the opinion that every religious and moral truth can be found in the Bible—an opinion never condemned by the Church—has always had its defenders.[1] These defenders are careful to add, however, that the whole teaching of the Church is not on the surface of Scripture, or in such a may that it can be deduced from it without the help of Tradition.

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[1] II, 1.

[2] Newman's translation, *op. cit.* p. 383.

[3] xxix, 41.

St. Vincent would subscribe to this reservation. Besides, he is not blind to the fact that Scripture can be employed against the truth, that, as Tertullian[2] had said, it may become a real mine for heresy. "It is a general characteristic of heretics," he tells us,[3] "to use Scripture to prop up their errors, in imitation of their father, the devil, who quoted Scripture to tempt Christ. "It is especially this custom that renders applicable to them the words of Our Savior: "Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep but inwardly they are ravenous wolves".[4] St. Vincent devotes a part of his work to warning the faithful against this danger. According to him, the great peril to the faith of Catholics is the authority of an illustrious teacher using Scripture to teach new doctrine.

III. Tradition.

To preserve his faith, the Catholic must adhere to the teaching of the Church. If this teaching is clear, he has but to accept it. When controversy renders it impossible to determine what the Church really does teach, he must have recourse to the writings of the Fathers. The author appeals at length to the history of the Church, to Scripture, and to the authority of the Apostolic See for proof of our duty to respect the teaching of the past; and he undertakes to show us how to determine with certainty the faith of the ancient Church.

When the need of investigation arises on a point of *sufficient importance* to justify such laborious research,[5] the enquirer must collect and study "the opinions of those ancient writers who, though living in different times and different places, nevertheless stood firm in the communion and faith of one Catholic Church and were looked upon in their day as reliable teachers". He is bound to accept their common teaching: "Whatever he finds held, written, and taught, by all together, in perfect agreement, openly, frequently and perseveringly, that he must likewise believe without hesitation.[1]

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[1] Cf. Newman, *Development*, chap. viii, sect. i, par. 4.

[2] *De Præscriptione*, xxxix.

[3] *Commonit.* xxvi.

[4] *Ibid.* xxv, xxvi.

[5] XXVIII, 39.

Not that absolute unanimity is to be looked for. Our author knows well, and duly impresses it upon us, that among those who died in the faith of the Catholic Church, there are some illustrious doctors who cannot be followed on all points. He instances Agrippinus of Carthage, "of venerable memory" and that "light of all saints and bishops and martyrs, the most blessed Cyprian" and his colleagues, who fell into error concerning the re-baptism of heretics.[2] Consequently Origen and Tertullian are not the only writers against whom we must be on our guard. The fact that a writer is learned, and has all other good qualities, will not excuse anyone who is his disciple and follower in opinions which are peculiar to him.[3] To the rashness or ignorance of one or two men, one must prefer what "almost all" have taught. A doctrine which rests on such authority has the note of "antiquity" as St. Vincent understands it. The crucial point, for the appreciation of the correctness of his views on Tradition, is the question: did he wish to reject as profane novelty any religious doctrine which has not been taught "openly, frequently, perseveringly" by all or at any rate by almost all "the priests and doctors" of antiquity? If he did, we must admit that he looked for too much in the writings of the Fathers, and that he has a very imperfect understanding of the principle of doctrinal development which he sets forth in chapter xxiii.

He is right in rejecting as heretical a doctrine which is contrary to the note of "antiquity" as he explains it, because this means that it is condemned by all the Church's approved doctors in the past; but to call a doctrine heretical because it is lacking in that note is to deny the fundamental assumption of all who believe in development in the modern sense. This concept cannot be better expressed, and at the same time distinguished from un-Catholic views on doctrinal progress than in the words of Cardinal Newman:

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[1] III, 4.
[2] VI, 9-11.
[3] VI, 11.

> "The hypothesis about the *depositum fidei* in which I gradually acquiesced was that of doctrinal development, of the evolution of doctrines out of certain original and fixed dogmatic truths, which were held inviolable from first to last, and the more firmly established and illustrated by the very process of enlargement; whereas here I have given utterance to a theory, not mine, of a certain metamorphosis and recasting of doctrines into new shapes—*in nova mutatas corpora formas*—those old and new shapes being foreign to each other, and connected only as symbolizing or realizing certain immutable but nebulous principles."[1]

Chapter xxxiii of the *Commonitorium* admirably describes the laws of growth and applies them to the Church's doctrine; but the general tenor of the work will not allow us to suppose that he meant as much by his figures as do those modern theologians who clothe their ideas on evolution of dogma in his words. Those words would suggest a development in the Church's teaching as considerable as that by which an infant develops into a full grown man; they even seem to set before us the conception of doctrines contained in germ in the primitive form of the teaching and thence evolved in the course of time. But the interpretation of the images by which St. Vincent illustrates the principles of development, must be influenced by the way we see him apply that principle. Now, if we leave aside chapter xxiii, there is nothing in the *Commonitorium* which would indicate that its author was conscious of much development in the past. The impression one would gather from the way he speaks of the teaching of the early Fathers, would be that he was convinced that all the dogmas held by the Church of his time had been actually and explicitly taught from the first. Although, as he tells us in chapter xxiii, the work of theologians makes us understand them better, we might, it would seem, trace all of them back and find them in something very like their present form, in the original teaching of the Apostles.

St. Vincent himself shows no desire to go back to the beginnings; practically he was satisfied with consulting those "Fathers" who had lived quite near his own times, to find out what the Church had "always" taught. Thus he gives the names of ten of the "Fathers" (there were twelve in all) quoted by the Council of Ephesus (431 A. D.) as "witnesses and judges". He gives the proceedings of that Council as an exemplification of his method of investigation into the past; and yet at Ephesus the earliest authority referred to was St. Cyprian; and the almost contemporaneous bishops, Theophilus of

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[1] *Essays Critical* and *Historical*, edit. 1871, vol. I, p. 287.

Alexandria (†412) and Atticus of Constantinople (†425) are among the witnesses of the ancient faith. Nevertheless we cannot conclude, in the sense of Cardinal Franzelin, in his thesis consecrated especially to the *Commonitorium,*[1] that relative antiquity was the rule which, theoretically, St. Vincent had in view. There is no question of the Fathers of any particular period, of those who lived just before the breaking out of a controversy; but of the Fathers living "in different times and places." Nothing authorizes us to hold that "antiquity" for Vincent did not include the "reliable teachers" of every century.

He recognizes that he cannot appeal to the consensus of the Fathers to refute inveterate heresy; but the reason he gives for this is not, as St. Augustine would have put it, that the Fathers, occupied about other things, had not thoroughly discussed the questions which had not arisen in their time. Still less does he suggest that the first Christian writers might not have been able to formulate the true doctrine on all of the points studied, dilated and passed upon by the able theologians and the Councils of the fourth and fifth centuries. The reason the older heresies cannot be refuted by a consensus of the Fathers is, according to our author, because *heretics have had time to corrupt their writings.*[2] To assign that reason and that alone, for inability to find "open, frequent, persevering" teaching on any point whatever betokens a very inadequate notion of development that had taken place before A. D. 434. It is no wonder, considering how exacting he is in regard to his note of "antiquity," that St. Augustine's teaching on the necessity of supernatural grace for the beginnings of faith and on other subjects, should be condemned as new, St. Augustine himself admits very frankly that the doctrine he was defending against the theologians of Southern Gaul was not clearly seforth in the writings of the ancient teachers. He himself, he says, before he had given any special study to the subject, had been of the mind of his opponents in regard to the *gratia præveniens,* and had written in that sense before his elevation to the episcopate. He simply reproaches them for not following him in that progress by which he had come to a better understanding of St. Paul and a deeper insight into the spirit of the Church such as it is manifested in her liturgy.[3] Was it this utterance of St. Augustine which called forth

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[1] *De Trad. et Scrip.,* th. xxiv.

[2] *Commonit.* xxviii.

[3] *De Præd. Sanct.* nn. 3, 4.

St. Vincent's chapter on the nature of *true* progress? It may have been. At any rate he says nothing therein which proves that he had a broad enough concept of progress to cover the case of the "*Doctor of Grace.*"

Notwithstanding the limitations of St. Vincent's idea of progress. that idea is certainly found in his book. He strongly affirms the possibility of evolution in the doctrine of the Church. He is much more explicit in this respect than any other Father. There are in his work expressions which would be a good rendering of Newman's idea, if they were met with in a work of Newman's. Set in the framework of the *Commonitorium,* they have not the same bearing; but nothing prevents us from seeing in this chapter on development a remarkable intuition of a law which it is easier for us to enunciate now. In our day development has taken place to a greater extent, and many learned works on the doctrinal history of the first five centuries have made it much better known than it was in the days of the monk of Lerins. To point out in detail in what his doctrine resembles, and in what it differs from more recent ideas on the subject would carry us beyond the limits of this present article.

WENDELL S. REILLY.

THE BOOK OF JONAS

Arguments For and Against Its Historical Character.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The tendency among modern scholars is not to be easily satisfied with the positions which past ages have handed down concerning the sacred books of the Old Testament. Rightly or wrongly they wish to test for themselves the views which tradition supplies regarding the authorship, date, literary structure, style, historical value, etc., of those sacred writings. For this purpose, they appeal chiefly to internal evidence, that is to the various data afforded by a minute study of the contents of each particular book, and according as time-honored positions tally, or on the contrary, conflict with such data, they are pronounced correct or valueless. By this means critics have disproved the full historical character of the book of Job which "is generally regarded in the present day as a kind of drama."[1] They contend also that, for similar reasons, the strict historical character of other writings, among which they prominently mention the book of Jonas, should be likewise given up. It may therefore be of interest to the readers of the New York Review to have briefly set before them the principal arguments which tend to establish, or, on the contrary, to militate against the historical character of the sacred writing which is usually ascribed to "Jonas, the son of Amathi" (Jonas i, 1). Before, however, entering upon this, the direct object of the present paper, it will not be amiss to sum up the contents of the book of Jonas.

Although these contents are sometimes divided into three parts (chaps. i-ii; iii; iv), they naturally fall under two heads, viz.: the prophet's first mission to Ninive (chaps. i, ii), and his second mission to the same city (chaps. iii, iv).[2] For, the beginning of each section is distinctly marked by the opening formula: "And the word of Yahweh came to Jonas" (i, 1), "and the word of Yahweh came to Jonas the second time" (iii, 1).

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[1] Vigouroux, *Manuel Biblique*, vol. ii. No. 614. Cf. H. Lesêtre, *Introduction a l'Ecriture Sainte*, vol. ii, p. 371, where we read "To the historical ground borrowed from tradition, the author (of the book of Job) has added the poetical and philosophical developments found in the dialogues."

[2] Cf. R. Cornely, S. J., *Introductio Generalis*, vol. ii, part ii, p. 557.

In the account of Jonas' first mission to Ninive we are told of his attempt to flee to Tarsis from the presence of Yahweh, that he might escape the task assigned to him, the manner in which he was overtaken, and his wonderful deliverance from the great fish which had swallowed him, together with a hymn, the composition of which is ascribed to him while still in the fish's belly.

The account of the prophet's second mission is hardly less marvelous. In conformity with Yahweh's order, Jonas goes to Ninive, enters a day's journey into it, and foretells that it will be destroyed in forty days. Immediately, a general repentance takes place, and God spares Ninive. Whereupon Jonas becomes exceedingly angry and wishes for death. He expostulates with Yahweh, and says that it was in anticipation of this very result that he had wished to flee to Tarsis. He nevertheless takes his station on a mountain near Ninive, and under a booth he has erected, waits to see what is to become of the city. God prepares a gourd which affords to Jonas a most pleasant shade. When, however, at the divine command, this gourd is struck by a worm and withers, the prophet, exposed to the burning heat of the sun, murmurs again and wishes to die. Then it is that Yahweh rebukes him for being so much grieved over the withering of a gourd, and yet wishing that God should not be touched by the repentance of a city in which were found more than 120,000 children who had not yet reached the age of discretion, and also much cattle.

These contents are written in prose,—except, of course, the hymn ascribed to Jonas in ii, 2-11,—and read much more like those of a historical, than those of a prophetical, composition.[1] As they seem to narrate actual events, so their historical character has been generally assumed by Jewish and Christian writers down to recent times. The following are the principal arguments usually brought forth in favor of this traditional view.

Our attention is first directed to the fact that the book of Jonas is not only numbered among the canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament, but actually placed in the series of the prophetical writings.[2] This, we are told, affords a strong presumption that its narrative consists of fact. Had the collectors of the canonical books thought that it exhibited religious truths in the garb of allegory or parable, they would have put it among "the Hagiographa" or third section of the Hebrew Bible, side by side with such non-historical compositions as Psalms, Proverbs, Canticle of Canticles, Lamentations, etc. But as they knew that it gives an account of what befell a prophet, they did not hesitate to assign to it a place within "the Prophets" or second group of their sacred writings, that is within a collection which comprises indeed distinctly prophetical books such as Isaias, Jeremias, Ezechiel, etc., but also historical works like the books of Samuel and Kings, Josue, and Judges.

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[1] Like the historical writings, the book of Jonas opens with the formula ויהי "and it came to pass."

[2] The following is the list of books contained in the three divisions of the Hebrew Bible:

To confirm this verdict of the Jewish framers of the canon of the Old Testament, a second argument is usually brought forward. It is drawn from many historical and geographical statements found in the book of Jonas and making, it is claimed, for its credibility and genuine historical character. Thus the hero of the narrative is designated by his own name and by that of his father. "His mission to the Ninivites is in perfect keeping with the historical relations of his time, in which the first cases occurred of contact between Israel and Assyria (Osee v, 13; x, 6,). . . . The description of the greatness of Ninive (Jonas iii, 3,) is in harmony with the statements of the classical writers (Diodorus Siculus ii, 3; Strabo, Book xvi, chap. i, § 3). Its deep moral corruption is testified by Nahum iii, 1; Sophonias ii, 13 sqq.; and the mourning of man and beast (Jonas iii, 5, 8) is confirmed as an Asiatic custom by Herodotus (Book ix, § 24), being in itself supported by analogous customs of our own in funeral processions."[1]

More telling still, it is affirmed, in favor of the historical character of the book of Jonas, is the argument suggested "by the psychologically truthful delineation of the personality of the prophet, as well as of

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I. The Law (Torah).	II. The Prophets (Nebhi'im).	III. The Writings (Kethubhim), (commonly called the Hagiographa).
Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy.	(1) *Earlier* Prophets: Josue, Judges, I, II Samue , I, II Kings. (2) *Later* Prophets: Isaias, Jeremias, Ezechiel, Twelve Minor Prophets.	(1) Psalms, Proverbs, Job; (2) Canticle of Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther; (3) Daniel, Esdras, Nehemias, I, II Chronicles.

[1] Karl Friedrich Keil, *Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, vol. i, p. 397 (English Transl.)

the other persons, the mariners and the Ninivites."[1] The character and person of Jonas are natural. All that he says and does is suitable to his times, and the circumstances under which he is placed. His severe preaching against Ninive, his Judaic views of the divine mercy being limited to his own countrymen, his zeal for the honor of Yahweh, his resistance to God's will in certain occurrences, his murmuring, the mixed virtues and vices of his disposition, present a picture drawn from nature. Who again, we are asked, but an eye-witness would have dreamed of describing the heathen sailors crying each one to his own gods, but fearing the wrath of Yahweh, and making supplication to Him, as soon as they hear of Him? In like manner, the Ninivites believing in God and repenting in sackcloth and ashes, standing out in contrast with the Hebrew prophet fleeing from Yahweh, and even after his own miraculous deliverance still feeling angry at the mercy of God shown to the heathen,—these are historical traits, which exclude everything like fictitious invention.[2]

Nor is this view of the contents of the book of Jonas a novel one, or one set forth simply for the purpose of upholding a theory. It is part and parcel of Jewish tradition as reflected in Tobias xiv, 4, 8, (in the Greek translation of Tobias); in III Machabees vi, 8; in Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book ix, chap. x, § 2; in the Targum on Nahum i, 1; in the Talmud; and as repeated by the Fathers and subsequent writers of the Christian Church. In fact, this belief so ancient and so constant in the historical character of the book of Jonas, is oftentimes urged as a separate and weighty argument in favor of its being accepted as history.

Only one more argument for the historical character of the book of Jonas remains to be set forth, and in the eyes of most advocates of the traditional view it is decisive. It consists in an inference drawn from Our Lord's words in Mt. xii, 38-42:

38. Then some of the Scribes and Pharisees answered Him, saying:
Master, we would like to see a sign from Thee.
39. But He answering said to them:
An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign;
and a sign shall not be given it
but the sign of Jonas the prophet.
40. For as Jonas was in the fish's belly three days and three nights,
so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.

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[1] Keil, *Ibid.*

[2] Cf. Samuel Davidson, *Introd. to the Old Test.*, vol. iii, p. 271; Abbè Trochon, *les Petits Prophétes*, p. 223; Keil, *Introd.*, vol. i, p. 398.

41. The men of Ninive shall stand up in the judgment with this generation,
and shall condemn it:
because they repented at the preaching of Jonas;
and behold, a greater than Jonas is here.
42. The queen of the south shall stand up in the judgment with this generation,
and shall condemn it:
because she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon;
and behold, a greater than Solomon is here.

From this passage it is confidently argued that Our Lord considered the book of Jonas as historical. He affirms that "Jonas was in the fish's belly three days and three nights," and that "the men of Ninive repented at his preaching." He declares Himself "greater than Jonas." Surely He would not have compared Himself with a man in a fable, a parable, or a myth. Again, in His eyes, Jonas is not less a historical character than "the queen of the south" mentioned immediately afterwards, and the prophet's mission to Ninive not less an actual fact than the queen's visit to Solomon. Furthermore, He considers Jonas' incarceration in the fish's belly as a real event, since He refers to it the Pharisees and Scribes who were asking for an actual miracle as a sign of His divine mission. Plainly then, Jesus regarded the contents of the book of Jonas as strict history, exactly as did His Jewish contemporaries; and where is the Christian, worthy of the name, who would dare to set aside His authority when He thus attests the truthfulness of one of the sacred writings of the Old Testament?

Such are the principal arguments which are usually set forth to prove the historical character of the book of Jonas, and which to many minds still appear conclusive. A large number, however, of recent scholars who have closely examined these various arguments, consider them as insufficient evidence that the contents of the book are simply those of a literal, matter-of-fact history.

They refuse, and indeed rightly, to attribute much weight to the first of these arguments. The historical or non-historical character of an inspired writing cannot be seriously regarded as the test whereby the Jewish collectors of the canonical books determined the sacredness or non-sacredness of a writing. Most probably they reckoned the book of Jonas among the Holy Scriptures, chiefly because it was ascribed to the prophet of that name. And they, no doubt, included it in the second division of the Hebrew Bible, viz.: "the Prophets," because it had been composed before that second collection of sacred writings was brought to a close; whereas the prophecy of Daniel, despite its obvious historical and prophetical features, was placed among "the Hagiographa," apparently because the second Canon, "the Prophets," had already been closed.

The same scholars look upon the second argument in favor of the historical character of the prophecy of Jonas, as hardly less inconclusive than the first. "It is impossible," says one of them, to derive the historical truth of what the book states from these particulars [that is, from certain points of history and geography correctly referred to in the book of Jonas]. They do *not* prove it. All that they show is the conformity of various points with the known facts of history. It is quite possible, for aught belonging to the geographical or historical notices in question, that the story of Jonas going to Ninive and travelling through it for three days partakes largely of the fictitious. The legendary and parabolical may be conformed to verisimilitude. A careful writer will assuredly refrain from violating the probable, or running counter to facts, manners, and customs, as far as they come in his way. To make a story agree with history and geography whenever it touches on their respective regions is one thing; to convert it into true history is another."[1] "Formerly," says a more recent scholar, Fr. Lagrange, O. P., "it was deemed strange that God should inspire an edifying story devoid of historical reality. . . . And yet, it is a matter of experience that an invented story may be more useful than a *true* sory. . . . Such books [that is, unhistorical writings] assume a rigorous historical precision without the least intention of deceiving any one. In order therefore to prove the historical character of a book of the Bible, it is not sufficient to insist on the vividness of the narration, the multiplicity of the details, the allusions to history or geography therein contained."[2]

Similar considerations are urged against the conclusiveness of the third argument set forth above. If every trait in the delineation of the character and person of Jonas were life-like and true to nature—as is maintained in the argument,—this would prove at most ,that the book *may be* historical, not that it *is* so. For life-like portraits may be drawn by the imagination of an able writer, aided perhaps by an original, which he uses as his starting-point. Moreover, certain details in the sketching of the portrait of Jonas, such, for instance, as his impertinent discussion with Yahweh in iv, 9, can hardly be considered as true to life.

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[1] Samuel Davidson, *Introd. to the Old Test.*, vol. iii, p. 269.

[2] Fr. Lagrange, in "*Revue Biblique Internationale*," Oct., 1896, pp. 508, 511.

As regards the fourth argument drawn from the Jewish tradition, no scholar worthy of the name dreams of considering this source of information as trustworthy in matters of historical or literary criticism, and this for the simple reason that the credulity of the Rabbis of past ages has known no limit in such matters. Not only has Jewish tradition, for instance, admitted that Moses wrote even the last eight verses of Deuteronomy which contain the account of his death and burial, but it has ascribed to Adam the authorship of a Psalm (Ps. cxxxviii in the Vulgate) the writer of which speaks of his own mother (verse 13). In regard to Jonas in particular, Jewish tradition has proved especially untrustworthy. To quote only a few particulars:

> "When Jonas went to Joppe he found no ship, for the vessel on which he had intended taking passage had sailed two days before; but God caused a contrary wind to arise and the ship was driven back to port (Zohar, Hayye Sarah). At this Jonas rejoiced, regarding it as indicating that his plan would succeed, and in his joy he paid his passage-money in advance, contrary to the usual custom, which did not require its payment until the conclusion of the voyage. According to some, he even paid the full value of the ship, amounting to 4,000 gold denarii (Yalkut, Jonah, 550). But all this happened to teach him the fallacy of his conclusion that God could be evaded (Yalk., *loc. cit.*; and Rashi, *ad loc.*), for the contrary wind affected his ship only; all others on the sea at that time proceeded uninterruptedly on their courses. . . .
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> "The crew finally was compelled to believe Jonas' statement that this calamity had befallen their craft on his account, and assented to his petition to be thrown overboard. Praying that they might not be accountable for death, they first lowered him far enough for the water to touch his knees. Seeing that the storm subsided, they drew him back into the ship, whereupon the sea arose again. They repeated this experience several times, each time lowering him deeper, but taking him out again, and each time with the same result, until finally they threw him into the sea (Yalk., *loc. cit.*).
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> "The fish which swallowed Jonas had been created in the very beginning of the world in order to perform this work (Zohar, Wayakhel; Pirke Rabbi Eliezer x.; see also Genesis Rabbah v, 5). Therefore this fish had so large a mouth and throat that Jonas found it as easy to pass into its belly as he would have found it to enter the portals of a very large synagogue (*Ibid.*). It had eyes which were as large as windows, and lamps lit up its interior. . . .
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> "The fish informed Jonas that he was to be devoured by Leviathan. . . . The fish showed Jonas all the wondrous things in the ocean (for instance, the path of the Israelites across the Red Sea; the pillars upon which the earth rests). Thus he spent three days and three nights in the belly of the fish, but would not pray. God then resolved to put him into another fish where he would be less comfortable. A female fish quick with young approached the male fish in which Jonas was, threatening to devour both unless Jonas were transferred to her, and announcing her divine order to that effect. . . .

"The gourd of Jonas was enormous. Before its appearance, Jonas was tortured by the heat and by insects of all kinds, his clothes having been burned by the heat of the belly of the fish; he was tortured again after the worm had caused the gourd to wither. . . ."[1]

Of course, the passages in the Greek translation of Tobias (xiv, 4, 8) appealed to as the most ancient witness of Jewish tradition regarding the book of Jonas, have nothing of the childish character of the travesty just quoted. But these passages are not found in the Latin Vulgate, and may not be genuine. The next ancient witness to that tradition is an apocryphal writing, viz.: the third book of the Machabees, the historical value of which is far from being beyond suspicion. Josephus does indeed set forth the contents of the book of Jonas, in his *Antiquities of the Jews*, but the manner in which he introduces and closes his exposition of those contents, leads one to surmise that he did not fully rely on them. Lastly, it is certain that during the Middle Ages, the Jewish rabbi Arbabanel looked upon the book of Jonas as the narrative of a dream, while Kimchi, a still more celebrated Jewish rabbi, assigned to it simply a moral scope. Apparently then, Jewish tradition has but little right to be considered as a conclusive argument in favor of the historical character of the book of Jonas, even though it should have been implicitly believed and faithfully repeated, century after century, by the Christian Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers.

In answer to the last and chief argument brought forth by the defenders of the traditional view, viz.: the authority of Our Lord, the opponents of the historical character of the book of Jonas contend that this authority is wrongly appealed to. They maintain that Our Savior conformed to the received manner of speaking and to the traditions of His Jewish contemporaries, and did not go against them when it was not necessary to do so."[2] "It was no part of His mission on earth to teach criticism or to correct all the erroneous opinions held by the Jews respecting their own Scriptures. He reasoned with them on grounds they acknowledged, employing the *argumentum ad hominem*, and adopting current views whenever they suited the purpose of that higher mission which He came to promote. Where He does not assert a thing on His own independent authority but merely to confound or confute the Jews of His day, He should not be quoted as a voucher for the historical truth of facts or events."[1] Nor should any special stress, we are told, be laid on the comparison between Jonas remaining three days and three nights in the fish's belly, and Our Lord spending the same length of time in the grave, which is explicitly set forth in Mt. xii, 40. For a careful comparison of the four passages (Mt. xii, 38-42; xvi, 1-4; Mk. viii, 11-13; Lk. xi, 16, 29-32), wherein mention is made of some wonderful "sign" as asked of Jesus by His contemporaries, renders it very probable that this allusion to Our Lord's resurrection, as it is distinctly pointed out in Mt. xii, 40 (or even as it is less clearly stated in Lk. xi, 30; Mt. xvi, 1-4, where we simply read: "and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet"), was no part of the original saying.[2] In fact, St. Mark, whose Gospel is generally primitive in comparison to St. Matthew and St. Luke has no reference at all to Jonas, and simply reads:

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[1] Art. Jonah, in *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. vii. pp. 226, 227.

[2] Card. Meignan, *les Prophètes d' Israel* (Paris, 1892), p. 369.—For instance, in the Parable of Dives and Lazarus (Lk. xvi, 19-31) Our Lord describes Hades as including both paradise and hell, and speaks of the condition of souls in the unseen world, in accordance with the Jewish beliefs of His time; but of course He must not be understood as confirming those beliefs. In like manner, in His exhortations to watchfulness in view of the last day, Our Savior speaks of what happened in the time of Noe (Mt. xxiv, 37-39) in accordance with the Jewish conceptions of the day, which supposed the flood to have been universal: "the flood came and took them all away;" etc.

> Mk. viii, 11-12.
>
> 11. And the Pharisees came forth and began to question with Him,
> seeking of Him a sign from heaven, tempting Him.
> 12. And sighing deeply in His spirit, He said:
> Why does this generation seek a sign?
> Amen, I say to you: No sign shall be given to this generation.

Whence it would appear that Christ's authority should not be appealed to as actually affirming the fact of Jonas' deliverance from the belly of the sea-monster. But even if we should suppose that Mt. xii, 38-42, contains the most accurate form of Our Lord's reference to Jonas and to the men of Ninive, "the absence or the presence of historical foundation," says Prof. Sanday, "was not essential to the application of the narrative as a 'sign.' Our Lord's use of it starts from the way in which it was understood by His hearers; behind this He does not go."[3] For these, and other such reasons, even thorough believers in revelation and in the divine authority of Christ, think that Our Lord's reference to Jonas in the evangelical records does not preclude a scientific discussion or even an actual rejection of the historical character of the prophecy which bears his name. The Abbé

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[1] Samuel Davidson, *Introd. to Old Test.*, vol. iii, p. 270.

[2] The ablest discussion of this point of literary criticism appeared in *The Biblical World* (Aug., 1902) pp. 99-112), in an article entitled "What was the sign of Jonah," and written by Prof. B. W. Bacon.

[3] Wm. Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 433.

Trochon, for instance, writes: "Catholic orthodoxy does not forbid us to maintain that the book of Jonas does not relate history, but is simply a parable;"[1] and he quotes the following words from the Reports of the "*Conférences ecclésiastiques de Versailles*" for 1879: "Thus far, the Church has not settled the question (of the historical character of the book of Jonas), and probably she will never settle it. Nor has she excluded from the ranks of her children Catholic interperters, such as Richard Simon and Jno. Jahn, who have denied the historicity of Jonas."[2]

Scholars who thus think that the arguments in favor of the historical character of the book of Jonas do not bear out that position, and that Our Lord's authority, in particular, should not be appealed to in its defense, feel quite at liberty to reject the traditional view. Their chief reasons to regard the narrative as not strictly historical may be briefly given as follows.

In the first place, it was not the aim of the author to write history. The work begins abruptly, and the events connected with the twofold mission of Jonas to Ninive are set forth only in so far as they contribute to convey the prophetic teaching of the book. A matter-of-fact history would have naturally stated in what place the prophet was vomited by the sea-monster; what were the sins of the Ninivites, which the prophetical histories are by no means accustomed in other cases to pass over; by what particular calamity the city was to be destroyed; whether the abolition of idolatry was entailed by the general repentance of the inhabitants; what was the name of the Assyrian king in whose time all this took place, who also turned to the true God with such humility and repentance, etc. Instead of these historical data, only two scenes are given in detail: the one on the sea, the other at Ninive. The transitions in the book look like the rapid flight of the imagination, not the steady flow of historical narrative, and the book closes abruptly after conveying the lessons intended.[3]

A second reason for thinking that the author did not write strict history is that the characters delineated in the book of Jonas can hardly be considered as true to life. The character of the prophet himself appears indeed very strange: to fly from Yahweh's presence, he selects a ship which will take him to the farthest West (Tarsis, in Spain), his mission being to the far East (Ninive, in Assyria);[1] when in imminent danger of death by a tempest, and when all around him are putting up prayers, he is quietly sleeping; he voluntarily offers himself to be thrown into the sea; and lastly, is constantly opposing God, speaking to Him, at least once, in a disrespectful manner (Jonas iv, 9). The conduct of the sailors seems also to be untrue to life. It is strange, for instance, that they should cease calling upon their respective gods, to cry to Yahweh (Jonas i, 5, 14), and that having found out the culprit who indeed has pleaded guilty, and has urged them to cast him into the sea as a sure means of calming it, they should not resort at once to that means, and should even call Jonas "innocent" (i, 14). Again, the character of the King of Ninive is not drawn in harmony with what is known of the haughtiness and cruelty of Eastern monarchs generally, and of Assyrian rulers in particular: only the greatest miracles could bring the Pharao of the Exodus to comply with the positive commands of Yahweh, and no such miracles are even hinted at in order to account for the humble repentance of the King of Assyria. Equally untrue to life, we are told, appears the description of the Ninivites who all repent at the message of an unknown individual; and the same thing must be said of the order issued by the king that a fast should be observed and sackcloth worn even by the infants and beasts (Jonas iv, 5-9).

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[1] Abbé Trochon, *les Petits Prophètes* (Paris, Lethielleux, 1883), p. 221.

[2] Abbé Trochon, *les Petits Prophètes*, p. 221, footn. 2.

[3] Cf. Prof. Charles A. Briggs, *General Introd. to the Study of Holy Scripture*, p. 345; John Jahn, *Introd. to the Old Test.*, p. 372 (Engl. Transl.)

In the third place, it is urged against the historical reality of the narrative, that it is difficult to account for the utter absence of allusions to the repentance of Ninive, from the king on his throne to the humblest citizen, in the historical books of the Bible and in the numerous prophecies which deal with Assyria and its relation to Israel.[2] The extent of that conversion, the sincerity and the depth of it, if historical at all, should have supplied the monotheistic teachers of Israel with at least occasional references in connection with the pure worship of the true God.

A fourth argument is connected with the miraculous element such as it appears in the book of Jonas. "To those who accept the fact of miracle," says one of the opponents of the historical character of the prophecy of Jonas, "the marvels of the fish and the gourd are not in themselves stumbling-blocks, and a reverent faith in the supernatural of relevation will repudiate all well-meant attempts to reduce their wondrousness by unreliable travellers' stories and vagaries of natural history.[1] The real difficulty about the element of the miraculous in the book of Jonas consists, for believing minds, rather in the amount and kind of it. From beginning to end, the narrative is one continuous chain of surprises, providences, and marvels of a very unusual description. And what is more significant still, much of it is, so far as we can perceive, unnecessary for the practical accomplishment of the matter-of-fact object assigned, while it as evidently serves with unequal effectiveness a didactic purpose, viz.: to emphasize and throw into intense relief certain truths of the very first importance in revelation."[2]

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[1] Cf. Von Orelli, *the Twelve Minor Prophets*, p. 173 (Engl. Transl.); Abbé Trochon, *les Petits Prophètes*, p. 232; etc.

[2] Whenever the Assyrians are spoken of, they are described as idolaters. Indeed, the fact of Ninive's conversion seems to be excluded by the following statement of Jeremias (ii, 11): "If a nation hath changed their gods, and indeed they are not gods; but my people have changed their glory [Yahweh] into an idol."

Lastly, the fact that the book of Jonas represents a hymn which celebrates a deliverance already granted, and which is "partially made up of selections from Psalms,[3]—some of them quite late in date,[4]—as composed by the prophet while still in the fish's belly, is often urged against the strictly historical character of the narrative.[5]

It should not be supposed, however, that all the scholars who do not regard the book of Jonas as a matter-of-fact history, consider it as a mere work of the imagination. According to several recent critics, that inspired work, like the books of Job, Tobias, Judith, is not altogether a fiction. Von Orelli, for example, tells us that "the fish-miracle is not the product of the author's fancy. Whether we regard it as a historical fact or assign it to legend, it was certainly matter of tradition. For it cannot easily be brought into harmony with the purpose of the narrator, as is shown by the explanations of most of the expositors, who are unable to extract any special moral teaching from it. A prophetic mission of Jonas to Ninive must also have been handed down by tradition, and indeed, in connection with that adventure, the astonishing result of his preaching. In the same way, the narrator found the Jonas Psalm ready to hand. Had he himself composed it out of fragments of prayers, as is now generally supposed, he would have introduced the Psalm, in this case also well put together, at a more fitting point."[1]

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[1] Such attempts have been made by F. Kaulen, Comm. on Jonas; H. H. Bonar, art. Jonah, in Smith, *Dict. of the Bible*; etc.

[2] W. G. Elmslie, in "*Book by Book*," p. 288.

[3] F. Vigouroux, *Manuel Biblique*, vol. ii, No. 1090, § 3.

[4] For instance Ps. cxx, 1; cxxi, 23; cxlii, 4; etc. Cf. Vigouroux, *Ibid.*

[5] Cf. Briggs, *General Introduction*, p. 347; Samuel Davidson, *Introd. to the Old Test.*, p. 274 sqq.; etc.

While this view of the matter agrees with the prevalent opinion that Hebrew writers did not invent entirely their stories, and accounts for the general appearance of the narrative and also for the time-honored tradition which looks upon the book of Jonas as actual history, yet most scholars who deny the historical character of the work think that it should be simply regarded as a fiction, the purpose of which is to inculcate important religious teachings. According to some, it is a parabolic fiction somewhat similar in its narrative form and didactic purpose to the well-known parable of the Prodigal Son.[2] Others see in it an allegorical composition, wherein Jonas represents Israel fleeing from the duty imposed on the nation in its prophetic character as a witness for God.[3] The world-power represented in Isai. xxvii and Jerem. li, 34, as a sea-monster, may in accordance with God's design, swallow up Israel (Jerem. li, 34); but Bel, the God of Babylon, is forced to disgorge his prey (Jerem. li, 44), after "three days," according to Osee's way of describing the duration of the Exile (Osee, vi, 2). In his second mission to Ninive, Jonas symbolizes, we are told, Israel restored and intrusted again with a prophetic mission. The Jewish nation preaches with sufficient readiness the doom of the Gentile world, and watches for the time when it will be fulfilled. But in His mercy, God has other views than His prophetical representative: He does not delight in the death of men, but rather in their repentance. This allegorical method of interpreting the book of Jonas is steadily gaining ground among Biblical scholars,[4] and does not evidently conflict with the requirements of Catholic orthodoxy. One may doubt, however, whether in so far as it denies all historical basis to the prophecy, it does not assume too "artificial a clothing of the national idea and history in a personal garb."[5] It would indeed appear more plausible if it were coupled with the view set forth above, which admits that the materials of the narrative were, at least substantially, supplied by tradition. Thus modified it would also be more worthy of acceptance than the theory which regards the book of Jonas as simply a rebuke of the selfish spirit of the Jewish people, a satire against Jewish particularism.

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[1] Von Orelli, *the Twelve Minor Prophets*, p. 168. Cf. Driver, *Introd. to Literature of Old Test.*, p. 324 sq.

[2] Cf. John Jahn, *Introd. to Old Testament*, p. 373 (Engl. Transl.).

[3] According to Isai. xli-lxvi, Israel is God's servant intrusted with the prophetic mission of carrying light and truth to the Gentiles.

[4] This view is admitted by De Wette; Delitzsch; Bleek; Reuss; Chas. W. W. Wright; Ed. Konig; Briggs; etc.

[5] Von Orelli, *the Twelve Minor Prophets*, p. 171.

With regard to the more or less rationalistic efforts which have been made to represent the book of Jonas as a historical myth chiefly on account of the fish miracle, it suffices to say that they have so far succeeded in proving only one thing, to wit: that all such attempts have no real ground besides the wish of doing away with the reality of that miracle and of the supernatural which is inextricably woven into the framework of the narrative.[1]

In conclusion, we will simply quote the following words of an acute and careful scholar of the day: "There is probably no intermediate resting place for intelligent faith between a simple acceptance of the history, and the theory held by many believing scholars, who, influenced by no shrinking from the supernatural, but purely by the literary character and didactic bent of the book, have found in it a kind of composition similar to the book of Job, or the pictorial prophetic visions and symbolical actions recorded in the memoirs of the prophets, and which in the present case may be more exactly defined as a species of spiritual allegory or religious parable, founded on a more or less extensive basis of historical fact."[2]

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[1] For details, see Von Orelli, loc. cit.; Ed. Konig. art. Jonah, in Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*; etc.

[2] W. G. Elmslie, in "*Book by Book*," p. 289.

THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST. II.

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.

The first study on this important topic,[1] was devoted to a rapid survey of the history of opinions concerning it, with an outline of the various difficulties, problems, and solutions suggested by the data of Holy Writ Before proceeding to an examination of the opinions of the Church Fathers, it will be well to devote an article to a more detailed consideration of the question itself, in order to see clearly the problems under discussion, and the data of Scripture and dogma on which their solution ultimately depends.

In the first place, then, let us examine in detail the testimony of the Sacred Writers concerning the human knowledge of the Savior. The first thing that impresses one is the overwhelming evidence in favor of superior knowledge on the part of Christ, so striking, indeed, as to make one hesitate to assert any limitation except what human nature necessarily imposes. According to the Synoptists as well as the Fourth Gospel, he often showed a knowledge that certainly came not of human experience. Thus when the disciples went to prepare for the last supper, he told them they would meet a man, bearing a pitcher of water, "whom they were to follow into the house" (Luke xxii, 10). When he prepared for his entry into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday, he gave a somewhat similar instruction regarding the ass: "Go into the village . . . in which as you enter, you shall find a colt tied, on which no man hath ever sat." (Luke xix, 30). And they found even as he had said. He was able to tell Peter the exact coin he would find in the first fish he would catch. (Matt. xvii, 27). When Nathaniel approached, he spoke of the "Israelite in whom there is no guile," and when he marvelled, saying: "Whence knowest thou me?" he answered: "Before that Philip called, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee," which drew from Nathaniel the exclamation: "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God." (John ii, 47-50). He was seemingly aware of the discussion which the apostles had in the way concerning the precedence in Christ's kingdom. "And Jesus perceiving the thought of their heart" (Luke ix, 47). He peered even to the depth of Judas' soul, and knew his baseness and his treachery. "For he knew who would betray him." (John xiii, 11). It was not uncommon for him to begin a line of reasoning because he was aware of the inmost thoughts of those round about him. "And immediately when Jesus perceived in his spirit that they so reasoned with themselves, he said unto them, "Why reason ye so in your hearts?" He is represented by the evangelist as being thoroughly cognizant of the family history of the Samaritan woman (John iv). He tells the ardent Peter that he will become afraid and finally deny that he knows the master whom he loved so tenderly. "Even this night before the cock crow twice, thou wilt deny me thrice" (Mark xiv, 30). He foresees clearly his coming passion. He seems to have a conscious knowledge of things such as is proper to God alone. "Woe to thee Corozain; woe to thee Bethsaida, for if the mighty works which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sack-cloth and ashes." (Matt. xi, 21). Does he not assert for himself a knowledge equal to that of the Father? "All things are delivered unto me by my Father, and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son." (Matt. xi, 27). He is in very deed the discerner of hearts, nor does he get his knowledge through the natural channels. "He did not," says the author of the Fourth Gospel (ii, 24, 25), "commit himself unto them, because he knew all men and needed not that any should testify of man; for he knew what was in man." To even the casual reader these texts suggest that our Lord's human knowledge was practically all-embracing,. These and similar passages should make us extremely cautious in admitting limitations in the human knowledge of the Savior.

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[1] New York Review, Oct.-Nov., 1905.

These texts, however, it must be admitted, do not settle the very special question: Did the soul of Christ from the moment of the Mystery of the Incarnation until the close of his mortal life always enjoy the beatific vision; did his human intelligence see God as he is, and in God all things that human mind may know and human ken embrace? Petavius is not loth to admit that Scripture and early tradition have almost nothing to say on this question. The Scripture arguments adduced by him to prove fulness of knowledge certainly seem rather weak to support such a weighty conclusion, and he produces little or no testimony from the earlier tradition. He allows in the first place that scarcely any of the ancient Fathers ever treat the question "*ex professo*", but claims that from their general position concerning the knowledge of Christ, we must infer that they held such doctrine implicitly. Concerning this tradition we shall see fully later on. The most striking proof which he adduces from Scripture is the passage in St. John (i, 14,) where Christ is said to be full of grace and truth. If full of truth, he argues, then he must have had the beatific vision, otherwise addition would be possible. Even if these words apply to Christ as man, this exegesis is doubtful—much more doubtful since the Holy Fathers frequently apply them to the Logos, who without doubt, was full of truth. He then refers his readers to Melchior Canus[1] who, he says, treats the question elaborately.

Cardinal De Lugo adduces the passage in John (i, 18, seqq.) where it is asserted that "no man hath seen God at any time," but "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." But even De Lugo willingly grants that weighty authority applies this passage to Christ as God, as the Word of the Father, and most modern interpreters are opposed to the learned Cardinal's own interpretation. In their argument from Tradition also Petavius and De Lugo fail to enforce their conclusion nor do they explain satisfactorily the sadness of Christ's life, his agony, his passion, which in their hypothesis become even more mysterious than the hypostatic union itself. True, all theologians admit that there is here a great difficulty, and most of them, following the doctrine of St. Thomas, endeavor to show that the soul of Christ in its superior region was filled with joy beatific, while sadness and pain and sorrow afflicted its lower region.[2] This explanation, however, has not seemed satisfactory to all, even amongst Catholics.

Leaving aside for the present the further consideration of this particularly difficult problem, we may enquire whether there are any other limitations to our Lord's knowledge beyond those necessarily inherent in a finite nature? The indications of such limittation found in the New Testament are few, and most of them easy of explanation. Followers of Kenotic theories adduce such incidents as the following. He expresses surprise, when questioned by his Mother in the temple. "How is it that you sought me?" (Luke ii, 49); surprise too, when he found the fig tree barren (Mark xi, 13);

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[1] *De Loc. Theol.*, Lib. xii, Cap. xii.

[2] III, Qu. 46, art. vii and viii. Cf. Suarez, *In Tertiam Partem Summæ*, Tom. 18, Disp. 38, Sect, 2, 3; Franzelin, *De Verbo Incar.*, pp. 433, 434.

surprise at the lack of faith in men (Mark vi, 6). Does not this surprise betoken new knowledge, new consciousness, if we are not to teach an intellectual docetism? He asks for information, and seemingly receives it. Of course, some of these questions are merely dialectical, e. g.: "Whose image and inscription is this?" "Whose son is he?" etc. But others betoken a desire for new information, v. g., the question in Luke (viii, 30): "And Jesus asked him, saying, what is thy name?" or again in Mark (xii, 28): "How many loaves have ye?" "Go and see." Note the same in Mark viii, 5, and ix, 20. Jesus asks the father of the child: "How long is it ago since this came unto him?" and of Mary he asks (John xi, 34): "Where have ye laid him?" Again, after the Pharisees had held council against him, it is written (Matt, xii, 15): "When Jesus knew it, he withdrew himself from thence." Here is seemingly new knowledge. The same is clear in John iv, 1-3: "When the Lord knew . . . he left Judea," etc., his new course of action apparently depending on the knowledge he received.

The awful scene in Gethsemani seemingly indicates that he had not fully realized beforehand what he was just experiencing: "If it be possible let this chalice pass," especially if we bear in mind the inspired commentary of the same in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Who in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear, though he was a son, yet learned obedience from the things he suffered." Learning obedience seems to indicate advance in knowledge. The scene of Gethsemani, too, has its parallel expressed in the words on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Grant that they are the words of the Psalmist, would our Lord at that supreme moment have repeated them if he had not then the experience which originally prompted them? Difficult as these various passages may seem of interpretation, still some explanation more or less plausible of each and all of them is given in the current commentaries.

Other and perhaps more serious difficulties on this head are incidental to the results of modern scientific research as applied to the books of the Old Testament. In our days the more intimate study of the Old Testament has led scholarly men to adopt conclusions at variance with traditional ideas concerning the authorship, etc., of its books. The question presents itself: Did our Lord endorse fully the Jewish view of their Scriptures? Did he believe, for example, that the Pentateuch, as it is, came substantially from Moses? and did he intend to teach this as his doctrine?[1] Did he believe and did he intend to convey to his hearers that he believed in the historical character of the prophecy of Jonas when he used it as a type of his resurrection? Did he, when quoting Daniel, actually intend to teach that Daniel was written at the time of the Babylonian captivity? Did he assert[2] that David really wrote the 110th Hebrew Psalm? Did he, though he asserted that he knew not the hour of his coming, think within himself—and actually teach—that the *Parousia* was close at hand? and if not, how account for such views as obtained in the early Church concerning the speedy coming of Jesus Christ? Finally, what interpretation are we to put upon the difficult passages in Luke ii, 40, 52; Mark xiii, 32; and Matthew xxiv; and how shall we explain the silence of Christ concerning scientific and social problems?

It is most necessary before entering on the discussion of this question to make proper distinctions. It is one thing to say that Christ grew in knowledge, that as man he did not know all things; and quite another to say that he erred in giving expression to certain ideas—that he said certain things which he thought to be true, but which the further development of knowledge has found to be false. To state this means to say that he was deceived, and that, though unwittingly, he deceived others. And this becomes a more vital question where such ignorance touches those things which were intimately bound up with his mission on earth. Certainly a perusal of the Gospel story gives even the casual reader the impression of an *infallible* teacher in the person of Jesus Christ. "He that despiseth you despiseth me. He that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me." And in his general attitude towards his hearers, he takes a stand which would be simply morally unjustifiable, had he not the right to subject every intellect to his teaching. If then we are anxious to be true to the story of his life as recorded in the Gospel, we must recognize him as an infallible teacher. This is also a necessary conclusion if we accept the faith of the Council of Ephesus, for if the personality of the man-God be divine, any deception would be attributable in the last analysis to the Logos, who as God can neither deceive nor be deceived. Finally, such a contention would be contrary to the very purpose of the Incarnation; for as the Incarnate God he seemed to teach mankind the path to heaven, to provide for the children of men a working religious system which would last till time is no more. Any knowledge therefore necessary for the fulfilment of such a function cannot in the light of faith be denied to Jesus Christ, without denying at the same time the purpose of his coming. If then any conclusion which scientific theology reaches leads to the denial of Christ's infallibility as teacher, it must be rejected by everyone who accepts the record of Christ's life, respects his moral worth, and believes in the purpose which God had in sending his only begotten Son in the likeness of our flesh.

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[1] Luke xxiv, 27, 44.

[2] Matt. xxii, 43.

But do not some of the seeming limitations mentioned above, imply the contrary? How can one consistently with the infallibility of Christ admit limitations in the knowledge of Jesus Christ? In the first place it must be remarked that some of the objections urged above do not touch the question of his infallibility as a teacher. That he really grew in knowledge, that he was ignorant of the last day, that he expressed surprise and admiration, that he acquired new knowledge from those round about him, that his vision of the future was dimmed in Gethsemani and upon the Cross, that he "learned obedience from the things he suffered," limitations such as these do not affect his title to infallibility, nay, may even be considered as lasting proofs of his love for us, which prompted him to take upon him even our lack of knowledge, that "in all things he might be like unto us."

But his attitude toward the Old Testament, and toward his second coming certainly constitute a more difficult problem. What was Christ's attitude toward the Old Testament? Concerning the questions of interest to modern criticism, he has told us nothing; however, his manner of using the Old Testament must be taken into consideration. And here we may lay down a safe and solid working principle: Once we have ascertained clearly what was the mind of Christ concerning any question of Old Testament literature or theology, there can be no further room for controversy—the question at issue is settled forever. But here is the great difficulty: how can we be sure what he intended so to teach? how be sure of his mind? Did he, for example, when citing Moses, intend to settle once and forever that Moses gave to the Pentatench the form in which we at present know it? Did he, when quoting Deuteronomy at the time of his temptation, confirm thereby the Jewish estimate of that book, which has since been so strongly attacked by the critics? Did he, by quoting the Book of Jonas, bind us to the historical truth of that narrative?

Some of those who believe in his inerrancy have answered that

Christ, finding the books of the Pentateuch accepted as Mosaic, finding Jonas accepted as historical by the persons whom he addressed, judged it wise to use the narratives as *argumenta ad hominem*; others say that he simply referred to the books of the Old Testament by their recognized names, "the names by which men always will refer to them, when they are speaking ordinary human language,"[1] just as men refer to Homer, without entering upon the famous Homeric question; others, finally, that his human knowledge was the knowledge of his time, and that his human knowledge on these points was as limited as that of his contemporaries—but those who hold this opinion believe that he was always conscious of his limitations, and that this consciousness acted to prevent him making any assertion inconsistent with pure truth. This view is put thus tersely by Ottley:[2]

> "His consciousness was limited, but such limitation did not necessarily mean that he himself was deceived; still less that he could mislead others. . . . It would be in accordance with his usual methods of sympathy to confine himself to the ordinary modes of expression current in his own age, or even to accept its scientific or literary conceptions. . . . He did not transcend the ordinary knowledge or conceptions of his time in matters not affecting the primary purpose of his coming.[3] It is admitted that he never teaches positively on points of science; analogy makes it equally probable that he never taught as to the *authorship* of different books of Scripture or their mode of composition. . . . It is *certain* that there are no statements of our Lord's which indisputably prove either that he was possessed of modern critical knowledge, or that he intended to endorse finally the traditional views of his countrymen in regard to the nature of their Scriptures."

Then, after asserting that in reference to this mysterious subject *our* ignorance ought to play a much larger part than it usually does, he concludes with these words, which everyone should endorse:

> "We may well shrink from constructing any general theory of our Lord's human knowledge; we are too apt to discuss and dispute, where we should wonder and adore."

There is, however, one difficulty which of late has puzzled Christian writers. It is in relation to the favorite Vesper Psalm, *Dixit Dominus*.[4] Many modern critics hold this Psalm to be of a later date than the age of David; and if that be true, how reconcile the fact with Christ's seemingly positive assertion that it was written by David: "David himself said by the Holy Ghost: The Lord said, etc." Nor will it suffice to say that the Lord is here merely using the passage in the sense accepted by the Jews. For the strength of Christ's argument depends on David's personal authorship of the Psalm. Christ is the Messiah; the Messiah must be the son of David according to the flesh. How then does David in spirit call him Lord, saying: "The Lord said to my Lord, etc?" If Christ really intended to assert that David wrote those words, then in accordance with our principle, we must believe David to be the author; and our explanation of the difficulty must consist in showing that neither the internal nor the external evidence adduced, force us to place the date of the Psalm later than David, that the part of the Psalm cited may be David's with after additions, etc., etc.[1] In point of fact, although many able critics seem to think the Psalm surely post-Davidic, others cannot see either in the language or the allusions sufficient reason for departing from the traditional view.[2] But is it really clear that Christ intended to assert the Davidic authorship? One may certainly doubt such a conclusion, particularly since it seems foreign to Christ's ordinary mode of acting; or one may ask himself whether it is really our Lord's purpose either to affirm or deny, or if he is not simply pressing upon the Pharisees an argument which their habitual assumptions ought to have suggested to them, to wit, that Christ is David's son—just such an argument as he used when he said: "Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is God."[3]

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[1] Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, 1901.

[2] *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, Vol. II, p. 305.

[3] Would views on the Old Testament not be within the scope of his primary purpose?

[4] Hebr. CX.

The difficulty of the *Parousia* is still more arduous, and an adequate answer would require a volume by itself. There is (1) the difficulty arising from the harmonizing of the texts themselves of Matthew, (ch. xxiv); Mark, (ch. xiii), and Luke, (ch. xxi); (2) whether in these chapters he only speaks of the fate of Jerusalem, or also of the day of final judgment; (3) if only of the Fall of Jerusalem, how to account for many phrases that seemingly allude to the last day; (4) how to account for the idea so prevalent in early Christian times, an idea seemingly not foreign to the Apostles themselves, of the speedy coming of the Lord.

For the harmonizing of the texts the reader must be referred to special studies on this point.[4] Le Camus, the present Bishop of

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[1] Cf. Powell, *Principles of the Incarnation*, p. 458.

[2] The same problem presents itself in Acts ii, 34

[3] Cf. *Bampton Lectures*, 1891, p. 198. See note on p. 270. Also *Inter. Crit. Comm.* on Luke xx, 42.

[4] E. g. Loisy, *Revue Biblique*, 1896, pp. 173-198.

Rochelle, holds that Mark xiii, Matthew xxiv, and Luke xxi, refer only to the Fall of Jerusalem and that such phrases as "the coming of the Son of man in power and glory," etc., are really but a way of expressing the triumph of Christianity in the early days of Christ's dispensation. This solution is not without serious difficulties; still to many it may present less trouble than the usual manner of cutting the knot, which consists in applying, apparently without definite reason, certain phrases to the Fall of Jerusalem and others to the last day. Possibly the true solution is a happy mean between these just mentioned, which makes the main topic of Christ's discourse the Fall of Jerusalem, and makes this Fall typify the great cataclysm which will mark the end of the world. The one is clearly present to the consciousness of Christ, is described in almost every detail, "when you shall see Jerusalem, etc.;" the other which is not present to his human consciousness—"of that day and hour, no man knoweth, not even the Son"—lies off in the dim, mysterious future. *Christ in no wise specified the time.* But some of his words, like those in Matt. x, 23; Matt. xvi, 27, 28; Mark ix, 1; Luke ix, 27, left in the minds ! Mk VIII 3 of those who knew him a hope of his early coming, even within the life of men living and associated with him.

For it is certainly difficult to deny that the early Christian writings are colored by this hope. They allude to the *Parousia* as a technical term to denote the second coming. In I Thess. (i, 10), St. Paul speaks of the converts of Thessalonica as "turning from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait for his son from heaven;" he expresses his joy (ii, 19) that the Thessalonians are "in the presence of our Lord Jesus at his coming;" he encourages them (iii, 13) to keep themselves "unblamable in holiness before our God and Father, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ with all his saints;" and counsels them (iv, 13-18) to sorrow not for those who have gone before, telling them that at the coming of the Lord "*we* who are alive shall be caught up." True, in his second Epistle, he warns them against thinking that he actually said "the coming is at hand," for first must be revealed the "Son of destruction." He encourages the Christians at Corinth (I Cor. i, 7) to be behind "in no gift, waiting for the *Parousia* of Christ, who will confirm unto the *End*." It would seem that Paul hardly expected twenty centuries to elapse before the great *Parousia*. In the Synoptists such expectation also appears, especially in Matthew xvi, 27, 28.[1] St. James' writings are tinged with the same hope: "Be patient therefore brethren unto the coming of the Lord. Behold the husbandman waiteth . . . and hath long patience. Be ye also patient, and strengthen your hearts, for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh" (v, 7, 8). The Apostle John says: "It is the last hour, and as ye have heard, etc." (I John ii, 18). Again, in the Apocalypse the words: "Behold, I come quickly, etc.", bring out the same idea; and this Scripture idea was continued by many of the early Fathers who taught millenarian doctrines.

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[1] Note carefully the difference between Matt. xvi, 27, 28; Mark ix, 11, 12; Luke

This, then, seems the easiest and best solution of what has been made a tremendous difficulty—the great apocalyptic discourse of Christ refers primarily to the Fall of Jerusalem, which also typifies the great Second Coming. The first event is vividly present to Christ's human consciousness; the second is mysteriously hidden. The Savior is not mistaken—he does not specify the day—but certain phrases of his discourse led the disciples to color their doctrine with the hope of an early coming.

With all these facts in view, let us return to the question of the possible limitations in Christ's human intelligence. Infinite knowledge is of a certainty impossible in the finite soul even of the Man-God—human limitations there must be. The common doctrine of theologians beginning with Peter Lombard has been that Christ possessed, from the dawn of his mortal life, the beatific vision. They are not loth to confess, however, that no such doctrine is clearly expressed in Scripture nor in early Christian tradition. There are, on the other hand, certain facts in the life of Christ which make the theory of permanent beatific vision of more than usual difficulty. It is not an easy task to give an intelligible answer to those who, insisting on the truth of the agony in the garden and the dereliction on the cross, cannot accept the ordinary explanation which seemingly assumes a division, into two compartments as it were, of a simple indivisible spirit. We should bear in mind that the theory of the beatific vision involves the general difficulty of seeming to make Christ's life a mere appearance. Aside from the texts above cited, we must ask ourselves in all seriousness what St. Paul really meant when he wrote the words: ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν. Are the beatific vision and fulness of knowledge compatible with this "*exinanitio*" which represents the Incarnate Word as being made in the likeness of man; and is such a declaration compatible with the "status comprehensoris"? And does not the same question arise

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ix, 27; and also the classical chapters cited above—Matt. xxiv; Mark xiii; Luke xxi, 5-36.

when we face with calmness the loving Savior whom the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (iv, 15) so touchingly describes as knowing by experience our infirmities, having been tempted in all things like as we are, yet without sin? It is moreover worth remembering in connection with this last passage, that the inspired author is addressing a people who can see in the earthly experiences of our Lord nothing glorious—that the humble suffering Jesus whom they knew, was to them a veritable "stumbling block." How then convert the foolishness of the Cross into a source of strength and light and hope? Is it by belittling the Christian ideal of the Messiah? By no means. Sublimer words were never penned than those of the opening chapter of this Epistle. Christ can fulfil the highest ideal of a Messiah, for he is the veritable Son of the Father Eternal. He is the heir to all things; by him did God bring the worlds out of chaos. He is the brightness of the Father's glory, the express image of his divine substance; he upholds all things by the word of his power. All things may perish, but he remains. All shall grow old as a garment, and as a vesture they shall be changed, but the Son is the self-same, and his years fail not.

But how reconcile all this with the self-abasement of Jesus Christ? A task was imposed upon him by his Father. To accomplish this task he became, as "captain of the world's salvation," perfect through sufferings. But in order to save the world, he must become like unto the children of men, "for both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are one," for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren. Our Savior must be our Brother.[1] As we have flesh and blood, so he has flesh and blood (Heb. ii, 14); as we must meet death, he must die in order to deliver us from bondage (*Ibid.* 15); as we are subject to trials and temptations, so Christ must "in all things be made like unto his brethren." "For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted." His nature is like unto ours; his earthly experiences are ours. Certainly such passages hardly suggest the "status comprehensoris." Nay, he is a little lower than the Angels (Heb. ii, 9) and can have compassion on the ignorant, for that he is compassed by infirmity (*Ibid.* v, 2). Again (*Ibid.* v, 7), in the days of his mortal life "he offered up prayers with strong crying"—yea, "with tears," and was heard for his reverence; and though the Son of the Father, yet—marvellous mystery—he actually "learned obedience by the things which he suffered"; and now that he reigns in the eternal Sabbath, now that he has passed into the heavens (*Ibid.* iv, 14 seqq.), he can still be touched with a feeling of our infirmities. Can it be that in all this the sacred writer is speaking solely of the lower and lesser infirmities of man? It seems hard to admit that such is the case since we know that the Man-God was in all points tempted as we are, and surely the passages of the Epistle taken in their obvious sense portray a likeness which would be highly unreal, if Christ had not experienced our limitations.

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[1] Bruce, *Humiliations of Christ*, p. 25.

EDWARD J. HANNA.

"O FELIX CULPA"

Thomas J. Gerrard

It is said that every difficulty in philosophy eventually resolves itself into the problem of evil; and again, that every difficulty in the problem of evil eventually resolves itself into the problem of that particular form of evil known to us as sin. Be that so or not, certain it is that the question of sin is one of the most urgent subjects with which the Christian apologist of to-day has to deal. In a recent number of the *Hibbert Journal*, Professor Hugh Walker, of Lampeter, essays to point out to us a new light on this problem of sin. It is drawn from the life of Oscar Wilde, the English poet and novelist, who, having risen to the heights of literary fame, sinned horribly, suffered the keenest punishment and degradation, and then wrote two books: "A Ballad of Reading Gaol" and "De Profundis." The Professor calls the conversion "The Birth of a Soul," and speaks of the new soul as "begotten by sin and born of agony." He does not, of course, entirely agree with his hero in the bold assertion that "in a manner not yet understood of the world, he (Christ) regarded sin and suffering as being in themselves beautiful holy things and modes of perfection." But he does tentatively and cautiously suggest that sin has its aspect of good; that for Wilde, and for other men, sin may have been necessary to bring out the full capacity for good in his soul; and that, this being so, we are indebted to Oscar Wilde, for a new light on the problem of evil, a light undreamt of by the Churches throughout the ages.

It is proposed in the following pages, then, to discuss this theory of the supposed moral value of sin, not with a view of giving a complete and satisfactory answer to the question, but with the intention rather of seeing in what sense precisely the theory may be accepted, and whether there be sufficient reason to justify a bolder and more confident assent to it.

I assume at the outset that there is a real and essential distinction between physical and moral evil, that is, between suffering and sin. To prove freedom of will and moral responsibility would be beyond the scope of the present article. Reason and design in the matter of suffering, as compared with the same question in the matter of sin, presents little difficulty. The analysis of the easier question, however, may suggest distinctions and reasons helpful to the elucidation of the other. What then is the moral value of suffering? In itself, of course, it is an evil. Only in its relation to the intelligent will does it acquire the quality of moral badness or goodness. In this relationship its design evidently is to test and strengthen the will. The end to be obtained is to put and keep in order a subordinate and intelligent will, or, in other words, to render the human will comformable to the divine will. Life, however, is so constituted that the human will is beset with a multitude of conflicting interests. It cannot accept all. It must take its choice and purchase some at the expense of others. The renunciation of the others causes it pain. Since, however, this renunciation is a necessary condition of the possession of the remainder, the pain must be endured. Thus it is that pain or suffering is a necessary condition of the due exercise of the will. In proportion as the acts of the will are repeated, renouncing certain interests, so much the stronger is it in favor of the interests that remain. Thus it is that pain and suffering are instrumental in causing and strengthening love. The pain is not good in itself. It is only good accidentally in so far as the energy of will-power in one direction implies the pain of resisting an attraction in another direction. And the pain is present whichever way the will acts. If it acts in the direction of bad it suffers the pain of refusing the good. If it acts in the direction of good it suffers the pain of refusing its imagined good According therefore as the suffering is borne in favor of real or of imagined good, so is it the accidental cause of moral improvement or moral deterioration. Only then in so far as it is used as a means of strengthening the will in the direction of good, can suffering be called good. And in this sense its goodness is quite extrinsic to itself, quite accidental. This view of the psychology and morality of suffering is confirmed by the manner of action of Christ in His treatment of suffering. He did not look upon it as something good and beautiful in itself. When it was nescesary for moral perfection He counselled it, even to the cutting off of the right hand and the plucking out of the right eye. But when the removal of it was necessary for moral perfection, He removed it. He performed His miracles out of pity for the sufferers, certainly, yet not without the further intention of showing forth His divine power and setting up a criterion on behalf of His moral teaching. Suffering in itself is bad and ugly. It is permitted, however, for the sake of the good which is accidental to it.

Let us see now how far one can draw a parallel between suffering and sin. If there is any beauty whatever connected with sin it must be strictly extrinsic and accidental. The essence of sin consists in the turning away of the human will from the Divine for the sake of some passing good. Since, however, God has supreme domination over his own creature, dominion by right of numerous titles, chiefly creation and purchase, any rebellion against His will can never under any circumstances whatever be called good in itself. So great is the disorder of an act of sin, that it cannot but be the ugliest of all uglinesses. But then, such is the mercy of God—it is infinite in extent and perfection—that the grace which follows on repented sin gives the sin a new relationship. It has been the occasion of a new manifestation of the divine beauty and goodness, a fresh insight into the wonders of the Divine Being, otherwise hidden from our gaze were it not for the doing of the act of sin. Still that manifestation of beauty and goodness is in no way whatever an emanation from the divine Will. As an occasion then of the bestowal of the divine mercies, sin may be called beautiful. The beauty, however, is extrinsic and accidental, and not intrinsic or essential. There is no intrinsic beauty in nothing. Yet nothing was that out of which God created a beautiful something. Sin likewise, even as all other evils, is something negative, a mere absence of something due. In the same way therefore that God could create a beautiful world of nature out of nothing, so also He can create a beautiful world of grace out of sin. The statement sounds somewhat bold perhaps. I take refuge behind the great name of St. Thomas. He considers the question under the title: "Whether if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?"[1] And St. Thomas gives his opinion that had there been no sin, there had been no Incarnation. He argues thus in favor of his opinion: "People have different opinions about the matter. Some say that the Son of God would have been made man, even if there had been no (original) sin. Others maintain the contrary; and it seems that we should prefer the opinion of these latter. For it is only through Holy Scripture, the means by which the will of God is made known to us, that we can know of those things that depend entirely on His will, and that are above the desert of His creatures. Wherefore since Holy Scripture always gives the sin of the first man as the reason of the Incarnation, it is better to say that this work was prepared by God as a remedy for sin, and that therefore if the sin had not existed, there would have been no Incarnation. But of course the power of God is not limited, and He *could* have become man, whether man had sinned or not."

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[1] Summa. pars 3a, qu. 1, a. 3, disp 3, corpus, et ad 3m.

In his third difficulty St. Thomas discusses and answers the very question so cautiously and timidly proposed by the writer in the *Hibbert Journal,* whether, with some men, it may not eventually be better to have sinned than not to have sinned. He states the difficulty thus: "Man's nature cannot become capable of receiving more grace through sin. On the other hand, since (original) sin was committed, it has become capable of the grace of Union with God (through Our Lord's Incarnation), which is certainly the greatest of all graces. So we must say that nature would have been capable of receiving this grace, even if there had been no original sin. Nor would God have denied to nature a grace of which it is capable. Therefore He would have become man, even if there had been no original sin."

I have quoted the objection at length so that my readers may see the context in which it stands. The point, however, which I wish to insist upon is St. Thomas's appeal to one's common sense, or what at first sight seems to be a dictate of common sense, namely, that sin cannot make human nature more capable of receiving grace. St. Thomas's answer is luminous enough. It is based on that quality of human nature known in scholastic language as *potentia obedientialis.* "The answer to the third difficulty is that we must distinguish two kinds of capacity in human nature. There is *first* the capacity that belongs to its own order and nature. God always satisfies this capacity, because He gives to every created thing what is demanded by its nature. But there is *secondly,* another capacity, which regards only God's almighty power; since every creature must always obey His Will. Now the capacity (of receiving Grace) mentioned here belongs to this second kind. And God does *not* always satisfy this kind. If He did, He could do nothing more to His creatures than He actually has done; which is false, as has been shown in the first part (qu. 105, a. 6). Nor is there any reason why human nature should not be led to something still greater after sin, than otherwise would have been. Indeed, God allows evil to happen in order that thence He may draw forth something better—*Deus enim permittit mala fieri, ut inde aliquid melius eliciat.*"

St. Thomas in support of his opinion appeals to the practice of the Church and to the teaching of St. Paul. Some churches may never have heard of this truth. One Church has always known and taught it. At Eastertide it is her one shout of joy and glory, that sin has been undone and death swallowed up in victory. But how? *"O certe necessarium Adæ peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quæ talem, ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!"* The ceremony in which these words occur, the blessing of the Easter candle, goes back at least to the beginning of the fifth century; whilst the "*Exultet,*" the hymn of which they form a part, is attributed by Martene to St. Augustine.

The explicit authority for the doctrine is sought in the epistle of St. Paul to the Romans.[1] "The law entered in that sin might abound. And where sin abounded grace did more abound." St. Thomas, commenting[2] on this passage, says that the abounding of sin may be considered as caused by the entering in of the law; in such a way however, that the abundance of sin must not be understood as the end of the law, but that which follows on the abundance of sin, namely, the humiliation of man; and again, that sometimes the sinner by divine help, through the thought of his sins becomes more humble and thus obtains greater Grace. Neither is the doctrine without Gospel authority. The first robe and the ring are given to the returning prodigal who has wasted his substance with harlots and in riotous living; whilst no feast is made for the son who served his father so many years and never transgressed his commandments. There is joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just that need not penance In the story of the woman that was in the city, a sinner, the Pharisee wills to see only the sinner; but Christ wills to see the sinner, and beyond the sinner. Which of the two loveth most, a debtor who is forgiven five hundred pence or one who is forgiven fifty? I suppose he who is forgiven most. "Thou hast judged rightly. Wherefore I say to thee: Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much. But to whom less is forgiven, he loveth less."

So it is with all the penitent Saints. Their sins were instrumental to their later sanctity. The recollection of their estrangement from God was a goad to closer union with Him St. Peter had not been so strong in the faith had he not first felt his weakness. St. Paul had not been so zealous in his fight for the Church had he not first known and remembered his zeal in fighting against it. St. Mary Magdalene had not come broken-hearted to Jesus had she not first realized how grievously she had wronged Him. A convent school-girl once said: "I wish I had been a great sinner, so that like Mary Magdalene I could be a great penitent." Was not that remark a sign of intuitive knowledge, the knowledge of a pure soul leaping to the truth instinctively, that the penitent woman of the city had risen to the height of her sanctity through and by reason of the depth of her wickedness? Still we must answer the child by a paradox: "Yes, it would be well to be a great sinner, if only you could become one without sinning." St. Paul also felt that momentary impulse but of course overruled it by his reason. "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid!" If on the one hand it be true that the penitent saints are the better for having sinned, on the other hand it cannot be denied that the innocent saints are better for having not sinned. Of the just man in the book of Wisdom it is written that "he was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul." Of Abraham it is written that "he was found faithful in temptation, and it was reputed to him unto justice." And so also of Joseph, and Phinees, and Jesus, and Caleb, and David and Elias, and Ananias and Azarias, and Misael and Daniel. The greatest joy of Holy Mary, it is piously believed, is the thought that she never offended God.

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[1] Rom. V. 20.

[2] Commentaria in loc. cit.

Since then there is no absolute rule of better or worse for innocent or for penitent, we are led to recognize teleology in the moral even as in the physical order. Although it is impossible to weigh the counsels of God and fix His reasons for the bestowal of this grace and the withholding of that, yet it is not difficult to recognize phenomena in the spiritual world which insinuate design on the part of God: that the innocent saints were to be for the manifestation of His graces of preservation, and the penitents for the showing forth of His graces of restoration; that the innocents were to be standards of perfection, showing the possible degrees of spotlessness in human nature, whilst the penitents were to be for the encouragement of the weak and fallen, showing the magnificent superabounding of God's mercy over the abounding of sin. True, these are but faint shadows and suggestions of the workings of the divine mind. They are sufficient, however, for our purpose to strengthen our reason in regard to what faith has already assured us of, namely, that there must be infinite wisdom governing all God's dealings with men.

And further, the idea is suggestive of a solution or at least a mental palliative for the most staggering of all difficulties, the eternal perseverance of sin. Just as now sin may be instrumental in manifesting the goodness, the beauty and the truth of God, so also may it be in the final consummation of all things, when the work of the innocent and the penitent, and even of the impenitent may be necessary to finish the perfection of the divine plan. All things work together for the good of them that love God; and, assuming the accidental goodness of sin, there seems no reason to exclude final impenitence from the "all things." It is certain with the certainty of faith that God is love, and therefore it is certain with the certainty of faith that whatever in His actions seems unlovely, is but an illusion.

"God's in His heaven
All's right with the world."

Thus wrote our poet Browning at the end of the nineteenth century. For a richer unfolding of this thought we may refer to a fourteenth century mystic. Mother Juliana of Norwich thus gives expression to the same act of reasonable faith:

> "There be many evil deeds done in our sight, and so great harms taken that it seemeth to us that it were impossible that ever it should come to a good end. And upon this we look, and sorrow and mourn therefor. So that we cannot rest us in the blissful beholding of God, as we should do. And the cause is this, that the use of our reason is now so blind, so low, so simple, that we cannot know the high marvellous wisdom, the might, and the goodness of the blissful Trinity. And this meaneth He where He saith: *Thou shalt see thyself that all manner of thing shall be well.* There is a deed which the blissful Trinity shall do (as to my sight); and what that deed shall be, and how it shall be done, it is unknown of all creatures which are beneath Christ; and shall be (unknown) till when it shall be done. The goodness of our Lord God willeth that we wit it shall be; and the might and the wisdom of Him, by the same love, will conceal it and hide it from us, *what* it shall be, and *how* it shall be done. And the cause why He wisheth us to know that it shall be is this—that He wisheth us to be more eased in our soul, and peaceable in love, leaving the beholding of all tempests that might hinder us from truly believing in Him. This is the great deed ordained by God our Lord from eternity; treasured and hid in His blessed Breast, known only to Himself, by which deed He shall make all things well; for right as the Blessed Trinity made all things out of nothing; right so the same Blessed Trinity shall make well all that is not well. And in this sight I marvelled greatly and beheld our faith; meaning thus: Our faith is grounded in God's word; and it belongeth to our faith that we believe that God's word shall be saved in all things. And one point of our faith is that many creatures shall be damned, (such) as the angels that fell out of heaven for pride; and many on earth that died out of the faith of Holy Church. . . . All these shall be damned to Hell without end as Holy Church teacheth me to believe; and standing all this, methought it was impossible that all manner of thing should be well, as our Lord showed in this time. And as to this I had no other answer in the showing of our Lord, but this: *That which is impossible to thee is not impossible to Me; I shall save My word*

in all things, and I shall make all things well. And in this I was taught by the grace of God, that I should steadfastly hold me fast in the faith as I had before understood; and *therewith* that I should stand and firmly believe that all manner of thing shall be well, as our Lord showed in the same time. For this is the great deed that our Lord God shall do; in which deed He shall save His word in all things, and He shall make well all that is not well. But what that deed shall be, and how it shall be done, there is no creature beneath Christ that knoweth it, nor ever shall know it till it be done."

The vision of this English mystic saves both reason and revelation. It neither shirks the difficulty of eternal sin, nor yet admits any possible defection in God's goodness. It takes reason as far as it may go; and then, instead of explaining one mystery by creating several others, it locates the mystery in its proper place. The seeming defect of God's goodness is only the result of our partial view; and our view being of necessity partial must of necessity make God's goodness appear imperfect.

The one plausible objection to this opinion is that it is enervating to moral character and destructive of spiritual energy. If after all,

Something good
Will be the final goal of ill,
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and stains of blood,

what is the good of trying at all? Why not eat and drink and be merry? Why not live at random? Clearly, if the theory will not stand the test of life, there is a flaw in it somewhere, and we must suspend our judgment until the flaw be found out. If, when rightly understood, it tends to the weakening of ethical uprightness and integrity, then it is manifestly based on a fallacy. I readily grant that there is danger present somewhere. But I claim that that danger consists in the garbled presentation of the truth, in giving half the truth and not the whole truth. Nowhere in the foregoing pages is the sanction of eternal reward and punishment belittled in the slightest degree. Nay, it is emphasized and insisted upon as essential to the beauty of the mystery. Physical evil may, and sometimes must be undertaken for the sake of moral good. But never so with moral evil. So grave is the disorder of even the most trifling venial sin, that no amount of consequent good could possibly justify the act. It is only for those who love God, that all things, sin included, work together for good. It is only the most short-sighted policy that would counsel sin in order that grace might abound; for, since there is no revelation that the sin will actually be repented of, and since the prize at stake is so tremendous, to take the risk would be folly in the extreme. Thus the judgment of reason supplements the judgment of revelation. "For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them. For that of the true proverb has happened to them: The dog has returned to his vomit: and the sow that was washed, to her wallowing in the mire." The presence of the danger, however, is no sufficient reason for the suppression of the truth: it is a reason for its careful elucidation. The truth is pregnant with spiritual profit, if only it be rightly understood.

First it is a strength to faith. The loss of faith, the failure to attain it, or the difficulty in maintaining it, is usually traced to some moral failing. Be this so or not, the difficulty of faith is invariably attributed to some supposed contradiction of reason in the relationship between God and man. Even if the doubter is dishonest he does not like to own it, and seeks an intellectual platform from which to justify his conduct. Commonest of all reasons given both for honest and dishonest doubt is the reason of God's position with regard to evil. Now the view which is here advocated, although it does not solve all difficulties, yet goes far towards making the main difficulty more bearable. It shows at least the possibility of God being right and good after all. It shows at least that there is no necessary contradiction in the simultaneous presence of sin and infinite goodness, truth, and beauty. And surely an opinion which does this must tend to a greater faith, trust, and confidence in God.

Secondly, it is a strength to hope. The most ghastly and most withering of all sinful states is that brought on by regarding sin apart from the Mercy which ever follows in its train. The deadly despair which the missioner finds so hard to combat is caused principally by fixing the attention on the pile of heaped-up unforgiven sin apart from its relationship to the redeeming Christ. But the view which takes in sin together with its *accidental* exigency of forgiving grace works directly against despair. And if in some cases—and this would always be through only half understanding it—it leads to presumption, then I say that presumption is less bad than despair.

Last and best of all, it tends to a stronger, purer and nobler love. The love which is given merely because it is commanded is good in its way, better than nothing. And such is the love which must be given to God when he is apprehended as a God of severity, anger and jealousy in their human significations. But the love which is given because God is so lovable in Himself, is infinitely better. And such is the love which must be given when the severer attributes of God are understood to be but the obverse side of His gentler attributes; when His jealousy is known to be exercised only for the good of the creature; when His anger is realized to be but a condescension of His love to a human passion. Thus, to be assured that in the permission of sin in general, and in the permission of the sin of final impenitence in particular, God's infinite love is at the bottom of all, is to be carried away by the inherent lovableness of God and to be almost unable not to love Him. The one is the cold act of the intelligent will yielding to the dictates of prudent judgment. The other is the generous response of the whole being magnetized by the Divine Being, the love asked by the Master when He said: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind."

It may now be asked how has this aspect of sin come to be so much overlooked; for, as I have shown, it is no new idea. I suggest Protestant influence. The Reformers taught that God was the author of sin; and though in later times they modified their language, yet in substance their teaching remained the same. "Homo justo Dei impulsu agit quod sibi non licet."[1] Thus wrote Calvin. I suggest therefore, but with the greatest reserve, that our theologians in fighting against these terrible heresies, have imparted to their work, not so much a Catholic as an anti-Protestant tone; that in insisting on the intrinsic and essential disorder and gravity of sin, they have lost sight of the advantages external and accidental to it; and that in emphasizing the just retribution which God undoubtedly brings upon sin, they have underestimated His creative power to produce good out of sin. Or it may be that the remains of Jansenism are not yet altogether purged away. Fortunately, however, both the Jansenistic spirit within and the Calvinistic without the Church are dying fast, and consequently there is less need to dwell so exclusively on those portions of the truth which the heresies sought to impugn. The presence of sin in the world, and especially its existence throughout eternity, instead of being a scandal and hindrance to faith, may be shown to be an argument in support of it. The indisputable and awful fact of sin may be claimed as an exigency—accidental and extrinsic, let me repeat a thousand times—of the Incarnation. Much has been written lately of the *New Apologetic* and its indebtedness to Scotus. Let not this seem to imply that it in any way excludes St. Thomas. His "utrum conveniens sit" is nothing else but the mark of the pre-existing exigency for the Christian creed in the present order of providence. Thus by adapting the second article of the *pars tertia*, we can construct an *apologetic* argument for the truth of Christian faith, weighty when taken in conjunction with the rest. The problem of moral evil cannot be gainsaid. It has an answer in the Incarnation sufficient for our intellectual and spiritual needs. Therefore it carries some weight as part of the evidence for the Incarnation. The presence of sin implies the need of faith, hope, charity, good example, association with divinity, knowledge of the nature of sin, realization of human dignity, humility, and reparation. In no way, however, can these needs be better supplied than by God becoming man. Therefore sin is at least a proof of antecedent probability, and when placed in position alongside with the remaining evidences, passes into a proof for the certainty of Christianity. Moreover the opinion here put forward, is potent because it appeals to the whole man. It appeals to his intelligence, to his royal supreme reason; and it appeals also to the ministers of his reason, his imagination, his feelings, and his affections. Who would not wish it to be true, that his past sins should, by divine power, be turned to eternal profit? Would not the best of us be glad to know that his past enormities could be the occasion of soul-beauty otherwise impossible? Is it not true that the blessed in heaven, where all illusion is gone and that which is perfect is come, are able to look back on their moral failings and see in them the occasion of much of their present glory? Nay, did not the Redeemer Himself choose an act of sin whereby to accomplish His great act of redemption? The sin of Adam may have been the greatest ever committed as regards fullness of knowledge and consent; but the sin of the Crucifixion was the greatest as regards the substance of the act. So closely did Christ identify Himself with the act, that He is represented by St. Thomas as being the cause of His own crucifixion, because He could have come down from the cross and would not. His name was to be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace; but the one name which should be above all other names was to be that which identified Him with the office sin-bearer—Jesus. He could have chosen an accidental death, or a natural death by hunger, famine or disease, or voluntary heroic death, say in saving a life in imminent peril. But no, He chose an act of sin. What could this mean if not that Christ wished to associate His atonement with sin in direct relationship; that the sin of His tormentors should be representative of the sins of all humanity; that it might be said of that one and of all others, even what was said of the sin of Adam: "O truly necessary sin which was blotted out by the death of Christ! O happy fault, which was worthy to have so good and so great a Redeemer!"

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[1] Instit. I, iv. 18, 92.

THOMAS J. GERRARD.

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST

Joseph Bruneau, D. D.

It has often occurred to thoughtful students that the explanations of the mysteries of Calvary and of the Mass to be found in text-books or even larger volumes of theology are very unconvincing and unsatisfactory. For this reason perhaps do we hear so little about this awful sacrifice from the Christian pulpit—a fact to be deeply regretted. Impressed by this situation, the lamented Bishop Bellord lately[1] "set forth some new views of sacrifice differing from those that have been generally current hitherto," and made "an endeavor to ascertain the fundamental essence of sacrifice."[2] To "the great bulk of theologians who have considered sacrifice to be essentially a destruction of life in honor of God, for the purpose of expressing latreutic worship or repentance for sin and atonement," he opposes what he calls a "banquet theory," it being now alleged on serious grounds, mostly archeological,—since "until lately the data did not exist for an accurate appreciation of the rite of sacrifice"[3]—that sacrifice is of the nature of a meal, and "that its object is to assert a bond of union between the partakers and the Deity."[4]

The editor of the Review in which Bishop Bellord's articles appeared after their author had passed to his reward, has invited some theologians to make a few remarks on the "Notion of Sacrifice." The discussion[5] has certainly proved interesting and useful. But it is strange that neither Bishop Bellord nor his opponents—for there has not been a single voice to agree with him in his advocacy of the Banquet Theory—appear to be aware[6] of the existence of another theory which might perhaps explain all the facts of the case, agree with the definitions of the Church and reduce to a remarkable synthesis all the mysteries of Christ and the dogmas by which they are expressed. This might be called the "Oblation Theory," to distinguish it from the "Destruction" and the "Banquet," theory.

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[1] *American Ecclesiastical Review*, July, September, 1905.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 259.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 260.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 259.

[5] *American Ecclesiastical Review*, September, October, November.

[6] We are surprised to read at the end of an otherwise very good historical sketch by the late Abbé Vacant, *La conception du sacrifice de la Messe dans la tradition de l'Eglise latine*, 1894: "Depuis le XVII siècle on a discuté ces théories sans y ajouter, croyons-nous, aucune vue importante."

The silence of Catholic writers on this head seems the more surprising, since the explanation to which we allude is well known to Protestant theologians. Dr. Alfred G. Mortimer, in a very interesting book[1] on the sacrificial conception of the Holy Eucharist, judged best to give the Catholic view in the words of Bossuet, because "he was not only a theologian of recognized authority, but he represented that great school in the Gallican Church which sought a basis for the unity of Christendom in Catholic theology." Now Bossuet belongs to "a most interesting group" of Seventeenth Century writers, such as De Bérulle, Condren, Olier and Thomassin. The views of these French theologians, Dr. Mortimer says, "are most brilliantly elaborated"[2] in a very striking and thoughtful treatise by M. l'Abbé Lepin, S. S., entitled *L'idé edu sacrifice dans la religion chrétienne, principalement d'après le Père de Condren et M. Olier.*[3] Moreover, this same theory—which he himself substantially accepts—Dr. Mortimer finds also in the German theologians Scheeben[4] and Schanz, as well as in the works of Fr. Tyrrell.

For his own part, the writer of the present article confesses that he experienced a great deal of dissatisfaction and disappointment in his theological studies on the question of Sacrifice, until he found—for it was never mentioned in the class-room—almost by chance, in a foot-note of an unknown dusty book,[5] the main features of this theory, which to him seemed at once as plain and simple as it was satisfactory.

It might not then be useless to give a brief exposition of this theory in order to enable interested theologians[6] to compare it with the "Destruction" and "Banquet" theories.

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[1] *The Eucharistic Sacrifice—an historical and theological investigation of the sacrificial conception of the Holy Eucharist in the Christian Church*—New York, 1901. Cf. Report of the Fulham Conference, 1903.

[2] p. 332, n.

[3] Lyon, 1897.

[4] "The deepest and most fascinating of modern theologians" (Wilhelm and Scannel, the translators of his *Dogmatik*, II, p. 450).

[5] G. Renaudet, S. S., *Theologiæ Dogmaticæ Elementa*, II, Paris, 1866.

[6] "*Hæc opinio magis pia est quam theologica*," says Fr. Tanquerey in a foot-note (*Synopsis theologiæ dogmaticæ specialis* I, p. 553, n.) A very summary sentence! Is the fact of its being generally ignored by theologians the reason why it is not "theologica"? Does not piety rest on and come from dogmatic truth? Cf. A. Levatois, *De essentia S. missæ Sacrificji*, Reims, 1901, p. 92.

A previous question, however, should be treated, viz., that of the method to be followed in determining the notion of Sacrifice. In this connection Bishop Bellord writes:

"Mythology and Archeology might hardly seem to be a likely field in which to search for the materials of an explanation of those transcendent mysteries,—the death of the Son of God and the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. None the less it is the case that modern researches in the sand-buried ruins of Chaldea, in the coral islands of the mid-Pacific, in classical literature, and the traditions of Bedouin tribes, have furnished us with the means of better understanding the worship which has been celebrated by the Church for almost twenty centuries."[1] . . . .

"The definition of Sacrifice is not to be constructed from the study either of that great Sacrifice itself, (i. e., that of Calvary) or of the Jewish and Gentile religions, at epochs when sacrifice had attained its greatest splendor of ritual and its richest significance in ideas."

Such, however, is not the verdict of one[2] who has recently published a masterly study on Semitic religions, and who is perfectly aware of the recent theories of R. Smith, S. Reinach and J. Wellhausen:

"Notwithstanding the considerable amount of documents recently excavated, it remains still impossible to build up from those texts a complete theory of Sacrifice. The difficulty partly comes from the fact that sacrifice even in its early origins was quite complex. A sufficiently coherent theory we can form only from the Bible . . . . . without losing sight of the fact that the Old Testament sacrifices were but the figure of that of the New Law."

Nor is such the opinion—though for different reasons—of Fr. Sydney Smith, S. J., who, in a careful critique of Bishop Bellord's article, says:[3] "Granted, for the sake of argument, that the primitive idea of a sacrifice was that of a sacred banquet in which God and men ate together in fellowship, and that all else is of subsequent origin, why must that primitive conception exercise an iron sway over all future generations? Why cannot God, in His guidance of the race, have ordained that in the newly instituted sacrificial rites of a new Covenant, the predominant place should be given to a derived idea like that of oblation, of blood shedding, or destruction generally, as being more profitable for those times,—to the subordination, if not exclusion, of the more primitive conception of a sacred meal? . . . . . It seems to me to follow that a sounder application of the historical method would send us rather to the study 'of the Great Sacrifice itself and of Jewish and Gentile religions' at the commencement of the Christian era than to any modern researches among the ruins of Chaldea, or the coral islands of the mid-Pacific."

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[1] *Am. Eccl. Review*, July, 1905, p. 2.

[2] Lagrange, *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*, pp. 266, 268.

[3] *Am. Eccl. Review*, October, 1905, pp. 417-418.

If we know from Revelation—i. e., if we are told by God Himself—that Christ really offered a Sacrifice on Calvary, really offers a sacrifice on our altars, as he also offers a sacrifice in Heaven, are we not more certain that we must have there the essential elements of a true sacrifice? And does not such a revelation shed some light on the nature or essence of other sacrifices. In any theory about sacrifice, should we not first of all exclude from the essence of the rite any element which would not be included in the greatest and truest sacrifice of all—that of Christ on the cross—and then try to determine the element which is common to all sacrifices, either pagan or Jewish, as well as to the sacrifice of Christ in its threefold phase: on earth, in Heaven, on our altars?

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The question of method once settled, we have to inquire what is the root idea to be found in all sacrifices, without exception. All will agree that sacrifice belongs to the "genus" of signs or symbols; that it is an outward symbolic expression of certain internal religious dispositions; that this sign conveys an idea—and that, after all, the most important element of sacrifice consists in the idea and the internal acts which it expresses outwardly—or, as Scheeben puts it: "No external sacrifice is perfect without an accompanying internal sacrifice, whereby the soul associates itself with the meaning and object of the external rite."[1] But what is the idea which should be considered as capital in the complex notion of sacrifice, and also what is the external form which is essential to convey that idea? The common opinion among theologians since the days of Vasquez, is that the sacrifice is calculated mostly to express the dominion of God over life and death. The essence of the external form of this rite is consequently the destruction or the immolation (at least equivalent) of the victim.

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[1] Scheeben, translated by Willhelm and Scannel, I, 198. "Significat sacrificium, quod offertur exterius, interius spirituale sacrificium quo anima seipsam offert Deo . . . . . sicut principio suæ creationis, et sicut fini suæ beatitudinis."—St. Thomas. *Contra Gentes*, L. 3. c. 119.

And indeed, some theologians know so exclusively this opinion—for it is no more than a mere opinion—that Dr. Cronin, writing against Bishop Bellord's view, calls it simply "*The* other view of sacrifice."

"Indeed the idea of death or destruction had become well nigh inseparable from the name of sacrifice. Custom and language had made it so; the authority of religious writers was all on the same side. The associations of sacrifice with the numerous oblations of Gentile and Jewish temples and more especially with that event by which the Lord Jesus consummated our redemption have so consecrated that notion of sacrifice as to make it extremely difficult to change it for another. To question the correctness of the definition is almost like laying an irreverent hand on the doctrines themselves. It may be well to recall the words of Cardinal Franzelin in his treatise, *De Sacrificio.* In Thesis xiv he says:

> "Credendum pariter est elementa omnia, quæ essentiam constituunt sacrificii generatim spectati, in hoc speciali sacrificio reperiri; non tamen ideo æque ad fidem explicitam pertinet, vel quæ sint omnes et solæ essentiales notæ sacrificii in genere vel in quo hujus eucharisticæ sacrificationis essentia unice reponenda sit."
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> And in Thesis xvi:
>
> "Non tamen ex ea (sc. mystica sanguinis effusione) per se spectata satis intelligitur *quomodo* eucharistiæ celebratio in se ipsa sit verum et proprium sacrificium."

It is now suggested that the definition of Sacrifice hitherto accepted is inadequate and erroneous, and that it is due to this misconception that theories about the Mass have been generally so unconvincing."[1]

Even if the great bulk of theologians who have considered sacrifice to be essentially a destruction of life in honor of God, had been mistaken as to the nature of sacrificial action and the idea that it was intended to convey; if they had been misled by the features most striking to the imagination, those whose symbolism was most eloquent[2] and impressive, and had as a consequence declared this most striking and culminating feature to be the essential and distinctive element of sacrifice, it would certainly not follow, as Dr. Cronin seems to fear, "that the Church of Christ, which was instituted 'to restore all things in Christ,' has lost the true idea of the supreme act of religion and divine worship."

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[1] Bp. Bellord. *Am. Eccl. Review,* September, 1905, p. 260.

[2] Mgr. D'Hulst gives the most eloquent expression we know of to that view of sacrifice. *Conférences de Notre-Dame,* 1893, 2nd Conference.

Now to speak candidly, it cannot be denied that theologians[1] generally do take for granted that the immolation of a victim enters into the essential concept of sacrifice, and is, in short, *the* essential element of it? And should we not say that it is regrettable—at least—that they make depend on so narrow and arbitrary a definition, an all important dogma like that of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, and, as Scheeben happily puts it, make such "painful efforts . . . to inflict at least a semblance of death on the giver of life." For, burdened with this definition, they are at a loss to show that the sacrifice of the altar does not fall short of the perfect sacrificial idea.

Bishop Bellord expresses this point strongly, almost cruelly:[2] "The theory requires that there should be a destruction sufficiently real to constitute a real sacrifice; the fact is, speaking plainly, that there is no such thing in the Mass. If a slaying is to be taken as the essential note of a sacrifice, then the Mass is not a sacrifice. To justify the application of the word Sacrifice in this sense to the Mass, it would become necessary to prove that there is a real sacrifice in a rite from which the essential constituent of sacrifice is absent. To this futile attempt most theologians address themselves. All the expedients of logic which they resort to in order to reconcile the two irreconcilables amount to one of two things: either that the Mass is not absolutely a true sacrifice, or that the constituent act of destruction need not be a real one."

Consistently, if they take refuge in a quasi-destruction, we will have only a quasi-sacrifice—a fatal difficulty which Bellarmine had pointed out. If they claim only a mystical, representative, commemorative immolation, we shall have nothing more than an appearance, or figure, or memorial, or shadow of sacrifice, but no real sacrifice. "Words like these explain nothing; they only serve to veil the self-contradictions contained in its explanations."

To have recourse, as de Lugo and Franzelin do, to a kind of *Kenosis* (*exinanitio*) of the functions natural to the sacred Humanity of Christ, besides the fact that it takes us away from Calvary, is opposed to the spirit of the Church who in her liturgy celebrates the *gloriosi Corporis mysterium*, with "robes of regal splendor and all that art can give . . . music and song, bright color of silks, sparkling jewels and the beauty of flowers accompanying the Sacred Host we have consecrated at Holy Mass;"[1] and rightly so, for Christ dieth no more; He is present on the altar in a really glorified state which we of course do not perceive; wherefore the eucharistic self-humiliation of Our Lord can hardly pertain to the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass. If it were so, the consecration of one species would be quite sufficient to produce the alleged *status declivior*; there would moreover be a perpetual sacrifice in the ciborium containing the Sacred Species of bread—a conclusion which no theologian would accept.

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[1] Cf. V. Rev. A. McDonald. *Am. Eccl. Review*, October, 1900, p. 454.

[2] *Ibid.*, September, 1905, p. 263.

An easy explanation could be offered why they have thus narrowed the idea of sacrifice. Would it not be simply because Calvary and the Cross of Christ being the dominant feature of all history, the fulfilment of all pre-figurative sacrifices, they have concluded that the destruction of the victim, the effusion of its blood if it be a living creature, formed the distinctive and essential constituent of sacrifice? At all events, they give neither historical nor theological proof in support of their assumption, for it must be said emphatically, this theory is of relatively modern origin![2]

We grant that the erroneous impression produced by the too *exclusive* consideration of the immolation of Christ on Calvary was to some extent natural and excusable, but we cannot help recognizing the fact that these theologians have been misled and that "a protest must be entered against any definition of sacrifice which seems to demand an apology or a quasi-apology for the Mass, because it involves only a quasi-destruction of the victim."[3]

We cannot better state that broader view which eliminates the element of destruction real or equivalent from the essential constitution of sacrifice in general than in the words of Dr. Paul Schanz[1] summed up excellently by Wilhelm and Scannel:[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, November, 1905, p. 518.

[2] This theory is to be found mostly in the works of the great Jesuit controversialists of the 16th and 17th centuries. Some trace it to St. Thomas. It would be at most an *obiter dictum* of the Angelic Doctor which might have originated it. "Sacrificium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum ad eum placandum." (*Summa*, 3a. q. 48, art. 3). Now in another place (2a 2ae q. 85, art. 3), he adds, among several examples, one which supposes the destruction of the victim. "Sacrificia proprie dicuntur quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit; sicut quod animalia occidebantur et comburebantur, quod panis frangitur et comeditur et benedicitur. Et hoc ipsum nomen sonat, nam sacrificium dicitur, ex hoc quod homo facit aliquid sacrum." Does not Vacant somewhat exaggerate when he says: "Cette observation met le sacrifice en dehors de la sanctification et des effets moraux qui en découlent; elle ouvre a la théologie de nouveaux horizons; on va dès lors faire consister le sacrifice dans la modification physique de la victime, et, trois siècles plus tard, la question principale agitée dans l'école sera de savoir quelle est l'action physique accomplie sur la Victime qui constitue l'essence du sacrifice de la Messe.?" (*L'Université Catholique*, August, 1894, p. 516.)

[3] *London Tablet*, October 29, 1898, p. 682. "*The Sacrificial Idea in the Mass*," a short, but pointed anonymous article.

> "The notion of *offering* (oblatio—προσφορά) may be taken as the fundamental notion of sacrifices. Man gives to the Divinity part of his property in order either to express his veneration and gratitude or to secure the divine favor, taking it for granted that God is pleased with such gifts and with the dispositions of the giver. . . . . The burning or outpouring of the gifts hands them over to God and through their acceptance God admits the giver to communion with Him. . . . . . The privation suffered by the giver parting with his property and the dispositions with which that privation is endured may have a great moralizing influence on the giver, but they are not essential. . . . . . Many sacrifices involve no appreciable privation, the Mass probably none at all. The outpouring of the libations and the killing of the animals are but the *means* for handing over the gift to God, and for bringing the giver into communion with Him. The killing necessarily precedes the burning, but the killing is not the sacrifice. . . . . . The killing is *preparatory* to the sacrifice. More importance attaches to the blood of the victim which is gathered and poured out at the altar. For according to the ancient ideas, the life or the soul is in the blood. When therefore the blood is offered, the highest that Man can give, viz., a soul or life, is handed over to God. . . . They who see in the killing of the victim the *final* act of the sacrifice have no satisfactory explanation for the pouring out of the blood, the offering of the life in it, and the burning. . . . . . The pouring out of the blood is the special function of the priest, while the killing may be performed by a layman. . . . . . The sacrificial meal . . . . affords no explanation for the outpouring of blood and for the incense offering. The *eating* of the victim accepted by God is simply the symbol of the union with God intended by those who offer the sacrifice."[3]

Mgr. S. Johnston[4] holds a view which comes nearer to this oblation theory than any other, though it seems to differ from it on several points. Starting with the principle "sacrificium non est nisi victimæ oblatio," he would with Azor[6] rather place the essential moment of the sacrifice in the *anamnesis*: *Unde et memores*, etc . . . . . in which the priest repeats so often the word *offerre*, *obtuli*, etc. Christ did nothing but offer Himself on the cross, whilst in the Last Supper, there is, besides the real presence, the offering in anticipation of the precious Blood and the Holy Communion, pledge of Salvation. What Our Lord did then, we do now in a retrospective manner. Very appositely does he remark: "It is good to believe that had sin never happened, Christ would have come. . . . . . And if the Incarnation had been, the Mass and Blessed Sacrament we might have had on earth also. Now would the Mass not be a sacrifice even if Christ had never been immolated? On account of the accident of sin, the sufferings and death have been added." Should we fancy that it is only owing to that "accident" that Christ offers a sacrifice? This would be a strictly logical inference if the essence of sacrifice is to be placed in the immolation.

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[1] *Die Lehre von den Heiligen Sakramenten der Katolischen Kirche*, 1895.

[2] *A Manual of Catholic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 450-455.

[3] Schanz—Summed up in Scheeben's English Ed. II, p. 450.

[4] *Am. Eccl. Review*, November, p. 514, ff .

[5] Azor is quoted on the authority of Scavini; the original is different. "Probabilior mihi videtur illorum sententia qui docuerunt totam evangelici sacrificii rationem in duabus actionibus, aut summum in tribus constitui; nempe vel in consecratione corporis dominici et sanguinis et oblatione, aut in consecratione et oblatione et sumptione; has enim tres actiones aut certe duas consecrationem et oblationem, omnino gratia sacrificii et natura postulat; præterea nihil." *Institutiones Morales* Lib. x, cap. xix, ed. 1613, fol.

So much for the negative side of the oblation-theory. "Let us not think [then], as Bossuet says, that the victim which we present in the Eucharist is to be there in truth anew destroyed."

* * *

Now for the positive, and, we deem, the beautiful side, of the sacrificial idea as exposed by Père de Condren,[1] († 1664), Superior of the French Oratory and by Father Olier, founder of St. Sulpice. According to these pious theologians sent by God to teach and train seminarians for the priesthood, the sacrifice of Christ did not consist merely in a transitory act; we should rather consider it as a state. This state of oblation, donation to God, is above all an uninterrupted internal act; Christ offers Himself up to His Father from the very first moment of His conscious life: "Holocausts and offerings for sin did not please Thee: Then said I: Behold I come: . . . . . to do thy will, O God." This most perfect sacrifice continues in outward conditions of humiliation, labor, suffering and death, because Christ was made our Brother entirely. "It behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren." The same continuous act of loving self-donation which gives its unity to the sacrifice of Christ, was expressed outwardly by different phases corresponding to the different parts of the sacrifices of the Old Law. So the life of our Divine Victim presents in succession, the consecration and oblation in the Temple, the immolation on Calvary, the consummation on Easter morning, and the Communion with God and man in heaven and on our altars.

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[1] Venons maintenant au sacrifice de la nouvelle loi qui est le sacrifice de Jésus Christ et posons pour fondement que toute sa vie, depuis le premier moment de l'Incarnation jusque dans l'éternité, est le sacrifice véritable figuré par ceux de la loi ancienne et par tous les autres." Ch. de Condren, *L'Idée du sacerdoce et du sacrifice de Jésus Christ*, 1901, p. 60.

This conception of Christ's sacrifice, as Dr. Lepin remarks,[1] does not contradict but completes and enlarges the common theory of theologians. Indeed, the immolation on the Cross is a true and real sacrifice; only instead of being the whole sacrifice of the Savior, it is but a part of that same sacrifice, its climax, just as the slaying of the victim was the most striking part of the figurative sacrifices. And this is why the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers would rather mention the Passion and the death on the Cross when they spoke of the Sacrifice of Our Lord; for the rest of His life might fade into insignificance when compared to that Climax which was, besides, the end of the meritorious career of the Savior, and consequently the consummation of our redemption: "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins" (Eph. I, 7).

Hence the name Sacrifice of the Cross, given to the whole life of Christ on earth, *tota vita Christi crux fuit et martyrium*,[2] a word on which Bossuet comments eloquently:[3] "Although the Crucifixion of Christ appeared to the world only on Calvary, yet that mystery had begun long before and had invisibly continued. Christ never was without His cross because He never was without advancing the work of our salvation. . . . Since it was the will of God that wounded humanity could not be cured but by His cross, His nails, His wounds, He unceasingly carried about with Him the torments of His Passion." Or to borrow the words of Bourdaloue:[4] "A victim destroyed to atone for sin, but a living and dying victim, whose sacrifice was never interrupted, this is Jesus Christ."

Strictly speaking, the atonement of Christ could have been completed after His first act—but it was to have its full effect only on Calvary, where, in the blood of Christ, the new Covenant would be sealed forever.

This is why we generally identify the sacrifice of the Savior with the act of His bloody immolation, under the name of the Sacrifice of the Cross; but in reality this immolation is but a part of the sacrifice, and the shortest; it was begun long before, it will have no end.

"After the sacrifice of that Body, *immolated* on the Cross," says

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[1] *L'Idée du sacrifice dans la religion chrétienne*, p. 80.

[2] *De Imitatione Christi* II, c. ii, no. 7.

[3] *First Sermon for the Purification of the B. Virgin.*

[4] *Panegyric of St. Paul*, 3rd part.

Père de Condren,[1] "after the destruction of His human life, it was still needful that all that remained there of the traces of his mortality in the wounds which he had received, all that he still retained of disfigurement, of lowliness and of ignominy; all the likeness to the flesh of sin and to the infirmity of the children of Adam, should be entirely destroyed, effaced, and consumed in glory. The consummation and burning of Jesus Christ as the Victim, is, therefore, accomplished in His Resurrection. He 'was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father.' He has been raised to life by this Divine Fire of the glory of his Father, which has consumed all that was not worthy of the Body of a God in the Body of Jesus Christ, dead on the Cross. For the burning, as has been said, took place for this reason, that the Victim might be, as it were, changed and transformed into God. There was nothing in nature which was better able to represent this in the sacrifices of the Old Law than the fire which was the symbol of God. But the burning of the sacrifice in the New Law, which is without comparison more perfect, and is no longer in figure but in truth, is so effected that the Victim has not only been changed into the type of God but has been as it were transformed into the glory of God Himself, nevertheless without losing any of the reality of His Human Nature. For it is by the Resurrection that this Sacred Victim has been freed from all which was mean and of earth; that He has been entirely reclothed and penetrated with such glory as becomes the Only Son of the Father; that He no longer lives but for God (*vivit Deo*); that He has been laid in the Bosom of God Himself; and that He has entered into a state altogether divine."

The following passage is from M. Olier: "On the day of the Resurrection, beholding His Son immolated in the tomb, the Father came with the glorious light of His Divinity to reunite him gloriously to Himself, not leaving in him any remains of his weakness and of former state, of his state of flesh, dense, passible, mortal; wherefore, consuming it entirely, He causes him to pass into a Divine state, as iron passes into the very state of fire."

The Ascension both completes the consummation of the victim, and manifests the communion of God with the sacrifice of Christ.

"In the Ascension," says Benedict XIV, "the Victim was received by God as an odor of sweetness, was placed at his right hand." In

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[1] De Condren *op. cit.* p. 70. We follow Dr. Mortimer's translation, pp. 324-330, correcting, however, a few erroneous renderings.

ascensione victima accepta fuit in odorem suavitatis.[1] This seems to be an echo of Heb. ix, 12, "He . . . . . . entered in once for all into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption."

Consistently with his narrow conception of sacrifice, Franzelin[2] is obliged to minimize the signification and bearing of the text, however precise and formal, of Heb. ix, 11-12, which compares the entering of the Savior into Heaven to the entering of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies, and for the same reason he denies the reality of the sacrifice of Christ in Heaven. "Now, of the things which we have spoken, this is the sum: We have such an high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of majesty in the heavens, a minister of the holies and of the true tabernacle which the Lord hath pitched, and not man. For every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is necessary that he also should have something to offer." (Heb, viii, 1-2)—a doctrine which has its counterpart in Apoc. v, 6: "And I saw and beheld in the midst of the throne . . . . . . a Lamb standing as it were slain." Whilst the Fathers do not teach very explicitly the reality of the Heavenly Sacrifice, still their interpretations of the letter to the Hebrews and the way they describe after the inspired writer the incessant interpellation of the Savior towards God, are at least suggestive of the reality of such a sacrifice.[3] If some of the Fathers like St. Chrysoston and St. Gregory Nazianzen seem to deny the reality of the Sacrifice in Heaven, they mean rather, as Thomassin shows,[4] to dispel the idea that Christ is there offering a sacrifice of humiliation and expiation, as if the Sacrifice of Calvary had not been sufficient.

Bossuet, so conversant with the writings of the Fathers, probably borrows from them the doctrine which he presents in his *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church in Matters of Controversy*, a work every syllable of which he had carefully considered and weighed:

> "The Son of God lies veiled upon the altar, clothed in those symbols which represent His death. Such is the efficiency of the solemn act of consecration. This sacred act is, moreover, a tribute of acknowledge-

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[1] *De Sacrificio missæ,* l. 2, c. 11 n. 5.

[2] *De Verbo Incarnato.* th. 51.

[3] We would refer to Dr. Lepin's work for the texts of the Fathers who could be quoted in favor of that view, pp. 172-180.

[4] Ubi Chrysostomus ait Christum exclusa mortalitate desiisse esse λειτουργὸν non aliud sapit quam quod, ut ait Paulus, Christus jam non moritur, mors illi ultra non dominabitur; sed agnus tamen in throno stans quasi occisus, juge sacrificium aut sacrificii Crucis perpetuatio sempiterna est." Thomassin, *De Incarn. Verbi* l. 10, c. 11, no. 8.

ment offered up to God's sovereign majesty; in such a way as, by it, Jesus Christ who is here personally present, renews, in some respect, and perpetuates, the memorial of His own obedience even to the death of the cross. So that in fact, there is nothing wanting to render it a real and perfect sacrifice.

"Neither can it be doubted that this holy action . . . is, of itself, peculiarly pleasing to the Almighty; and calculated powerfully to induce Him to look down with an eye of pity upon the distress of His creatures. It thus replaces before Him the voluntary death, which this Beloved Son underwent for the sake of sinners; or, rather, it thus replaces before Him this Beloved Son Himself, under the emblems of that death, by which once, His indignation was appeased. . . .

"The mere circumstance of the presence of Christ Jesus upon the altar, is, itself, as every Christian must acknowledge, a kind of intercession, extremely powerful with God, in favor of mankind,—according to the saying of St. Paul, *Christ presents Himself; and appears in the presence of God in our behalf.* (Heb. ix). It is therefore our belief that our benevolent Redeemer present upon our altars under the symbols of death intercedes for us; and presents there continually for us to His eternal Father that death which He once suffered for the sanctification of His Church." . . .

"If, indeed, (I make this remark in order to prevent all equivocation) if the word 'offer' be understood in this Epistle as implying the actual death of the victim,—then I allow it to be true that in such a case Jesus Christ is neither offered up any longer in the Eucharist; nor even on any other occasion whatsoever. But the fact is that in different parts of the sacred writings the word 'offer' has a much more extensive signification. Often it is said that we offer to God whatever we present before Him. And the Church, which regulates its language, as well as its doctrine, not by the mere Epistle to the Hebrews, but by the entire body of the Sacred Scriptures, does not hesitate to say, that Christ Jesus offers Himself to God whenever presenting Himself before His majesty, He appears there in behalf of men—consequently, that He offers Himself likewise in the Sacrifice of the Holy Eucharist. This is, indeed an expression, that is general in the writings of the Fathers."[1]

Theologians, it must be granted, say very little about the sacrifice in heaven; indeed, this phase of Christ's sacrifice is not so immediately and directly interesting for us as it is for the Blessed who surround the golden altar. Still, a certain number, as Dr. Lepin remarks,[2] conceived the Eucharistic sacrifice as being not confined to the moment of the Consecration, consequently as being not an act but a state—v. g., de Lugo, etc.—Why, then, should we not conceive the Sacrifice in Heaven as a real one, since Christ is there in a similar state of victim —"The Lamb standing as it were slain"—offering himself to his Father; "where the sacrificial intention of the Priest and the glorified wounds of the victim live forever in the eternal Pontiff?"[1] Of course there is no real immolation of the victim; but . . . who has decreed that an immolation is necessary? The impossibility, however, of finding any immutation is likely one of the reasons, if not the main one, why theologians too often, in spite of the text of Hebrews and of the analogy with the Jewish sacrifices, refuse to see in the sacrifice of heaven anything but a *sacrificium improprie dictum*[2]—a sacrifice only by analogy.

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[1] Ed. New York, 1895, pp. 185, 186, 192, 193. Many other passages are referred to in Lepin's book, pp. 180-186.

[2] Letter to Dr. Mortimer, published in Appendix G. to his book, *The Eucharistic Sacrifice*, p. 585.

"Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day and the same forever" (Heb. xiii, 48). St. Thomas[3] applies these words to the perennial sacrifice of Christ. By "To-day" we might designate the eucharistic sacrifice from which we derive our daily bread.

Christ brings down to earth the perennial sacrifice of heaven in order to apply His merits to mankind and at the same time enable the Church to offer with Him and through Him a perfect sacrifice. The Mass then, like the eternal offering in heaven, completes the sacrifice of the cross by accomplishing its ends—viz., the full participation of mankind in its fruits.[4]

Now the Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Mass is a true and proper sacrifice, constituted essentially by the self-oblation to the Father of Christ really present on the altar. But it is also a *sacrificium relativum*, having an accidental relation to Our Lord's offering in heaven, but with conditions fitting the state of a visible, militant church for which it has been specially instituted. The two sacrifices in heaven and on earth are parallel and analogous, so that Bossuet seems to infer the reality of the sacrifice of our altars from the reality of the sacrifice in heaven.[5]

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[1] Scheeben, Eng. trans, ii, p. 204.

[2] Talhofer also thinks that the sacrifice in heaven is a real sacrifice, as Dr. Schanz affirms in a letter, August 24, 1900, to Dr. Mortimer. "Sacrificium cæleste vere esse sacrificium opinatur, non nudam interpellationem seu representationem. Auctores antiquos quos enumerat invenies apud Stentrup nec minus apud Thomassin (*De Incarn.*, c. x-xi, sqq." Dr. Mortimer, not having the works of Talhofer, had wrongly attributed to him the Socinian view of some Anglican divines that "the essentially sacrificial act, Our Lord's oblation of himself to the Father, took place not upon the cross, but after Our Lord's ascension into heaven."

[4] 1a 2ae, q. 102, art. 4, ad 10.

[4] Scheeben, p. 205.

[5] *Exposition*, p. 153, "The Church . . . does not hesitate to say that Christ Jesus offers Himself to God whenever presenting Himself before His majesty, He appears there in behalf of men; *consequently*, that He offers Himself likewise in the sacrifice of the Holy Eucharist. This, indeed, is an expression that is general in the writings of the Fathers."

On the other hand, the Mass subsists solely by its relation to the cross and from it derives its sacred efficacy. To quote Bossuet again, "Our benevolent Redeemer, present upon the altars under our symbols of death, intercedes there for us and presents there continually for us to His eternal Father that death which He once suffered for the satisfaction of His Church."[1]

This essential relation to the sacrifice of the cross which it commemorates and whose fruits it applies to souls is to be found in the consecration of the two distinct species, their separation being an image, a figure of the immolation which took place on Calvary.

So that to the question, "Is the formal reason why the Mass is a sacrifice one and the same reason why the oblation of the Divine Victim on Cavalry was a sacrifice?" we answer: In either case the formal reason is to be found in the donation which Christ makes of his humanity—with this difference, that on the cross this donation has the form and appearance of an immolation—on the altar, Christ offers himself through his priest without any real immolation, but *as* annihilated under the species and clothed with the sensible marks of the Passion.

Hence it appears how true is the teaching of the Church concerning the identity of the Mass and the sacrifice of the cross—a point which every other theory seems to fail to show forcibly. Whilst they are one and the same, still the Mass is in a very true sense the representation of Calvary.[2] *Omnis sacrificii vis in eo est ut offeratur,* says the Catechism of the Council of Trent,[3] which agrees perfectly with what we called the "Oblation" theory.

Now Christ continues to offer himself clothed with the signs of his passion until the communion; the consequence would be that the duration of the sacrifice proper is not limited to the short instant of the consecration, but extends over all the time until the communion; many of the ceremonies performed then accomplishing and perfecting the symbolism and representation of the immolation. And such is certainly the *sensus fidelium.* This view therefore seems calculated to foster the piety of the faithful who realize better that at Mass Christ is offering himself and that they can and must unite themselves to his oblation.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[2] "In quantum in hoc sacramento representatur Passio Christi qua Christus obtulit se hostiam Deo rationem habet sacrificii." (S. Thomas, *Summa,* P. iii, q. 79, a. 7).

[3] P. 4, c. 4, No. 78.

Starting with a true notion of sacrifice, this oblation theory explains, it would seem, all the facts of the case. It agrees with the testimony of Scripture as well as with the doctrine of the Fathers, and finally is in conformity with the language of the Council of Trent and its Catechism. But above all, it seems the best suited to explain the unity of the sacrifice of the Savior; that grand mission which Christ came to fulfil for the glory of God and the salvation of men; a sacrifice which began on earth with the mortal life of the Savior and persevered up to the day of the Ascension, to continue forever in heaven, and be perpetuated on our altars until the end of time to held us, to console us, and prepare us for eternal bliss.

Gloria in excelsis Deo,
et in terra pax hominibus!

JOSEPH BRUNEAU

P. S. The December number of the *American Ecclesiastical Review,* just published, brings us twenty pages which are supposed to be the last word on the question of Sacrifice. The first article is from the pen of Father Lehmkuhl, S. J. After having noted that Bishop Bellord's view had been advocated some years ago by a German theologian, Dr. Fr. Renz (*Die Geschichte des Messopfer-Begriffs*), he declares it impossible to side with either. As to the general idea of sacrifice, he thinks that the Banquet theory fails to consider and include the essential elements of the subject, a subordinate, accidental part of the ritual having been assumed to be the distinctive element of sacrifice. The shedding of blood is to Fr. Lehmkuhl the natural expression of adoration and atonement. Still, in the second part of his critique, where he answers the difficulties pointed out in a masterly way by the late Bishop as arising "from the acceptance of the so-called destruction theory," he seems to minimize the importance of that destruction as being only the opinion of "some theologians," a view which "can hardly be consistently defended." The essential note of the Sacrifice of the Cross, "this most perfect sacrifice" lay in "the act of Christ who *offered* Himself freely as the Victim to the Eternal Father for the redemption of man. . . . As God-man and High Priest, Christ performed this act of *self-oblation* [italics ours] in giving His life upon the cross. . . . The Last Supper and the Mass are a *realis exhibitio* of adoration and atonement which was offered to God."

Very Rev. Alex. MacDonald, who takes part in the debate, insists, as in his previous articles (1900) that, (according to the tradition of the Church: "The Mass is not other than the sacrifice of Calvary, but the self-same." To him, Mgr. Johnston seems to make the Mass more than Calvary, and Dr. Cronin less. Fr. MacDonald is evidently one of those theologians with whom Fr. Lehmkuhl prudently disagrees. Resting on a text of St. Thomas which he conveniently quotes in mutilated form, he unhesitatingly decides that "the immolation of a victim as willed by the priest [is] the formal act of sacrifice. . . . The thing offered is not a victim in the formal sense until it is immolated." So Christ, though materially Priest on Calvary and Victim in the upper room, "was Priest in the Cenacle and Victim on Calvary." Thus Fr. MacDonald flatters himself that he has met what he is pleased to call "the most serious phase of the objection" presented by Bishop Bellord. Only, as in 1900, he fails to explain *how* the Mass is a sacrifice and the self-same as the sacrifice of Calvary, according to the constant teaching of Tradition on "the oneness of Christ's sacrifice."

J. B.

STUDIES.

ST. JUSTIN MARTYR. III.

Joseph Turmel

DOCTRINES (*Continued*)

Eschatology. The end of the world is near.[1] God puts off the day of Judgment through regard for certain souls whose conversion He foresees.[2] But the delay will not be for long. The catastrophe, however, will not take place until after a generation, as the elect are not all born yet.[3] In the days which will precede the end of the world "the man of apostasy" will wage war against God. And as that dread time is now drawing nigh, this wicked personage will soon appear.[4]

The first act of the final drama will be the resurrection. All Christians believe that their bodies will return to life;[5] and those who claim to be disciples of Christ, while rejecting this doctrine, do not deserve to be called Christians.[6] It is true that the resurrection is a difficulty to human understanding. But are there not other facts round about us just as mysterious? Is not generation, for example, incomprehensible? And would we not consider it incredible if we did not witness it?[7] We should, therefore, silence the objections of reason and set ourselves to learn of God, who makes all things. Now Ezechiel taught the resurrection,[8] and, moreover, the resurrections wrought by Christ during His life must be considered as a pledge of our own resurrection.

The first resurrection will embrace only the just. The Savior will gather them at Jerusalem, and they will live on earth for a thousand years in his company[1] in the midst of plenty, and united to their wives, who shall bear them children.[2] The earthly reign of the just, which is naturally rejected by pseudo-Christian adversaries of the resurrection,[3] meets opponents also in the ranks of good Christians.[4] However, anyone who wishes to be perfectly orthodox must admit it.[5] And in fact the prophet Isaias states it clearly in the prophecy where he describes the happiness which the inhabitants of Jerusalem shall one day enjoy.[6] And if he does not state definitely the duration of this earthly happiness, he leaves it easy to infer.[7] Besides, John, one of the apostles of the Lord, received a revelation which taught him that the righteous will pass a thousand years in Jerusalem.[8]

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[1] *Dial.* 39. "The times now running on to their consummation."

[2] *Dial.* 39, 28.

[3] First *Apol.* 28.

[4] *Dial.* 110. See also *Dial.* 32.

[5] *Dial.* 46; First *Apol.* 18.

[6] *Dial.* 80.

[7] First *Apol.* 19.

[8] First *Apol.* 52.

When the millennium shall have reached its end, there shall be another resurrection, this time a universal one[9] It will be followed by a judgment,[10] after which all men will be divided into two groups. In one will be the just, that is, the Christians; in the other, the devil, the demons, and all the wicked or unbelieving;[11] and among them will be also found those who were Christians only in name.[12] The just will receive incorruptible bodies;[13] they will make no further use of marriage;[14] and they will be with God.[15] As for the devil and his partisans, they will be hurled into Gehenna,[16] where they will burn eternally,[17] that is to say, for as long a time as it will please God to keep them in existence.[1] When the time comes that they should no longer exist, the vital spirit will depart from the soul, which will thus return to its starting point.[2]

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[1] *Dial.* 69.

[2] *Dial.* 80. This refers to the expression λαχμὸν βάλλοντες.

[3] *Dial.* 81. "And they shall plant vines, and shall themselves eat the produce of them . . . they shall not beget children to be cursed . . . and their offspring with them."

[4] *Dial.* 80.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.* "But I and others, who are right-minded Christians on all points . . ."

[7] *Dial.* 81.

[8] *Ibid.* Justin notices particularly the passage where it is said: "According to the days of the tree of life shall be the days of my people"; and infers from it that the terrestrial rule of the righteous will last a thousand years. He points out in this connection that before the Lord a thousand years is as one day. Justin's views on the matter are clear, but his reasoning is far from being so. There is probably a gap in the text.

[9] *Dial.* 81.

[10] *Ibid.* This passage shows that the first resurrection will be partial.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Second *Apol.* 8; First *Apol.* 19.

[13] First *Apol.* 16. "And let those who are not found living as He taught, be understood to be no Christians, even though they profess with the lip the precepts of Christ."

[14] First *Apol.* 52; *Dial.* 45.

[15] *Dial.* 81.

[16] First *Apol.* 8.

[17] First *Apol.* 19.

While waiting for the first resurrection, which will restore their bodies to them, the souls of the just dwell in a "better" place than ours;[3] but this abode is not Heaven, as is asserted by pseudo-Christians who reject the resurrection.[4] Heaven will not be open to the just until after the judgment which will follow the second resurrection.[5] As for the souls of the wicked, they dwell from now until judgment in a different place from the abode of the just. There they await the divine sentence.[6] Both the just and the unjust retain the exercise of their faculties, as is proved by the conjuring up of the dead and all the other practices of magic.[1] The souls of the wicked, as is easily understood, are under the power of the demons; but even the souls of the just do not escape this humiliation, at least unless they are protected from it by a special intervention of the Savior—an intervention which the Christian should beseech before his death.[2]

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[1] First *Apol.* 18, 21, 28, 45, 52; *Dial.* 45, 117.

[2] *Dial.* 5. "But others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished."

[3] *Dial.* 6. οὐ μεθέξει ποτὲ ὅταν θέλοι ζῆν. See also, *Ibid.* toward the end. The true sense of the foregoing passage, which theologians have often distorted, was recognized by Huet (*Origeniana* II, xi, 25). Martin (*La vie future*, p. 185), who acknowledges that Huet's interpretation is the only plausible one, and that there is question here of the annihilation of the wicked after a punishment of longer or shorter duration, observes that throughout this passage it is the old man who is speaking, and concludes that we do not here find the views of Justin, who is merely the reporter. It is evident that this solution is of no avail for anyone who considers the introduction of the old man as a literary fiction. We may add that even if this hypothesis were true, the argument of Martin would have no greater force, since the old man speaks like one inspired, and the theologians who take him for an angel are not more than half mistaken. The only problem for an impartial mind is to discover the connection between the texts just quoted and those others which speak of a κόλασις αἰωνία, of a πῦρ αἰώνιος, punishment to endure ἄπαυστος. Are St. Justin's views on this question consistent? Before drawing the conclusion that he has contradicted himself, we should have to give proof that he uses the expressions αἰώνιος and ἄπαυστος in the metaphysical sense given to them by later theologians. Now it is impossible to prove this, since the saintly doctor has not given any explanation of the sense in which he employs the terms. We might conjecture that he gives to them the meaning they had in his time. This conjecture is not favorable to the theologians, for the two expressions had long meant simply a duration longer than human life, or better, an indefinite duration. Only one text of Justin lends color to the other interpretation. It is in *Apol.* I, 8, where he says that the punishment of the wicked will be αἰώνιος and that the cycle of a thousand years imagined by Plato must be rejected. But here Justin (who is no doubt combining various data of *Timæus*, for Plato nowhere speaks of a punishment of a thousand years) has in view the theory of Metempsychosis. He simply wishes to say that the Christian doctrine, unlike that of the great Greek philosopher, leaves no hope to the wicked of having their torments one day crowned with bliss.

[4] *Dial.* 5.

[5] *Dial.* 80.

[6] This position, which is explicitly stated nowhere in Justin's works, can be inferred from *Dial.* 80, 81.

The teachings just given are borrowed in large part from the *Dialogue*. It is easy to understand that problems relating to the final condition of man would occupy a much more limited space in the *Apologies*. Writing to the Emperor and to the Senate to defend the Christians, Justin had little occasion to treat in detail the questions of eschatology. We may add that he has sometimes avoided them of set purpose. This is notably true of a place in the First *Apology*,[3] where the description of the millennial kingdom presented itself most naturally for treatment by the future author of the *Dialogue*. One expects it, but it is not given. No doubt Justin felt that the announcement of the speedy establishment of an earthly kingdom for the Christians would not be of a sort to gain for them the good will of a government which laid claim to universal sway. As a prudent pleader, he preferred to leave in the background a belief which, if announced, would have compromised the cause he was defending.

Baptism. "How we dedicate ourselves to God, being new made through Christ, I will explain. All who are persuaded, and believe, that the things which are taught and affirmed by us are true, and who promise to be able to live accordingly, are taught to pray, and beg God with fasting to grant them forgiveness of their former sins; and we pray and fast with them. Then we bring them where there is water; and after the same manner of regeneration as we also were regenerated ourselves, they are regenerated; for in the name of God, the Father and Lord of all things, and of the Savior Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, they then receive the washing of water. . . . In the water we receive remission of the sins we committed. . . . This washing is called illumination, because they who learn the meaning of these things are enlightened in their mind. . . . In the name of God, the Father and Lord of all things . . . and in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in the name of the Holy Ghost, does he who is enlightened receive his washing".[1] In three or four other places, Justin also speaks of baptism, stating that it was instituted for the remission of sins and to effect spiritual circumcision.[2] But this text of the First *Apology* surpasses all the others in importance. We learn from it that the rite of baptism in the second century was, with the exception of infusion, what it is to-day. And it is difficult not to recognize in it, in spite of one or two expressions, the doctrine of *ex opere operato.*[3]

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[1] *Dial.* 5.

[2] First *Apol.* 18.

[3] *Dial.* 105.

Sacrifice; the Eucharist. Trypho acknowledges, on the authority of a text of Malachy, that the sacrifices offered in Jerusalem were not agreeable to God; but he claims that the prayers addressed to the Lord by the Jews of the dispersion are agreeable in His eyes, and that the Lord had these prayers in view when He foretold that a pure sacrifice would one day be offered to Him in every place.[4] Justin is in complete accord with Trypho on the first point, but he differs with him entirely on the other. With Trypho, he purifies the notion of sacrifice, rejecting the slaughter of animals, and reduces it to mean simply prayer. "That prayers indeed and thanksgivings offered up by the worthy are the only sacrifices which are perfect and acceptable to God, is what I myself also affirm, for these alone the Christians have been taught to offer."[5] But he proves that the sacrifices dear to God are the prayers of the Christians and not those of the Jews of the dispersion. "It is we," he says, "who are the true priestly race of God."[6] And to prove his assertion, he appeals to the text of Malachy, which foretells that the clean oblation will be offered in every place. Since the Jews are not widely spread, they cannot offer sacrifice to God in every country in the world. The Christians, on the contrary, are in a way to realize this condition, since they have penetrated even amongst the barbarians.[7] So they are the "priests" whose sacrifices God accepts.[8]

The sacrifices, that is, the prayers which Christians offer to God, have an object. What is it? We may answer in a general way that it is thanksgiving. We read in the First *Apology*: "The president of the assembly gives glory to the universal Father through the Son and the Holy Ghost; and he addresses Him with long acts of thanksgiving for His gifts."[1] The sacrifices are intended to thank God for His benefits. But since these benefits are manifold, the acts of thanksgiving must be various. God is thanked "for having created the world and all that is therein for the sake of man";[2] and also "for having delivered us from the sin in which we were born, and overthrown with an utter destruction the principalities and powers of evil, through Him who was made to undergo suffering according to His will."[3] In other words, God is thanked for the benefit of creation and for the benefit of redemption. And to connect each of these two blessings with a material and concrete object, thanks are rendered, on the one hand "in remembrance of food, both solid and liquid":[4] a resumé of the gifts of creation; and on the other, "in commemoration of the passion endured for men by the Son of God".[5]

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[1] First *Apol.* II. Justin states that Christians do not expect an early kingdom. This is indeed the truth, but not the whole truth. See also Second *Apol.* 2, where, speaking of a martyr, St. Justin says that "he is about to go to the Father and to the Kingdom of Heaven."

[2] First *Apol.* 61.

[3] *Dial.* 14, 18, 43, 44.

[4] Weizäcker (Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie, XII, p. 111) thinks differently.

[5] *Dial.* 117.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Dial.* 116.

[8] *Dial.* 117; see also *Dial.* 41.

The thanksgiving in commemoration of our nourishment finds a very natural expression in the offering of the bread and the cup which help to sustain us. Now this is just what Christ has commanded us to do—to render thanks with the bread and the cup in commemoration of the Body and Blood which He took for our salvation.[6] For these two reasons drawn one from the nature of things, and the other from the institution of Christ, the two thanksgivings—that which commemorates the blessing of food (that is to say, of creation), and that which commemorates the blessing of redemption—should both be rendered with the aid of bread and the cup.[7] There is then a "Bread of the Eucharist" and a "Cup of the Eucharist".[8] In other words, the Eucharist is accomplished with the aid of "the bread and the cup.[9] Accordingly, the president of the assembly makes the long acts of thanksgiving mentioned above, only after they have brought to him "the bread and wine with water added" [10] "When he has concluded the prayers and thanksgiving, all the people who are present express their assent by saying Amen. This word Amen means in the Greek language, So be it. . . . . Then those whom we call deacons give to each of those who are present a portion of the bread and wine mixed with water over which the acts of thanksgiving have been made, and also carry them to those who are absent".[1]

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[1] *Dial.* 117.

[2] First *Apol.* 65.

[3] *Dial.* 41.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Dial.* 117. Justin has just spoken of the sacrifices (for thanksgiving) offered by Christians.

[6] *Ibid.* ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ πάθους ὃ πέπονθε δι' αὐτοὺς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνηται.

[7] *Dial.* 70.

[8] This is explained by ἐν ᾗ in *Dial.* 117, just quoted.

[9] *Dial.* 41.

[10] *Dial.* 117.

Justin then explains that the term "Eucharist", the proper use of which is to designate the prayer of thanksgiving, serves also as a name for the food over which the thanksgiving has been made.[2] He adds also that none may partake of this food except those who believe in the Christian teaching, and who have been washed in the laver for the forgiveness of sins and to regeneration, and model their lives according to the precepts of Christ.[3] Then he gives the reasons for these conditions in the following words: "We do not receive these things as ordinary food or ordinary drink; but as by the word of God, Jesus Christ our Savior was made flesh, and had both flesh and blood for our salvation; so also the food which was blessed by the prayer of the word which proceeded from Him, and from which our flesh and blood, by assimilation, receive nourishment, is both the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh".[4] But why do the Christians regard this food over which the prayers have been said as the flesh and blood of Jesus? Justin answers that this belief has its source in the language of the Savior Himself, who, as the Apostles testify, "took bread, and gave thanks, and said, This do in commemoration of me; This is my body. And in like manner He took the cup, and blessed it, and said, This is my blood".[5]

This text, which indicates in summary fashion how the thanksgiving was made, and what the bread becomes after the thanksgiving is made, has been from both points of view, the object of keen discussion. And in the first place, what are we to understand by "the prayer of the word which proceeded from Him"?[6] Does this expression refer to the Catholic formula of consecration: *Hoc est corpus meum*; or does it refer to the Lord's Prayer? Catholic theologians who hold the first opinion, advance in its defence that it is only by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, that the Eucharist is accomplished; and, moreover, these words are cited by Justin in the lines immediately following. In favor of the second opinion it is urged that the formula: *Hoc est corpus meum* is not a prayer; and that Justin cites it not to explain how the Eucharist is accomplished, but to prove[1] that the Eucharist is the Body of the Savior. Now, the Lord's Prayer is a "prayer of the word which proceeded from Him"; and, according to the testimony of St. Gregory the Great, it was with this prayer that the eucharistic consecration was originally effected.[2]

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[1] First *Apol.* 65. The word κράμα oftentimes means a mixture of water and wine; but it designates also wine alone. And this is why Justin says that water and κράμα are brought in. See Duchesne (*Bulletin Critique*, 1891, p. 282), against Harnack, who, not being aware of this meaning of the word, wishes to suppress it as an interpolation.

[2] *Ibid.* Here Justin speaks no longer of the κράμα, but mentions explicitly ἄρτου καὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος.

[3] First *Apol.* 66.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

Just as there are two contrary opinions about the formula to which Justin attributes the consecration of the Eucharist, so also there are two concerning the idea which he has of the "Bread of the Eucharist" and "the Chalice of the Eucharist." On the one side it is pointed out that the learned apologist designates with the names of "bread" and "wine" (or "chalice") the objects already consecrated;[3] that he presents the Eucharist as a memorial of the double blessing of creation and of redemption (or the Incarnation);[4] that he presents it, moreover, as a "food on which our flesh and our blood are nourished";[5] and the conclusion is drawn that the Eucharist is for him bread on which has descended a benediction which indeed makes it sacred, but which has not changed its nature. On the other side, emphasis is laid on the passage in which Justin says that the Eucharist is the Body and Blood of the Lord; and where, to justify this belief, he appeals to the text: "This is my body"; attention is also drawn to the relationship which he establishes between the Eucharist and the taking of a human body by the Logos;[1] and from these premisses the deduction is made that the author of the *Apologies* believed in transubstantiation.

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[1] "δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ." Watterich (*Der Konsecrationsmoment in heiligen Abendmahl und seine Geschichte*, p. 43), sees in λόγου an objective genitive, and translates it: "by the prayer addressed to the Logos." This interpretation is irreconcilable with the phrase τοῦ παρ 'αὐτοῦ which absolutely demands for λόγου the meaning of "word." So it must be translated: "The food over which the thanksgiving has been made by the word of the prayer (the word containing the prayer) which proceeded from Him."

[2] In point of fact, this is Justin's sole reason for quoting the words of the Last Supper.

[3] *Epist.* IX, 12, *P. G.*, 77, 957. St. Gregory is explaining why he thought it proper to insert the Pater in the liturgy of the Mass and to put it in the Canon, or as he says: "post precem quam scolasticus composuerat." His reason is that "mos apostolorum fuit ut *ad ipsam solummodo orationem* oblationis hostiam consecrarent."

[4] See the texts cited above.

[5] Cf. *Dial.* 70, where the Eucharist is presented as the memorial of the Incarnation.

These two controversies are still far from being settled. For a long time to come there will be differences of opinion concerning the cause to which Justin attributes consecration, and concerning the idea which he held as to the nature of that consecration. We remark, however, that on this latter point a step towards agreement has been made since the middle of the last century. Those who refuse to recognize in the First *Apology* the doctrine of transubstantiation are now generally willing to acknowledge that St. Justin establishes between the Eucharist and the Incarnation a relation which they conceive under the type of assimilation. They conclude that the illustrious Doctor believed in the presence of the Logos in the consecrated Bread, in a sort of hypostatic union between the Logos and the Eucharist.[2]

Liturgy. We have already seen the teachings of St. Justin on the rite of Christian initiation. We find a rapid survey of the Eucharistic liturgy in the following text, which, though it touches also on matters already discussed, cannot here be passed over in silence: "On the day which is called Sunday, there is an assembly in the same place of all who live in cities, or in country districts; and the Records of the Apostles, or the writings of the Prophets, are read as long as we have time; then the reader concludes, and the President verbally instructs and exhorts us to the imitation of these excellent things; then we all together rise to offer up our prayers; and, as I said before, when we have concluded our prayer, bread is brought, and wine, and water; and the President, in like manner, offers up prayers and thanksgivings with all his strength; and the people give their assent by saying Amen; and there is a distribution, and a partaking by everyone, of the Eucharistic elements; and to those who are not present they are sent by the hands of the deacons".[1] In another passage we are told that between the prayer and the thanksgiving they give the kiss of peace.[2]

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[1] First *Apol.* 66, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σαρκὸς κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν. Paulus (*Ueber die Logoslehre bei Justinus Martyr*, in the *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1886 p. 681), believes that Justin looks upon the Eucharist as forming by degrees in a mysterious way the transformed bodies which we shall possess at the resurrection. This interpretation is open to the following objections: (a) the Fathers, who, like St. Ignatius, consider the Eucharist as a pledge of immortality, never mention anything about the formation of our glorified bodies; (b) Justin says that the bread and wine nourish our bodies "by transformation," i. e., by transforming them into Christ. According to Paulus' hypothesis, he should have said that they nourish the body "of transformation", i. e., the transformed body.

[2] See the text of *Apol.* I, 66, quoted above.

Penance. Nothing pertaining to this subject is found in the writings of Justin, who had no occasion to treat of it. There is, however, a passage in the *Dialogue* which may be considered to throw some light on the matter. In it he says that in order to obtain salvation, one must believe in Christ, purify one's soul by baptism, and live thenceforth without sin.[3] This language, in so far as it warrants conjectures, seems to imply that baptism is the only means of obtaining pardon for sins here below; and that those who commit sin after baptism have no way of being reconciled with the Church, from which they have been excluded by their sin.

The Synoptics. Justin mentions at different times the "Memoirs of the Apostles.[1] He declares in one place that these "Memoirs" were written "by the Apostles or those who accompanied them".[2] Elsewhere he says that these "Memoirs" are called Gospels.[3] He is acquainted therefore with several writings containing the history of the Savior, and possessing in his eyes an apostolic or quasi-apostolic origin. He never names the authors of these writings. But as quotations belong now to St. Mark (the surname of Boanerges for St. John);[4] now to St. Luke (e. g., the sweat of blood;[5] the words: Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit);[6] now to St. Matthew (e. g., the apparition of the star to the Magi),[7] it must be admitted that he knew our three Synoptics, and that he attributed them to the Apostles or to their companions. Moreover, besides the relatively few cases where he refers expressly to the "Memoirs of the Apostles", he borrows from Matthew and Luke a host of texts without indicating their source. Usually he is rather free in his rendering of the texts, and satisfied with an approximation to them. This method would naturally lead, and does in fact lead, to inaccuracies. Thus he reports a parable as not having been explained by the Savior, although the parable is explained in the Gospel of St. Matthew, from which Justin has borrowed it.[8] Sometimes the inference is drawn from this that he did not know our First Gospel in its present form, in other words that this Gospel has been retouched since the middle of the second century.[9] This conclusion is unjust, since it neglects to take into account the liberty which Justin allows himself in his citations.[10]

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[1] Weizsäcker, *Die Theologie des Mærtyrers Justinus*, in *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1867, p. 98.

[2] *Apol.* I, 66.

[3] *Ibid.* 65. Harnack has published in *Texte und Untersuchungen* (vii, 2, p. 115, ss.) a dissertation tending to prove that Justin is one of the representatives of Aquarianism, that is to say, of the doctrine which allowed for the celebration of the Eucharist only bread and water, and which had, during the first centuries, a certain number of adherents, especially in Africa. The thesis rests on the following arguments: (a) Justin (*Dial.* 70) applies to the Eucharist the text of Isaias (xxxiii, 16), "Bread is given him, his waters are sure." (b) he denounces as a parody on the Christian Feast (a parody invented by the demons) the mysteries of Mithra, in which, he says, they offer bread and water; (c) he applies (*Apol.* I, 32, 54; *Dial.* 52, 63, 69, 75,) to the Passion of the Savior, and not to the Eucharist, as do the later Fathers, the passage in the prophecy of Jacob (Gen. xlix, 11,) where we read: "He shall wash his robe in wine, and his garment in the blood of the grape"; (d) he declares (*Apol.* I, 54; *Dial.* 69) that the myth of Bacchus inventing wine was concocted by demons to fulfil the prophecy of Jacob which was really fulfilled by Christ, and yet, in speaking of the mysteries of Bacchus, he says nothing of wine, but confines himself to mentioning the presence of an ass at these mysteries. But to Harnack's arguments the following answers may be given: (a) Justin mentions wine three times in the First *Apology* (65 to 67); and if Harnack rejects these mentions as interpolations, he does so only to suit the needs of his case (one of the mentions is the κράμα spoken of above); (b) the application to the Eucharist of the text of Isaias where there is question of bread and water in no way authorizes the inference of Harnack, since Justin is so often satisfied with partial resemblances; (c) this answer also applies to the parallel instituted by Justin between the Eucharist and the mysteries of Mithra, in which they offered bread and water; (d) though some of the Fathers have applied the text of Gen. xlix, 11, to the Eucharist, a number of others have applied it, as did Justin, to the Passion of the Savior or to His Incarnation; (e) the mention of the ass in the mysteries of Bacchus is explained by the expression in the prophecy of Jacob "tying his ass to the vine"; moreover, some editors prefer the reading "They use *wine* in his mysteries," i. e., οἶνος instead of ὄνος. In fine, the thesis of Harnack has been universally rejected. (Cf. Funk, *Kircheng. Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, I, 278.)

The Gospel of St. John. We read in the First *Apology*: "Christ has said: If you are not born again you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."[11] In the *Dialogue* we read that John the Baptist said to the Jews, "I am not the Christ; I am the voice of one crying".[1] The same *Dialogue* speaks in one place of the "Unigenitus"[2] and presents the brazen serpent[3] as a figure of Christ. Moreover, St. Justin declares that the Christians worship God "in reason and in truth",[4] which the blood of Christ has begotten "not of human seed, but of the will of God."[5] Finally he gives to the Son of God the name of Logos, and says that this Logos was in God before the creation of the world.[6] Such are the principal points of coincidence which can be perceived between the writings of the illustrious apologist and the Fourth Gospel.

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[1] *Dial.* 44.

[2] Cf. especially *Dial.* 100-107.

[3] *Dial.* 103.

[4] *Apol.* I, 66.

[5] *Dial.* 106. This text raises a problem which we shall examine shortly.

[6] *Ibid.* 103.

[7] *Ibid.* 104. Also *Dial.* 88, where Justin, drawing from St. Luke, says that Jesus was almost thirty years old when he began to preach; *Apol.* I, 34, where he mentions the census of Quirinius.

[8] *Dial.* 78.

[9] *Dial.* 107. The reference is to "the sign of Jonas," which St. Matthew (xii, 39,) alone mentions in the terms employed by St. Justin.

[10] Paulus maintains this opinion in *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1891, p. 129.

[11] Moreover, "the sign of Jonas" appears further on in St. Matthew (xvi, 4,) this time without explanation. Justin may have had this passage in mind, without advert-

These resemblances are not infrequently attributed to the environment, to floating ideas. It is claimed that the Evangelist as well as St. Justin, independently of each other, had utilized formulas, metaphors, and theories which were in the air, and adopted certain expressions which had come down to them by oral tradition.[7] To-day this explanation is generally considered insufficient to account, if not for each parallel taken by itself, at least for the collective evidence of the facts adduced. It is therefore believed that Justin knew the Fourth Gospel, and that in most of the cases where his expressions are the same as those in that Gospel he has borrowed them from it.[8] Environment, however, is still considered as the explanation, sometimes probable, sometimes morally certain, of some of the points of coincidence.

As is evident, no doubt would have been possible if Justin had taken the pains to acknowledge in any way his indebtedness to the Fourth Gospel; but he has nowhere done so. In the twenty to thirty cases where he mentions the "Memoirs of the Apostles," he has always in view the Synoptics,[9] and never the Fourth Gospel.[10] And the same

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ing to the text of xii, 39.

[1] *Apol.* I, 61; cf. John iii, 3.

[2] *Dial.* 88; cf. John i, 20, 23. Matthew, iii, 3 quotes the text of Isaias, but does not put it into the mouth of John the Baptist.

[3] *Dial.* 105; cf. John i, 18.

[4] *Dial.* 94; cf. John iii, 14.

[5] *Apol.* I, 6; John iv, 24.

[6] *Dial.* 63; cf.John i, 13.

[7] See under LOGOS.

[8] Cf. Renan, *l'Eglise chrétienne*, pp. 59, 69, 385. Also Paulus, *Ueber die Logoslehre bei Justinus Mœrtyrer*, (*Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1891, p. 141).

[9] Oscar Holtzmann, *Das Johannes Evangelium*, p. 172; H. Holtzmann, *Einleitung in das neue Testament*, p. 467; Harnack, *Dogmeng.* I, 341. *Réville, Le quatrième évangile*, p. 68, leaves the question pending, but inclines towards this second opinion.

[10] Or some one of the Apocrypha, as we shall see shortly.

author who is so anxious to give apostolic warrant for the facts or the texts which he borrows from the first three Gospels, shows no such concern when his positions run parallel with those of St. John. We have here a contrast which cannot be overlooked. And what makes the contrast the more striking is that on the one hand, when Justin wishes to prove the millennial kingdom, he does not hesitate to appeal to the authority of "John, one of the disciples of Christ",[1] and to the "revelation which was made to him" (the Apocalypse); and on the other hand, there are places where there were urgent reasons to induce him to fall back on the authority of St. John as an evangelist. One of the principal theses of the *Dialogue* treats of the existence of the Logos. Justin labors at great length to prove that below the "Supreme God" there is "another God," inferior to the first and the Agent of His will, the Logos. To establish this doctrine, which he has very near at heart, he piles up texts from the Old Testament. He seizes on all the texts that present themselves, and does not hesitate to do violence to them when it suits his purpose. The quality of the proofs does not concern him; it is number he is looking for. Why then does he forego the valuable assistance which the prologue of St. John would have given him? Why does he not add to the texts of the prophets the text of an evangelist? Why, finally, does he not here appeal to the "Memoirs of the Apostles" whose authority he invokes elsewhere in more than twenty places. Such is the problem raised by the silence of St. Justin concerning the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, which he knew, and from which he borrowed without acknowledgment. Many critics conclude from this attitude of his that the author of the *Apologies* did not know of the apostolic origin of the Gospel of the Logos, and looked upon it as a doctrinal treatise, estimable in its way, but without special authority—a conclusion from which it is hard to escape.[2]

Saint Paul. We find in the *Dialogue* an imitation of the passage in I. Cor. where St. Paul says that there must be heresies;[3] we find also mention of the man who, at the end of time, is to lift himself up against God[4] (II. Thess.) St. Justin has then read these two Epistles. And the way in which he contrasts circumcision and faith goes to show that he has read Romans and Galatians.[1] On the other hand he never appeals to the authority of St. Paul, and when he borrows from him, it is always without acknowledgment. Moreover, while he is in accord with the great apostle on the question of universal salvation, he differs with him on several points. Thus, for example, he considers it sinful to eat meats offered to idols.[2] He says that he is in union with the Judæo-Christians.[3] And as we have seen,[4] his doctrine on salvation is not drawn from St. Paul. It must be said, however, that his attitude towards the Judæo-Christians does not go beyond a toleration of them; and that, though he consents to live in communion with the partisans of the Mosaic Law, he nevertheless declares that he rejects their principles. Nor must it be forgotten that in the second century, the use of meats sacrificed to idols was regarded as a sign of apostasy, and this problem had thus taken on an aspect unknown to the author of the Epistle of the Corinthians.[5] On the whole, Justin cannot be considered as an opponent of St. Paul; on the contrary, he must be viewed as a partisan of the great apostle, but one who has not grasped the full meaning of the Pauline doctrines. Why then has he never invoked the authority of St. Paul? Why does he never acknowledge the source of the citations which he makes from him? Why indeed is it that he never mentions any other apostles than those who set out from Jerusalem after Pentecost?[6] Some say that the illustrious apologist acted thus on account of his opposition to the Gnostic Marcion, who leaned on the authority of St. Paul.[7] Is this explanation of the attitude of St. Justin sufficient? It is certainly open to question; but there is no other to put in place of it.

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[1] Concerning a seeming exception, see H. Holtzmann (*loc. cit.*)

[2] *Dial.* 81.

[3] Oscar Holtzmann, *l. c.* H. Holtzmann, *l. c.* Thoma, *Zeitschrift für wissentschaftliche Theologie*, 1875, p. 560. Réville, *l. c.*

[4] *Dial.* 35; cf. I. Cor. xi, 19. Justin quotes this phrase as a saying of the Savior.

The Apocryphal Gospels. Justin relates that Jesus was born in a "cave" near Bethlehem;[8] he says that Mary "experienced joy"[9] at the message of the Angel Gabriel. And the words which he puts in the mouth of the latter are a mixture of the texts of Matthew and Luke.[10] Now these three particulars are found in the Gospel of St.

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[1] *Dial.* 32 and 120; cf. II. Thess. ii, 4.
[2] *Dial.* 44, 23.
[3] *Dial.* 35.
[4] *Dial.* 47.
[5] See under REDEMPTION.
[6] Cf. Weizsacker, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1867, p. 73.
[7] *Apol.* I, 39, 49, 50; *Dial.* 42.
[8] Thoma, *l. c.*, p. 824.
[9] *Dial.* 78; cf. *Protevang.* 18.
[10] *Dial.* 100; cf. *Ibid.* 12.

James (or Protevangel). We are therefore entitled to conclude that Justin knew and used this apocryphal writing. He has also made use of either the Gospel of the Hebrews or the Gospel of the Ebionites, for he says that the river Jordan was lit up with a miraculous fire at the moment of the baptism of Christ.[1] Now these statements, as we know from other sources, are found in these two books, or at least in one of them.[2] Finally, the First *Apology* presents Herod and Pilate as living together;[3] it teaches us, moreover, that the enemies of Jesus "set Him on the judgment-seat, and said, Judge us".[4] He owes these two statements, as well as a special formula,[5] to the Gospel of Peter.[6] To sum up, St. Justin has made use of at least three apocryphal Gospels.[7] Does he rank them amongst the books which he calls "Memoirs of the Apostles"? In other words, does he attribute to them an apostolic origin? The question is insoluble in so far as it relates to the Gospel of James and the Gospel of the Ebionites, which he never names. As for the Gospel of Peter, he mentions it and attributes it to the apostle of that name in a text of the *Dialogue*, which, however, is perhaps spurious.[8]

Canon of the New Testament. Justin puts the "discourses" of the Lord above the teachings of the prophets, and presents them as the rule of faith for the Christian. And he believes that these "discourses" are faithfully reproduced in the "Memoirs of the Apostles"

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[1] *Apol.* I, 33; cf. *Ibid.* 22. However, the combination which we find in the Gospel of James is not the same in all points as that of Justin.

[2] *Dial.* 88.

[3] *De Rebaptismate* (in the works of St. Cyprian, Hartel, III, 90), mentions this point in the *Pauli Prædicatio.* Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxx, 13,) speaks of it in the Gospel of the Ebionites.

[4] *Apol.* I, 40. Cf., also *Dial.* 103.

[5] *Apol.* I, 35.

[6] The expression λάχμον βάλλονσετ in *Dial.* 97

[7] These three concordances have been known only since the discovery of the fragments of Ackmim. See Harnack, *Bruchstücke des Evangeliums und des Apocalypse des Petrus* in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, IX; Lods, *l'Evangile et L'Apocalypse de Pierre.*

[8] He refers several times (*Apol.* I, 35, 48) to the Acts of Pilate. But Harnack seems to have proven (*Die Chronologie*, p. 610; also *Die Gesch. der altchr. Litteratur*, p. 21), that Justin takes for granted the existence of these supposed Acts, which he never cites, which he has not seen, and which, finally, never existed. The Acts of Pilate cannot therefore be included in the count. There is doubt about the Gospel of Thomas. Justin (*Dial.* 88,) speaks of the "carts and yokes" made by the Savior (cf. Evang. Thom. 13). Zahn (*Forschungen*, I, 539) and Bonwelsch (*Realencycl.* third edit., IX, 650), believe that Justin borrowed these expressions. Harnack denies this (*Die Chronol.* p. 594); in *Altchris. Litteratur*, p. 16, he is in doubt.

(Matthew, Luke, perhaps Mark,[1] perhaps the Gospel of the Ebionites), since it is from these that he quotes them. Moreover, he often appeals to the "Memoirs of the Apostles" to support the teachings he gives about the life of the Savior. He ascribes therefore to the Gospels (those which he regards as such) an historical authority. Moreover, he ascribes to one part of their content, the "discourses" of the Lord which they report, a canonical authority superior to that of the Old Testament.[2] Does he extend this canonical authority to the other portions of the Gospels? Does he consider the Gospels as inspired? Does he associate them with the Old Testament? On the one hand, he teaches us that in his day the reading of the "Memoirs of the Apostles" had its place in the liturgy side by side with that of the prophets.[3] And this practice gives evidence of a veneration, which, even though primarily attached to the content of the Gospels, must, by force of the facts, have been extended to the books themselves, at least in a certain measure. On the other hand, when he speaks of "Scripture", it is always the Old Testament that he has in view. It is always texts of the Old Testament that he is introducing when he uses the formula "The Holy Spirit has said", or others of the same kind. Moreover, he does not hesitate to say that Christians believe in the Gospel narratives because they are confirmed by the oracles of the prophets.[4] This would make it seem that he does not give canonical authority to the Gospels. The "Memoirs of the Apostles" constitute, in his eyes, a collection by themselves, for he sometimes uses the formula "the Gospel", which manifestly designates these Memoirs taken as a whole.[5]

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[1] *Dial.* 106. We there read that the change of name from Simon to Peter is written *ἐν τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν αὐτοῦ.* The *αὐτοῦ* designates Peter; hence it might be concluded that Justin has in view the Gospel of Peter, and consequently that he numbers it among the "Memoirs of the Apostles." However, since the fact here mentioned and the one that follows are found in our St. Mark, commentators were pretty generally agreed that the Gospel in question was that of St. Mark, so they substituted *αὐτῶν* for *αὐτοῦ.* (cf. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, p. 375). On the other hand, the discovery at Ackmim by showing that Justin used the Gospel of Peter, has changed the state of the question; so that now the common opinion is that the Gospel of Peter is indicated in *Dial.* 106, and consequently that he attributes to it an apostolic origin. (cf. Harnack, *Die Chronologie*, pp. 474, 622; also *Die Geschichte der altchr. Litteratur*, p. 12).

[2] The mention of the surname "Boanerges" which we have adduced as a citation from St. Mark, comes (*Dial.* 106) right after the mention of the new name given to Simon. If the latter fact is drawn from the Gospel of Peter, there is every reason to believe that the former is from the same source.

[3] *Apol.* 16, 13, 23; *Dial.* 139. Cf. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, p. 99.

[4] *Apol.* I, 66. See above, under LITURGY.

[5] *Apol.* I, 33. He states that the Christians believe in the Gospel accounts of the

He believes, however, in the divine origin of the Apocalypse, which he attributes clearly to the Apostle Saint John.[1] In short, besides the Old Testament, he knows one inspired book, the Apocalypse; and a collection of venerable books, the Gospels, among which he includes probably the Gospel of Peter, but not our Fourth Gospel. The doctrine of the New Testament exists in his writings in a germinal state.

Septuagint. Following the story of the pseudo-Aristæus, Justin relates that Ptolemy asked for a copy of the Bible, and then sought for men able to translate this copy into Greek, and that seventy old men were sent him for this purpose. He adds, without questioning the anachronism, that it was of Herod that Ptolemy made this request.[2] He holds that the Bible should be interpreted according to the Septuagint version.[3] He claims too that the Jews have corrupted the text in order to obscure the prophecies relating to Christ.[4] Naturally, he believes that the Greek manuscript which he uses is a faithful reproduction of the primitive translation; nor has he any thought of the work which Origen was to undertake a half-century later to restore the original text of the Septuagint. It has long since been conceded that the accusations of interpolation which he made against the Jews were not well founded, and that he was deceived by apocryphal glosses.[5]

Plato and Philo. Justin's points of contact with Plato are of various nature. Sometimes he expressly quotes the opinions of the great philosopher;[6] at other times he draws his inspiration from him or makes use of his formulas without naming him;[7] and at still other times he appeals to his authority to prove his own doctrines.[8] In

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virginal conception. Cf. also *Dial.* 53.

[1] *Dial.* 100; also *Dial.* 10 (in the latter passage, the expression "the Gospel" is put into the mouth of Trypho).

[2] *Dial.* 81.

[3] *Apol.* I, 31; *Dial.* 68.

[4] *Dial.* 68, 71.

[5] *Dial.* 71. Cf. the note by Maran. Justin probably wishes to say that the Jews have altered the Hebrew Bible, so that it is necessary to consult the Greek Translation if one wishes to get at the primitive text. As it reads, his statement is that they have altered the text of the Sepuagint.

[6] He reproaches the Jews (*Dial.* 73) with having changed the text of Ps. 95: "Regnavit a ligno Deus," suppressing the words "a ligno." He reproaches them also (*Dial.* 120) with suppressing the passage where Isaias is said to have been cut in two with a wooden saw.

[7] Cf. e. g., *Apol.* I, 33; also *Apol.* I, 44.

[8] See for example the definition of God in *Dial.* 4: "He who is above all essence." Cf. Plato's *Republic.*

such cases, however, he is careful to insist that the truth was already taught by the prophets, and that Plato drew his finest theories from the Bible.[1] In point of fact, it is the author of the *Apologies* who makes the agreement. Sometimes he introduces among Christian dogmas some doctrine that he has read in *Timæus*;[2] sometimes he ingenuously attributes to Plato some Christian dogma of which the author of *Phædo* never dreamed. It is from Plato that he borrows the idea of God as Architect, which he wishes to make a truth of revelation; and it is to Christians he owes the two doctrines of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, of which he claims to find traces in the writings of Plato.[3] He says, however, as we have already seen, that the author of *Timæus* did not properly understand or reproduce the teachings of the prophets concerning the Logos. And it is no doubt the doctrine of the Logos that he has in mind when he says: "The doctrines of Plato are not entirely different from those of Christ, nor are they entirely like them."[4]

Justin refers frequently to Plato, but he never mentions Philo. And yet his theory of the Logos, which he vainly endeavors to find in Plato, is intimately bound up with that which is given in the writings of the Alexandrian philosopher. A century and a half before the Christian apologist, Philo had spoken of the Logos; and his Logos, the intermediary between the Ineffable God and the world, had, with the exception of the Incarnation, all the characteristics which we discern in the Logos of Justin.[5] Had the author of the *Apologies* and the *Dialogue* read the author of *De Somniis* and *De Confusione Linguarum*? Or did the Philonian doctrine of the Logos come to him through the teaching of his Christian masters? It would be impossible to answer this question if the only points of contact between St. Justin and the Alexandrian philosopher were those relating to the Minister of the supreme God. But certain other coincidences, especially the symbolical interpretation of the twelve little bells attached to the High Priest's ephod,[6] can be fully explained only by supposing direct contact with the Philonian writings. It is then probable that the Christian apologist knew the works of the Jewish Platonist.

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[1] *Apol.* I, 59, 60, etc.

[2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] See De Faye, *De l'influence du Timée de Platon sur la théologie de saint Justin* in *Etudes de critique et d'histoire*, VII, p. 169, ss.

[4] See LOGOS and TRINITY.

[5] *Apol.* II, 13.

[6] See Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, I, 95-97.

Stoics. The Logos of Justin is therefore of Philonian origin. It contains, however, an element foreign to Philo. As we have already seen, the illustrious apologist believes that particles or seeds of the Logos are sown in all human souls. This "seminal Logos" is of Stoic origin. The school of Zeno believed in a divine seed, a λόγος σπερματικὸς in the universe; and Justin, who had been a Stoic before becoming a disciple of Plato, borrowed this doctrine from that school. But it must be said that he has modified it. According to the Stoics, human reason was as a fragment of the divine Reason, and each human intelligence a "seminal logos", while the Christian philosopher carefully distinguishes the human mind from the portion of the Logos which enlightens it.[1]

Jews. This beautiful theory, one remarks with regret, is little developed in his writings. The reason is that Justin had other masters than the Platonists and the Stoics. He was familiar with the ideas of the Alexandrian Jews And these doctors had told him the stories of pseudo-Aristæus and Aristobulus. They told him of the seventy-two elders who were sent to Alexandria at the express request of King Ptolemy to make a Greek translation of the Bible. They put before him the sibylline and orphic poems, in which there was question of the patriarchs and of the God of Israel. They showed him that the philosophers, not excepting the divine Plato, had borrowed their finest thoughts from the Bible, but without understanding it perfectly. And Justin, dazzled by these wonderful tales, accepts them in all simplicity, without stopping to ask himself what need the philosophers had of the Bible when they had in themselves sparks of the divine Logos. In the *Apologies*, the Alexandrian thesis of the biblical origin of philosophical ideas is found side by side with the doctrine of illumination by the seminal "Logos," each supplementing the other. In the *Dialogue*, there is never question of this work of the Logos,[2] and the philosophers are always represented as plagiarists of Moses and the prophets.[3]

Varia. Justin knew the Epistle of Barnabas, from which he borrows his theory of the Logos extended in the form of a cross while fashioning the world;[1] and perhaps also the formula: "Regnavit a ligno Deus."[2] He also knew and used the Epistle to the Hebrews.[3] He says that, in his time, Christianity had already penetrated among the barbarians.[4] We have already seen that he puts the prophecies of the Old Testament above the Gospel narratives;[5] he also puts them above the miracles worked by our Savior. He has to do with adversaries who believe in the miracles worked by Jesus, but who explain them by magic. Accordingly he lets the miracles go, and takes refuge in the prophecies.[6] He says that the Romans have raised a statue to Simon Magus in the island in the Tiber between the two bridges, with the inscription "*Simoni deo sancto*",[7] and he asks the Emperor to pull this statue down.[8] Now about the end of the sixteenth century (1547), they discovered in the island of the Tiber the pedestal of a statue with the inscription: "*Semoni Sanco Deo Fidio Sex. Pompeius S. P. E. Col. Mussianus Quinquennalis Decur. Bidentalis donum dedit.*"[9] There could be little room for doubt that here was the inscription seen by Justin. For a long while, indeed, some well-meaning defenders tried to evade this conclusion;[10] but to-day it is generally agreed that Justin read the name of Simon Magus into an inscription to the old Latin god *Semo Sancus.*[11]

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[1] *Dial.* 42. See Maran's note. It must be acknowledged that Justin does not accord with Philo in details, but there is none the less a remarkable agreement. Cf. also *Apol.* II, 9, in which God is called "the Father of lawgivers", and compare the text of Philo cited by Maran. Note finally the fact that Justin (*Apol.* I, 13), calls God γεννήτωρ of the world, and that Philo speaks of the work of God by means of the verb γεννάω (*De victimis offerendis*).

[2] Weizsäcker, *loc. cit.*, p. 87.

[3] Harnack, *Dogmeng.* I, 470.

At the end of the First *Apology* we read (1) a letter of the Emperor Hadrian to the proconsul of Asia, Minicius Fundanus, establishing the procedure to be followed in dealing with the Christians; (2) a letter of Antoninus to "the community of Asia" praising the Christians, and commanding not to disturb them in the exercise of their religion; (3) a letter of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius to the Senate, relating that he and his army, during the expedition against the Quadi owed their escape from danger to the prayers of the Christian soldiers, who obtained a miraculous rain-storm; and, as a testimony of gratitude, prescribing that the liberty of the Christians should be respected. The first of these documents is preceded by an introduction, in which Justin himself announces that he appends to his Apology a rescript issued by Hadrian; the other two are simply added on without any explanation.[1]

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[1] He speaks of the Sibyl in *Apol.* I, 20, 44.

[2] *Apol.* I, 60. Cf. *Barnabas*, 12. See note by Maran.

[3] *Dial.* 73. Cf. *Barnabas*, 13.

[4] *Dial.* 13. Cf. Hebr. ix, 13, (the allusion to the ashes of the heifer). *Dial.* 67; cf. Hebr, viii. 8, (the new covenant). *Apol.* I, 12, 63; cf. Hebr. iii, 1, (Jesus our apostle).

[5] *Dial.* 117.

[6] See above: CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

[7] *Apol.* I, 30. Cf. *Ibid.* 22. where Justin compares the miracles of Esculapius with those of Christ.

[8] *Apol.* I, 26.

[9] *Apol.* I, 56.

[10] See Baronius (ad annum 44); Maran (*Præfat.* III, 6, in *P. G.* 5, 142); Tillemont (note on Simon Magus, II, 521); Maran (*loc. cit.*), who, however, offers a milder defense.

[11] Mentioned by Ovid (*Fasti* VI, 213).

The letter of Marcus Aurelius, even if authentic, could not have been placed by Justin himself at the end of his *Apology*, since it narrates an event posterior by at least seven years (174) to the death of the martyr-apologist. Besides, nobody dreams of ascribing to it the least historical value.[2] And the only question which this apocryphal letter brings up, is whether it was written before Tertullian, or was invented later.[3] The second opinion is much more probable. As for the edict of Antoninus, it is also agreed that, at least in its present form, it deserves no credence, seeing that it purports to grant to the Christians exactly what their apologists kept demanding during the whole of the second century and afterwards.[4] However, Harnack believes that it contains a kernel of history.[5] At any rate, it could not have been attached to the Apology by Justin himself.

There remains the letter of Hadrian to Minicius. Eusebius tells us that he found this document in Latin, and translated it into Greek.[1] So our Greek text is due to the Bishop of Cæsarea. As for the Latin text, it may be considered as proven that we have in it, not the original, but a translation made by Rufinus from the translation of Eusebius.[2] Although strongly attacked by some scholars, the rescript of Hadrian has had numerous defenders.[3] To-day it is pretty generally agreed to consider it as authentic. Mommsen does not hesitate to say that by this rescript Hadrian grants to the Christians the free exercise of their worship. But his interpretation is rejected by all. The rescript leaves in force the edict of Trajan, which outlaws the Christians. It merely instructs the proconsuls that they should not let themselves be swayed by the caprices of the mob, when they demanded that Christians should be sentenced to the lions without process of law; and enjoins them to punish informers against the Christians who fail to prove their accusations.[4] Such is the common opinion.

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[1] The letters of Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius come in the manuscript after the Second *Apology* (which, by the way, is reckoned as the First). In the editions they are put after the letter of Hadrian.

[2] The story has a certain basis in fact. The Roman army which was pursuing the Quadi did really owe its safety to a storm. But the interpretation of it ascribed to the Emperor is not historical. Those who were with him considered it as a miracle, but they gave the credit for it to Jupiter Pluvius. (cf. Capitolinus, 24; Themistius, *disc.* XV to Theodotius; Claudianus, *in sextum cons. Honor. v.* 340). Dion Cassius alone (LXXI, 10) sets it down to Hermes, invoked by the Egyptian magician Arnuphis. The Jupiter Pluvius on the Column of Antoninus shows that Marcus Aurelius adopted, at least externally, the common interpretation, though no doubt he looked upon it as childish.

[3] Renan (*Marc-Aurèle*, p. 277), believes that the letter was composed during the lifetime of Marcus Aurelius, and that Tertullian used it. Scaliger thought that it was not written until the sixth century. It is certain that the text of Tertullian (*Apol.* 5) does not exactly square with the letter as we have it. Cf. Maran (*Præfat.* III, 5, *P. G.* 5, 138). Harnack (*Die Chronologie*, p. 702), does not come to a decision.

[3] Renan (*Eglise chrétienne*, p. 302); Aubé (*Saint Justin*, p. 61, ss.); Allard (*Histoire des persécutions*, I, 293).

[5] *Texte und Untersuchungen*, XIII, 4. Ground for hestitation is given by the fact that Melito, in his letter to Marcus Aurelius (in Eusebius, IV, 26) mentions edicts of Antoninus.

JOSEPH TURMEL.

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[1] *Hist. Eccl.* IV, 8. 9.

[2] Cf. Funk, *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, I, 333, ss. This detail is not without importance for the interpretation of the rescript. The preference should naturally be given to the more ancient text. Now the Latin text can be interpreted more easily than the Greek in the sense of a legal recognition of Christianity.

[3] Its authenticity was first attacked by Keim (*Theolog. Jahrbücher*, XV). It has been defended by Renan (*Eglise chrétienne*, p. 32); Allard (*Histoire des persécutions*, I, 235); Lightfoot (*The Apostolic Fathers*, I, 320); Mommsen (*Historische Zeitschrift*, 1890, p. 389); Harnack (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, XIII, and *Die Chronologie*, I, 257); Funk (*loc. cit.*).

[4] Cf. Funk (*loc. cit.*, p. 345); Callervaert, in the *Revue d' Histoire et de Littérature religieuses*, VIII (1903), p. 152.

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI AND THE MOSAIC LEGISLATION*

Gabriel Oussani

Introduction.

The discovery and diciphering of the Code of Hammurabi, the oldest code of laws in the world, has given rise to many interesting problems and discussions, and has materially affected our former knowledge of the social and legal customs, not of only ancient Babylonia, but of Western Asia in general. In this famous code we have a monument of antiquity of incomparable legal and historical value, dating as it does, from the third millennium B. C., a thousand years before Moses,[1] and ante-dating by a much greater period the laws of

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*Comp. the writer's article, *The Code of Hammurabi*, in the August-September No. of The New York Review, pp. 178-197, and the full bibliography there given as an appendix. For more recent contributions to the literature on the subject, see the appendix to this article.

[1] On the probable date of Moses, cf. articles *Moses* and *Exodus* in Cheyne's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, (by Cheyne himself), and Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, (by Harford Battersby and W. H. Bennett, respectively); Hommel, F. *The Pharaoh of the Exodus*, *Expository Times*, March, 1899; Lieblein, *L'Exode des Hébreux*, in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archeology*, XX., p. 277, and Vol. XXI, p. 53; Mahler, *Der Pharaoh des Exodus*, Berlin, 1896. Prasek, *On the Question of the Exodus*, *Exp. Times*, March, April, June and August, 1900; Sayce, *Who Was the Pharaoh of the Exodus?* *Homiletic Review*, December, 1899; and in the *Expository Times*, April, 1899. In all probability the Hebrew Exodus took place not, as it was formerly believed, during the reign of Rameses II, but in that of his successor, Merenptah. The limits of the reign of Rameses II are variously given as 1348-1281 B. C. (Sayce, *Egypt of the Hebrews*, p. 309); 1275-1208 (Driver, *Authority and Archeology*, p. 69); or 1324-1258 B. C. (Paton, *The Early History of Syria and Palestine*, p. 15.); and consequently, that of Merenptah about 1200 B. C., which is the most probable date of Moses and the Exodus. Dr. Spiegelberg, in his recent book, *Der Aufenthalt Israel in Aegypten, im Lichte der ægyptischen Monumente*, Strassburg, 1904, has attempted to reconcile the biblical data of the Exodus with the Egyptian monuments, especially the stele of Merenptah, who is supposed to have defeated the Israelites in Palestine, and the Tell-el-Amarna tablets, which speak of the Khabiri (probably the Hebrews). He places the domination of the Hyksos in Egypt at from 1700 to 1500 B. C., during which time many Semitic tribes, including that of Jacob, migrated and settled in Egypt. During the reign of Amenophis IV, the Hebrew tribes, the Khabiri, attack the small tribes of Canaan, and in 1350, Sethi I restores order again. During the

Solon[1] or Lycurgus,[2] the laws of the Twelve Tables,[3] of Rome, or any other ancient legislation.[4] It is by far the oldest, most complete and most

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reign of Rameses II, (1324-1258), the relations between Egypt and the tribes of Goshen are again disturbed, and during that of Merenptah II, i. e., about 1250 B. C., the Hebrew tribes, profiting by these disturbances, flee from Egypt under the guidance of Moses; cf. *Revue Biblique*, 1905, p. 471-472; Cheyne, *Bible Problems and the New Material for their Solution*, New York, 1904, p. 156-159; cf. also *Revue Biblique*, 1899, p. 267 ff., and 1900, p. 578 ff. Dr. Breasted, of Chicago, has announced lately a sensational discovery, viz., the earliest mention of the "camp of Abraham," on the famous list of Sheshong I, at Karnak; cf. *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, 1904, p. 36. On the famous Israel stele of Merenptah, cf., Breasted, *Biblical World*, January, 1897; Deiber, *Revue Biblique*, April, 1899; Hommel, *Expository Times*, October, 1896; Naville, *Les dernières lignes de la stèle mentionnant les Israélites*, Paris, 1898; Petrie, *Contemporary Review*, May, 1896; Wiedemann, *Museon*, 1898, p. 1 ff; and Vol. XVII, p. 89 ff.; Paton, *op. cit*, p. 143.

[1] This famous Athenian lawgiver, son of Execestides, was born about 640 B. C. and died 559 B. C. He was one of the "Seven wise men" and author of the "Solonian Constitution." Cf. O. Seyffert, *Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, (Eng. trans.), London, 1901, pp. 595-596; G. Grote, *History of Greece*, London, 1869, Vol. III, pp. 90-160; V. Duruy, *History of Greece*, (Eng. trans.), Boston, 1892, Vol. I, Section II, pp. 522 ff.; Curtius, *History of Greece* (Eng. trans.), N. Y., 1874, Vol. I, pp. 365 ff.

[2] This Spartan lawgiver, if he ever existed, must have lived somewhere between the 10th (Herodotus) and 8th centuries B. C. (Thucydides). The conflicting traditions on the life and work of Lycurgus are so significant that the majority of modern critics are disposed to relegate him to the region of pure myth. Cf. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., Vol. II, pp. 338-420; V. Duruy, *History of Greece*, (Eng. trans.), Boston, 1892, Vol. I, pp. 443-475; Curtius, *History of Greece*, Vol. I, pp. 209 ff.; Max Duncker, *History of Greece*, London, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 357-396.

[3] The laws of the *Duodecim Tabulæ* represent the first attempt made by the decemvirs (451-450 B. C.) to reduce to a regular code the older unwritten and imperfectly formulated laws of custom—criminal, civil and religious (jus publicum, privatum, sacrum), which had up to that time prevailed in Rome. The Twelve Tables formed practically the source of the whole system of Roman jurisprudence. Tradition relates that they were originally written on twelve tablets of bronze. Only detached fragments have been preserved of this important code of laws, copies of which we are told were still to be seen in the Roman Forum in the 2d century after Christ. Cf. Burns, *Fontes juris Romani*, and F. D. Allen's *Remnants of Early Latin*, 1888, §§ 174-207; Mommsen, *History of Rome*, (Eng. trans.), 1891, Vol. I, p. 365 ff; V. Duruy, *History of Rome*, (Eng. trans.), 1890, Vol. I, pp. 331-340.

[4] That there existed in ancient Egypt a certain system of laws is more than probable. The so-called "Negative Confessions" in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, with their forty-two clauses, are evidently the work of priestly writers, being an expansion of an older and shorter collection of precepts about brotherly love and neighborly duty. Cf. Boscawen, *The First of Empires*, pp. 197-199. A written Code of Laws, similar to that of Hammurabi, probably never existed in Egypt, at least in ancient times. During the short reign of Bkenrenef, the only king of the XXIVth dynasty, we are told by Diodorus (I, 94), that a certain Bocchoris ,"a wise and prudent man," who flourished in Egypt, was one of the six great lawgivers of the valley of the Nile, the other four being Mnevis, Sasyches, Sesostris, Amasis and Darius, father of Xerxes.

important code of laws of the ancient world. The city of Babylon, in which it was enacted and promulgated, was then and for long afterwards, the most cosmopolitan city of antiquity, and the center of civilization for Western Asia. In fact, from the earliest times, and particularly at the Hammurabi period, it seems to have been, not only the political mistress of Asia, but also the source from which religion, art, laws, letters and sciences spread through all Western Asia; and the code of laws which Hammurabi promulgated in the city of Babylon seems to have been accepted as authoritative in all the neighboring countries, such as Assyria, Mesopotamia, Elam, Canaan, and probably South Arabia and Egypt. Hence our code is of an international character, a fact which still further increases its importance.

Prior to the discovery of the Hammurabi code of laws, our knowledge of the social and legal customs of the ancient Babylonians was fragmentary and incomplete, being based almost exclusively on a few detached laws and contract-tablets, the latter of which, although very numerous and covering a long stretch of time, are, nevertheless, rather monotonous and obscure.[1] In the Code of Hammurabi, however,

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He is said to have "established everything that concerned the kings, and prescribed exact rules and laws for the making of contracts. He was so wise, and of so piercing a judgment in his decisions, that many of his sentences, for their excellency, are kept in memory to this very day." Elsewhere, we are told by Diodorus (I, 79), that he made a law that "if a man borrowed money, and the lender had no writing to show for it, and the other denied it upon oath, he should be quit of the debt; to that end, therefore, in the first place, they were to sacrifice to the gods, as men having conscience, and tender and scrupulous in taking of an oath." Budge, *History of Egypt*, Vol. VI, pp. 119-120; Maspero, *Histoire ancienne des peuples de l' Orient classique*, Vol. III, p. 246, note 2; Wiedemann, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 578-9; Prof. Petrie's *Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt*, N. Y., 1898, Lecture VI and VII.; Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1894, chapter V, VI, VII, pp. 79-149.

[1] The principal works on the subject are Oppert and Menant, "*Documents juridiques de l'Assyrie et de la Chaldée*, Paris, 1877, (somewhat antiquated); Peiser-Kohler, *Aus dem Babylonischen Rechtsleben*, Leipzig, 1890, ff; Peiser, F. E., *Jurisprudentiæ Babylonicæ quæ supersunt*," Coethen, 1890; Meissner, B. *Beitraege zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht*, Vol. XIth of Haupt and Delitzsch, *Assyriologische Bibliothek*, Leipzig, 1893; Reisner, G., *Tempelurkunden aus Telloh*, being Heft XVI, of the *Mitteilungen aus den Orientalischen Sammlungen*, Berlin, 1901; Peiser, in the 4th volume of Schrader's *Keilschriftliche Bibliothek*, 1896; Johns, *Assyrian Deeds and Documents*, three vols., Cambridge, 1898, and *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters*, London, New York, 1904; Pinches, *The Old Testament in the light of the historical records and legends of Assyria and Babylonia*, London, 2d ed., 1903; Sayce, *Babylonians and Assyrians*, (in Dr. Craig's *Semitic Series*); Delitzsch Frd, *Zur juristischen Litteratur Babyloniens*, in *Beitraege zur Assyriologie*, IV, pp. 78-87; G. A. Barton, in Dr. Harper's *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature*, N. Y., 1901, pp. XLVI-L, and 256-282; Pinches, in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1897, pp. 589 ff, and 1899, pp. 103 ff; Radau, *Early Babylonian History*, New York, 1900;

the various aspects of Babylonian life, law and customs are so accurately and profusely presented that we are now in a position to form an almost complete picture of that ancient social organization. Nor is this its only value. It has enabled us to see the remote origin of many of the legal customs and practices which have come down to our own day; thus showing our indebtedness to Babylon for many of our social institutions. The well known dictum: "Ex Oriente Lux," was never better illustrated than by the discovery of this famous Babylonian code.

To theologians and Biblical students, however, the supreme interest of the code lies in the unexpected light which it has shed on what is generally called the Mosaic Legislation of the Pentateuch. The exaggerated notions concerning the perfection of this legislation[1] and the extreme views as to its divine authorship[2] on which these notions were based, have been profoundly modified by a more scientific exegesis, aided by new discoveries. Among these discoveries, the Code of Hammurabi takes a prominent place, as it shows more clearly than anything else, the Babylonian source of many Hebrew ideas,

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Teloni, B., *Litteratura Assira*, (*Manuali Hoepli*), Milano, 1903, pp. 167-180; Daiches, S., *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden aus der zeit der Hammurabi-dynastie*, Leipzig, 1903-1905, in 2 parts; Meissner, B., *Aus dem altbabylonischen Recht*; *Skizzen*, Leipzig, 1905.

[1] "Au reste," says Bossuet, "Moise y avait si bien réglé toutes choses que jamais on n' a eu besoin d'y rien changer. C'est pourquoi le corps du droit judaique n'est pas un receueil de diverses lois faites dans des temps et des occasions differentes; Moise, éclairé de l'esprit de Dieu, avait tout prévu . . . Mais ce qu 'il y avait de plus beau dans cette loi, c'est qu 'elle préparait la voie a une loi plus auguste, moins chargée de cérémonies et plus féconde en vertus." *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, II partie ch. III, ed. Lebel, vol. XXXV, p. 206, 203, 201, etc. Comp. also Lagrange, *Historical Criticism and the Old Testament*, (Eng. trans.), London, 1905, pp. 148-155.

[2] It should be noted that in general legislators and reformers of antiquity claimed to be acting under special divine influence. Hammurabi, in the prologue to his code, claims to have received his laws from the Sun-god, just as Confucius, Zoroaster, Mohammed and other legislators of antiquity claim to have received their laws from their respective deities. The question raised by Renan as to whether the Law was given upon Sinai because Sinai was holy, or was Sinai esteemed holy because the Law was given there, is interesting in this connection. Recent researches tend to show that Sinai was regarded as a sacred mountain by the Sumerians, Babylonians, Canaanites and Egyptians long before Moses. Cf. Boscawen, *The First of Empires*, London, 1903, pp. 19, 20, and 321. Cf. also the very suggestive article on *Sinai-Horeb*, by Cheyne and Winckler, in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, cols. 4629-4643, and the 3d ed. of Schrader's *Keilinschrifte und das Alte Testament*, p. 365; also the recent article of G. H. Scipwith, *The God of Sinai and Jerusalem*, in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Vol. XVII, 1905, pp. 489-513.

laws and customs.[1]

The aim of the present and following articles is to study the legislation of the Code of Hammurabi in itself as well as in its relation to that of the ancient Hebrews, which is found embodied in the books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy.

I.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN BABYLONIA.

Judges, Courts, Legal Procedure, Witnesses, Oaths, Etc.

One feature of the Hammurabi Code which strikes the attention of the student, is that it presupposes the existence of regularly constituted courts of law, with duly qualified judges invested with authority to sit in judgment upon the accused and to punish the guilty. In this connection, insistence is laid on the need of impartiality in the judges and on the sanctity of oaths; the duties and responsibilities of witnesses are clearly defined; while bribery, threats and other such influences are severely condemned. All this evidently presupposes a highly developed state of civilization and a well organized social community, such as we look for in vain in other Semitic peoples at this early period. These facts indicate that this high civilization had already been long in existence, and that the Code was only intended to fix definitely certain judicial decisions which, though not new, required the authority of royal approval to give them perfect validity.[2]

It is also evident that in Babylonia at the time of Hammurabi, justice was no longer administered according to the rude natural sense of right, or by tribal custom, as was the case among all other nations of antiquity, the Hebrews included.[3] On the contrary, justice was administered in accordance with the definite enactments of a recognized external authority, invested with full power to dictate laws and to punish transgressors.[4] Hence the Babylonian system of law at the time of Hammurabi had already passed from the nomadic stage of traditional usage into a well developed system of legislation. The contract-tablets, furthermore, reveal to us that this condition of affairs must have existed in Babylonia centuries before Hammurabi. There is every reason to suppose that our code was constructed on the basis of much earlier Sumerian or non-Semitic collections of laws, such as repeatedly appear in many old Babylonian contract-tablets of the pre-Hammurabi age, and in which many phrases occur that seem to have been extracted from some codified system.[1] The Code of Hammurabi represents, therefore, an amalgamation of legal decisions and practices coming from widely different sources, a result which is undoubtedly due to the fusion of races in Babylonia at a very early period.[2]

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[1] Comp. Delitzsch, Frd. *Babel und Bibel*, and the almost numberless articles and books, published for and against the position taken by the famous Berlin Assyriologist. Delitzsch doubtless exaggerated the importance of some of the material he worked into his pan-Babylonian theory, but according to many competent scholars, his main position and conclusions remain unshaken.

[2] Cook, S. A. *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*, London, 1903, p. 48.

[3] Cf. Gen. xx, 9; xxix, 26; xxxiv, 7; II Sam. xiii, 12.

[4] In this connection the reader may read over some of the scathing denunciations and curses launched by Hammurabi, in the epilogue of his code, against those who will not respect and obey his rules and regulations.

The earliest mention of a professional judge in Babylonia is found in the stele of Manistusu, one of the most ancient of known monuments.[3] There we read of a certain Galzu, a judge, and of many officials who acted as judges upon occasion.[1] But the contents of many of the pre-Hammurabic contract-tablets clearly show that such an official position must have been well known in early Babylonia. In the Code of Hammurabi itself, references to judges are not as frequent as one would expect, which is easily explained by the assumption that the office was already too well established to demand any special emphasis; but the few scattered allusions which we find clearly indicate the dignity of judges, and their principal duties and liabilities. Thus we read in § 5 that:

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[1] Johns, C. H. W. *Assyrian and Babylonian Laws, Contracts and Letters*, London-New York, 1904, pp. 40-43. We are actually in possession of many detached Sumerian laws, several centuries earlier than Hammurabi. These have come down to us in later Babylonian legal phrase-books, drawn up by scribes, and which served as school text-books and exercises for the Babylonian students of Sumerian, the language of the pre-Semitic inhabitants of Babylonia. Cf. Peiser. *Jurisprudentiæ babylonicæ quæ supersunt*, 1890; Meissner, B., in *Beitraege zur Assyriologie*, Vol. III, pp. 493-523; Delitzsch, Frd., *op cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 78-87. These Sumerian laws refer principally to the organization of the family. Hence they were called by Haupt "*Sumerian Family-laws*"; *Die Sumerische Familiengesetze*, Leipzig, 1879. The date of these very ancient Sumerian laws cannot be later than 3000 B. C., possibly earlier. Cf. F. Hommel, *Geschihte Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 1885, pp. 380 ff. The following are a few specimens of these ancient Sumerian Family-laws:

I. If a son has said to his father: You are not my father, he may brand him, lay fetters upon him, and sell him.

II. If a son has said to his mother: You are not my mother, one shall brand his forehead, drive him out of the city, and make him go out of the house.

III. If a father has said to his son: You are not my son, he shall leave house and yard.

IV. If a mother has said to her son: You are not my son, he shall leave house and property.

V. If a wife hates her husband and has said: You are not my husband, one shall throw her into the river.

VI. If a husband has said to his wife: You are not my wife, he shall pay half a mina of silver.

VII. If a man has hired a slave and he dies, is lost, has fled, has been incapacitated, or has fallen sick, he shall measure out 10 ka of corn *per diem* as his wages.

It must be noticed that No. V refers not to a private quarrel, but to a refusal of conjugal rights, while in No. VI the man divorces, or puts away, his wife, but pays a heavy fine.

[2] S. A. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 49

[3] Manishtusu, King of Kish, reigned about 4000 B. C. According to Hilprecht,

> "If a judge pass judgment, render a decision, deliver a verdict, signed and sealed, and afterwards alter his judgment which he has rendered, he shall be called to account for the alteration of the judgment, and he shall pay twelve-fold the penalty which was in the said judgment; and, in the assembly, they shall expel him from his judgment seat, and he shall not return, and he shall no more take his seat with the judges in a case."

The last words are to be particularly noted, as they clearly show the existence and the dignity of professional judges, of courts of justice, each judge having his own seat; and of a higher court of appeal before which the accused judge must account for the alteration of his decision.[2] In the Pentateuchal legislation, no parallel is to be found

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Old Babylonian Inscriptions, chiefly from Nippur, Philadelphia, 1895, Vol. I p. 26; *Explorations in Bible Lands during the nineteenth century*, Philadelphia, 1903, p. 330; and Radau, H., *Early Babylonian History down to the end of the Fourth Dynasty of Ur*. New York, 1900, pp. 18, 23, 126, 127, 148, 214, he is anterior to both Naram-Sin and his father, Sargon I, of Agade; (the former, according to Nabonidus, the last King of Babylon, 555-538 B. C., reigned about 3800 B. C.); while, according to Thureau-Dangin, (*Revue d' Assyriologie et d' Archéologie Orientale*, Vol. IV. p. 74), he was "probablement postérieur a Naram-Sin." Cf. also H. Winckler, *Altbabylonische Keilschriftexte*, Leipzig, 1892, p. 22, and his recent book, *Auszug aus der Vorderasiatischen Geschichte*," Leipzig, 1905, p. 6; Rogers, *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, N. Y., 1901, Vol. I, p. 360; Boscawen Chad., *The First of Empires*, London, 1903, p. 51; Maspero, G., *The Dawn of Civilization, Egypt and Chaldea*, N. Y., 1894, p. 602, and Winckler, *Sumer und Akkad*, in the *Mitteilungen des Akad. Orientalistischen-Vereins*, Vol. I, p. 18.

[1] Johns, *op. cit.* p. 80.

[2] "There are two disputed phrases in this law as it stands. In the first place, the judgment is presumably annulled by an appeal, either to a new court or to the king himself. In the contemporary letters of Hammurabi and his dynasty, the king is frequently appealed to, either directly, or after a case had been tried in the local courts. In one instance the litigants, having failed for two years to obtain justice at Sippar, apply to the king, who gives orders for the defendant and the 'witnesses who have knowledge of the case' to be brought to him to Babylon for judgment. In another we find Hammurabi investigating a charge of bribery against one of his officials; he confiscates 'the money or whatsoever was offered as the bribe,' and commands the men who had taken it and the witnesses to be sent to him for trial. (King, W. L., *Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*, 3 vols., London, 1898-1900,

to this Babylonian law, although bribery and unfairness in legal proceedings are repeatedly condemned.[1]

According to § 9 of the Code, it was the duty of the judge to examine the testimony of the witnesses, whether written or oral:

> § 9. "If a man who has lost any article find it in the hands of another, and the man with whom the lost article is found say: A merchant sold it to me in the presence of witnesses, and the owner of the article says, I can produce witnesses who know my lost property, then shall the buyer bring the merchant who sold it to him, and the witness before whom it was purchased, and the owner shall bring witnesses who know the lost property. The judge shall examine their evidence before God (i. e., in open court), and both of the witnesses before whom the price was paid, and of the witnesses who identify the lost article. If the merchant is then proven to be a thief, he shall be put to death. The owner of the lost article receives his property, the buyer shall recover the money he paid for the same from the estate of the seller."

In criminal cases involving death sentence, the judge could grant the accused six months' grace in which to produce his witnesses.

> § 13. "If the witnesses of that man be not at hand, the judge shall put off the case for six months; and if then he do not produce his witnesses within these six months, that man is malevolent, he himself shall bear the penalty in that case."

This paragraph probably refers to theft, which in the Code of Hammurabi is sometimes punishable with death. As Dr. Davies remarks, "The laws of Hammurabi which pertained to theft are much harsher than those of the Hebrews. This is natural, for they point to a more developed commercial and business system than that which obtained in Israel."[2] In a commercial community harsh penalties are required to safeguard the right of personal property.

The judge had also power to act in cases in which a father wished to disinherit his son, or when a widow with a young family desired to marry again.

Vol. III, 21 ff, and 136). On the other hand, Scheil and Johns render, "if . . . he has annulled (altered) his judgment," which seems hardly natural, since the judge, however much of a partisan, would scarcely go back upon his written verdict. It is possible that the law refers to a judicial error, and the penalty and subsequent punishment would be excessively severe. In the second place, the "twelve-fold" (*a-du* 12 *su*) penalty has been disputed, and Winckler, in his edition of the Code, understands it to mean that the penalty consists of the sum (in the judgment) together with 12-60, that is to say, an additional 20 per cent. The addition of a fifth—as in late Israelitish laws, (Lev. vi, 5; xxvi, 15, 19; Num. v, 7). This view is suggestive, but there are serious objections against it. (See T. Jeremias, *Moses und Hammurabi*, p. 25, n. 2; Orelli, *Gesetz Hammurabis*, p. 47; S. A. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

[1] Cf. Exodus xxiii, 6-8; I Sam. viii, 3; xii, 3; Isa. i, 23; Ezek. xxii, 12; Amos v, 12; Deut. xvi, 9; xxiv, 17; xxvii, 19; Levit. xix, 15.

[2] *The Codes of Hammurabi and Moses*, Cincinnati-New York, 1905, p. 30.

§ 168. "If a man decide to thrust out [disinherit] his son, and say to the judge, I will thrust out my son, then the judge shall examine into his reasons, and if the son have no grievous fault, which justifies his being thrust out, the son may not be cut off from sonship."

§ 177. "If a widow, whose children are minors, desire to enter another house (i. e., re-marry), she shall not do so without the consent of the judge. If she enters into another house, the judges shall examine into that left by her former husband, and they may give over the house of the former husband to the new husband and that woman, to be managed by them, and they (the judges) shall cause them to draw up a contract. They shall keep the house in order, and bring up the children, but may not sell the household goods for money. Whoever may buy the household goods of a widow's children shall forfeit his money, and the goods shall revert to their owners."

If the children wished to turn their widowed mother out of her house, they could not do it without referring the matter to the judge.

§ 172. "If her husband have not given her a gift, they (their children) shall restore her dowry, and she shall receive from the property of her husband a share equal to that of a son. If her sons worry her, so as to drive her out of the house, then the judge shall inquire into the matter, and if the sons be to blame, the wife shall not leave her husband's house, but if the wife be determined to leave the house, she must leave to her sons the gift which her husband gave her, but the present from her father she may retain. She may marry the man of her heart (choice)."

Slanderers of votaries and married women were to be summoned before the judge, and severely punished:

§ 127. "If a man point his finger at a votary or at a man's wife, but cannot prove his charge, he shall be taken before the judge, and shall be branded in his forehead."

As Dr. Cook remarks, "The precise nature of this penalty is not clear. It is conceivable that the forelock, the mark of freedom, was cut off; but the same word is used elsewhere of the branding of the slaves."[1]

The judge was also supposed to be present at the execution of the sentence,[2] and he was also expected to reconcile, whenever it was in his power to do so, father and son;[3] to take the inventory of the property of a widow's children on her re-marriage,[4] and to decide family quarrels.[5] His services were also called upon for various other occasions, as clearly appears from many dispositions in the Code

In Babylonia, according to Johns, "Judges constituted for the most part a distinct profession, but it must not be understood that they had no other means of livelihood. Indeed, there is no hint anywhere that they received any remuneration for their services. But it was a high honor and by no means subsidiary to another office. Among those who officiated as judges, we find most of the higher officials.[1] Doubtless the king himself acted as judge on occasions, and probably no great official of the realm was wholly free from the call to act in a judicial capacity. But, as a rule, the judge is simply noted as 'judge.' That the priests were judges (as it was the case in Israel in later Old Testament times), is quite unproved. The judges were men of great importance and high rank, but there is nothing to show that they were priests. An age qualification is more likely. The judge was a professional man. We often find a man, bearing the title 'judge,' acting as party to a suit, or witness to a deed, when he is certainly not acting in his judicial capacity. To a certain extent he was a territorial officer, had his own district for jurisdiction, and was jealous of cases being taken elsewhere. How the ranks of the judges were filled we do not know, but there is a hint of royal appointment in the phrase, 'the king's judges.' On the other hand, there is clear evidence of the office being hereditary. Thus, Ibik-Anunitum had no less than three sons, Idin-Ishtar, Marduk-Mushallim, and Nannar-iddinam, all judges. Whether a right to the office descended in the female line is not quite clear, but we find a lady, Ishtar-ummu, among the judges, on occasion. She was also the scribe."[2]

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[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

[2] Cf. Law § 127, quoted above.

[3] Cf. Law § 168, quoted above.

[4] Law § 174, quoted above.

[5] Law § 172, quoted above.

Although no mention is made, in the Code of Hammurabi, of "chief judge," the existence, nevertheless, of such a position is quite certain, for it existed in old Sumerian and later Assyrian and Babylonian times.[3] We often find several judges together on the bench, and the highest official in rank was doubtless chief judge on the occasion.[1] The number of judges sitting in each case was usually four or five. They had to sign their names at the end of their judgment in its written form. Prof. Sayce tells us that, at least in later Babylonian times, where foreigners were involved, the case was first tried before special judges, who probably belonged to the same nationality as the parties to the suit; if one of the latter, however, was a Babylonian, it was afterward brought before a native tribunal.[2] Plaintiff and defendant pleaded their own case verbally, their plea being afterwards drawn up in legal form by the clerks of the court, after which witnesses were called and examined, and oath was taken in the names of the gods and of the king. Advocates are unknown, for no mention whatever is made in any of the documents so far discovered, of legal advisers and defenders. In later Babylonian times, legal processes became more elaborate, as appears from the many contract-tablets of the time of Nebuchadnezzar and Nabonidus.[3]

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[1] In a document dated at Babylon the 6th day of Nisan in the seventeenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, we read: "These are the judges before whom Sapik-zeri, the son of Zirutu, and Baladhu, the son of Nasikatum, the servant of the secretary of the Marshlands, have appeared in their suit regarding a house. The house and the deed had been duly sealed by Zirutu, the father of Sapik-zeri, and given to Baladhu. Baladhu, however, had come to terms with Sapik-zeri and handed the house over to him and had taken the deed (from the record office) and had given it to Sapik-zeri. Nebo-edhernapisti, the prefect of the Marshlands; Nebo-suzzizanni, the sub-prefect of the Marshlands; Merodach-erba, the mayor of the city of Erech; Imbi-ilu, the priest of Ur; Bel-yuballidh, the son of Merodach-sum-ibni, the prefect of the western bank; Abta, the son of Suzubu, the son of Babutu; Musezib-Bel, the son of Nadin-akhi, the son of the adopted one; Baniyua, the son of Abta, the priest of the temple Sadu-rabu; and Samas-ibni, the priest of Sadu-rabu."

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

[3] Johns, *Assyrian Deeds and Documents*, Cambridge, 1898 (§567.)

The Semites looked upon the gods as the "givers of decisions";[4] and the decisions of those who, like Hammurabi, were believed to represent them on earth, were taken as expressions of the will of the gods. Hence, among the Semites, as well as among most primitive nations, legal decisions were given at the gate of some celebrated temple or shrine, or in the temple itself, or in some other sacred place. In Babylonia the most appropriate places were the gate of the goddess Nin-marki, that of the god Nun-gal, the temple or the gate of Shamash, and the temple of Marduk, the tutelary deity of Babylon.[5] In Israel, as appears from I Sam. vii, 16, the place of judgment was at times a sacred place of some note, but, generally speaking, they chose one of the city gates, which were then, as they are still, the centers of business activity.[6] In later Babylonian times, courts of justice were also instituted in the king's palace, without supplanting, however, the temple gates and other sacred places.

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[1] Cf. Johns' article, *Code of Hammurabi*, in the Extra Volume of Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, 1904, p. 595.

[2] *Babylonians and Assyrians, Life and Customs*, New York, 1900, pp. 197-198.

[3] Specimens of these will be given below.

[4] Cf. W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 2d edit., London, 1894, p. 70.

[5] Meissner, B., *Beitraege zur altbabylonische Privatrecht*, Nos. 43 and 78 ff; Johns, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

[6] Job xxix, 7 ff; Ruth iv, 2 ff. In Arabia, where nomadic life was so characteristically opposed to settled, agricultural, and town life, the most important public transactions, such as rendering decisions and settling disputes between the various members of the tribe, as well as holding literary and poetical competitions, etc., were held in the public markets or fairs (*suq*), some of which were quite famous, such as that of Ukad and others. Cf. Huart, Cl., *A History of Arabic Literature*, (Eng. trans.), New York, 1903, p. 27; "*Bulugh-ul-Arab fi ahwal-il-Arab*," by Shukri Mahmud

In the Code of Hammurabi, as well as in all ancient and late Babylonian and Assyrian legal contracts and suits, witnesses held an important place. In the Code they are called "Shibu," which means literally "grey-headed" or "*elder*," corresponding to the Arabic *Sheikh*, and the Hebrew *Zekenim*.[1] Some of these were permanently attached to the court, practically forming a kind of jury; while others, witnesses properly so called, were brought in to report what they had seen or heard about the cases under trial. The former class of witnesses practically gave decision on the case, the judges rendering the official verdict; while the others were brought in by the parties concerned, or summoned by the court, only to testify before the judges their personal knowledge of the matter. These were generally called "*Shibi mudi*," i. e., "witnesses that know." When a party refused to appear in court or as a witness, the judge had the right to summon him and "cause him to come before the judge," or "bring him before the other party." Cases could be settled out of court, and the agreement was generally written in contract-form, with signature of witnesses. Thus, in the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, a certain Imliya brought witnesses to the door of the house of an official called Bel-iddin, and accused Arrabi, the superintendent of the works, of having stolen an overcoat and a loin-cloth belonging to himself. But it was agreed that there would be no need on the part of the plaintiff to summon witnesses; the stolen goods were returned without recourse to the law.[2]

Alusi, of Bagdad, (a history of Arabic civilization, literature and customs, in Arabic), Bagdad, 1900, 3 vols., Vol. I, pp. 282-299 ff.

[1] The word *shibu*, "witness," occurs 16 times in the Code, and *shibutu*, "witness or testimony," twice. It is doubtful whether the signification was always "*grey-headed*" and "*elder*." Apparently, there is no connection between the two ideas, unless the word meant witness, i. e., a man of acknowledged probity and standing, as the "elders" of a community were supposed to be. In § 9 of the Code, "those who know," who were not necessarliy old, are called *shibi*. Cf. Johns in Hastings' "*Extra Volume*" of the *Bible Dictionary*, article, "*Code of Hammurabi*," p. 595. I am inclined to think that, originally, the word *shibi*, or elders, was applied to those respectable and venerable members of the community, who acted as witnesses in drawing up contracts for sale, exchange, deeds, bonds, deposits, etc., and in these cases the witnesses were undoubtedly the elders of the community, but in course of time the term acquired a technical meaning, and was applied to witnesses in general. Cf. Jeremiah, *Moses und Hammurabi*, p. 29; Meissner, *Beitraege zur altbabylonische Privatrecht*, p. 5 ff, and 95; Johns, *op. cit.*, p. 85. Comp. also Delitzsch, *Assyrisches Handwoerterbuch*, Leipzig, 1894. (sub voce.)

[2] Sayce, *Assyrians and Babylonians*, p. 200. Johns, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

Bribing, intimidating, or in any way influencing witnesses, as well as false testimony, are severely punished in the Hammurabi Code. In §§ 3 and 4, we read:

§ 3. "If a man (in a case pending judgment) threaten the witnesses, or do not establish that which he has testified, if that case be a case involving life, that man shall be put to death."

The corresponding Hebrew law is found in Deut. xix, 16-19:

"If an unrighteous witness rise up against any man to testify against him of wrong doing; then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord, before the priest and the judges who shall be in those days; and the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if the witness be a false witness and had testified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his brother."

The law in both cases is evidently based on the *Lex talionis.*

§ 4. "If a man offer as a bribe grain or money to witnesses, he himself shall bear the sentence of the court in that case."

The corresponding Hebrew law is found in Exod. xxiii, 8:

"And thou shalt take no gift; for a gift blindeth them that have sight, and perverteth the word of the righteous."

And in Exod. xxiii, 1-3, we read:

"Thou shalt not take up a false report; put not thy hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou speak in a cause to turn aside after a multitude to wrest justice; neither shalt thou favor a poor man in his cause."[1]

Witnesses were necessary in all legal purchases and transactions. Thus in § 7, we read:

"If a man buy silver, gold, slave, male or female, ox, sheep, or anything whatsoever from the son, or slave of any person, without witness or contract, or receive the same on deposit, he is regarded as a thief, and shall be put to death."[2]

The object of this law is evidently to prevent underhand business transactions with irresponsible children and faithless slaves or those inexperienced in such matters.

In §§ 122, 123 and 124 of the Code, we read:

"If a man deposit silver, gold, or anything whatsoever, all that he may deposit, he shall show to witnesses, make a contract, and then he shall deposit."

"If a man deposit anything without witnesses and contract, and they at whose place the deposit was made, deny it, there is no legal redress in that case."

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[1] For later Jewish laws relating to false witnesses cf. *Jewish Encyclopædia*, Vol. I, 394a.

[2] Cf. Ruth iv, 2 ff; where Boaz meets the other kinsman of Ruth, at the gate of the city of Bethlehem, to transact business before the elders of the city, and to draw up a contract before witnesses.

"If a man deposit silver, gold, or anything whatsoever with another in the presence of witnesses, and the depository deny it, he shall be brought before the court, and whatever he had denied he shall pay in full" (if convicted).[1]

No exact parallel to these dispositions can be found in the Pentateuchal legislation. The nearest is that found in Leviticus vi, 2-6:

"If any one sin, and commit a trespass against Jehovah, and deal falsely with his neighbors in a matter of deposit, or of bargain, or of robbery, or have found that which was lost, and deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie; in any of all these things that a man doeth, sinning therein, then it shall be, if he hath sinned and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing which he hath gotten by oppression, or the deposit which was committed to him, or the lost thing which he found, or anything about which he hath sworn falsely, he shall even restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more thereto: unto him to whom it appertaineth shall he give it, in the day of his being found guilty."

Witnesses were also asked to identify the lost articles in dispute.

§ 11. "If the owner (or claimant) of the lost article do not produce witnesses to identify said article, he is malevolent and guilty of fraud; he shall be put to death."

§ 10. "If the buyer cannot produce the one who sold the article and the witnesses before whom he bought it, but its owner bring witnesses who identify it, then the buyer is put to death as the thief, and the owner of the lost article shall take his property."[2]

The reader must certainly have noticed that whenever the word "witness" occurs, it is always in the plural number, for, as we know from the many documents and contract-tablets, witnesses were required to be always more than one, not less than two, and, possibly, in capital sentences, more than two, just as in the Deuteronomic legislation, where serious crimes required the evidence of "*two or three*" witnesses.[3]

The taking and administering of oaths holds a prominent place in the Hammurabi Code, as well as in Babylonian legal procedure in general. The sanctity of the oath was of course insisted upon, and for this reason it was generally taken in some sacred place and administered by the judges themselves to both litigants and witnesses.

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[1] Harper, in his translation, renders the last clause as follows: "He shall double whatever he has disputed, and repay it." (*The Code of Hammurabi*, Chicago, 1904, p. 43).

[2] Cf. also Law § 9, quoted above, which refers to the same topic. As we have already remarked, theft was considered a capital offence, and hence, in the majority of cases, punishable with death.

[3] Deut. xvii, 6; Num. xxxv, 30; cf. also Matt. xviii, 16; xxvi, 60; II Corinth. xiii, 1; I Timoth. v, 19.

Sometimes it was administered by the king himself. Quite frequently, the names of one or more gods, together with that of the king, are mentioned. In later Assyrian and Babylonian times the taking of oaths, although not entirely superseded, nor in any way neglected, did not play such a prominent part. It became in fact a legal formality to which all had to submit.[1]

According to the Code of Hammurabi, in all legal suits in which independent evidence was not available, two methods were prescribed. The first was to appear "before God," i. e., take a solemn oath in order to purge oneself of the charge. The other was to undergo an ordeal. Hence we read:

§ 120. "If a man has deposited his corn for safe keeping in another's house and it has suffered damage in the granary, or if the owner of the house has opened the store and taken the corn, or has disputed the amount of the corn that was stored in his house, the owner of the corn shall declare on oath the amount of his corn, and the owner of the house shall return him double."

§ 126. "If a man has said that something of his is lost, which is not lost, or has alleged a depreciation, though nothing of his is lost, he shall estimate the depreciation on oath, and he shall pay double whatever he has claimed."

§ 240. "If a boat, on its course, has run into a boat at anchor, and sunk it, the owner of the boat that was sunk shall estimate on oath whatever was lost in his boat, and the owner of the moving vessel, which sunk the boat at anchor, shall make good his boat and what was lost in it,"

§ 227. "If someone has deceived the brander, and induced him to cut out a mark on a slave, that man shall be put to death and buried in his house; the brander shall swear, 'I did not mark him knowingly,' and shall go free."

§ 206. "If a man has struck another in a quarrel, and caused him a permanent injury, that man shall swear, 'I struck him without malice,' and shall pay the doctor."

§ 207. "If he has died of his blows, (the man) shall swear (similarly), and pay one-half a mina of silver."

§ 266. "If lightning has struck a fold, or a lion has made a slaughter, the herdsman shall purge himself by oath, and the owner of the fold shall bear the loss of the fold."

§§102, 103. "If the merchant has given money, as a speculation, to the agent, who during his travels has met with misfortune, he shall return the full sum to the merchant. If, on his travels, an enemy has forced him to give up some of the goods he was carrying, the agent shall specify the amount on oath and shall be acquitted."

§ 106. "If an agent has taken money of a merchant, and his principal suspects him, that principal shall prosecute his agent, put him on oath before the elders, as to the money taken; the agent shall pay to the merchant threefold what he misappropriated."

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[1] Johns, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-94.

§ 107. "If the principal has overcharged the agent and the agent has (really) returned to his principal whatever his principal gave him, and if the principal has disputed what the agent has given him, that agent shall put his principal on oath before the elders, and the merchant, because he has defrauded the agent, shall pay to the agent sixfold what he misappropriated."

§ 249. "If a man has hired an ox, and God has struck it, and it has died, the man that hired the ox shall make affidavit and go free."

The principle underlying the validity and efficaciousness of this oath of purgation or attestation, which allows the accused to clear himself of an imputed crime by swearing that the charge is false, is evidently the belief that the deity, in whose presence the oath is taken, will avenge himself upon the perjurer. This conclusion is evidenced by the religious and social customs of the other Semitic nations, and of all ancient peoples in general.[1]

Oaths being held as so sacred, perjury was severly punished. Hence if the suit was a capital one, the perjurer was punished with death. If it was slander, the penalty was branding. But the most widely current penalty in similar cases, not involving capital offences, was that the suitor who could not justify in any way his accusation or claim, not only lost his case, but was condemned to pay the penalty which, if successful, he would have inflicted on the other party. Akin to the oath of purgation was the practice of ordeal which furnished a more material and recognized test. The test of ordeal seems to have been practised by all nations of antiquity, including the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Old Saxons, and even the Hebrews. It was of various kinds, such as plunging into deep water, fire, etc. Those who lost their lives in the ordeal were considered guitly, and *vice versa*. In the Code of Hammurabi the test of ordeal is prescribed only twice, and in both cases the ordeal was for the suspected person to plunge into a sacred river, which was supposed to overpower the guilty and save the innocent. The first case is the following:

§ 2. "If a man has accused another of laying a spell upon him (i. e., of being a sorcerer), but is unable to sustain the charge, the accused shall go to the sacred river; he shall plunge into the sacred river, and if the sacred river shall conquer him (i. e., if he be drowned), he that accused him shall take possession of his house. If the sacred river shall show his innocence and he is saved, his accuser shall be put to death. He that plunged into the sacred river shall appropriate the house of him that accused him."

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[1] Cf. Janssen in the *Revue Biblique*, 1903, p. 259, (quoted by Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 63 in note), where he tells us of a guilty Bedouin who agrees to take an oath at a holy tomb, but on his way, fearing the possible consequences, is filled with terror and confesses.

The other case is that of a wife, who, having fallen under the suspicion of unfaithfulness, protests to be innocent:

§ 132. "If the finger have been pointed against a man's wife (i. e., if she has been suspected), but she have not been caught lying with another man, she shall plunge into the river for her husband's (satisfaction)."

Another kind of ordeal practised in Babylonia, but not mentioned in the Code of Hammurabi, consisted in the litigant being compelled to eat a mina weight of some magically concocted food and to drink the contents of an inscribed bowl. What the result was expected to be is not stated, for the text which gives it is so fragmentary that it is very obscure.[1]

II.

LAW AND JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ISRAEL.

Was There a Legislative Authority in Ancient Israel?

It has been truly said that law as law was unknown in early Israel.[2] The customs of the clans, and the conduct of the elders or of the most influential members of the tribe, were looked upon as the standards of law and morality. Lawfulness was a matter of custom more or less ancient and more or less approved; and penalty was equally a matter of custom. When custom failed in a specific case, judgment could be rendered and new precedents might be made which in process of time would crystallize into customs.[3] Hence the old tribal system among primitive Semitic clans, and especially in early Israel and Arabia, knew no legislative authority; and no single person or groups of persons was ever acknowledged as having power to make laws or to render judgment.[4] Of course, prominent individuals or families within the tribe enjoyed certain privileges, in acknowledgment of which they performed certain duties; and in many cases they were called upon to settle differences, but they had no judicial powers, and if their decision did not satisfy the litigants, they had neither the right nor the power to enforce obedience, much less to inflict punishment. "Within the tribe all men are on a footing of equality, and under a communistic system petty offences are unreasonable. Serious misdemeanor is punished by expulsion; the offender is excluded from the protection of his kinsmen, and the penalty is sufficiently severe to prevent its being a common occurence. The man who is wronged must take the first step in gaining redress, and when it happens that the whole tribe is aroused by the perpetration of any exceptionally serious crime, the offence is fundamentally regarded as a violation of the tribe's honor, rather than as a personal grievance on the part of the family of the sufferer."[1] This condition of affairs, however, does not necessarily imply a condition of lawlessness and irresponsible social organization. On the contrary, tribal customs formed practically a law of binding character, although they were not regarded as law in the proper sense of the term.

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[1] Johns, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

[2] E. Day, *The Social Life of the Hebrews*, (Dr. Craig's *Semitic Series*), New York, 1901, p. 177.

[3] E. Day, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.; Benzinger, in his article *Law and Justice*, in Cheyne's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, cols. 2714-2715.

[4] Benzinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit. On primitive Semitic social life and institutions, cf. W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 2d ed., London, 1894; *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, 2d ed., London, 1903; G. A. Barton, *Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*, New York, 1902, especially pp. 30-80, and the authorities there referred to. Cook, S. A., *op. cit.*, chap. iii, and *alibi passim.*

That such was the prevalent legal system of the ancient Hebrews in the patriarchal period is quite certain.[1] The few recorded incidents in the lives of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob furnished ample illustration of it. The long sojourn of the Hebrews in Egypt, and the comparatively advanced civilization with which they there came in contact, as well as in their settlement in Canaan, might be expected to have influenced their old tribal system of law and justice. Nevertheless, the authentic historical records of Israel's national formation, and even the legislation of the Book of the Covenant, which is undoubtedly the oldest Hebrew code of laws, when carefully examined, utterly fail to show any such remarkable advance in the administration of law and justice, over the old nomadic tribal system.[2] It is true that, as Dr. Benzinger remarks, "before the monarchy Israel had attained a certain degree of unity in matters of law; not in the sense that it possessed a written law common to all the tribes, or as a uniform organization for the pronouncing of legal judgments, but in the sense that along with a common God it had a community of custom and of feeling in matters of law, which community of feeling can be traced back very far. *It is not so done in Israel* and *Folly in Israel, which ought not to be done*, are proverbial expressions reaching back to quite early times."[3] Our main contention, however, remains unshaken, viz., that law as law, with legislative power and authority, or a uniform system of legal procedure with courts and professional judges, were unknown in the earlier period of Israelitish history.[1]

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[1] Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50. Cf. also Benzinger, *op. cit.*, col. 2715. The same condition of affairs still obtains among the majority of modern Arab tribes, as has been attested by such accurate witnesses as Palgrave, Doughty, Burton, Lady Anne Blunt and others. The same tribal custom prevails also among the scattered Bedouin tribes of Mesopotamia, Syria and North Africa, as well as among all ancient and modern half-civilized nations. "Every Arab tribe," says Burkhardt, "has its chief sheikh, and every camp is headed by a sheikh, or at least by an Arab of some consideration; but the sheikh has no actual authority over the individuals of his tribe. . . . Should a dispute happen between two individuals, the sheikh will endeavor to settle the matter; but if either party be dissatisfied with his advice he cannot insist upon obedience. The Arab can only be persuaded by his own relations; and if they fail, war commences between the two families and all their kindred respectively. . . . In fact the most powerful Aeneze chief dares not inflict a trifling punishment on the poorest man of his tribe without incurring the risk of mortal vengeance from the individual and his relations. . . . The prerogative of the sheikhs consists in leading their tribe against the enemy; in conducting negotiations for peace or war; in fixing the spot for encampments; in entertaining strangers of note, etc., and even these privileges are much limited." *Bedouins and Wahabys*, pp. 115-116. The ten Judges of Israel were by no means judges, in the strict sense of the word; they were the sheikhs or leaders of their people, in which capacity they distinguished themselves in leading their tribes against their enemies, the Canaanitish tribes. Hence, as W. R. Smith remarks, "the idea of executive government, as we understand it, is quite unknown to the inhabitants of the desert. The business of a judge, among the Hebrews as among the Arabs, was to declare the law when consulted, not to enforce it, or even to offer a decision that was not asked. The principle held good alike in criminal and civil cases, and the foundation of what we call criminal law was the right of self-help on the principle of exact retaliation." *The Prophets of Israel,* 2d ed., London, 1902, p. 36.

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[1] On the primitive, Mosaic and post-Mosaic Hebrew social and legal life, cf. the following works: C. F. Keil, *Manual of Biblical Archeology*, (Eng. trans.), Edinburg, 1888, in 2 vols; especially Vol. II, pp. 150-175 and 290-380; as well as *Hebrew Archeologies* of Ewald, Schegg, Abbé Glaire, and the more modern ones of Benzinger (1894), and Nowack (Leipzig, 1894); E. Day, *op. cit.*, New York, 1901; Buhl, F., *La Société israèlite d'après l'Ancien Testament*, (French trans.), Paris, 1904; Amitai, L., *La Sociologie selon la législation juive, etc.*, Paris, 1902; Castelli, D., *Il diritto di testare nella legislazione Ebraica*, 1878; Trabaud, H., *La loi mosaique, ses origines, son developpement et son role*, . . . Paris, 1903; Todd, J., *Politics and Religion in Ancient Israel*, New York, 1904; G. Levy, *La famille dans l' antiquité Israèlite*, Paris, 1904; Duschak, *Das Mosaische Strafrecht*, 1869; Klein, *Das Gesetz ubèr das Gerichtliche Beweisverfahren nach mosaisch-talmudisches Recht*, 1885; Bertholet, *Die Stellung der Israeliten und Juden zu dem Fremden*, 1896; Mielzinger, *The Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce*, Cincinnati, 1901; and the many valuable articles in the Dictionaries of Herzog, Winer, Schenkel, Riehm, Cheyne, Hastings, Vigouroux, as well as the *Commentaries* on the Hexateuch, Judges and Kings, by Dillmann, Holzinger, Gunkel, Wildboer, Baentzsch, Bertholet, Steuernagel, Driver, Lagrange, Moore, Gray, etc., and the many interesting articles in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, of which eleven vols. are already published.

[2] It must be remembered that the sons of Jacob and their posterity lived a very retired and secluded life in Egypt. They were confined to one or two localities, peacefully enjoying an agricultural or semi-nomadic life, their relations and contact with the idolatrous Egyptians being chiefly material, and without any intimate connection in religious and social affairs. In all probability they were governed by their own appointed chiefs or elders.

[3] Art. cit. in op. cit.; cf. Gen. xxxiv, 7; Jos. xii, 15; Judg. xix, 23; xx, 10; and

A study of the different Hebrew terms for "judge" clearly shows that a professional class of judges, and, consequently, duly constituted courts, did not exist in Israel till the first period of the monarchy, and even later. The *Shoterim* שטרים were primarily subordinate military officials, who were employed partly in the maintenance of civil order and military discipline.[2] It was not until post-exilic times that the term was applied to one with judicial power.[3] The *Mehokek* מחקק (from *hakak* primarily, "to cut in," "to inscribe," "to decide," etc., and subsequently, as in Arabic, "to be just," "right," etc.), meant originally commander or ruler.[4] The *Shophetim* (Lat. Sufetes, plural; Assyrian, Sapatu), from which the "Book of Judges" takes its title, were not judges but *champions* and *deliverers*. Hence in Hosea vii, 7, and Ps. ii, 10, *Shophetim* is a synonym of "king" and "ruler," and the *Sufetės* of the Phœnician cites and colonies were interpreted "kings" by the Greeks.[5] The original meaning of the verb שפט *shaphat* (found in Assyrian and Phœnician, but not in

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II Sam. xiii, 12.

[1] According to Spiegelberg, *Studien und Materialien zum Rechtswesen des Pharaonenreiches*, Hanover, 1892, p. 63, (quoted by Cook), even in Egypt, where Israel sojourned for a long period of time, it is questionable whether professional judges and courts existed before the new kingdom.

[2] Driver, *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, p. 17, According to Nöldeke, (*Geschichte des Qorans*, p. 13), the original meaning of the stem *shatar* (Arab. *satara*, "to rule," (a book), "to write;" and *satr*, "a line of writing," etc.), was "to range in order"; and, consequently, *shoter*, originally meant "arranger," and "organizer," (cf. Job xxxviii, 33). In Exod. v, 6, 10, 14, 15, 19, the Egyptian officials appointed by Pharaoh's taskmaster for the purpose of superintending the labors of the Israelites are called *shoterim*. Cf. also I Chronicles xxiii, 4; xxvi, 29; xxvii, 1; and II Chronicles xix, 11; xxvi, 11; and xxxiv, 13; Driver, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, and pp. 199, and 206-209; Gesenius-Buhl, *Handwoerterbuch*, etc., *sub voce*; the *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon* (by Brown-Driver-Briggs), *sub voce*, and Keil, *Biblical Archeology*, Vol. II, 344-5. The various passages in Exodus, Deuteronomy, Numbers and Judges, in which mention is frequently made of judges, justice and legal tribunals, when examined separately, are likely to impress upon the reader that regularly organized courts and professional judges were known in ancient Israel in the Mosaic and immediately post-Mosaic ages; but when these same passages are carefully and collectively studied, with regard to their very late date and composition, the impression is quite the opposite.

[3] Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[4] Cf. Judges v, 9, 14; Deut. xxxiii, 21; and Isaiah xxxiii, 22.

[5] G. Moore, *Commentary on the Book of Judges* (*International Critical Commentary*) p. 13; and his art., *Book of Judges*, in Cheyne, *Encycl. Biblica*, § 1, col. 2633. Meyer, art., *Phœnicia*, in the same *Encyclopædia*, § 16.

Arabic and Aramaic) is quite uncertain. In the period of Judges it meant not only "to sit up," "to decide," and "to judge," but mainly "to vindicate," in the sense of to defend, to deliver, to avenge and punish. And thus the so-called "Book of Judges" should be called, as in fact it was called (according to St. Ephrem) by some Syriac writers of the third and fourth centuries A. D., "*The Book of the Deliverers*" or "*Champions*."[1] In Phœnicia and Carthage the *Sufetes* were, according to Livy, the magistrates, corresponding to the Roman Consuls. Even as late as the Middle Ages, in Spain and Sardinia (Cagliari), the governors and petty rulers were called "*judices*," which is, of course, a survival from the times of the Phœnician rule.[2] The *Sufetes* of Carthage, however, it must be remembered, were regular magistrates, and belonged to a much more highly organized political society than the *Shophetim* of the Israelitish period of the Judges. Among the ancient Hebrews, as well as among the Arabs, to be judge was to be ruler and commander. Hence in Arabic *Hakim* means "ruler," and "governor," although the verb means also "to judge," "to decide," and, originally, "to be wise."

Another term is *Palil*,[3] the real meaning of which is rather obscure. *Pillel* means "to mediate," to "arbitrate;" and in Isaiah xvi, 3, *Pelilah* means "umpire" in general, although in later Hebrew literature it means umpire in matters of judgment.

Qasin is another term generally interpreted as "judge," its real meaning being rather that of "chief" and "petty ruler."[4] Etymologically and phonetically it is the same as the well-known Arabic word *Qadi* "judge."[5] In Micah iii, 1 and 9, however, it is synonymous with "head" and "chief."[6]

Another term for "judge" is *Elohim* אלהים, or "gods."[7] The reason why "judges" were sometimes colled *elohim*, or "gods" is, according to Dillmann,[8] because they gave sentences and decisions at holy places. Graf and Kuenen think that one of the sanctuaries of Yahweh is meant, where the priests gave divinely sanctioned judgments.[1] Marti, on the other hand, believes that the household god is referred to as Elohim.[2]

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[1] Moore, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

[2] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. xi, xiii, 88 and 89.

[3] Exodus xxi, 22; Deut. xxxii, 31; Job xxxi, 11.

[4] The Authorized Version renders "Guide," the Revised Version "Chief."

[5] Cf. Isaiah i, 40; iii, 7; xxii, 3; Judges xi, 6, 11; Jos. x, 24; Isaiah iii, 67, and i, 10.

[6] Cf. *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon*, *sub voce*, p. 892, and the authority of Olshausen and König, there quoted.

[7] Exodus xxi, 6; xxii, 8; I Sam. ii, 25; and Judges v, 8.

[8] *Commentary on Exodus*, ad loc., cf. also the remarks in the commentaries of Baentsch and Holzinger, *ad locum*.

The last and only Hebrew word, which, properly speaking, means "judge," in its etymology and historical significance, is *Dayyan* דין (found in all Semitic languages: Arab, *dayyan*; Aram., *dayyana*; Assyrian, *da-a-nu* or *da-ia-nu*, etc. . . .) Although the stem meant originally "to requite," "to compensate," "to govern," and "to rule," we have sufficient warrant to believe that it meant, from the very earliest times, "to decide," and "to render decision." In the Old Testament, however, the word rarely occurs.[3] In I Sam. xxiv, 15, it is even questionable whether it belongs to the original text,[4] and it is only in post-exilic times that the word meant "professional judge."[5]

These considerations equally apply to the same or equivalent words found among all Semitic tribes: Arabs, Phœnicians, Arameans, Canaanites, Moabites, etc., except the Assyro-Babylonians, among whom, as we have seen, the corresponding words for "judge" seem to have acquired, from very early times, the technical meaning of a person invested with judicial power and authority.

In our next article we shall study the origin and evolution of Israelitish law and legal literature from Moses to Ezra, as embodied in the four great Pentateuchal Legislations, known as the *Book of the Covenant*, the *Law of Holiness*, the *Priests' Code*, and *Deuteronomy*. We shall discuss the origin, date and authorship of these four Hebrew Codes of Law, in the light of the most recent results of modern Biblical criticism. Any discussion of Hebrew legal, social, and criminal institutions, as found in the Pentateuch, concerning the administration of law and justice, the constitution of the family, the rights and privileges of husbands, wives, children and slaves, property, business transactions, and other customs and usages, must necessarily be preceded by a study of their origin, antiquity, and historico-theological setting.

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[1] *Geschichte Israels*, p. 29, and Cheyne, *E. B.* col. 2636, cf. also *the Oxford Hebrew Lexicon* (BDB), *sub voce*, p. 43, where the reason is given as that of their divine representatives at sacred places, or, as reflecting divine majesty and power. Cf. Gesenius-Buhl and Fuerst Hebrew *Lexicon, sub voce.*; Moore, *op. cit.*, 146; H. P. Smith, *Commentary on Samuel* (*International Critical Commentary*), p. 20; and Dr., Driver, *Notes on the Text of Samuel*, 1890, *ad c.* ii, v. 25.

[2] Cf. Psal. lxviii, 5, and I Sam. xxiv, 15.

[3] Budde, on Samuel, *ad loc.* H. P. Smith, and Driver, *op. cit.*, *ad loc.*

[4] Ezra vii, 25.

[5] *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon, sub voce*, p. 192, Gesenius-Buhl, *sub voce*, and *Encycl. Biblica*, col. 2632.

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NOTES.

A reproach, and, unfortunately, a just one, is often leveled against the Catholic scholarship of the generation just past, that at a time when the long-accumulating flood of Biblical criticism was threatening the ancient barriers of religious belief, so few were found equipped with the knowledge and skill to stem or turn the advancing tide. The difficulty was a twofold one. Catholic students, with some honorable exceptions, had neglected to take up the difficult studies requisite for an understanding of the new problems, and—what is of no less importance—almost nothing had been done to prepare the Catholic public for the seemingly radical changes of position which the new accessions of knowledge would necessitate. Accordingly, religion, as presented by its defenders, was forced to undergo that series of ignominious changes of base exposed by Houtin in *La question biblique chez les catholiques de France au dix-neuvième siècle.*

According to all present indications, there will be no grounds for such a charge against the Catholics of the present century, and especially those of France. The host of zealous youths who, a generation ago, set themselves soberly to work to prepare for the defense of religion, are now mature scholars; and with the help of pupils who share in the same active and enlightened spirit, they are now producing articles, studies, dictionaries, collections, some popular and apologetic, others scholarly and critical, but all, or almost all, written with competent knowledge of the facts and with loyalty to religious truth.

In the department of NOTES in the last issue of this REVIEW, we referred to the series of *Etudes bibliques*, edited by Father Lagrange, and the projected *Bibliothèque de l'enseignement scripturaire*, to be edited by Mgr. Batiffol and Fathers Touzard, S. S., and Rose, O. P. In Father Lagrange's series, we are informed that we may soon expect the *Introduction to Isaias*, by Father Condamin, S. J., who is now resident at the Jesuit House in Canterbury. This will form the second and concluding volume of Father Condamin's work on the great prophet. His earlier volume, consisting of a translation of Isaias with critical notes, was reviewed in our June-July issue.

There is promise of another series—or, rather, several of them—of equal scholarship, but with less immediate bearing on Holy Writ, to be edited by Rev. F. Martin, Professor of Semitics at the Catholic Institute of Paris. The general title of the publication is *Documents pour servir a l'étude scientifique de la Bible.* The first series is to consist of translations (with critical commentary) of the Apocryphal literature of the Old Testament. The initial volume (now in press) deals with the extremely interesting *Book of Enoch,* which exercised an influence on some of the writers of the New Testament. A study of these apocryphal writings, which date from 200 years before Christ to 200 years after Christ, will serve to throw a light on the conditions of Jewish thought at the period of the beginnings of Christianity. This series will take up six or seven volumes; and, on its completion, Father Martin proposes to issue a series of translations of Babylonian and Assyrian texts, Targums, etc., a knowledge of which is almost indispensable for a scientific study of the Bible.

For the study of the New Testament, an excellent collection of manuals containing translations with running commentary and notes, has been prepared by Fathers Lemonnyer, O. P., and Rose, O. P. The latest to appear, *Les Actes des Apotres*, by Father Rose, completes the collection with the exception of St. John's Gospel. These manuals are admirably adapted to the needs of the general student. They take into account the data of criticism, but without being burdened with long discussions about points of minor importance. They form a good example of honest Catholic scholarship going serenely about its work of elucidating the sacred literature confided to the Church's care, and using for the purpose the results of the labor of friend and foe.

Across the Channel work of a similar sort is being done, but in a somewhat more popular style. Madame Cecilia has written a commentary on St. Mark for the series of Catholic Scripture Manuals. The work on St. Luke in the same series was written by Monsignor Barnes. The collection is intended for the use of Catholic pupil-teachers and for those preparing for University examinations. In style and purpose, it reminds one of the volumes of the *Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges*. The work of Madame Cecilia is well adapted for its purpose, and will be found very useful for catechists also. Especially admirable are its pedagogical features, the use of different kinds of type to indicate difference of importance in the matter, orderly arrangement of the notes, etc., all of which manifests the experienced teacher.

Of interest to a still larger number of Catholic readers is the announcement made by Longmans, Green & Co., that they have in press a volume on *The Tradition of Holy Scripture*, by Dr. William Barry. It is one of the series of Catholic manuals on theological topics to be issued under the editorship of Monsignor Ward and Father Thurston, S. J. Every one, we think, will agree with the judgment of the very able writer of the "Literary Notes" in the *Tablet*, that for the delicate task of preparing a satisfactory manual on this most important topic it would be difficult to find any one better qualified than Dr. Barry.

Funk and Wagnalls announce the project of publishing a new Bible Dictionary, to be edited by Dr. Melancthon W. Jacobus, of the Hartford Theological Seminary. Such a work would scarcely seem to have a field of usefulness, especially so soon after the publication of Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, which with Cheyne's *Encyclopedia Biblica* will no doubt satisfy for some time to come, the needs and tastes of different schools of opinion in matters relating to Scripture.

Turning to Catholic works of the same description, Father Vigouroux's

Dictionnaire de la Bible has reached Fasc. XXVI, treating Mathathias-Moab. The *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* in which M. Vacant's work as editor is now carried on by M. E. Mangenot of the Catholic Institute of Paris, has been brought down to Fasc. XVII: Charité-Cisterciens. The *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie* of Dom. F. Cabrol, now Abbot of Farnsborough, is preparing Fasc. VIII: Anges-Antiphonaire. Nearer home preparations are being pushed for the issue of the sample volume of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, an announcement of which was made in our June-July issue. During the past Summer, Dr. Pace, of the Catholic University, one of the editors, was abroad securing the collaboration of European Catholic scholars.

While abroad, Dr. Pace attended the meeting of the Catholic Truth Society at Blackburn, of which he has written an interesting sketch for the Catholic Associated Press. One topic discussed at the meeting is of especial interest. It was pointed out that one of the main causes of prejudice against Catholics is misrepresentation, often unintentional, in the secular press. To meet this need a Catholic Press Bureau has been established in Germany and in France to furnish accurate information on matters concerning the interests of the Church. The Truth Society has taken up this work in England.

The Catholic Truth Society is publishing in pamphlet form the Westminster Lectures, a series of discourses on Apologetics. The lecture of Father John Gerard, S. J., on *Modern Freethought* is very well done indeed. It runs somewhat along the same lines as an article in the initial number of this REVIEW, by M. George Fonsegrive. The series is edited by Rev. Francis Aveling, D. D. Other lectures published in the same series are on Immortality, by Dr. Aveling; God, by Canon Moyes; Free Will, by Rev. A. B. Sharpe; the Witness of the Gospels, by Mgr. Barnes; and the Resurrection, by Mr. Gideon Marsh. The character of these pamphlets is an added proof that the Catholic Truth Society is not restricting its efforts to threshing straw.

In this department of NOTES in the last issue we expressed a welcome for a projected Catholic Review to be issued by the professors of Maynooth College. We have since received a prospectus giving fuller details which will, no doubt, be of interest to our readers. The new review is to be called the *Irish Theological Quarterly*. The first number will be issued in January next. The price is set at two shillings a number, or seven and six-pence a year. Subcriptions will be received by the publishers, M. H. Gill & Son, Dublin, or by Dr. Walter McDonald, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Concerning its management and purposes, we quote from the prospectus:

"The Review will deal with five branches of Theological Science; Dogma (systematic), Dogma (historical), Moral, S. Scripture, and Ecclesiastical History. Each of these departments will be under the charge of one of five editors, all of whom are members of the Faculty of Theology of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth:—Rev. Walter McDonald, D. D., (Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment); Rev. Joseph MacRory, D. D., (Professor of S. Scripture); Rev. John M. Harty, and Rev. Patrick Tonor, D. D., (Professors of Theology), and Rev. James MacCaffrey, S. T. L., (Professor of Ecclesiastical History).

"While the editors have been assured of valuable assistance from other theologians of distinction, they will depend only on themselves, and are prepared to work for the Review as if no assistance were to be expected. They hope by their own unaided efforts, if necessary, to make the periodical worthy of the Faculty to which they belong. Their object will be to treat the religious questions of the day in a broad and conservative spirit, to keep their readers in touch with Catholic thought throughout the Church, and to help them to meet new phases of error. Special attention will be given to reviews of books. Only works of real interest will be noticed; but these will be carefully read and honestly criticised; for this the editors pledge their word in a special manner. They hope in this way to bring under the notice of their readers the latest and best specimens of theological literature."

The announcement that Mr. Wilfrid Ward is to take editorial charge of the *Dublin Review* in January next will be received with delight by all who are interested in religion and learning. It is sufficient compliment to him to say that the public may expect that he will conduct this fine old Review with the same success as did his illustrious father a generation ago. Mr. Ward is eminently fitted for his new position. He is personally acquainted with a large number of the leaders of thought in England and elsewhere; he is equally at home in Catholic theology and in the general field of modern intellectual progress; and, perhaps, best of all, in the difficult task of reconciling old beliefs with new discoveries, he takes a "Liberal-Conservative" attitude which makes him a model for Catholic apologists. In breadth of knowledge and of sympathy, in candor and impartiality, in devotion to the Church and to truth in general, it would be difficult to find an editor for a Catholic review to surpass the author of *William George Ward and the Catholic Revival* and *Problems and Persons*.

In the first number of the New York Review, to which Mr. Ward contributed the opening article, we remarked concerning him: "In his method he is a follower of Newman, with whose writings he is probably better acquainted than any other person living, and a large part of his labor has been to work out to its logical conclusions the theory of Development, as a basis for the defense and the strengthening of Catholic Christianity. In view of this, it is to be hoped that before long we shall be able to speak of him as the biographer of the great Cardinal." It is a pleasure to note that this wish is on the road to fulfilment, as Mr. Ward has been put in possession of the documents so long and so carefully guarded by the late Father Neville.

It has been surmised by many that Father Neville's policy of delay was in accordance with the instructions of Newman himself; that the Cardinal was loth to have documents treating of matters of dispute presented too soon to the public, partly out of delicacy about wounding the feelings of living participants in these events, and partly to ensure that calm historical judgment which cannot be had until the storms of controversy have passed away. If such was his mind, it has certainly been borne out since then by the case of his brother Cardinal of Westminster. At any rate, it is certain that the Fabian policy has turned out for the best, since the task of writing the biography has fallen to the capable hands of Mr. Wilfrid Ward.

During his wardenship of Newman's papers, Father Neville has occasionally given out some morsels to a hungry public. The latest of these (a posthumous publication) is a little volume containing *Addresses to Cardinal Newman with his Replies*, 1879-'81, a delightful memorial of an interesting episode in the great Oratorian's life. We are told in the Preface that shortly after his election to the Pontificate, Leo XIII was asked by a friend what would be his policy as Pope, to which he replied: "Wait till you see my first Cardinal." There are indications that Leo XIII had Newman in mind for this dignity from the time of his own election to the Papacy. Father Neville's collection gives evidence of the unanimous approval given to the Pope's judgment in elevating him. The Cardinal's replies show him to us in a charming light, and not a few of them contain matter of more than passing interest.

The leading article in the *Revue du Clergé Français* for mid-September is one by M. Boudinhon on *La Sainte Maison de Lorette.* The authenticity of the story of the *Santa Casa* is a problem on which Catholic scholars have been working for some time past, and usually, it would seem, towards an adverse conclusion. Propaganda students are all familiar with the arguments against the genuineness of the shrine urged with so much force by the distinguished professor of Church History, Dr. Pinacchi; and Father Grisar, S. J., in a striking and timely paper on *The Condition of Catholic Historical Criticism*, read at the Catholic Congress, Munich, 1900, touches on this matter in the same spirit. Dr. Lapponi, the well known Catholic physician of Rome, after a careful investigation of the facts, has arrived at the same conclusion.

Father Boudinhon acknowledges indebtedness for the immediate inspiration of his study to an article on the subject in the *Rassegna Nazionale* by Professor Leopoldo De Feis who has made a careful study of the documents bearing on the question. The conclusion of both these scholars is against the authenticity of the miracle. American readers will find an excellent summary of the arguments in an article in the *Catholic World* by Rev. Bertrand L. Conway. It is gratifying to note that this investigation is altogether the work of loyal Catholic scholars. Too often we wait until similar conclusions are forced upon us by those "qui ex adverso sunt", to the no small scandal and distress of faithful souls who would learn these matters with equanimity from a priest. And as Father Boudinhon concludes: "Neither the authority of the Church nor piety rightly understood, will suffer anything from such a conclusion. . . . Even if it be not the house of the Blessed Virgin, Loretto remains what it was, a privileged sanctuary of Mary. And it matters little, after all, whether we can say at Loretto or at Nazareth: '*Hic* Verbum caro factum est' provided the Christian can nourish his faith and his piety with the sublime words: 'Verbum Caro factum est et habitavit in nobis.'"

The recent work of Dr. Rivière on *Le dogme de la Redemption*, which will be reviewed in our next issue, is the initial volume of a collection entitled *Etudes d'histoire des dogmes et d'ancienne littérature ecclésiastique*. The series is to follow along the lines of a similar work begun in Germany under the supervision of Dr. Ehrhard, the distinguished Strasburg professor. The next volume in the French collection is to be one that will be of interest to those who have studied the controversy concerning Anglican Orders. It is entitled, *Les réordinations, étude sur l'histoire du sacrement de l' ordre,* and is written by M. Saltet, professor of History at the Catholic Institute of Toulouse.

If Father Saltet takes into consideration reordinations outside the Church, he will find matter for an interesting note in an occurrence which took place in New York City on Nov. 5th. Rev. Mr. Irvine, an Episcopal clergyman who had been deposed by his bishop, was reordained by Archbishop Tikhon, who is in charge of the Russian Church in the United States. In fact, the Metropolitan, according to the published accounts, thought it necessary to confer on his convert Confirmation and Deaconship, as well as the Priesthood. This will be a rude blow to those of the Church of England and its offshoots, who, since the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ,* on Anglican Orders, have been looking to the Greeks for recognition and sympathy.

The successor to Father David Fleming, O. F. M., as Secretary of the Biblical Commission is Dom Laurence Janssens, a Benedictine of the Abbey of Maredsous, Belgium, at present rector of the College of St. Anselm, the International College of the Benedictines, in Rome. He is a consultor of the Congregation of the Index, and the author of an important commentary on St. Thomas, now in course of publication. He is second Secretary, Father Vigouroux, S. S., still retaining the first place. Father Fleming has become Provincial of the Friars Minor in Ireland.

The new French weekly, *Demain*, announcement of which was made in our last issue, will, if one may judge by its first number, surely fulfil all promises and expectations. There is a spirit of hopefulness and energy about it. As its title indicates, it has its face turned to the future, or if it looks to the past, it is to learn lessons for self-betterment and not to indulge in useless regrets or recriminations. The first number shows that it is closely in touch with English and American Catholic thought, since of four leading articles, one is by W. J. Williams, its English correspondent, one by our friend, M. l'Abbe Felix Klein, and one by Henri Brémond, S. J., admirer and translator of Newman.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments—Von D. B. STADE, Geheimem Kirchenrat und Professor der Theologie in Giessen. I Band: Die Religion Israels und die Entstehung des Judentums. Erste und zweite Auflage. Tübingen, Verlag von C. B. MOHR, (Paul Siebeck) 1905. pp. xii, 383.

The volume on hand (vol. II will complete the treatise) is but one of many that form a complete series bearing on the theological sciences (Grundriss der Theologischen Wissenschaften). Its importance and serious character claim our attention. Modern theologians, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, delve more deeply into the strata of revealed religion in order to find material, the scientific adjustment of which will aid us in forming a mental picture of the development of revelation—God's gradual and progressive manner of dealing with mankind, and man's attitude towards the moulding hand of God. This is what Dr. Stade undertakes to do, partially at least, in his Biblical Theology of the Old Testament, a task which certainly bristles with many difficulties from the historical as well as the theological standpoint. Nothing daunted, however, he approaches the problem with the keen eye of a critic. The completion of this first volume will certainly be hailed with delight by the eager student.

It is beyond the scope of the present notice to point out all the excellences that characterize this work, or to indicate even in a summary manner the interesting topics wherewith this "multum in parvo" is filled. A most cursory appreciation, with some of the leading thoughts, must suffice.

Dr. Stade presupposes, of course, the distinction of sources in the Old Testament. Without it, a truly scientific treatment of this subject is impossible. The reader should therefore have at least a superficial knowledge of this matter, otherwise the author's reasoning will often be unintelligible to him. The distinction of sources permits the author to prove that there is a gradual development of religious ideas until the fulness of revelation appears in Jesus Christ. In the light of this gradual development, suggested by the very text of Scripture, many apparently hazardous statements and conclusions receive ample vindication. The reader must be prepared, however, to see some traditional notions of Old Testament history and Old Testament theology disposed of rather ruthlessly. He may feel that he cannot endorse every dictum of the author, yet thoughtful students will be slow to reject without thorough investigation the results of so much careful painstaking labor.

The division of the book is clear and simple. The introduction (§§ 1-11) gives a survey of the matter to be treated. It is not a compilation of dogmas or a dialectic tilt on dogmatical grounds, but simply a history of the religion embodied in the Old Testament. The paramount importance of such a history becomes apparent when we revert to the intimate connection between the Old Testament and the New. Christ grows up amidst Jewish surroundings and builds his religion upon the doctrines and ethical principles already revealed to the Jews.

The treatise proper covers the time from the beginning of Israel to Nehemias, and is divided into two sections: (1) The religion of Israel in ante-prophetic times and (2) The changes wrought in the religion of Israel during the age of prophecy. On the very threshold of the first section, we are guarded against a wrong inference from the use of the word "ante-prophetic." The author tells us that he employs it for want of a better expression and that it applies to the period of time commencing with the history of Israel and extending to the eighth century B. C. (§ 12).

Among the sources of the theology developed during this period are those portions of the Old Testament that antedate the prophets, as also those writings of the prophets in which they inveigh against the faith, the morals and the institutions of their time. These sources are only fragmentary, whence the difficulty of presenting an adequate picture of this period (§ 13).

The beginning of the religion of Israel will perhaps ever remain a moot question. Dr. Stade identifies it with the work of Moses in behalf of the oppressed Israelites. Yahweh showed interest in this nomadic tribe and freed it with a strong hand from bondage. Israel in turn became impressed by the power of Yahweh. It cannot be determined to what extent Israel worshipped Yahweh prior to the Exodus. Yahweh was certainly known as "God of the Fathers," but not yet as "God of Israel." The author does not admit the promulgation of special laws on Mount Sinai at this period, since in the face of such a promulgation the subsequent history of Israel would be unintelligible and the sermons of the prophets inexplicable (§§ 14-18).

The fundamental thought of the religion of Israel is contained in the phrase: "Yahweh is Israel's God." The growing knowledge of this truth forms the development of that religion. Monolatry is strongly insisted upon and is responsible for the success of this development. Stade rejects as derogatory to the dignity of revelation the assumption that humanity started with monotheism (§ 19).

Whilst Israel sojourned in the desert, it adopted customs favorable to the worship of Yahweh. These were either exchanged or abandoned upon entering Canaan. The worship of the Baalim—local gods—attracted the attention of the children of Israel and drew forth the censure of the older prophets. The prophets in question here were men of exceptional personality, zeal and influence. Their concept of Yahweh, however, was far inferior to that of the author-prophets who appeared later (§§ 20-24).

In §§ 25-104 we have a description of ante-prophetical faith and worship. With Israel Yahweh is the God of the country; he has other gods beside himself; he is spiritual (not, however, in our sense of the word) and is always intent upon the good of Israel. The gods apart from Yahweh are gods of other countries. These have a real existence for the Old Israelite; he is a theoretical polytheist and a practical monotheist. Yahweh is faithful; however, at times, his attitude and action elude calculation or forecast. He is eminently a God of war and powerful in his own domain. Israel's idea of Yahweh's sanctity is not derived from his moral excellence or ethical superiority, but from the fact that he is inviolable, unapproachable. The same obtains with holy persons. Yahweh is not only the source of good but also of evil. No distinction is made between physical and moral evil, between the active and permissive attitude of God. Yahweh can simply do as he pleases. Israel of old had no word for "world" nor an idea of creation as now accepted. ברא appears only after the exile. Previous to that period Yahweh's actions were designated by יצר and עשה, which terms were common to human activity. At this stage of religious development the hand of God is recognized not in the upholding and governing of the universe, but in miracles.

Yahweh's abode is successively Mount Sinai, the land of Canaan, the different sanctuaries in Canaan, and later on, the temple. These representations have as a common feature that Yahweh is not in heaven (some place of glory above the earth). Worship on the במות

was considered perfectly legitimate at an early date. In later years it was restricted to the temple.

There is scarcely a paragraph in this section of the book that does not introduce some feature, which will be conducive to a better understanding of the early Israelite's religious frame of mind. This is true especially of the treatises on the different names of God; on Yahweh's appearance in the thunderstorm and its attendant phenomena; on the מלאך and the רוח Yahweh (Elohim); on the distinction between clean and unclean and the reason for this distinction; on the various kinds of sacrifice; on Israel's concept of body and soul; on its idea of morality and the shortcomings of the ante-prophetic moral ideal.

The second section (§§ 105-147) treats of the history of religion as presented in the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries (often called the literary—or author—prophets in contradistinction to the older prophets who left no writings); in the period of the exile and in the time from the end of the exile to the days of Nehemias.

The religion of ancient Israel was greatly affected by the preaching of the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries, as also by the influx of Assyrio-Babylonian tenets. To the proof of this contention are consecrated nearly all the remaining paragraphs of the book. It is insisted upon that the chief concern of the prophets was not the future, but the past and especially the present. They were to teach Israel, to manifest to the people the will of God. Every prophet is taken in turn and the new thoughts that he brought to bear upon the religion of Israel are exposed. This part of the work is fascinating and certainly instructive, as it gives us a fair appreciation of a great portion of the Old Testament. Opposition will no doubt be shown to Dr. Stade's contention that the Old Testament owes much to Assyro-Babylonian sources. To such he attributes, for instance, the account of man's creation and his expulsion from Paradise, of the flood, of the tower of Babel, of the Patriarchs, which he claims cannot be met with in any pre-exilic document of Israel. This opinion, however, is not new and is endorsed by scholars equally distinguished for learning and for devotedness to infallible authority.

The author's positions with regard to the vacillating character of Israel's faith during this period are amply illustrated. On perusing his pages Israel's religious frame of mind at the various stages looms up before our mind's eye. We are shown how predictions as to impending punishment for sins fell on listless ears. We are also led to see how indifference yielded to the deepest religious fervor when these predictions were fulfilled and how their realization vindicated in the mind of Israel the prophets' claim of being the mouthpiece of Yahweh.

Messianic hopes are presented in their gradual appearance with the rise of the various prophets. Freedom from bondage was at first their object, but later on that object was a kingdom. The student is also reminded of the fact that the popular acceptation of Messianic prophecies proved a great encumbrance to the ministry of Our Lord and his Apostles among the Jews. When Stade, however, maintains that Messianic prophecies embrace in their concept the idea of a kingdom, we should not infer with him that this is their exclusive object. The prophetic vision and utterance extends also at times to the king, to the Messiah.

Ample attention has been given throughout this section to historical events that served as a substratum to Israel's faith and worship. Apart from what has been said about the appearance of the prophets we may point in proof of this assertion to the chapters on the composition of the ספר הברית, to the reform of Josiah and especially to the finding of the ספר התורה under his reign, to the building of the temple and the reform of Esdras, all of which topics receive ample treatment. In the concluding chapters he shows the beginnings of Judaism such as we meet it thenceforward.

We take exception to Dr. Stade's insinuation regarding the deutero-canonical books of the Old Testament (p. 22). For the Catholic the canonicity of a book does not depend upon its acceptation by the Palestinian Jews, but upon its admission by the Church. "Kultische Handlungen" instead of "kultische Manipulationen" (p. 118), would be more reverential. We certainly disagree with the author when he tells us (p. 150) that invocation and prayer are of less significance in modern than they were in ancient times. From p. 287 it would appear that the writer sees a contradiction in admitting that man is responsible for his acts and yet dependent upon God. Does not this very dependence imply responsibility? It must, however, be said in justice to the volume before us that the points to which we object receive only passing notice, and do not detract from the value of the work as a whole.

The alphabetical arrangement of subjects treated, as also the index of all the scriptural texts referred to will be appreciated by the student. The size of the book is convenient, and its material and typographical make up is quite elegant. EDWARD HEINLEIN.

The Hebrew Prophet—by Loring W. Batten, Ph. D., S. T. D. The Macmillan Company. New York. 1905.

All who peruse this little volume will agree with its author that he has "expended a large amount of labor on it." Within the compass of a little over 340 pages, Dr. Batten has succeeded in giving a careful and discriminating summary of the leading aspects of the Hebrew Prophet. He has availed himself of all the data scattered through the sacred books of the Old Testament, as also of the information afforded by the principal works and articles on prophecy, published during the last forty years. He has pursued the investigation of his important and difficult topic with a patience and thoroughness worthy of the best Biblical scholarship of the day. And the result of his labor is a clear and concise sketch of the part played by the prophets of old in the religious society to which they belonged.

Prominent among the happy features of the work is Dr. Batten's constant effort to set forth the development which is so marked a characteristic of Hebrew prophecy. At no time in the treatment of his subject does he lose sight of the distinct stages through which prophecy passed as a divine communication imparted to individuals, or as an institution embracing "the Prophets" and "the Sons of the Prophets," and standing in the most intimate relation to the State and to the Church under the Old Testament dispensation. So that his picture of the Hebrew Prophet is always drawn in harmony with the perspective suggested by a careful study of the material at his disposal.

Another praiseworthy feature of the work is the transparent sincerity of its author. What the writer cares for is the truth as far as he can reach it. Throughout, he is the painstaking investigator, the prudent, conservative, yet independent scholar, who weighs recent theories, examines proposed textual emendations, accepts or sets aside time-honored positions, solely on their merit. Scarcely here and there, as for instance, his reference to the Roman *Index Expurgatorius*, do we notice anything that does not seem to be called for by the subject in hand; and hardly at any time do we feel that a position is maintained through excessive conservatism. Particularly interesting and instructive are the chapters entitled "The Sons of the Prophets," (chap. iv); "The Prophets' Credentials", (chap. vi); and "The Prophet's Vision," (chap. xiii). But there is not a chapter of the book that does not offer new suggestions or otherwise valuable information.

One may regret, however, that the author has not seen his way to treat the always important subject of Messianic Prophecy. Some among his readers may object to his interpretation of the prophet's call as rather naturalistic. But despite these and other blemishes, Dr. Batten's work on *The Hebrew Prophet* contains more information than many a more pretentious volume on the same topic, and will prove a valuable addition to any Biblical library.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

La Pensée Catholique dans l'Angleterre Contemporaine—par ERNEST DIMNET, in 12°. pp. xxii, 313. Lecoffre, Paris, 1905.

From his boyhood days, Father Dimnet had a love for Newman; and so, to the many who now feel attracted towards this religious genius, the central figure of his book, he tries to show the path. This book will prove extremely interesting to French readers who have not the same facilities as we have, for perusing the works of Newman, Wiseman, Tyrrell, Lilly, Barry, W. Ward. To us it should be still more useful; for there has not yet appeared any *étude d' ensemble* on the brilliant English school of apologists of which Newman is the head and the centre. The book claims to be an objective exposition of the doctrines of that group. It is written especially "for those who being more impressed with the objections of our opponents than with the classical replies offered to them, might be inclined to deem those difficulties insoluble." Indeed, many of the ideas exposed by these leaders may seem in themselves common-place; Father Dimnet rejoices over this as a fact which proves that these ideas can be made fecund. He thinks that it is no more than strict justice to proclaim that they were perceived by Wiseman, "the precursor"; contemplated in their full light by Newman, "the seer"; and exploited by the Cardinal's disciples, Tyrrell, Barry, Ward and Lilly, previous to any other writers, and in a spirit of wonderful loyalty and submission to the Church. The names of these men will not soon be forgotten, for "their religious theories will bring about slowly but surely, a renewal of Christian spirit, to which nothing in the past can be compared."

The study on Wiseman (1-72), based on Ward's Life of the Cardinal, presents a penetrating criticism of that valuable biography. "Wiseman loved with his whole soul, unconsciously and naively, the Truth, the Church, and the Life." Such is the leading feature expressed by his biographer. Wiseman was the most modern, i. e., the most intelligently active Bishop of the nineteenth century, because he was deeply impressed with the absolute conviction that every form of progress, scientific, æsthetic, or social, is good, and the Church has the power of adapting herself to it, and thus consecrating it. Hence Wiseman's biography has a very real apologetic value.

Philosophers and apologists are now discovering Newman, fifty years after the publication of his main works, and yet many of his biographers, viewing him superficially, see in his life little more than his conversion, or perhaps, only its poetical exterior setting, the mediæval city of Oxford. Father Dimnet tries to point out the highest aspects of his thought and of his deep influence (73-130). The true Newman must be sought for in the *University Sermons*, *The Essay on Development*, and the *Grammar of Assent* In that series of incomparable analyses we find his characteristic apologetics, the restitution to the will and to grace of their prominent role in the act of faith; as well as the theory, both wise and bold, of the relativity of dogmatic formulas.

Theology and Devotion (131-216), the longest sketch in the book, considers the work of Father George Tyrrell, S. J. A footnote tells us that the study is based on *The Faith of the Millions*, though Father Tyrrell might better be judged by his later work, *Lex Orandi*. The author believes that nobody has better assimilated Newman's doctrine, or rather the spirit of Newman's doctrine. He lauds him as a modestly persuasive defender of Theism, but considers that he is at his best in the deep analysis of the relations of devotion to theology, and of dogmatic symbols to the higher realities which they indicate rather than express.

The first defect which Dimnet finds in Tyrrell is that of thinking without method; the cause being, he says, that Father Tyrrell is neither a Frenchman nor a metaphysician, and besides is a very busy man. Moreover, he is too quick to perceive the consequences of his premisses, and he wants to tell his readers all about it at once; hence he adds to his *thesis* a *parenthesis*, which obliges him to explain some *hypothesis*. And still Father Tyrrell desires to be clear, but to no purpose. However, he is fascinating by his sincerity, his kindness, his modesty, his broad views and suggestive ideas. He is a philosopher and a mystic; he reminds you of Gratry, and under his speculation you constantly feel a deep religious warmth, almost a lyric love for Catholicism in its most mystical forms.

His method as an apologist consists in showing the character, both human and analogical, of relevation; which seems to be the only way by which our contemporaries, especially the intellectual *élite,* can reach Christianity. The Kantists are not the only ones with whom the method of immanence should be used; all of our moderns need to be taught that we remain incomplete without Christ's grace and truth.

As for the form of Christian dogma, it was, it is, and it will always be imperfect and perfectible. But the virtue of dogma being above all an aptitude to touch the heart, to move the mind, Father Dimnet thinks this theory of the Development of Dogma is more rhetorical than historical; and also, that whilst it may well apply to the doctrine of the nature and attributes of God, it is unsatisfactory with regard to the dogmas of the Fall of Man or Biblical Inspiration. Nevertheless, Father Tyrrell's method of apologetics is efficacious because behind the theologian we find in him "*un homme de bien et un homme de cœur,*" a man with the invincible conviction that devotion—the most important thing—is not absolutely bound to theology, a man of whom Father Dimnet does not hesitate to say in conclusion: "*Il est impossible de le lire sans l'aimer.*"

The short essay entitled *Théisme et Morale* (217-236) is a study on W. S. Lilly, who is said to be neither a philosopher nor a historian, nor even a professional critic, but "*un chercheur de vérité et un vérificateur d' idées,*" a man deeply religious, on every page of whose books we can read that Science and Faith are friendly allies.

Delightful, indeed, and excellently phrased is the portrait of Dr. Barry, "*le pretre littérateur,*" (237-266), whose only defect is to be too learned; a man whose life and talent are dominated by and consecrated to the grand idea that there are many dwellings in the Father's house and that all our faculties can develop in the religious atmosphere, the Church being like a vast cathedral in which all can assemble and pray.

The book closes with *Evolution and Theology* (257-304), an epilogue and a profession of faith, as well as a study of Wilfrid Ward, a theologian though a layman, a liberal, but free from rashness. The main problem with which he is concerned is: to what extent may or even should loyal Catholics be influenced by the *Zeitgeist*? According to Ward, the future of Christianity is conditioned by the spread of evolutionism. He shows that materialistic tendencies are rather of the past than of the present; whilst the adaptation of Christianity to its surroundings will continue in the future as in the past, leaving untouched all that fosters Christian sentiment and Catholic devotion. This is to render our religion acceptable to thousands of sincere minds who are unable to apply to things religious intellectual methods which they have never known or have completely discarded.

We highly recommend this useful book.

J. Bruneau.

The Religion of Duty—By Felix Adler. New York. McClure, Phillips, & Co.

In this little book we have the substance of Dr. Adler's ethical teaching, as delivered during a number of years past, to the Ethical Culture Society, of New York. The editor, Mr. Willis Sprague, who is evidently a disciple of Dr. Adler's, contributes a preface and a few closing words of appendix.

It is needless to say that any such reproduction of Dr. Adler's teaching is bound to contain much that is wholly admirable, much that makes for the highest type of personal and social living, much that must command the sympathy of all who love and labor for righteousness. It is equally certain, however, to contain much which cannot be subscribed to, we will not say by a Christian believer merely, but by any Theist.

To take the more agreeable task first, we would note briefly the expression by Dr. Adler of certain convictions, such as it is by no means customary to find amongst those who are busied in providing substitutes for Christianity. He deprecates, for instance, the "increasingly vague and indefinite way" in which the idea of God is held by so many, and urges the importance of distinctions and clearness in our thinking on such a theme. "Blurred images," he says, "faint, vague, impalpable things in the mind, cannot at all help us." We cannot see that Dr. Adler succeeds in making the idea of God one more easily to be seized and held by the average mind, but, at all events, we are glad to have from such a quarter, this protest against the mistiness with which so many are satisfied to leave the subject of religion invested, while at the same time they regard it as intolerable in any other department of thought.

In these days, again, when the mutual obligations of husband and wife are held of such light account in so many quarters, and so much weak sentimentality is talked on the subject of divorce, it is refreshing to come across a paragraph like this:

> "Husband and wife have become estranged. Incompatibilities, repulsions, have taken the place of the first attractions. Tell them that

they shall love each other. But they will answer that the very cause of their estrangement is that they cannot love each other, that love is dead; and therefore they demand to be released from each other's hateful society. Rather say: 'Your first love then is dead. Now, do your duty. Duty tells you to see behind the repulsions, behind these perversities and incompatibilities, a being with whose welfare you have solemnly charged yourself, toward whom you have assumed the task of developing and bringing to light the better nature that exists, though it may be hidden and dormant. Do your duty! That is all that is asked of you.'"

We could not wish much to be added to Dr. Adler's words insisting on the absolute necessity of the connection of love with duty, or his reprobation of the widely prevalent desire to have the sweetness and sentiment of morality without its sternness.

Again, we are glad to see Dr. Adler maintaining the necessity of keeping up the custom of public assemblies on Sunday for bringing home to men and impressing upon them the higher things of life. He insists also upon the necessity of publicly solemnizing such events in life as marriage and death, of surrounding them with dignity and sacred significance, of providing what he calls an *interpretation* of them. On these, and on many other points which it would take too long to indicate, we are happy to be in complete agreement with our author.

Where, however, we must of course part company with him is in his contention that the Church has failed, and must perforce fail, to satisfy these needs of the human spirit. Of such failures Dr. Adler has no doubts, as also he is equally convinced that his Ethical Society can and does supply these same needs. He is convinced that the world needs other and quite different ethical formulas than those which the Church (by which he means Christianity at large) has provided. It is not too much to expect that the critic of a system of thought and life should give evidence that he understands thoroughly what that system is. We have to say, however, that Dr. Adler, on the contrary, shows in a multitude of ways that he misconceives, and (of course unintentionally) misrepresents the Christian view of man, the attitude of the Christian religion to human society, and the nature of the special motives and sanctions for morality which it sets before men.

For instance—"I do not agree with the orthodox Church in the statement that there is no moral health in man, that he is a being absolutely depraved." Neither do we agree with any Church, be it called orthodox or un-orthodox, which teaches any such doctrine. We do not know what may be Dr. Adler's standard of orthodoxy in Churches but certainly the Catholic Church (no inconsiderable section of Christianity at least) has never taught a doctrine like this. It may be found in the writings of Luther, Calvin and other founders of Protestantism, and Dr. Adler is not the first opponent of Christianity who has saddled Christianity as a whole with such perversions of the doctrine of Original Sin; but in the name of Catholicism we must protest against such teaching being described as "orthodox" Christianity.

So, too, it is Dr. Adler's understanding, or misunderstanding, of the phrase, "the world," as it occurs so often in the Scriptures and in other Christian writings, that lies at the root of the main accusations which he brings against Christianity.He quotes St. James' definition of "pure religion and undefiled," one element of which is "to keep one's self unspotted from the world." He might have quoted St. John's "Love not the world," and numerous other passages to the same effect in other writings. Now, if "the world," in such passages, meant, as Dr. Adler wishes to make it mean, the society of our fellow men, there certainly would be ground for his charge that Christian principles incline towards an unsocial selfishness. But the "world" on which Christians are urged to turn their backs, is not the society of men and women amongst whom they live, but it is a spirit, a tendency to be found there, something impalpable, indeed, but most real, that which draws men to live for the present only, to attach themselves to the outward, the transitory, in opposition to the eternal, the true—all this is summed up in the phrase "the world," as used by the New Testament writers. But that Christians are urged to turn their backs on the world of living men and women, to draw aside from it as unclean, to disregard its activities and interests and refuse to take their share in them—this is something which exists only in Dr. Adler's mind; it has no support in the teaching of Christ or His Apostles. Christ proposes to regenerate the world by regenerating the individual, and if this work is still far from complete even in regions where Christianity has long had sway, if Dr. Adler can point, as, alas, he can, to innumerable instances in our political and commercial life, or in international relations, where injustice and selfishness are rampant, he can also discover how in directions without number the whole social life of man has been elevated, purified and ennobled by the influence upon and within it of Christian ethics.

He is confident that Ethical Culture can do thoroughly and completely what Christianity has as yet done only in part; but whereas, in regard to the work of Christianity in the world we can appeal to the record of history, in the other case we have only Dr. Adler's confident anticipations, anticipations which to us do not at all seem to find justification in the nature of the hopes and motives he proposes to substitute for those of the Christian religion. He acknowledges the wonderful effect belief in the Incarnation has had in awakening the passionate love and gratitude of those brought up under the influence of Christian ideas as they contemplated the Infinite and All-Holy stooping to this humiliation in love for man. Nor is it wonderful that it should be so. Wonderful, however, it would indeed be did any such reverence, worship, and love issue from embracing the conception of the God of Ethical Culture. The thought "He loved me, and gave Himself for me" has shown itself capable, all along the Christian ages, of inspiring heroic love, devotion and endurance, forgetfulness of self and sacrifice for others. Dr. Adler thinks the same or greater results can be secured by the thought that there is "a cosmic significance in the moral law." He may have succeeded in inspiring himself with a glow of holy enthusiasm for virtue by such considerations, but human nature will have to be something very different from what it is, if, asking for the bread of religious hopes and motives, it can satisfy itself with this stone.

S. P. MACPHERSON.

Ueber den Sakramentalen Character—O LAAKE. Eine historisch dogmatische Abhandlung. pp. 1-210. Munich. 1903.

Der Sakramentale Character—M. J. LUCIAN FARINE, D. D. Eine dogmatische Studie. pp. 1-95. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1904. (Strassburger Theologische Studien).

Caractère Sacramentel in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie, Paris,* 1905. H. MOUREAU, Professeur de Théologie à la Faculté de Lille. (Cf. J. TURMEL, *Histoire de la théologie positive.* 1904. pp. 423 ff).

These are the latest works on the doctrine of the Sacramental Character. It is somewhat remarkable that within a few months three monographs should be published in this rather abandoned field. All three touch upon the question of the existence and nature of the sacramental character, giving us the various views held by different theologians.

Abbé H. Moureau, in a clear and concise account, as befits a Dictionary, sets forth and criticises to some extent the explanations offered by various theologians. We find the Church's doctrine and the various views of ecclesiastical writers treated much more fully in Laake. By far the majority of Doctors and Theologians hold that the sacramental character consists essentially in a physical mark, sign, impression—in a certain intrinsic modification produced in the soul. The early Fathers and the later doctors and theologians illustrate this view by the analogy of a brand put upon sheep, or the mark made on soldiers. St. Thomas accepted this theory of physical modification of the soul; but he added this special point, that the character marked the recipient in some special way for the worship of God and also conveyed certain powers; thus making it a participation in the priesthood of Christ. Applying this principle to the three Sacraments that according to Catholic tradition impress a character, he held that Baptism impresses indelibly upon the soul the seal of the Christian, making the recipient one of the subjects in Christ's Kingdom and rendering him capable of receiving the other Sacraments; Confirmation makes him a soldier of Christ and conveys a special strength for professing the faith; by Holy Orders he becomes a minister of Christ, and is empowered to perform sacred functions.

Against this theory of physical impression, besides its vagueness, it might be objected that by considering the character as a modification of the soul, theologians make it difficult to see how it is distinct from sanctifying grace, though all hold that it is different.

Duns Scotus maintained that the Sacramental Character was simply an official deputation for a certain and unchangeable situation; whilst Durand of Saint-Pourçain, always noted for his peculiar views, says in a somewhat skeptical tone: "*et nos loquentes ut plures dicamus cum eis characterem nonnihil esse*," and claims that it consists in a relation. Nearly all the theologians censure this opinion,—many, we think, because they surmise that Durand was rather skeptical as regards the doctrine of character altogether.

Dr. Farine, improving on St. Thomas's explanation, considers the essence of the Character as a configuration with Christ as Man-God in Baptism, with Christ as God-King in Confirmation, with Christ as God-Priest in Holy Orders. This view is satisfactory, but we would make one suggestion. Might not this theory become more reasonable if in place of Christ as King we substitute Christ as Victim? The author wishes to establish a relation between these sacraments and three predominant functions or states of Christ. Does it not seem that the state of Christ as Victim is a more predominant feature in His life than that of Kingship? Christ indeed conquered sin during His life, but He did not reap the reward of His victory over sin until He had also conquered Death. Would it not be better to emphasize, not the victory, but rather the means to it, i. e., Christ's sacrifice, obedience and suffering? In other words, to substitute for the state of king, that of victim?

Now, could we not conceive that the Sacraments which produce a character, incorporate us into Christ by associating us with these different states in the life of the Savior—thus making us partakers of the Divine life, which was the main object of the Incarnation? The first phase in the life of Christ was the Hypostatic Union of that human being, the son of Mary, with the Logos, the Son of God. By Baptism we are incorporated, associated with Christ in this first phase of the theandric life of the Man-God; we are associated with the Divine Person of Christ by a union analogous to, though different from, the Hypostatic Union. Without losing our own personality, we belong to Christ, *creati in Christo Jesu;* we become the adopted sons of God. But our soul is not modified any more than the human nature of Christ was changed by its union with the Logos.

Christ coming into this world offered Himself to do the will of His Father, to be obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross; His existence was one long infinite sacrifice to His Heavenly Father. Now, Confirmation would be an association with Christ as victim, with Christ adhering to the will of His Father even unto death. This, of course, means self-denial and struggle against sin and Satan to conquer and overcome them. Hence, through Confirmation we are made soldiers of Christ.

The most exalted state assumed by the Incarnate Word is that of the Priesthood—*Tu es Sacerdos in æternum.* As a priest, Christ our Mediator takes away the sins of the world, makes us partakers of His holiness, sons of God, members of His body, victims with Him, nay, more, He renders certain privileged men partakers of His priesthood. Now it is by Holy Orders that these men are associated with Christ as priests; they receive legitimate power to offer the same Sacrifice that Christ offered, to administer the Sacraments, imparting by this means the divine life to men's souls, and contributing to their salvation.

In these three associations, the character is distinct from, and logically precedes sanctifying and sacramental grace. The character is a relation to, an association with, an incorporation into Christ, and does not intrinsically modify the soul; a real modification is produced by sanctifying grace which renders us worthy of the association, whilst sacramental grace gives us the right to the actual graces necessary to fulfil the duties of the newly-acquired state.

J. BRUNEAU.

St. John and the Close of the Apostolic Age—by the ABBÉ CONSTANT FOUARD, with Photogravure Portrait of the Author. Crown 8vo. 1905. Longmans, Green & Co.

This is the final volume of the late Abbé Fouard's series on the *Beginnings of the Church.* In fact, God called His faithful priest and servant to his reward on December 3, 1903, before he could see his last volume published. This would have been a crowning consolation, for he had already, in March, 1903, received his appointment from the Pope as a member of the Biblical Commission. It was indeed a happy idea to publish this last volume with a photo portrait of the author. The gentle smiling countenance, in which are perceived indications of brightness and humor, corresponds exactly to the picture a mere reader of his books might form of him. This new work reviews the history of the Church from the martyrdom of St. Paul to the death of St. John, thus furnishing the reader "with a picture of actual conditions towards the close of the first century when the Fourth Gospel was composed by St. John, who had outlived all his brethren in the Apostolate, and had attained a very advanced age." The tone is indeed traditional, as it is throughout the works of Father Fouard, but not narrow or intolerant. You feel that he knows of other positions; but with all his solid erudition, his aim is to popularize the results of scientific exegesis; he does not think he is called on to ventilate new theories, but rather to foster piety with solid studies, a moderate criticism, and an attractive literary form. For instance, when speaking of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, he would not object to the theory that the disciples of St. John clothed the doctrine of their master with their own language.

We need, of course, books on St. John of a somewhat different kind. But for the great majority of readers, this will be very near the ideal. Indeed, the set completed by this sixth volume, attractive as Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. have succeeded in making it, will be a very handsome and welcome addition to the library of any intelligent reader.

J. BRUNEAU.

The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel—Eight Lectures on the Morse Foundation, delivered in the Union Seminary, New York, in October and November, 1904—by WILLIAM SANDAY, D. D., LL.D., Litt. D. 8° pp. xii, 268. Scribner's, 1905.

Just a year ago Prof. Sanday was delivering these lectures, which he now dedicates to his American friends, before an audience which grew thinner day by day. But let us hasten to say in favor of the book that Prof. Sanday writes much better than he lectures.

The first lecture is a *Survey of Recent Literature.* Prof. Sanday chose his subject in the Fall of 1903, because criticism of the Fourth Gospel had then reached a point which, in his opinion, was further removed from truth and reality than at any prior period in his recollection. Three books of conspicuous ability had appeared, seriously wrong in their conclusions and method: Schmiedel's, Réville's, Loisy's The works of Stanton and Drummond, published in 1904, would render his lectures less useful; but he was already committed to his task; besides, on account of the incomplete character of these two books, he thought there was still room for his course of lectures. His purpose is apologetic; he proposes to defend the traditional view, in spite of difficulties, against the three schools which he designates as *Mediating theories, Partition theories, Uncompromising rejection.*

The second lecture outlines the *critical methods* of to-day. Harnack's description of the last two decades (1876-1896) as a "return to tradition," fits well with the conditions in England; for even the progressive element in the English mind works on conservative lines. Englishmen feel that there is something wrong in the German methods and conclusions; of course he refers to the type of minds represented by *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible,* not that which rejoices in the *Encyclopedia Biblica.* What is true of England he thinks is true of the whole Anglo-Saxon (?) race. He of course includes America, where, he thinks, though general culture is less widely diffused, first-hand knowledge of critical work is more often to be found than in England. The American students "want to keep their faith, and yet they also want to see the realities of things." The American professors trained in Germany look at methods through German spectacles. Now "the very excellences of the German mind have in some ways contributed to the formation of wrong standards of judgment. . . . . . Germans have the power of sustained abstract thought . . . . . . hence they are too ready to assume that all the rest of the world are the same, that if an important piece of evidence is omitted in an argument, it can only be because it was not known." They are not ready enough to "believe that, as a rule, in ancient times as well as in modern, people meant what they said and said what they meant, and that more often than not they had some substantial reason for saying it." After having quoted instances in which criticism has corrected itself, he gives examples of mistaken methods, showing how empty is Harnack's supposition that all the information Irenæus possessed about the greatest leader of the Church of his own home came only through two channels and no others. Was he like a princess in the fairy tale, shut up in a tower and cut off from all communication with the outer world? What about his relations with Pothinus, and his sojourn in Rome?

Then Dr. Sanday candidly states his own position: "You will not expect of me any new and startling theory to account for the phenomena of the Fourth Gospel. I am content to go back to the oldest categorical statement in respect to it that history has handed down to us. It seems to me that this statement really gives an adequate explanation, if not exactly of everything, at least of all the salient points that need explaining."

The following lectures, (3) *The Standpoint of the Author: that of an Eyewitness*; (4) *The Pragmatism of the Gospel*, viz., "that characteristic, the abundance of detail—to all appearance precise detail—with which it presents its pictures;" (5) *The Character of the Narrative*—are the demonstration from internal evidence of the traditional position. Many details are but a reproduction of his articles in the *Expositor* for 1892, and are as interesting as well known. The mass of particulars inspires Dr. Sanday with a strong conviction that our Gospel *could only be*, at least roughly speaking, the work of one who had really lived through the events that he describes; the only other alternative—quite unacceptable—being that "the author was a second-century Christian who, by a *tour de force*, threw himself into the circumstances of the time and had a wonderful success in reproducing them." Is this really the only alternative?

The sixth lecture on *The Doctrine of the Logos* and its influence on the Gospel seems to be a transition to the next and all-important one, *The Christology of the Gospel*. The criticism of the views of Harnack, Grill, Réville and Loisy, takes up a great part of the lecture on the Prologue. Speaking of Loisy, he says: "I am afraid that the tendency, if not the purpose, of his whole book is to convict the author of the Gospel of writing fiction where he professes to write fact." Not a few serious Christian scholars will doubtless find that statement too strong and unwarranted. Is it history or is it fiction? This indeed is the vital question about the Fourth Gospel. As Dr. Sanday well says in the Preface: "The burning point of the controversy has come to rest more and more upon the question discussed in this lecture." But he adds with a modesty which would disarm any critic: "I am conscious of inadequate treatment, especially in Lecture VII. . . . . . I am quite aware that what I have given is rather a sketch for a possible answer to this question, than a really satisfactory discussion of it." Shall we accept, as the critics generally assume with very little proof, that the theology of St. John is simply a development of that of St. Paul, and that the theology of St. Paul was from one end to the other the Apostle's own creation? "Such a theory would mean that quite a half, and the most important half, of the fundamental theses of historical Christianity were a mere human invention. In this view there is a real nucleus of truth in Biblical Christianity, but that nucleus in the light of modern science is seen to be very small indeed; all the rest is surplusage. . . . .The misfortune or the theory is that . . . . . . it is very largely upon the surplusage that nineteen centuries of Christians have lived."

The book is to be commended as a good modern re-statement of the traditional position; but will the critics consider that Dr. Sanday has met all (or even the greater part) of their objections? We have been, we confess, somewhat disappointed both with the lectures and the book.

J. BRUNEAU.

DISCUSSIONS

Contributions to this department are confined to topics previously treated in THE NEW YORK REVIEW. Criticisms of papers are limited to a single issue, and the discussion closes with a reply from the original writer.

Theories of Sacrifice.

In the August-September number of the NEW YORK REVIEW appeared a notice of a little book of mine on the Sacrifice of the Mass. The writer of that notice believes I have failed to do justice to the theory which makes the essence of sacrifice consist in *offering*, and implies, if he does not affirm, that there are arguments in favor of it which I either do not know of at all or purposely pass over. Now, the statement of the theory in question, cited by me from Dr. Mortimer, was by him taken bodily from Wilhelm and Scannell's *Manual*. These authors, in their turn, profess to have drawn it from the writings of the late Dr. Schanz. From Dr. Schanz's own words, in a letter to Dr. Mortimer (cited by the latter at pp. 557-59 of his book), I should infer that Scheeben and he are the "classic defenders" of the theory. He says that Lepin has quite recently adopted it, and adds: "Fixeront[1] (*L'Université Catholique*, 1897, 15 May, p. 550) cites Bérulle, Thomassin, and Bossuet as in accord with this view—*antecessores huic notioni consentientes*," which I take to mean that their writings lend some support to it, not that they themselves expressly put it forward or defend it. Such being the case, I conceive I am justified in describing it as "a modern theory of sacrifice." I know of no arguments in favor of it other than those considered in my little book, and should feel deeply obliged to any one who may know of such if he would volunteer to state them for me. My motive, I trust, is not love of controversy but love of truth. . . .

In my little book I have discussed the "offering" theory in the light of Old Testament teaching. It will be instructive to examine the same theory further in the light of what the New Testament teaches and the Church has defined in regard to the one great Sacrifice of the New Law.

1. It is a point of faith defined by the Council of Trent that our Lord made the sacrificial offering of His Body and Blood at the Last Supper. It is a revealed truth, on the other hand, that He "was offered once to exhaust the sins of many" (Heb. ix, 28), and "by one offering hath perfected forever them that are sanctified" (Ib. x, 14). The content of these passages,[2] and indeed the whole drift of the Epistle, shows that St. Paul is here speaking of the bloody Sacrifice on Calvary. Either, then, the offering of the Body and Blood in the Last Supper did not by

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[1] Tixeront (not Fixeront as Mortimer's typographical error has it) the distinguished author of Histoire des Dogmes was reviewing in 1897 in the article quoted the thesis for which the Catholic University of Lyons conferred the degree of D. D. on Fr. Lepin, *L'idèe du sacrifice dans la religion chretienne*, and naturally he mentions after Fr. Lepin the different writers who had held against the bulk of theologians, this oblation theory; however it is mostly Père de Condren's theory that Dr. Lepin exposes. He does not pretend to invent a new theory and he seems to believe that Scheeben, Schanz, Thalhofer, depend more or less on that group of French seventeenth century writers. (See M. Lepin *L'idée du sacrific eucharistique dans l'Eglise anglicane, d'apres un ouvrage récent* [Mortimer's]. Reprint from L' Université, Catholique, 1902, p. 25. However, Scheeben at least in the English translation, does not quote any of these writers. In Father Lepin's thesis the arguments in favor of the oblation theory are to be found fully and forcibly presented.

[2] The contents of these passages from Heb. (probably not from St. Paul) shows, as theologians think, that Christ's merit was over after His death; that then, and then only, the world was reconciled to God. The inferences do not seem to be logical. Christ was offered but once, since his oblation begun with his conscious life, is never to end. That same self-oblation is to be found in the Last Supper also, as well as on the cross, in heaven and on our altars, but with different outward conditions. How, from the fact that the offering in the Last Supper was one and the same with the offering on Calvary, does it follow that the offering by itself was not a sacrifice? Just the reverse would rather follow. The difference between the two sacrifices being precisely in the external conditions: a bloody immolation on Calvary, a banquet in the Last Supper; but in both the same oblation or sacrifice: Christ offering himself to his Father.

itself constitute a sacrifice, or Christ was offered *twice*. To affirm the former is to exclude the "offering" theory; to affirm the latter is to contradict the Apostle.

To put this in another way. On the "offering" theory, the offering is the sacrifice; that is to say, the act of offering, together with the thing offered, constitutes the sacrifice. Now, there was an offering in the Last Supper; also, there was an offering on Calvary, else there was not, on the same theory, a sacrifice there. Therefore, on the "offering" theory, Christ must have been offered twice, whereas the Apostle distinctly declares that He was offered once. But if it be said that the offering in the Last Supper was one and the same with the offering on Calvary (which I take to be the truth), it follows that the offering by itself was not the Sacrifice, for the offering on Calvary was inseparably bound up with the bloody immolation. Without that which is offered there can be no offering, and that which was offered on Calvary was the bleeding Victim that hung there on the Cross.

2. According to Scripture, as well as to the tradition[1] of the whole Christian Church, the Sacrifice of the New Law was finished on Calvary. According to the "offering" theory, on the other hand, the Sacrifice was finished at the Last Supper.[2] There the offering was made, and the offering, on that theory, is the sacrifice.

3. Neither Scripture nor tradition permits us to affirm that the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the Last Supper and in the Mass is other than the Sacrifice of the Cross. Now, on the "offering" theory, either there was no Sacrifice of the Cross, or it was other than the Eucharistic Sacrifice. On that theory, the offering, by itself and apart from the bloody immolation on Calvary,[3] constituted and constitutes the Eucharistic Sacrifice. If not, then the offering is not the whole essence, but only part of the essence, of sacrifice, and the theory is wrong. If so, there must have been a second and new offering on Calvary, else, on that theory, there would have been no sacrifice there. But if a second and new offering, then a second and new sacrifice, essentially other than the Eucharistic Sacrifice, seeing that the essence of sacrifice is supposed to consist in *offering*.

4. The offering that is regarded as the essence of sacrifice cannot be merely internal, i. e., in the will only of the one that offers, for sacrifice is essentially an act of external worship. But on Calvary there was no external offering:[4] there was but the bloody immolation voluntarily

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[1] Not certainly according to the Epistle to the Hebrews or the Apocalypse.

[2] This is a complete misrepresentation of the oblation theory. The offering continues on the altar of the Heavenly Jerusalem and on the eucharistic altar.

[3] The internal offering constitutes essentially the sacrifice of Christ. Now this sacrifice is outwardly expressed in different manners—on the Cross by a real immolation; in the Eucharist by a representation of the tragedy of Calvary; in Heaven as befits the conditions of eternity. Of course, if there were a new offering, there would be also a new sacrifice. But there is neither. Whilst in all the other theories it seems hard, if not impossible, to avoid that difficulty.

[4] To quote only one authority: "He was offered once to exhaust the sins of many." Heb. ix, 28. Does Dr. MacDonald forget that he quoted that text a few lines above—applying it to the sacrifice of the Cross? It seems even that the defenders of the destruction theory have been so much impressed with the external circumstances of

undergone by the Divine Victim. On the "offering" theory, then, there was no such thing as the Sacrifice of Calvary.

5. To maintain the Sacrifice of Calvary the advocates of the "offering" theory would be reduced to the necessity of affirming that it was the executioners of our Lord who offered the Sacrifice. It was they who laid hands on the Victim, fastened Him to the altar of the Cross, and by piercing His hands and feet shed the Blood which "blotted out the handwriting of the decree that was against us." This appears to me to be the *reductio ad absurdum*[1] of the "offering" theory.

The theory just mentioned, like the still more recent "banquet" theory, claims to correspond with the notion of sacrifice prevalent in primitive times, especially among pagan peoples. The fact that both theories make this claim indicates the difficulty of determining with precision at this day what the notion of sacrifice really was in those remote ages. This much at least is beyond question, that in the classic authors of pagan antiquity the immolation of the victim enters into the essential concept of sacrifice. Equally beyond question is it that in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, where the ritual of sacrifice is prescribed by God Himself, not only the offering but the destruction of the victim is ever expressly enjoined. What warrant can there be for eliminating from sacrifice an element which belongs to it by God's own positive ordinance?[2] Let it be granted that destruction of the victim either found no place at all, or was not the element on which the chief stress was laid, in the sacrifices of the ancient world. It can hardly be counted a guarantee of its truth to-day that a theory should accord with such a conception of sacrifice. When we seek to gain true ideas in ethics as in jurisprudence, do we go back to the crude beginnings of society in prehistoric times, or hie us to lands peopled by savages? And if not, why should we do so when we wish to gain true ideas in religion or about religious worship? If primitive man fancied that the supreme act of external worship consisted in parting with something that was dear to him and handing it over to the Deity, or again in sitting at a banquet with his tribal god, he did but grope in the dark, with no light from above to guide him. When the light came it revealed sacrifice as the offering of a victim immolated on an altar, foreshadowing the immolation of the Lamb that was slain from the foundation of the world.

The Author of *The Sacrifice of the Mass.*

In the above the author of "The Sacrifice of the Mass" takes exception to the statement in the notice of his book that only "the weakest arguments in favor of the Offering theory are mentioned," as this implies "that there are arguments in favor of it which he either does not know of or purposely

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Calvary that they are trying to inflict a semblance of death on the author of life. How can we imagine "an immolation voluntarily undergone" which will not at least imply a self-offering?

[1] It is indeed a *reductio ad absurdum*, but not of the oblation theory, at least as it is understood and exposed by those who hold it. It is easy enough to ridicule a caricature.

[2] Did God positively ordain that there should be *no sacrifice* without the destruction of the victim? What about the Mass, when the victim is Christ who "dieth no more"?

MODERN SUBSTITUTES FOR SOUL

Edward A. Pace, D. D.

Considering the empirical tendency of modern thought, one might easily infer that the problems and even the concepts of metaphysics had lost all interest. They seem to have been "criticised" out of existence. It is not only that they cumber the ground where the special sciences delve; but also that they are found to be useless growths in philosophy itself from which they originally sprang. Agnosticism, of course, has long since pruned them off and cast them into that wide outer region that lies under the pall of the Unknowable. In more conservative systems they are allowed to survive as interesting reminders of an earlier development, which the history of philosophy dutifully traces but to which, apparently, there is no possible return.

Now it will not be denied that criticism, both in its avowed purpose and in some of its actual results, is a legitimate and fruitful method. Had knowledge remained just where it was at the close of the medieval period, it would still have needed careful revision if only to determine the real value of its content and of its foundation. But it was inevitable that, as new fields were opened for exploration, the principles and ideas which served as the base line of survey should be closely scrutinized. In the development of the natural sciences especially, there was too much at stake to allow an unquestioning acceptance and use of such ideas as cause and matter and force. And it is not surprising that philosophy, in adjusting itself to the new environment created by the advance of knowledge, should have been obliged to refine and modify its concepts.

The pressure brought to bear upon philosophy by the physical sciences was strong enough to completely overturn the older cosmological theories. The latter, indeed, offered a "passive resistance;" but their final disappearance, or at any rate their retirement to the region of speculation, was not considered an irreparable loss. From the atomic theory or from the principle of the conservation of energy no serious disaster was apprehended for life, religion, or morality. So it came to pass that thinkers who were certainly loyal to Christian belief gave their adherence to views of the physical order which modern science proposed.

With new theories concerning man himself and, in particular, the higher nature of man, the case was different. Psychology, it is true, was bound to become, in its turn, more empirical. It had to sharpen its introspective view and to make its analysis keener. There was and is abundant work for it to do in unravelling the complex processes of mind, in discovering the laws of mental development, and in searching out the connection between mind and body. All that has been accomplished by shrewd observation or delicate experiment, and all that may yet be accomplished by these means, must surely be welcomed by every student of psychology. Such investigation is simply the carrying out in detail of the Scholastic axiom—*operatio sequitur esse.* The more we know about the behavior of the mind the better are we prepared to speculate about its nature. But when psychology declared that it could dispense with the concept of a soul and when, on the other hand, certain metaphysical systems threw discredit on the idea of substance in general, the situation of philosophy became embarrassing indeed. The consequences of denying the existence in man of a permanent spiritual principle were too obvious. They meant not only a recasting of this or that theory concerning the processes of mind, but also a radical change of attitude towards the problems of man's origin, destiny and worth. However willing philosophy might be to accept at their face value the results of empirical investigation, it could not at once surrender an idea so important as that of the soul. Here and there, no doubt, a philosopher might be found to declare that the soul-question had been finally ruled out of discussion. But more serious thinkers knew and still know that this question cannot be so lightly set aside. It may be "handed over" from psychology to the philosophy of mind and thence referred to epistemology; it may suffer delays in passing from bureau to bureau of metaphysical construction; but it demands and must find a solution.

Meantime, the plain man who has not followed the history of the problem through all its deviations and hears only the verdict—there is no such thing as soul—will probably ask: What are you going to put in its place? Granted that the day of vital spirits and substantial forms and windowless monads is past: does it follow that they have no modern successor or substitute? Or has evolution swept us so far from the speculations of the past as to make "ego" and "self" appear as illusions from which we pray to be delivered?

Such inquiries are, to say the least, quite natural; and, curiously enough, they have been anticipated by more than one school of philosophy. For when we look somewhat closely into the history of the problem we find that those who discard the idea of soul-substance do, as a rule, only exchange it for some other concept. The mental life, as it goes on from moment to moment, may be explained by showing that this process follows upon that process in accordance with definite psychological laws; but why there should be any sequence or how this comes to be continuous or what differentiates mental life from any other sort of life, is not so readily explained. It may be, too, that there is no explanation, that we are dealing with ultimate facts and that we ought to rejoice in the knowledge that beyond these facts we cannot go. Still, materialism goes beyond them, and so does every philosophy that seeks a consistent view of reality.

We have thus, in modern thought, various substitutes for the soul. Each of these has been examined, and most of them have been found wanting or open to serious objection. To point out anew their several defects is hardly necessary; nor is it my present intention to develop a concept of the soul in the light of psychological research. There is another aspect of the problem—the logical aspect—and it is with this that I am here concerned. I wish to ask, in other words, whether in rejecting the idea of soul-substance and in offering substitutes for that idea, philosophical speculation has been entirely consistent and altogether free from those very tendencies, weaknesses, or mistakes which it undertook to reform.

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To begin with one of the extremes: Agnosticism tells us emphatically that the substance of mind is unknown and unknowable. We can no more frame an idea of it than we can, by taking thought, penetrate the nature of that Power which manifests itself in the transactions of the outer world. *That* out there is X; *this* within us is Y. The value of the one is as far beyond our reach as the value of the other. All that we can say is that they are the same.

This conclusion, to put it mildly, is disappointing. Psychology of late has made such a brave showing of methods and results that one might be pardoned for supposing that we had learned something more than our forefathers knew about the nature of mind. In our simplicity we had imagined that a thing which "manifests" itself, somehow gets to be known if there is an intelligence able and willing to perceive the manifestation. But this is a question for epistemology; it is not precisely the point at which we take issue with the agnostic statement. Our difficulty centers about the "manifestation." Granting that the substance of mind is unknowable, we merely ask, in the name of logic, why anything should be said about manifesting, revealing or appearing. A conscious state as such is no manifestation of anything other than itself. It comes and goes as an internal event or process, a selection, emotion, or volition. It may be linked to preceding states and, in accordance with the law relatively, it may present traces of their influence. But it does not, just as it occurs in consciousness, proclaim or even suggest its origin out of a substantial mind either knowable or unknowable. It is a manifestation only because we, by a roundabout way of inference and reasoning, conclude that there must be something behind it. I do not, for the time being, pass upon the value of this conclusion. What I wish to point out now is the rather curious position taken by agnosticism when it talks about manifestations of the unknowable.

If, conversely, it be said that we are compelled, by the very nature of thought, to posit an agent or underlying something for mental processes, the logical situation of agnosticism is no whit better. We are aware that the processes take place, and we are also aware that they are not processes in the abstract but processes of a definite sort. Our actual experience is of blue or of sweet, of hard or of cold; "sensation" is an abstract name for all such experiences, just as "emotion" is an abstract name for joy and anger and fear. "Process" is the largest abstraction of all, a short-hand expression for everything that happens in consciousness. If, then, the agnostic is justified in saying that the processes must proceed from something, he may be further constrained to say that this kind or these kinds of process must issue from this sort of something. He cannot logically be permitted to drain out the qualities that make the mental experience what it is and use the pulp of an abstraction to prove that there is "something" back of consciousness. To be quite consistent he should confess: I know not, and no one else can know, whether these processes be "manifestations" of something or just—processes.

His plight, however, becomes decidedly worse when, adopting the Spencerian treatment, he identifies the unknowable within and the unknowable without. Before saying that two things are the same, one may be reasonably supposed to have some slight acquaintance with each. The fact that we have found no value for X and no value for Y is hardly a warrant for inferring that X is equal to Y; they may be unequal. Having reached the conclusion that the Power which manifests itself in the external world is unknowable and that the source of our conscious states is likewise unknowable, we may properly affirm that the same adjective describes both as far as description is possible. But to identify them is a questionable procedure. At best, the agnostic should declare: I know not whether this unknowable is in any respect similar to that other unknowable. The relation, if any there be, between the two, is as unknowable as the terms themselves.

There may, of course, be reasons for holding that each mind is part of the universal Mind, a speck in the Ultimate Reality; but these reasons are not likely to take unknowableness as their middle term. The likelihood decreases when one is informed, on very good agnostic authority, that there is no conceivable passage from the physical series to the mental series. The two series present such radical differences that we cannot possibly think of motion becoming thought or of thought transforming itself into motion. Whether this reciprocity be really inconceivable, I do not attempt to decide. I should simply like to know why, from this hopeless antagonism in appearances, we must infer that what lies beneath the one series is identical with what lies beneath the other. If from the study of mental phenomena we can draw no conclusions regarding the substance of mind, and if, with all our knowledge of physical phenomena, we are unable to find out anything about the Power behind them, what ground have we for supposing that the two unknowable somethings, in spite of their irreducible manifestations, are at bottom the same?

Agnosticism, with characteristic modesty, puts forth the plea that, at any rate, it saves us from the necessity of reducing consciousness to the level of matter. By taking refuge in the unknowable, we are supposed to escape the onset of materialism and the fate which is in store for its victims. Possibly there is comfort in the thought. But whatever be its shortcomings, materialism has, in its own rough fashion, an air of consistency which is, logically, to its credit. It gets rid unceremoniously of the soul and then it says bluntly: consciousness is a product of the brain. Mind we know directly; the brain we know fairly well and may hope to know better; of the unknowable we have not the slightest need.

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Here, then, we have another substitute for soul. Instead of a metaphysical entity aloof from consciousness and beyond the reach of investigation, we are offered an organ whose structure and functions we can observe. And the more carefully we observe, the more clearly do we see that mental process is dependent for its origination and continuation upon what takes place in the brain. The soul is superfluous; and the idea of a soul serves only to disturb the easy course of our psychical mechanics.

Various exceptions have been taken to this radical doctrine, and some of them have annoyed those materialists who love to wear the garb of respectability when they go forth to meet practical consequences. But the main trouble lies right at home, at the logical hearth of the theory. Materialism, finding that the soul cannot be pictured in imagination, forthwith declares that the soul-theory is no explanation of consciousness. We do not, it says, come any nearer to understanding the origin of thought by postulating a spiritual thinking substance, nor do we, by multiplying faculties, give an intelligible account of the variety we find in mental processes and much less of the laws by which these are governed. But when materialism is asked to explain how thought or any other form of consciousness issues from the brain, it is obliged to confess its ignorance and so to seek shelter in a corner of the agnostic swamp. There it may talk quite freely about "conditioning," "accompanying," and "depending" without serious fear of attack. The spiritualist knows as well as any one else that mind and organism are bound in the closest of unions, but he also claims that thought, since it is no less real a process than nutrition or circulation, must be the product of a being just as real as the organism. And he certainly seems justified, so long as materialism is silent on the origin of thought, in ascribing it to what he calls the soul.

Materialism, again, shows a certain recklessness in the use of standards and measures. If asked to state what any substance is capable of, it would surely not be content to point out the least significant of the activities which the substance in question exhibits. If the capacity of the brain, for instance, had to be estimated, the materialist would hardly stop at the declaration that the brain is the seat of some reflexes and the source of some motor processes. He would naturally point to the more complex functions and, in his own interest, to those functions which are more immediately connected with mental activity. He would not, at any rate, reduce the highest functions to those that are of least consequence as indications of what the brain can do. But when he comes to gauge the capacity of mind, he has quite a different measure. Sensation and imagination are clearly organic processes; therefore, thought and volition are organic too; and this in spite of the fact that introspection reveals a radical difference between the higher and the lower forms of consciousness.

The attempt of materialism to show that all vital function is a form of movement has, from the logical view-point, its justification. Once we take the position that matter is the only reality, we may legitimately infer that there is no activity other than that of material energy. Processes in the brain, like other organic processes and like all manifestations of physical force, are simply modes of motion subject to mechanical laws. We thus teach a view of reality which is at once simple and comprehensive. With the problems of vitalism and animism we are no longer concerned. Life in its most complex phases is finally seen to be a part of the larger cycle of change through which the energy of the world unceasingly passes. But then, we may ask, has not materialism made its own task more hopeless? If it has really succeeded in reducing cerebral function to the level of movement, with what assurance does it call on us to believe that thought is a product of the brain? Its very success in physics and physiology must disqualify it as a witness when the origin of conscious process is at issue. And its failure at the critical moment of its application to the central problem of mind, is not to be excused on the plea: *ignoramus et ignorabimus*.

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It was inevitable that the extravagances of Materialism should call forth a reaction. Even those who had little sympathy with spiritualism grew weary of hearing that thought is a secretion of the brain. They saw, too, that the unsavory doctrine could not be helped by such thin disguises as the Double Aspect Theory or any other monistic coating. It was needful to lift consciousness as a whole above the plane of material activity and to discover in consciousness itself the explanation of its phenomena. Not the brain and not the substantial soul, but the series or aggregate of mental processes was to constitute the essential nature of mind. Psychical events, in an order and succession of their own, without reference to any underlying permanent cause, would, when thoroughly investigated, account for their own coming and going. The "stream of consciousness," in two dimensions, would bear upon its surface the reason and laws of its flowing.

At the same time, the "Actuality" theory, as it is called, leans upon the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. The mental series has as its concomitant the physical series of processes in the brain. Between the two there is no causal connection; the brain does not produce the conscious process nor does the conscious process produce the cerebral change. They are simply parallel. Whether pre-established or not, the harmony between the two series is such that, when the organic change occurs, the corresponding conscious process takes place—and *vice versa*.

Apparently, the theory has much in its favor. It sets not only the higher activities of mind but all forms of consciousness in an order apart from organic function. To psychical causality it ascribes an efficacy no less real than that which is claimed for causes in the physical world. It relieves us of all anxiety about the sub-conscious and settles at one stroke the question as to mental powers. By limiting our psychological inquiry to what actually happens, it obliges us to study more carefully each process and to determine more accurately the relations which bind all processes in the Actuality which it substitutes for soul.

The substitution, however, seems to have been accomplished without scrupulous attention to the ordinary rules of procedure. It was said, for instance, that the substantial soul must be discarded because it is not "given" in consciousness. Sensations we know and emotions and thoughts; but, search as we may, we never catch a glimpse of the soul. If it really exists, its chief function would seem to be self-concealment; and in this it is remarkably successful. Be it so: but then, is the "series" any more accommodating? Consciousness, after all, has a very narrow range. To the sharpest introspection only a few links are "given," and even these glide away so quickly that they can hardly be examined. If it is said that the series includes those states also which have disappeared, the statement may be true enough, but it does not help us out of the difficulty. Processes that are over and gone form, of course, by the mere fact of succession in time, a series, the history of which may be written; but the most faithful reproduction by memory does not bring back to actuality the yesterdays of mind.

As a second count in the indictment of the soul theory, it was urged that if the substance of mind did appear in consciousness it would not afford an explanation of mental processes. We would not get any clearer idea about the origin of the several conscious states nor any deeper insight into the laws of their succession. We would simply have on our hands a new problem more intricate and baffling than any other. The concept of a soul, framed to account for mental phenomena, gives no account of itself. Let us suppose that this objection is valid; and then let us see how far it is met by the Actuality theory. It will be admitted that the earlier processes in the series are not at this moment directly influencing consciousness; they are no longer existent. They cannot, literally, be recalled. If they have left no trace, if they have come and gone as the images of objects that pass in front of a mirror, it is hard to see how they affect in any way the states that follow. In reciting the alphabet we pronounce *a*, *b*, *c*, before the other letters; we form a series. Yet no one will say that *a* or *b* determines the sound or the position in the series of *x*, *y*, and *z*. In fact, we would not be able to recite the alphabet twice, uttering the same sounds in the same order, had no record been left of our first attempts. But the case of the mental series is even more difficult. A conscious process which has ceased to be and which has left no vestige of itself, is supposed to account for other processes which are still "future contingents," and about which present surmise or speculation is useless. We can understand the formation of habits involving the performance of certain movements in a regular sequence, because we know that each repetition of the movements is registered in motor centers, muscles and nerves. On the same basis we explain the acquisition of skill, facility of action, and strength of inveterate habit. But no explanation would be possible if in the organism we had only actuality of function with nothing permanent to retain the effects of previous function. The actualistic theory may congratulate itself on dispensing with soul or any other enduring subject of mental life; but it taxes logic heavily to pay for the substitution. If the substance of mind cannot account for the activities of mind, these surely do not explain themselves by pointing to other events of which no record is kept.

The Actualists, however, take appeal to the very canon of interpretation which has always been alleged in favor of the soul theory. In the mind, they claim, everything is fleeting process, momentary occurrence, ceaseless change. Consciousness reveals no permanence. It is essentially a procession of states; and if one of these states shows a tendency to linger in the form of an insistent idea, the procession halts, and mind itself becomes abnormal. Consequently, that which is to explain mental life cannot be an enduring substantial thing. Since the nature of mind is inferred from its mode of action, and since the most conspicuous characteristic of mental activity is change, we are forbidden to think of an underlying permanent soul.

This conclusion seems plausible; but before accepting it we may ask a question or two. What tells us that consciousness is the scene of perpetual change? Awareness of change implies comparison, and that which makes the comparison ought to persist long enough to span the interval between the events compared. Even supposing that each new state, in the moment of appearing, somehow announces that it is different from its immediate predecessor, we are still at a loss to explain our perception, either of identity or of difference, between our present experience and the experience, say, of last year. If it be answered that in reality we compare the present state with a memory-product which is likewise present, the further question arises: how do we recognize this "revival" as part of our earlier experience? Such words, indeed, as "early" and "recent" can have little meaning for a mind whose essence is the actuality of its processes. The concept, also, of a series, if this is supposed to extend beyond the few states that are at any time given, is a remarkable product of a consciousness in which there is nothing permanent. How any human mind ever came to know itself as a succession, to discover the connection between its processes or to maintain its serial form in spite of frequent interruptions, is, on the Actuality hypothesis, a problem from which the boldest metaphysics must shrink.

It was, perhaps, to hide its domestic uneasiness that Actualism, from the outset, took an aggressive attitude. It rejected the substance theory on the ground that the idea of substance had been taken over from the physical order and applied, illegitimately, to the mental order. It was a foreign importation which no amount of declaring and no readiness to pay duty could save from confiscation. It bore, moreover, the unmistakable mark of its origin; to admit it was to admit materialism. On this score, Spiritualism had been lax or unwary; but now, sitting in the gateway of customs, was the stricter guard of the Actuality theory; the substance idea was deported.

It was plainly a grievous thing for Spiritualism to lose, in such a fashion, its most valued possession and to find that it had all along been furthering the interests of its chief opponent. It might, however, have observed that Actualism also had engaged in some peculiar transactions. It might, for instance, have pointed to a suspicious resemblance between psychical "elements" and those other elements with which chemistry deals, or to the more striking resemblances between mental "processes" and the phenomena of the material world. But what is more important to note, the idea of a series is clearly suggested by our ordinary observation of external facts, and it is emphasized by the results of physical science. Our natural tendency is to think of the self as at least relatively stationary in the midst of changing phenomena. In correcting the tendency at the behest of the Actuality theory, we apply to the mind the imported concept of series; and we do not obliterate the traces of its foreign origin when to the idea of mental series we join that of cerebral series and say that the one runs parallel to the other. Actualism, at all events, should be mindful of its own condition when it rises to cast reproach upon other theories of mind.

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In some recent presentations of the Actuality view, the attempt has been made to remedy its more obvious defects. Its failure, especially, to account for the facts of memory necessitated a modification, or even a reluctant concession in favor of something more permanent than the individual states and their serial arrangement. On the cerebral side there must be, as the effect of each change, a residual trace which, in its own measure and according to its depth, determines the subsequent response of the brain to new stimulation; there must be organic dispositions. Parallel to these we must have, or assume, psychical dispositions; that is to say, each mental process must, in its passing, leave behind it a trace, vestige, or residual effect which may remain latent for an indefinite period but which, under certain conditions such as a corresponding cerebral change, may revive and take its place in the actuality of consciousness. Habit, memory, association and recognition are explained if we admit the presence in the mind of psychical dispositions.

The substance theory can have no objection to the statement that mental processes make their mark; this is only another way of saying that there is something in which the mark is preserved. But it was surely a mistake for the Actuality theory to tolerate the mention of dispositions. What is it that is "disposed"? What receives the disposing influence of the state that is actually present? And what, with its store of dispositions, persists from the moment when a state disappears to the moment of its revival? It is difficult to understand a series of processes that issue from no real being; it is yet more difficult to conceive of dispositions, that is of potential processes, residing in no subject. One might as well look in thin air for the shadow of a movement that simply occurred.

To make matters worse, it is acknowledged that the dispositions as such do not appear in consciousness. They are not given: their existence, precarious as it is at best, is inferred. They seem to enjoy a singular immunity from the objection that was urged against soul-substance on the ground of its non-appearance; and they escape, through their strict retirement, the disasters which befell mental faculties and powers. What place or places psychical dispositions occupy in the mental series, is not quite clear. The series is essentially fluent, while the dispositions, to be of any service whatever, must have some degree of stability. They must compensate for the transitory character of the processes which they represent. But if this be their office, they are in open defiance of the very canon which rules out the substance of mind; they pretend to a permanence which is incompatible with the most obvious feature of consciousness. And they claim that their permanence is greater in proportion to the frequency with which non-permanent processes recur.

Meantime, out of their "deeper inconsequent depth," these psychical dispositions exert a remarkable influence. They are somehow aware of what is going on at the surface of mind and of what takes place in the brain. They facilitate or hinder the revival of conscious states, and they are chiefly responsible for the mental attitude on which the fortune of any new impression or idea so largely depends. In a word, though they never venture openly upon the scene, they determine what actually passes there. All this they are known and said to do—in spite of the fact that they elude the closest introspection.

One can hardly be called rash for suspecting that the disposition theory is a residual trace of the substance idea. The tendency to think something that remains and by its permanence, however shadowy, accounts for the continuity of mental life, is almost irresistible. In yielding to it, the Scholastics were at least economical; they were satisfied with one substance. The Actuality theory, by postulating a plurality of dispositions and assigning to each the essential characteristics of permanent factors, only sets many substances in place of one.

What holds them together in a unitary mental life, the theory does not declare.

In fact, some advocates of the theory show a commendable reserve in speaking of psychical dispositions. Nothing, it is said, can be known about these traces beyond the fact that they are somehow left in the mind. Their mode of persistence, their qualities, and their mutual relations are inscrutable. They are merely suspended actualities in a misty mid-region which no man can discover. So we return, after a roundabout of speculation and discussion, to make our peace with agnosticism; that which accounts for the essential features of mind is unknowable.

As a means of relieving the situation it has been proposed that the dispositions be regarded not as purely psychical, but as psycho-physical, i. e., they are to be at once mental and organic. As mental, they furnish a support for the series, and temper, in their own proper measure, the actuality of mind. As organic, they find warrant for their permanence in the impressions retained by the brain. They are thus, like the man who builds his house on the border, secure from molestation, so long, at any rate, as danger presses from one side only. But whether they are agile enough to escape the combined attack of materialism and pure phenomenalism, is somewhat doubtful.

In other respects, the term "psycho-physical" has done good service, and it may yet have a mission to perform. It emphasizes the unitary nature of man, and its final interpretation may be found in a theory which shall determine the relation of body and soul as real constituents of a real being. If the relation has been obscured, this is mainly because of the exaggerated importance attached, now to organic function and now to mental process. Looking upon these activities as profoundly different *in se,* philosophy has at times declared that the psychical alone is real; while, at other times, it has been just as positive in maintaining that the only reality in man is organic. The net result has not been to the advantage of the psychical factor. While materialism has defended its thesis at all costs, idealism has permitted the reality of mind to dwindle until now there remains but the passing conscious state with its penumbra of dispositions. To say that the mental series is parallel to the physical series is, perhaps, a convenient figure of speech. But when it becomes clear that the mental series issues from no real subject, we are obliged to admit either that mind is a strange aggregate of causeless effects or that it is literally a product of brain. In the former case, our parallelism is in open violation of a basic principle; in the latter, it defies all geometry, since parallelism ceases the moment one line begins to approach the other. And, in any case, the attempt to provide a substitute for soul results in a metaphor the interpretation of which is just now the centre of discussion: it is not "given" in consciousness.

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GENTILISM AND THE INSTINCT FOR CATHOLICITY

THREE TYPICAL INSTANCES.

Cornelius Clifford

Christian thought, like the religion of which it is the inadequate yet ever-growing expression, has in almost every epoch of its history aspired to the completeness and the exclusiveness of a system. In obedience to an instinct, which has been variously denoted, but never sufficiently accounted for, its exponents have aimed at an ordered unification or hierarchy of ideas which is hardly less imposing in its assertions than the claims of that more palpable hierarchy of personages whose mission it is to keep traditional Christianity ever in touch with the actual business of life. This tendency, as the student of opinions scarcely needs to be told, has had a diversified effect upon the development of Christian teaching; for it has both retarded and fostered progress. If it has been the occasion of not a few of the most tragic misunderstandings which the historian of heterodoxy has had to record, it has been, just as surely, the source of some of the most enduring transformations of view which Catholicism, considered as a philosophy, has been able to effect over the intellect of man. The result, on the whole, may be said, therefore, to justify the stress that has gone to its making. Controversy, it is true, is not necessarily the sign of a profound reflectiveness; and, from the nature of things, it is a constantly decreasing quantity in the evolution of higher and more esoteric views; yet it serves a purpose, however humble, in the scale of thought; and in the case of Christian dogma—the outcome of an intricate and many-sided process not easily describable in purely scientific terms—its influence is nearly always found to be positive and upbuilding. The historic Jesus is seen more and more to be both Messiah and Lord; and the historic Church, which traces its descent downward through the centuries from Him, acquires new titles to justify its ancient claim to be His most incontrovertible witness in all the deeper debates of life. Schools and individual leaders of opinion may wither and be forgotten; but Catholicism lives on, assimilating into the very fibre of that protecting cortex of dogmatic pronouncement with which it inevitably surrounds itself, the ideas and often the catch-words of systems that enjoyed a brief and brilliant period of exuberance in their time merely because they had presumed for a season to forecast its decay.

What it may be asked, is the secret of this amazing vitality? How shall we describe in terms which the scientific student may be induced to consider, the source at once of so much self-adaptability to the contrariousness of environment and of so much persistence amid the most insidious vicissitudes of change? That is the problem to which we hope to find a partial answer in the present essay; and it will enable the reader to follow our argument the less contentiously, we imagine, if we define as clearly as possible at the outset, the particular sense in which we shall employ the term *GENTILISM* as both characterizing and explaining, in on notable aspect, at least, the mysterious process to which every true scholar would like to give a name.

In order to do this, however, we must first attempt to reconstruct for ourselves a chapter in primitive Church history; and it is to the scarcely chronicled score of years immediately succeeding the Ascension of Our Lord that we must go, if we would gather the most telling data which will enable us to understand Gentilism, both in its inception and in its subsequent development, as a human force guiding the destinies of Catholicism amid its many-issued adventures in a world where men will always find it difficult to believe rationally and well.

We are so accustomed to the secular breadth and cosmopolitanism of Catholic Christianity that we find it difficult to conceive that it was ever evolved from a religion as austerely separatist as Judaism showed itself to be in the days of Our Lord. *Non coutuntur Judæi Samaritanis.* Jew and Samaritan were hardly more opposed in New Testament times than are the historical descendants of Abraham to-day to the spiritual progeny of Christ. However reasonably inclined we may be to correct our astonishment at the thought of their original identity by reference to the favourable conditions of the birth-time of the Christian Church, the close-knit ecumenicity of the Roman Empire, and the intelligent tolerance of the *Diaspora* driven by the stimulus of an ineradically commercial instinct to establish themselves in the various centres of imperial trade, the fact remains that in temper and in outlook the two faiths are almost as far apart as the gates of night and day. The one is static and retrospective, fashioning in the intervals of its devotion to secular pursuits a nebulous dream of future self-justification out of the elements of its unforgettable past; the other is dynamic and forward-moving, with its eyes strained towards the flaming barriers of the world, preoccupied, whether in victory or in defeat, with the thought of a Person whose visible return to earth is to be the harbinger of Israel's belated repentance and the rehabilitation of a jaded and conscience-stricken mankind

The little community which established itself in Jerusalem after the events of the first Christian Pentecost was as consistently Jewish in its outward life as ever Our Lord Himself had been. Its members continued to take part in the ancient worship; and their Apostolic leaders went up to the Temple at stated hours to pray. While they were looked upon with suspicion by the Sadducean caste who held the places of power, they themselves, if we may take their ordinary everyday conduct as evidence of their habit of mind, had no suspicion that they were destined to drift apart from the Synagogue of their own people, or to develop into a new religious force in the world. They made much of baptism, indeed, and accepted the mysterious ceremony known as the laying-on of hands which confirmed them in Our Lord's Spirit; they met, too, at each other's houses for eucharistic prayer; but none of these practices was held to be incompatible with circumcision or with the profession of Israel's hereditary faith. As in the days of the all-too brief career of the Master from whom they drew their holiest inspiration, they were a *pusillus grex*, a seed, a nucleus, if you will; but they betrayed as yet little of the unyielding self-consciousness that invariably issues in the aloofness of a sect. They still kept well within the bounds of national Jewish tradition they preached obedience to the Prophet of whom Moses spake; their summons was to *Israel according to the flesh.*

How long this condition of things endured it would be difficult to say. Even if we adopt the extreme views of Ewald and his followers and assign St. Stephen's martyrdom to the year 38, it could not have lasted for any great length of time. The death of the proto-martyr was the beginning of a crisis which was destined to have the most far-reaching results. It revealed the real ethos of Christianity as essentially a world-wide religion. As so often happens in God's paradoxical dealings with religious mankind, this deeper character of the new faith seems to have been detected, in the first instance, much more clearly by those who had been watching it critically from without than by the spokesmen who were heralding its claims so enthusiastically from within. Its official leaders might hesitate for a while, minor schisms on the score of tradition and expediency might divide them, might even lead, as in the case of many of the Hebræo-Christian communities, to ultimate separation and the multiplication of sects, but one thing was henceforth to be increasingly certain. Jesus as Israel's Messiah had been something more than a national Prophet. His Gospel had a note of universality about it; and the body of followers who insisted upon the privilege of communicating its message to mankind could not, in the nature of things, long continue to occupy an equivocal and subordinate position in current Judaism. In a few chapters of the Acts of the Apostles and in the bulk of the acknowledged Epistles of St. Paul we possess the materials which will enable the most mechanical of historians to point the moral of this passing phase of nascent Christianity. It is not a hard moral to draw; and, indeed, since Baur's clumsy attempt to distort the original nucleus of facts that bear upon it, we have had disquisitions on its meaning to spare. From the beginning the nations beyond the pale of the promises were to have as vital an interest in the life and death of Christ as the supposedly more fortunate races within. That is St. Paul's version of the eternal Gospel; and before he lays down his life in its defence, the Church is, in intention, at least, if not in actual and verifiable fact, no longer Jewish but Christian and Catholic. Christ, and not the Law, is all in all for the true believer; and his sympathies ought to be as many-sided and deep as all that is of good report in human nature itself. The forces that conspired to produce this extraordinary change of view, may, considering the character and consequences of their historic interplay, not inappropriately, be described as *the tendency towards Gentilism* on the part of the accredited exponents of dogma in the Christian Church.

Few things are harder to define than an idea in its inception; yet few things are so easy to understand as a policy or principle of action—which may be described as an idea in precipitation—after it has found concrete expression, gathered to itself a following, and vindicated its right to live.

The Gentilism that operated so radically and with so much scandal to the conservative during the first half century of Christianity did not, like many a cognate influence peculiar to the Apostolic age, entirely pass away. On the contrary, it endured as a kind of centrifugal and disquieting force, urging the hardier exponents of the faith to ever widening spheres of logical activity, to fresh statement, and sometimes even to views that were denounced at the time as hazardous attempts at compromise. In this sense it was, as we have intimated, disquieting and revolutionary; but in another sense, in the sense, namely, that the new position could be found on reflection to be inevitably involved in the old, it was actually fortifying and reassuring, a true principle of evolution and growth, sharply accentuating the original nucleus of teaching and fact centering in the life and Person of the Founder, as the seed of a mighty tree whose leaves were in many bewildering and as yet undenoted ways to be for the healing of the nations. So long as there were *Goim* to be gathered into the wider and more tolerant Israel, so long as there were other and more obvious philosophies of life to be reckoned with, the work of re-statement and apology would go on until the business of dogmatic formulation and of theological commentary upon it—a process, observe, addressed inevitably to but one side of human nature—would come to acquire an importance almost as vital as that more spiritual display of energy by which the whole of Catholicism, its insistent everyday claims, its hard obedience, its sacramentalism, not less than the pomp and legitimate pride of its worship, is commended to the whole of humanity itself.

To aspire adequately to trace the progress of an influence like that would be to aspire after the unattainable. Even if the rare combination of gifts necessary for the task could be found in any one favoured individual, the genius and comprehensiveness of outlook of a Mediæval Aquinas, say, linked to the painstaking devotion to detail supposed to be characteristic of the modern Teuton, the result would be far from illuminating; for not only would the space of the longest life be too brief for its completion, but the public would still be far to seek for whom so encyclopædic a lesson could be charged with definite meaning. There is, however, a humbler, and, in the immediate effect of its stimulus upon the wise theological student, perhaps even a more excellent, way of noting the characteristics of Gentilism as a veritable yet always forward-carrying element in the intellectual forces of the Christian Church. It is the method of the theological biographer for whom exponents of doctrine are interesting, not merely for what they note, but also for what they connote; for whom tendencies and by-issues are sometimes as instructive as those more matured results of reflection and personality that contribute so largely to the master currents of progress at every critical stage of Catholic thought. We venture, therefore, to direct the reader's attention to a triad of names, each of them noteworthy to an admirable degree, and each of them in turn associated with a remarkable display of that cosmopolitan spirit which we have described above as one, and that not the least important, of the intellectual energies of Catholicism. Two of them belong to the very beginnings of theology; and the third is of our own time. They are, briefly, Justin Martyr (114-165 circ.), Origen (185-254), and John Henry Newman (1801-1890). The extraordinary gap which intervenes between the last and the others of the group must not be taken as indicative of any aboriginal arbitrariness of selection. It will be amply justified, we think, in the course of an argument which, from the necessities of the case, is constrained to be illustrative and epideictic, rather than detailed and exhaustive. Other names, we allow, might be added with profit; but few would be found to be quite so pivotal or even quite so representative.

Justin Martyr, then, who is the best known of the earlier Christian apologists, enjoys the distinction, likewise, of being the first of that series of writers in whom the orthodox Gentilism to which we allude is seen to be most characteristically at work. In his life, as in his writings, many schools of philosophy and at least two civilizations seem to meet. They are focussed for us in a message, the burden of which, like St. Paul's, speaks unequivocally of a Catholic Christ. Born in Flavia Neapolis in Samaria, of a family which was in all likelihood of mixed Hellenic and Roman origin, he retained down to the day of his death, in the curious versatility of spiritual accent that marks both his life and his style of argument, the evidences of his various upbringing. In common with so many of the more distintinguished spokesmen of Christianity in the second and third century, he was nurtured in Paganism, and underwent a veritable Pilgrim's Progress through its conflicting schools until his soul reached out to Reality at last through the even then already succinct frame-work of the Christian creed. His *Wanderjahr* through the fields of speculation appears to have been as long as it was disillusioning; but the account he has left us in the earlier chapters (cc. ii-viii *incl.*) of the *Trypho* of the great mental crisis through which he passed on the eve of his conversion and his consistent after-devotion to the philosophic garb and mode of speech down to the day of his martyrdom show us that the *Wanderjahr*, for all its errors, was a time of growth and acquisition as well. He was a disciple, he tells us, of the Porch, until the Porch disappointed him; because it had no message for a soul that was "athirst for God." He turned to the Peripatetics only to find further disappointment in their "over-shrewdness." The chilling opposition which his conscience detected between their passionless abstractions and his teachers' cynical pursuit of gain made him enter into himself. The master who could cheese-pare his daily dole of wisdom in direct proportion to the vanishing dimensions of a school-fee was clearly not a master to swear by. So he abandoned him, "believing him to be no philosopher at all." The Pythagoreans, to whom he next had recourse, were not a whit more successful in awakening a response in his questioning heart. Their long and barren scholasticate with its prentice bouts of music, astronomy and geometry, their policy of systematic repression, their inverted *antipathism*, their elaborate discipline of silence and delay, only served to irritate him. He quarrelled with his novice-master and went over to the Platonists, among whom he enrolled himself under the direction of one of the most influential of their leaders, who seems to have conducted a school of some repute at Ephesus. The insight he there gained into "immaterial things," he tells us, quite overpowered him; and, in the already threadbare phrase of the Sect "the contemplation of ideas furnished his mind with wings." His was an intelligence that flew fast and far. He made rapid progress, and in a surprisingly short space of time he was ripe for his last disillusionment. It came to him, appropriately enough, in a pleasant garden sort of place, "a certain field," he calls it, on the outskirts of the city, "not far from the sea." It was there that his heart, full of "a great passion for quietness" and sick of the unsatisfactory commerce of wrangling men, yielded itself to the toils of a supreme agony of self-introspection out of which the truth emerged that was to set him free. That truth was nothing short of the concrete *Logos*, the "Christ of God," who was at once the Self-justifying Explanation of the world and of the soul which had been in quest of Him so long. Initiation into the Christian mysteries soon followed, and, as Justin himself hints in the eighth chapter of the *Trypho*, the "happy life" began. We need not infer, as Tillemont and others have done, that there was anything especially miraculous about this episode, or that the "vision" in which the philosopher-apologete describes in such detail the change that came over him was anything more than a parable of his own devising, framed in accordance with the rhetorical mode of the day. Christianity had appealed to his peculiarly reflective temperament in the first instance as being an inspired philosophy of life, and, having had experience of its Reality, he conceived the outlines of a true apology for it by contrasting its living claims with those purely theoretic conjectures of the schools which had enriched his mind, indeed, but had left his inner self so solitary and poor.

There is no evidence whatever for the opinion that Justin was admitted to Orders. He probably continued as he had begun, a philosopher with the philosopher's bent for explaining the most vital experiences of his career in terms that the schools would understand. It is said that, because he is more concerned with Christians than with Christianity, it is not easy to construct a metaphysic from his writings which will enable us to test his personal conception of the new creed. That is only half true.

If his expositions of doctrine fail to reveal him as a man of strikingly original genius, they set him before us, at any rate, as a widely read and cultivated layman, full of the cultivated layman's discreet enthusiasm for the religion of which circumstance, academic training, and the gifts of fortune combined to make him one of the timeliest and sanest of apologists. Breadth, sobriety, and simplicity of view are the triple notes that invariably characterize his argument. They serve also to explain the indefeasible Catholicity of his position, and make him, for all his second century inarticulateness of statement, a voice which still retains its freshness for the thinkers of our time. The wisdom born of his varied experience soon found expression in his two famous *Apologies* and the *Dialogue with Trypho*. Whether he was the author of the other works sometimes associated with his name is more than doubtful. This is a point, however, of relatively small importance, compared with the two upon which his fame chiefly depends. For it is in these that the native Gentilism of the man displays itself, and gives a key, so to say, to the apologists that come after him, not only in the boldness with which he identifies the historic Christ, who is the *Annointed of God,* with the *Logos* of the Platonists, but in the dominant method and note of his teaching, which is vital and pertinent to his contemporaries, while it is never out of harmony with the essential traditions of the past. His witness is valuable to the Church in every age, not merely, or perhaps, even primarily, because he was a saint, but because he was a worker whose instinct for the growing influences of his epoch made his interests many-sided and his theological horizon wide.

St. Justin had hardly been dead a quarter of a century when there appeared in the famous school of Alexandria an exponent of scientific apologetic, who, while moving fearlessly along the lines that the earlier apologists, had sketched by way of suggestion, seemed, by the sheer weight of his genius and his essential sympathy with all that was best in the progressive forces of his time, to carry the Church forward a thousand years, and bring it into familiar touch with the most classical speculations of the Middle Age. We refer, of course, to Origen, the real father of dogmatic theology, and the greatest, if not the first of those Greek thinkers, in whom modern scholarship seems to find so much that furnishes material both for instruction and debate. He was born in Alexandria in the year 185; and, before he had reached middle life, he became the recognized leader of the most influential school of opinion that Christianity has probably ever known. Posterity has remembered him as the author of the *Hexapla* and the most wonderful of Scriptual exegetes; but his interest for the historian of dogmatic evolution lies preponderatingly in the fact that his attempt to group into a whole and to throw into scientific outline the scattered statements of Catholic belief, as he apprehended it, was the most effective, as well as the most original, piece of thinking that has come down to us from a time when Christianity was evidently preparing itself for presentation to mankind in the thought-forms of the West. Conceiving the religion of Christ as a living whole or series of co-ordinated Realities —Fundamental Truths, he called them—he endeavored to reduce the net results of his speculation to a *scientific statement couched in the philosophic language of his day.* The outcome was the ΠΕΡΙ 'ΑΡΧΩΝ, a treatise in four books, of which the only extant version is the impaired translation that we owe to the orthodox editing of Rufinus. The minor problems connected with the adequacy or inadequacy of the text in its present form need not detain us here. Sufficient evidence exists to warrant the conclusion to which modern scholarship leans that Rufinus gives us the essential argument of the original. The story of Origen's progress towards the philosophic positions of the Περὶ 'Αρχῶν is not without its significance for the present day students of Gentilism. He is said deliberately to have taken up the study of philosophy, not as an immature youth, but as a man of middle life when his mind was at the height of its powers and his fame as a teacher was beginning to attract the attention of the academic world.[1] We can do no more than sketch here in barest outline the contents of this extraordinary work. The first book deals with the Triune God and the universe of spirits; the second discusses the motives and economy of the Incarnation; the third puts before us the problems of evil and of free will; while the fourth contains Origen's well known views on the use and interpretation of Holy Scripture. In spite of the Universalism that breaks through, here and there, like a gleam of sickly light amid the actual obscurities of the treatise, in spite, too, of less important errors on points that the surer intuitions of later Christianity ultimately cleared up, the work as a whole is a veritable third century *Summa Theologica*, anticipating in the sweep and suggestiveness of its ideas, even while it falls far short of—owing to the discursiveness and lack of cogency of its methods—the greater and more enduring *Summa* produced a thousand years later by the genius of St. Thomas of Aquin.

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[1] Eusebius, *H. E.*, cc., xviii, xix.

The Περὶ Ἀρχῶν has had a varied fortune. Few, save the not incurious in scholarship, read it now; and fewer still have the intellectual courage to contemplate in quietness, as a speculative possibility, the solutions it points to but does not always sustain. The author has no suspicion that he is often pleading beyond the brief of the original *depositum fidei*; although his reverence for *what has been handed down* reveals him as one of the most unquestioning advocates of *Apostolicity of doctrine* the Church has ever known.[1] Throughout the entire work, as in his point of view as a thinker generally, he is in reality a crisis-maker. The mind that has once been kindled into thought by contact with his ideas will never again be altogether as it was. Yet in attempting to appraise him we need constantly to remind ourselves that he was a pioneer. He was one of those path-finders in the wilderness of speculation through whose errors the way of lesser men is made cautious and smooth. If one great saint and father condemned him, another became his panegyrist by pointing out how completely he had made the Christian world his debtor by his all-but-inspired contributions to the thought and knowledge of his day. In this, as in some of the more poignant events of his outer history, in his enforced and protracted exile, and above all, in the unaccountable irony of that strange series of ecclesiastical mischances that beset his path as a teacher and gave ground for controversy after his heroic death, he furnishes an early parallel to the career of John Henry Newman. A period of more than sixteen centuries of development intervenes between them in point of time, and the whole body of perfected definition in dogmatic belief furnishes an eminence of outlook to the one that the other necessarily lacked; but in temper and spirit, and, more especial y, in their unconscious appeal to the *instinct for re-statement*, each may be characteristically described as *pre-eminently the thinker of his age.*

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[1] Cf. ii, *passim.*

Considering the fore-ordained inertia of the theological mind on most matters, its reasonable distaste for novelty or singularity of view, it is no small achievement to have impressed one's claim to that distinction upon the intelligence of a later and more critical generation. That is why in searching for the latest and most significant illustration of orthodox Gentilism, as a force that helps to keep the note of Catholicity fresh and obvious in the world, we turn, not to Augustine, epoch-making and disquieting as his speculations on Grace and Free Will proved in the event to be; not to Vincent of Lerins whose one brilliant phrase almost served as a substitute for real thought for nearly seven hundred years; nor to Thomas of Aquin whose genius was so compelling, whose lucidity and comprehensiveness were so complete, as well nigh to work the sad miracle of making theology popular by seeming to transform the profoundest of the sciences into the most facile-tongued of the arts for every Sophist to shine by down to the days of Trent and after; but to the one lonely thinker of these times, who in the diversified experience of his own inner religious life, as well as in the incomparable overflow wherewith that life has enriched the Church for many a decade to come, has enabled us once more to apprehend what is, indeed, in its way, *the breadth and length and height and depth*—the historicity, the psychology and the very grammar of the Christian faith.

Without pressing a comparison that may lead us fallaciously far afield, it may be said that Newman's peculiar geuius had more in common with the Alexandrians who first aroused him, than with the Scholastics whom he only perfunctorily studied and whom, in all probability, he never thoroughly understood. The many-sided imagination and ever-brooding mysticism of the man threw a veil of mistrust between his mind and that of the over-confident Middle Age. He stood closer to the third century than to the thirteenth; and habitually, both as Protestant and as Catholic, wrote like a thinker more in sympathy with Origen than with Thomas of Aquin. There are those, of course, who will question this view; but whether one be prepared to accept it or not, it will have to be conceded that there is much in the great Oratorian's cast of mind that recalls the hardly greater Alexandrian. If his philosophic contributions to the opinion of his time are more fragmentary than Ozigen's, more casual in their treatment of the fundamental problems of belief, and considerably less ambitious in scope, they are scarcely less profound in the insight they afford; and in their procedure are assuredly not less unconsciously daring.

Speaking roughly, and with an eye only to the main currents of philosophic endeavour, the religious mind of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, where it was engaged at all in serious work, and not occupied in repeating parrot-wise the discoveries of its earlier teachers, was concerned with three great problems. First of all, it was labouring at the task of re-writing the story of Christianity, particularly in its beginnings. This was its *historical* problem. Secondly, it was feeling its way tentatively towards a fuller and more satisfactory expression of the positions of faith in terms, now of the Hegelian, now of the so-called Neo-Kantian metaphysic. This was its *logical* or *philosophic* problem. And everywhere, not in Germany only, but in England, in France, and even in Italy, it was perplexing itself over the score of lesser difficulties involved in Darwin's theory of evolution; giving vent here and there to its impressions, yet hardly venturing to speak its inner thoughts out plainly. This was in reality but another and *wider phase of its philosophic problem*; and the three together bade fair to extend indefinitely the horizon of its apologetic outlook. On each one of these several points Newman had had a message, and had uttered it in terms clear enough for the reflective to understand. Owing to a variety of untoward circumstances, which it is not our business to examine now, the message had awakened no intelligent response in the soul of the time. For fully thirty years previously Newman had been living his sequestered life at Edgbaston, broken only by the abortive and melancholy episode of his Irish university experience. He had not been idle during that time; though the distractions of his office as superior of a community of clerics and his headship of a small but remarkably efficient school might have justified him in his general disinclination to speak, even had there been no subtler or more insistent reason for silence. He had published some lectures and essays; he had re-edited the incomparable *Sermons*, and had added a volume or two which showed, in many splendid ways, the exuberant, if less classical, influence of his new environment. He had, moreover, written the wonderful *Apologia* and made the entire English-speaking world his listener for all time. For these things he was gratefully remembered by that small section of his co-religionists to whom, in the poverty of their then educational environment, so elusive a thing as style could make an appeal. By these things he was accordingly judged; though not so, we imagine, would he, if compelled to make the enumeration, have counted his achievements. The existence of great gifts need not necessarily be unsuspected by their fortunate possessor; though it is characteristic of human nature that they must be exercised as though they were so. Far back in 1845 Newman had written the *Essay on Development* and left it, if not in reality uncompleted, at least with an appearance of incompleteness, as a great teacher might end abruptly the lesson he would have his disciples take most to heart. Twenty years later he had published the *Apologia*, written under a great stress and hastily, but not unpreparedly; and in the process he had laid bare his soul's habitual attitude towards God, its own conscience, and the puzzling world. Finally, in 1870, he allowed the book to appear that had "tried him most of all." It was the famous *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.* He "had written and re-written it," he admitted to a friend, "more times than he could count"; he "could not have done better," had he "spent a century on it." This last was, in reality, his most ambitious achievement. He seems to have dreamed of it all his life long. He had touched upon it during his Oxford days with a profound suggestiveness in the discourses afterwards collected into the volume known as the *University Sermons* That first attempt, as he publicly admitted after the *Grammar* had appeared, had been made with "no aid from Anglican and no knowledge of Catholic theologians." The final shape that his thoughts on the subject took in 1870 left him apparently still unsatisfied and with a mind tormented by many misgivings. "I have the same fidget about it," he writes, "as a horseman might feel about a certain five-feet stone wall which he passes by means of a gate every day of his life, yet is resolved he must and will some day clear—and at last breaks his neck in attempting." Did Newman really break his neck in the effort? The answer will depend largely upon one's training and—let us add, borrowing a salutary hint from the *Grammar* itself,—upon one's temperament in philosophy. If we are Aristotelians, we shall be under no temptation to follow him over his alluring wall. We shall stick to our syllogisms and affect to see through, or, haply, to amble through, what we lack the energy to surmount. But if we are Cartesians or Hegelians or Neo-Kantians or Pragmatists, or if we hold, after having had experience of both Suarez and DeLugo, that no philosopher has yet uttered the magic word which will enable one to pluck the psychological heart out of the mystery of faith, we may be prepared humbly to take the *Essay* on its face value. We shall then see in it a grammar that goes far to justify the intricate and perplexing assents of Christian belief, because it is the sincere life-work of one of the most virile-minded and capable thinkers of our time.

Newman had the supreme distinction in the latest Providence of God of having lived through the bulk of the experiences which he endeavoured so searchingly to appraise. He has been called by many philosophic names, some of them having an uncouth sound to the ears of Neo-scholasticism; but through all his greater works, and notably through the three which we have cited as most characteristic of his habit of thought, there runs a burden that knows few, if any, changes. It may be summed up in the contention, variously and eloquently set forth, that we have no true experience of any other causality than that of will, and that, in consequence, we must be prepared to see in the history of the Christian Church the slow development of the divine purposes as manifested through the living forms of evolutionary Catholicism; that experience affords a deeper draught of knowledge than theory; that the individual is more than the general, the concrete than the abstract. It is the philosophy of a new, devout and stimulating Realism, as opposed to that perfunctory and all-but-inert Notionalism which so many cultivated thousands are content to accept as an explanation of their religious creed. Will the philosophy live and propagate itself through the convictions of a school? It would be difficult to say; but already one may detect signs of a tendency in that direction in the labour of exposition attempted by writers as diverse in temperament as Dr. Barry and Mr. Wilfrid Ward in England, and by M. Thureau-Dangin and Père Henri Brémond, S. J., in France. That is why we have ventured to close our present illustrations of Gentilism by this brief sketch of Newman's progress towards a philosophy. Whether future generations will ever think of him as a philosopher or not, is a question over which sensible men will not be disposed to linger. He had the elements of philosophy in him to a great and extraordinary degree, and he was endowed, moreover, with a genius for expression that enabled him to stamp his ideas sympathetically and with force upon the imagination of his time. Not in the clear shadowless fields of apologetics only, but in those twilight spaces where the science of apologetics passes insensibly into that of theology, where Reality seems to the candid searcher to be lost for a while, only to be doubly and trebly felt later on as a thing transfigured and enhanced by mystery, on all the unsolved cruxes of latter-day debate, the cogency of evidence, the nature and probative function of miracle, the permanence of evil, the limits of free-will, the essence of inspiration, the genesis of faith, and above all on the origin and laws of religious, as distinguished from profane, thought,[1] he has furnished the resolute thinker with a clue. It lies in his theory of *real* as opposed to *notional* apprehension, and in his reiterated insistence upon the individual and personal element in what he delights to characterize as the *illative sense*. This is Newman's contribution to the world of living thought—one might almost call it his discovery—and how provocative the mere suggestion of it has proved, the mass of commentary, orthodox and un-orthodox, Catholic, non-Catholic, and even Agnostic, that has appeared on it since its publication, amply testifies. Surely it is not rash to call such a man great, nor is it pressing an analogy too far to hazard the contention that the architectonic spirit of orthodox Gentilism which we have recognized both in St. Stephen and in St. Paul, and which the Church under the Providence of God has followed through the ages in the life and writings of men like Justin and Origen, has re-appeared in these latter days of increased knowledge and still more increased faith, speaking to some high purpose which we are only beginning to divine, in the unique personality of John Henry Newman.

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[1] Newman, in common with the great body of Catholic theologians, holds, of course, that the ventures of faith are only partially analogous, and seldom quite similar, to those of reason. If in his attempted analysis of the act by which *a man believes unto salvation*, he seems to lean now to William of Paris, now to Suarez, it must be admitted that in one important particular, in the stress, namely, which he gives to the uniqueness of the concrete act as affected by divine influences and the believer's own idiosyncrasies, he betrays a preference rather for DeLugo. The process of religious belief, being a vital act in which the solitary soul and its Creator are immediately concerned, is, of necessity, he contends, a personal and unique one, and is never altogether the same in any two individuals. It would be misleading, however, to describe it, on that account, as a purely subjective experience. *Grammar of Assent*, p. 385, ss; Ripalda, *de fide*, D. 2; Kleutgen, *Beilagen*, U. S. W., II, § 2, 4 et ss.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE

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When Plato sketched in matchless language his ideal republic:

> "The fair fantastic commonwealth, too fair
> For earth, wherein the wise alone bare rule,
> So wise that oftentimes the sage himself
> Shows duller than the fool."

he laid stress upon certain fundamental social truths, which have, ever since, been part and parcel of our theory and practice. The state is an organism, and lives an organic life; man cannot be judged apart from it,—scarcely indeed can he be conceived apart from it. Above all, the body politic is no mere human compromise,—no *modus vivendi* arrived at, regretfully, by men who would much prefer to ride roughshod over their neighbors, but who, for fear of retaliation, agree to institute a police force. For it is not force that drives men into communities; nor is it utilitarianism. It is rather an instinct, nature-implanted, which bids them seek in the community that field for the expansion of their faculties, which a solitary or even a family life cannot afford them.

Man, then, is a member of a body politic, a note in a harmony, a part in an organism. And so at once we are provided with a number of helpful images, each of them throwing some light on what should be man's relations to the community to which he belongs. We need only open St. Paul's epistles to see how suggestive and helpful is the metaphor when applied to the Church. We are the members of Christ, drawing life from Him, deriving worth from Him, possessing unity of aim amid diversity of function, exhibiting that combination of unity and variety,—the "one and the many" of Plato's elusive formula,—which is the mark of an organism. Similarly the metaphor has been worked upon in modern times by the Church's latest apologists—thinkers who reconcile for a questioning world the elements of permanence and change, and show how, of all religious bodies, the Catholic Church alone can develop with safety, since she alone is permanent.

Among the ever-changing problems which the thinking Catholic has to face, is that which concerns his social duties as a member of a state. In days when the functions of Church and State were interwoven inextricably, the problem (save in exceptional cases) was simple enough. Throne and altar were painted on the same banner,—with some strange results which need not here be specified. But at least they could both be made the simultaneous objective of man's fealty. For the Christian and the citizen to keep his eye on both, it did not necessitate the squint demanded of the sausage-seller in Aristophanes' play. But with the break up of the old order came the need of much readjustment. In general, indeed, the state has never had to complain that Catholic principles are a bar to loyalty:—that parrot cry has been raised with some success, but is becoming discredited. Yet, in detail, there is much debatable ground between the two domains of Church and State. The problem has been solved in many ways according to differences of national temperament, tradition or other circumstances. And men's practice has been colored by theories derived now from one sphere of action, now from another.

What we are concerned with here is a point of the very highest practical importance both to Church and State. It is our desire to join issue with what we believe to be a not unnatural perversion of a sound principle. The nature of our subject is sufficiently indicated by the title of this paper; and our exposition of it has been suggested by an admirable article of the Abbé Guibert, (Superior of the seminary of the Catholic Institute of Paris) in a recent number of the *Revue du Clergé Français.*

What then is this principle which has suffered perversion, or rather misapplication? It is briefly this. Life should be social and not merely individual. "Service" must be the watchword of humanity: for in the due service of others we shall find our truest selves.

The principle stands beyond cavil It springs straight out of the conception of the state as an organism, of which we have already spoken. We need not labor the point further. But what is the misapplication? It may be put thus: "The contemplative life not being of service to the community—being in fact unsocial—cannot be justified."

But is the contemplative life unsocial? At first sight it might well appear to be so. It would seem to be a life lost to society, a selfish withdrawal of much-needed forces from the battlefield "How," one is tempted to ask, "can men and women shut themselves up in convents when the world is so full of misery and sin, of wretchedness and despair?" The question may come as a difficulty to the most zealous and devoted souls; indeed, their very zeal may add strength to the suggestion. They are bent on the service of others. In this they are Christlike and apostolic. But their too ready acceptance of certain inadequate views about human society leads them to suppose that the contemplative life is unsocial. We believe them to be mistaken; but the mistake is not an unnatural one for a zealous man to make in these busy days. And as it lies at the bottom not only of difficulties felt by Catholics, but of objections brought by those outside the Church it will repay a few moments' consideration. But before we investigate the causes of the error let us glance for a moment at its consequences. Were it to become generally accepted amongst us that the contemplative life is an unsocial and therefore an unjustifiable life, the first result would be the emptying of our monasteries, beginning with those entirely devoted to contemplation. These *horti inclusi*—enclosed gardens of God—oases in a dusty world, would disappear. What thinking man can contemplate the prospect with equanimity? Indeed, the loss would be a great one. In the first place there would be the cessation of the homage offered to God in these places: the stream of adoring prayer which rises to Him unceasingly. This point we shall not dwell on, for we are thinking rather of the social benefits of such institutions, the "carnal" reasons, if we may so call them, for keeping up contemplative orders. And these, although too often overlooked, are not far to seek.

The present writer well remembers "going down" one day at the end of term from Oxford. His mind was stocked and his spirit soothed with images of towers and spires, of venerable libraries, of solemn halls and grave chapels, of studious old-world gardens,—images fragrant with memories which have cast their spell on all generations from the days of Chaucer's lean but cheerful clerk to those of the judicious Pepys, who, upon June the ninth, 1668, wrote Oxford down in his diary as "a very sweet place" (a comment which, for all its brevity, we would not exchange for a wilderness of guide books) and on to Matthew Arnold's moonlight benediction, and the more practical devotion of Oxford's millionaire son. "All have felt"—we quote Mr Morley—"All have felt the indefinable charm that haunts the grey and venerable quadrangles . . . those elevated memorials and sanctified associations of scholars and poets, of saints and sages, that march in glorious procession through the ages, and make Oxford . . . a dream of music for the inward ear, and of delight for the contemplative eye."

With eye and ear thus possessed, then, the writer set out upon the day in question. But eye and ear were soon assailed by sights and sounds of a less pleasing character. His train passed through the "black country," and on by the smoky northern towns. Factory chimneys in serried lines, furnaces poisoning the air around, acre upon acre of dingy tenement, the dull roar of industry, the harsh clank of machinery;—no green thing, no restful sight, no silent voices from the old time builders of stately piles.

Even though one recognized the elements of good that doubtless lurked in these unattractive surroundings,—the devotion to duty, the honesty and self-sacrifice and family affection and religious feeling,—yet one was glad to have stored within the memory, pictures of a sanctuary uninvaded by machinery and traffic. One was grateful to Oxford, and felt that here was an element of human life overlooked by the Manchester school.

Our illustration—it is no more—has carried us somewhat from our point. But it is surely suggestive. If Oxford has its value, even on this head, is it not still more important for us to have in our midst houses of Carthusians and Trappists, sanctuaries where a tired and fevered world may repair, though but occasionally, to refresh itself with the sight of the calm and radiantly happy men and women who have found what many deny to be possible in this world—an absolutely serene and contented life?

Quite apart, then, from supernatural considerations, we have here a reason for attaching the greatest social value to houses of contemplation. They are a standing protest against certain features of our modern life which have called forth emphatic warnings from such eminent authorities as Mr. William James. That distinguished psychologist has denounced with convincing eloquence what he calls the "bottled-lightning" type of mind with which we are becoming increasingly familiar—the over-excited, over-intense mental life which so many of us lead, with the result that "the sultry, threatening, exhausting, thunderous inner atmosphere never quite clears away." All this, he tells us, indicates not strength but weakness; and he recommends a deliberate attempt to cultivate just that freedom of mind, and "power through repose" and equanimity which are, in fact, fostered by the contemplative orders in the Church. Mr. James quotes with approval from a charming work on "The Practice of the Presence of God," by one Brother Lawrence, a Carmelite friar "The simple-heartedness of the good Brother," he concludes, "and the relaxation of all unnecessary solicitudes and anxieties in him, is a refreshing spectacle." Here, then, is at least one social function of enclosed religious houses, viz., the providing of a "refreshing spectacle" in a world of over-wrought and jaded souls.

But more than this. If the contemplative orders were to die out amongst us, a still greater calamity would follow For there must be in the lives of each of us, if we are to live Christian lives at all, some element of contemplation, of prayer and self-restraint. Now it is clear that even a modicum of this necessary element in our lives cannot well persist unless there are in our midst men and women who are, so to say, specialists in contemplation, to be our guides and our models. Analogies might be multiplied. Here again the Platonic idea of the state proves illuminating. The state is the individual "writ large"; and any element of the single human life must have its concrete embodiment in a class to be found within the community. And what would there be to save us from our own egoism unless we had before our eyes the spectacle of men and women whose devotion to prayer and mortification is complete. One of the most rousing exhortations in à Kempis is the passage where he tells the fainting Christian to "observe the Carthusians, the Cistercians, and the monks and solitaries of various orders, how they do every night rise and sing psalms to the Lord." Nor can we neglect the lesson: for, as the Abbé Guibert well says, "a Christianity without prayers and without sacrifices would cease to be the Christianity of the Gospel. Even if the exterior cult were to remain, it would be but a form of paganism, for it would be without action upon life." To despise the contemplative life is to cripple the Church of God.

Whence, then, comes this under-valuing of the contemplative life which is liable to seize even upon zealous Catholics? It comes, as we have said, from an inadequate analysis of what is meant by social service. For the contemplative life is emphatically *not* an unsocial life. Quite apart from the higher motives to which we have alluded, our reason should tell us that in nature herself we may find a defence of the contemplative orders.

Let us come back to Plato's idea of the State. The essential solidarity which subsists between the members of any community, indeed between all members of the human race, makes it clear to us that nothing is of so great social value as the development of character in individuals. The truly unsocial man is the man who, so to say, lets his character evaporate in noisy activity, in empty bustle, in self-seeking of any kind: the man, for instance, whose religion is, to use Faber's expression, in his hands or his eyes rather than in his heart. Such a one may have the appearance of zeal, but he has not the reality. He may seem to be socially useful, but he is a mere drone in the human hive. But the man who in silence and solitude stores up in his heart a great reservoir of character, or driving power—call it what you will—is bound to affect the world, precisely on account of this solidarity of which we speak. The waters thus stored will irrigate the world, while the man of pretences is but paddling in his tiny puddle. The one is a semblance, the other a reality.

"Semblance and reality!—*Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.*" This was ever Plato's theme, and his mind (like Newman's, in later times, keenly sensitive to truth) would have welcomed the extension which the Catholic Church has given to his words in the writings of her saints and ascetics. She tells us the need of releasing a few of our number from the serving of tables, so that they may live always in the sight of the spiritual realities, which our own activity so often eclipses; that their hearts may acquire an exquisite delicacy of spiritual balance, and their minds range freely amid the crags of contemplation of which the rest of us get but an occasional glimpse. Let no one say that such a life must needs be narrowing and cramping. It produces, of course, an unworldliness and childlike simplicity which we may mistake for narrowness; but we are blind indeed if we cannot see what has become of the energies which have been drawn off from family cares and business responsibilities.

If we are to do good to society we must provide, not a crowd of superficial busybodies, but a few men steeped and saturated in the eternal truths. Just as a retreat is worth a host of conferences and controversies to us all, so the existence in our midst of a few men vowed to the highest life, exercises a more powerful influence on the social organism than a multitude of mere talkers. The vitality of the few will raise the tone of the whole languishing community. It is the élite that tells. And why? Because they live an intense life which increases the vitality of those around them; because they represent an idea,—and a man who represents an idea is of the utmost social importance. After all, it is a question of the division of labor; if the social organism is to be complete it must include a certain number of men set apart to live the life of contemplation.

We may add that, just as the justification of contemplative orders on the familiar principle of the division of labor should commend itself to all students of social development, so the notion of a seeming inactivity which is fraught with most momentous practical consequences should be familiar to all who have had some experience of life. They should not, therefore, find the notion a stumbling-block when they encounter it in the Catholic system.

Father Robert Benson, in his fascinating book, "The Light Invisible," serves us with a striking illustration from which we must be allowed to quote somewhat extensively.

He is describing the thoughts of one who, on seeing a nun praying in a convent chapel, was tempted to regret the seeming uselessness and barrenness of the contemplative life.

> "I cannot but more and more admire the fierce courage and industry, the gloomy endurance, and the infinite mechanical ingenuity of the great cities, as one reverences the fervid labors of a wasps' nest, though the end of it all is only a noxious lump of clay."
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> "After all it is essentially selfish,—it is a sin against society. Possibly it was necessary when the wickedness of the world was more fierce, to protest against it by this retirement; but not now, not now! How can the lump be leavened if the leaven be withdrawn? How can a soul serve God by forsaking the world which He made and loves?"

And following the temptation came a flash of insight, described in terms confessedly inadequate.

> "First I became aware suddenly that there ran a vital connection from the Tabernacle to the woman. You may think of it as one of those bands you see in machinery connecting two wheels, so that when either wheel moves the other moves too. Or you may think of it as an electric wire, joining the instrument the telegraph operator uses with the pointer at the other end. At any rate there was this vital band or wire of life.
>
> "Now in the Tabernacle I became aware that there was a mighty stirring and movement. Something within it beat like a vast Heart, and the vibrations of each pulse seemed to quiver through all the ground. Or you may picture it as the movement of a clear deep pool, when the basin that contains it is jarred—it seemed like the movement of circular ripples crossing and recrossing in swift thrills. Or you may think of it as that faint movement of light and shade that may be seen in the heart of a white-hot furnace. Or again you may picture it as sound—as the sound of a high ship-mast with the rigging, in a steady wind; or the sound of deep woods in a July noon."

The intense *activity* which the spiritual eye discerned in the chapel is thus illustrated:

> "I was aware that the atmosphere was charged with energy; great powers seemed to be astir, and I to be close to the whirling center of it all.

Or think of it like this. Have you ever had to wait in a City office? If you have done that you will know how intense quiet can coexist with intense activity. There are quiet figures here and there round the room. Or it may be there is only one such figure—a great financier—and he sitting there almost motionless. Yet you know that every movement tingles, as it were, out from that still room all over the world. You can picture to yourself how people leap to obey or to resist—how lives rise and fall, and fortunes are made and lost, at the gentle movements of this lonely quiet man in his office. Well, so it was here. I perceived that this black figure knelt at the center of reality and force, and with the movements of her will and lips controlled spiritual destinies for eternity. There ran out from this peaceful chapel lines of spiritual power that lost themselves in the distance, bewildering in their profusion and terrible in the intensity of their hidden fire. Souls leaped up and renewed the conflict as this tense will strove for them. Souls even at that moment leaving the body struggled from death into spiritual life, and fell panting and at the feet of the Redeemer on the other side of death. Others, acquiescent and swooning in sin, woke and snarled at the merciful stab of this poor nun's prayers. . . . Yes, and I in my stupid arrogance had thought that my life was more active in God's world than that of this nun, just as a shopkeeper, bustling to and fro behind the counter, might think, if only he were mad enough, that his life was more active and alive than the life of a director who sits at his table in the City. Yes, that is a vulgar simile; but the only one that I can think of which in the least expresses what I knew to be true. There lay my little foolish narrow life behind me, made up of spiritless prayers and efforts and feeble dealings with souls; and how complacent I had been with it all, how self-centered, how out of the real tide of spiritual movement! And meanwhile, for years probably, this nun had toiled behind these walls in the silence of grace, with the hum of the world coming faintly to her ears, and the cries of peoples and nations, and the persons whom the world accounts important, sounding like the voices of children at play in the muddy street outside; and indeed that is all that they are, compared to her—children making mud-pies or playing at shop outside the financier's office."

This striking attempt to visualize a great reality will appeal in a specia way to those who strive after some picture however inadequate, of what Aristotle calls the "activity of immobility"—an expression which seems to take us nearer to God than most metaphysical formulas. The thought is one which serves as a good corrective to the perplexing whirl amid which so many active men are condemned to live. But we cannot develop it here, for we are concerned rather with a vindication of the contemplative life which will appeal even to the utilitarian.

Utilitarianism is in fact not without worth as a guide to life, provided that we give a sufficiently wide scope to our notion of utility. We should be prepared to admit that the contemplative orders, if not useful, were better abolished; but we should not accept the narrow interpretation too often given to the word "useful." The fact is that the most severely enclosed orders have their place in and their influence upon the life of the Church. This has ever been recognized by their founders, who take care to impress upon their subjects that a monk who is not helping the Church by his solitude had better return to the world.

But how can a life seemingly shut off from the world benefit mankind? Our faith and our experience both tell us that it in fact does so; and if we seek a reason in philosophy, we shall find it in that dim and half-explored but most suggestive region of study which deals with the interconnection of souls, and with the influence of character and personality upon bodies of men—with the essential oneness of the human family, and the still more amazing oneness of the Communion of Saints. And this, as we have said, is foreshadowed in Plato's doctrine of the organic nature of society. With faith, experience, and philosophy to warn us, it were surely the height of rashness to disparage a member of the social body, the functions of which may be shown to be so necessary to the harmonious working of the whole.

It is, then, no merely speculative question that we have raised, but one of immense practical importance. The future success of Christianity may depend largely upon the maintenance of the contemplative orders. The forces of irreligion are gathering thick and fast, and we shall need all our strength to meet them. Can we, in the struggle before us, afford to throw away a most potent means of preserving the Catholic spirit among our people and extending its influence to those who are wandering in darkness? Our reason as well as our faith tells us that in the cloistered orders lies an integral part of the Catholic organism; that on them, perhaps no less than on the activity of our preachers and teachers and lecturers, we depend, under God, for success in the ceaseless battle which the Church is everywhere waging against infidelity and error.

CHARLES D. PLATER.

LEADING PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE BOOK OF JOB

A BRIEF EXPOSITION AND DISCUSSION

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The book of Job is one of the most remarkable productions in our sacred literature. It combines depth of thought with richness of expression to an extent unsurpassed in any other composition. In poetic inspiration and skill it is unique in the world's literature, only approached in modern times, by Goethe's *Faust*, which in fact was modelled after it. Its profound philosophy and literary finish, however, were unknown to most older ecclesiastical writers, who thought that the book of Job was prose throughout, and strict history in all its details. Church Fathers and Christian writers of old simply turned to its pages for comfort and strength in bodily suffering or mental anguish. And it was reserved to modern scholars to point out its poetical excellence, as also its importance in the unfolding of religious thought in Israel. This they have achieved through a long and patient study of its contents; not however, without raising literary problems which still await a satisfactory solution. And it is the chief object of the present paper briefly to set forth and discuss the leading problems which confront students of that sacred writing, at the present day.

The book opens with a Prologue (chaps. 1-2) written in prose, the purpose of which is to make known the person of Job and the occasion and extent of the calamities which befell him. Job was a wealthy man of exemplary righteousness, living outside of Israel, in the land of Hus, on the borders of Edom. On a certain day, "when the sons of God had come to stand before Yahweh,"[1] the disinterestedness of his piety was called in question by "the Satan" or Adversary, who claimed that Job's virtue would not withstand a reverse of fortune. Then it was that, with God's permission to afflict Job without touching his person. Satan deprived him so suddenly of all his property and children that after each calamity only one messenger survived to announce it. Thus stripped of all his possessions, and bereaved of his children, Job manifested the deepest grief, but bowed submissively, and hence, "in all this, Job sinned not, and spoke not impiously against Elohim."

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[1] This is the correct pronunciation of the personal name of the God of Israel, and scholars generally use it instead of the conventional form "Jehovah."

Again the heavenly council was convened, and Satan appeared, together with "the sons of God," in Yahweh's presence. Again Job was the subject of commendation on the part of God, who upbraided Satan with instigating Him unjustly against His faithful servant. Satan replied that the trial had not been sufficiently severe; if afflicted in his person, Job would prove unfaithful. Satan was therefore permitted to afflict Job with bodily sufferings, with the restriction, however, that his life should be spared. Yet, though smitten with a loathsome disease, and urged by his wife to "curse Elohim[1] and die," God's servant remained steadfast in his piety. A few months intervened, during which three of his friends, having heard of his afflictions, came to condole with him. Struck dumb at the sight of Job's misery, they sat beside him in silence during seven days, expressing thus their feelings of dire distress.

After this introduction the poem proper begins with a *lament* on the part of Job, which takes up the whole third chapter of the book. His passionate cry for death "passes through three phases. In the first (iii, 3-10), he curses bitterly the day of his birth, wishing himself unborn; in the second (iii, 11-19), he asks why, if he must needs be born, he did not pass at once to the grave; in the third (iii, 20-26), he expresses his mournful surprise that life should be prolonged to those who, in their misery, long only for death."[2]

These loud and despairing complaints shocked his friends, who, no longer able to restrain themselves, began a debate with Job on the subject of his afflictions. This debate consists of three cycles of poetical speeches (chaps. iv-xiv; xv-xxi; xxii-xxxi); and each cycle comprises six speeches, one by each of the three friends, with Job's reply to each.

In the first cycle, Eliphaz, Baldad, and Sophar, Job's friends, draw arguments from the general conception of God to vindicate His righteousness in His dealings with Job. Eliphaz appeals to His *universal goodness*, which does not allow the righteous to perish under affliction; to which Job replies that death plainly awaits him, and that his sins have not merited the sufferings he undergoes. Baldad calls upon God's *discriminating justice* to prove that if Job's children have perished, it was because they were vicious persons; if Job himself is pure, let him turn to God and seek mercy from Him. To this Job answers that God destroys according to His pleasure the innocent and the guilty and that he himself is an illustration of this truth since he is innocent and has no hope of restoration. Sophar insists on God's *omniscience*. He knows—what is unknown to Job—Job's guilt, and punishes him therefor. In answer, Job maintains that bad men are prosperous in this world; warns his friends not to defend so badly the justice of God, and pleads his cause before the Almighty.

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[1] "Elohim" is another Hebrew name of the God of Israel, and its use is characteristic of certain Psalms or documents in the Old Testament Literature.

[2] S. R. Driver, *Introd. to the Old Testament Literature*, p. 413 (9th edit., 1899).

In the second cycle, Job's friends adopt a different line of argument. To prove the justice of God they appeal to His government of men, to the operation of His providence in the world, as observed in the fate of the wicked. Eliphaz contends with great vigor that both experience and the lessons of the ancients prove that wicked men are not only in continual terror, but meet with a terrible end. Job, rejected by God and man, affirms that his innocence is fully known to God, and that nothing is before him but death. Baldad, in his second speech, attributes the punishment of the sinner "to the order of nature and the moral instinct of mankind, both of which rise up against the sinner,"[1] so that misery in life and dishonor after death are the sure lot of the wicked. Again Job asserts his innocence, of which he is so fully conscious that his previous wish becomes a firm hope that God will appear and establish his innocence: this he ardently longs for.[2] The second speech of Sophar enlarges on the brevity of the sinner's prosperity, and explains it from the retributive operation of sin itself. Job continues to maintain that sinners are happy, constantly happy as proved by experience, and that they die in peace and are buried in honor.

Seeing their inability to bring home to Job the sense of his guilt by means of the reasons they had set forth hitherto, his friends start a new line of argument in the third cycle of speeches. They now charge him openly with great crimes as the reason for which he is subjected to suffering. In this last cycle, the third speaker, Sophar, fails to reply; and after a pause Job resumes his discourse. In several chapters he defends his innocence and his doctrine of the divine distribution of happiness and misery. Were he conscious of evil, he would not have appealed to the judgment of his Maker. But although God does not distribute happiness and misery according to His own pleasure, yet He has always reasons, which man is incompetent to explore. He then depicts his former condition and his pious conduct, contrasting it with his present state of wretchedness, in order to show that his losses are not attributable to any crime of his. He expresses at last another wish to be able to vindicate himself before God.

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[1] A. B. Davidson, *Comm. on Job*, p. 130.

[2] With regard to the celebrated passage rendered in the Latin Vulgate by "Scio quod redemptor meus vivit . . . ," see *General Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures* by the present writer, and the works referred to there.

After Job's earnest appeal to God with which "his words ' are said "to be ended" (chap. xxxi, 40), one would naturally look for Yahweh's immediate intervention in behalf of His servant. Instead of this, however, Eliu, a bystander during the debate, is introduced in a few lines of prose. In his long poetical speech which follows he declares that both parties have gone too far, the friends of Job in charging him with crimes, and Job himself in maintaining his innocence and so accusing God of injustice. He concludes his discourse with a fine description of several divine attributes.

It is only at this point that Yahweh intervenes to answer Job "out of a whirlwind" He first proposes to His servant (xxxviii-xxxix)[1] questions on the creation and organization of the physical world and of the animal kingdom, to answer which it would have been necessary for Job to have taken part in the creation and have mastered its whole plan. This leads Job to acknowledge his ignorance and also his presumption in having dared to contend with God. In His second speech, Yahweh convinces Job of his error in charging Him with injustice in governing the world and afflicting him, and consequently in his answer Job gives up all doubts and repents his former words in dust and ashes (xl-xlii, 6).

The book of Job concludes with an Epilogue in prose (xlii, 7-16).[2] Yahweh expresses his displeasure with Eliphaz and his two friends, who had not spoken so justly of Him as Job himself had done. He directs them to present a burnt-offering and secure the prayers of Job in their behalf. Job is then restored to health, and his wealth is doubled. He receives as many sons and daughters as before, and dies in a good old age.

The general literary structure of the book of Job comes out sufficiently from the foregoing summary of its contents. Apart from its

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[1] In the Hebrew, chaps. xxxviii-xl, 5.

[2] In the Hebrew, chap. xliii, 7-17.

Prologue and Epilogue, the work is highly poetical. The speeches that make up the debate between Job, and his friends are symmetrically arranged. They fall into three cycles, each of which, in the primitive form of the body of the work, comprised six discourses, one by each of the three friends, with Job's reply to each. The additional speeches put in the mouth of Eliu and Yahweh are also connected with the poetical debate which has preceded, and they, no less than the foregoing cycles of speeches, are marked with the stamp of sacred poetry, Hebrew parallelism. When one joins to this the highly-wrought imagery, the wealth of comparison, the depth of human feeling, the vivid portraiture of patriarchal life, the impressive descriptions of external nature, etc., with which the central part of the book of Job is replete, he will readily understand why all interpreters of that sacred writing consider it as a masterpiece of Oriental poetry.

But while contemporaries thus agree in their praise of the literary art displayed in the contents of the book of Job, they are greatly at variance with regard to the integrtiy of its text as it has come down to us. Students of textual criticism widely differ as to the extent of critical emendation required by the present condition of the work, and higher critics are no less divided as to those large parts of the book which should be considered as entering from the first into its composition. Only a brief treatment of these two vexed questions can be given here

In regard to the first point it is now generally granted that the Massoretic Text of Job, from which our Latin Vulgate is practically a direct rendering, needs not a little critical emendation on account of the obscurities and other difficulties which it presents in many places. This appears all the more probable because, on the one hand, it has long been known from Origen's testimony[1] that the Septuagint Version, which was made from a Hebrew text older than the Massoretic, was shorter than our Hebrew Text by some seven hundred lines; and because, on the other hand, the Coptic translation of the Septuagint published in 1889 by Ciasca, and exhibiting the pre-Origenian state of the Greek text, has fully borne out Origen's testimony. In view of these data, and also in virtue of their own metrical theories concerning Hebrew poetry, some critics—among whom stands prominently Dr. Bickell—have maintained the superiority of the Septuagint Text to that of our Hebrew Textus Receptus. They have attempted to reconstruct the Hebrew Text[1] and to show that the book in its present state has grown by additions which were successively made to a much shorter poem. All such attempts, however, though evincing great learning and ingenuity on the part of their authors, have appeared so sweeping and arbitrary in many of the alterations advocated that they have not met with much acceptance. Moreover, it has been felt and emphatically stated by the leading defenders of the superiority of the Massoretic Text over the shorter text of the Septuagint[2] "that the omissions of the Greek Version do not relieve the chief difficulties which attend the text of the book as it stands, whilst in several cases, at least it is difficult to understand the context without these omitted passages or to explain how, if they did not form part of the original text, the passages in the Hebrew came to be added to it. Glosses and amplifications on such a scale generally declare themselves as such beyond much possibility of question."[3] The truth, as it seems to us, lies between the two extreme views concerning the relation of the Hebrew text to the Septuagint Version: while the Massoretic text is less pure than its defenders are willing to grant, the Septuagint translation should not be relied on implicitly. The author of the latter is unknown and his method of rendering may have been very lax. Yet, from both extrinsic and intrinsic data, it may be safely said that it points to a text considerably shorter than our Hebrew Textus Receptus.

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[1] Cf. Origen, *Epistle to Africanus*, § 4; and St. Jerome, *Pref. to the Book of Job.*

As regards the questions of higher criticism relating to the integrity of the book of Job, the tendency among most modern interpreters is to hold that Job, as we now possess it, is the outcome of more or less gradual accretion. Some among them[4] would reduce the size of the book by at least one half. They think that the prose portions (Prologue and Epilogue) together with the long poetical parts which now make up the speeches of Eliu and of Yahweh, did not form part of the original work, which merely controverted the current doctrine of reward and punishment and therefore concluded with Job's last long discourse, where we now read "the words of Job are ended." They hold also that even the portions having a right to be considered as integrant parts of the original poem, viz., the three cycles of speeches between Job and his friends, have been added to in different places and considerably altered in character. Harldy less extensive changes are advocated by Merx, Bateson, Wright, Cheyne, and others; while the speeches of Eliu and a few other sections (chaps. xxvii, 7-xxviii; xl, 10-xli, 25)[1] are practically the only ones which such careful critics as Chas. H H. Wright[2] and A. B. Davidson[3] would consider as later additions.

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[1] The most important attempts at reconstruction are those of A. Merx, *das Gedicht von Iob*; Bickell, *Carmina Vet. Test.*, translat. by E. J. Dillon, *Sceptics of the Old Test.*; K. Budde, *Hiob*; C. Siegfried, *the Book of Job*, in *The Sacred Books of the Old Test.*, edit. by P. Haupt; Loisy, *le Livre de Job*; D. B. Duhm, *das Buch Hiob*.

[2] Among them may be mentioned A. Dillmann; Prof. Driver; K. Budde (in his latest work on Job;) etc.

[3] W. T. Davison, art. "Job," in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii, p. 664.

Such critics as G. Bickell, D. B. Duhm, etc.

The first to regard the Prologue and Epilogue as not belonging to the original book was Rich. Simon. The main difficulties now urged in favor of that view arise from their apparent inconsistency with the poetical part of the book. While it is granted that the cycles of speeches in general presuppose the main facts of the story in the Prologue, it is said that in chap. xix, 15 sqq., the survival of Job's children and servants is referred to in opposition to the statements in the Prologue (i, 16 sqq. Again, the Prologue ascribes the trials of Job to Satan, whereas no being of the kind is even hinted at by Job or his friends in the poetical part of the book. In the prose Prologue Job is a model of patience, and yet as soon as he speaks in verse his language betrays impatience, defiance, almost impiety. The ascription of Job's sufferings in the Prologue to God's design to try his righteousness is apparently unknown to the body of the work. As regards the Epilogue, it "seems to spoil the whole book by rehabilitating the very doctrine which the book was written to disprove. Job, restored to health and prosperity and living to a good old age, would have been a triumphant example of the doctrine that, sooner or later, the righteous were rewarded in this life."[4] Finally, in both the Prologue and the Epilogue the offering of sacrifice is regarded as the appointed means to placate the Deity,[5] while repentance alone is insisted upon for that purpose in the body of the work.[6] To account for these and other such apparent inconsistencies, Duhm, D. B. Macdonald, and others regard the Prologue and Epilogue as having formed primitively part of a prose story of Job,[7] in which he was made to speak more reverently of God than his friends,[1] but of which nothing is now extant save the present Prologue and Epilogue in the book of Job.

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[1] In the Heb. xl, 15-xli, 34.

[2] *An Introduction to the Old Test.*, p. 150 sq.

[3] The Book of Job, in *the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.*

[4] W. H. Bennett and W. F. Adeney, *Biblical Introduction*, 2d edit., p. 127.

[5] Cf. i, 5; xlii, 8.

[6] Cf. v, 8 sqq.; viii, 20; xi, 13 sqq.; etc.

[7] Duhm calls it "a popular book," *Volksbuch.*

Scholars who are wont to account for discrepancies in Holy Writ by appealing to divergent sources of information faithfully transcribed or utilized by subsequent writers will naturally feel inclined to admit some such theory in the present case. And yet numerous critics who have examined in detail the various difficulties just stated consider them as insufficient evidence.[2] Furthermore, they remind us that "some introduction and conclusion must have accompanied the poetical part," and that "there is no evidence or probability that any others, different from those now found, ever existed."[3] Even such critics as E. Reuss, C. Siegfried, E. Kautzsch, etc., do not hesitate to recognize that the present Prologue is indissolubly connected with the body of the work,[4] and to admit that in the writer's time "the author of the book of Job felt it necessary to assert the final bliss of the righteous, even at the cost of inconsistency."[5]

The objections usually raised against chaps. xxvii, 7-xxviii, as forming a part of the primitive composition are generally regarded as more serious than those urged against the Prologue and Epilogue. They are briefly as follows: First, there is an apparent contradiction between the sentiments which Job expesses in that section and those he gives vent to both before and after.[6] In the second place, it is difficult to discover any connection between chaps. xxvii and xxviii. Lastly, the seventh verse of chap. xxvii does not seem to be the natural continuation of what precedes, while the first verse of chap. xxxi clearly marks off this chapter from the preceding, and the second verse of chap. xxix can be easily considered as a sequel to the sixth verse of chap. xxvii. From all this it is conjectured by many (1) that chap. xxvii, 7-23 is in its entirety, or at least in part either a misplaced discourse of Sophar, who has no speech in the third cycle, differently from the other friends of Job, or a later addition; (2) that chap. xxviii is also a later addition, or perhaps an independent poem in praise of Wisdom, and inserted here to secure its preservation.

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[1] Cf. Job, xlii, 7.

[2] For a detailed examination of those difficulties, see particularly A. B. Davidson *The Book of Job*, pp. xxx-xxxv.

[3] A. B. Davidson, *loc. cit.*

[4] Cf. E. Kautzsch, *An Outline of the History of the Literature of the Old Test.*, p. 161 (Eng. transl.)

[5] W. H. Bennett, *loc. cit.*

[6] Contrast, for instance, xxvii, 13-23, with xii, 6; xxi; xxiv, 22; etc.

Despite these difficulties, the original character of chaps. xxvii, 7-xxviii is not entirely given up by Fr. Knabenbauer,[1] H. Lesetre,[2] A. B. Davidson, Samuel Davidson,[3] Abbé Loisy,[4] K. Budde, C. H. Cornill,[5] etc. These scholars dispose of the alleged inconsistency between that section and the preceding and subsequent chapters in various ways. Job, it is claimed by some, is not made there to embrace an opinion of his friends that is contrary to his own previous statements, but he simply *relates* it somewhat at length, with a view to declare it *foolish.*[6] According to others, Job relates this view of his friends, and then uses it as an argument *ad hom nem,* thus: As you know so well the fate of the sinner, take the warning to yourselves, for you are behaving wickedly. The connection between chaps. xxvii and xxviii is usually explained as a further illustration by Job in chap. xxviii of the mystery of God's ways already set forth in the foregoing chapters;[7] while the fact that the whole section (xxvii, 7-xxviii) does not seem to fit into its context may be accounted for by a partial dislocation which is the probable outcome of errors in transcription.[8]

The descriptions of Behemoth and Leviathan in Yahweh's second speech (xl, 10-xli, 25 in the Vulg.) have often been regarded as later additions, chiefly on the following grounds: (1) the description of these animals, if an original part of the poem, would have been in place in the first divine speech beside the other animal pictures as proving Yahweh's power; it is out of harmony with the idea of the second speech which deals with the problem of divine righteousness; (2) the same description lengthens uselessly the second speech, the natural conclusion of which is clearly in xl, 9; (3) the style is in several ways inferior to that in chaps. xxxviii-xxxix. To these objections Samuel Davidson has pertinently replied in the following manner.[9] "Here it is incorrectly assumed that the divine attributes of omnipotence and righteousness are treated apart in the two speeches of Jehovah. . . . This is not so. . . . The omnipotence of God is referred to in xl, 4-9, immediately after Job is challenged respecting his righteousness (verses 2 and 3). The difference of style merely shows the art of the poet in giving an appropriate form to each of his pictures. The style is not inferior at times to that of the best passages in the poem.[1] . . . Some connection, too, may be traced between xl, 9 and what follows. He that feels tempted to undertake the government of the world in the place of God, as if he could manage it better, must first be sure that he is able to master and lead at his pleasure the monsters of the animal world. Can Job do this?"

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[1] *Comm. in lib. Job.*

[2] Job, in Lethielleux' Bible.

[3] *Introd. to the Old Test.*, vol. ii (London, 1862).

[4] *Le Livre de Job*, p. 13 sq.

[5] *Einleitung in das A. Test.*, 4th edit. (Freiburg, 1896).

[6] Cf. Job xxvii, 12.

[7] For other more or less satisfactory solutions of those difficulties, see A. B. Davidson, Driver, Loisy, etc.

[8] Cf. Loisy, *loc. cit.*

[9] *Introd. to the Old Test.*, vol. ii, p. 204.

The most questioned part of the entire work is xxxii-xxxvii, which contains the speeches of Eliu. These discourses are generally considered by critics and interpreters as not a part of the original poem, but rather as an addition intended to tone down the undue emphasis on certain aspects of truth which was felt in the speeches of Job and his friends. The principal arguments brought forward are briefly as follows: First, Eliu is not mentioned in either the Prologue or the Epilogue. And yet the Prologue names all the others who will share in the debate, and the Epilogue praises or blames, according to their deserts, all those who are supposed to have taken part in the controversy. In the second place, the Eliu speeches are not connected with the poem as a whole. Nobody has addressed Eliu before he begins to speak, and after his speeches nobody replies to him, so that his words, if removed, would not be missed. But further, they are a disturbing element in the poetical part. The opening words of Yahweh: "Who is this that wrappeth up sentences without knowledge?" addressed to Job without naming him (xxxviii, 2), naturally suggest that Job has just been speaking, and that he has not been silent while Eliu has proceeded with a long discourse. The Eliu speeches therefore interrupt the connection between Job's challenge in xxix-xxxi and Yahweh's apparently direct reply in xxxviii. Indeed they weaken the force of Yahweh's remarks by anticipating them at least in part. In the third place, the full and *verbatim* reproduction of Job's words at the beginning of several speeches of Eliu betrays a reader of the Poem, rather than a listener to the debate. Fourthly, Eliu occupies substantially the same position as the three friends of Job, and especially Eliphaz, so that there is apparently no need of a fourth speaker to set forth what has already been said. "And further, where Eliu differs from the friends it is rather in deeper reverence and a somewhat more advanced view of sin, both things betraying a later age and suggesting that the original Book perplexed pious minds by its extraordinary boldness."[1] Lastly, the Eliu speeches are characterized by a language less vigorous and lucid than the rest of the Poem, and they contain so many peculiarities of expression, and such a deeper coloring of Aramaism, that it is only natural to refer them to an author distinct from the writer of the poetical part of the book of Job.[2]

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[1] This point is admitted by so able a scholar as Prof. Driver, *Introd.*, p. 427.

To most of these objections answers of unequal value have been given by the advocates of the integrity of the Poem. Indeed it is frankly admitted by A. B. Davidson, Prof. Driver, and others that the objections urged against the genuineness of the Eliu speeches have not been fully disposed of by the answers they have so far received. It is hardly true to fact, for instance, to contend with the advocates of the genuineness that Eliu was worthy neither of the praise nor of the blame distinguished in the Epilogue: he wrongly held Job guilty in his words, and shared the blameworthy opinions of Job's friends on the most important points.[3] In answer to the second objection it has been said that were the Eliu speeches left out, the most important lesson of the Poem would be done away with, viz., the disciplinary function of suffering. In reality this disciplinary function had been mentioned already by Eliphaz in chap. v. And further, this leaves intact the second part of the objection, viz., that the long speeches of Eliu look distinctly like a long interpolation between Job's challenge in chaps. xxix-xxxi and its apparently *immediate* answer by Yahweh in chap. xxxviii.[4] And it is a most significant fact that none of the advocates of the genuineness dares to meet this second part of the objection. The third difficulty, as stated above, has likewise been left without an adequate answer. Finally, the reasons usually given to account for the larger number of Aramaisms and other peculiarities of language and style in the speeches of Eliu, viz., that Eliu was an Aramæan from the tribe of Buz,[5] that he was a timid young man, and that the style, after the somewhat embarrassed opening of the discourse, is just what might be expected of an unexperienced speaker, etc., are hardly worthy of serious consideration, for, apart from the improbability that any of the speeches as they now stand were uttered by real personages, the other friends of Job were probably Aramæans just as much as Eliu; and the latter, in view of his manifest boldness of language, can hardly be called a timid young man, while his style, as distinctly stated by so competent a judge as Prof. Driver, "is such as to produce an impression upon the reader who peruses the entire group of speeches that is unmistakably different from that which any other six chapters of the Book leave upon him."[1]

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[1] A. B. Davidson, *The Book of Job*, p. li sq.

[2] See K. Budde's admissions in this regard, quoted by Driver, p. 429, footn.

[3] Cf. Abbé Le Hir, *le Livre de Job*, p. 367.

[4] Fr. Vigouroux (*Manuel Biblique*, vol. ii, No. 612) admits that "the speeches of Eliu seem to be less intimately connected than the rest with the body of the work"; and before him, Fr. Le Hir (*loc. cit.*, p. 366) wrote: "It must be confessed that the drama of Job would seem complete even though these (Eliu's) speeches would be removed from it."

[5] Cf. Gen. xxii, 21.

Yet some positive arguments have been presented in favor of the genuineness of the speeches of Eliu. First, it has been argued that, far from simply repeating those of Job's friends, or merely anticipating those of Yahweh, they truly correct the former and prepare the way for the latter, so that their position is very natural in the book of Job. In the second place, it is said that the close and natural connection between Eliu's last speech and Yahweh's answer from the storm consists in this, that the rising thunder-cloud which Eliu describes is the very storm out of which Yahweh will soon speak. Lastly, "what is really the greatest difficulty in the way of considering these speeches a later insertion is just one of the facts which has been adduced to show that they are an insertion, namely, the opposition between them and the Prologue. If Eliu spoke like the three friends in ignorance of the Prologue and the cause of Job's calamities which it reveals, his position is natural. But if he was a reader of the Book, the way in which he completely ignores the Prologue with its view of affliction and substitutes a theory radically different is extraordinary. In such a case his censure would extend to the whole cast of the Book."[2]

Whatever may be thought of the actual value of these arguments, it is hardly probable that they will outweigh the difficulties stated above, and induce scholars generally to regard the speeches of Eliu as an original part of the book of Job.

It is easy to notice that in whatever way—gradual or otherwise—the main parts of the book of Job were put together, they all refer to one great subject, which, on account of the imperfection of the prevalent eschatological notions, was so perplexing a problem to the Jewish mind: the relation of suffering to sin.[3] Thus the Prologue suggests that suffering may be a trial for the sinless man. In the debate which follows the friends of Job maintain that it is the punishment of the sinner, while he himself proclaims his innocence, and shows that suffering and sin are not, in point of fact, connected either in his own case or in the case of many others. Eliu covers pretty much the same ground as Job's friends, while Yahweh chiefly inculcates man's powerlessness to grapple with such a tremendous mystery as the existence of evil in the world. Finally, the Epilogue seems to show that for the truly just man trials and misfortunes will have an end even in this life.

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[1] *Introd. to the Literat. of the Old Test.*, p. 429.

[2] A. B. Davidson, *The Book of Job*, p. li sq.

[3] Of course, scholars who regard Job as a gradual compilation from divers works or

It is because some scholars have failed to grasp this general idea to which, under one aspect or another, all the great divisions of the work refer, that so many theories have been put forth regarding the purpose of the book of Job, and that "almost every theory that has been adopted has found itself in collision with one or more parts of which the Book now consists, and has been able to maintain itself only by sacrificing these parts upon its altar."[1] Among these unsatisfactory, because incomplete, views, the following may be mentioned: (1) the book of Job has for its purpose to inculcate true wisdom or the doctrine of unlimited acquiescence in the divine counsels and will[2] (cf. xxviii, 28, and the general drift of Yahweh's speeches); (2) its aim is to teach the immortality of the soul (Michaelis; Ewald); (3) it intended to controvert and discredit the dominant theory that all suffering proceeds from sin, that God's retributive justice is the *only* principle by which men are governed (Driver and others); (4) its design is to cast some light upon an acknowledged problem, viz., how the sufferings of the just in this world can be reconciled with God's righteousness (Hanneberg; Vigouroux; Kautzsch; etc.); (5) the author wished to comfort the much-tried Jewish nation, symbolized by the righteous Job, with the thought that suffering was not a conclusive proof of its sinfulness, and the hope of final deliverance and greater prosperity than in the past.

The last theory just mentioned concerning the purpose of the book of Job goes far towards denying the historical character of that inspired writing. In describing the hero of the poem as simply a

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parts of works assign a special purpose to those various elements. See, for inst., art. "Job" in the *Encyclop. Biblica*.

[1] A. B. Davidson, *loc. cit.*, p. xxiii.

[2] This is the view of many scholars, among whom may be mentioned Jno. Jahn, Samuel Davidson, Loisy, etc.

personification of the Jewish people, it practically does away with its historical basis, and sees little more in the book than the work of poetical imagination. Indeed, E. Reuss, A. Merx, and even Hengstenberg do not hesitate to represent the book as entirely imaginative. In so doing they share the view of some ancient Jewish rabbis, which is embodied in the Talmud[1] to the effect that Job "existed not, and was not created, but he is (only) a parable." It is true that at a later date this passage was taken by Jewish scholars[2] to mean: "Job existed not, and was not created except in order to be a parable" (or type), i. e., a model for the children of men. But the celebrated rabbi Moses Maimonides († 1204) understood the Talmudic passage in its obvious sense when he spoke of Job as a "parable meant to exhibit the views of mankind in regard to Providence."

The arguments usually set forth to show that Job is exclusively a work of the imagination are: (1) the manifestly supposed conversations between God and Satan, God and Job; (2) the wonderful literary form of the debate, the disputers being made to deliver profound theological and philosophical discourses in regular heptasyllabic verses; (3) the artificial regularity of the numbers descriptive of Job's possessions in the Prologue and the Epilogue (7 sons, 3 daughters, 7,000 sheep, 3,000 camels); (4) the advanced, and consequently late, character of the dogmatic truths with which the author represents Job and his friends thoroughly familiar, while the historical coloring is apparently borrowed from a much earlier age.[3]

Despite these and other such grounds for regarding the book of Job as a mere allegory, most scholars admit that Job is not simply a poetical invention. The Scriptural references to him in Ezechiel (xiv 14) and in St. James (v, ii) seem to point to a real person well known in history, and thus his name has been reckoned among the saints venerated by the Church in the East and in the West.[4] The writer of the book in describing the moral character of Job, his riches, trials, etc., conveys the impression that he is dealing with at least a basis of actual history; and it is beyond doubt that the ancient Hebrew writers did not invent the personages of their poems. Furthermore, "as the author of Job comes forward clearly as a *teacher*, the ends which he had in view would be better secured if he set vividly before his people a history of which the outlines were popularly known than if he took as his hero one with whose name they were unfamiliar."[1]

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[1] Treatise Baba bathra, fol. 15, in Magnus, *Comm., z. B. Hiob*, p. 298.

[2] Among whom may be mentioned rabbis Hai, Rashi, and Eben Ezra.

[3] Cf. H. Lesêtre, *Introd. a l'Etude de l' Ecriture Sainte*, vol. ii, p. 370 sq.

[4] The Eastern Church celebrates the feast of Job on the 6th, and the Western Church on the 10th of May.

But while contemporary critics and interpreters agree generally in admitting that the book of Job is not exclusively a work of the imagination, they are far from adhering to the ancient view of Jews and Christians which looked upon the entire work as thoroughly historical. They feel that Job, in its present form, is not purely and simply history. This they hold not only in connection with the debate between Job and his friends,—in which the thought, the highly wrought imagery, the poetical form, cannot possibly have been the extemporaneous utterances of four persons casually brought together,—but also in connection with the two celestial counsels spoken of in the Prologue; the symbolical numbers, three, five, and seven, used to describe Job's flocks and children; the statement that after his restoration the latter are exactly the same in number as before, while the former are exactly doubled; the lengthy speeches put into the mouth of Yahweh; etc. They are thus led to consider the book of Job as resting on a historical tradition which the author used and dramatized at his leisure, and in consequence they speak of it as "a drama,"[2] "a dramatic poem,"[3] etc., wherein the principal parts are in the form of a dialogue, and the plot passes through the successive stages of entanglement, development, and denouement.

As might well be expected, it is impossible at the present day to disentangle the elements which belong to tradition from those which were added by the author.[4] It may be conjectured, however, that tradition told of Job as a man of exceptional piety and great wealth, who, suddenly bereaved of his children, health, and possessions, was at first fully resigned to God's holy will, but afterwards broke out into complaints against His providence, remained unsatisfied with the arguments of his friends, and was finally restored to his former health and prosperity. As regards the precise form under which these various data were circulated in the author's time nothing can be defined. Fr. Lesetre[5] surmises that "they reached the author under the form of popular songs, traditional accounts, etc., widely spread in Arabia."

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[1] Driver, *Introd. to the Literat. of the Old Test.*, p. 412. See also A. B. Davidson, *The Book of Job*, p. xviii sq.

[2] Vigouroux, *Manuel Biblique*, vol. ii, No. 614.

[3] Driver, *loc. cit.*, p. 413.

[4] Cf. H. Lesêtre, *loc. cit.*, p. 372; Driver, *loc. cit.*, p. 412, etc.

[5] *Introd. a l'Etude de l'Ecriture Sainte*, vol. ii, p. 372.

The most obscure question concerning the book of Job is that which relates to its Author and Date of composition. Owing to its title, which is simply the name of its hero, many[1] have ascribed the authorship to Job himself; but both intrinsic and extrinsic data are against this too easy way of dealing with the problem;[2] and in consequence this view is now rejected by all critics. The opinion expressed in the Talmud and adopted by Cajetan, Bellarmin, Sanchez, etc., that Moses is the author of the book of Job, is likewise inadmissible. "The antique color of the book suggested to uncritical minds that it was an ancient composition, and such minds are always ready to ascribe an anonymous writing to some well-known name. Neither the Mosaic age, however, nor the times that followed it—times of stirring enterprise and warfare—were favorable for the production of a work of deep reflection such as Job."[3] The other great names put forth in this connection are those of Solomon, Isaias, Ezechias, Baruch, etc., "and who not? There are some minds that cannot put up with uncertainty, and are under the necessity of deluding themselves into quietude by fixing on some known name. There are others to whom it is a comfort to think that in this omniscient age a few things still remain mysterious . . . No literature has so many great anonymous works as that of Israel."[4] The name of the author of Job is completely unknown.[5]

The date of composition of the book of Job is hardly less uncertain than the name of its author. It is indeed true that some prominent critics[6] have referred, and still refer, its composition to the Solomonic age, alleging chiefly the following reasons: (1) the highly elaborate and finished form of the poem, which, they say, bespeaks a period, such as that of Solomon, when lyric and gnomic poetry were cultivated in a high degree of excellence; (2) the questions regarding human life and the divine government of the world which are discussed in Job, and which had, it is claimed, arisen in Solomon's time; (3) the act that the author of Job seems familiar with foreign countries and their products, and this familiarity with distant lands could have existed in the age of Solomon; (4) the points of contact in the book of Job and in the Proverbs of Solomon: sometimes in the ideas, such as the descriptions of Wisdom and the Sheol; sometimes in words and expressions common to both, which indicate that they were composed at the same period; (5) the frequent allusions to passages in Job which have been detected in Isaias, Amos, Jeremias, Lamentations, and several Psalms. But it is none the less true that more numerous and no less able scholars[1] regard the book of Job as much later in date than the Solomonic age. From among the many arguments they appeal to,[2] the following deserve a special notice: (1) While the literary form and character of the poem point at least to the mature age of Hebrew literature, its strongly Aramaic language is best accounted for by ascribing its composition to a later period, to a date more or less contemporary with the Deutero-Isaias (Isaias, chaps. xl-lxvi), which is usually referred to about the middle of the sixth century B. C. (2) The subject-matter of the book of Job is particularly conclusive for a late date. "The theme herein discussed and the manner of its discussion necessitate a long previous history. The problems of human life are doubtless old, but they could not be raised in the manner displayed in Job without a previous religious history, and one of considerable duration, in which the doctrine of the three friends had come to be the current and orthodox explanation of the facts of life. The history of the Old Testament shows that only at a comparatively late period were these maxims questioned; and when we find them not only questioned but discussed in the thorough manner of the Book of Job, we may be sure that it was not composed till at least the closing period of the monarchy. Other features of religious doctrine—the doctrine of God, the way in which Satan is mentioned, and the spiritual doctrine of man, for example—point likewise to a comparatively late date."[3] (3) Many passages in the book of Job, such as iii, 20; vii, 6, 7; ix, 24; xxiv, 12; etc., point to a condition of great disorder and misery as the background of the poem, and totally different from Solomon's reign; and in particular xii, 17-25 seems to have in view "the great political changes wrought by the Assyrians or the Chaldæans among the principalities of Palestine and Syria (cf. Isai. x, 7 13 sq.)."[1]

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[1] St. Ephrem; St. Gregory; Pineda; Lowth; etc.

[2] These data are well stated in Lesêtre's *Introd.*, vol. ii, p. 365 sq.

[3] A. B. Davidson, in *Book by Book*, p. 148. See also Lesetre, *loc. cit.*, p. 366; Cornely, *Introductio*, vol. ii, part ii, p. 48.

[4] A. B. Davidson, *Comm. on the Book of Job*, p. lxviii.

[5] "In tanta opinionum de auctore libri Job varietate consultius est," says excellently Natalis Alexander, "nihil asserere, nisi incertum esse, a quo scriptus fuerit."

[6] Welte; Danko; Kaulen; Vigouroux; Delitzsch; Cornely; etc.

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[1] Gesenius; Ewald; Samuel Davidson; A. B. Davidson; Driver; Loisy; W. H. Bennett; E. Kautzsch; etc.

[2] They are carefully set forth by Driver, *Introd.*, p. 432 sqq.; W. T. Davison, art. "Job" in Hastings' *Dict. of the Bible*, vol. ii. p. 669 sqq. Prof. Driver justly calls attention to the fact that "the comparison of parallel passages in other books leads seldom to conclusive results, partly because the dates of the books referred to are often doubtful, partly from the frequent difficulty, even when the dates are clear, of determining on which side the dependence lies." (Cf. H. Lesêtre, *Introduction*, vol. ii, p. 367, No. 3).

[3] W. T. Davison, art. "Job," in Hastings' *Dict.*, vol. ii, p. 670. See also A. B. Davidson, *The Book of Job*, p. lxiii, and Driver, *loc. cit.* p. 434.

Plainly these arguments are not without their respective force. But they are indecisive as regards the precise period—whether the age of Jeremias, during, shortly after, or even long after the Babylonian Exile—to which the book of Job should be referred. And this uncertainty has no doubt contributed towards keeping up the theory, to all appearance started by Luther, that Job belonged to the Solomonic age.

Such are the leading problems raised by modern criticism concerning the book of Job, and the principal solutions given them by contemporary scholars. The problems, as we have seen, bear on the integrity, the general object, the historical character, and date of composition of that sacred writing. They are, therefore, each and all, clear, precise, and legitimate questions of literary and historical criticism. As regards the solutions proposed by scholars, they will no doubt appear unsatisfactory to many minds, chiefly on the ground that they have not thus far commended themselves to the general acceptance of critics. It remains true, however, as shown in the foregoing pages, that critics and commentators generally reject the full historical character of the book of Job and admit that its author is unknown. It is true likewise that most critics regard the speeches of Eliu (chaps. xxxii-xxxvii) as later additions to the poetical part of the book. These are valuable conclusions, and it may be hoped that in a near future, Biblical scholars will see their way to agree on the solutions concerning which they are still at variance. At any rate, their slowness in accepting new theories is a warrant of their desire to test them thoroughly, and a proof of the injustice often done to critics at large when they are accused of over-eagerness in welcoming views which go, or seem to go, against dogmatic, or at least, traditional, positions.

Francis E. Gigot.

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[1] Driver, *loc. cit.*

THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST. III.

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.

The Catholic interpreter of Holy Scripture cannot lose sight of the tradition of the Church, especially as it is expressed in the writings of the Fathers. Accordingly, we shall now supplement our study of the Scripture passages bearing on the human knowledge of Christ[1] by an investigation into the testimony of the Fathers concerning the question.

And first of all, in order to give point to our inquiry, it will be of advantage to specify the two texts which are the main basis of Patristic commentary on the subject, and also to indicate the general opinion of theologians of later date concerning the interpretation of these texts.

The first of these texts is: "Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men." (Luke ii, 52). At first sight, this certainly seems to indicate the natural development common to all the children of the human race. He grew in age, in stature, in frame —this was surely a real growth. And it would seem to follow that as he grew in stature, so in the same sense, he must have increased in wisdom. But here nearly all Catholic theologians draw a sharp distinction and hold that the growth in wisdom (as also in grace) was merely in *appearance*; that from the first dawn of his existence there dwelt in Christ the fulness of beatific knowledge; and that as the years went on he showed such knowledge as was fitting for his time of life. All indications therefore of real limitations are but so many appearances—he knew all things in that vision which makes men blessed. Now it is evident that such a view does not come from a literal acceptation of the text. It must therefore be held in virtue of some principle bound up with the Incarnation, which will not allow the admission of any limitations in Christ's knowledge. This principle is stated by St. Thomas, who is followed by practically all theologians since the Scholastic age. It is this: "the Divine excellence of his

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[1] NEW YORK REVIEW, Dec., 1905. pp. 425ss.

Person required in Christ the fulness of knowledge, and he would not be the head of all creation if some creature at any time surpassed him in mental perfection."[1]

Petavius[2] asserts that the fulness of knowledge "Christi dignitati magis consentanea et huic, quam gerebat personæ officioque Mediatoris et Capitis hoc est omnimodæ gratiæ ac sapientiæ fontis aptior, nec non Judicis, etc." And Suarez[3] says of the theory that Christ was lacking in fulness of knowedge: "'Repugnat dignitati personali Christi Domini et unici supremi Judicis ac denique pugnat cum revelationibus ab ipso Christo Domino factis."

The *a priori* principle thus laid down by these most eminent of theologians, that we should judge according to what is "magis consentanea," or most in harmony with the nature and purposes of the Incarnation, will be accepted by all Christians; but its application will of course depend on the view one takes of that mystery. And it is quite conceivable that other theologians may reach opposite conclusions from the same premisses. In fact, many do think that the purpose of the Incarnation,—which purpose must ever be kept in mind,—is better fulfilled by the Christ that shared in our infirmities, even in our lack of knowledge. Anticipating a little, we may quote the view of St. Athanasius[4] concerning that purpose: "that bearing about in his body (his human nature) our ignorance, he might free our nature from all its defects." It is evident that *a priori* arguments on matters such as this are likely to be of little use. The only secure method will be to learn what we can from the Word of God and the tradition of the Church as contained in the Fathers.

The other important text is that of St. Mark xiii, 32: "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father." Catholic interpreters almost unanimously hold that even as man Christ knew "the day and the hour"; and when brought face to face with the letter of the text, they answer in one of three ways, which are thus summed up by Cardinal Franzelin:[5]

"Prima: Ignorantiam diei judicii esse œconomicam, quatenus Christus est *revelator* consiliorum et mysteriorum Dei; non igitur ad sciendum sed ad revelandum ignorasse diem consummationis omnium.

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[1] Cf. Wilhelm and Scannel. p. 148.

[2] *De Incar.*, Lib. XI, Cap. I, v. 15. Cf. also Franzelin, *De Verbo Incar.*, p. 409.

[3] *Comm. in Sum. Theol.*, P. III, Qu. X, Art. II.

[4] *Ep. II ad Serapionem.* Migne, *P. G.*, XXVI, col. 624.

[5] *De Verbo Incar.*, p. 426.

Altera est subtilior: ignorari scilicet diem illum ab omni creatura si hæc per se spectatur, atque etiam a natura humana Filii secundum meram suam essentiam spectata; nec tamen ideo sequitur etiam in exaltatione hujus naturæ ad eam visionem in qua actu est, locum habere ignorantiam. Tertia explicatio est: Filium sive secundum divinam sive secundum humanam naturam non scire diem illum scientia incommunicata, sed scire tamen scientia communicata a Patre"—that is to say: the Son has no knowledge which he may communicate; or he has no knowledge that springs from human intellect; or, finally, his ignorance of the day and the hour is bound up intimately with the ineffable divine relation of the Father and the Son.

With these texts in view, it is the mind of the writer of these notes to place before his readers the whole tradition of the Church up to the time of Gregory the Great. This tradition will serve as a commentary on the texts, and will also put us in possession of the views held in the primitive Church on a question which is receiving so much attention in our own days.

Irenæus. In speaking of the Generation of the Son, Irenæus asserts[1] that men who hold certain views concerning the Logos show thereby that they know neither human things nor divine; and then proceeds:[2] "And ye, absurdly puffed up, say boldly that ye know the unutterable mysteries of God, whereas even the Lord, the very Son of God, allowed that the Father himself alone knows the day and hour of Judgment, saying expressly 'Of that day and hour no man knoweth, nor yet the Son, but the Father only.' If therefore the Son felt no shame to refer to the Father the knowledge of that day, but spake what is true, neither let us be ashamed, etc."[3]

Origen. (a) In his commentary on St. Matthew, Origen treats both these texts,[4] the one on the Last Day professedly, and the other—on Our Lord's growth in knowledge—only in passing. He does not seem surprised that such lack of knowledge should be attributed to Christ, who advanced through all the stages of wisdom and grace, being made perfect only in the resurrection—"non tamen ut veniret jam quod perfectum erat, priusquam propriam dispensationem impleret." Speaking with a certain hesitation, he puts forward this view: that it is only before he has "consummated all things" that Christ admits lack of knowledge—until then "no one knows, neither the angels, nor the Son, but the Father alone"—but after the resurrection, when about to ascend into heaven, when his disciples again questioned him, his answer changed; he no longer says that he does not know but: "It is not for *you* to know the times or the seasons which the Father has put in his own power."

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[1] *Adv. Hær.*, Lib. II, par. 5.

[2] *Ibid.* par. 6.

[3] Keble's Trans. in *Library of the Fathers*, p. 178. Vid. *Adnotationes in Irenæum.* Migne, *P. G*, I, col. 1583ss.

[4] Migne, *P. G.*, col. 1686.

(b) Further on in the same place, he offers an entirely different solution, which we find afterwards adopted by others. He refers the ignorance to the Church, which is the body of Christ: He knows not "as long as the Church, which is his Body, knows not that day and hour, and he is understood as knowing when all his members shall have known."

(c) In commenting on St. Luke, he treats the question of Christ's development more directly,[1] but he makes use of a phrase which is at best very ambiguous: "Sapientior per singulas videbatur ætates." "Videbatur" may refer to mere appearance—that outwardly and to the eye he seemed to advance; and as we have not the original Greek, it is difficult to decide on Origen's meaning. But this is not the only place where he treats the matter. If we turn to his Homilies on Jeremias, we find that he puts and answers the question of development with all directness: "Nemo autem proficit qui est perfectus, sed ille proficit qui indiget profectu. Ergo proficiebat ætate, proficiebat sapientia, proficiebat gratia apud Deum et apud homines."[2] Here surely the mind of Origen is clear. If we accept the testimony of the Gospel, he says, Jesus actually advanced in wisdom. Then he argues: no one advances who is perfect, but only one who is in need of advancement. And this sense runs through all that follows in this section.

Athanasius. The greatest Doctor of the Incarnation treats these texts *ex professo* again and again, sometimes, it is true, with a note of hesitancy, but generally, it would seem, on the basis of one great principle: in the Godhead there cannot be ignorance, but ignorance is proper to the flesh.

(a) In *Orat. III Contra Arianos*, he says: "Now why it was that though he knew, he did not tell his disciples plainly at that time, no one may be curious, where he has been silent; but why though he knew, he said: 'No, not the Son knows,'—this I think none of the faithful is ignorant of, viz, that he made this as those other declarations, as man by reason of the flesh. For this, as before, is not the Word's deficiency, but of that human nature *whose property it is to be ignorant.*[1] Then further on,[2] St. Athanasius gives the reason which seems to lie at the very bottom of this mystery—that out of love for man he took on his limitations in knowledge. "Moreover this is proper to the Savior's *love of man*; for since he was made man he is not ashamed because of the flesh which is *ignorant*, to say '*I know not*,' that he may show, that knowing as God, he is but ignorant according to the flesh. And therefore he said not: 'No, not the Son of God knows' . . . but simply '*no, not the Son*,' that the ignorance might be the *Son's* as born *from among men*."

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[1] *Ibid.* 1853.

[2] *In Hier.* i, 8. Migne, XIII, 264.

(c) And still further on,[3] like Origen, he contrasts the two modes of speech, the one before, the other after the resurrection: 'He did not then say 'No, not the Son,' as he said before *humanly*, but 'It is not for you to know.' For now the flesh had risen, and put off its mortality; and no longer did it became him to answer after the flesh when he was going into the heavens."

(d) He afterwards takes up the difficulty which arises from the text of St. Luke ii, 52. "He advanced in *wisdom*"; and it is evident that the great Doctor of the Incarnation approaches the text with sincere trepidation. He speaks with less boldness than before, and seems loth to admire any such growth. The passage though long is worthy of ample citation. He first of all refutes the objection brought against the very divinity of Christ by the contention that "the Son of God had no room for reaching forward." "It was not then the Word, considered as the Word, who advanced . . . but *humanly* is he here also said to advance, since advance belongs to man."[4] Then further on,[5] he speaks as if this were but a progress in the manifestation of Divinity: "of the body then is advance; for, it advancing, in it advanced also the *manifestation of the Godhead to those who saw it*." . . . "The body increasing in stature, there progressed in and with it the manifestation of the Godhead also, and to all was it displayed that the body was God's temple, and that God was in the body." This is surely indefinite, and misses the real question of the advance of the soul, for the divine may have been manifested in a real, human growth. But finally, as if to silence his objectors, he concludes:[1] "And if they urge that *the Word become flesh* is called Jesus, and refer to him the term *advanced*, they must be told that neither does this impair the Father's Light, which is the Son, but that it still shows that the Word has become man and bore true flesh." Then he gives this explanation, which is difficult to understand: "Therefore not Wisdom, as Wisdom, advanced in respect of Itself; but the *manhood advanced* in Wisdom, transcending by degrees human nature, and made God, and becoming and appearing to all as the organ of Wisdom, for the operation and the shining forth of the Godhead."

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[1] Newman's Trans. in *Library of the Fathers*, pp. 460, 461.

[2] *Ibid.* 461.

[3] *Ibid.* 469.

[4] *Ibid.* 473.

[5] *Ibid.* 474.

(e) After the treatise against the Arians, we have the letters of the illustrious Doctor to Serapion. Here again he touches the same question, but this time with undoubted clearness. He is writing to Serapion on the text of Mark xiii, 32, which words, he asserts, are only too true, but the Arians will not see the proper sense of them; and then he goes on to say: "Because he became man, and to man ignorance is proper, as is hunger, as is thirst, for this reason in as much as he was made man did he wish to show forth even our ignorance, first that he might show the truth of his human body, and then that bearing about in his body (his human nature) our ignorance, he might free our common nature from all its defects, might purify it, and thus present it perfect and holy to God the Father."[2]

(f) Finally in *De Incarnatione: Contra Arianos*, he gives the general rule: when we find aught predicated of Christ which seems to savor of limitation, we must attribute it to his humanity.

Gregory of Nyssa. (a) In writing against Apollinaris, Gregory quotes St Luke ii, 52: "Jesus advanced," and then lays down the general principle that Jesus "reached the perfection of man's estate, by passing through the ordinary stages of human development."[3]

(b) It may be objected, however, that Gregory evidently here speaks of growth in bodily frame, or of growth in favor of men. But this can hardly be his mind, for farther on in the same treatise he again attacks the position of Apollinaris in this fashion: "You [Apollinaris] seem to assert that what appeared in time, was God before all time; but that which appeared in time seemed to have attributes which are foreign to the divine nature; will divinity nurse at a mother's breast? will divinity labor? will divinity grow? will divinity be *ignorant of the seasons*? will divinity *know not the day and the hour*? will divinity shed its blood? will divinity die?" Then he alludes anew to the fact that Christ knew not that the figs were unripe, knew not the day and the hour, and continues: "Who is he who *knows not*? who is dejected, sad? who is abandoned by his Father?"[1] Surely the saint of Nyssa not only seems to admit a limitation in Christ's human knowledge, but uses it as an argument for the perfection of Jesus' humanity against the error of the Apollinarists.

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[1] *Ibid.* 475.

[2] *Ep. II ad Serapionem.* Migne, XXVI, col. 624.

[3] *Adv. Apoll.* Migne, *P. G.*, XLV, col. 1149.

Basil, the elder brother of the saint of Nyssa, whose vast learning merited for him the title of Great, also touches on our question, principally in a letter to Amphilochius.[2]

(a) Treating *ex professo* the text of Mark xiii, 32, he seems not at all inclined to interpret it literally, but prefers to see in it hidden allusions to the relationship which exists between the Father and the Son in the great mystery of the Holy Trinity. However, in the conclusion of his first paragraph,[3] where he is alluding to Christ's request for water at the well of Samaria, he says: "This is the word of Christ, which tells of bodily need." And he also acknowledges that a man does not go beyond the bounds of pious opinion if he refer the ignorance mentioned in Mark to the humanity of our Lord, since of him it is written that he grew in wisdom and grace before God and men.[4]

(b) In the next section he proceeds to give his own view as to the interpretation of the Marcan text. He judges it to mean that if the Father were ignorant the Son would not know, since the Son has all things from the Father. Basil therefore allowed the opinion which admitted limitation in Christ's knowledge, though he seemed little inclined to adopt it himself.

(c) The same question is discussed by him in a previous letter *ad Cæsarienses*[5] in which he comes to the conclusion: "It is for thy sake that he knoweth not the day and the hour, although nothing is hidden from true Wisdom, for by It all things were made." He explains this as meaning that Christ did not wish to reveal the last day, since knowledge of it would be hurtful to mankind by reason of the feelings of weariness or of despair which it would produce. He comes to the same conclusion (in which most modern Catholic interpreters are at one with him) when discussing the question in *Lib. IV contra Eunom.*[1] Christ was silent concerning the time of the day of judgment, he says, "because it was not fitting that men should have such knowledge."

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[1] *Ibid.* col. 1176.

[2] Migne, *P. G.*, XXXII, n. 236.

[3] Col. 877.

[4] Col. 878.

[5] Migne, *P. G.*, VIII, col. 255, par. 6.

Eustathius. Facundus Episc. Hermaniensis, writing in defense of the *Tria Capitula*, says of Eustathius: "Nam beatus Eustathius Antiochenus episcopus, qui primus in concilio Nicaeno fuit, sexto adversus Arianos libro de eo quod ait Dominus "nemo scit diem illum, etc." —dicamus, inquit, cujus rei gratia Filius hominis diemproprii advent us ignoret. Neque enim dubium est quia et hoc, causa utilitatis hominum providens, adinvenit omnium Creator et opifex Deus. Sicut enim *hominem*, causa salutis hominum, Verbo cooptavit et *Deo*, sic et insignem judicii diem causa divini beneficii homini (sc. Christo) competenter abscondit, ne forte ineffabilia mysteria similis generis hominibus indicans, et diem secundi adventus ostendet."[2] When we consider that this holy Father was "primus in Concilio Nicaeno," certainly his testimony must have great value in questions of Christology.

Epiphanius. This writer treats the question *ex professo* in his work *Adv. Hæreses*, Lib. II.[3] He is very prolix, and at times it is extremely difficult to follow his thought, but the pith of his opinion seems to be as follows:[4] The Father's knowledge of the Judgment day is already complete, that is he has attained all the knowledge that is proper to him, for he has handed over the actual execution of the judgment to the Son. The Son knows when the time shall be equally with the Father; but he has the knowledge of experience yet to gain, since he has not yet judged the world. "He is not ignorant, but he has not yet perfected his knowledge by action, for he has not yet judged."[5]

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[1] Migne, *P. G.*, XXIX, col. 696.

[2] This bit of Eustathius is preserved only in this Latin quotation.

[3] *Adv. Hær.*, Lib. II. Migne, *P. G.*, XLII, col. 269.

[4] *Ibid.* col. 276.

[5] Maldonatus, *in Matt. xxiv*, 32-36, argues that if this sense of the words be adopted, the *Father* could not be said to know the day of judgment. "Qua etiam ratione illa altera Origenis et Epiphanii interpretatio refelli potest, ideo Christum ignorare diem judicii quia expertus non est—nam neque Pater expertus est."

(b) Epiphanius returns to the question in the Third Book of this same treatise *Against Heresies*,[1] where he argues to the reality of Christ's human soul from the fact that he advanced in wisdom. "How was it possible," he asks, "that he should make progress in wisdom if he were lacking a (human) mind?"

He represents his adversaries as answering: for this very reason we have refused to allow a human soul in Christ, lest we be at the same time obliged to admit that he is bound by the desire of fleeting things, which holds men's souls. Then, after quoting Eccles. vii, 30, he goes on to argue that such reasoning is entirely vain, because when we attribute to the eternal Son of God a body of flesh we never for a moment suppose that there has been any lessening of the eternal Word; and so too when we teach that Christ assumed even the limitations of man's soul, we never for a moment imagine that he thought aught unworthy of his divinity.[3]

Theodoretus. Gentianus Hervetis, writing to the Cardinal of *Santa Croce,* says of Theodoret: "Inter episcopos si non primum, certe inter primos, locum obtinet." This illustrious light of the Greek church touches our question in his work *Hæreticar Fabular. Compend.*[4] He is showing that Christ assumed not only a body but a human soul; and he says that this is clear from the text of St. Luke ii, 52: "Jesus advanced, etc." For the body grows in stature, in size, as the years run on, while the soul grows in wisdom. That which is divine grows not, for the divine word of God is in all things at the height of perfection. Rightly indeed did the growth in wisdom go hand in hand with growth in stature, and the divine nature revealed its wisdom in keeping with degrees of human, bodily development.

We also learn the mind of Theodoret from Cyril's *Apol. Contra Theod. pro. xii Capit.*[5] Cyril introduces Theodoret in Anath. IV, as saying: "To whom shall we apply the ignorance and the fear? How could he speak the truth in saying that he had all that the Father hath, when not having the knowledge of the Father? 'The Father alone knoweth the day.' If then he [Christ] speak the truth when saying that he is ignorant, anyone might suppose this of him. But if he knoweth the day, but says that he is *ignorant with a wish to hide*

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[1] Migne, *P. G.*, XLII, col. 677-680.

[2] *Ibid.* col. 679.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Migne, *P. G.*, LXXXIII, col. 497.

[5] Migne, *P. G.*, LXX, col. 409-412.

it, you see in what a blasphemy the conclusion issues. . . . Not then to God the Word does the ignorance belong, but to the form of the servant, who at that time knew as much as the indwelling Godhead revealed."[1] And this is a general law with Theodoret, for he adds that this position must be maintained in all similar cases.

Ambrose. (a) Ambrose is the most interesting of the Latin doctors on this difficult question, and his mind is well worth following out. In *Lib. V de Fide*,[2] he treats *ex professo* the difficulty arising from the texts of St. Matthew xxiv, 36, and St. Mark xiii, 32. He asserts in chapter xvi that the old Greek codices have not the reading found in Mark, and is inclined to think the reference to the Son an interpolation. "Primum veteres non habent codices Graeci: *quia nec Filius scit*, sed non mirum si et hoc falsarunt quia scripturas interpolavere divinas."[3] Then he proceeds to give his own opinion in case the text be genuine. This opinion seems to be that Christ as a man had knowledge of the last day, but that out of consideration for the Apostles he judged it wiser not to communicate his knowledge.[4] "Mavult enim Dominus, nimio in discipulos amore propensus, petentibus his quae cognitu judicaret, videri ignorari quod noverat quam suam potentiam demonstrare."

Having thus expressed his own opinion, he confesses that there are very many—"plerique"—who with all confidence assert that while nothing was hidden from our Lord's divine nature, still as man a knowledge of the last day was not vouchsafed to him. But it is better to let Ambrose speak for himself:[5] "Sunt tamen plerique non ita timidiores ut ego—malo enim alta timere quam sapere—sunt tamen plerique eo freti quod scriptum est: Jesus proficiebat aetate et sapientia et gratia apud Deum et homines, qui dicant confidenter quod secundum divinitatem quidem ea quae futura sunt ignorare non potuit, sed secundum nostrae conditionis assumptionem ignorare se quasi *Filius hominis*."

(b) This work was written in A. D. 377-378. In his treatise on the Incarnation[6] written some three or four years later, he takes up the question of Christ's advance in wisdom. He seems to have gained in the meantime that confidence which he lacked when writing *De Fide*, for he now asserts a real advance in knowledge. He introduces Christ as

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[1] *Ibid.* col. 412. Cf. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, III, p. 28

[2] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 687 sqq.

[3] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 722.

[4] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 872.

[5] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 873.

[6] Migne, *P. L.* x, Col. 327, No. 66.

saying "sensu hominis rogavi . . . . sensu hominis profeci; sicut scriptum est: et Jesus proficiebat aetate." Ambrose goes on to say: "Quomodo proficiebat sapientia Dei? Profectus est aetatis, et profectus sapientiae, sed humanae est. Ideo aetatem ante praemisit, ut secundum hominem crederes dictum—aetas enim non divinitatis sed corporis est. Ergo si proficiebat aetate hominis, proficiebat sapientia hominis; sapientia autem sensu proficit, quia a sensu sapientia. Jesus autem proficiebat aetate et sapientia. Quis sensus proficiebat? Si humanus, ergo et ipse susceptus est: si divinus, ergo mutabilis per profectum. Quod enim proficit utique mutatur in melius: sed quod divinum est non mutatur, quod ergo mutatur non utique divinum. Sensus igitur proficiebat humanus; sensum ergo suscepit humanum."[1] This needs no commentary.

Ambrose proceeds to confirm this by referring to Luke ii, 40: "The child grew and waxed strong, etc." and also to Isaias viii, 4: "For before the child shall have knowledge to cry, My father, and my mother, etc." Commenting on the latter text he writes: "Sapientiam enim Dei futura et occulta non fallunt; expers autem agnitionis infantia, per humanam utique imprudentiam, *quod adhuc non didicit ignorat.*"[2]

Hilary. (a) The great Doctor Hilary is not of easy interpretation in the many things he has written about the human nature in Jesus Christ. He treats our special problem in *De Trinitate*, ix.[3] He begins in the ordinary way by taking up the difficulty in Mark xiii, 32, which the Arians used as conclusive against the divinity of Christ. He proves that Christ, at least as God, must have known all things, since all things proceed from him, and it is he who has decreed the time of the day of Judgment. After a consideration of the question : How God is said not to know, he turns again to speak of Christ and writes:[4] "Interrogatio ignorantis ex homine est: in his se omnibus veritati corporeae nativitatis accommodans, quibus naturae nostrae infirmitas detinetur non ut infirmus esset ex natura qui Deus est, sed ut infirmitates sibi hominum Deus homo natus assumpserit . . . manens Deus Verbum, saepissime in ea est professione, qua homo est, cum tamen et protestatio Dei ea sit saepe quae hominum; cum ea nescit quae aut non sint *in tempore confitenda* aut *non agnoscuntur ad meritum.*"

Although the expressions are obscure, Hilary was evidently not inclined to admit any real ignorance in Christ; and this fact becomes clearer when we read:[1] "Est ergo absconsa sapientia, quae quia abscondenda est, interdum et nescientia confitenda est, ut esse possit absconsa." Moreover, Hilary says further on that the Apostles did not understand Christ to say absolutely that he was ignorant, for after the Resurrection they again asked when he would restore the kingdom to Israel[2] (Acts i, 7.)

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[1] *Ibid.* No. 75.
[2] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 716.
[3] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 722.
[4] Migne, *P. L.* xvi, Col. 872.

(b) Returning to the question in Book x,[3] he renders a similar solution : "Hanc nescitae diei professionem non ignorationis esse infirmitatem sed tacendi dispensationem docuimus."[4]

Cyril of Alexandria. Among the great Doctors of the Incarnation Cyril is certainly of the first rank. His opinions on this particular problem are scattered here and there through his many works. That he recognized the great difficulty and importance of the question is evident from the fact that he returns to it no less than nine or ten different times in his treatises on the mystery of the Incarnation. On the one hand he seems to fear to allow any ignorance on the part of Christ; and as far as the present writer can interpret his mind, he must be finally classed with those who deny that Christ was ignorant, even as man, of the day of final retribution. However, there are certainly some passages where he inclines not a little to the admission of limitations in Christ's knowledge, as if fearing for the truth of his humanity were he to advocate the opposite views too strongly. But let the reader judge for himself.

(a) In *Lib. iii adv. Nestor.*,[5] after quoting Luke ii, 52, he says: "But thou sayest that the growth was unto wisdom, albeit how is not this without learning ? For we believe that out of . . . . . . the womb of the virgin, Emmanuel being God proceeded forth man, full surely of the wisdom and grace that are inherent of nature. What sort of growth then will he admit of, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom?

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[1] Migne, *P. L.* x, Col. 327. sqq.

[2] *Ibid.* No. 67.

[3] Migne, *P. L.* x, Col. 348 seqq.

[4] At this sentence in Migne (note j) occurs a long passage which Erasmus found appended in a codex. This additamentum is found only in two known codices; one of these being the Paris Edition of 1631. According to this Hilary advances another new opinion contrary to the one already expressed in Book ix. Here of Christ as man it is said: "Nescientiae etiam non dedignatus errorem." Is this really from the hand of Hilary? If so, it must have been added as a note after the book was written, as another and tentative solution of the difficulty, and it simply leaves us doubtful as to the real mind of the great Saint of Poitiers.

[5] *P. G.* lxxvi, Col. 153.

How then is he said to advance? It is, I deem, by God the Word co-measuring with the increase and stature of his own body the manifestation of the most God-befitting goods that are in him.'"[1]

Advance in wisdom, therefore, was but a manifestation proportioned to bodily growth. It is very hard to understand Cyril's mind here, for granting that it is a manifestation of the divine wisdom, such a manifestation must be through the medium of a human soul; and the question always returns: was the light let into the human soul as it were, gradually? or did it have the full flood of the divine vision from the beginning, and simply manifest this as the days went on? This same difficulty presents itself in all passages found in the great Doctor's writings.

(b) In his book *Ad Reginas de Recta Fide*,[2] he says: "In affirming our Lord Jesus Christ to be one, and assigning to him both divine and human properties, we truly assert that it was congruous to the measures of the Kenosis on the one hand, that he should receive bodily increase and grow strong . . . . . and on the other, that he should seem to be filled with wisdom in so far as his wisdom showed itself daily more and more in harmonious development with the growth of his body."

(c) This is brought out still more clearly in the *Thesaurus*:[3] "The Word became flesh, as it is written, and was perfect, being the wisdom and power of God. But seeing it was necessary that he should adapt himself to the custom of our nature, ... while his body gradually grew he appeared daily wiser to those who saw and heard him." And further on he declares: "He is said to make progress because his wisdom and grace became more conspicuous to those who saw him." Here, too, we have the same difficulty noted above. Cyril has not gone to the bottom of the question. He speaks of the Word, but not, at least explicitly, of the human soul of Christ.

(d) In another passage in the same *Thesaurus*[4] he says: "Not because the Eternal Word was ignorant does he say 'I know not,' but showing in himself human nature; for inasmuch as he clothed himself with our flesh, he also took upon himself the form of our ignorance which should be ascribed not to his own nature, but to humanity."

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[1] *Oxford Translation*, p. 113.

[2] Migne, *P. G.* lxxvi, Col. 1353.

[3] Migne, *P. G.* lxxv, Col. 428.

[4] Migne, *Ibid.* Col, 373.

And further on[1] he says with clearness : "For Christ is not really ignorant of it when he says he does not know that hour"—giving us to understand that Christ acts simply in accord with an established economy, but that in reality he is not ignorant.

(e) This same idea we find clearly expressed in the treatise *Adv. Anthropomor.*[2] Here again he denies that the Word of God can in any wise be ignorant, but in so far as he was a man, he does not set aside the appearance of ignorance. Further on in the same passage he asserts that Christ, out of consideration for the Apostles, *pretended* not to know, lest they should be made sad because the secret had not been confided to them.

(f) In a passage in his treatise *De Incarnatione Domini*,[3] Cyril speaks clearly for once of limitation, though even here he should be interpreted according to the general trend of his mind. He is considering the text of Luke ii, 52, and he insists that if there was growth in knowledge, it was not in divine but in human knowledge, which advances with our years, which has need of instruction, which gradually learns both what is human and what is divine.[4]

Gregory Nazianzen. This Doctor, like many of the others, advances a double view on this vital subject.[5] In *Orat. xxx. Theol. iv*, he forcibly rejects the idea that the *Son of God* can be ignorant of anything; or that he should know all that will happen up to the last moment and then be without knowledge of the crisis itself. But since the text of Mark puts the word "Son" without any qualification, we may assert in a way altogether conformable to piety, that as God he has a knowledge of the last day, as man he is ignorant.

In the following section[6] he begins by saying : "If this answer just given is sufficient, then there is no use of further inquiry. If, however, our opponents judge it not satisfactory, then we give another solution" —and the answer here given is the one we have already alluded to when speaking of Gregory's great friend St. Basil, who sees in the text of Mark some mysterious allusion to the relationship between the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity.[7] Evidently Gregory considered both these solutions to be of sufficient weight to merit serious consideration.

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[1] *Ibid.* Col. 377, ad fin.

[2] Migne, *P. G.* lxxvi, Col. 1100.

[3] Migne, *P. G.* lxxv, Col. 1453.

[4] See also Migne, *P. G.* lxxii, Col. 509.

[5] Migne, *P. G.* xxxvi, Col. 124.

[6] *Ibid.* Col. 124.

[7] This is Maldonatus' final solution in his commentary on Matth. quod vid.

Chrysostom. This father has written very little on the matter. Petavius in *De Incarnat.*, Cap. xi, quotes Chrysostom as favoring the view that our Lord indeed knew, even as man, the day and the hour, but because it was not expedient for us, or because he was not commissioned to reveal it, he did not communicate his knowledge.

Chrysostom treats the question in his commentary on Matthew;[1] and he says the knowledge of the last day is referred to the Father to make the event more awful to the disciples, and to exclude further inquiry. Then he proceeds:[2] "If it be not this, but Christ is really ignorant of the day and hour, when will he know it? Will it be together with us? But who will say this? And the Father he knoweth clearly, even as clearly as *He* knoweth the Son: and of the day is He ignorant?[3] but how he ought to judge, and of the secrets of each he hath full knowledge; and what is far more common than that, of this could he be ignorant?" And in this strain he speaks all through the homily.

Jerome. When dealing with the question *ex professo* in his commentary on Matth. xxiv, 36, Jerome seems to hold that the knowledge of the last day was not hidden from Christ even as man, but he did not reveal what he himself knew, because it was not expedient for the Apostles to possess such knowledge. He begins[4] by throwing doubt upon the text. Then granting its truth for argument's sake, he proceeds to state that Jesus as the Word is the author of all times and seasons—"All times were made by him"—and of a consequence, the knowledge of the last day must be his. He also states that Jesus has an intimate knowledge of the last day. "Quid est majus, notitia Patris an judicii? si majus novit, quomodo ignorat quod minus est?"[5] Then he asks why our Lord made such an assertion, and answers that in Christ, according to the Apostle, "are hidden all the treasures of knowledge and wisdom," and that he withheld such knowledge because it was not expedient for the Apostles to know, since if they were left uncertain as to the day of doom, they would live in constant expectation of the Judgment. "Ostendit quod ipse sciat, sed non expediat nosse Apostolis, ut semper incerti de adventu Judicis, sic quotidie vivant quasi die alia judicandi sunt."[6]

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[1] Migne, *P. G.* lviii, Hom. 77.
[2] *Ibid.* Col. 703.
[3] This can be predicated of the Son only as God.
[4] Migne, *P. L.* xxvi, Col. 181.
[5] *Ibid.* Col. 188.
[6] *Ibid.* Col. 189.

(b) In his commentary on Osee,[1] speaking of the text "neque Filius," he writes: "Ideo ignorare se dicit quia nobis non expedit discere." The Commentary on Matthew saw the light in 398; the Commentary on Osee in 406; in 415 we find Jerome holding a contrary opinion when writing *II Adv. Pelag.* In his argument against the Pelagians he asks the question:[2] "Can we promise ourselves full knowledge, when of the Angels and even of the Son, it is written that they know not the day and the hour?" Then follows this very strong sentence: "Carnis infirmitas Deo habitatore gaudebat et tamen mensuram fragilitatis suae excedere non potuit, ut non secundum apparentiam juxta veteres haereticos, sed vere Dei Filius hominis filius crederetur."

The argument seems perfectly clear. The Pelagians made too great boast of the power of human nature. St. Jerome reproves their presumption by the example of Christ, who, though he was the Eternal Word made flesh, still because of the weakness of the flesh *he could not* (non potuit) exceed the limited measure of human nature. Nay more, his observance of the measure of limited human nature is the great argument for the truth of Christ's humanity, which might otherwise be thought (as the heretics had taught) only a mere appearance. This interesting passage gives rise to the question whether, during the seventeen years which elapsed since the time of his Commentary on Matthew, Jerome had really changed his mind on this vital problem.

Ephrem Syrus. In *Rythm.* 77 this writer considers Mark xiii, 32 in connection with the Arian objection. It is extremely difficult to understand just what he thought of the human knowledge of Christ, for he is all intent on proving against his opponents Christ's divinity, little caring for our question, which was to him entirely secondary. And yet certain expressions deserve careful attention, as for example: "But the Fruit came down and clothed Himself with a Body and clothed Himself along with it with the feeble names of His kindred, that as He even put on our human nature, He might also put on our knowledge for our sakes. He that knew all things became unknowing, He asked and listened, as a man, for man's sake." This certainly means a true human limitation.

(b) Further on in *Rythm.* 78. S. Ephrem alludes to some one with whom he had been disputing, and whom he had won back to the faith, who had been led to acknowledge "that our *Redeemer* also knew that hour." Does this refer to his humanity? Not necessarily: but the word Redeemer has a great affinity to humanity. (Oxford Transl. p. 349 sq.—p. 355.)

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[1] Migne, *P. L.* xxv, Col. 845.

[2] Migne, *P. L. Adv. Pelag.* xxiii, Col. 576.

Augustine. The great Doctor of the West is against admitting ignorance in Christ even as man. He speaks of the Lord's ignorance of the last day, and says clearly:[1] "Cum ergo ita dicatur nescire Filius hunc diem, non quod nesciat sed quod nescire faciat eos, quibus hoc non expedit scire, id est, non eis hoc ostendat." And further on[2] he openly declares that Christ indeed has a knowledge of the consummation of all things, but he was not ordered by the Father to reveal such knowledge to men: "Quia vero Dominus noster Jesus Christus *Magister* nobis missus est, etiam Filium hominis dixit nescire illum diem, quia in magisterio ejus non ut per eum sciretur a nobis." And again he reiterates "nescire dicitur, quod nescire nos facit, etc."

(b) In Question IX. (*De div. Quaest.*)[3] he expresses anew the same thought when he writes that the Son is said not to know, because he reveals not his knowledge to others "nescire Filium sic dictum esse quia facit nescire homines."

(c) He begins his 97th *Sermon*[4] with a dissertation on Mark xiii, 32. Here again he seems to deny that the Son can be in ignorance of the last day. He writes: "Ubi quidem magna quaestio est, ne carnaliter sapientes putemus aliquid Patrem scire quod nesciat Filius. Nam utique cum dixit: "*Pater scit,*" ideo hoc dixit quia in *Patre* et Filius scit."

(d) In *Lib. I de Trinitate,*[5] he repeats what we have written above: "Hoc enim nescit, quod nescientes facit, id est, quod non ita sciebat ut tunc discipulis indicaret." If, however, it occurred to anyone that Augustine is not speaking of Christ as man, he has but to turn to the *Libellus Emendationis Leporii ad Episcopos Galliae.* Leporius had strayed from the truth, and through the interest taken in him by the African Bishops, especially Augustine, had recanted his error. But because of the scandal he had given in Gaul, he wrote to the Bishops a retractation.[6] Among other things in which he says he had gone astray is the question of the human knowledge of Jesus Christ. He states that when of old Christ had been charged with ignorance, he had always considered it sufficient to answer, that the Lord was ignorant "secundum hominem," but that now he anathematized such an opinion. His words are: "Ut autem et hinc nihil cuiquam in suspicione derelinquam, tunc, immo ad objecta respondi, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum secundum hominem ignorare. Sed nunc non solum dicere non praesumo, verum etiam anathematizo prolatam in hac parte sententiam: quia dici non licet, etiam secundum hominem ignorasse Dominum prophetarum."[1] Surely Augustine's mind is clear if he caused Leporius to advance such a formula.

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[1] Migne, *P. L.* xxxvi, Col. 90.

[2] *Ibid.* Col. 355.

[3] Migne, *P. L.* xl Col. 48.

[4] Migne, *P. L.* xxxviii, Col. 589.

[5] Migne, *P. L.* xliii, Col. 837.

[6] Migne, *P. L.* xxxi, Col. 1215 seqq.

Didymus Alexandrinus, who died about 396, has left a clear opinion on the text of Mark xiii.[2] First he throws some doubt on the text, by asserting that Matthew does not use the clause "neither the Son." Didymus, as is evident from this passage and also from *In Psalmos, ad ver* 7 *Psa m.* lxviii, and *In I Joannis, Cap. ii, ver.* 8, held that Christ indeed knew the last day, but because it was not expedient for the Apostles to have knowledge of it, he said "I know not." It is always difficult to understand whether Didymus was referring only to the divinity, or was considering the question, whether as man Christ could err.

(e) Didymus in another passage[3] alludes approvingly to the opinion of Basil, cited above. Isidore of Pelusium is exactly of the same mind. But here again it is not easy to determine whether or not he is writing of the divinity of Christ alone.[4]

Cassiodorus, in *Expos. in Psalt. Ps. ix,*[5] openly professes himself as a follower of Hilary and Augustine "judicantes esse nefarium, si illa omnipotens Verbi humanatio aliquod de futuris ignorasse putaretur, quod Patrem scire praedicavit." He then explains the saying of Christ, by again citing the solution of Augustine "quod utiliter suos faciat nescire subjectos."

Gregory the Great. Since the days of Gregory the Great no Father of note and scarcely any theologian has openly declared that Christ as man knew not the day of Judgment. The question was referred to Gregory for adjudication by Eulogius Patriarch of Constantinople. Eulogius vigorously opposed the Agnoetae who held that our Lord as man was indeed ignorant.[6] In the clearest possible terms where there is no chance for tergiversation, Eulogius teaches that it is impious to assert that even as man Christ could have been ignorant. To Eulogius

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[1] *Ibid.* Col. 1229.

[2] Migne, *P. G.* xxxix, Col. 917.

[2] *Ibid.* Col. 920.

[4] Migne, *P. L.* lxxviii, Col. 260-261.

[5] Migne, *P. L.* lxx, Col. 92.

[6] Migne, *P. G.* ciii, *Bib. Phot.*

Gregory replied: "In your teaching against the heretics that are called Agnoetae there was much for us to admire; but to displease there was nothing." Gregory himself gives several explanations of the passage in Mark xiii, 32, but in one and all he sets his face firmly against the admission of ignorance in Christ even as man. In his letter to Eulogius he expressly refers such ignorance to the Church as Christ's body: "De eo vero quod scriptum est: Quia diem et horam neque Filius neque angeli sciunt omnino recte vestra sanctitas sensit quoniam non ad eumdem Filium, juxta hoc quod caput est, sed juxta quod corpus ejus quod sumus nos, est certissime referendum."[1] Further on[2] he says that the Father alone is said to know, in order that all pre-eminence in knowing may be attributed to the Father who, as he communicates being, so also communicates knowledge to the Son: "Unde et Pater solus dicitur scire, quia consubstantialis ei Filius, ex ejus natura qua est super angelos, habet ut hoc sciat quod angeli ignorant." Later on in the same place he offers another solution, saying that our Lord indeed knew it as man, but not because of the inborn power of human mind: "In natura quidem humanitatis novit diem et horam judicii, sed tamen hunc non ex natura humanitatis novit . . . . . ." And he then explains that he knew it even as man, "per Deitatis suae potentiam."

EDWARD J. HANNA.

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[1] Migne, *P. L.* lxxvii Col. 1097.

[2] *Ibid.*

STUDIES.

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI AND THE MOSAIC LEGISLATION. (II)

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

The Four Hebrew Legislations of the Pentateuch.

In treating the interesting problems of Hebrew legislation in their relation to the Code of Hammurabi, the first question which presents itself for discussion is: When did a uniform system of law and judicial procedure similar to that of the ancient Babylonians, become established in Israel? If the traditional theory concerning the date and authorship of the Pentateuch could still be maintained, the solution of this problem would be easy. The answer would be that a well-developed system of law and justice, scarcely inferior to that of the Hammurabi Code, existed in Israel from the time of Moses. Unfortunately, however, this simple solution of the problem can no longer be upheld. It would be out of place here to enter on a discussion of the arguments which have led to this practically unanimous conclusion,[1] although some of the reasons for it will become manifest in the course of our more special investigation.

Suffice it for the present to say that modern scholars are agreed in discovering in the Pentateuch four codes of laws. These are:

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[1] Concerning this matter the student may refer to Driver, *Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 1-160, and the full bibliography there given (pp. 1-4); the articles *Hexateuch*, *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, *Numbers*, and *Deuteronomy* in Cheyne's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, by Wellhausen, Moore and Barton; and in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, by Woods, Ryle, Harford-Battersby, and White, with the full bibliographies appended to each article. Cf. especially Wellhausen, *Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der historischen Buecher des Alten Testaments*, Berlin, 1889; Kuenen, *Historico-Critical Inquiry into the Hexateuch* (quoted above), London, 1886; Holzinger, *Einleitung in den Hexateuch*, Freiburg, 1893; Cornill, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Freiburg, 1892; Kautzsch, *Literature of the Old Testament* (Eng trans.), London, 1899; W. R. Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, 2d ed., 1892, Lect. viii-xiii; Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, New York, 1893, 2d ed., 1897; Westphal, *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, 1888-1892; Addis, *The Documents of the Hexateuch*, London, 1893-1898, in 2 vols.; the *Oxford Hexateuch*, by J. E. Carpenter and G. H. Battersby, London, 1900, in 2 vols.; cf. also the Introductions to the Old Testament, by Koenig, (Bonn, 1893), and Strack (Munich, 4th ed., 1894), as well as the Commentaries on Genesis, Exod., Num., Levit. and Deuteronomy by Dillmann, Delitzsch, Driver, Gray, Strack, Holzinger, Bertholet, Gunkel, Baentsch and Steuernagel, and the Histories of Israel, especially those by Stade and Kittel.

I. The "Book of the Covenant," contained in Exodus xx-xxiii, which comprises the Decalogue (Exod. xx, 1-17), but consists chiefly of civil enactments designed for the use of a very primitive community. To this is related Exod. xxxiv, 10-26, and probably Exod. xiii, 3-16. II. The "Priests' Code," consisting chiefly of laws and regulations relating to sacrificial and ceremonial institutions. These occupy Exodus xxv-xxxi; xxxv-xl; Leviticus i-xvi; xxvii; and Numbers i-x, 28; xv; xviii; xix; and xxv, 10-xxxvi. III. The "Law of Holiness," so named on account of the stress which is constantly laid by it upon holiness as a guiding motive. It is of priestly redaction, as is the Priests' Code, but was originally distinct from it. It is contained in Leviticus xvii-xxvi, and is partly ceremonial but largely moral. IV. The "Book of Deuteronomy," the fifth book of the Pentateuch.[1]

Passing now to a consideration of the date of these different codes, we may sum up for the present the conclusions of biblical scholarship as follows:

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[1] On the "Law Literature" of the Old Testament cf. Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 43-45; 141-144; also his *Commentary on Deuteronomy* (in the *International Critical Commentary*), London, 1902, pp. iii, iv ff.; Kuenen, *Historico-Critical Inquiry into the Origin and Composition of the Hexateuch*, London, 1886, p. 17ff., 214ff., 262ff., 272-313, etc.; Kautzsch, *Outline of the History of the Literature of the Old Testament* (Eng. trans.), London, 1899, pp. 29, 30; 94ff., 100ff., 106ff.; W. R. Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, London, 2d ed., 1892, Lect. ix, xi, and xii; also his *Prophets of Israel* (2d ed. by Cheyne), 1902, *passim*; Ch. F. Kent—F. K. Sanders, *The Growth of Israelitish Law* in the *Biblical and Semitic Studies of Yale Bicentennial Publications*, New York, 1901, pp. 41-90; Kuenen, *Religion of Israel*, London, 1875, vol. ii, pp. 250-286, and his *Hibbert Lectures* on *National Religions and Universal Religions*, London, 1882, pp. 82ff, 156-167; Wellhausen, *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i, 1878, chaps. i-iii, and pp. 435-440 (4th ed., 1894); and *Israelitische und Juedische Geschichte*, 1894, pp. 134ff.; Ryle, *Canon of the Old Testament*, London, 1892, pp. 22-33, 48ff., 57-60, 71-74 and 75-91; Montefiore, in his *Hibbert Lectures* on the *Origin and Growth of the Ancient Hebrews*, London, 1892 (3d ed. 1897) *passim*; Smend, *Alttestament-Religion-Geschichte*, 1893, *passim*; Schultz, *Old Testament Theology* (Eng. trans.), vol. i, pp, 188ff., and chap. xviii; Nowack's *Hebraische Archeologie*, 1894, vol. ii; Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, 1893, pp. 168-188, and Ottley, *Bampton Lectures*, London, 1897, Lect. v; Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, 2d ed., New York, 1897; Cheyne, *Jewish Religious Life After the Exile*, New York, 1899, p. 72ff.; Kautzsch, *Religion of Israel*, in Hastings' *Extra Volume*, London, 1904, pp. 612-734, *passim*. Cf. also Driver's article, *Law in the Old Testament*, in the same Dictionary, and Dr. Gray's article, *Law Literature*, in Cheyne's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, coll. 2730-2744, where the author appropriately divides the history of Hebrew and Jewish Law Literature into six periods, viz.: (1) the pre-Josianic; (2) the Josianic; (3) the exilic; (4) the earlier post-exilic; (5) the later post-exilic; and (6) the Rabbinic. For a more exhaustive bibliography of the subject cf. W. R. Harper, *The Priestly Elements in the Old Testament*, 2d edition, Chicago, 1905, pp. 155-191, especially pp. 167-169, 177-179 and 189-191.

I. The "Priests' Code" is the latest, as it is the most important constituent of the Pentateuchal legislation, and, in its present form, cannot be earlier than the time of Ezra (about 445 B. C.)[1] II. The "Law of Holiness," which shows a very close resemblance to the "Book of the Covenant" and to "Deuteronomy," is a distinct code in itself, and has a great affinity with the prophet Ezechiel, to whose time it probably belongs, i. e., about 595-572 B. C.[2] III. "Deuteronomy" is the "Book of the Law" found, or claimed to have been found, by the High-priest Hilkiah in the Temple at Jerusalem in the eighteenth year of Josiah, i. e., about 621 B. C. This code, in its present form, must have been written between 622 and the reforms which Josiah introduced after the retreat of Sennacherib in 701 B. C.[3]

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[1] Cf. Driver, *Lit. Old Test.*, p. 10, 12, 68, 73-75, 82-84, and 125-135; Kautzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 106ff.; Montefiore, *op. cit.*, pp. 315, 345; Ottley, *op. cit.*, 120ff. and 141; W. R. Smith, *The Old Test. in the Jewish Church*, pp. 319ff., 381ff., 397ff., and 428ff. Addis, *Documents of the Hexateuch*, vol. ii, pp. 170-188; Cheyne, in W. R. Smith's *Prophets of Israel*, 2d ed., London, 1902, p. 380, note 13; Gray's article on *Law Literature* in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, quoted above; Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, London, 1893, p. 279ff.; Kuenen, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-313; Driver, in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary, Law in the Old Test., vol. iii*, pp. 70-72; and the commentaries on the Hexateuch, quoted above.

[2] Cf. Wellhausen, *Composition der Hexateuch*, pp. 151-175; Noldeke, *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des Alten Testaments*, Kiel, 1869, pp. 62-71; Kuenen's *Hexateuch*, (*Historico-Critical Inquiry*, etc.), pp.24-28, 5-10; Baentsch, *Das Heiligkeits-Gesetz*, Leipzig, 1893; Driver, *Lit. Old Test.*, 42ff., 59, and 145ff.; W. R. Smith, *O. T. in the Jewish Church*, p. 323, note, and 428ff.; Kautzsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102; Montefiore, 235, 236; Addis, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, 170ff.; Paton, in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1895, 1897ff.; Driver, *The Book of Leviticus*, in Dr. Haupt's *Sacred Books of the Old Testament*, 1898. Cf. also the Articles, Introductions and Commentaries quoted above.

[3] The Literature on Deuteronomy and the many complicated problems connected with it is almost inexhaustible. For our purpose the following will be sufficient: Driver, *L. O. T.*, 69-103; *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, (*International Critical Commentary*), New York, 1902, pp. i-lxxvii, especially xxxivff.; Holzinger, *Einleitung in dem Hexateuch* (1893) p. 313ff.; Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, 107ff., 214ff., 262ff., Wellhausen, *Composition des Hexateuchs*, and *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 4th Germ. ed., 1895, (Eng. trans., London, 1885); Staerk, *Das Deuteronomium, sein Inhalt und seine literarische Form*, 1894; Steuernagel, *Der Rahmen des Deuteronomiums*, 1894, and the same author's *Entstehung des Deuteronomiums*, 1896; Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, 267ff ; Stade, *Geschichte Israels*, i, 650ff.; Cornill, *Einleitung* . . . § 9; Montefiore, *Hibb. Lectures*, 177ff.; Westphal, *Les sources du Pentateuque*, ii, 33-132, and 262-318; W. R. Smith, *O. T. J. Church*, 352ff.; Kautzsch, 61ff., and 94ff.; Addis, vol. ii, 1-30; Ottley, 123, 133, 145, 169, 173, 219, etc., H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History*, 264ff., 271ff, and 332. Also the Commentaries of Dillmann, Steuernagel and Bertholet on Deuteronomy, and the article on *Deuteronomy* in *Encycl. Bibl.*, and Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, by Moore and Ryle respectively. For a more exhaustive bibliography, cf. W. R. Harper, *The Priestly Elements in the Old Testament*, 2d ed., Chicago, 1905, pp. 167-169.

VI. The "Book of the Covenant" is the earliest extant code of Hebrew legislation, and probably the first Hebrew code of laws. In its present form, it cannot be much earlier than the prophets Hosea, Amos and Micah, i e., the eighth or ninth century B. C. In its original form it was undoubtedly designed for a very simple agricultural community, but as it comes down to us, it shows in places correspondences with the laws and customs of Israel, which we find in the history of the age of the Judges and the early monarchy.[1]

In these four codes we have the entire civil, criminal, religious and ceremonial legislation of the ancient Hebrews. The Code of Hammurabi, however, is distinctly a civil and criminal code, having no connection whatever with religious and ceremonial institutions; and as the object of the present inquiry is a comparative study of the Babylonian and Hebrew legislations, the sphere of our investigation is naturally limited only to those topics which are common to both legislations. In the following tables a comprehensive analysis is given only of the civil and criminal enactments found in the four Hebrew legislations, the religious and ceremonial regulations being entirely omitted.

I. Deuteronomy purports to contain the last utterances and discourses of Moses, delivered before the Hebrew people in the plains of Moab just before his death. It opens with a historical introduction, stating the place and the time in which the discourses were given (chap. i, 1-5) This is followed by the words of the great Leader, which are divided into three main discourses, forming the first thirty chapters of the whole book. The first discourse is chiefly historical, reviewing the life of Israel in the wilderness (i, 6-iv, 43) The second, which is introduced by a brief historical preface (iv, 44-49), is at first hortatory (v-xi), but its main concern is with legislation, and, indeed, it is this section which contains the Deuteronomic code (xii-xxvi). To this is appended a description of the ceremony of ratifying the laws (xxvii), and a rehearsal of the warnings and blessings intended to ensure their observance (xxviii). The third and last discourse is an additional exhortation, urging the people to be faithful to Yahweh and His covenant (xxix-xxx). The next three chapters (xxxi-xxxiii) contain the farewell words of the prophet, his deliverance of the Deuteronomic laws to the priests, his commission to Joshua, the Song of Moses, and the Blessing of Moses. The last chapter (xxxiv) contains the account of his death.

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[1] Driver, *L. O. T.*, 22ff.; Gray, in *Encyclopædia Biblica*, col. 2716; Briggs, *The Greater Book of the Covenant*, in the *Hebrew Student*, (Chicago, May, 1883,) p. 289ff., and the *Little Book of the Covenant*, 264ff.; J. W. Rothstein, *Das Bundesbuch und die relig-geschicht. Entwicklung Israels*, 1888; W. R. Smith, *O. T. J. Ch.*, Lect. xi, xii, especially p. 333ff.; Baentsch, *Das Bundesbuch, seine ursprungliche Gestalt*, 1892; Bacon, *Triple Tradition of the Exodus*, 1894, p. 110ff.; Wellhausen, *Comp. Hexateuch*, 83ff; 327-333; Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, p. 259-262, and *passim*; Harper, *Commentary on Amos* and *Hosea*, 1905, pp. lxiv-lxix; Moore, in *Encyc. Biblica*, col. 1447ff., and the literature there quoted, col. 1451; Gray's article *Law Literature* in *E. B.*; Kautzsch, *op. cit.*, 29-31; Dillmann, Holzinger and Baentsch's Commentaries on Exodus; Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch* (1897), 211-232, and 242-255; Addis, *op. cit.*, vol. i, 136ff., 142ff.; Driver, in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* (*Law in the Old Testament*), vol. iii, 67, 68.

The civil, criminal and social enactments contained in the Deuteronomic code are quite numerous, as is shown in the following table (from Driver):

xv, 1-11. The year of Release, i. e., the year during which the rights of a lender are to be in abeyance, and repayment of a loan is not to be exacted by him of a brother Israelite.
xv, 12-18. Hebrew slaves.
xvi, 18. The appointment of judges.
xvi, 19-20. On judging justly.
xvii, 8-13. The supreme tribunal.
xvii, 14-20. The power of the king,
xix, 1-13. Asylum for murderers and homicides.
xix, 14. Landmarks.
xix, 15-21. Witnesses.
xx. War and military service.
xxi, 1-9. Expiation of a secret murder.
xxi, 10-14 Treatment of female captives.
xxi, 14-17. Rights of the first-born.
xxi, 18-21. Undutiful children.
xxi, 22, 23. Disposition of corpse of criminal.
xxii, 1-4. Strayed or helpless cattle; lost property.
xxii, 5. Against wearing the apparel of the other sex.
xxii, 6, 7. On birds and their young.
xxii, 8. House battlements.
xxii, 9-11. Against unnatural combinations in agriculture.
xxii, 13-21. Slander against a newly married maiden.
xxii, 22-27. Adultery.
xxii, 28, 29. Seduction.
xxii, 30-xxiii, 1. Incest with stepmother.
xxiii, 2-9. Conditions of admittance into the theocratic community.
xxiii, 10-14. Cleanliness in the camp.
xxiii, 15, 16. Humanity to escaped slaves.
xxiii, 17. Against prostitution.
xxiii, 20-21. Usury.
xxiii, 25. Regard for neighbor's crops.
xxiv, 1-4. Divorce.
xxiv, 10-13. Pledges.

xxiv, 7. Man-stealing.
xxiv, 8, 9. Leprosy.
xxiv, 14, 15. Wages of hired servant not to be withheld.
xxiv, 16. The family of a criminal not to suffer with him.
xxiv, 17, 18. Justice towards strangers, widows, and orphans.
xxiv, 19-22. Generosity to gleaners.
xxv, 1-3. Moderation in infliction of stripes.
xxv, 4. Threshing ox not to be muzzled.
xxv, 5-10. Levirate-marriage.
xxv, 11-12. Modesty in women.
xxv, 13-16. Just weights.
xvii, 6, and xix, 15. Witnesses.
xix, 21. *Lex talionis*, with a different application for each case.

II. The legislation of the Priests' Code (Exodus xxv-xxxi; xxxv-xl; Leviticus i-xvi; xxvii, and Numbers, i-x; xv; xviii; xix; and xxv, 10-xxxvi) contains but few civil regulations, being concerned mainly with the religious and ceremonial institutions. The following regulations, however, are to be noted:

Numbers, chaps. v and vi, contain laws on various subjects, such as exclusion of the leprous and unclean from the camp, (v, 1-4), etc.

v, 5-10. The officiating priest is to receive the compensation for fraud, in case the injured person be dead, and have no next of kin, etc.

v, 11-31. Law of ordeal prescribed for the woman suspected by her husband of unfaithfulness.

xxvii, 1-11. Laws regulating the inheritance of daughters in families in which there are no sons.

xxx. Laws concerning vows.

xxxvi. Heiresses possessing landed property to marry into their own tribe (in order to preserve the inheritance of each tribe intact).

III. The Law of Holiness is equally meagre in civil regulations, being chiefly concerned with moral behavior and religious exhortations. In chaps. xviii, xx and xxiv, however, unlawful marriages and unchastity are strictly forbidden and also punished; and certain special cases of injury to the person are enumerated.

IV. The Book of the Covenant (Exodus xx-xxiii), however, contains a distinctly civil code, as is evident from the following analysis:

Exodus xx, 1-17. The Decalogue.

xx, 22-26. Prohibition of graven images; and regulations for the construction of altars.

xxi, 2-11. Prohibitions respecting male and female slaves of Hebrew race.

xxi, 12-17. Capital offences.

xxi, 18-32. Injuries to life or limb.

xxi, 33-xxii, 6. Cases of danger caused by culpable negligence, or theft.

xxii, 7-17. Deposits, loans, and seduction (which is here treated, not as a moral offence, but as a wrong done to the father, and demanding pecuniary compensation).[1]

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[1] Seduction as well as adultery on the part of the woman have been always considered as theft affecting the father and the husband of the woman respectively.

xxii, 18-31 and xxiii, 4, 5. Miscellaneous religious and moral injunctions (e. g., helping an enemy in his need, etc.)

xxiii, 1-3, and 6-9. Veracity and equity in the administration of justice.

xxiii, 10-19. On the Sabbatical year, the Sabbath, the three annual pilgrimages and sacrifice.

xxiii, 20-33. A concluding exhortation.

The so-called "Little Book of the Covenant" (Exodus xxxiv, 10-26, and Exodus xiii, 3-16,) is practically a repetition of many of the religious enactments of the original, or "Greater Book of the Covenant," such as the Feast of the Unleavened Bread, the dedication of the first-born, but with some additions and modifications. These repetitions agree substantially, often even verbally, with the theocratic section of the Book of the Covenant

It is evident from the above analysis of the four Hebrew legislations that our main sources of information concerning the social and legal life of the ancient Hebrews are the "Book of the Covenant" and Deuteronomy. Hence, in order to form a just estimate of the historical and legal value of these two Hebrew codes of laws and to fully appreciate their importance for the comparative study of Semitic, and especially, Hebrew-Babylonian legislation, a discussion of their origin, date and authorship is indispensable.

In order to familiarize the reader with the conventional abbreviations adopted by modern biblical critics to designate the various sources and documents of the Pentateuch, the following list of signs is furnished:[1]

"On the whole," says Ch. Letourneau, "our long inquiry has abundantly proved that very generally, in human societies, marriage has been, or is still, a bargain, when not a capture. In all legislations the married woman is more or less openly considered as the property of the husband, and is very often confounded, absolutely confounded, with things possessed. To use her, therefore, without the authority of her owner, is a theft; and human societies have never been tender to thieves. Nearly everywhere theft has been considered a crime much more grave than murder. But adultery is not a common theft. An object, an inert possession, are passive things; their owner may well punish the thief who has taken them, but him only. In adultery, the object of the larceny, the wife, is a sentient and thinking being—that is to say, an accomplice in the attempt on her husband's property in her own person." (*The Evolution of Marriage and of the Family*, London, 1904, p. 208; being vol. xiii, of the *Contemporary Science Series*). In the Code of Hammurabi adultery and seduction are considered as theft, and theft, as a rule, is punished, in that code, by death.

[1](1) Comp. Dr. Haupt's pamphlet entitled: *Bibles within the Bible, or the Origin of the Five Books of Moses*; p. vi. Some critics prefer the use of Ja, Jb, Jc, etc., Pa, Pb, etc., instead of J1, 2, 3, etc. Dillmann uses the symbol A for the priestly document, B, for the Elohistic, and C, for the Yahwistic. By Delitzsch the Priests' code is expressed by the letter Q. By some critics the multiplication of the number of redactors and editors for each document is carried to an almost ridiculous extent.

J stands for the *Judæan* or *Yahwistic* Document, which was subsequently edited and amplified by several redactors, such as J¹, J², J³, etc.

E stands for the *Ephraimitic* or *Elohistic* Document, and as in the case of J, we have also E¹ and E², etc.

JE stands for the combined documents J and E.

D stands for the Book of *Deuteronomy*.

JED stands for the combined documents J, E and D.

H stands for the *Law of Holiness*.

P stands for the *Priestly Document*, hence also P¹, P², P³, etc.

JEDP stands for the combination of all the Pentateuchal documents with their various editions.

The following diagram indicates the dates and gradual formation of our present Pentateuch:


J¹ (VIII–IX cent. B. C.)
J² (VIII cent. B. C.)
J³ (VII cent. B. C.)
J
E¹ (VII cent. B. C.)
E² (VII cent. B. C.)
E
JE (about 650 B. C.)
D (bet. 620-700 B. C.)
JED (about 550-600 B. C.
H (570-590 B. C.)
P¹, P², P³, bet. 400-500 B. C.
JEDHP—Pentateuch
(about 400-440 B. C.)

Origin, Date and Authorship of the Deuteronomic Legislation.

A comparative study of the legislation of Deuteronomy and the other three Hebrew codes shows unmistakably that Deuteronomy is in many respects an expansion of the Book of the Covenant. It is evident from the many verbal parallelisms, and from the fact that nearly the whole ground covered by the Book of the Covenant, with one exception (Exodus xxi, 18-xxii, 16), is included in that of Deuteronomy: the latter being a priestly but popular expansion, with certain modifications, allowances, and parenetic comments, of the older and comparatively archaic legislation of the Book of the Covenant.[1] Deuteronomy is also, in many cases, parallel with the Law of Holiness; but the parallelisms are less systematic and complete than those with the Book of the Covenant. The great contrast, however, between Deuteronomy and the Law of Holiness is that, even where the substance is similar, the expression is nearly always different, as against the many verbal coincidences found between Deuteronomy and the Book of the Covenant. Hence the parallel laws in D and H may have had a common oral source, but no literary dependence can be detected.[2] The parallelism between Deuteronomy and the legislation of the Priests' Code is still less frequent and less noticeable than in the case of the Law of Holiness. There are, in fact, between the two legislations great and irreconcilable discrepancies which prove conclusively that the two codes are entirely different in aim, and that the redactor of Deuteronomy cannot have possibly known or, still less, utilized any of the material found in the legislation of the Priests' Code.[3] Several of the religious and ceremonial regulations are, of course, common to all of the four codes of Hebrew legislation, but even these common laws when incorporated in Deuteronomy, are remodeled and fashioned after the Book of the Covenant and not after the Priests' Code. So that even supposing that the legislation of the Priests' Code existed at the times when Deuteronomy was written, "it is clear," as Driver remarks, "that the writer did not attach any great importance to it, or treat it practically as one of his sources. Had he so treated it, and especially if it had possessed in his eyes a recognized authority and importance, it is incredible that his references to it should not have been more systematic and exact. As it is, he moves on, without displaying the smallest concern or regard for the system of P; such institutions of P as he refers to are mentioned almost incidentally, without any sense of the significance attaching to them in the system of which they form part; and many of P's most characteristic and fundamental institutions, if not contradicted in Deuteronomy, are simply ignored by it. There can be no doubt that the author of Deuteronomy was acquainted with priestly laws and institutions; but the nature of his allusions shows that his knowledge of them was derived, not from the systematic exposition of them found in the Priests' Code, but from his own practical acquaintance with the form in which they were operative in Israel in his own day; and this in many particulars differed materially from the regulations laid down in the Priests' Code."[1] Hence, it is certain (1) that at the time when Deuteronomy was composed, the Book of the Covenant must have been long in use, and (2) that the legislation of the Priests' Code either was not yet framed, or at least was not yet combined in a single work with the Book of the Covenant, and was without official standing in Israel.[2]

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[1] A parallelistic synopsis of the four Hebrew legislations found in JE (*Book of the Covenant*), P (the Priests' Code), H (the Laws of Holiness), and D (Deuteronomy) is given in Driver's *Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 73-75, and the same author's *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, pp. iv-vii; cf. Addis, *Documents of the Hexateuch*, vol. ii, 115ff., 119, 122, 123.

[2] Comp., however, the notable exception in Deut. xiv, 3-21, relating to clean and unclean animals, which exhibits a remarkable parallel with Leviticus xi, 2-23. Some critics, however, assign Levit. xi, 2-23, to the Priestly Code. Addis, *Documents of the Hexateuch*, ii, 90ff.

[3] Some of these contradictions and discrepancies are of capital importance in a work pertaining to religious and ceremonial legislation, such as those relating to the position and privileges of the priestly tribe; the "Tent of Meeting"; the distinction between the priests, the sons of Aaron, and the common "Levites"; the Levitical cities; the year of Jubilee; the sacrificial system; the meal-offering, the guilt-offering, and the sin-offering. These topics, which are of fundamental importance, and especially insisted, on in P, are never mentioned in Deuteronomy, while others are either

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incidentally mentioned or passed by in silence. Driver, *Deuteronomy*, xiii; Addis *op. cit.*, ii, p. 38, 62.

[1] *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, xiii, xiv, and *Literature of the Old Testament*, 76-82. The different relation in which Deuteronomy stands to the three codes of JE, H, and P are stated by the same writer as follows: "It is an *expansion* of the laws in JE (Ex. xx, 22-xxiii, 33; xxxiv, 10-26; xiii, 3-16); it is, in several features, *parallel* to the "Law of Holiness"; it contains allusions to laws—not, indeed, always the same as, but—similar to the ceremonial institutions and observances codified in the rest of P. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

[2] The Law of Holiness, at least in substance, dates from a much older time than that of the collector or redactor who first arranged its provisions as we now find them. It has also many points of contact with the Priests' Code, and was certainly known to the prophet Ezechiel, who was probably also acquainted with some at least of the dispositions of the Priests' Code. In some of its features, the Law of Holiness resembles the Book of the Covenant, especially in the moral precepts, while it differs from it chiefly in the greater amount of details, and in dealing with the ceremonial

Another factor in determining the date of Deuteronomy is the scope and standpoint of its author or redactor. The Book of Deuteronomy is chiefly legal, for if we read Deut. iv, 45-xxvi; xxvii, 9, 10; xxviii; xxxi, 9-13 together, we have a connected and consistent legal, religious and ceremonial code.[1] But Deuteronomy is more than a

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rather than with the civil side of the Israelitish community. There is also every reason to believe that the Law of Holiness is not preserved in its original integrity, some topics being treated incompletely, others imperfectly arranged, while instances of frequent repetitions are not wanting. The same considerations apply also, more or less, to the Legislation of the Priests' Code. Hence it is safe to conclude that the redactors or authors of JE, P and D, in compiling their respective legislations, must have utilized independent legal and ceremonial enactments, survivals of ancient usage, or results of religious development.

[1] The unity of the Deuteronomic legislation cannot be seriously contested. Ch. xii-xxvi forms, properly speaking, the Deuteronomic code of laws, ch. v-xi being a hortatory introduction prefixed to the code proper and containing a second edition of the Decalogue, etc. . . . According to Addis, (*Documents of the Hexateuch*, ii, 25); Driver (*op. cit.*, p. 87); Koenig (*Einleitung in das Alt. Testament*, 210); Marti (in Kautzsch's German translation of the Old Testament); Ryle (in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* ad loc.); Steuernagel (in his commentary on Deut.) and many others, chapters v-xi form a part of the original law-book; while according to Kuenen (*Hexateuch*, p. 212), they belong to the same author as xii-xxii, but were composed some years later. Cornill (*Einleitung*, 86), Holzinger (*Einleitung in den Hexateuch*, 275), and Wellhausen (*Prolegomena*, p. 369), believe they form a later addition by a different author. Ch. xxviii, is ascribed by Addis, Driver, Kuenen, Marti, and others to the original Deuteronomic code, while Cornill (*Einleitung*, 21f.), and Wellhausen, (p. 369f.) regard it as a later addition. Chaps. xxix-xxxi are in all probability a later addition, for they differ in style from the main Deuteronomic code, while xxx, 1-10, presupposes the Exile. Ch. xxxii, 1-45, containing the so-called "Song of Moses," is an entirely independent poem, in which there is no indication of Mosaic authorship. It looks back to a period of great national prosperity, reminding the reader of Israel's idolatry and oppression. Furthermore, it has some points of contact with Jeremiah, Ezechiel and Deutero-Isaiah. Comp. Addis, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.; Driver, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Koenig, p. 224; and Kuenen, 256. Cornill and Steuernagel regard it as post-exilic, while Dillmann thinks it was composed about 800 B. C. Comp. however, Lagarde, *Semitica*, vol. i, p. 28; Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, p. 374 (E. trans., p. 352); Kittel, *History of Israel*, i, 83, 187; Cheyne, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 31, 177; G. Moore in *Enc. Biblica*, col. 1089, and the literature quoted here in note 1. The remaining verses of ch. xxxii, i. e., 44-52, are probably Deuteronomic. Ch. xxxiii, containing Moses' blessing is ascribed by Dillmann (p. 415) and Driver (*Deuteronomy*, ad loc.) to the time of Jeroboam I; by Addis, Cornill, Kuenen, Wellhausen and Steuernagel to that of Jeroboam II, while Koenig, a most cautious and conservative scholar, refers it to the period of Judges (*Einleitung*, p. 202). The last chapter (xxxiv), containing an account of Moses' death and burial, can scarcely be considered as Mosaic. Whether the first four chapters of Deuteronomy belonged originally to the main Deuteronomic code, or form a later addition, is quite uncertain, although the majority of modern critics are decidedly in favor of the latter hypothesis. Cf. Klostermann, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1871, p. 253ff.; Wellhausen, *Composition des Hexateuchs*, pp. 191, 193, 195; Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, 12-17; Westphal, *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, ii,

code of laws. The aim of the writer was not only to provide the people with a manual of civil, religious and ceremonial institutions, but mainly to inculcate in the Hebrew people an absolute devotion to Yahweh, and to warn them against the dangers of idolatry. Hence he performs the function of preacher quite as much as that of lawgiver. The whole aim of Deuteronomy is thus centred in the teachings: "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh thy God is one Yahweh" and "Thou shalt love Yahweh thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength." And in order to enforce this love, the Deuteronomic legislation is given as a covenant between Yahweh and Israel. In his scathing denunciation of idolatry his aim is to persuade the people to an absolute and uncompromising repudiation of all false gods. Yahweh is one, and He is the only God of Israel. Israel is the chosen people, and the only people chosen by Yahweh. He loves Israel; He has blessed them through their forefathers; He delivered them from Egypt, led them safely through the desert, and, finally, gave them the promised land. He has always been, He is, and He shall always be their only God, father, deliverer, benefactor, and defender. Consequently, Israel must love, adore, and worship Him alone; and all the religious and ceremonial rites and institutions inculcated in this document tend to effect this close union between Yahweh and Israel. Hence the spirituality of the moral and religious teaching of Deuteronomy in this connection is almost transcendental, and is nowhere paralleled in any of the other books of the Old Testament. Another characteristic feature of Deuteronomy is its proclamation of the unity of sanctuary, i. e., of only one legitimate place of public worship; the local shrines, high places, and sacred localities, which were seats of either unspiritual, or of actually heathen worships, are to be not merely reformed, but absolutely abolished. Indeed, local shrines, even though dedicated to Yahweh, were not allowed to exist; and all this is prescribed simply to accomplish the one supreme end—the monotheism of Israel.[1] The third characteristic feature of the

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66-68, 80-90; Koenig, *Einleitung*, 212ff.; Cornill, *Einleitung*, § 9, 5; Addis, *op. cit.*, and Driver, *Deuteronomy*, lxvii ff. Van Hoonacker, however, argues to the contrary. Cf. his interesting study *L'origine des quatre premiers chapitres du Deuteronome*, Louvain, 1889, (published originally in three articles in *Le Museon*, 1888-9 vol. vii, pp. 464-482, viii, 67-85, and 141-149). For a full discussion of both theories cf. Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. lxviii-lxxii.

[1] It is to the ingenuity and critical acumen of Wellhausen that we owe the establishing of this peculiarity of the Deuteronomic legislation concerning the centralization of worship and the unity of the sanctuary, a theory which places the literary criticism of the Bible at the service of historical criticism. A. van Hoonacker, the

Deuteronomic legislation is the fact that it confirms the tribe of Levi in its possession of the priestly rights. This tribe alone is to supply ministers for the central sanctuary.

The Deuteronomic legislation is therefore a continuation and reaffirmation of the religious and moral teachings of the great prophets of the ninth and eighth centuries B. C., such as Hosea, Amos, Isaiah and others. Its moral and religious teachings are based on those already laid down by the prophets, who had preached the same doctrine, only in a more eloquent manner, long before the author of Dt. The same standards of morality, sanctity, love, justice and duty appear in the prophets and in Dt., and also the same impassioned and sustained protest against idolatry and heathenism. *Real* and *absolute* monotheism was first firmly established in Israel by the prophets, and their teachings are still more formally and explicitly inculcated by Deuteronomy. Hence the centralization of worship was but a necessary consequence of this crystallized monotheism. In one particular, however, Deuteronomy differs somewhat from the prophets, viz., it has greater sympathy with priests and priestly institutions. This is easily explained by the great changes effected by the priestly reformation which took place between the time of Hosea and that of Deuteronomy.

It is generally admitted that the difference of style between the Book of Deuteronomy and that of the other three Hebrew codes is sufficiently remarkable to exclude any possibility of common authorship. It is also evident that the legislation of Dt. frequently conflicts with that of the other three codes, thus rendering any community

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distinguished Catholic scholar and biblical critic of Louvain, in a masterly treatise, entitled *Le lieu du culte dans la législation rituelle des Hebreux*, Louvain, 1894, sought to minimize the value of Wellhausen's theory of the unity of the sanctuary as a Deuteronomic innovation, by showing that the laws of the Book of the Covenant also recognize only one legitimate public sanctuary. Van Hoonacker's criticism, keen and scientific though it is, does not affect Wellhausen's thesis as a whole. His objections are interesting, but not sufficiently conclusive to offset Wellhausen's main position. A similar attack on Wellhausen's theory was made by Dr. W. L. Baxter, in his book *Sanctuary and Sacrifice, a Reply to Wellhausen*, London, 1896, a work of considerable value, but of an apologetic character and pervaded by theological preoccupations. (Cf. Prof. Peake's criticism of Dr. Baxter's book and the latter's reply in the *Expository Times*, vol. vii, pp. 400-5; 559-564; vol. viii, p. 47). Of a more scientific character are Dr. H. A. Poel's Dissertation, *Examen critique de l'Histoire du Sanctuaire de l'Arche*, Louvain, 1897; and Wilhelm Moeller's recent book *Are the Critics Right? Historical and Critical Considerations Against the Graf–Wellhausen Hypothesis* (Eng. trans., New York, 1904). Comp. also W. W. Martin, *The Tora of Moses*, New York, 1902.

of origin highly improbable. Furthermore, in Dt. there occur certain expressions, such as "*beyond Jordan,*" for *Eastern Palestine,* which cannot have been written in the Mosaic age, for they imply that the author was resident in Western Palestine. The legislation of Dt., moreover, and also of P and H, treat of many things which must have been entirely beyond the civil or ceremonial requirements of the wandering Hebrew tribes of the time of Moses. We may therefore safely conclude from all of these considerations that these three codes are not the product of any one writer, and certainly not of a writer as ancient as Moses.

As for the date of the "Book of Holiness," Cornill places it in the second half of the Exile;[1] Driver, shortly before the Exile;[2] Holzinger, in Babylonia, immediately after the Exile;[3] Kautzsch, about 561 B. C.;[4] and Kuenen, towards the end of the Exile.[5] The date of the "Priests' Code" is also variously estimated. Addis believes that it was written about the time of Ezra;[6] Cornill, a little before 458 B. C.;[7] Driver, at the time of the Babylonian captivity (approximately);[8] Holzinger, not later than the beginning of the fifth century B. C., it being united with H in Babylonia before 458 without any co-operation on the part of Ezra;[9] Kautzsch, about 500 B. C.;[10] and Kuenen, between 500 and 475 B. C.[11]

To sum up the results of our investigation thus far: the Book of Deuteronomy cannot have been the product of the same age as the Law of Holiness and the Priests' Code; it shows no literary and historico-religious dependence on either H or P; and, therefore, since all scholars agree that H and P cannot be earlier that the Babylonian Captivity, nor later than the time of Ezra, i. e., between the fifth and sixth centuries B. C., it follows that Deuteronomy must be earlier than the sixth century B. C. But we must try to assign it to a more definite period.

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[1] *Einleitung in das Alte Testament,* (1891, § 6, 4th ed., 1897).

[2] *Literature of the Old Testament,* pp. 138, 143, and *Leviticus,* by the same author in Dr. Haupt's *Polychrome Bible.*

[3] *Einleitung in den Hexateuch,* p. 447ff.

[4] In his German translation of the Old Testament, and *Literature of the Old Testament.*

[5] *Hexateuch,* p. 276.

[6] *Documents of the Hexateuch,* i, p. lxxxiii.

[7] *Einleitung . . .* loc. cit.

[8] *Literature of the Old Testament,* p. 129.

[9] *Einleitung in den Hexateuch,* p. 442.

[10] *Op. cit.,* loc. cit.

[11] *Hexateuch,* p. 303.

In Exodus xx, 24, we find that at the time of Moses, or, rather, of the redactor of the Book of the Covenant, which is undoubtedly the oldest law-book of Israel, altars and shrines could be built and sacrifices offered in any part of the land. This practice we find in constant use in Israel during the time of Moses, Joshua the Judges, and as late as the age of Solomon, or even later. Nor was it merely tolerated; it had the sanction of undisturbed and venerable usage.[1] But in Deuteronomy, as we have seen, this is formally condemned and abrogated. Hence the legislation of Dt. must have originated at a date considerably later than the age of Moses or of the early monarchy. During the reign of Solomon and his successors down to the eighth or ninth century B. C., a gradual tendency to centralize Israelitish worship in one great sanctuary was steadily developing. The local shrines and altars were at first tolerated, but the custom of central worship grew until by the time of Manasseh and Josiah it became a law; and it was at this time that the author of Dt. introduced his elaborate legislation restricting public worship to a single temple. Hence the Deuteronomic legislation cannot be earlier than the seventh or the close of the eighth century B. C.

Though the date of the composition of the book leaves such a wide margin for conjecture, there can be little hesitancy about one point, viz., that it cannot be later than the 18th year of King Josiah (621 B. C.), the year in which Deuteronomy was discovered by the High Priest Hilkiah in the Temple at Jerusalem, as we are told in II Kings xxii, 8ff. That the "Book of the Law," found by Hilkiah, was in reality the Code of Deuteronomy, is beyond doubt, as is shown by the fact that the reformation carried out by Josiah followed step by step along the lines laid down in Deuteronomy. Wellhausen and many other critics are of opinion that the date of the discovery of the book was also the date of its composition. According to this theory, the finding of the "Book of the Law," by Hilkiah, was part of a plan devised by him, probably with the co-operation of King Josiah, to overcome any opposition to the reforms by presenting them as forgotten commands of Moses. How much truth there is in this it is difficult to say. This much, however, is certain—that the legislation of Dt., in its present form, cannot be earlier than the seventh or eighth century B. C., nor later than 621 B. C.[1]

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[1] Cf. I. Sam. ix, 12-14; x, 3-5; and I Kings xviii, 30.

The comparatively late date of Deuteronomy, however, does not necessarily imply that its entire civil, religious and ceremonial legislation is of such late origin. On the contrary, most critics are agreed that a comparative study of the legislation of Deuteronomy and the other three Hebrew codes shows unmistakably that many of the laws and regulations found in them are a repetition of the legislation of the Book of the Covenant, which is, as we shall see, *substantially* Mosaic. Many others are based on usages and traditions which were very probably introduced or sanctioned by Moses himself and his immediate successors, especially among the priests, who were the custodians and interpreters of the traditional and Mosaic institutions of Israel. Hence the true Mosaic legislation cannot be said to be limited to the Book of the Covenant, that is to say, it is wrong to infer from their late date that the Priests' Code, the Law of Holiness, and Deuteronomy contain an entirely non-Mosaic legislation. The date of the *redaction* of the laws in the four Hebrew legislations must be carefully distinguished from the date of the laws themselves. The laws embody usages, many of which are doubtless, in their origin, of great antiquity, though they may have been modified and developed in various ways in the course of time. The different compilers or redactors did little more than reduce to a permanent form the legal and ceremonial traditions which had long been current in priestly circles.[1]

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[1] The social and political organization of Israel, as depicted in Dt. is so far advanced over that represented in the Book of the Covenant that we are compelled to allow a difference of several centuries for an evolution of such an extent. In some sections of Deuteronomy, such as xvii, 14-20, a reminiscence of the monarchy of Solomon is quite discernible. There are other facts which go to show that Deut. was not written before the 7th Cent. B. C. (Cf. *Encycl. Bibl.*, col. 1085). Thus the idolatrous worship of the "*Host of Heaven*" (iv, 19; xvii, 3), was an Assyrian cult—frequently condemned by the Prophets of the seventh century (Jer, viii, 8; xix, 13; xxxii, 29; Zeph. i, 5, etc.), but not mentioned by any earlier biblical writer; it was probably introduced into Israel by Manasseh, during whose reign Assyrian influence was at its height in Judah. The same holds good of the sacrifice of children, "*sending them through the fire*" to the King-God (Dt. xviii, 10; xii, 31). To these evidences we must also add the significant fact that while the earlier prophets, such as Amos, Hosea and the Proto-Isaiah, show no knowledge of Deut., later prophets, such as Ezechiel, and especially Jeremiah, are, on the contrary, plentifully saturated with its doctrine and legislation. Furthermore, the theological standard of our author is so elevated and sublime that it necessarily presupposes an age of theological speculation. The signs for distinguishing the true from the false prophet, given in Dt. xviii, 20-22, give indication of an age in which the true prophets found themselves in conflict with numerous and influential false prophets—which was a characteristic of the 8th and 7th century B. C. In short, as Driver remarks, "As soon as Dt. is recognized as a work of the 7th cent. B. C., the phenomena which were so perplexing, upon the hypothesis of its Mosaic authorship, (or even of any authorship earlier than the 8th cent.), are at once readily explicable." (*Commentary on Deuteronomy*, p. 48). Comp. also G. Moore, in *Encycl. Biblica* (sub voce) and the articles *Deuteronomy* and *Law* (*in the Old Testament*), in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*. For a spirited and interesting appreciation and criticism of the principal problems connected with Deuteronomy (as exposed by Driver, in his *Lit. of the Old Testament*) comp. Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, London, 1893, pp. 265-286, where the author's proclivity to the most radical conclusions of modern biblical criticism is at its zenith.

The Book of the Covenant (Exodus xx-xxiii.)

The Book of the Covenant is undoubtedly the oldest extant Hebrew code of laws. Leaving aside the Decalogue, which contains a concise but comprehensive summary of the fundamental social and religious duties of the Israelite,[2] the Code, properly speaking, contains two elements, the *"Words"* or *"Commands,"* and the *"Judgments."*[1] These latter, which relate to the civil and criminal law, are comprised in xxi, 1-xxii, 17; 25-27, and are all expressed hypothetically; the "Words" or "Commands," which consist chiefly of positive injunctions of moral or ceremonial law, expressed in an imperative form, such as *"thou shalt,"* and *"thou shalt not"* are contained in xx, 23, 26; xxii, 18-24, 28-31, and xxi i, 1-19. Besides these "Words" and "Judgments" we occasionally find in these sections some parenetic additions and comments, which are undoubtedly of later date and by different hands while in xxxiv, 10-26, called by some "the Little Book of the Covenant" we have a repetition of the ceremonial institutions already prescribed in xxiii, 10-19. The characteristics of the Code and the stage of society for which it was designed are well described by the late W. Robertson Smith. "The society contemplated in this legislation is of very simple structure. The basis of life is agricultural. Cattle and agricultural produce are the elements of wealth, and the laws of property deal almost exclusively with them. The principles of civil and criminal justice are those still current among the Arabs of the desert. They are two in number, retaliation and pecuniary compensation. Murder is dealt with by the law of blood revenge, but the innocent manslayer may seek asylum at God's altar. With murder are ranked manstealing, offences against parents, and witchcraft. Other injuries are occasions of self-help or of private suits to be adjusted at the sanctuary. Personal injuries fall under the law of retaliation, just as murder does. Blow for blow is still the law of the Arabs, and in Canaan, no doubt, as in the desert, the retaliation was usually sought in the way of self-help. The principle of retaliation is conceived as legitimate vengeance (xxi, 20, 21). Except in this form there is no punishment, but only compensation, which in some cases is at the will of the injured party (who has the alternative of direct revenge), but in general is directed by law.

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[1] Driver, *The Book of Leviticus* in Dr. Haupt's *Sacred Books of the Old Testament*, New York, 1898, p. 57. The same distinguished scholar aptly remarks that "among the enactments peculiar to Deuteronomy, which tradition, as it seems, ascribed to a later period of the legislator's life, there are many which likewise may well have formed part of it. It is further in analogy with ancient custom to suppose that some form of *priesthood* would be established by Moses; that this priesthood would also inherit from their founder some traditionary lore (beyond what is contained in Exod. xx-xxiii) on matters of ceremonial observance" (*Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 153). *Mutatis mutandis*, the same considerations may be profitably applied to the Law of Holiness, and the Priests' Code.

[2] Some modern critics distinguish two distinct Decalogues in Exodus: *the Older Decalogue*, found in Exodus xxxiv, 12-26, and consisting of ten regulations, and the *Younger Decalogue*, found in two forms, viz., Exodus xx (belonging to E^1 or more probably to E^2), and Deut. v, (belonging to the Deuteronomical source). Cf. Wellhausen, *Composition der Hexateuch*, p. 331ff.; Budde. *Zeitschrift fur Alte Testamentliche Wissenschaft*, vol. xi, p. 216ff.; Bacon, *Triple Tradition of the Exodus*, 139-158; Stade, *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i, p. 510; Holzinger, *Commentary on Exodus*, p. 119f; *Deuteronomium*, p. 30ff; Baentsch, *Exodus-Leviticus-Numeri*, p. xlvi; Moore and Gray in Cheyne's *Encyc. Biblica*, col. 1446f. and 2733f. respectively; and Harper, *Commentary on Amos and Hosea*, (*International Critical Commentary*), p. vliii. Other scholars, however, think that the so-called *Older Decalogue* (Exod. xxxiv, 12-26), although it can be arranged in the form of ten regulations, has only the *appearance* of a decalogue, being simply a set of ceremonial prescriptions, parallel to some of those found in the Book of the Covenant. (Cf. Kautzsch's article "*Religion of Israel.*" in the *Extra Volume* of Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, p. 633). Many scholars hold that the so-called *Younger Decalogue*, with which we are all well acquainted, is not an original constituent of the E document, but belongs to a Judaean recension of E. It is assigned by Kuenen, Wellhausen, Baentsch, W. R. Smith, Marti, Addis and others to the seventh century, and by Holzinger, Dillmann, Driver and others to the second or first half of the eighth century. Cf. Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, 2d ed. 1897, appendix iii, v, and ix, and Harper, *Commentary on Amos and Hosea*, pp. lviii-lxiv, with the full bibliographical references on the subject. On the Deuteronomic version of the Decalogue cf. Driver, *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, p. 84ff.

"Degrading punishment, as imprisonment or the bastinado, are unknown, and loss of liberty is inflicted only on the thief who cannot pay a fine. The slave retains definite rights. He recovers his freedom after seven years, unless he prefers to remain a bondsman, and to seal his determination by a symbolical act at the door of the sanctuary.

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[1] On the Hebrew terms for *"law," "ordinance," "judgment,"* etc., cf. Briggs, *op. cit.*, p. 242ff., and especially Driver, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible,* vol. iii, pp. 64-67, in connection with the same words in the *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon*, edited by Profs. Brown, Driver and Briggs, (11 parts are already published).

His right of blood-revenge against his master is limited, and instead of the *lex talionis*, for minor injuries he can claim his liberty. Women do not enjoy full social equality with men. Women slaves were slaves for life, but were usually married to members of the family or servants of the household. The daughter was her father's property, who received a price for surrendering her to a husband; and so a daughter's dishonor is compensated by law as a pecuniary loss to her father. The Israelites directly contemplated in these laws are evidently men of independent bearing and personal dignity, such as are still found in secluded parts of the Semitic world under a half-patriarchal constitution of society where every freeman is a small landholder. But there is no strong central authority. The tribunal of the sanctuary is arbiter, not executive. No man is secure without his own aid, and the widow or orphan looks for help, not to man, but to Jehovah Himself. But if the executive is weak, a strict regard for justice is inculcated. Jehovah is behind the law, and He will vindicate the right. He requires of Israel humanity as well as justice. The Ger, or stranger living under the protection of a family or community, has no legal status, but he must not be oppressed. The Sabbath is enforced as an ordinance of humanity, and to the same end the produce of every field or vineyard must be left to the poor one year in seven. The precepts of religious worship are simple. He who sacrifices to any God but Jehovah falls under the ban. The only ordinance of ceremonial sanctity is to abstain from the flesh of animals torn by wild beasts. The sacred dues are the firstlings and first fruits; the former must be presented at the sanctuary on the eighth day. This, of course, presupposes a plurality of sanctuaries, and in fact Exodus xx, 24, 25, explains that an altar of stone may be built, and Jehovah acceptably approached, in every place where He sets a memorial of His name. The stated occasions of sacrifice are the feasts of unleavened bread, in commemoration of the exodus, the feast of harvest, and that of ingathering. These feasts mark the cycle of the agricultural year, and at them every male must present his homage before Jehovah. The essential points of sacrificial ritual are abstinence from leaven in connection with the blood of the sacrifice, and the rule that the fat must be burnt the same night."[1]

The Book of Exodus is a logical and chronological continuation of the Book of Genesis, consisting chiefly of historical, legal and religious material, derived from three different sources: the *Priestly*, the *Yahwistic* and the *Elohistic*. The characteristics of these three sources are the same as in Genesis and in the Hexateuch in general, and the method of their amalgamation into one consecutive narrative is throughout the same. In Exodus i-iii, E is the chief source; iv, 1-16 ff. is mainly Yahwistic, as also are chapters v and vi. The following chapters, vii-xx, are an amalgamation of J, E and P, with many editorial comments and additions. The section xx-xxiii, embodying the "Book of the Covenant" is certainly traversed by many glosses, (such as xii, 20b, 21, 23, 24b, 30; xxiii, 9b, 13, etc) and editorial additions. It is also certain that the order of the various laws and statutes has been modified especially in ch. xxi, 37 ff. As it stands, ch xxi, 1, is without any antecedents in xx, and this (cf. vv. 18-26) is composed of very disparate elements The Decalogue (xx, 2-17) is generally held to have been incorporated into E from an older source. Addis thinks that in its written form it cannot be earlier than the eighth century B. C It is generally held that the Book of the Covenant proper is earlier than either E or J, but that it was first incorporated into E, or possibly by the *Redactor* of J and E, (i. e., RJE.) Ch. xxxiv, 1-28, which is a code parallel to the Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant, belongs to E or possibly to the Redactor of JE.[1] As to its authorship, the Book of the Covenant is assigned by Koenig to JE; by Dillmann to J; by Budde to E; and by Kuenen and Cornill to E[2]. In 1876 Wellhausen assigned it to J, but Kuenen submitted Wellhausen's theory to a minute criticism to show that the work must be assigned not to J, but to E Kuenen's criticism forced Wellhausen, in 1889, (Comp. *Composition d. Hexateuch*, p. 327) to retract his opinion in favor of that of Kuenen, which seems, nowadays, to be the most generally accepted one. Driver, in the early editions of his classical book *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 29 ff., assigned it to J, probably influenced by Wellhausen's views, but in later editions of the same work,[1] and in his Commentary on Deuteronomy[2] and other articles and contributions,[3] he assigns it, although with some hesitation, to E.[4] But the criteria for distinguishing, in any accurate way, the various enactments and laws of the Book of the Covenant according to their Yahwistic and Elohistic elements, are so meagre, that it is safer to refer to it as JE, a style which is generally adopted by modern critics.

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[1] *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, 2d ed., pp. 340-342.

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[1] The relative date of J, or so-called *Jehovistic*, or, better, *Judaean Prophetic Document*, is given as 850-750 B. C. by Addis (*Documents of the Hexateuch*, i, lxxxii); by Cornill, 850-700 (*Einleitung* . . . p. 78); by Driver, the earlier centuries of the monarchy (*Lit. of the Old Testament*, p. 118); by Kautzsch, 850; by Koenig, after David (*Einleitung*, p. 206); by Kuenen, 800-650; and by Wellhausen, (*History of Israel*, p. 13), the Assyrian period. That of E, i. e., *Elohistic*, or better, *Ephraimitic Prophetic Document*, is given as 850-750 B.C. by Addis, (*op. cit.*, vol. i, p. lxxxii); by Cornill, 750-650 B. C.; by Driver, (*op. cit,*), as that of the early centuries of the monarchy; by Kautzsch, as 775 B.C.; by Koenig, (*Einleitung*, p. 205), the period of the Judges; by Kuenen, (*Hexateuch*, p. 248), 750-650 B. C.; and by Wellhausen, the Assyrian period. The date of the combination of J and E together into one Prophetic Document is given as 650-621 by Cornill; about the eighth century by Driver; about 650, by Kautzsch; about the close of the seventh, or beginning of the sixth century B. C. by Kuenen; and still later, by Wellhausen. Critics like Dillmann, Delitzsch, Kittel and others, who represent the comparatively conservative school, are in favor of the earliest of these dates, or even of dates somewhat more remote.

The date of the Book of the Covenant is variously fixed by modern scholars. Reuss was of the opinion that it was the product of the legal reforms of the reign of Jehosaphat, and consequently of the ninth century B. C.[5] Stade thinks that the Israelitish civilization of the Mosaic age could not possibly have produced such a code as the Book of the Covenant, so he refers it to the reign of Manasseh, i. e., about 690 B. C.[6] Wildeboer assigns it to the Northern Kingdom, and holds the priesthood of Bethel responsible for its promulgation;[7] Cornill considers the reign of David as the earliest assignable date;[8] Wellhausen thinks that the people for whom the legislation of the Book of the Covenant was intended were far more advanced than the Hebrew people of the Mosaic age. He supports his assertion by referring to Exodus xxi, 32, 35, where mention is made of silver and of the price of an ox, etc.;[9] Driver simply suggests that the ordinances contained in the code must have existed in *written shape* before they were incorporated into E;[1] Koenig regards it as substantially Mosaic.[2]

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[1] Page 31, and *passim*.

[2] Page xxxvii, and *passim*.

[3] Cf. article *Law (in the Old Testament)*, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*.

[4] Cf. Bacon, *Triple Tradition of the Exodus*, 1894, p. 110 (in note), according to whom the attribution of the Code of the Covenant to J instead of E by Driver and Baentsch is either an oversight, or the consequence of too great dependence on Wellhausen. On the attribution of Exodus xx-xxiii to E, cf. Dillmann, *Exodus*, 220; Juelicher, *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1882, p. 205f.; Budde, *Zeitschrift für Alte Testamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1891, p. 215; Wellhausen, *Composition des Hexateuchs*, p. 327; Bacon, *Triple Tradition* . . . p. 110f.; and Addis, *Documents of the Hexateuch*, vol. i, p. 136-138 (in note). As this last author rightly argues, the theory of the Jahwistic origin of the Book of the Covenant as well as of the Decalogue "*may be confidently dismissed.*"

[5] *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften der Alt. Testament*, § 200.

[6] *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i. p. 638.

[7] *Die Literature des Alt. Testament*, §§ 7, 15.

[8] *Einleitung* . . . p. 69.

[9] *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, p. 400.

Some radical critics, however, argue that the Book of the Covenant has no connection, either literary or historical, with Moses and his age, but that its contents appeared so important to the author or redactor of Exodus that he represented it as having been dictated to Moses on Mount Sinai by Yahweh Himself.[3] This last hypothesis, considered in itself, has some support in the fact that precedents are not lacking in the religious literatures of antiquity. To attribute religious and literary productions of later generations to some well known and respected prophet, reformer, and legislator of the past was a not uncommon device. But in the case of Exodus xx-xxiii, the hypothesis seems to us to be at least highly improbable, if not altogether inadmissible. There is every reason to believe that the legislation of the Book of the Covenant, in its essential features was given by Moses himself to Israel on entering Canaan, or, as Kuenen suggests, just before the crossing of the Jordan.[4] That the other three Pentateuchal codes (P, H, and D), although considerably later than Moses, also contain a certain stratum of Mosaic legislation cannot be seriously questioned.[1] Moses, by reason of his authority and the special needs of his times, must have enacted more social, religious, and ceremonial laws than those actually found in the Book of the Covenant. He would have been singularly unfitted for his task as champion, deliverer, and organizer of his people had he not realized the necessity of promulgating certain elementary laws, imperfect perhaps and incomplete, but at least sufficient for the guidance and governance of the youthful and aspiring nation just entering on the scene of its future greatness.

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[1] *Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 122.

[2] *Einleitung* . . . p. 186ff.

[3] Ex. gr., Baentsch, according to whom, there is no trace of a Mosaic kernel in the Book of the Covenant, nor of its owing anything to the attempt to adapt Mosaic ordinances to a later time. Cf. Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, p. 262 (in note). In Exodus xxiv, 7, the writer (be he Moses, or JE, or E^1 or E^2), tells us explicitly "And he [Moses] took the Book of the Covenant and read it in the audience of the people: and they said, All that Jahweh hath spoken will we do, and be obedient." All critics agree that the book referred to in this passage is the Book of the Covenant. Nevertheless they seem to be equally confident in maintaining that the tradition in regard to the compiler and date of the Book of the Covenant embodied in the statement of Exodus xxiv, 7, is misleading. This assertion, of course, is not impossible in the abstract, but it cannot be sustained or substantiated. We will not go as far as to say that "When scholars, equally learned and with equal critical acumen, let the date of a piece of literature range between the reigns of David and Manasseh, we may be pardoned if we assume that they do not know its date, and are indulging in the pastime of solving a puzzle or riddle." Kelso, *The Code of Hammurabi and the Book of the Covenant*, in *Princeton Theological Review*, 1905, p. 401). Critics may have their reasons for their assertions but the most important thing for us is not so much to know the exact date of the redaction of the Book of the Covenant as to decide whether or not the code of laws embodied in it can claim a Mosaic origin, and if modern cirtics do not seem to agree as to the exact date of the redaction of the Code in question, ranging between the tenth and eighth centuries B. C., they are more or less unanimous, *exceptis excipiendis*, in regarding it as substantially Mosaic.

[4] Cf. *Encyclopædia Biblica*, col. 1449.

This *a priori* consideration, however, should not be pushed too far; for after all, suppositions, no matter how just and reasonable, must yield to facts, which are the final test of every hypothesis. And even granting a Mosaic element in the three later Hebrew legislations, it still remains most difficult to decide just how much of the Pentateuchal legislation is Mosaic in origin and spirit. Accordingly, we are not warranted in assuming as certain or even as probable that the Priests' Code, the Law of Holiness or, still less, the Code of Deuteronomy, reflects in any way the actual legal institutions of the Mosaic age, except in the particular cases in which they clearly reproduce or amplify the legislation of the Covenant, as it was handed down by Moses to the elders of the tribes; or when internal evidences, supported by the analogy of other Semitic legislations, and in the light of the social and religious history of the Hebrews of the Mosaic age, are in favor of the probability of their antiquity.

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[1] The following remarks of Prof. W. H. Bennett, in regard to the Mosaic elements and material in the Pentateuchal legislation and in the Pentateuch in general, deserve to be quoted: "It seems extremely probable, if not certain, that the earlier sources (utilized by D, P, J, and E in compiling their Priestly, Jahwistic Elohistic and Deuteronomic narratives and legislations) contained matter which originated with, or received the sanction of Moses. Even where a law as it stands was clearly addressed to the Israelites of the Monarchy, it may be an adaptation or translation, so to speak, of a Mosaic law to suit the needs of later times, an application of a principle laid down originally by Moses. A Mosaic element in the Pentateuch is as probable as Davidic poems in the Psalter; but in both cases we have no criteria which enable us to identify this element with any definiteness or certainty. Many Israelites, at certain periods, regarded Moses much as we Christians regard Christ, as the supreme authority for religious truth. All that was implied by or deduced from the teaching of Moses was held to be Mosaic, just as we call all that is implied by or deduced from the teaching of Christ Christian. The usage is natural and justifiable in both cases. Moses' position in Israelite religion was, of course, only similar, and not strictly parallel to the relation of Christ to Christianity; yet the Pentateuch is Mosaic as the final product of a process which owed its first impulse, its direction and character to Moses." (*Biblical Introduction—Old Testament*, London, New York, 1899, p. 59.)

The most superficial examination of the Book of the Covenant shows furthermore, that its legislation was not the introduction of a new law. The book is simply a setting down in writing of long current social and legal practices.[1] This is supported by the fact that in it there is no trace of great legal principles, or of an attempt to exhibit an abstract system of law, with a view to its application to concrete cases, as in the case of the Code of Hammurabi, and in some parts of the later Hebrew legislations. The Book of the Covenant is merely "*a collection of individual legal decisions*" based, naturally, on traditional usage.[2] These decisions were evidently designed to regulate the life of a simple agricultural community (as is shown by the frequent mention of the ox, ass, and sheep); and, although the nature of the contents shows a certain advance in civilization, it is nevertheless quite primitive and archaic, as is shown by the predominance of the *lex talionis*[3] the conception of God as the immediate source of judgment,[4] the right of asylum,[5] the first fruits and firstlings,[6] the observance of the sacred seasons,[7] etc. . . . Hence the Book of the Covenant is not, properly speaking, a code of laws, but simply a collection of social and religious customs, which acquired in the course of time a certain binding character, but in which the idea of executive power and authority is entirely unknown.

Gabriel Oussani.

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[1] *E. B.*, col. 2716, and Driver, *L. O. T.*, p 35.

[2] *E. B.*, loc. cit.

[3] xxi, 18 ff., and 23-25.

[4] xxi, 6 ff.; xxii., 8-9

[5] xxi, 13 f.

[6] xxii, 29 ff; xxiii., 19.

[7] xxiii., 10-17.

STUDIES ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

Francis E. Gigot

IV. The Early Preaching of Jesus in Galilee

Literary Analysis of Mk. i, 14, 15; *Mt. iv,* 12-17; *Lk. iv,* 14, 15.

The narrative of the temptation which was examined in our last Study brings to a close the Synoptic account of the events preparatory to Our Lord's ministry. These events, as we have seen, are exactly the same in our first three Gospels, viz.: the preaching of John the Baptist, and the baptism and temptation of Jesus. And they are told with such literary resemblances and differences as clearly to imply that the three evangelical narratives stand in close relation to one another. In fact, our examination of those literary features led us at the end of each Study to admit (1) that St. Mark is primitive in comparison to the other two Synoptics; (2) that St. Matthew depends on St. Mark; and (3) that St. Luke has utilized both St. Matthew's and St. Mark's narratives. It led us also to consider Mk's description of those events as decidedly more objective than the parallel record in either Mt. or Lk. whose special apologetical purpose accounts for their chief differences from Mk. and from each other.

Conclusions such as these in reference to the evangelical records of the events preparatory to Our Lord's ministry, go far, as can be easily realized, towards making us expect that similar views should be held in regard to the Synoptic accounts of the public ministry itself. It is likely indeed, that in telling the events which make up Christ's public life in Galilee, the first three evangelists preserved their individual manner of recording the words and deeds of Jesus. That such is actually the case, however, can be proved only by a detailed study of the Synoptic narratives. We therefore proceed to that study, beginning with Our Lord's early preaching in Galilee.[1]

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[1] A direct translation of this section from the original Greek will be found on a special page, at the end of this paper.

I. Mk's Account Examined.

St. Mark's account of the early preaching of Jesus in Galilee opens in the same primitive manner as the preceding sections in our second Gospel:

Mk. i, 14.
And after John was delivered up,
Jesus came into Galilee
preaching the Gospel of God.

It is connected with the narrative of the events preparatory to Our Lord's ministry by the simple Hebrew conjunction ו *καὶ* (and), and by a natural reference to John the Baptist as are already known to the reader. Its mention of John's imprisonment: "after John was delivered up" is made in the original Greek (*μετὰ τὸ παραδοθῆναι τὸν Ἰωάνην*) by means of a construction which is justly regarded as characteristic of Mk's style,[1] and which in its primitive simplicity, corresponds directly to the use of the construct infinitive after a preposition in Hebrew temporal sentences. Next comes a general statement concerning Our Lord's public ministry: "Jesus came into Galilee preaching the Gospel of God." It is an objective statement exactly after the usual manner of our second evangelist, for it simply gives the name of the One (Jesus) whose public life is now beginning, mentions the special scene of His ministry (Galilee), and states the general object of His mission (preaching of the Gospel of God). In particular, the expression "came preaching" betrays no reflection on the part of the writer upon the reason which led Jesus to select Galilee as the special theatre of His work; and further, the construction of *ἐλθεῖν* with a participle *ἦλθεν κηρύσσων* is one of the distinctive features of St. Mark's style.[2] It is beyond doubt, too, that the word *εὐαγγέλιον* must be numbered among the literary characteristics of our second Gospel,[3] while the phrase "the Gospel of God" is a very primitive Christian expression as appears from its use in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians and other early Epistles of St. Paul.[4]

The summary of Our Lord's preaching in Galilee is set forth in the next verse of our second Gospel:

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[1] Cf. H. B. Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (p. xli), in regard to the use of the article with infinitives and sentences.

[2] Cf. Mk. i, 33, 39, 40; ii, 3; etc. See also Mk. vi, 6; *καὶ περιῆγεν . . . διδάσκων*.

[3] Cf. Cf. John C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 10.

[4] See Moulton and Geden, *A Concordance to the Greek Testament*, p. 397 sq.

> Mk. i, 15.
> And saying: The time is fulfilled,
> and the Kingdom of God is at hand:
> Repent, and believe in the Gospel.

Here again, we easily notice important characteristics of St. Mark's manner of writing, and manifest proofs of the early origin of his account of Christ's preaching. There is first of all, the general structure of the sentence, the clauses of which are given without attempt at logical order. This is one of the features characteristic of St. Mark's narrative which we will have repeatedly to point out in the sequel, and one which apparently was noticed as far back as the time of the presbyter whose words Papias quotes as follows: "and the elder said this also: Mark . . . wrote down accurately everything that he remembered, without, however, recording in order οὐ μέντοι τάξει what was either said or done by Christ."[1] And it is worthy of notice that in his Diatessaron,[2] Tatian modified the order[3] presented by Mark i, 15, and wrote:

> Repent and believe in the Gospel.
> The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand.

In the second place, the word "Gospel" (in the phrase "believe in the Gospel") is, as was stated above, one of the terms characteristic of our second Synoptist. Again, the expression "the Kingdom of *God*" is very often met with in St. Mark's narrative; and it was doubtless the one usual on the lips of the early Christians, while the Jews preferred to it the more reverential phrase "the Kingdom of *Heaven*."[4] In like manner, the clause "the time is fulfilled," especially because directly connected here with a declaration concerning the near coming of God's Kingdom, bears the actual impress of the expectations of the early Christians regarding that coming. Finally, the formula "believe in the Gospel" corresponds directly to the Hebrew האמין ב and sets forth the distinctly Christian element which was added to repentance at the beginning of the preaching of the Gospel, to prepare for the Kingdom of God.[5]

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[1] Eusebius, Eccles. History, Book iii, chap. xxxix.

[2] Cf. The Diatessaron of Tatian, by Rev. Hope W. Hogg, in vol. iv of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, p. 51.

[3] The Syriac Version of Mk. i, 15, has the same order as the original Greek.

[4] The expression "the Kingdom of *Heaven*" is found only in St. Matthew's Gospel. The other canonical Gospels and the Epistles use uniformly "the Kingdom of *God*." Cf. Gustaf Dalman, *the Words of Jesus*, p. 93sq.

[5] The view we have taken of Mk. i, 14c, 15, is in thorough harmony with the early

It thus appears that we have in Mk. i, 14, 15, a very early account of the opening of Christ's ministry in Galilee. The structure of the sentences is of the most primitive kind, and the imparting of the information is just as objective in this passage as in any of the preceding sections of our second Gospel. Mk's summary of Our Lord's preaching, in particular, reflects directly the ideas and expressions of the early Apostolic age. So that in these two verses of St. Mark's narrative, literary analysis not only does not disclose anything that must needs be considered as derived from the parallel accounts in Mt. and Lk., but shows that everything tallies with what was the primitive form of the evangelical tradition.

II. Mt's and Mk's Accounts Are Closely Allied.

When we pass from Mk's account of the beginning of Our Lord's public ministry to that of St. Matthew, the first feature that strikes us, is one to which we have repeatedly called attention in our preceding Studies. It consists in the close literary connection which can be noticed between the parallel accounts in our first two Gospels.

In the section now under consideration, even a rapid glance at the parallel records in Mt. and Mk., is sufficient to make us realize that apart from the quotation from Isaias and the remark introductory to it found in Mt. alone (Mt. iv, 13-16), the two records are indeed closely allied.

Mk. i, 14, 15.	Mt, iv. 12-17.
. . . .	12. Now when He heard
14. And after John was delivered up,	that John was delivered up,
Jesus came into Galilee	He withdrew into Galilee.
	(*Verses* 13-16 *introduce and quote* *Isaias* ix, 1, 2.)
preaching the Gospel of God,	17. From that time Jesus began to preach,
15. and saying: The time is fulfilled,	and to say:
and the Kingdom of God is at hand;	Repent,
Repent, and believe in the Gospel.	for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

Both Mt. and Mk. (over against Lk.) mention explicitly the imprisonment of John the Baptist as having taken place before Our Lord's return into Galilee; both again (over against our third evangelist) state that Jesus began His preaching directly upon that return; and

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preaching of Christianity as described in Acts ii, iii. (Cf. J. Knabenbauer, S. J., *in Actus Apostol.*, p. 74sq.) It disposes of the superficial solution suggested by Allan Menzies (*the Earliest Gospel*, p. 64), who regards as "Pauline additions," the literary resemblances between Mk. i, 14, 15, and various passages of St. Paul's epistles.

more particularly, both (differently also from St. Luke) give a summary of Christ's exhortations during His public life. But not only do Mt. and Mk. thus follow the same line of thought, they have also several resemblances in style and vocabulary: notice, for instance, in both, the use of παραδιδόναι (to deliver up) in the aorist and without any complement; and that of κηρύσσειν and λέγειν to introduce the summary of the preaching;[1] etc. Finally, a strong confirmation that these resemblances in respect to the substance and the language of Mk. i, 14, 15, and Mt. iv, 12, 17, are due to a literary dependence, is found in the nature of the context in which our first two Synoptists have inclosed their respective account of the beginning of our Lord's ministry. This account is given in both Mt. and Mk. immediately after the narrative of the temptation of Jesus and immediately before that of His call of the first disciples, that is, between two narratives in which both Gospels stand in a close literary relation.[2] Whence it is only natural to think that a similar dependence exists in the intermediary section which tells of the opening of Christ's public life, and that the resemblances in respect to both matter and form noticeable in Mk. i, 14, 15, and Mt. iv, 12, 17, point to such a literary relation.

III. Derived Character of Mt's Account.

The second general feature of Mt. iv, 12-17, as compared with Mk. i, 14-15, is also one we have pointed out in our preceding Studies on Mt's and Mk's parallel accounts. Here, as in the preceding sections, St. Matthew's narrative is later than, and derived from that of St. Mark.

Mt's first verse is indeed parallel to Mk's opening lines:

Mk. i.	Mt. iv.
. . . .	12. Now when He heard
14. And after John was delivered up,	that John was delivered up,
Jesus came into Galilee. .	He withdrew into Galilee.

Yet it reads as if derived from our second Synoptist, for it completes and modifies intentionally Mk's matter-of-fact statement that Jesus came into Galilee after John had been delivered up. It brings out distinctly that Our Lord came into Galilee because He had heard of the imprisonment of His precursor, a reason which is only implied in Mk's statement. And in consequence, it represents as a withdrawal (ἀνεχώρησεν) from Judea, what St. Mark had described simply as a coming (ἦλθεν) into Galilee. This manner of representing Christ's departure is plainly in the line of the fuller and later forms of evangelical tradition embodied in our fourth Gospel (John iv, 1-3), and its introduction into Mk's opening lines explains the differences in wording which are noticeable in Mt's parallel verse. It accounts, as we have just said, for the change of ἦλθεν (He came) into ἀνεχώρησεν (He withdrew). It explains naturally how Mk's primitive construction καὶ μετὰ τὸν παραδοθῆναι τὸν Ἰωάνην gave way to the more elaborate form ἀκούσας δὲ ὅτι Ἰωάνης παρεδόθη (Mt. iv, 12ab). It accounts also for the dropping of the name "Jesus" in Mt. iv, 12c. If St. Mark had written: "After John was delivered up ἦλθεν (He came) into Galilee," *John* might not unnaturally have been taken as the subject of the verb ἦλθεν; so that to prevent the ambiguity, Mk. said explicitly: "*Jesus* came into Galilee." But when Mt. inserted the reason for which Our Lord came into Galilee, such an ambiguity was no longer to be feared in his sentence. "Now when He heard that John was delivered up," the only possible subject of the verb *to hear* was Jesus whose temptation had just been narrated by St. Matthew; and in the next clause "He withdrew into Galilee," the same noun, "Jesus," was clearly still the subject of the verb "withdrew." Finally, as can be easily seen, Mt's insertion into Mk's opening lines (Mk. i, 14ab) accounts for their transformation into a full sentence in our first Synoptic Gospel:

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[1] It must be said, however, that some textual critics regard καὶ λέγων in Mk. i, 15, as a later addition.

[2] The literary relation of Mt.'s and Mk.'s narratives of the temptation has been proved in our foregoing study. (See the New York Review, Oct.-Nov., 1905), and that of their accounts of Our Lord's call of the first disciples will he shown in our next paper.

Mk. i	Mt. iv.
. . . . . .	12. Now when He heard
14a. And after John was delivered up,	that Jesus was delivered up,
14b. Jesus came into Galilee	He withdrew into Galilee.
[preaching the Gospel of God],	. . . . . .

It was this change of Mk's opening lines into a full sentence which allowed Mt. to make in a natural manner immediately after Mk. i, 14b, a new and much longer insertion:

Mt. iv. 13. And having left Nazareth,
He came and dwelt in Capharnaum
which is by the sea,
within the borders of Zabulon and of Nephtalim;
14. That it might be fulfilled
which was said by Isaias the prophet:
15. The land of Zabulon and the land of Nephtalim
toward the Sea, beyond the Jordan,
Galilee of the Gentiles,

16. the people sitting in darkness
saw a great light,
and to those sitting in the region and shadow of death
a light arose.

Apparently when Mt. iv, 13ab, was written, tradition told explicitly of Jesus preferring Capharnaum to Nazareth as the centre of His ministry in Galilee. So that it was only natural for St. Matthew to mention this preference in immediate connection with Our Lord's withdrawal into Galilee (Mt. iv, 12c), and thus to complete Mk's account of Christ's coming into that district of Palestine. This our first Synoptist would do all the more readily, because, though St. Mark nowhere states explicitly that Jesus made Capharanum-by-the-Sea His dwelling place during His public life, yet he implies it throughout his account of the Galilean ministry.[1] St. Matthew subjoins (iv, 13d) that Capharnaum is "within the borders of Zabulon and of Nephtalim," through no mere geographical interest, but in accordance with the general apologetical purpose of his Gospel, which we have pointed out in our preceding Studies. He wishes to connect the centre of Our Lord's evangelical labors with that part of the Holy Land, which had been the object of an ancient and mysterious prophecy recorded in the book of Isaias (Isai. ix, 1, 2). In harmony with the rabbinical views and methods of interpretation of his day he applies expressly the prophecy to the Messias,[2] and quotes and interprets it so as to show to his Jewish contemporaries that the fact of Jesus living and preaching in Galilee, far from being an argument against His messiaship,[3] is a positive proof in its favor: "that it might be fulfilled which was said by Isaias the prophet, etc."

The long insertion over, St. Matthew appears again parallel to, and derived from St. Mark's narrative:

	Mk. i.		Mt. iv.
14c.	preaching the Gospel of God,	17.	From that time Jesus began to preach
15.	and saying: The time is fulfilled,		and to say:
	and the Kingdom of God is at hand:		Repent,
	Repent, and believe in the Gospel.		for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

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[1] Cf. Mk. i, 21; ii, 1; ix, 32 (Greek: ix, 33); etc. When St. Matthew speaks of Capharnaum as a city "by the Sea," he has already in view Mk. i, 16, which refers to "the Sea of Galilee."

[2] In reference to this quotation from Isaias, Maldonatus (*In Matth.*) writes: Prophetiam Isaiæ. . . . (Evangelista) suo more ad Christum accommodat." See also D. Calmet, O. S. B., *In Matth.* iv, 14; Prof. Toy, *Quotations in N. T.*, p. 23sqq.

[3] For traces of difficulties against Jesus' messiaship on the score of His connection with Galilee, see John i, 46; vii, 52. Cf. also Knabenbauer, S. J., in Matth., vol, i, p. 159.

His first line: "from that time Jesus began to preach," bears the distinct impress of its origin. It is worded in view of, and in full harmony with Mk. i, 14:

> And after John was delivered up,
> Jesus came into Galilee
> preaching the Gospel of God. . . .

In this verse St. Mark had stated two things: (1) that Jesus came into Galilee after John's imprisonment; and (2) that He then began His preaching. In Mt. iv, 12-17, these two statements are also given, but separately. The first is expressly made in Mt. iv, 12, where we read:

> Now when He heard
> that John was delivered up,
> He withdrew into Galilee.

Mt's reason for making this statement separately, is plain. The mention that Christ's coming into Galilee supplied him with a natural place wherein to insert his justification of Jesus' choice of that Northern district of Palestine for living and preaching: "the Galilee of the Gentiles" was the region involved in darkness, on which, according to prophecy, the Messias at His coming would shed the "great light" of His doctrine.

The insertion once made (Mt. iv, 13-16), St. Matthew turned to Mk's second statement, and embodied it in his very next line: "From that time Jesus began to preach" (Mt. iv, 17a). As he had in view the whole information imparted in Mk's single verse (Mk. i, 14), he mentioned expressly the beginning of Our Lord's preaching, and by the addition of a short formula of his own: ἀπὸ τότε (from that time),[1] referred it back to the time which followed immediately John's captivity and witnessed Jesus' withdrawal into Galilee.[2] That in writing iv, 17a, St. Matthew had distinctly in view the wording of Mk. i, 14, is confirmed by the fact that he inserted in that line the name of Jesus, which, as was shown above, he had dropped from Mk. i, 14b. Thus does it appear that Mt. iv, 12, 17a, were meant by St. Matthew to set forth exactly the information found in Mk. i, 14, and that Mt. iv,

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[1] As stated in our preceding Studies the use of the particle τότε is one of the distinctive features of St. Matthew's style. In reference to the formula ἀπὸ τότε see J. C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 135.

[2] The fact that our first Gospel connects the formal beginning of the teaching of Jesus with the captivity of John the Baptist is admitted by A. J. Maas, S. J., *the Gospel according to St. Matthew*, p. 52. (St. Louis, Herder, 1898). Cf. also H. B. Swete, *the Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 12.

17a, in particular, was composed in view of, and in full harmony with St. Mark's narrative.

The foregoing remarks show that the differences thus far noticed between Mt's and Mk's accounts of the opening of Our Lord's ministry, are of the same description as those we have already set forth in our preceding Studies, and they likewise point to Mt's dependence on our second Gospel. They also prepare us for regarding the other differences we must now examine between these two accounts, as really of the same kind, and as consequently traceable to the same general cause. It is indeed true that a comparison of Mt. iv, 17, with Mk. i, 14c, 15, discloses the fact that the passage in St. Matthew is not only shorter but also smoother than the corresponding one in St. Mark's narrative:

Mk. i.	Mt. iv, 17.
14c. preaching the *Gospel of God*	From that time Jesus began to preach
15. and saying: *The time is fulfilled,*	and to say:
and the Kingdom of God is at hand:	Repent,
Repent, *and believe in the Gospel.*	for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

So that such clauses as "*the Gospel of God,*" "*the time is fulfilled,*" "*and believe in the Gospel,*" which are found in Mk. alone, might at first sight, be considered as later additions meant to complete Mt's shorter forms of expression: "*to preach,*" "*to say,*" "*repent;*" while the less orderly arrangement of the material in Mk. i, 15, might be regarded as arising from the insertion of those clauses into Mt's more direct and primitive record. It might also be claimed that Mt's formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven,*" is more primitive than Mk's expression "the Kingdom of God," because a direct rendering of the Aramaic form מלכותא דשמים (the Kingdom of *Heaven*) usually employed by Our Lord and His Jewish contemporaries. Finally, when it is remembered that the words of Jesus as given by St. Matthew: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand," are exactly those with which St. John delivered his message to the Jews of his time (cf. Mt. iii, 2), it would seem that our first Synoptist has preserved the primitive sentence used by Our Lord to connect directly His own message with that of His precursor, and that consequently Mk's different form of expression is a modification of St. Matthew's record. And yet a careful study of Mk. i, 14c, 15, and Mt. iv, 17, renders more probable another explanation of these differences.

In the first place, the arguments just set forth in favor of the primitive character of Mt. iv, 17, as compared with Mk. i, 14c, 15, are not strictly conclusive. The additions supposed to have been made by St. Mark to St. Matthew's record, may, and as we shall soon see, must be considered as suppressions by St. Matthew of particulars found in our second Gospel. Again, Mt's formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven*," though perhaps nearer to the very expression used by Jesus at the beginning of His ministry, may have not been, and in fact, as we shall presently show, was not current in Christian circles, *before* Mk's formula "the Kingdom of *God*." Lastly, as St. Matthew's words: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand," can hardly be considered otherwise than a summary of the message of both Jesus and John, one readily sees how Mt. iv, 17cd may, after all, not record purely and simply Our Lord's words at the beginning of His public life in Galilee; and further, it is difficult to understand why the words of Jesus as given by St. Mark (i, 15), would not connect sufficiently His message with that of His precursor, since the burden of Christ's message in both Mt. and Mk. is evidently the same.

In the second place, the differences between Mt. iv, 17, and Mk. i, 14c, 15, point really to Mt's dependence on our second Gospel. Thus Mk's supposed additions: "the Gospel of God," "the time is fulfilled," "and believe in the Gospel", to Mt's shorter forms: "to preach," "to say," "repent," are actual suppressions of those particulars in Mk. i, 14c, 15, by our first Synoptist. The first of these clauses "the Gospel of God," was known to St. Matthew as appears from Mt. iv, 23, "Jesus went about all Galilee teaching in their synagogues and *preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom*," wherein the expression κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας (preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom) recalls manifestly Mk's i, 14c: κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ preaching the Gospel of God). Instead of transcribing it at iv, 17a, which, as we have shown above, was worded in view of Mk. i, 14c, he simply wrote: "From that time Jesus began to preach," because at this point, it was his special intention to bring back his reader to the very beginning of Our Lord's ministry in Galilee (notice the expressions "*from that time . . . began*). But as he knew full well that St. Mark's statement,

> Mk. i, 14.
> And after John was delivered up,
> Jesus came into Galilee
> preaching the Gospel of God,

referred not only to the beginning of Christ's preaching, but to the whole extent of it, he postponed Mk's distinct mention of the preaching of *the Gospel,* to a verse of his own (Mt. iv, 23,(wherein he gives a conspectus of Our Lord's work in Galilee:

> Mt. iv, 23.
> And Jesus went about all Galilee
> teaching in their synagogues
> and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom,
> and healing all manner of disease,
> and all manner of sickness among the people.[1]

Mk's second clause: "the time is fulfilled," was naturally dropped by St. Matthew, who had just inserted into Mk's narrative, the passage of Isaias ix 2, as *fulfilled* in Our Lord's choice of Galilee for living and preaching. And lastly, Mt's suppression of Mk's phrase "and believe in the Gospel" after the word "repent," was the no less natural consequence of his dropping of the reference to "the Gospel" in Mk. i, 14c.

As regards Mt's formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven,*" it can hardly be considered as current in Christian circles, at an earlier date than Mk's corresponding expression "the Kingdom of *God,*" otherwise it would be impossible to explain how St. Matthew, who usually speaks of "the Kingdom of *Heaven,*" places four different times,[2] the formula: "the Kingdom of *God,*" on the lips of Jesus. Apparently both forms of expression were current at the same time, and were fully known to our first evangelist and his readers.

Of course, it could be claimed that, though speaking Aramaic, and using habitually the formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven,*" Jesus employed at times the expression "the Kingdom of *God,*" and that this accounts for the two forms as they are recorded in our first Synoptic Gospel. If so, it would look strange indeed that St. Matthew should not have used oftener than he did "the Kingdom of *God,*" when reciting the words of Jesus; but more particularly, the supposition that Our Lord spoke at times of "the Kingdom of *Heaven,*" and at other times of "the Kingdom of *God,*" would justify our contention that in Christian circles, the former was not current at an earlier date than the latter expression.

A strong confirmation of the view here advocated is found in two well-ascertained facts: (1) in the first book of the Macchabees, composed between 105 and 64 B. C., the name "God" is never used, and the word "Heaven" is constantly employed in its stead; (2) in the second book of the Machabees, written also somewhat before 64 B. C., the name "God" is habitually used, while at times (iii, 15; vii, 11), the word "Heaven" is substituted for it. This conclusively shows that even before the Christian era, the Jews had got into the habit of speaking of "Heaven" when meaning "God," and that nevertheless they actually used both as real equivalents of each other. The interchangeable use of both names naturally persevered among them at, and after, the coming of Christ,[1] and we have a trace of it in the expressions "the Kingdom of *Heaven*," and "the Kingdom of *God*."

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[1] Mt. iv, 23, is repeated at Mt. ix, 35; and in both places St. Matthew clearly intends to give a summary of Christ's work *during* His public life. In iv, 23, our first Synoptist couples Mk. i, 39 with Mk. i, 14c.

[2] Mt. xii, 28; xix, 24; xxi, 31, 43.

These data allow us to account for Mk's use of "the Kingdom of *God*," at i, 15b, without regarding it as a later modification of Mt's formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven*." Both expressions were current in Mk's time of writing, and he employed the "Kingdom of *God*" here, and throughout his Gospel, in preference to the other form of expression, because its meaning was more obvious to the Gentiles for whom he wrote. They also enable us to explain why differently from our second Synoptist, St. Matthew, nearly throughout his Gospel, preferred to use "the Kingdom of *Heaven*." He wrote his narrative in view of Jewish readers very familiar with the Aramaic expression "the Kingdom of *Heaven*," and moreover his apologetical purpose against the Jews would naturally lead him to adopt their received manner of speaking, as it led him readily to accept their manner of quoting, and reasoning from, texts of the Old Testament.[2]

If we now recall to mind what has been shown above, viz.: that Mt's record of Our Lord's early ministry in Galilee bears the manifest impress of changes introduced into Mk's parallel account for apologetical purposes against the Jews, we can readily see how Mt's use in iv, 17d, of the formula "the Kingdom of *Heaven*," instead of Mk's expression "the Kingdom of *God*," should be considered. It is just one more of those changes which our first Synoptist made in Mk's corresponding passage to adapt it for the special purpose of his apologetics,[3] and consequently one proof more that Mt. iv, 12-17, is derived from Mk. i, 14, 15.

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[1] Thus Mt's incidental mention that Our Lord's contemporaries swore "by *Heaven*," is a proof of their custom to avoid the use of the word "God." Again ,the question "the baptism of John, whence was it? from *Heaven* or from men" (Mt. xxi, 25; cf. Mk. xi, 30), put by Jesus to His opponents, is another instance of the same custom. Com. pare also Lk. xx, 4, "the baptism of John, was it from Heaven, or from men"? with Acts v, 38b, 39: "if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to naught; but if it be of *God*, you cannot overthrow it."

[2] In Mt's Gospel "quotations from the Old Testament, not found in the parallel Gospels, are made direct from the Hebrew" (W. F. Adeney, *A Biblical Introduction*, 2d edit., 1904, p. 293).

[3] St. Luke who has a non-Jewish purpose of apologetics in view, and writes for

IV. Peculiarities of Lk's Account.

There remains for us to examine St. Luke's record of the early preaching of Jesus in Galilee, which in our third Gospel, as in Mt. and Mk., comes immediately after the narrative of the temptation. It reads as follows:

Lk. iv.

14. And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee,
and a report concerning Him went out
through the whole adjacent region.
15. And He taught in their synagogues,
being glorified by all.

It is certain that in these two verses St. Luke intends to tell of the same events as are set forth in Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15. Like the other two Synoptists he speaks of Jesus' coming into Galilee, and like them also he gives a conspectus of Christ's preaching during the Galilean ministry.[1] It is no less certain, however, that our third Gospel exhibits here several features of its own which are worthy of special notice.

Thus, one would look in vain in Lk. iv, 14, 15, for Mt's and Mk's distinct reference to the imprisonment of John the Baptist, and consequently also for their direct connection of Our Lord's early preaching with that imprisonment. In like manner, our third evangelist does not attempt to supply a summary of Jesus' preaching such as appears in both Mt. and Mk. And hence one is not surprised to find that words and forms of expression common to the parallel passages in our first two Synoptics, do not appear in Lk. iv. 14, 15. Again, it can be easily observed that though, like St. Matthew and St. Mark, our third Synoptist places his general description of the Galilean ministry immediately after the temptation, he differs from them by recording immediately afterwards, not the call of the first disciples (Mt. iv, 18-22; Mk. i, 16-20), but the rejection of Jesus at Nazareth (Lk. iv, 16-20).

Gentile readers, uses uniformly the same formula as St. Mark: "the Kingdom of God." Wellhausen's recent theory (*das Evangelium Matthæi uebersetzt und erklaert*, Berlin, 1904), that Jesus spoke of "God" and the "Kingdom of *God*," as did the Galilean peasants and that consequently the phrase "the Kingdom of the Heavens" is literary and secondary, was framed too irrespectively of the facts we have pointed out, and of many others which could be mentioned, to commend itself to the acceptance of scholars at large.

[1] Cf. Lk. iv, 15, "And He *taught* in their synogogues;" the imperfect ἐδίδασκεν points to teaching as Christ's habitual practice (Plummer, St. Luke, p. 117).

Together with these various differences from Mt. iv, 12-16, and Mk. i, 14, 15, Luke's narrative in iv, 14,15, has positive features of its own, which are well worth noticing. Among these we may mention the following particulars: ὑπέστρεψεν (He returned); δύναμις, used of Divine power; καθ' ὅλης in the sense of "through whole;" ἡ περιχώρος (the region round about); καὶ αὐτὸς (and He); all of which are marks of St. Luke's style,[1] and some of which have already been pointed out as such in the preceding Studies. In the next place, Lk's opening line "And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee," is most intimately connected in thought and expression with Lk. iv, 1, "Jesus full of the Holy Spirit returned from the Jordan," that is with a statement which bears the distinct impress of St. Luke's style and method of composition.[2] Lastly, it must be noticed that in iv, 14, 15, our third evangelist speaks of Christ's extensive fame directly upon His return into Galilee, and only afterwards of His teaching in the synagogues, whereby Jesus secured that great fame. Such an order does not seem to be natural, and therefore needs an explanation.

V. Lk's Dependence on Mt. and Lk.

In view of differences so great and so numerous one might be tempted to think that St. Luke is in the section now under consideration, altogether independent of the other two Synoptists. It can be shown, however, that such is not the case.

It is quite true that at iv, 14, our third evangelist has no distinct reference to the imprisonment of John the Baptist, but this does not prove that he was unacquainted with Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15. His omission is simply due to the fact that at iii, 19, 20, he has anticipated Mt's and Mk's mention of that imprisonment, with a view to complete the account of John's preparatory ministry.[3] It is true also that in iv, 14, 15, St. Luke does not connect the beginning of Our Lord's Galilean ministry with the silencing of John, but this is naturally accounted for by the fact that he has already spoken of Jesus as "beginning" (of course, to preach) at iii, 23, in very close connection with his statement regarding John's imprisonment, at iii, 20. Indeed, as we observed in one of our preceding Studies, Mt's use of ἤρξατο (iv, 17). seems to have suggested Lk's ἀρχόμενος in iii, 23.[4] So that when these two omissions on St. Luke's part are attentively considered, they are really found to prove his acquaintance with the contents of Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15, and in particular with the wording of Mt. iv, 17. And indeed, this is only what we might expect when we remember that at iv, 14, 15, our third evangelist mentions, as do Mt. and Mk., in their parallel passages, Jesus' coming into Galilee, gives like them a conspectus of His ministry in Galilee, and thus forms a little section (Lk. iv, 14-15), which he places immediately after the temptation, exactly in the same way as Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15, form a distinct section after the narrative of the temptation of Jesus.

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[1] Cf. Moulton and Geden, *A Concordance to the Greek Testament;* Plummer, *The Gospel According to St. Luke*, p. 116sq.

[2] Cf .The New York Review, Oct.-Nov., 1905, p. 355.

[3] Cf. The New York Review, June-July, 1905, p. 99.

[4] Cf. The New York Review, Aug.-Sept., 1905, p. 229, footn. 1.

But one will say, how did it come to pass that if St. Luke wrote iv, 14, 15, as a parallel section to Mt's and Mk's accounts of Our Lord's preaching, he, differently from them, refrained from giving at this point a summary of that preaching? The answer is easy. Our third evangelist omitted at iv, 14, 15, the summary found in the other two Synoptists, simply because he intended to subjoin at once his account of Jesus' rejection at Nazareth which contains that summary. In Lk. iv, 16-30, we read the following passage:

> 17. And the roll of *Isaias* the prophet was handed to Him,
> and having unrolled it, He found the place where it was written:
> 18. The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
> wherefore he has anointed Me to *preach the Gospel* to the poor;
> he has sent Me to proclaim release to the captives,
> and recovery of sight to the blind;
> to set at liberty those that are bruised,
> 19. to *preach* the acceptable year of our Lord.
>
> . . . .
>
> 21. *And He began to say* to them:
> To-day is *fulfilled* this scripture in your ears.

It can hardly be doubted that this passage presents a summary of Christ's preaching in Galilee, which is equivalent to the one found in Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15. A quotation from Isaias (lxi, 1sq.), peculiar here to St. Luke, and described as *fulfilled* in Our Lord, corresponds to a quotation from Isaias (ix, 1, 2), peculiar to Mt. iv, 12-17, and also represented by him as *fulfilled* in Jesus. Again, Lk's quotation from Isaias contains a reference to the preaching of the Gospel, which reminds us of Mk's expression "preaching the Gospel of God" (Mk. i, 14c).[1] In making the quotation, St. Luke has in view, exactly as Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14-15, the whole course of Our Lord's ministry ("the acceptable year of the Lord"), and also the opening part of that ministry, since he sets the incident of the rejection at Nazareth in immediate connection with Jesus' return into Galilee (Lk. iv, 14, 15). In Lk's mind, "the poor," "the captives," "the blind," "the bruised," of Isai. lxi, 1sq., correspond to "the people sitting in darkness, in the region and shadow of death," of Isai. ix, 1, 2, quoted by St. Matthew (iv, 15, 16). Finally, in Lk. iv, 21, we read ἤρξατο δὲ λέγειν an expression which is practically identical with Mt. iv, 17ab: τότε ἤρξατο ὁ Ἰησοῦς κηρύσσειν καὶ λέγειν, seeing that κηρύσσειν has been used by Lk. at iv, 19.

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[1] In our third Gospel, the εὐαγγελίζομαι of the LXX, takes the place of Mk's expression κηρύσσειν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον as its full equivalent.

In view of all this, we consider it quite certain that St. Luke dropped at iv, 14, 15, Mt's and Mk's summary of Our Lord's preaching in Galilee, simply because he wished to give very soon (viz. in his account of Jesus' rejection at Nazareth) one which he considered as its equivalent, and which was at the same time most in harmony with the predominant tone of his Gospel: the Gospel of mercy *par excellence.*

The place at which our third Synoptist narrates Our Lord's rejection at Nazareth accounts not only for the fact that he dropped at iv, 14, 15, Mt's and Mk's summary of Christ's preaching; it explains also the peculiar inversion we have noticed above in these verses of St. Luke. It will be remembered that this evangelist speaks of Jesus' extensive fame *before* mentioning His teaching in the synagogues whereby He secured that fame. He thus inverted the natural order of his two statements, because he wished to place Christ's habitual teaching in the synagogues of Galilee in immediate connection with what happened at the time of His preaching in the synagogue of Nazareth. In this way, Lk. iv, 15:

> And He taught in their synagogues
> being glorified by all,

forms a direct introduction to the narrative which follows immediately and records in detail how Jesus preached in the synagogue of Nazareth on a Sabbath-day, and how "*all wondered* at the words of grace which proceeded from His mouth" (Lk. iv, 20)..

As regards the origin of the statement itself "and He taught in their synagogues," and that of the clause which precedes it: "and a report concerning Him went out through the whole adjacent region," we think that it should be connected with Mt. iv, 23a "And Jesus went about all Galilee *teaching in their synagogues*," and Mt. iv, 24a "*And His fame went throughout all Syria*". In St. Matthew's Gospel these two statements (Mt. iv, 23a, 24a,) are separated from its account of Jesus' early preaching in Galilee, only by the narrative of the call of the first disciples (Mt. iv, 18-22), and form a kind of duplicate record of the Galilean preaching. Now as St. Luke intended to narrate the call of Christ's first disciples only later (at v, 1-11), he dropped Mt's account of that call, and utilized Mt. iv, 23a, 24a, so as to form a conspectus of Our Lord's ministry parallel to the one given in Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15. Of course, in utilizing Mt. iv, 23a, 24a, St. Luke adapted them to his own context by means of the inversion of which we have just spoken, and also through the substitution of his own favorite word περιχώρος instead of Mt's "Syria." His desire of recording at once Christ's rejection at Nazareth required likewise that he should adopt the direct form "and *He taught* in their synagogues," instead of Mt's construction "*teaching* in their synagogues," while his purpose of giving at v, 14, 15, a conspectus of Jesus' *preaching* in Galilee led him naturally to drop all the references to Our Lord's miracles which are found in Mt. iv, 23, and iv, 24.

A last point needs to be briefly mentioned here, because of its bearing upon the dependence of Lk. iv, 14, 15, on Mt. iv, 12-17. In comparing Mt's record of the early preaching of Jesus, with the one given by St. Mark, we explained Mt's introduction of Isai. ix, 1, 2, through the desire of our first Synoptist to justify Our Lord's selection of Capharnaum as the centre of his work in Galilee, by means of a quotation from the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Now, it is in full view of this desire on St. Matthew's part, that our third evangelist anticipated the order of events in both Mt. and Mk., and narrated at once Christ's rejection at Nazareth. By so doing, he also justified to his own readers Our Lord's selection of Capharnaum in preference to Nazareth as the centre of His preaching: Jesus had preached in the synagogue of Nazareth, and His fellow-townsmen, after admiring His doctrine, had cast Him away ignominiously. Indeed, such an anticipation of the narrative of Jesus' rejection at Nazareth was apparently suggested to St. Luke by Mt. iv, 13: καὶ καταλιπὼν τὴν Ναζαρὰ κατῴκησεν εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ words which seem to imply that Our Lord visited His city upon His return into Galilee, and that the visit was followed by an immediate forsaking (καταλιπὼν) of it, in favor of Capharnaum.[1]

IV. Concluding Remarks.

Let us now sum up the principal conclusions which come out of the foregoing examination of the Synoptic accounts of Our Lord's early preaching in Galilee.

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[1] Cf. Joseph Knabenbauer, S. J., *Evangelium secundum Matthæum*, vol. i, p. 158.

It seems, first of all, that owing to its great simplicity in respect to contents and form, St. Mark's narrative is decidedly primitive in regard to the other two Synoptics. It is an objective statement made in strict harmony with the conceptions and language of a very early date in the Apostolic age. In the second place, St. Matthew has modified in various ways the account of the early preaching of Jesus, which is found in our second Gospel; and in particular he has inserted into Mk's narrative the quotation of Isai. ix, 1, 2, with a view to justify Jesus' choice of Capharnaum in Galilee for His preaching. But whatever changes he has introduced, he has most carefully abstained from any statement that would have conflicted with Mk's information. In the third place, St. Luke seems at first sight to be independent, in almost every particular, of both St. Matthew and St. Mark. And yet, when his parallel record is closely examined, it is found to stand in close literary relation with both Mt. iv, 12-17, and Mk. i, 14, 15; nay more to have been composed directly in view of the other two Synoptics.

These general conclusions, as it can be readily seen, are practically identical with those that have been suggested to us by our Studies on the Synoptic accounts of the events preparatory to Our Lord's ministry. So that it is only natural to add to them, the further conclusion, that in beginning their respective narratives of the public ministry itself, our first three evangelists have actually preserved their respective methods of composition.

Francis E. Gigot.

GALILEE.

14. And a
Jesus came i

preaching the
15. and say
and the Kingd
Repent, and b

Lk. iv, 14, 15.

14. And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into [Galilee,

And a report concerning Him went out through the whole adjacent region.

15. And He taught in their synagogues being glorified by all.

NOTES.

Through the *Revue Augustinienne* we learn of the recent inception of a new publication *Slavorum Litteræ Theologicæ*, which has for its purpose to unite the scattered forces of the Slav nations, to promote amongst them a taste for theological studies, to put within their reach the results of the genius of the Western races, and especially to treat of the points of controversy between the West and the East in a way to lessen bitterness and to open the way for agreement; it will strive to effect a better understanding between the two Churches in order to repair the evils of the present unhappy lack of unity. All who are of the mind of Christ will pray that these efforts, undertaken so much in His spirit, may meet with ultimate success.

The same excellent *Revue* (conducted by "Les Augustins de l' Assomption" at Louvain) renders a valuable service to Western scholars by giving at intervals a resumé of the articles in a large number of Russian religious periodicals. The attitude of religious-minded Russians on questions of belief and discipline is of especial interest to Catholics nowadays, when the national church is threatened with the loss of that State support which has so long kept it in independent existence. Even though the question of reunion has not yet been pushed to the forefront, it is evidently a time when the guides of Catholic thought should begin to acquaint themselves with the conditions of this mighty religious organism which may be forced ere long to make tentative efforts toward re-incorporation into the general Catholic body. If such a time should come, it would rank amongst the tragedies of Church History if the opportunity should be lost through narrowness and lack of sympathy—which are synonyms for ignorance of facts and feelings.

The glimpse of the life of the Russian Church which one gets from this conspectus of periodicals is indeed extremely interesting. Minds are evidently more occupied with practical than with intellectual questions. A few points of Biblical criticism are touched upon by members of the theological faculties of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but in a very conservative way. We find an article on Kant and Nietzsche in one review, but in another there is a plea for the introduction of philosophy into the Seminaries. Heretics and dissidents evidently give the orthodox a great deal of trouble, as there is much said of their works and ways. There is complaint about Socialism, and here and there a note of protest against the Erastianism of the Church.

There are many indications that the recruiting and training of the clergy is one of the most important internal questions. Priests do not encourage their sons to follow their example—they often prefer to see them professional men. And many of the brighter students, when they finish their academic studies, turn aside from the priesthood. Many reasons are given for this: distaste for the humdrum life of a village pope; unwillingness to marry with small prospects of means to bring up a family well—it would seem that marriage is almost a requisite for the parochial clergy. Others blame the seminaries, their lack of discipline, their inefficient training, etc. Students in some places are allowed out late at night—they must do their courting before ordination. Altogether, it makes a difficult problem, but it is a good sign that it is arousing such general consideration.

In the organ of the Holy Synod, of St. Petersburg, we find a pastoral conference which gives interesting details concerning Church customs. In the matter of confession, priests are told to advise their people that they should not all come to this sacrament on the same day in Lent. "As for confession in common, it is permitted only to Father John of Cronstadt, and, as a general rule, it is not accorded to other priests. However, in case of necessity, the priest may hear in common the confessions of children and of adults who may be supposed to have committed only sins which are ordinary for human weakness. In such cases, those who do not request to be heard privately should be gathered in groups of from ten to fifteen."

A succinct and valuable summary of the religious conditions in Russia is given in *Studi Religiosi* (Nov.-Dec., 1905) by P. A. Palmieri. His remarks on the condition of Catholicity in the Empire are of especial interest. In Poland, he says, the Church is strong, but national and racial antipathies hinder all relations between the Catholic priests and those of the established religion, so that nothing can be done at present towards reunion. He hopes that if the Poles secure autonomy as a result of the present troubles, this barrier will be broken down. In Russia proper, Catholicity seems quite strong in certain parts. In St. Petersburg there is a Catholic academy with a fine library, but the staff of professors is weak. Catholics have done little or nothing to meet the arguments of the "Orthodox." He deplores the lack of a theological review which would present the Catholic position to the more intelligent members of the Russian clergy and laity.

A study that goes much deeper into the tendencies of Russian religious thought is furnished in the columns of *Demain* by a professor in the University of Cracow. He lays especial emphasis on the work of Solovieff, Slavophile and idealist, who dreamed of a future reunion of the Churches; and who has left behind him a school, the best known members of which are the Princes Troubetskoi: Sergius, whose recent death bereft Russia of her best son just when he was most needed, and Eugene, who is a professor at Kieff. The disciples do not seem to put forward the idea of reunion as strongly as did Solovieff, but they represent an ardent movement for reform in Church and State with the religious ideal kept predominant. The Polish professor is of one mind with the Italian writer in *Studi Religiosi*, that lack of mental contact between the Catholic and the Orthodox leaders of thought is unfortunate. The point of contact, he believes, is supplied by the idealism of Solovieff, and he makes a plea for a close study of the ideas of this thinker in order to gain that sympathetic understanding of matters of agreement and difference without which reunion will be impossible.

The January number of the *Dublin Review*, the first under the new editorship, is out—and a very fine number it is. There is some change in its outward form—the familiar green cover is retained, but is of a more artistic hue. The paper is bulky, but light, somewhat like that in the *Hibbert*, so that its 230 pages give one the impression of a goodly volume. This gives it a fine appearance, though it will be of doubtful advantage when it comes to binding the numbers. The type is in the best English style, of good size, but not so inconveniently large as that in the *Hibbert*. All in all, the publishers have succeeded in producing a magazine which in appearance will rank with the best on the literary market.

But "there is that within which passeth show." The number of English Catholics who have attained to literary eminence is out of all proportion to the Catholic population, and Mr. Ward is a man who can command their confidence and secure their co-operation. So this issue contains contributions from Abbot Gasquet, W. S. Lilly, Father Thurston, Mrs. Meynell (a poem), Professor Phillimore, Viscount Llandaff, and the editor, and, as representing Continental Catholicity, Father Dimnet, whose book on English Catholic thought was reviewed in the December number of this REVIEW. It would be a pleasant task to chat about many of these articles, as, for instance, Abbot Gasquet's delightfully appreciative reminiscences of his American tour, but we must be content with a passing notice of them, and direct our attention to contributions which are in our own special field of interest. These are mainly two—and both of them are unsigned, but are presumably by the eminent editor himself.

The first of these is on "St. Thomas Aquinas and Mediæval Thought." The article, which treats ably of St. Thomas' manly endeavor to deal with the rationalism of his day on its own principles, and the opposition which his attempt aroused amongst the "unco guid," is interesting to the historian and the philosopher, but in intent it is evidently a parable. "Mutato nomine, de nobis fabula narratur." Nor does the author hesitate to apply his parable. Intellectual conditions in the University of Paris in the thirteenth century are illustrated by those in the University of Oxford in the nineteenth; and the method and spirit of the great Master of Theology in his own age are strongly recommended to Catholic apologists in ours.

We shall make but one quotation—and it is difficult not to quote more extensively. It is the application of the parable: "If work in the field marked out by the 'higher criticism' is occasionally touched by some of the defects of the methods it has to use, that does not make it the less necessary. If those few who are competent to undertake it are afforded no scope for their energies, humanly speaking, the movement of criticism must lead widely to the destruction of faith, especially in those masses of half-educated people for whose especial benefit the avoidance of un-settling questions is professedly designed. . . . When such questions are widely raised, it is precisely the simpler souls, those least qualified to meet them rationally, who most need a recognized literature which has dealt with them in a Christian spirit. Such a literature is the indispensable guide and authority for the average mind. Its very existence, and its recognition on the part of the official rulers, are a support to him. If it exists, his faith is saved. If it does not, humanly speaking, it goes. Thus we may welcome the establishment of the Biblical Commission by Leo XIII at the end of his reign as a fitting complement to his commendation at its outset, in the encyclical *Æterni Patris*, of the method and spirit of St. Thomas."

It will seem strange and forced to those whose views are bound by the accidents of time that St. Thomas should be chosen as an exemplar of the "forward" movement of Catholic thought, while as a representative of conservative opinion we are offered the author of the works on *Development of Doctrine*, and the *Grammar of Assent*. Cardinal Newman's name is identified with the three main ideas which are at the basis of our most modern apologetics—the analogical nature of religious truth, the theory of doctrinal development, and the personal nature of assent. And yet Mr. Ward—for it is surely Mr. Ward who wrote this article on "The Functions of Prejudice"—is correct in calling Newman a Conservative. The writer gives an admirable analysis—similar to one contributed to the opening number of this REVIEW—of the fine balance and temper of Newman's mind: his sympathy (especially when he found himself surrounded by the safeguards of orthodoxy which the Church supplies) with the efforts of liberal scholars to get at the exact truth in science and history; and at the same time his strong opposition to those who would uproot the foundations of religious belief.

In summing up Newman's attitude towards the new intellectual questions which at times come up for solution, the author says: "Advocates of reform, he urged, must remember that the Church is an organic structure necessarily containing intellects on many different levels. The stability of the body politic and of theology must be regarded in all efforts at intellectual development. All interests, and not merely the intellectual, must be considered. Consequently discussion must neither be burked nor be allowed to lead to hasty changes. Minds must be gradually accustomed to the points at issue as being subjects for debate, before being forced in a definite direction. The new questions must be opened and allowed for a time to remain open. And the gradual prevalence of such modifications as the advance of science demands, will be a natural consequence. A great authority on the subject once said to the present writer that had Newman been with us he would have entered into Abbé Loisy's views with special interest, although he would not have adopted them. The extensive qualifications which time and criticism will bring must come first. Time itself is essential that the exaggerated interpretations which are ever placed on novelty by unelastic minds may be got rid of. 'Novelty is often error to those who are unprepared for it from the refraction with which it enters into their conceptions.'" The last sentence is Newman's own—from the preface to the third edition of the *Via Media*.

Whilst speaking of Catholic magazines which aim at covering the wide field, literary, historical, religious, of Catholic thought, it would be an unpardonable oversight not to signal a remarkably able periodical furnished us nearer home—the *Catholic World*. Month after month for the past year, Father Burke has been offering to his readers the work of the best Catholic writers at home and abroad. His standards are evidently high, but he manages to keep up to them. Take for instance his January number—slim to the touch, but it contains nearly 150 pages, and he has to repeat this feat twelve times a year. There are articles by Dr. Kerby, of the Catholic University, Father Tyrrell, M. F. Quinlan, Dr. Fox, M. D. Petre, Father Sullivan, E. G. Hurley, a story by Katharine Tynan, and a poem by John Jerome Rooney. This is a fine showing, and it is only an instance of the monthly treat which the *Catholic World* furnishes to its readers.

The announcement in the December issue of the *Dolphin* that that excellent periodical was about to suspend publication, came as a surprise. But its indefatigable editor had turned a large part of his energies to the cause of ecclesiastical music, and the management of three magazines was too much even for his untiring zeal. During its four years of existence, the *Dolphin* did excellent service for the Catholic cause.. To illustrate this we may instance the articles by Dr. Heuser himself, afterwards published in book-form under the title *The Harmony of the Religious Life*; Canon Sheehan's *Under the Cedars and the Stars* and *Glenanaar*; Dr. Kerby's articles on Socialism; the "Lex Amandi" series; the studies in hymnology by Dr. Henry, etc.

The new quarterly, *Church Music*, which is issued by the Dolphin Press, is a very fine publication indeed. In the first place, it presents a very attractive appearance. Paper, type, etc., are excellent. The editor has secured the co-operation of a number of distinguished authorities on ecclesiastical music, and has spared no effort to make the new quarterly the best in its chosen field. The articles in the initial number cover a wider range of topics than one would have thought possible in such a limited field. Of articles which have more than a technical interest, we might mention the practical suggestions of Dr. Henry of Overbrook Seminary, and Mr. Gibbs of Covington; and a very frank and interesting account of the history of the Vatican Edition by Rev. Norman Holly of Dunwoodie, who is the American representative on the Pontifical Commission for Ecclesiastical Chant.

In the biblical section of the collection "la Pensée Chrétienne," of which we noted in last issue Father Rose's work on the Acts of the Apostles, there has been published a translation and commentary on the Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse by Father Calmes. Amongst Father Calmes' conclusions regarding the latter difficult book, these two are noteworthy: (1) the Apocalypse has a direct reference to contemporaneous facts, and consists of an application of eschatological tradition to historical events of the author's time or the near future; (2) although the book has a literary unity in the idea of the triumph of Christ and His elect, it supposes a number of documents, some Jewish, which the redactor has combined, adapting them to his own point of view.

The first Part (Genesis-Kings) of a new edition of the Hebrew Bible has been issued by Hinrichs, Leipzig. It is edited by Kittel, with the co-operation of such eminent scholars as Beer, Buhl, Dalman, Driver, Loehr, Nowack, Rothstein, and Ryssel. It consists of the Massoretic text, very carefully edited, and is furnished with notes indicating corrections suggested by ancient authorities or by modern critical science, and also with the variants suggested by ancient versions. These emendations are put forward with the careful diffidence of a truly scientific spirit. As Father Loisy says in the *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, this edition cannot be too highly recommended to young students of Hebrew.

The French Catholics have at last a translation of the Bible based on the original texts—would that we Catholics of English speech could say the same! It was begun by M. l' Abbé Crampon, who died in 1894, when he had published only the Pentateuch. However, he had prepared the manuscript of the other books, and this has been re-edited and published at intervals by Fathers of the Society of Jesus, with the aid of Professors of Saint Sulpice. The large edition is in seven volumes (Desclée, Paris), and there is now issued a handy edition in one volume. The translator and editors have made use of the results of criticism in a very judicious way. Those which seem solidly based are freely admitted, while new and untried hypotheses are set aside. The more important variants of the Vulgate are given. The Three Heavenly Witnesses text is put in parentheses, with the note: "These words are not found in any Greek manuscript before the fifteenth century, nor in any manuscript of the Vulgate before the eighth."

The German translation of the Apocrypha of the New Testament, published under the editorship of Hennecke, has been recently supplanted with a volume of introduction and notes (*Handbuch zu den Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*, Mohr, Tübingen). The scholars who contribute to it are the same who prepared the translation. This work places at the disposal of the student in convenient and accessible form a vast amount of information concerning the Apocrypha—an ample bibliography, critical and historical commentary, etc.

Commenting on the late decision of the Biblical Commission on the historicity of the Bible, the writer of the "Chronique Biblique" in the *Revue du Clergé Français* says: "It is the intention of the writer which is the great rule of interpretation. But here, as in all cases except when there is a special intervention of the Church, it is the place of the exegetes to determine by an examination of all the facts just what the intention of the writer was. And it is precisely because they believed it to be manifest that in this or that chapter of Genesis, or in books like Tobias, the sacred author did not intend to write history, but was satisfied with reporting ancient traditions without giving warrant for their veracity, or using popular tales for purposes of edification, that Catholic critics have questioned the historicity of such narrations. The decision of the Commission does not seem to touch them, provided that the reasons they adduce in favor of their opinion be really solid."

M. Henri Brémond has given us in an article in *Demain*, the conclusions of his psychological essay on Newman, which is soon to appear. The ground of a man's religious consciousness, the scene of his inward struggle, is sacred. All the world, however, knows that conscience was the great Englishman's most luminous star. It is interesting in this light to probe and appreciate his religious experiences not in a psycho-pathological way but in the surest spirit of reverence and discipleship.

Setting out over a hitherto untrodden field, for all theologians and apologists had insisted on religion as the foundation-stone of conscience, the Cardinal built his religious consciousness, step by step, on *conscience* as manifested in religious sentiment, Christian experience, Christian relations and countless other modes of expression. The starting-point as well as the grand conclusion is that the essential principle and the sanction of law is conscience. It is in truth with Newman an axiom. His principles are expressed in the *Grammar of Assent*, which is, to use M. Brémond's phase, "a long definition of the *illative sense,* and this *illative sense* is the name which conscience takes in the quest for religious truth." Conscience is the sole means of "religiously arriving at religious truths." Going still further and driving home with irresistible precision the great idea, the Cardinal holds that conscience is not alone a principle of knowledge: it is the end of all religion, natural and revealed. For example, "Apostolical order is an ethical principle or it it is not worth much."

BOOK REVIEWS.

Life and Matter: A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's "Riddle of the Universe"—by SIR OLIVER LODGE. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York and London. 1905. The Knickerbocker Press, pp. ix, 175.

Professor Haeckel's oracular settlement of all questions on the simple-seeming lines of Materialistic Monism has been pushed with so much persistence by his English disciples that his book has gained the no doubt unwelcome attention of men who otherwise would have scarcely thought it worthy of their notice. It is a refreshing sign of the times to see scientists of the first rank coming forward to establish the claims of the immaterial against the sweeping generalizations of their too dogmatic brethren. Physical science had played the part of Cinderella so long that it was not unnatural that she should have taken a domineering tone when she found herself a princess. But her best friends and admirers are now informing her that her sway is far from being universal, and that her authority is subordinate.

One of the best contributions to the discussion was given to the public by Sir Oliver Lodge in the *Hibbert Journal* about a year ago. The present little work is made up on the basis of that and other articles and addresses, which have been rewritten and supplemented to give them unity and completeness. In his preface the author informs us that the volume, though controversial in form, has for its aim to formulate a doctrine concerning the nature of man and the interaction between mind and matter. He desires to confute two errors: "(1) the notion that because material energy is constant in quantity, therefore its transformations . . . are insusceptible to guidance or directing control; (2) the idea that the specific guiding power which we call life is one of the forms of material energy—so that directly it relinquishes its connection with matter other equivalent forms of energy must arise to replace it."

The main lines of his criticism of Haeckel's method and results have been so admirably summarized by Sir Oliver that we cannot do better than to quote his words:

"In his effort to simplify and unify he has underestimated some classes of fact and has stretched scientific theory into regions of guess-

> work and hypothesis where it loses touch with real science altogether. The facts which he chooses gratuitously to deny, and the facts which he chooses vigorously to emphasize, are artistically selected by him according as they will or will not fit into the philosophic scheme. . . . At present, the scheme formulated by Professor Haeckel must to philosophers appear rudimentary and antiquated, while to men of science it appears gratuitous, hypothetical, in some places erroneous, and altogether unconvincing." (pp. 9, 10).
>
> "The progress of thought has left him, as well as his great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century; he represents, in clear and eloquent fashion, opinions which then were prevalent among many leaders of thought—opinions which they themselves in many cases, and their successors still more, lived to outgrow; so that by this time Professor Haeckel's voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as the pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh and more idealistic direction." (p.51.)

Passing now to a consideration of the more positive and constructive side of the treatise, we may consider Sir Oliver's views on the nature of life. Opponents of Materialism vary widely in the estimate they make of the amount of reality which they are willing to hand over to the realm of the material. The Idealist deposes matter completely; Descartes drew the line sharply between *human* thought and the rest of the universe; the repentant Materialists of the latter half of the nineteenth century, as, for instance, Professor Tyndall, acknowledged a "gap" between matter and all forms of consciousness; but Sir Oliver takes his stand at the outposts, and maintains that Life does not belong to the domain of the mechanical. To him it is the manifestation of a non-material substance drawn from the storehouse of nature, and manifesting itself for a time as controlling physical powers, only to withdraw at last to its source. For he maintains, and rightly, that nothing that is really a *substance* ceases to exist. He does not treat with any adequacy the claims of self-conscious and moral entities to a personal persistence, though he evidently believes in it. On the other hand, he is no believer in special acts of creation. His views of the origin of man and his "Fall" are worth considering, not indeed that they are new, but they may be found helpful to some. The advent of man in the course of evolution was a rise, psychologically considered; but it brought with it responsibility, and with responsibility, sin, and thus, from an ethical point of view, a fall (pp. 78, 79).

So much for the treatment of one of the great triad of questions which lie at the basis of all religious belief—God, Freedom, Immortality. On the existence of God he has less to say, but he indicates over and over again that he cannot conceive any satisfactory explanation of the universe without Intelligence and Purpose. In his treatment of Freedom, he rejects alike the *a priori* generalizations of the mechanicist, and the attacks on the validity of physical laws such as that of the conservation of energy, made by philosophers like Stallo and James Ward. Instead, he maintains that the vital power can direct physical energy into new channels without any addition to the sum of that energy, that is, without violation of the law of its conservation. The author makes much of this contention, but he does not give it an adequate treatment. French Libertarians have handled it more thoroughly (for references, see Maher, *Psychology*, p. 521). And when Sir Oliver devotes himself to the more metaphysical side of the question of Freedom, it is doubtful whether he establishes a sufficient hasis for responsibility in its ethical sense.

Taken as a whole, the work has its faults and its merits. Some of the faults arise from its origin—it is largely a compilation, and in a compilation the treatment of subjects is likely to be incomplete and scattering. Moreover, the author speaks with the restraint of one who does not wish to go beyond the more manifest inferences which he can make from the data of scientific discovery, so that the note he strikes is sometimes weak and hesitant. But though this may be uncongenial to one with the temper of faith, it opens the way and leaves room for faith, so that adverse criticism may be ungrateful and unfair. Let us welcome it then as a step in the right direction, as a protest from one having authority against the arrogance of a self-satisfied Materialism which would reduce the highest and noblest elements of Reality to the level of the basest category of human experence.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

Psychology of Ants and of Higher Animals—by REV. E. WASMANN, S. J. pp. 200. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder. London and Edinburgh: Sand & Co.

This is a translation (translator's name is not given) from the second German edition of Fr. Wasmann's *Vergleichende Studien ueber das Seelenleben der Ameisen und der hoeheren Tiere*. It is, however, stated in the translator's preface that "the author has kindly added a series of notes and observations on the ant forms of the United States . . . the present work, therefore, is more than a translation; it may be called a new edition, revised and enlarged by Father Wasmann."

The work contains a short introduction which is followed by four chapters on the topics of animal community life, warfare and slavery, architecture, breeding and nursing; the conclusion occupies some eight pages. The book is very interesting reading, whether one agrees with all of Fr. Wasmann' contentions or not. It contains many original observations on the habits of the ant—an animal that has been the object of wonder ever since man took to observing the creatures about him; and which caused St. Augustine to write (quoted on the title-page): "Plus enim formicularum et apicularum opera stupemus quam immensa corpora balænarum."

The thesis of the essay is to show that, if intelligence is to be ascribed to the higher animals because of the highly developed activities exhibited in their community life, their warfare, their building and breeding habits, then intelligence should be allowed to ants; for the latter, as Fr. Wasmann endeavors to show, surpass even the higher animals in these particular spheres of activity. Since many animal psychologists grant intelligence to the higher animals, and are disposed to regard the activities of ants as purely instinctive or automatic, Fr. Wasmann urges that the exclusion of ants from the intelligent class is unwarranted.

He himself denies all intelligence to animals, understanding by intelligence the "power to act with deliberation and self-consciousness." According to him, all the wonderful reactions of ants—and he relates some amazing anecdotes of ant "intelligence"—can be explained by merely sense impressions received in an organism endowed by heredity with its own peculiar nervous system and powers of sensitive cognition and appetite (conation). But all the reactions of ants are not automatic, for these insects show a certain "plasticity" in their powers of cognition and appetite, leading to a modification of their usual behavior, as, e. g., in the tamed ant that was wont to lick the honey from Fr. Wasmann's finger. The mistake of the popular psychologist of animals is to call these exhibitions of sense-cognition and memory intelligence. In the conclusion the author takes roundly to task those writers who, like Brehm and S. Buechner, humanize the brute, and who "not only trifle with scientific psychology, but also drag into the mire the dignity of man."

We can recommend the work as an able essay to explain the so-called intelligence of ants on the part of one who has spent more than twenty years of his life in their study, and whose results have appeared in the leading zoölogical journals of Germany, as well as in popular form. This volume is a companion one to *Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom*—the two volumes having much the same purpose in view.

The translation is quite good; and there are very few misprints: on p. 149 amphibias is used for amphibians. There are numerous references to recent literature (mostly German), so that the book should prove valuable to one desirous of learning where information is to be had concerning the habits of ants.

J. C. HERRICK.

Tractatus De Divina Gratia Secundum S. Aphonsi M. De Ligorio Doctrinam et Mentem—by JOANNES HERMANN, C. SS. R., Rome, 1904, in 4to, pp. xiv, 754.

This very compact volume on grace, though published in Rome, comes to us from England. "Haec scripsimus in Collegio Liverpolitano quod exsules nos e Gallia fraterno hospitio recepit" (p. xiv). We can well believe that it is the result of many years of work, as the modest writer states in his letter to Pius X, "in quo scribendo plurium annorum operam collocavi." For it is a real work to go through its 754 pages—a pleasant study, however, and not a painful task. Nevertheless, the reviewer candidly thinks that the book could profitably be shorter—and this for two reasons: because it would be read by a greater number who would thus profit by it, and also because some antiquated and useless questions might disappear, to the no slight betterment of the treatise as a whole. To mention immediately the point which is the most original as well as the most interesting: the system of Saint Alphonsus Liguori on the mode of operation of actual grace is exposed at length and vindicated with filial devotion. Many readers will be surprised to learn that there is such a system. For it is seldom mentioned in our text books, "Prorsus ignorent vel tam parvi faciant, ut illud absque examine rejiciunt et ne dignum quidem reputant quod exponatur a theologo." (p. 501).

The faithful son of Saint Liguori grows indignant at such conduct. It is fortunate, we think, that his remonstrances are in Latin. "Istius agendi ratio ad minus in eis denotat vel insignem ignorantiam, vel stupendem animi levitatem, vel pertinacem præconceptis opinionibus adhæsionem, theologo plane indignam." This silence seems all the more incomprehensible as Saint Liguori is not the first who proposed this *via media* theory: Ysambert, Duval, Hubert, Le Moyne, Duplessis d'Argentré, Tournely and other professors at the Sorbonne had already advanced it as the best solution of the difficulties. We notice, by the way, that Father Hermann has a strong leaning towards the Sorbonne and its Doctors, and more than once (e. g., p. 52), we see his preference for their opinions.

The obvious danger which is incurred by the defenders of any *via media* theory is that they are exposed to attacks from both sides—in this case from Jansenists, Thomists, and Augustinians on the one hand, and from Molinists and Congruists on the other. Very sharp attacks they can be, too—"digladiantur" (p. 34) is the rather bellicose expression by which Father Hermann himself describes the conflict of views amongst theologians. But the advantage of such a position, Father Hermann claims, is that you can borrow the good points from every system and turn opponents into friends and co-workers. "Nobis agendum est contra omnes patrones aliorum systematum, ita tamen ut eos ad nostram sententiam stabiliendam coadjutores habeamus." (p. 339). Now this system which Saint Liguori does not hesitate to call "multo probabiliorem et æquiorem" may be summed up in two points: (a) For the performance of good works of a more difficult nature we need a grace efficacious *ab intrinseco, natura sua,* in the existence of which he believes in opposition to the Molinists; (b) for less difficult works, such as prayer, an ordinary grace called "sufficiens" is all that is required—but this sufficient grace can be changed by prayer into efficacious grace, notwithstanding the teaching of the Thomistic school.

Of course Thomists as well as Molinists will protest against this simple distinction. But the Thomists supply arguments to prove the first part, whilst the Molinists have accumulated proof upon proof to demonstrate against the Thomists that sufficient grace suffices. The foes have become friends. Should we call it "the triumph of failure?"

Let us now consider the appreciation passed on the Molinistic system by their new "coadjutor." It may be summed up: "Gratiam

Dei nimis extenuat . . . orationis necessitatem minuit. Falso aut saltem debili nititur fundamento"—the two-fold foundation being the *scientia media* and the fear that the Bannezians (not Thomists—for Saint Thomas is a Molinist!) would destroy human freedom (318-322). As for the Congruists, they are accused of doing away with the necessity and even the possibility of prayer; whilst of the Thomistic theory we are told (p. 275) that with such a system there is no longer any "gratia sufficiens." Sin would not be imputed to man. Human freedom seems to be done away with. God does not seem to will the salvation of all. Prayer is impossible and Christian hope is destroyed. That is all!

Amongst the different Thomistic systems, or rather the attempts to present a doctrine more in accordance with Tradition, one, it seems to Father Hermann, deserves a special examination. It was originated by the late Father Guillermin, O. P., in the *Revue Thomiste* (vols. 9, 10, 11). Since the death of the eminent Dominican and the publication of the book under review, the Abbé Maisonneuve has given a very lucid exposé of the system in the *Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique* (Jan., 1905). The conclusion of Father Hermann is that Guillermin's system, though very near to that of St. Alphonsus, is still at essential variance with it, since it does not admit that an efficacious prayer can be the result of a "gratia sufficiens."

It seems that our author's main objection against all the other systems is that they undermine the role of prayer in a more or less direct or disguised way (p. 464-465) whilst the system of St. Alphonsus, following the teaching of Tradition, is based as it were on the efficiency of prayer, which is called (p. 402) "omnium veritatum speculativa-practicarum populo christiano utilissima et maxime necessaria." Father Hermann is aware that a serious objection will be brought against his system; its lack of scientific character. For there is no philosophy in it. Neither the *scientia media*, nor the *decreta predeterminantia* are made use of! The answer (p. 400) is a confession that we are here confronted with an insoluble difficulty; opponents claim that it is soluble, but they fail to find a solution—which position is preferable?

One cannot help thinking that of the 250 pages on the question "De modo quo operatur gratia," many might be suppressed; many others would not have been written, if (1) we would not continue, against the most elementary rules of logic, to oppose the "gratia sufficiens" to the "gratia efficax;" (2) and if we would consider that grace is both (a) the excitation (or invitation) given to our faculties of intellect and will, and (b) that mysterious and intimate union by which God co-operates with us. Now if grace is viewed exclusively from the first stand point, evidently we make it efficacious; and the Molinists are right. If we take the second exclusively, grace is necessarily efficacious, *natura sua, ab intrinseco*: and the Thomists are right. Perhaps the above observation might help towards a reconcilation of the two schools . . . if they really desired it.

If actual grace is a mystery, habitual grace is a deeper one. With this remark we are introduced into the second part, on sanctifying grace. The author correctly distinguishes it from justification. But why does he not begin with justification? The discussion of the texts of St. Paul to the Romans, in connection with the Protestant theories of justification through faith and imperative righteousness, is weak. Indeed, there is a lack of careful critical exegesis all through the book. "Nescit homo utrum amore an odio dignus sit" (Eccl. ix) is still quoted because "theologi communiter utuntur" (p. 565). This reason does not suffice. We are told that the text from Sap. viii, 21, "Ut scivi quoniam aliter non possem esse continens, nisi Deus det" proves that there are infused moral virtues; whether it be considered as referring to wisdom or to chastity, either *in habitu* or *in actu.* He quotes (p. 571) Ps. lxxxiii, 12, "Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus." But what does "gratia" mean in that text?

Such books as Jovene *De Vita deiformi*; Terrien, *La Grace et la glorie*; Bainvel, *Nature et Grace,* should not be absent from a bibliographical list on Grace. The history of errors and their development is not treated in a satisfactory way. Why habitual grace is distinct from charity is not satisfactorily shown. Very weak is the answer to the objection: "How is it that infused virtues do not give facility to act?" Is it true to say (p. 640) that only men of extraordinary sanctity may have the same certitude of being in the state of grace as we have of adoring Christ when a pious priest tells us, "I have consecrated this host"?

Certain discussions are extremely curious. Selecting at random, p. 655 is devoted to the question: Are Elias or Henoch in a condition to merit, and do they merit? We are told that it is the custom of theologians to treat this question—*inquirere solent.* They might turn their attention elsewhere. It seems there are as many as five opinions. Some object to their meriting on the plea that after so many centuries they would surpass even St. John the Baptist in sanctity;

others cannot conceive the waste of time involved in their not meriting. Our author's opinion is "Nobis esse omnino ignotum"—a very sensible conclusion. Besides, there are some who think that Elias is really dead, and that Henoch may have never existed.

These defects, however, do not mar the good qualities of the book; our quoting them shows that the work is of such interest as to obtain for itself a careful reading. We cannot do better in conclusion than to quote from the letter written by the Pope to Father Hermann, "In re dogmatica emines."

L' Enseignement de Jèsus d'aprés les Evangiles synoptiques—par MGR. P. BATIFFOL, recteur de l' Institut Catholique de Toulouse. pp. xxvi-303. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie. 1905.

This volume belongs to the new popular series of scriptural publications which are being issued under the direction of Mgr. Batiffol, Father Rose, O. P., and Father Touzard, under the general title: *Bibliothèque de l'Enseignement Scripturaire.*

The publication of this series is one of the many evidences of the great revival of scripture study, at present going on among the clergy of France. That such a revival was much needed is plain, not only from the exposé of former conditions as set forth in Houtin's *Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIXme siècle,* but also from admissions expressed or implied in the Introduction to the series, supposedly from the pen of Mgr. Batiffol himself. Thus we are told that it has hitherto been impossible for French readers to find books treating scientifically the scripture problems of the day without having recourse to works written in German or English. With regard to modern scripture problems, works in French are either totally wanting, or they ignore most of the important questions at issue.

It is to meet this generally recognized need that the present series has been projected, and in the mind of its promoters it is intended to occupy a place in French biblical literature similar to that held by the Cambridge Bible collection in England and America. This revival of interest in scientific Bible study is remarkable for its brilliant display of scholarly activity. Plainly the scientific movement inaugurated by the *Revue Biblique* and its distinguished school has been eagerly caught up by the younger generation of scripture scholars with that lively enthusiasm so characteristic of the Gallic race.

The present volume on *The Teachings of Jesus* is by force of circumstances an implicit reply to Abbé Loisy's remarkable work, *L' Evangile et l' Eglise*, as this last was an answer to Harnack's *Wesen des Christenthums*. The author, however, endeavors to prescind from all controversy and disclaims any apologetic purpose, desiring to confine himself to a simple historical exposition.

The work is divided into seven chapters, as follows: (1) The Method of Jesus' Teaching; (2) The Teaching of Jesus and the Jewish Law; (3) The Fatherhood of God; (4) The Religion of Regenerate Man; (5) The Kingdom of God; (6) Jesus Himself; (7) The Future.

Under these titles the learned author essays to portray the broad lines and the principal ideas of Christ's teaching as embodied in the three first Gospels. It is not claimed that the synthesis thus set forth is a complete presentation of the teaching of the Master, for this can not be grasped in its integrity unless, together with the synoptic tradition, account be taken also of the Fourth Gospel and the subsequent tradition of the Christian Church. However, it is beyond question that a synthesis drawn from the Synoptic Gospels, though necessarily incomplete, must be regarded as basic in any scientific treatment of the question according to the historical method.

The introduction of the work is devoted to the task of showing that the Synoptic Gospels as regards the teaching of the Savior are substantially reliable.

While the treatise cannot claim to embody the final word on so difficult and delicate a subject—this indeed will be impossible until the intricate problem of the literary and historic interdependence of the Synoptic Gospels shall have received a much greater amount of critical attention than has thus far been expended on it, at least on the part of Catholic scholars—Mgr. Batiffol's work is certainly an interesting and very valuable contribution to the literature which has for its object to elucidate the beginnings of Christianity.

James F. Driscoll.

I. **Justin: Apologies**—Texte Grec et Traduction Française, Introduction et Index—par Louis Pautigny, Alphonse Picard. Paris, 1904. pp. xxvi. 200.

II. **Eusebe: Histoire Ecclesiastique, Livres I-IV.**—Texte Grec et Traduction Francaise—par Emile Grapin, Alphonse Picard. Paris, 1905. pp. viii. 524.

During the last quarter of a century religious studies have made remarkable progress in the intellectual world. The scholarly works that have been issued testify to the absorbing interest which has centered about the history of Christianity, and especially about its early ages. And the study of Patrology has received an impetus that promises a very decided improvement in the manner of treating this branch of religious history. Hitherto the general student of patristic literature has had to cope with many inconveniences, among which may be mentioned the difficulty of securing access to a library of the Fathers, the immense size and bulkiness of the tomes and the not infrequent unreliable texts found therein. Hence the present volumes—the first of the series of "Textes et Documents," which are being edited under the able direction of Hippolyte Hemmer and Paul Lejay. The object of this series is to furnish the reader with original, reliable texts and literal French translations, together with an Introduction required by the work in question, and an Index which, among other things, will contain a list of the philosophical and theological terms used in the book. This object has been very well followed out in the volumes of Justin and Eusebius, which, besides having all that the editors claim for them, have been issued in a very neat and attractive form—as attractive and as handy as any text-book. Consequently the idea of bringing out such a series cannot be too highly praised, as it will prove of immense advantage to students of history and theology. For the benefit of those interested in this subject it will not be amiss to say that the following works are in course of preparation: The Apocryphal books of the New Testament (the first volume of which will appear in May), the Apostolic Fathers, the Apology of Athenagoras, the Miscellanea of Clement of Alexandria, the Panarion (or Heresies) of Epiphanius and a volume on the Greek Councils. Furthermore the editors have promised to issue in the future one or more of the most important works of Origen, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, Athanasuis, Basil of Cæsarea, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Leo, Gregory the Great, and Vincent of Lerins; also the Apostolic Constitutions, the Emperors' Constitutions and Letters relating to the Church, the African Councils, a Collection of Christian inscriptions and a volume on liturgical texts.

1. M. Pautigny has written a very interesting Introduction to his edition of Justin's work. There is only one manuscript that contains the two Apologies—it is in the National Library of Paris—and this

manuscript places the second Apology before the first. But this arrangement is wrong from a chronological viewpoint, for it is now certain that the second Apology was written after the first one. Eusebius, however, seems to mak no distinction between the Apologies, nor does any other writer mention two Apologies. Harnack, therefore, holds that the second is only a supplement—a postscript added later on to the first, on the occasion of three men having been condemned to death for being Christians. But this view has been rejected by Kruger, Cramer and others. And M. Pautigny himself holds to two distinct Apologies. Two features of this volume deserve special mention. There is a good bibliography after each point that has been discussed; and the Index, which is quite extensive, will prove useful to the reader.

2. The Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius will comprise two volumes, and a third one will contain the Introduction and an Index. At present only the first volume has appeared. The text is that of Schwartz, and so it is thoroughly reliable. The editors have retained Eusebius' custom of enumerating at the beginning of each book the titles of all its chapters. But in the French translation each title is repeated in its proper place, so that the reader will not be obliged to turn back in order to find out the subject of the chapter he is perusing. Unfortunately the Appendix contains but few annotations; however when additional information is required the student is referred to the best and most recent authorities on the subject.

John F. Morgan.

The Book of Ecclesiastes.—A new metrical Translation with an Introduction and explanatory Notes—by Paul Haupt, Professor of Semitic Languages in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. The Johns Hopkins Press. 1905.

For superficial onlookers, this book will be a puzzle. Students of the Old Testament who have kept in touch with the works lately published on Ecclesiastes, will recognize in it ideas exposed some time ago "I came to my conclusions fourteen years ago", says the author, "after having interpreted the Book in the Old Testament Seminary of the Johns Hopkins University for three years (1888-1891) and when I examined my notes last winter, I found hardly anything requiring modification." His views concerning the other books of the Old Testament have undergone considerable change; a number of books on

Ecclesiastes have appeared during that interval of time; but nothing has induced Professor Haupt to deviate from his original opinion.

His position is substantially this: The traditional text of Ecclesiastes is in a state of sad confusion, partly accidental, for the author might have left a number of parallel variants, without indicating which he preferred; partly intentional, his pessimistic, Sadducean and Epicurean doctrine being softened by interpretations, glosses, distinctions due to the "orthodox Pharisaic editors" who thus poured "some water into author's strong wine." Now Professor Haupt restores the original order of the work, which is the production not, of course, of King Solomon, but of a "prominent Sadducean phycisian" in Jerusalem, who was born at the beginning of the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164), and died in the first decade of the reign of Alexander Jamnœus (104-78 B. C.) and who may have completed his book at the age of 75. The genuine portions of Ecclesiastes are arranged in eight sections comprising 195 pairs of hemistichs. If, to illustrate the results obtained, we take the third chapter, we find that its different verses are distributed all over the book: iii, 1-8, should be the *first* section ix-xii; 10-11 should be in the sixth; 12-13 should be in the seventh; 15 should be in the first; whilst 15-22 should be in the fourth.

Needless to say that Professor Haupt confesses that he has "no mathematical evidence"; that he does not claim "to have been present when the editorial changes were made." Still he seems to be quite sure and altogether satisfied—his maxim being "that the probably right is preferable to the undoubtedly wrong." Now this last canon does not seem to cover the case. For to substantiate a fact, conjecture is not sufficient; now the question before us is one of fact, viz.: Did things happen concerning the composition of the books as the learned professor describes? We confess that in spite of the decidedly affirmative and somewhat absolute tone of the author, and even the ingeniousness of the system, we still remain sceptical.

Perhaps to explain this mysterious book, a little less stress should be put on the dislocation of the choirs, and a little more on the dreamy oscillation of a thought not strictly logical. What if the writer had allowed his thought to imitate the wind of which Ecclesiastes speaks (i, 6):

The wind it blows to the south
And the wind it veers to the north,
For ever veering, veering,
Again to resume its veering,

in order to soothe his imagination and to better picture the state of his soul?

For the rythmical English translation—a sample of which we have just quoted—Professor Haupt availed himself of the assistance of the distinguished co-editor of the Polychrome Bible and Shakespearean scholar, Horace Howard Furness. We are told that "the metrical question will be discussed in an article on the form of the Book of Ecclesiastes which will be published with the critical edition of the Hebrew text."

Grammaire Hébraique abrégée—par J. Touzard in 8vo. pp. xxiv, 395. Victor Lecoffre, Paris, 1905.

This new Hebrew Grammar does not claim to be, and in fact, is not, either an exhaustive or an advanced treatise on the Hebrew language. It is an elementary work exactly as intended by its distinguished author, the Abbé J. Touzard, recently appointed professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris. And it is an excellent introductory grammar: its general plan is good; the questions treated have been judiciously selected; and the method of treatment is clear and orderly.

The work is made up of two principal parts, really distinct from, and yet completing, each other. The first part (some 68 pages) would form by itself an excellent Hebrew Primer, if it were published separately with the Paradigms which the author has placed at the end of the whole volume. It supplies beginners with a concise, lucid, and accurate statement of the rules which concern Hebrew Reading and Etymology, together with progressive exercises in Reading and Writing. So that students who have mastered this first part of the Abbé's work are fairly equipped to translate Biblical texts, and fully prepared to read with profit the second part of Father Touzard's "Grammaire Hébraique."

The second part (pp. 69-385) is the Grammar proper. It deals with the Phonetics, Morphology, and Syntax of the Hebrew Language. In the treatment of these three great sections we cannot help admiring the amount of information given, and the accurate manner in which it is put. The author is manifestly familiar with the best works on Hebrew Grammar published before him. He is also an experienced teacher who has an eye to clearness, as well as to precision of expression, and who gradually introduces his students to the scientific methods of comparative Grammar. In particular, he is to be praised for the use he has made of the Hebrew fragments of Ecclesiasticus recently discovered. Perhaps one will regret (1) that he has not seen his way to treat more fully the Syntax of the Hebrew Sentences; (2) that he has not added to the valuable Index of Biblical passages, an Index of Topics; (3) that he has attached undue importance to the Massoretic Text, though he has used it in its best available form.

The book is printed with great care and accuracy. So that in this, as in the other respects, the "Grammaire Hébraique abrégée" is a work worthy of Fr. Touzard's reputation as a Scriptural teacher and a Hebrew scholar.

Francis E. Gigot.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Philosophy of Religion: A critical and speculative treatise of man's religious experience and development in the light of Modern Science and reflective thinking, by George Trumbull Ladd. LL. D., formerly Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. 2 vols., New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905.

The Reconstruction of Religious Belief, by W. H. Mallock. Harper Brothers, New York and London. 1905.

The Theory of Psychical Dispositions, by Charles A. Dubray, S. M., Monograph Supplement No. 30 of the *Psychological Review*. The Macmillan Co., New York. 1905.

God and Human Suffering, by Joseph Egger, S. J. London and Edinburgh, Sands and Co., St. Louis, B. Herder. 1905.

Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with some abridgement) of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* of Saint Thomas Aquinas, by Joseph Rickaby, S. J., M. A., Lond.; B. Sc. Oxon. Author of *Aquinas Ethicus*, etc., etc. Burns and Oates, London; B. Herder, St. Louis.

Elements of Practical Pedagogy, by the Brothers of the Christian Schools. La Salle Bureau of Supplies, Second Street, New York. 1905.

Studies from Court and Cloister: Being Essays, historical and literary, dealing mainly with subjects relating to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, by J. M. Stone, Author of *Mary the First, Queen of England, Reformation and Rennaissance*, etc. London and Edinburgh, Sands & Co. St. Louis, Mo., B. Herder, 17 South Broadway. 1905.

Il Libro D'oro: of those whose names are written in the Lamb's Book of Life. Translated from the Italian by Mrs. Francis Alexander. Little, Brown & Co., 254 Washington Street, Boston.

Politique Religieuse Et Séparation: Par Hippolyte Hemmer, Prêtre du Clergé de Paris. Paris, Alphonse Picard et Fils, 82 Rue Bonaparte. 1905.

Reflections from the Mirror of a Mystic. Translated from the Works of John Rusbrock by Earle Baillie. London, Thomas Baker. MCMV.

The Life of St. Teresa of Jesus, of the Order of Our Lady of Carmel. Written by herself. Translated from the Spanish by David Lewis. Third edition enlarged. With additional Notes and an Introducion by Rev. Fr. Benedict Zimmreman, O. C. D. London, Thomas Baker. MCMIV.

Universal History: An Explanatory Narrative by REUBEN, PARSONS, D. D. Author of *Studies in Church History, Some Lies and Errors in History*, etc.

The Pioneer Forecasters of Hurricanes, by the REV. WALTER M. DRUM, S. J., Published for the Observatory of Belen, Havana, Cuba. 1905.

Kurzgefasstes Handbuch der Katholischen Religion. VON W. WILMERS. Vieret durchgesehene Auflage. Mit bischoeflicher Approbation. Regensburg, Rom, New York & Cincinnati. Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Pustet, Typograph des Heil. Apostolischen Sthules. 1905.

A Story of Fifty Years: From the Annals of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Cross. 1855-1905. With Illustrations. Notre Dame, Indiana. The Ave Maria.

The Crux of Pastoral Medicine. The Perils of Embryonic Man: Abortion, Craniotomy and the Cesarean Section, by REV. ANDREW KLARMANN. Permissu Ordinarii Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati. 1905.

Life and Writings of St. Patrick, by MOST REV. DR. HEALY. Benziger Bros., N. Y.

Lex Levitarum, by the BISHOP OF NEWPORT. Benziger Bros., N. Y.

St. John Baptist De Rossi, by LADY HERBERT. Introduction by CARDINAL VAUGHAN. Benziger Bros., N. Y.

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

Edward A. Pace, was born in Florida in 1861. He entered St. Charles' College, Maryland, in 1876 and was graduated in 1880. As a student of the American College, Rome, he followed the courses in philosophy and theology at the Propaganda and received in 1886 the degree, Doctor of Theology. In preparation for work at the Catholic University, he spent three years in Louvain, Paris and Leipzig, receiving from the Leipzig University in 1891 the degree, Doctor of Philosophy. He was then appointed Professor of Philosophy in the Catholic University. His remarkably efficient work as a professor at that institution has not absorbed all of his energies. He was closely identified with the foundation of the *Catholic University Bulletin*; he is deeply interested in any movement for the advancement of education in Catholic schools, and he is one of the editors of the new *Catholic Encyclopedia*. His publications include numerous articles on psychological, educational, and philosophical subjects.

Charles D. Plater, was born in London in 1876. He made his studies at Stonyhurst, and in 1894 he entered the Society of Jesus. On account of his talent he was sent in 1900 to Pope's Hall, the house which the wise policy of the English Province has established at Oxford University. He took his degrees with honor from that famous institution. At present he is a classical master to the Jesuit candidates for Oxford at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst. Though still young he has already contributed to English Catholic periodicals a number of articles mainly on sociological topics, which have attracted attention.

WAS JUDAISM A CHURCH?

Rt. Rev. Mgr. Pierre Batiffol

Christianity and the Christian Church issued from the bosom of 1st century Judaism; hence the interest which a knowledge of this Jewish *milieu*, of its beliefs and institutions, has for the student of Christian beginnings. Of late years especially, historians of early Christianity have endeavored to concentrate upon this *milieu* all the light possible and to amplify to the fullest extent the henceforth classical chapter of the *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte* with the ulterior purpose of utilizing it for the study of the Gospel and of the early Church. Exaggeration was here as elsewhere a danger to be reckoned with, and it is the exaggeration of this tendency that has given an undue prominence to apocalyptic eschatology in the criticism of the Gospels, thus creating a current of opinion against which at present reaction is somewhat difficult. In reality, it was between Pharisaism and Messianism that the Gospel found its course, for it was itself identified neither with Nomism nor Messianism. But was not this course already open? Was there not a Judaism which consisted neither in strict legalism nor in apocalyptic expectations of the Messias—a kind of liberal, spiritualized, universalist Judaism? Hence the question arises: What was the nature of the influence exercised by the Judaism of the Dispersion upon the establishment of the Christian Church.

It is curious to note that critics who scarcely dissemble their reluctance to recognize ecclesiastical elements in Apostolic history seem to be captivated by the idea of making out the Judaism of the Dispersion to be a church. The paradox is in speaking, as does Dr. Harnack, of a "Jewish Church." This paradox has gained ground latterly having been made one of the fundamental theses of Bousset's work entitled: The Religion of Judaism during the New Testament Epoch.[1]

We may ask whether it is to be taken for granted that this view is sufficiently proved; and the object of the present paper is to enquire whether the idea is borne out by any newly discovered evidence, or is only the embodiment of a logomachy.

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[1] W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter.* Berlin, 1903.

Among the salient facts brought into full light by recent study and investigation is that of the geographical expansion of Judaism. Not only had the Jews from the time of the Hasmonean restoration (141—63 B. C.) Judaized Palestine by annexing to Judea Idumea, Perea and Galilee, but even before the Hasmoneans they had penetrated into the whole Greek world. This dispersion of Judaism among the Greek communities, begun in the days of Alexander, reached its climax in the time of Julius Cæsar and Augustus. The reign of Herod was its golden age. There were jewries in all the Roman provinces bordering on the Mediterranean and the Black Seas; they were found in Mesopotamia, in Arabia, in Babylonia, in Media, etc. A Jewish poet who lived about the year 140 B. C. could indeed without doing violence to facts pen the following emphatic verse:

Πᾶσα δὲ γαῖα σέθεν πλήρης καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα.[1]

Statistics of this Jewish expansion have more than once been prepared by noting in texts of authors and in inscriptions all the traces referring to the existence of these jewries of the Dispersion, in Asia, Asia Minor, Africa and Europe. We need only mention the most complete of these statistics, that of Schuerer.[2] One fact is easily deducible from it, viz., that the expansion of Judaism did not coincide with the first expansion of Christianity. The great centres are of course the same—it could hardly be otherwise. These are Antioch, Damascus, Smyrna, Ephesus, Thessalonica, Athens, Corinth, Alexandria and Rome. But Christianity did not penetrate at first into certain other places where nevertheless Judaism had already found a home, for instance, Palmyra, Nisibus, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, the borders of the Black Sea, the Archipelagoes, Sicily, the interior of Egypt, and Roman Africa.

Another point to be observed is the numerical importance of the jewries of the Dispersion, particularly in Syria, in Egypt, in the provinces of Asia Minor and in Rome. It is calculated that at the time of Philo the Jews numbered 13 per cent. or about one-seventh of the whole population of Egypt. Philo estimated the number of Jews living in Egypt to be about one million. Under Tiberius 4,000 Jews were deported from Rome to Sardinia under pretext of forcing them into military service; a fact which would justify the estimate that the jewry in Rome counted at least 10,000 men, to say nothing of the women and children. Harnack reckons that the Jews represented about 7 per cent. of the total population of the Roman Empire at the time of Augustus.[1] These figures, quite conjectural though they be, would throw not a little light on the rapid spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire if it were proved that Christianity was propagated exclusively or even easily in the jewries. But it is certain that from the year 64 the Roman legislation distinguished Christians from Jews—a fact which suffices to prove that the whole body of Christians were not Jews by race, and also that the Jews were a population which formed a race apart.

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[1] *Oracul. Sibyll.* iii, 271.

[2] Schuerer, *Geschichte des Juedischen Volkes*, t. iii, p. 2—37.

A third ascertained fact is that the Jewish population resisted assimilation to the peoples in whose midst it was established. The race was bound to a faith which by its rigorous obligations tended naturally to isolate its adherents from their social surroundings. Thus mixed marriages were prohibited; Jews were forbidden to frequent theatres, circuses, gymnasia, baths, etc.; they were forbidden to sit at the same table with a Pagan. They were bound by an interdict against military service and public office. Real legal privileges assured to the Jews practical liberty in their religion, permitted them to assemble in their synagogues, to have their own judges, to render justice according to their laws, to observe the Sabbath and to practise circumcision; but these privileges only contributed to separate them still more from their social and religious surroundings. Finally, antisemitism completed their exclusion, for even in these times the fanatical hatred of the Jew was in the air, and it found vent not only in sarcasm but frequently even in proscriptions and massacres. The Jews, on account of their race, formed in the full sense of the word a state within a state. "The Jews," says Strabo, "have at Alexandria an ethnarch who rules in their *ethnos*, and who presides in court, and signs orders as if he were the head of an independent state." This word "*ethnos*" or the word "*laos*" was claimed by the Jews as the official name of their jewries in other places, for instance, in Smyrna and Hierapolis, as is known from the inscriptions.[2]

This through and through penetration of the Jewish race by its religious faith is a phenomenon to which Bousset seems not to have attached sufficient importance, or rather he has simply failed to take it into account. According to him the phenomena which indicate the transformation of Judaism into a church are the following, viz. the dissociation of religion from national life; then the fact that such dissociation does not issue in pure individualism but rather in the rise of community forms which are religious without being national; and finally the fact that these community forms or organizations extend beyond the boundaries of the nation. "It is only when these three symptoms appear that we have a right to speak of a tendency toward the formation of a church."[1]

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[1] Harnack, *Mission und Ausbreitung*, p. 5.

[2] Schuerer, p. 11-13.

Bousset seems to be misled by a confusion which he himself creates between national life and political autonomy. The latter in some degree at least, was possessed by the Jews in the time of the Hasmoneans. That autonomy consisted in their being governed by princes of their blood and of their faith. On no other terms could they conceive political legitimacy, but the national life was not dependent on this condition. For—and it is an observation of the historian Josephus which Bousset has recalled quite *a propos*[2]—the Jewish people had this peculiarity that its national constitution was neither monarchical, oligarchical or democratic, but theocratic. It should be added that the theocracy had no need to be exercised by a prince, be he of the most direct and authentic line of David, nor by an organized and traditional priesthood. The law alone was sovereign, and it alone represented the sovereignty of God. And since, individual defections apart, nothing could detach a Jew from the law of God, and since that law regulated to the last detail his whole life, private, social and religious, no dissociation of religion from national life was possible no matter where that life found its abode.

And if the Jew emigrated so easily, and if, once emigrated, he established himself and multiplied so rapidly without ever being absorbed by neighboring populations, the reason is, that renouncing all political existence he found everywhere what he sought, viz. the possibility of living in security his national life, that is to say, the life conformed to the institutions given by God to his people.

Unlike the Greeks who had pushed so far the science of civil government, the Jews from the time of the Hasmoneans and the Herods, not having found the political elements of that science in the Law, were unfit for politics as well as for war, and their history proves it superabundantly. But they were indeed the people least of all exposed to individualism. For the more religion isolated them from the people among whom they lived, the more strict was the solidarity with which it bound them together among themselves. "Quia apud ipsos fides obstinata," writes Tacitus, "misericordia in promptu, sed adversus omnes alios hostile odium."[1] Everywhere reviled and threatened, they congregated in quarters by themselves so that they might the better defend themselves and mutually aid one another. They had their synagogues where they met every Sabbath; they had their own cemeteries where they were buried side by side.

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[1] Bousset, *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

Thus there came to be imposed upon them certain community institutions not provided for by the Law. Bousset is quite right in mentioning in this connection the synagogue service—service of prayer and instruction—a late institution it is true, since it goes back only to the 2nd century of our era; an institution nevertheless which was to be found in every jewry whether in Palestine or in the Dispersion. In each jewry the synagogue was the centre of national life, because it was the home of piety and a depository of the knowledge of the Law. Each jewry was so well represented by its synagogue that even in Jerusalem the Jews of Alexandria had a "synagogue of the Alexandrians" and likewise those from Cyrene had a "synagogue of the Cyreneans." (Act. VI, 9) Bousset might have observed, however, that in each jewry the community institutions were modeled after the institutions of the Greek municipal communities. The synagogue was a προσευχή; it was also on certain days, a deliberative assembly. he expression συναγωγή τῶν 'Ιουδαίων, was synonymous with ἔθνος τῶν 'Ιουδαίων with κατοικία τῶν 'Ιουδαίων, and with *Universitas Judæorum.*[2]

The synagogue had at its head an αρχισυνάγωγος to preside at prayer and instruction, but it had also an Archon elected to administer the temporalities of the jewry, and with the Archon a council of ancients (γέροντες, πρεσβύτεροι). These community institutions were therefore the issue of the conditions of the national life of the Jews of the Dispersion, and they bear witness to the indissoluble association between what was national and what was religious.

Bousset sets forth the principal bonds which united the Jews of the Dispersion to the Holy City; the annual tax of the didrachma paid to the treasury of the Temple, the unity of the calendar, the pilgrimages to Jerusalem, and the religious communications between Jerusalem and the Dispersion.[1] But do these bonds constitute a church or do they merely testify to the national and religious unity of the Jewish people? The centralization at Jerusalem is the exterior sign of that unity, and that centralization is attested by those pilgrimages and contributions of money, yet this centralization is so far from creating that unity that the latter will survive the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple. The unity of the calendar has its *raison d'etre* in the Law. It is not necessary therefore to suppose new tendencies in Judaism in order to explain these new bonds; here again the race and the Law are responsible for the unity.

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[1] *Histor.*, v, 5.

[2] Schuerer, t. iii, p. 39—51.

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Historical experience teaches us that the notion of a church excludes the consideration of race, and no less does it exclude the idea of a book. It rather connotes the idea of a spiritual society and a living tradition. If any tendency really new in Judaism can suggest the notion of a church it should be sought in hellenization and in proselytism.

Bousset has, we believe, well characterized hellenization when he describes it as a transformation of Judaism into wisdom (p. 74). In fact, from the day it entered the environment of hellenic civilization, and notably at Alexandria, Judaism was forced to assume an apologetic attitude, and in order to gain a hearing it had to present itself as a σοφία. Jewish wisdom had in its favor that it was more ancient than any other. The noted synchronisms of Greek and Jewish history were the starting point of the first attempt to compose a universal history, and in the latter everything extolled the prodigious antiquity of the Jewish people and its role in the origin and development of civilization.

The contradictions of Greek philosophy, the extravagances of Greek Paganism served to bring out into strong relief the unity, the vigor, the solidity of the Jewish faith, which, in its essential content, its monotheism and its ethic, could easily pretend to be the native and normal wisdom of humanity.

A great movement of Jewish thought therefore, very different from Judean pharisaism—a movement at work for three centuries—was the real cause which brought about the hellenization, and, if we may use the term, the universalization of Judaism.

The Hebrew Bible hitherto inaccessible to the Greeks was translated (at least in part) in the 3rd century B. C. It was an innovation detested by the Jewish zealots—one which even the legend of the pseudo-Aristæus failed to render acceptable, but it afforded a new and unheard of source of information for the Greeks, and the hellenizing Jews began immediately to exploit and interpret it. In the 2nd century Aristobulus, exegete and philosopher of Alexandria, started the idea that the great masters of Greek thought, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, etc., were simply disciples of Moses. This idea, says Bousset, became the fundamental dogma of Hellenistic Judaism. The better to establish it and for the glorification of the Jewish cause apocryphal and falsified texts were attributed to Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides with a view to bring these writers into harmony with Moses. Allegorism which is to the Scriptures what euhemerism[1] is to the mythological legends, completed the process of hellenization. Philo the contemporary of Jesus, Philo the encyclopedic philosopher, is the best representative, it has often been said, of this neo-Judaism.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

It would, however, not be in accordance with facts to make this hellenization responsible for another deeper tendency noticeable in the Judaism of the period, viz. that of minimizing ever more and more the importance of ritualistic worship. It is clear that this worship as centralized in the Temple of Jerusalem was continually losing its attraction (and influence) and that the real aliment of Jewish piety was furnished by the services conducted in the various synagogues. However, this was not due to hellenization, for this piety without altars was in opposition to the Greek spirit. It had its origin in the preaching of the prophets, in the historical conditions that had followed the destruction of the Temple, in the very fact of the dispersion, and finally in the very religious and very ancient conviction that mercy is better than sacrifice. Nor was the unpopularity of the Temple priesthood a consequence of the hellenizing movement; it was rather due to pharisaism and to the political and doctrinal ideas of the priestly caste. On the other hand, while the Temple with its priesthood was losing its importance and prestige, and even might soon have disappeared altogether without any serious detriment to the religious faith of the Jews, nevertheless the ceremonial obligations enjoined by the Law retained all their binding force, nor were they undermined by the hellenizing tendency though the latter sought to attach to them an allegorical signification.[1] Thus the character of the hellenistic movement becomes manifest. It was a philosophy of religion developed within the religion itself.

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[1] Euhemerism, so named after its author Εὐήμερος, a Greek philosopher of the 4th cent. B. C., is the theory which explains polytheistic mythology as resulting exclusively or in the main from the deification of dead heroes, and thus regards the myths as being derived more or less remotely from historic facts and personages.

It would be impossible to institute a comparison between the culture of the hellenistic Jews and the tradition of the rabbis. These latter claimed confidently to hold in their possession the key of knowledge and the chair of Moses. Their claim rested on a παράδοσις or tradition which was assumed to have come down to them in direct succession from the Great Lawgiver of Israel through Joshua, the Elders, the Prophets, the great Synagogue and its last representatives among whom were Simon the Just and his disciple Antigonus of Soko, and later Shammai and Hillel, and so on. Rabbinism was indeed traditional, but it was manifestly a tradition without speculation, without criticism without progress; which is tantamount to saying that it was without life. Yet it retained a respectable and imposing authority which no one thought of setting aside how onerous soever it might appear to the indocile. Bousset sees clearly that all this is entirely foreign to hellenistic Judaism;[2] and he is forced to acknowledge (with certain reservations) that though the Hellenists did possess a theology, theologians and a theological literature, their theology did not have, as in Palestine, the character of an authoritative jurisprudence formulated in the shape of official decisions. On the contrary it was something private and in this respect did not differ from the popular philosophy of the Greeks. It was a spontaneous development, issuing from the need felt by the Jews of the Dispersion to define their attitude towards hellenism and meet the exigencies of their new surroundings. Thus it was apologetical rather than judicial, and its exponents had become the masters of the Dispersion without having been invested with any authority save that conferred on them by public confidence and the intrinsic value of their teaching. From this point of view Aristobulus and Philo cannot be compared with Shammai and Hillel, and still less with Melito or St. Irenæus. At most, a comparison might be admitted between them and St. Justin who was a philosopher and a layman.

It may be said therefore that the hellenization of Judaism was an intellectual movement resulting from the contact with Greek civilization, but it did not involve any schism as regards the national life of the Jews of the Dispersion.

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[1] Bousset, p. 110.

[2] Bousset, p. 148.

There remains the question of "proselytism." Did not this feature constitute among the Jews a status outside and independent of Jewish national life?

The proselytes that is, the contingent of Greeks converted to the Jewish faith formed during the most prosperous period of the Dispersion, an important element in every jewry. The enlightened Jew had but to read the prophets to be convinced that in the Law he possessed the light which was destined to illumine the Gentile world. Convinced as he was of the superiority of his religion, to convert a Greek to Judaism was to compel as it were, a recognition of this superiority. The Pharisees therefore no less than the Hellenists were ardent in this propaganda.

"But if thou art called a Jew, and restest in the law, and makest thy boast of God, and knowest His will, and approvest the more profitable things, being instructed by the law

Art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light of them that are in darkness,

An instructor of the foolish, a teacher of infants, having the form of knowledge and of truth in the law.

Thou therefore that teachest another, teachest not thyself; thou that preachest that men should not steal, stealest;

Thou that sayest, men should not commit adultery, committest adultery; Thou that abhorrest idols, committest sacrilege;

That thou makest thy boast of the law, by transgression of the law dishonorest God." (Rom. ii, 17-23).

Though not equalling in number the votaries of Isis or of Mithra, the proselytes in the various Jewish centres were very numerous. It must be admitted, however, that they formed a floating contingent, for even according to the testimony of Josephus many of them failed to persevere. But be that as it may, each synagogue had its group of proselytes. When St. Paul at Antioch in Pisidia addresses his hearers: "Ye men of Israel, and you that fear God" he designates by the latter (φοβούμενοι θεόν) the proselytes. The author of the Acts uses with regard to them a synonymous term (σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν) often met with in epigraphy—the Latin equivalent being "Metuens."[1]

Rigorously speaking these σεβόμενοι or φοβούμενοι, these "fearers" of God, were not προσήλυτοι in the strict rabbinical sense of the term. The proselytes of the latter category were those Pagans who having submitted to the rite of circumcision observed strictly all the prescriptions of the Mosaic Law. These proselytes of the "strict observance" were, it is believed, very few in number, and were in fact incorporated into the Jewish people. Thus St. Paul says to the Galatians (v. 3) "And I testify again to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole law." Only the circumcised converts, and consequently observers of the Torah were the "proselytes of righteousness"—proselytes in the strict sense of the word.[1] To belong to this class besides accepting the rite of circumcision it was necessary to offer a sacrifice in the Temple and receive a kind of baptism. The sacrifice was naturally omitted after the destruction of the Temple, but an interesting question arises with regard to the character of the baptism. Was this characteristically Christian rite already in use among the Jews?

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[1] Schuerer, t. iii, p. 124.

It must be acknowledged that the texts upon which we must depend as sources of information on this point are of questionable value and meagre in detail. Seeberg who in a recent work[2] treats the question *ex professo*, puts forward a description of the initiation of proselytes taken from the treatise *Jebamoth* of the Talmud which at the earliest cannot be prior to the 3rd century A. D. He adds another description taken from the *masseket Gerim* which goes back to the latter half of the 2nd century. These two descriptions agree. They represent the candidate as being interrogated concerning the Jewish religion which he is about to embrace. After having answered satisfactorily he undergoes the rite of circumcision followed immediately by a baptism or bath, called in *Gerim* "the bath of levitical purification," or "the bath of purification." In the treatise *Jebamoth* are related the decisions of two rabbis who lived toward the close of the 1st century A.D., viz. R. Eliezer and R. Josua. The former says: "A proselyte who is circumcised but not baptized is nevertheless a proselyte, for we know with regard to our Fathers that they were circumcised, but not that they were baptized." The latter affirms that "He who is baptized but not circumcised is already a proselyte for we know with regard to our mothers that they were baptized but lacked circumcision. The conclusion drawn by the "Sages" is that "neither a circumcised person who is not baptized nor the unbaptized man who lacks circumcision is truly a proselyte, but only he who is both circumcised and baptized and these maxims of R. Eliezer and R. Josua give us to understand that the baptism was not a very ancient rite since the former recalls that his ancestors were only circumcised. The solution given by the "Sages" is one of conciliation—a compromise in view of the existing practice of receiving baptism. It would seem that the controversy concerning the necessity of baptism was contemporary with the Rabbis above mentioned, viz. about the year 100 A. D. Arrian who wrote in the first half of the 2nd cent. is quoted to the effect that the true proselyte is he who has received both the rite of baptism and circumcision.[1] This writer furnishes evidence that the rite of baptism was an established custom in his day a fact which of course is no warrant that the custom was not a matter of discussion half a century earlier. A very important and significant circumstance is the silence of Philo and Josephus concerning the matter, a silence which seems to make it clear that baptism did not have in their day the importance that it had attained in the time of Arrian. And this acquired importance was due probably to the concurrence of the Christian baptism and of a similar rite in the worship of Mithra.

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[1] Schuerer, t. iii, p. 127—128.

[2] A. Seeberg, *Das Evangelium Christi* (Leipzig, 1905) p. 98—101.

In reality a Pagan became a Jew only by circumcision But for any adult who had submitted to this rite even though he were of Jewish parentage, there remained a legal defilement resulting from the fact of his having been (for a time) uncircumcised. The following rabbinical case is quoted in this connection.[2] Can a Pagan who has been circumcised on the eve of the Paschal feast partake of the passover the next day? The school of Shammai replied in the affirmative "He takes the ablution and eats the passover." The School of Hillel answers negatively, for "a man who comes forth from the state of uncircumcision is like a man who comes forth from a tomb," which is equivalent to saying that he is legally defiled for the space of seven days. (Numbers xix, 16). In any case the Pagan was defiled in the eyes of the Jew and thus he needed to be purified by an ablution before being incorporated into the chosen people. "Judaeus cotidie lavat quia cotidie inquinatur," says Tertullian.[3] The baptism which precedes or follows circumcision is but a form of the *mania purifica* of the orthodox Jews.

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Even though these proselytes having become Jews, and Jews of the strict observance were incorporated into the Jewish people so as to be no longer distinguished from it—we would not say that Judaism constituted a church, because even including these proselytes of righteousness we have only a *people*. Can we find the beginnings of a church in the σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν, in these proselytes in the looser sense who were not circumcised and who did not practice the law?

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[1] Schuerer, t. iii, p. 132 Arrian, *Dissert. Epict.*, ii, 9.

[2] Schuerer, t. iii, 131.

[3] *De Baptismo*, 15.

Here hellenization aided powerfully the Jewish propagandism, for it presented Judaism as embodying a wisdom more ancient than any other, and, taking little account of ritual, exhibited the Jewish religion in its essence—monotheism and moral righteousness. The religious-minded Greek found therein a justification of his dissatisfaction with polytheism and mythology. "Judæi mente sola unumque numen colunt.... Igitur nulla simulacra urbibus suis, nedum templis sistunt; non regibus haec adulatio, non Cæsaribus honor"[1] Judaism when reduced to this essence had more to offer than had any of the philosophies, because it was philosophical without ceasing to be a religion. Judaism has been likened to the Oriental religions, such as those of Isis, Sabazios and Mithra, of which there were so many followers among the Greeks and Romans, but the comparison is hardly justified. It would be nearer the truth to say that Judaism was a reaction against these licentious mythological forms of worship so replete with pompous ceremonies which appealed to the senses. Judaism as it was understood by its hellenistic exponents had more affinity with stoicism than with the above named religions. But it was a stoicism imbued with the idea of God and retaining certain ceremonial observances without which there can be no external religion.

Josephus assures us that everywhere, in the cities of the Greeks as well as among the barbarians, could be found pious observers of the Sabbath, and he makes the same assertion with regard to the fasts and the rules concerning food.[2] St. Augustine quotes a text from Seneca which expresses the leavening of Paganism by the Jewish spirit and customs: "Cum interius usque eo sceleratissime gentis consuetudo convaluit, ut per omnes jam terras recepta sit, victi victoribus leges dederunt.... Illi tamen causas ritus sui noverunt: major pars populi facit quod cur faciat ignorat"[3] It is probable that in the mind of Josephus as well as of Seneca there is question only of a leavening influence more or less vaguely felt by the social communities Greek, Roman or barbarian on account of the contact with the Jewish communities in their midst, whereas we seek on the contrary a real adhesion to Judaism which would be characteristic of proselytism on a large scale.

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[1] Tacitus *Histor.* v, 5.

[2] *Adv. Apion*, ii, 39.

[3] Renan, *Origines*, vol. ii, pp. 255, 256.

Of this we find a case in Juvenal, viz.: that of a Roman who became an observer of the Sabbath, abstained from eating pork, etc. He was doubtless one of the φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν, hence the name "metuens" applied to him by Juvenal. But the son of this "fearer of God" embraced Judaism in the strict sense of the word. He received circumcision, repudiated his allegiance to Roman law, and acknowledged no law but the Torah.[1] The son is an instance of a true proselyte of righteousness duly incorporated into the Jewish people while the father became a Jew in a much less definite sense. The same, distinction appears in the story[2] of the conversion of the royal family of Adiabene, on the Tigris.

"This house," writes Renan, "Persian in origin, but already initiated into Greek culture, became almost entirely Jewish, and even devoutly so. . . . Izates, the head of the family, embraced Judaism on the preaching of a Jewish merchant named Ananias. . . . About the same time his mother Helena received instructions in the true religion from another Jew. With the zeal of a new convert, Izates wished to become circumcised. But he was strongly dissuaded from it by his mother and Ananias. The latter proved to him that the observance of the commandments of God was more important than circumcision and that a man could be a good Jew without this ceremony. This tolerant view was held by a small number of enlightened minds. Some time after a Jew of Galilee named Eleazar found the King reading the Pentateuch and showed him by the texts that he could not keep the Law without being circumcised. Izates was convinced and had the ceremony performed at once."[3]

A similar instance is that of the centurion Cornelius at Cæsarea. Cornelius was a centurion of the *Italian* cohort. He was therefore not a Jew. But he was pious "and fearing God" (εὐσεβὴς καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν) with all his house, giving much alms to the people, and always praying to God He is "just and fearing God (δίκαιος καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν) and having good testimony from all the nation of the Jews" On the occasion of the visit of St. Peter he called together "all his kinsmen and his special friends." When Peter returned to Jerusalem, he was reproached for having gone in to a stranger to the people (ἀλλόφυλος): "Thou didst go in to men uncircumcised, and didst eat with them."[1]

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[1] Iuvenal, *Sat.* xiv, 96—106.

[2] Josephus, *Antiq.* xx, 2—5.

[3] *De Civitate Dei*, vi, 11.

We have now three very characteristic instances of proselytism in the broader sense in contrast to the proselytism of righteousness. The proselyte in the former sense is not circumcised and does not observe the law; on the other hand, he makes profession of monotheism; he is pious, that is, he rejects Paganism; he practices the moral precepts of the Law, and observes some of its prohibitions. But no matter how great may be the good feeling he has for the Jews and they for him, he remains a stranger and unclean. This sort of interdict is raised only when he accepts circumcision and the full observance of the Law.

Can we find the necessary elements of a spirtual society, of a Church, in this group of adherents so loosely attached to Judaism, and, in the last analysis, unrecognized by it? And shall we identify this church, which Judaism regards as gentile and unclean, with Judaism itself, giving to both the name of the Jewish Church. This would be a striking abuse of words.

The truth of the matter seems clearly to be, that historic Judaism, that represented by the Pharisees, was based on the ideas of a people and a Law: A man was or was not a child of Abraham, did or did not observe the Law. Particularism was an essential article of the Jewish faith, and the idea of a Church is incompatible with it.

Hellenized Judaism had an intention of a religious universalism, but it conceived it less as a reformed faith than as an apologetic for the traditional faith, an argument to gain the respect of the Greeks. It has been justly said that hellenized Judaism defended its religious beliefs by means of hellenism, while pharisaism defended them against hellenism. Hellenized Judaism did not broaden the concept of the people of God nor did it minimize the idea of the Law; its apologetic was a literature, and nothing more. Proselytism, in fine, was the outcome of this apologetic, and like it, led up to circumcision. Anyone who stopped short of this was an *allophylus*, a stranger and unclean, for "the people" and "the Law" were all in all.

It has never been doubted, however, that this group of gentile adherents who were attracted towards Judaism by its theodicy and ethics were exceptionally well prepared to appreciate the Church. The puritanic exclusiveness of Judaism itself was not a Church.

PIERRE BATIFFOL.

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[1] Acts, x, 2—24; xi, 3.

THE DILEMMA OF EPICURUS

Thomas J. Gerrard

In the middle of the last century we were made to believe that Christian doctrine develops. At the beginning of the present century we are being made to realize that Christian apologetic develops also. And so it comes about that our answer to the old dilemma must be polished and re-set. Perhaps never since the time of Epicurus has the difficulty been exploited with such effect as during these last fifty years. John Stuart Mill stands as its sponsor before the world of thought; and a host of inferior writers have carried it down to the populace which thinks not. Thus reads one of them in a popular newspaper:

> "For the problem was: Given a good God, how can He have created mankind, knowing beforehand that the vast majority of those whom He created were to be tortured forever? Given a just God, how can He punish people for being sinful when they have inherited a sinful nature without their own choice or of necessity? Given a righteous God, how can He allow sin to exist for ever so that evil shall be as eternal as good, and Satan shall reign in Hell as long as Christ in heaven? Worst of all puzzles, perhaps, was that of the existence of evil and misery and the racking doubt whether God *could* be good, and yet look on the evil and the misery of the world unmoved and untouched. It seemed so impossible to believe that a Creator could be either cruel enough to be indifferent to the misery, or weak enough to be unable to stop it. The old dilemma faced me incessantly: 'If He can prevent it and does not, He is not good; if He wishes to prevent it and cannot, He is not Almighty.' I racked my brains for an answer. I searched writings of believers for a clue, but I found no way of escape."

The Vatican Council,[1] speaking of the relation between Faith and Reason, has told us that "an empty semblance of contradiction arises either from the doctrines of Faith not having been understood and explained according to the mind of the Church, or from fanciful opinions being taken for the voice of reason." A typical example of this empty semblance of contradiction is the opinion according to which the vast majority of those whom God created were to be tortured for ever. This view, although maintained by men of great name, never was a part of Catholic truth. The collective experience of the Christian body has discovered that such a doctrine is at variance with its inmost needs and highest aspirations; that it is out of harmony with its spiritual life; that it is unresponsive, nay, repulsive to that prompting of the Holy Spirit saying that the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour has appeared. A corruption is distinguished from a development by its transitory character; and for this reason the severe view of God's Providence is passing away, whilst the kindlier one[1] remains. No preacher now, having respect either for his moral or his intellectual reputation, harps upon the great multitude of the lost.

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[1] Session III, cap. 4.

The difficulty of sin and suffering, however, though softened by this development of thought, is not settled. The beginning and the everlasting persistence of evil are facts which are thrown in our faces, and which have to be reckoned with. Doubtless the unbeliever has presented these facts in a distorted setting, and doubtless he has scattered abroad a multitude of fallacies; but none the less doubtless has the Christian apologist been alive to the mischief, and none the less doubtless has he been successful in meeting the fallacies. Take one as an example. Why did God make man capable of sinning? Here it has been demonstrated beyond all question that without the power to sin, man would not have possessed the gift of free-will. Archbishop Ullathorne is a classical exponent of this point. In his chapter, "Why Man Was Not Created Perfect," he gives six forceful answers to the question: the necessity of there being only One Perfect Being, the dignity of free-will, perfection not until the final end is reached, the gradual manifestation of God to His creatures, the progressive advancement of the creature towards God, and the necessity of trial before approval. The reasoning is clear and conclusive as far as it goes. One can easily see why God did not make man so that he could not sin. But then there is a further question: Why did not God make man, not so that he *could* not sin but so that he *would* not sin? "When a man grows querulous," says the Archbishop, "over his own imperfect nature. . . let him reflect how much good he might have had, and has it not, because when the occasion offered, he failed in courage and let it pass." Yes, but why did not God give the courage? The Divine Will is so efficacious, that not only those things happen which God wishes to happen, but they also happen in the very *manner* in which God wishes them to happen. For the order and perfection of the universe, God wishes some things to happen of necessity and others not of necessity; and accordingly he has preferred secondary causes, some of which act of necessity, others not of necessity. When an effect therefore desired by God is produced by a non-necessary cause, such as any effect produced by the free-will of man, it does not follow that it happens merely because man's will is free, but rather that God, wishing that it should happen freely, prepared a free cause for it. God being able to move all things sweetly, each according to its own nature: a stone according to the law of gravitation, a brute according to the law of instinct, He also can move the human will to act according to its own nature, that is, without destroying its freedom.

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[1] I would here draw attention to a forthcoming essay on this subject by the late Bishop Bellord, the manuscript of which I have been allowed to read. It advances considerably further than the position taken up by Father Faber, and is undoubtedly the ablest vindication of the generous view that has appeared since the memorable chapter in *Creator and Creature.*

Thus it follows that God could have so arranged that man would never have wished to sin, and consequently never would have sinned; and this without interfering with liberty or impairing its dignity. He could have done it in three ways: first, by widening man's vision of Himself, or, in other words, by making the glass of mystery less dark; secondly, by infusing more strength into man's will; thirdly, by slacking the fires of concupiscence. In this way, the evil necessary for the manifestation of God's attributes would exist *in potentia*, but would never be reduced to act. But when we ask why God did none of these things, we can only answer reverently that that pertains to the inscrutable mysteries of the divine mind. The unbeliever, however, is not so reverent in his way of procedure. He replies immediately that our answer is no answer. "Here is an evident way," he says, "in which God could mend matters and does not. Such a God cannot be good. And the God who is not good can be no God at all."

Hand in hand with the difficulty of the kind of creation is the difficulty of non-creation. If God foresaw the evil why did He not prevent it by abstaining from creation? Two eminent Catholic writers have lately offered a solution, one in popular, the other in more technical fashion. Father Sydney Smith, S. J., in the *Month*,[1] answers as follows:

> "In the first place it is manifest that no injustice and no unkindness is done by the Creator to His creature in imparting to him a gift whereby he can, if only he will, secure for himself a life of solid and enduring, nay,

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[1] September, 1905.

even of eternal happiness; a gift which he can only wrest to his own ruin and misery by the most deliberate perversity. If, on the other hand, our Creator were to be under a sort of compulsion to leave such beings uncreated lest they should be guilty of this awful perversity, would He not be thus reduced, if the expression may be permitted, to the condition of one constrained to 'let sleeping dogs lie'? And would that be a condition worthy of the Omnipotent and Supreme? Does it not seem much more congruous that He should give life to whom He will, and vindicate His own supremacy by offering to each of His rational creatures the inevitable alternative of final salvation or final perdition, according as each faithfully submits itself to his law and government, or raises against Him the standard of revolt?"

Father Sharpe, in the *Dublin Review,*[1] writes thus:

"But if it is asked why God should not have abstained from creating rational creatures whose defection He foresaw, so that all who had received the gift of existence might eventually share the divine triumph over evil, it may be answered that so to have abstained from creating those whose rebellion God foresaw, would have been equivalent to conceding the victory to evil—not actual indeed, but already visualized in the eternal present of God's foreknowledge; God would have, in fact, already yielded up His Will to the perverted will of possible creatures, which is inconceivable."

Of course both the writers whom I quote, first entrench themselves, as every Catholic must, behind the primary truth, that whatever God does is right and just; that whatever sense of justice and goodness is in man must come from a First Cause which is itself supreme Justice and Goodness; that whatever answer is given is but a reverent attempt to lift the veil of God's counsels; and that the success of such attempt may be imperfect and unsatisfying.

Now, whilst occupying a like position of safety, I beg most respectfully to take exception to the proffered solution. I find it anything but perfect and satisfying. That the Creator should impart a gift to the creature which He foresaw would be the occasion, nay, the cause of its eternal perdition, seems, as far as unaided human reason can see, most unkind if not indeed unjust. Neither do I see how the Creator, by leaving such beings uncreated, would be under any sort of constraint, or in any condition whatsoever unworthy of the Omnipotent and Supreme. Nor yet do I see how such abstention would be equivalent to conceding the victory to evil. The main consideration of Father Sharpe's article—supplemented by another article in a subsequent number of the same review[2]—is a most helpful and luminous contribution to a difficult subject. His idea is this, that the problem may be approached from two sides, the subjective and the objective; and in both cases produce practically the same result. By an induction from experience he shows that the *malum naturæ*, the mutual opposition of creatures, in some vague way represents the immanent relations in the divine nature; and by a deduction from the revealed truth of the threefold Divine Personality he shows the necessity of formal evil in creation. Leaving the time-worn metaphysical considerations, he embarks on the ethical. God created man to reflect His glory; and so man by looking into himself might see that reflection. This reflection, however, I venture to suggest, may be made more clear by giving up the attempt to answer the non-creation difficulty from reason; for, as I beg leave to think, it is unsatisfying, and unsatisfying because it is incomplete.

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[1] January, 1905.

[2] *Dublin Review*, July, 1905.

The old illustration of the child and the razor carries, I think, a valid reason in support of my point. Everyone must hold a father to be most unkind who would give to his little son a razor to play with, knowing beforehand for certain that the child would cut himself. Nor is the father excused because he gives the child serious warning of the danger. Nor yet again is the father made subject to the child because he exercises a fatherly care and foresight, and bestows his gift accordingly. Again, Christ bids us pray: Lead us not into temptation. One of the most ordinary graces of our lives is that God, foreseeing our sure fall under certain circumstances, keeps us out of those circumstances. He does not, however, by so doing, concede the victory to evil. Or again, consider that countless number of possible sinners whom God might have created, and did not, and never will create. Is God defeated by them? Is He thereby put under constraint or denied his prerogative of supreme omnipotence? It will be answered that God abstained not with the view of preventing the evil, but from some other motive hidden in His own eternal counsels. Then, I say, why not so with the actual sinners? Why did God not abstain, not because of the evil which He foresaw, but in spite of it. There was at least one man who had better never been born. God, foreseeing his eternal loss, could have hindered it, could have abstained from creating the sinner, and yet in so doing *not* have been influenced by the action of the sinner. We may admit, of course, and maintain with all our heart and mind and soul that God had a wiser reason for creating—God in creating Adam knew beforehand he would sin, and yet pronounced the work to be very good—but at the same time grant that that reason has been concealed from us;

that as far as the rational evidence which He has vouchsafed us shows anything at all, it is that He might better have abstained from creation. To any reasonable mind it is evident that to hinder evil from having any existence whatsoever is a more complete victory over it than to allow it an eternal existence.

If, however, we are to give up these answers as being insufficient, what are we to put in their place? Is there anything better at hand? I admit at once that I know of no answer from purely rational sources. But I maintain that it is more honest and much better for the cause of the Church to say so than to advance such unsatisfactory reasons as we have been considering. Even after having travelled along the lines of these so-called answers, we are brought to mystery; and meanwhile our answers have failed to convince. To quote one of the writers who uses them, "what makes our subject so acutely and pathetically interesting is that the fact of all this sin in the world is taken by so many to be a convincing proof that there is no God, and therefore no divine warrant for the Christian religion, and it is just to this wide spread and widely spreading conviction that the growth of Agnosticism is mainly due."

Since then we must always fall back on mystery, I suggest that the mystery must be sought in another place. Let us admit at once, that as far as our limited power of reasoning goes, God does appear at times cruel and unjust. First, let our preamble of faith be established, whether from St. Thomas, or from Hegel or from Newman. Let our criteria of revelation be insisted upon. Then arguing from the fact that Eternal Goodness exists and that Eternal Truth has spoken, let us show that what seems to be the cruelty and the injustice of God, must, although we do not see the explanation, be only seeming. Let it be boldly and unflinchingly asserted that Christ sometimes appears in a garb of blood-guiltiness; that He came not to send peace but a sword; that He came to set a man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother; that the prophet foretold Him as such: "Clad in a vesture stained with blood, and His name was the Word of God."

And here I am not pleading merely the necessary limitation of human faculties as a reason for accepting what appears to be a self-contradiction. But I am offering an all-important reason for that limitation—the real answer is locked in mystery precisely in order to beget, to try and to strengthen faith. Therefore, I say, let be! Do not attempt to solve the mystery, but rather emphasize and accentuate it. Set it before the people as one of God's secrets which cannot and never was intended to be made known. Faith is a trial; and this seeming scandal in God's creation is the supreme trial of faith.

In seeking for a theological justification of this position, we cannot remind ourselves too often that there once was a man named Thomas Aquinas; and that he had an apostolic namesake. What the one taught by theological genius the other taught by sad experience. In both cases that teaching was the need of the predominant action of the will over the reason for the due perfection of an act of faith. The Angel of the Schools taught that we cannot believe that which is demonstrated; and that to say "I believe" means "I cannot demonstrate." The Apostle chose rather to arrive at faith by way of demonstration: "Except I shall see, I will not believe." But his Master duly corrected him: "Blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed." And so we find that minds so very different from each other as those of Scotus, Aquinas and Newman all agree on this principle. It is one of the leading characteristics of the Scotist[1] system which I need not stay to point out. St. Thomas indeed does maintain that, considered in themselves, the understanding is of more importance than the will; but that considered in relation to their object, and when that object is faith, then the will is of supreme importance.[2]

> "When the good thing perceived is more noble than the soul itself, then by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the understanding. But when the good thing perceived is below the soul, then in comparison with such thing, the understanding is higher than the will. Hence the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; on the contrary, however, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love of them." Again, he says:[3] "The understanding of one who believes is determined not by the reasoning faculty, but by the will; and, therefore, assent stands here for an act of the understanding so far as it is determined by the will." And once more:[4] "Faith implies an assent of the understanding to that which is believed. For the understanding assents to a thing in two ways: one way because it is moved to this by the object itself, which is known by means of itself or by means of something else; the other way, not because it is sufficiently moved thereto by its proper object, but by reason of a certain choice freely declining to one side rather than to the other. And if perchance this is with doubt and fear lest the opposite may be true, then it is but an opinion; but if it is with certainty

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[1] Vide *Sent. IV*, dist. 49, qu. 4.

[2] *Summa*, p. 1, qu. 82, a. 3.

[3] *Summa*, 2a 2æ, qu. II, a. 1, ad 3m.

[4] *Summa*, 2a 2æ, qu. I, a. 4, C.

and without such fear, then it is faith. Those things are said to be seen which of themselves move our understanding or sense to a knowledge of themselves. Whence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can concern the things seen either according to sense or according to understanding."

Then as for Newman there is his remarkable passage:[1]

"If I am asked to use Paley's argument for my own conversion, I say plainly, I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts."

Indeed a very strong re-action seems to have set in against that purely intellectualist analysis of faith which demanded syllogism for each step and looked upon the direct influence of the will as wholly illegitimate. And this re-action is due in no slight measure to the felt inadequacy of the intellectualist theory, a feeling voiced so eloquently by the *Grammar of Assent.*

As an evidence of this reaction I would quote the following, being the substance of the doctrine now being taught to students of philosophy in one of the most important of our seminaries:

"*Certain* and *evident* are but different degrees of the same assent in which there is no fear of the opposite, certainty being the state of mind by which the intellect clings with firm assent to some known truth. When a thing is 'evident,' the intellect is absolutely forced on account of the perceived impossibility of the opposite. Hence it is impossible that the will should move the understanding or the assent to anything else. When a thing is 'certain' the understanding is not absolutely forced on account of the perceived impossibility of the opposite, but the understanding is moved to assent rather on account of the perceived weakness of reasons which are adduced in support of the opposite. Nevertheless the understanding is impelled to an immovable assent in so far as the will *commands* the understanding to despise the paltry reasons for the contrary—*inclines* the intellect to assent in so far as it sees that the reasons for the opposite ought to be despised."

If this much can be said of certitude in general, how much more of the certitude of faith? The prominence given to intellectualism in the past has arisen from the circumstances of our age and country. The *rationabile obsequium* theme has been so overdone as to create an impression that our belief rests directly and not merely conditionally on arguments; whilst the truth that the assent of faith is an act of the mind produced—not passively by force of evidence, but actively by force of will-power, has become dull and dormant. Hence the necessity of a return to the pre-rationalistic age of theology. Man is a rational animal certainly; and much more. Suppose his reason acts perfectly and his will is weak, is he not less a man than if his will were stronger and his reason less infallible? Is it not in his will that freedom reigns? Is it not by that will-action striving against the forces of nature that man develops his manhood? Is it not by will-energy that man decides his eternal life? Is it not mainly by the act of the will that he unites himself to God? As St. Bonaventure says: "qualitas in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive affectione." Now if there is any question in all theology and philosophy in which this doctrine of the pre-eminence of the will needs asserting and repeating again and again, it is the fundamental question of the Dilemma of Epicurus. Let this need of direct will-action be clearly shown—then the dilemma becomes not an obstacle but a help to faith. Both the thinkers and the non-thinkers of mankind have busied themselves about it during at least the last twenty-two centuries, and from the rational side have scarcely touched it. Human nature cries out that there must be loving wisdom underneath, somewhere. Since neither horn of the dilemma affords rest, the soul must go seeking its satisfaction elsewhere: "Datur tertium" is its conviction. The "tertium" cannot be found in agnosticism, for conscience at least forbids that. The only escape is by the spontaneous free assent of the will clinging to the goodness of God in spite of the seeming contradiction. Thus by emphasizing the dilemma there has been excited the "wish to believe." Our text books state in a general way that there must be prevenient grace before faith can be received. May it not be that this dilemma is part of that prevenient grace? Without faith it is impossible to please God. Why then try to take away the greatest trial of faith, the fuel which purifies it and makes it burn more keenly?

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[1] *Grammar of Assent*, p. 425.

A characteristic test of any theory offered to the public in these days, especially in England and America, is its adaptability to life and action. Will it work? Is it true to experience? Does it meet the needs of man's whole being, mental, moral and aesthetic? A tree is known by its fruits, and grapes cannot be gathered from thorns, nor yet figs from thistles. Tested by this criterion the intellectualist answer to the old dilemma makes but poor show of success. Imagine a devout religious consoling the sufferers of Mont Pelée with the thought that the laws which govern earthquakes work for the good of countries at the other side of the earth; or a London priest comforting a dying consumptive with the argument that if the race were not thinned down there would be no room for life at all; or a Sister of Mercy helping a cancer patient with the suggestion that his malignant growth was no more part of God's design than are the ash-heaps around a factory furnace! Indeed it is very curious how the rationalising theologian, although he strains and strives after these forced reasons in his treatises, yet invariably falls back on the faith position whenever he comes face to face with the difficulty in real life. But only with half-success; for in his speculating moments he has thought that the rationalist position is that which one *ought* to adopt whether it satisfies the whole man or not. And the consequence is that when he comes to a poor sufferer, either of mind of or body, he has no other relief to offer than a sigh and an ejaculation: "Ah! well, I suppose it is all for the best." He has been striving after two incompatible possessions. He wants to have all the merit of faith and all the satisfaction of sight with regard to the same object. Faith however, will brook no such encroachment on her royal domain. If she will be possessed she must be purchased and the full price must be paid. He who will follow Christ must take up his cross and forsake all. Progress in the spiritual life spells sacrifice, and to this end there must be detachment of mind even as detachment of heart and affection.

If we look at God's economy in the world we find that He is ever calling for this will-action over and above the understanding. And if we look at the great experts who have best adapted themselves to that economy, the saints, we find that their strength has been proved and established precisely by answering to this call. God has said expressly: "My ways are not your ways, and your thoughts are not my thoughts;" and the saint has replied: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom; the earth is filled with thy riches." The infinitesimal fraction of view which God has given us of His universe is made bearable only by the exercise of will clinging to His word that He shall be justified in all His sayings. The children of Israel were placed in the wilderness in the midst of famine and starvation, whilst in Egypt they might have sat over the flesh-pots and eaten bread to the full. They were to gather bread fallen from heaven, but only sufficient for each day, in order, said God, "that I may prove them whether they will walk in my law or no." They preferred, however, to walk by sight. The result was that they lost the merit of faith; for the bread which they saved began to be putrified and full of worms. The patriarch Job, on the contrary, rescued himself by his will-energy. His outlook on life could scarcely have been made more appalling.

"'Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said: A man-child is conceived. Why came I out of the womb to see labor and sorrow, and that my days should be spent in confusion?'' Yet, although God had not abstained from creating, and although He had not hesitated to strike the innocent after creation, still the just man clung to Him with will and affection: "Although He should kill me, I will hope in Him."

In the Sermon on the Mount, this seeming paradox of God's unfairness was made the reason for the final touch of beauty, by which Christ made perfect His ethical system. Love of enemies had been dreamt of by no other morality. In this at least Christ placed His morality alone and above all others. "Love your enemies: do good them that hate you: and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you: that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven, who maketh his sun to rise upon the good and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust."

St. John of the Cross claims the dark night of God's seeming absence as a necessary experience of all those who will pass into the full light of Love. So great are the trials, he says, and so profound the darkness that no human knowledge can comprehend them nor tongue describe them. And faith, clinging faith, faith straining in spite of all obstacles, this is the faint flicker which is to lead us through the dark.

> That light guided me
> More surely than the noon-day sun
> To the place where he was waiting for me
> Whom I knew well,
> And where none but he appeared.
> O, guiding night:
> O, night more lovely than the dawn;
> O, night that has united the lover with his beloved
> And changed her into her dove.

The Blessed Lidwine, who thirsted and prayed so much for every kind of suffering, shrank from this desolation. Yet she must needs bear it for four long years. "She only treads the way I have trod," was the message from her Love; have I not suffered thus? Have I not been left in uttermost abandonment?" "Strike me then, O my Saviour," she added, "wound me as you please." And her penance became a ravishing act of love; her tortures her consolations; her tears her recreation; her desolation her joy. Of St. Theresa we are told that all the doors by which consolation might enter her soul were closed, whilst one was opened to admit troubles. These were mental anxieties about the past and uncertainties as to the future. Worst of all was the thought, the only one which could really disturb her, that she had committed sin. "O my God," she cried, "what a miserable life is this where nothing is certain and everything is changeable! I knew not what to do, so I went and threw myself down before the blessed Sacrament simply that I might gaze there, for to pray was impossible. This was one of the fiercest moments of my life." The trial of St. Catherine of Siena was that, waking or sleeping, she was beset by frightful and humiliating phantoms which sought to defile her eyes and her ears. The unclean spirits whispered in her ear: "Alas! poor little one, why thus torment thyself?" Christ seemed to have abandoned his child to the sport of the demons. Yet by the will-action of prayer and penance, she elicited her act of faith: "Who art thou to seek comfort at God's hands, . . . cannot thy Spouse and Creator give thee joy and consolation in eternity?" At length one day, after a violent struggle with her passions, the unclean spirit fled and Christ appeared to her on the Cross. Taking up the words of one hitherto similarly tried, St. Anthony the Hermit, she spoke to Christ: "O Lord where wert thou when my heart was so vexed with foul and horrible temptations?" "Daughter," He replied, "I was in thy heart." Then she again: "How is it possible that Thou shouldst dwell in a heart so filled with shameful thoughts?" Then He in reply: "If I had not been present those foul thoughts had doubtless prevailed and made their entrance into thy soul with full consent."

To come to more modern times, there is the lament of the great Cardinal:

> "Starting then," he says, "with the being of a God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as my own existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into logical shape I find a difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my satisfaction) I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems simply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is so full; and the effect upon me is in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me when I look into this living busy world and see no reflection of its Creator. This is to me one of those great difficulties of this absolute primary truth to which I referred just now. Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience, I should be an atheist or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into the world. I am speaking for myself only, and I am far from denying

the real force of the arguments in proof of a God, drawn from the general facts of human society and the course of history; but these do not warm me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me and my moral being rejoice. The sight of the world is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of lamentations and mourning and woe."[1]

Nor is the seeming contradiction confined to the world of human life.

"It is well for us," writes Ruskin, "to dwell with thankfulness on the unfolding of the flower, and the falling of the dew, and the sleep of the green fields in the sunshine; but the blasted trunk, the barren rock, the moaning of the bleak winds, the roar of the black, perilous, merciless whirlpools of the mountain streams, the solemn solitudes of moors and seas, the continual fading of all beauty into darkness, and of all strength into dust—have these no language for us?"[2]

Yes, the whole of creation speaks it. Sometimes the sound is stifled, at other times it is more audible. It gains in intensity as it is uttered by each order of creation, ascending from stone to tree, from tree to brute, from brute to man. Then it reaches its culmination in the Recapitulation of all creatures, the Sum of all their sorrows. From the stark heights of Calvary the piercing cry rings through the vastnesses of earth and heaven: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

The Christian and the pagan; the believer and the agnostic; the philosopher and the peasant; the saint and the theologian; the prophet and the evangelist; God and man: all have felt the weight of the difficulty, all have striven to escape it. But he alone has succeeded who has followed the God-chosen way; he who, by exerting his noblest endowment of free-will, has reached out beyond reason and by faith has grasped God. This is the only apologetic which satisfies, the apologetic of the Cross, which in spite of all seeming failure cried out with a loud voice: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit."

THOMAS J. GERRARD.

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[1] *Apologia*, p. 241.

[2] *The Stones of Venice*, Pt. III., p. 138.

THE NOTION OF MORALITY

John T. Driscoll, S. T. L.

Ethics is known as the science of human action. It aims at investigating the sources and laws of human conduct. It embraces man not merely as an individual but as he is in the concrete with his manifold relations as a member of the family and of the state. As a science, ethics is based on certain fundamental truths, and is made up of certain principles and laws. The primary and most important is the distinction between virtue and vice, between right and wrong. To pursue virtue and to do what is right constitutes moral conduct. Ethics therefore has been truly called the science of morality.

The purpose of the present article is to analyze the meaning of morality. It is clear that different notions of the word will color the various presentations of the subject and exert a corresponding influence on human action. Hence different men may agree on the beauty and necessity of morality, and yet hold widely different conceptions of what morality is. Contemporary literature presents abundant illustrations. In textbooks, in magazines, in the press, the subject of morality and its various applications to life is discussed in scholarly language, and to the cursory reader all is in apparent harmony. A more thorough study, however, reveals vital disagreements which show that there is not one but many theories of ethics, and that the science of human life is a difficult and important study.

I. Theory of Kant.

Kant's ethics are based on the analysis of the moral consciousness. The analysis reveals the consciousness of the opposition between duty and inclination. Duty has its source in the reason; inclination comes from the animal part of our being. Morality rests upon the control of the inclinations by the reason. Hence the consciousness of obligation as the central principle in the sphere of morality. Obligation first arises from the fact that man as a rational being prescribes a law to himself as a sense-being. Thus Kant postulates a radical antinomy in the moral order, viz., the opposition between reason and sensibility. The law of the reason is the law of duty. A will is morally good when it is determined solely by duty. The acts of the will determined by inclinations have no moral value.

The consciousness of obligation is expressed in the form of a demand. Let the moral law be the sole determining ground of the will. It has the force of a categorical imperative: *Thou shalt.* Its behests are unconditional and should be obeyed without regard to consequences. The moral law is the essential expression of reason; it is not imposed by any external authority. I myself and no one else can say "Thou shalt" to me. Here is found the notion of autonomy. In the autonomy of the will is contained the essence of morality. Another person can say "Thou must," but this is not categorical. It is only a hypothetical imperative, i. e., if you would obtain or avoid something, and this implies an external sanction. Obedience to the hypothetical imperative is heteronomy and a will so guided has no moral value. The moral autonomy of Kant finds its civic expression with Rousseau. In his republic every citizen is at the same time a subject and a part of the legislative body. He thus obeys laws to which he gives assent. With Kant there is only free self-determination, no constraint from external causes. The nature of the moral autonomy is spontaneous activity. Hence arises the notion of freedom, which is conceived as the power to act unconditionally. If the determination to act comes from self then it is spontaneous and therefore free. As such it is moral. If it comes from causes external, then it is not spontaneous and lacks freedom and morality.

Happiness has a two-fold meaning: the satisfaction of the sense-impulses and the realization of the practical reason. In the former, virtue is not a means of promoting happiness. In the latter, happiness is the satisfaction which we feel upon the realization of reason. In this sense virtue is the only means of attaining true happiness. It is regarded as inseparable from morality and is based primarily upon self-respect.

Kant taught that personality constituted man an absolutely independent being. Hence man has in himself his own end. This independence is what gives value to a morally good act. Then man acts as a person.

The moral teaching of Kant is something new in history. It differs both from Stoicism and Christianity. To him duty is not a manifestation of nature as with the Stoics, nor does it come from God. It is an absolute and independent law based ultimately and solely in the autonomy of the individual will. Hence the rise of independent morality which profoundly influenced German, English, and American thought. But a moral law imposing upon a free agent the obligation of right and duty, constraining him to obedience even at the loss of wealth and position, entailing self-sacrifice and suffering, contravening at times individual desires, furnishing an unfailing source of strength in trial, rewarding the good with peace and buoyancy of mind, punishing the wrong-doer with the agony of remorse, must have a moral source and basis above and beyond the will of the individual. Yet the moral law of Kant, judged by his own exposition of it, is nothing more than an individual or hereditary habit. It cannot explain the facts of consciousness nor can it furnish the data of a sound science of ethics. If morality rests ultimately on individual judgment and since, as experience shows, judgments vary, who is right in the inevitable case of conflict? The result is seen in the moral scepticism and pessimism which pervade modern thought.

II. Hedonism and Utilitarianism.

Hedonism is the doctrine of those who teach that pleasure is the end of conduct and the criterion of moral action. First elaborated by Epicurus, it deeply influenced ancient Greek and Roman civilization. Championed in our own times by writers of authority, it reappears under a new name as a theory of morality. But as there are sensuous, æsthetic, and intellectual pleasures, the consistent Hedonist may be a seeker of sensuous gratification, a lover of the beautiful, or with Marius the Epicurean, an apostle of intellectual culture. No rigid line of demarcation separates these phases one from another. Experience shows that they run together and intermingle. Thus in this theory morality means pleasure, and an act is performed and merits praise provided it bring pleasure to the doer.

Hedonism is true in holding that we seek the good because its possession perfects our nature. It errs in teaching that pleasure is the true and only meaning of good. What pleases one person does not always please another. Hence its foundation is subjective, and human conduct is left to the mercy of wayward and conflicting desires. How explain the voice of conscience with its constraining power over our inner life, with its approbation or blame or remorse? In obedience to its behests why do I seek the unpleasant in resisting temptation, in facing trials and even death? If morality mean pleasure, virtue and duty have no meaning. Hedonism fosters the low and ignoble in our nature. The consistent seeker after pleasure is shut off from the higher springs of action. He is his own end, and the acquisition of pleasure is the aim of existence. The legitimate consequences of this teaching are shown in a pessimistic tone of thought in the drama and novel of modern sensualism. The weakness of Hedonism gave rise to another school of morals. This in the hands of John Stuart Mill is known by the term Utilitarianism. It is an attempt at improvement by the introduction of the element of altruism. To Mill the standard and test of conduct is not the individual good, but the greatest possible good for the greatest number. He holds that pleasure is not sufficient in itself, but that it is necessary to make a choice between pleasures. Hence the principle of utility which determines the meaning of morality.

In explaining the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism, viz., the greatest possible good for the greatest number, its advocates separate into two schools, viz., Empirical and Intuitional. The former under the leadership of Mill and Bain, seek an empirical criterion for pleasure either, with Hobbes, in legislation, or in the general estimate of mankind. The latter, with Sidgwick, hold that we have an immediate faculty of rational intuition which informs us that the good of others is as desirable an end of conduct as our own happiness. Thus we have a system of Intutional ethics.

But the morality of human conduct cannot be gauged by utility. For utility is only a means to an end; it is not a standard in itself. The end with utilitarians is pleasure; and we have seen that pleasure cannot be an end. The pleasure of others is subjective and variable. Hence morality would have no definite content, no fixed meaning, but would be subject to individual caprice. Furthermore, on the grounds of experience we have no way of knowing what act would conduce to the greatest possible good for the greatest number. If with Mr. Sidgwick we hold that the results of an act are the only tests of its righteousness, we will have to admit that moral good or evil depends on the consequences of the act. But this is an impossible criterion. How can anyone calculate the possible results of his actions?

III. Theory of Comte.

According to Comte the study of man's moral and intellectual constitution is a branch of Biology. There are in man a number of affective instincts which impel him to action and determine the nature of his activity. They are called egoistic and altruistic and are the only motor impulses of our nature. The great problem of ethics is to establish and maintain a unity of our being. This unity is brought about by a convergence of our motor principles to a common destination without which we cannot be at peace with ourselves. In the brute the egoistic instincts predominate. In man the inner harmony is effected through the ascendancy of the altruistic impulses. This is especially evoked and demanded by the social nature of man. To establish unity amid the conflicting impulses of individual life is the work of religion, which effects its end by inculcating devotion to Humanity. Religion appeals to and fortifies the altruistic principles, calls upon us to suppress every internal movement and abstain from every act which is opposed to the maintenance and development of the life of Humanity, and to cultivate all the tendencies which promote its well-being and further its work. Morality therefore has its source in the altruistic or social affections, and consists in the relation their acts have to the well-being of Humanity. As this relation is vague and variable, the social impulses alone are not a sure test and guide of conduct. Hence the way is open to scientific research, and the elaboration of a complete and definite moral code is had only by scientific proof. The characteristic trait of Positivist morality is its all pervading social tendency. The aim is not an adjustment to the present environment as with Spencer, but the attainment of our ideal social condition by the gradual betterment of society through the performance of pure altruistic actions. The well-being of humanity is the purpose and the test of morality. To this as a standard all moral questions are referred. What are known as moral beliefs are in most cases nothing more than beneficent social prejudices, which are just, because they are beneficent. A few exceptions exist where the reason and basis of them are obvious. The consistent Positivist sees no meaning in any doctrine teaching "duties to one's self." He regards duties themselves as real, but their nature and obligation are grounded not in relation to self but in their social point of view. We perform these duties and in so doing acquire virtue and perfect ourselves, not that personal perfection is a purpose or end in itself, but because we are enabled thereby to discharge our only true duty, to perform our only real service—the service of humanity.

In the vocabulary of Positivism there is no such term as "moral right." The legislation of the State may confer civil rights on the individual. In the moral order duties only are recognized; and by duties are meant any and all useful social functions voluntarily discharged.

Thus Comte takes issue with the Kantian theory by eliminating the arbitrary element from human conduct and by placing the moral value of an act in its effect on the formation of habits and the development of capacities. In the last analysis the rules of conduct are relative to collective and ideal Humanity. In this way morality is transformed into religion—the service of ideal Humanity. In the words of a recent exponent of Ethical Culture: "The moral nature is that by which we transcend ourselves and enter into an ideal region. Ethics is essentially the thought of what ought to be. It holds up the picture of our ideal selves and gives us back society transfigured. Ethical religion would turn man's thoughts this way. Man's ideals do not reveal anything outside ourselves but only indicate what we ourselves should be and do."[1] Thus the moral order never is but is ever becoming. It grows with our growth. It is the prerogative of man that he need not follow the law of his natural being, but is himself the author of a higher moral law and creates it even in acting it out.[2]

IV. Theory of Spencer.

The moral teaching of Herbert Spencer rests on the same foundation with Hedonism and Utilitarianism. But he attempts a reconciliation between the two schools by introducing the element of evolution. He holds that experience is ultimately the sole source of knowledge even in the moral order. Yet the experience laboriously acquired by the individual is transmitted to succeeding generations. Thus what is empirical in the race becomes intuitional in the individual. Moreover in this manner a true basis is found for a reconciliation between egoism and altruism, and rational laws hold sway instead of mere empirical calculations or vague hopeless yearnings. He calls this theory evolutionary ethics and contends that it is a synthesis of the best elements in Hedonism, in Empirical and Intuitional Utilitarianism.

Ethics, according to Spencer, is a study of what I ought, hence a study of ends. But the adaptation to environment is the end of human conduct. "The ultimate man is one in whom this process of adaptation to the social state has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society."[3] Thus the goal set before us and in which human progress ends is conformity with an external order. This external order is known as the general welfare. It thus becomes the principle of moral action, the ultimate test or standard of moral distinctions.

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[1] Salter, *The Ethical Religion.*

[2] Cf. Felix Adler, *Life and Destiny.*

[3] *Data of Ethics,* p. 26.

With Spencer, life is adaptation to environment. The moral environment is the universal welfare. Hence the progress of morality is the progress of the adaptation of human life to its necessary conditions and constitutive laws. Private morality is viewed as a result of this progressive adaptation and development. With Comte the perfect state of society is regarded as an ideal principle determining the present act. With Spencer it is merely a result or effect of natural laws and cosmic evolution.

The more the adaptation to the environment, the larger and fuller is the measure of life. Thus "evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in the offspring, and in fellow-men."[1] Good conduct is that which conduces to any one of these three forms of life. Good conduct becomes the best "when it fulfils all these classes of ends at the same time." The real value of life and the reason why it is sought is found in pleasure. We ought to promote life because it is good, and "taking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable."[2] Hence the ultimate reason why actions are good or bad is that they stand in causal relation to happiness or misery. Spencer does not advocate the greatest happiness of the greater number as the rule of morality, but teaches that actions are right or wrong according as they advance or retard the general welfare. The test of perfection in a moral act is its conduciveness to pleasure, and the general welfare is the general happiness or pleasure. Thus "acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or increase their misery."[3] The absolute right in conduct can be only that which produces pure pleasure, i. e., pleasure unalloyed with pain. Hence conduct which has a concomitant of pain or any painful effect is partially wrong.[4] Virtue in itself has no value or constraining power. It is regarded as a means to promote personal or general happiness.

With Spencer, the source and basis of ethics is found in Sociology. Ethics suppose the existence of a society made up of human elements.

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[1] *Ibid*,. p. 26.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

These elements are endowed with powers of reason and of feeling. Ethics regulates the interaction of these elements in formulating the principles and laws of human conduct. Its purpose and aim is to aid in establishing a universal cosmical equilibration.

Both Comte and Spencer deny the existence of the moral law and the voice of conscience. Their concept of morality is animal, organic, mortal, and earthly. With Spencer the life of man in present society is the end; with Comte the end and purpose of moral action is in the perfect society of the future. Hence the moral good has no other basis than utility, either to the present environment or to the ideal Humanity of the future. With both the supreme standard is happiness; but happiness is a conscious state, and as such is purely subjective. Every man is guided by his own appreciation of what constitutes pleasure. But appreciations differ. Again, conditions of happiness in the individual are physiological and temperamental, not ethical and spiritual. To distinguish among pleasures we must suppose an element introduced from outside, which thus becomes a standard for moral values. If we seek the welfare of existing or of future society, what outside element can we find which in its last analysis will not be purely subjective? If general welfare mean general pleasure, it can be said that there is no psychical experience of any such state. Then whose happiness furnishes the criterion either of an actual or of an ideal general happiness? If ours, why should others conform to our own? If that of others, why should we conform to theirs?

V. Theory of Christian Ethics.

It is a law of human life that men seek the good. Now the good admits of more than one meaning. It may signify *pleasure*, and on this meaning is based the theory of Hedonism. Or it may signify *utility*, whence arises the theory of Utilitarianism. The defect in these theories lies in their claims to be the supreme and sole guide of human conduct. But good has another meaning, viz., that whose possession ennobles and perfects our nature in the highest and best possible manner. This leads to the conception of the *summum bonum*, the *highest good*, which forms the groundwork of Christian Ethics.

The distinction between right and wrong is a primary conviction of man. It holds sway the world over in every place and at every time with no distinction of race or age. An obligation presses upon us to do what is right. We do may wrong but we are conscious of violating a law. The obligation does not take away the power of free-will.

Its necessity therefore is moral, not physical. It has a basis in the relation of means to an end. To obtain a definite end we must employ certain means; we need not use them, but the end cannot then be attained.

The notion of the moral order is thus revealed in our nature as intelligent beings. Consciousness shows that man acting in full possession of his faculties always acts for an end or purpose. In physical nature, order or harmony prevail throughout. Every object tends to an end by virtue of physical necessity. Here we observe a unity of action which results in a physical order. In human life an analogous tendency and concatenation of ends exist. But human action is free and seeks an end proposed by the mind. Thus unity and harmony should prevail in human life. This is only attained by an ultimate unity of tendency. Thus human acts can be viewed as constituting a system. On this fact is based the science of ethics.

The reason for the unity and harmony which reign in human life is found not with Kant in the subjective consciousness of the individual, but in the objective moral order. The moral law is the guide and sanction for what conduces to our true last end. The obligation to obey it is based on the very nature of things. In spite of free-will and the fact of disobedience we are conscious of its binding force. Men may differ as to the morality of individual acts. The difference is due to varying circumstances or to an error of judgment. The great fundamental fact that there is a right and wrong is never obliterated.

In a moral order, therefore, which is objective as based in the very nature of things, and as such independent of the arbitrary dictum of the individual, are grounded

> The unwritten and unchanging laws of heaven
> They are not of to-day or yesterday,
> But ever live, and no one knows their birthtide.

The moral law with its abiding constraining power is made known through the voice of conscience. Conscience is thus the judgment of the individual as to the morality of his own conduct; it is the application of the moral law to the particular events and circumstances of life.

This hidden monitor proclaims the ineradicable distinction between good and evil. It awakens in the soul the conscious obligation of duty. Its voice is ever heard urging, restraining, praising or condemning. I carry with me in the busy whirl of daily life or in the silence of my lonely hours a judge and witness of my most secret thoughts and motives. Its decisions are the promulgations and applications of an eternal law which rules the course of history and man. The commands of duty, the consciousness of obligation, its "ought" and "ought not" are the inseparable witnesses of every thought, word, or deed. They awaken in the mind the consciousness of dependence on One who is far above and yet deep down in the recesses of the soul. The moral law manifesting itself through the voice of conscience is the foundation of Christian ethics. It is the well-spring of heroism, and when illumined by the bright light of Christian faith and virtues, elevates and transfigures the natural man by shedding over him the glory of adoption to divine Sonship.

By obeying the dictates of the moral law, man seeks the real good. The possession of this good perfects his nature. Christian philosophy teaches that God is not only the basis of the moral law, but He is also the supreme and ultimate end of human conduct. The life of Christ is an illustration of this truth. He proclaims that we must seek God above all things, that He alone is our true and ultimate good, and in possession of Him we shall be truly happy. As means to obtain this end, our highest good, He enforces the natural precepts of the moral law, sets them forth more clearly, and adds thereto the rules of Christian conduct. Thus revelation throws a flood of light upon our end and the means to obtain it.

Thus we have a firm basis and clear conception of morality. It is not with Kant the arbitrary dictum of the individual will; it is not pleasure either egoistic or altruistic; it is not with Spencer adaptation to the pure human environment of existing society, nor with Comte the attainment of an ideal humanity in the dim and distant future. Morality is the voice of conscience expressing the moral law which is based in the very nature of things as the participation and expression of the eternal law by which God constitutes the universe.

JOHN T. DRISCOLL.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE BIBLE:

THE NAME AND THE THING.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

Few modern phrases have aroused, and still arouse, as much suspicion or opposition as that of "Higher Criticism." It sounds like an arrogant and self-laudatory title, and when applied—as is usually the case—to the written word of God, seems to bespeak anything but the implicit faith and profound reverence with which the Bible has been surrounded in past ages, and which its sacred character imperatively demands. Apparently it treats a supernatural work as if altogether amenable to the tribunal of human reason, and calls up the image of a self-constituted superior court which considers itself as empowered to look into, and pass final judgment upon, the literary and historical claims of the Holy Scriptures. Hence it is that in the eyes of many the name of "Higher Criticism" is simply a euphemistic term to denote the aim and principles of unbelief, and is really synonymous with Rationalism. Nay, more. Through a kind of disgust towards what seems to them an insidious way of attacking and gradually undermining faith in the Bible, they go so far as to contend that our inspired books are altogether beyond the province of criticism and that their composition and transmission should not be subjected to critical investigation.

Most men, however, are not so carried away by their dislike of the name of "Higher Criticism" as to maintain this extreme position. They grant that the canons of criticism, like those of Greek or Hebrew grammar, may be utilized in the study of Holy Writ. They even admit that while the divine element peculiar to Sacred Scripture does not fall within the range of man's criticism, the same thing cannot be said with regard to the human element which the inspired writings have in common with other literary productions. Though inspired and divine the various books that make up the Bible bear the unmistakable impress of the time, place, style, methods of composition, etc., of their respective authors, and to all these literary features a biblical scholar may reverently, yet scientifically, apply the canons of criticism which are in vigor to ascertain and determine the true origin and character of ancient writings. But, they ask, why should criticism when applied to the Bible bear the name of "Higher Criticism," and not be called "Sacred Criticism" as was formerly done by authors of treatises on Introduction to the study of the Holy Scriptures? Is not the substitution of the word "Higher" for "Sacred" Criticism, an ominous one? And why is "Higher Criticism" in such great favor among the rationalistic scholars of Germany, Holland, France, and other countries, if not because its name appears to them particularly suited to hide their unbelieving views and purposes?

It is doubtless true that in recent times especially, "Higher Criticism" has often been employed in the interests of doubt and infidelity, and that rationalistic scholars have been foremost in claiming its verdict in favor of their irreligious notions and of their negative conclusions. But it is none the less true that all through the nineteenth century, and more particularly during its last part, numerous Catholics and Protestants, sincere believers in the inspired character of Holy Writ, have been students of "Higher Criticism." They knew that they could only meet these negative critics on their own grounds, and that they had nothing to fear for the faith that was in them from a strictly scientific investigation of the contents of Holy Scripture. And in point of fact, their earnest efforts have often been crowned with the most brilliant success; for time and again it was given to these believing scholars to show either that the facts appealed to by their opponents were no facts at all, or that the irreligious theories, framed by the deniers of Revelation, were not really borne out by a careful study of the actual facts. Whence it appears that the "Higher Criticism" of the Bible should not necessarily be identified with the views and purposes of incredulity. "Higher Criticism," like history, like biology, like geology, like any other branch of human knowledge, if rightly cultivated must finally make for the cause of truth, so that its name should not share in the opprobrium which unbelieving scholars of Germany, Holland, France, or any other country, justly deserve by their impious use of its methods of investigation.

The "Higher Criticism," when the name is applied to the scientific study of the genuineness, integrity, reliability, and literary form of the Holy Scriptures, is but a part of *Sacred* Criticism. It is thereby distinguished from another branch of Biblical Criticism which deals with the ways and means of restoring the sacred text as far as possible to its genuine form, and which, on that account, is usually called "Textual Criticism." Students of this latter branch of critical science know full well that though watched over in a special manner in the course of ages, the inspired books which make up the Bible have been transcribed, like all ancient writings, during many centuries by all manner of copyists whose ignorance or carelessness our sacred writings still bear witness to. They therefore consider it only proper that they should have recourse to the art of criticism in order to eliminate the textual errors which can still be discovered. While for this purpose they carefully avail themselves of all the material at their disposal, such as extant MSS., ancient Versions, Scriptural quotations found in the writings of Church Fathers, etc., and skilfully apply to them the ordinary rules of criticism for restoring ancient writings to their primitive form, they are thoroughly conscious of doing a useful and noble work. They know, however, all the while, that they are pursuing an occupation far less reaching in its import than the one pursued in the other branch of Biblical Criticism, that of "Higher Criticism." They therefore do not take it amiss that the department in which they are engaged, and which is usually called "Textual Criticism" from its principal aim of bringing back the sacred text to its primitive condition, should also be called "Lower Criticism" in contradistinction to the other department, that of "Higher Criticism," where the graver questions of the literary form, authenticity, reliability, and integrity of the inspired books are investigated.

This then is the proper frame of mind of the students of Textual Criticism. They feel that in their efforts to reject erroneous readings and point out the genuine reading of individual passages they have a right to follow the same rules as are in vigor for determining the relative value of the variants of any ancient writing, but must leave to "Higher Critics" the arduous task of dealing with the far more reaching problems of literary and historical criticism.

It is precisely the part of students of the more important branch of Biblical Criticism which is commonly called the "Higher Criticism," to do their work anent the difficult questions which belong to it, with the same earnestness, singleness of purpose, and we would add, modesty, as we have recognized in students of Textual or Lower Criticism. Unfortunately too many among them have boasted of the name of Higher Critics, as if it conferred upon them anything but the charge of investigating some of the most delicate questions relative to Holy

Writ, at the present day. Too many of them have dabbled boldly in problems which pertain to an entire department of ecclesiastical science, and pronounced judgment against the inspired character of the book or group of books with which they were dealing. No wonder, therefore, that theologians, zealous guardians of the faith, have regarded them as intruders meddling with matters with which they were not conversant, and as prompted by a more or less avowed spirit of incredulity. In fact, it is chiefly in this way, that the "Higher Criticism" has become in the eyes of many, synonymous with a rash and impious attempt, in the name of a supposed new science, to destroy all belief in the inspired character of the Bible. Had students of this higher branch of Biblical criticism confined themselves, like the textual critics, to a strict scientific treatment of the questions within their province, they would not have aroused against the "Higher Criticism," anything like the suspicion and opposition which we described at the beginning of this paper. Had they all carefully refrained in their publications from indulging caprice, doing violence to texts, or scorning historical proofs when they were forthcoming, there is hardly any doubt that they would have gradually won for that branch of Biblical Criticism, the consideration which its careful and impartial pursuit naturally deserves. But be this as it may, the questions referring to the literary form, the authenticity, the reliability, and integrity of ancient books, whether secular or sacred, are the special object of the "Higher Criticism," and their study may, and should be, pursued without anti-scientific and anti-religious bias.

Francis E. Gigot.

JUDGMENT DAY IN JEWISH THOUGHT

William L. Sullivan, C. S. P.

It is not necessary at this day to repeat that the eschatological teaching of the Gospels is one of the most serious and delicate subjects in the whole field of theological study. Everyone knows this. Everyone who reads theological literature at all is having it constantly brought before his mind that such problems as the knowledge of Christ, the Kingdom of God, the character of the Gospel-narrative, and the relation of Christian to pre-Christian thought, depend in large measure upon the meaning of the Synoptic discourses on the Second Coming and the Last Day. Dr. Hanna's excellent studies in this REVIEW on the knowledge of Christ have brought the matter afresh to our attention in connection with the momentous subject of *scientia Christi.* The problem is a very old one, to be sure, and summary solutions of it have long been prevalent; but for all that, it is still timely and vital, and still calls for the best thought of the Christian student, even though an entirely satisfactory answer to all the perplexities of the case may be impossible to obtain.

The eschatological doctrine of the Gospels is chiefly contained in the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew, the thirteenth of St. Mark, and the twenty-first of St. Luke. We may study the discourse which this triple narrative attributes to our Lord either according to the method of pure exegesis, or according to the historico-comparative method — *religionsgeschichtliche Methode.* The former has to do with the ideas of the discourse in themselves, with the language which expresses them, and with their place in the general scheme of Christ's teaching; the latter will examine these ideas in relation to the current thought of the time, and will endeavor to trace them back through the path of their development even if possible to their origin. It is this latter method alone which this paper will employ. Consequently, the problem immediately before us is: First, to investigate the eschatological ideas current in Judaism in our Lord's time, to the extent that they bear on our subject of the last day; secondly, to work backward through the Old Testament in order to see the evolution through which these ideas have passed; and, thirdly,[1] to take a comparative view of the non-Jewish conceptions which may have influenced this department of Hebrew thought and theology.

In order to facilitate references it may be well to tabulate the main points of the three Synoptic chapters which form our starting-point. The following are the signs and wonders there given to prepare believers for the Second Coming:

	Mt. xxiv.	Mk. xiii.	Lk. xxi.
1. False Christs and prophets will appear.	5, 11, 23, 24	6, 21, 22	8
2. Wars and rumors of wars.	6	7	9
3. Nation rising against nation.	7	8	10
4. Famine, earthquake and pestilence.	7	8	11
5. Great signs in the heavens; the sun darkened; the moon will not give light; the stars fall; the powers of heaven shaken.	29	24-25	11, 26
6. Roaring of the sea.			25
7. Men destroy and hate one another.	10		
Parents and children, brother and brother, bring one another to death.	12	12	16
8. Woe to those that are with child.	19	17	23
9. Angels will gather the elect.	31	27	

We have now to deal with our first question: What ideas similar to these ran current in Judaism in the time of our Lord? Our sources for an answer to this query will be contained in that remarkable literature of the Jewish apocalyptic writings, which covers the period from the date of the book of Daniel[2] to nearly the end of the first century after Christ. The works comprised in this literature have risen steadily in importance, the more they have been studied, until at the present day all critical students recognize in them a primary factor and a vital influence in the religion of the Jewish people at the dawn of the Christian era.[3] The quotations[4] that we shall make will be taken first from one of the oldest, if not quite the oldest section of the book of Enoch, a section which dates from the latter half of the second, or the first half of the first century before Christ; secondly, from that portion of the Jewish Sibylline Oracles which goes back to between 200 and 100 B. C.; and thirdly, from Fourth Esdras and the Apocalypse of Baruch, which appeared, it is true, only toward the end of the first century after Christ, but which nevertheless are unmistakably and absolutely Jewish.[1] This is what the Book of Enoch says in its 99th and 100th chapters on the final woes of the world:[2]

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[1] This third question for lack of space must be remitted to some later time.

[2] I assume that Daniel was written in 168 or 167 B. C.

[3] This is the unanimous opinion of critics of the present day. Cf. v. g. E. Kautzsch, introductory notice to his magnificent edition of all this literature of late Judaism. *Die Apokryphen u. Beudepigraphen des Alt. Test.*, 1900. See also the suggestive little essay of Baldensperger: *Das Spaetere Judenthum als Vorstufe des Christenthums.* 1900.

[4] The translations that follow are made from Kautzsch's German version, with the exception of the passage from the Sibylline Oracles which is based directly on Geffcken's Greek Edition: *Die Oracula Sibyllina.* 1902.

> "In that day they that suffer need, shall rend their children in pieces, and toss them aside. Miscarriages shall go out from them, they will cast aside suckling babes, and never turn to them, and they will have no pity on their offspring. I swear to you sinners that sin is making ready for a day of unheard of bloodshed. Men will pray to stones; others will make idols of gold, silver, wood, and clay. . . . In that day fathers will be struck down in one place with their sons; and brothers shall fall dead side by side, and blood shall flow from them like a river. A man will not restrain his hand out of compassion from slaying his son or grandson. The sinner will not restrain his hand from slaying his best-beloved brother. From dawn of day to set of sun they will kill each other. A horse will wade breast-high in the blood of sinners and a wagon will sink therein to the top. In that day the angels will come down to a secret place and drive all the servants of sin to one station."

The following description of judgment day is from the third book of the Sibylline Oracles, beginning with line 672:

> "From heaven fiery swords will fall on the earth, and great torches will come blazing upon men. The all-producing earth will be shaken in that day by the immortal hand; and the fishes in the sea, and all beasts of the earth, and the numberless kinds of birds, and all the souls of men, and the entire ocean will tremble before the immortal Face, and there will be woe. The steep mountain-peaks and the great hills will He tear asunder, and black darkness will appear to all.[3] Stones will run with blood, and every torrent will flood the plains. . . . And God will judge them all (sinners) with war, and sword, and fire, and deluging rain, and brimstone will fall from heaven."

In the fourth chapter of Fourth Esdras, Esdras asks the angel Uriel if he (Esdras) will be alive at the last day? Uriel answers, in the fifth chapter, that he does not know, but that these are the signs of the end:

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[1] Cf. v. g. Erich Haupt's *Die eschatologischen Aussagen Jesu in den synop. Evg.*, 1895. p. 47.

[2] The apocalyptic writings sometimes make the Messianic age a mere preparation for the final and everlasting era of salvation, as Rabbinical theology does throughout. According to such a view the Messianic age would be preceded by a judgment on Israel's enemies, and followed by a final judgment on the whole world. It is sometimes difficult to say which judgment these apocalypses are describing; but for our present purpose this need not distract us, for the reason that in popular Jewish thought, the two judgment-scenes most probably mingled together as one great forensic drama, as Volz points out: *Juedische eschatalogie von Daniel bis Akiba.* 1903. p. 258.

[3] ἔρεβος πάντεσσι φανεῖται

> "See the days are coming when the earth-dwellers shall be seized with a mighty fear. The way of truth shall be hidden, and the land of faith without fruit. . . . Then suddenly will the sun shine by night and the moon by day. Blood will trickle from the trees, and the stones will cry out. The nations will come in tumult and the highways of heaven will be in confusion. The sea of Sodom will bring forth fishes and will roar at night with a voice which few will understand but all will hear. In many places an abyss will open and fire will stream up for a long time. . . . Friends will turn upon one another of a sudden, women will give birth to monsters. Fresh water will be turned to salt."

In the sixth chapter, the description thus goes on:

> "Books will be opened in the face of the firmanemt that all men may see. Women will bring forth untimely in the third and fourth month; but these children will live and run about. The trumpet will sound aloud. All men will suddenly hear it, and will tremble. But whoever survives all that I have told to thee shall be saved, and shall see my salvation and the end of my world."

The ninth chapter says there will be commotions in the nations, confusion among peoples, uprisings among princes and ferments among rulers. The thirteenth chapter gives the famous vision of a man who will rise out of the sea to annihilate by the power of the Most High, the host arrayed against him.

The Apocalypse of Baruch declares that concerning that day there will arise reports, and rumors and imaginings (c. 48); that there will be famine, drought, and misery, many apparitions and meetings with demons, and a rain of fire (c. 27).

> "Then will the despised rule over the mighty, and the little ones will be exalted above the eminent; and they that were nothing shall possess power over the powerful: and the poor will have preference over the rich, and the transgressors shall lord it over the heroes. The wise will keep silence, and fools will speak." (c. 70).

If these quotations are long, I trust that they are important enough to justify the space they have taken. They are specimens of the apocalyptic speculations which seem to have been rife in late Judaism, and represent the nearest approach to prophecy that the jaded spirit and formalistic piety of Israel could then attain. Apocalypses of this sort are only degraded prophecy; but they are exactly what the popular imagination will seize upon, and gradually develop to a grotesque degree. We have not space here to describe the extravagances of this *Wunderlust* which our apocalpytic writings display[1]

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[1] A full account of the eschatology of late Judaism is to be found in Volz's work already mentioned.

Enough to say that the spinning out of the "signs," and the minute reckoning of just when the great day would come, went so far that finally in the post-Christian era, the Talmud discountenances all such conjectures, and bids men not to bother their heads about them any longer under penalty of being deluded and accursed. But at all events, these ideas were prevalent among the Jews when Christianity arose; and many consider that they suggested the form, the expression, the literary vehicle of the evangelical portrayal of the day of judgment.

But these apocalyptic descriptions of judgment are themselves the offspring of the Old Testament conception of the Day of Yahweh. Everyone who has read the prophets attentively will remember how great a place in the prophetic writings is occupied by this mighty day יום יהוה Yahweh's "day" *par excellence*, when He will display His most terrible power against Israel's enemies, will defeat and destroy them, will raise up Israel, His own, and will begin to bestow upon her the fabulous blessings of the golden age. Later we shall see all that this idea was in its origin. Just now I would call attention to how naturally such an expectation would lead to apocalyptic detail and thaumaturgic imaginations. As already suggested, popular belief always drifts from the abstract to the concrete; always develops the symbol before it analyzes the truth symbolized. And besides this tendency inherent in the nature of things, there was another reason why Israel should deliver herself up to apocalyptic dreams. The Jews were oppressed, they were trodden under foot by the godless, they had become the laughing stock of the heathen. Chaldean, Persian, and Greek had ridden rough-shod over them, and Yahweh who had brought their fathers out of Egyptian bondage, withheld His hand from succoring them, so that they were the despised and rejected of men, as the author of the Servant of Yahweh songs calls righteous Israel. Now Yahweh shared the reproaches of His people; His cause was one with theirs. And however much it might be His will that they should suffer for their infidelity, however strong the language of the elder prophets telling Israel that Yahweh was independent of them, did not need them, and was minded to destroy them, still in the idea of the covenant, God formed the foundation of Jewish faith; and according to this idea they felt convinced that the fortunes of the people and its God were one, and that Yahweh's anger against the Gentiles was inflamed anew with every fresh injury to Israel. And so they relieved present humiliation and disappointment by thinking with vindictive joy of the day when Yahweh would avenge Himself. They gloated over the portrayal of that day. They went into minute detail in fancying the terror of the Gentiles when Yahweh would smite them, subject them to the Jew, or annihilate them. These dreams were part of that wonderful Messiahism which was born in the misfortunes of Babylonian oppression and to this very hour has not lost its hold on the heart of the Jewish race. But long before a clear idea of a personal Messiah emerged from the vague trust in Yahweh's restoration of His people, the "Day" was a familiar thought; and even in later times the figure of the Messiah was often indistinct and insignificant, when the picture of the "Day" was dominant and vivid![1]

Joel says:[2]

> "It is nigh at hand; a day of darkness and of gloominess, a day of clouds and whirlwinds; the day of Yahweh is great and very terrible; and who can stand it! The earth hath trembled; the heavens are moved; the sun and moon are darkened; and the stars have withdrawn their shining. I will show wonders in heaven; and on earth blood and fire and vapor of smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and dreadful day of Yahweh doth come."

Zacharias adds:[3]

> "Then Yahweh shall go forth and shall fight against those nations, as when He fought in the day of battle. And it shall come to pass in that day that there shall be no light, but cold and frost. And there shall be one day which is known to Yahweh; not day nor night; and in the time of the evening there shall be light."

> "In that day," Ezechiel says,[4] "there shall be a great commotion upon the land of Israel. So that the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air and the beasts of the field, and every creeping thing that creepeth upon the ground, and all men that are upon the face of the earth, shall be moved at my presence; and the mountains shall be thrown down; and the hedges shall fall; and every wall shall fall to the ground. And I will call in the sword against him in all my mountains, saith the Lord God; every man's sword shall be pointed against his brother. And I will judge him with pestilence and with blood, and with violent rain, and vast hail stones; I will rain fire and brimstone upon him, and upon his army and upon the many nations that are with him."

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[1] For example in the book of Daniel, the figure of the Messias is weakly drawn and insignificant in the judgment-scene just when we should expect it to dominate.

[2] Joel ii, 23; 10, 11; 30, 31.

[3] Zach. xiv, 3, 6, 7.′

[4] Ez. xxxviii, 119-22.

And Isaias[1] announces that:

> "The flood-gates from on high are opened, and the foundations of the earth shall be shaken. With breaking shall the earth be broken; with crushing shall the earth be crushed; with trembling shall the earth be moved; with shaking shall the earth be shaken as a drunken man, and shall be removed as the tent of one night. And it shall come to pass that in that day Yahweh shall visit upon the host of heaven on high, and upon the kings of the earth, on the earth."

Passages like these, which could be multiplied indefinitely, make it clear that the Old Testament is the parent of the apocalyptic expectations which flourished at the dawn of Chritsianity; and that consequently it is the source, once removed, whence the Gospel-apocalypse has derived its general structure if not its constituent ideas.

But now we must push back our enquiry one step farther. How did the idea of the Day of Yahweh originate, and what were its primitive elements? We may be perfectly certain that the idea in some form or other existed before the compilation of our canonical prophecies. For it is not a conception that appears in them accidentally, or by way of simile, or as the sudden creation of prophetic fervor. It is so frequently found, it occupies so prominent a place, it runs through writings of such diversity as to age and style, that the conclusion seems irresistible that the substance of the idea must have been one of the most familiar features of Jewish religion before the first prophecy was written. This in fact is evident from the testimony of the first writing prophet himself. For Amos uses the phrase "that day," as a designation of the Day of Yahweh, in an obviously well-known technical sense. "And it shall come to pass in that day, saith Yahweh, God, that the sun shall go down at mid-day, and I will make the earth dark in the day of light" (xiii, 9). And in a still more striking passage, Amos implies that the desire for the Day of Yahweh was widely spread among the Jews: "Woe to them that desire the day of Yahweh. To what end is it for you? The day of Yahweh is darkness and not light" (v. 18). This text proves very clearly that the Jews looked forward eagerly to Yahweh's Day as a propitious event; as a day in which Yahweh would show forth His power for the sake of Israel, and to glorify his people. And Amos bids them beware; for the day that they expected with joy would turn to their destruction because of their sins.

If Amos was the first to say those words, then he is the author of a creative, a revolutionary, conception in the Israelitish religion.

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[1] Is. xxiv, 18-21.

For in that case he stands forth as originating the great spiritual truth that God's judgments are based on inner righteousness, not on race, rite or covenant. That idea did not exist in early Israel. Their idea of Yahweh's Day was non-ethical. With them it was a day wherein their God would destroy their enemies, merely as such, and would fill the lap of His people with earthly glory and temporal blessings, irrespective of any interior condition of soul. They long considered morality as hardly if at all distinguishable from the punctilio of ritual. If only they offered sacrifices at the altar of Yahweh, and placed no other god's beside Him on terms of equality, He in turn would fulfil His part of the covenant by bestowing prosperity on Israel. We must not forget that the spiritual side of Hebrew religion as of every other religion of these times, was very slow in developing. And this necessarily, since for centuries Israel was absolutely destitute of the two ideas which lie at the root of righteousness and responsibility, an adequate idea of the individual soul, and an ethical idea of the future life. With this vital deficiency in their religion, they were and had to be tardy and dull in understanding that the bond between God and man is the bond of the spirit. Indeed down to a late period of their religion we see even in the prophets, vestiges of a very rudimentary spiritual comprehension. The "woes" denounced so often against the "nations" show a particularistic narrowness, an unspiritual forgetfulness of possible merit even in the heathen, and a bloodthirsty satisfaction in contemplating their destruction, which are utterly foreign to the New Testament, and even opposed to the prophets at their best, for example, to those noble hopes for the final winning of the world to the true God, that we find uttered in the supreme eloquence of Second-Isaiah. I believe it to be true, indeed, that underlying the primitive Yahweh religion there existed strong and perhaps for that age, unique feelings of gratitude, loyalty and attachment to Yahweh, which were the germ of the later ethical faith. But the evidence seems overwhelming that for centuries these feelings were buried beneath a tribal view of God, and a non-moral idea of relation between God and the soul of man. Only by accepting this position, and practically all critical students of Scripture have now accepted it, can we at all understand the phenomenon of prophetism, and appreciate the vast difference between Jewish religion as Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah preach it, and as we find it under Solomon, David and the Judges.[1]

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[1] See for example the account of early Israel's moral ideas in Smend: *Alttestamentliche Religions-Geschichte*, pp. 161-172.

Primitively then the Day of Yahweh was non-ethical, because the idea of Yahweh Himself was so. It was a day wherein He would slaughter the foes of Israel and raise up His people to lord it over the earth. There was no question of vindicating the moral law, of rewarding inner virtue, or punishing sins of unrighteousness, as Amos tells us clearly. We are now ready to answer our question: How did the idea of the Day of Yahweh originate? What was there in the original conception of Yahweh which led the early Hebrews to think of Him as a slayer of men? Our answer must be that in early Israel, Yahweh was predominantly regarded as a war-God. The notion of a transcendental Deity infinitely righteous, merciful, and loving, was utterly beyond the comprehension of the first Yahweh worsphipers. If they had possessed such a notion, we should not read in their literature of Yahweh commanding armies, and making the earth drunk with blood, merely to annihilate the non-Jewish sons of men. The higher idea of God is the teaching not of early Israel but of the prophets first, and then perfectly and gloriously, of Christ We should have to write down half the Old Testament, were we to quote the texts that prove that Yahweh was Israel's Captain-God. Yahweh looked upon the Egyptian army and slew their host, (Ex. xiv, 24); He heaps up the Egyptian dead on the seashore, (Ex. xiv 31); He sends forth a fire that kills two hundred and fifty men, (Num. xvi, 35); He tells Moses: "Get out from the midst of this multitude; this moment will I destroy them," (Num. xvi, 45); He kills multitudes of the Gabaonites by hurling great stones from heaven, (Jdg. x, 14); He chooses new wars and overthrows the gates of Israel's enemies, (Jdg. v, 8); He delivers city after city of Canaan to Josue that the inhabitants may be butchered; the prince of His host appears to Josue holding a drawn sword, (Jos. v, 13); He will slay the serpent Leviathan with His great and strong sword, (Is. xxvii, 1); He tells Ezechiel that He has sharpened and burnished His sword for slaughter, (Ez. xxi, 9 sq.); He will flash His sword terribly in the faces of the Gentile kings, (Ez. xxxii, 10); Yahweh of hosts orders Saul to smite Amalec and "utterly destroy all that he hath, man and woman, child and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass"; and because Saul spared Agag the king and some of the flocks and herds, Yahweh repented that he Had appointed Saul as King of Israel, and rejected him forthwith, (I Sam. 15). Besides the ordinary weapons of war Yahweh uses the terrible powers of nature, thunder, lightning, storms, earthquakes, pestilence and plague. Yahweh's ways are in a tempest and whirlwind, (Nahum i, (3); against His enemies He will bring a burning wind from the desert, (Osee xiii, 15); and after inebriating His sword with blood, He will send brimstone and burning pitch, (Is. xxxiv). But we must make an end of quotations. Enough probably have been given to prove, first, that Yahweh was Israel's war-God; and, secondly, that the massacre and butchery attributed to Him were often carried on, utterly without any reference to ethics, but solely on the ground of Israelitish nationalism, and tribal aggrandizement.

Here, then, it would seem, we have the root and origin so far as Jewish religion is concerned at any rate, of the idea that the Lord's Day will see a dread display of the more terrible power of the Deity. To the early Israelites Yahweh was a God of awful prowess with sword and fire. Countless corpses and annihilated cities marked the progress of His host; and in His hand were thunderbolts and whirlwinds for the destruction of His enemies, whether Gods or men. From this it was easy to pass to the conception of a day above all days when Yahweh would complete His conquest, and lay low every stubborn foe that stood against Him. It was natural that the Jewish imagination should run riot in the thought of such a day. It was practically inevitable that wheresoever they found a new picture of wrath or a new theology of vengeance, they should borrow from it, in order to make still more vivid the blazing canvas on which they had painted the awful splendors of Yahweh's Day. But of one thing we must beware. We must not estimate either the spiritual or the doctrinal value of judgment day as it is in the Gospels by the source whence it appears to be derived. One of the most vital faults of method in the study of a religion or of comparative religions, is to interpret the final stage of a rite or a dogma by its primitive and elementary stage. This would be, as Wellhausen has remarked,[1] to lose sight of the new values that a religious idea may take on in evolution; and to ignore the creative action of great religious geniuses who have made old things new by stamping them with the impress of an original mind and a powerful personality. So it would be wrong even scientifically to maintain that the Gospel judgment day and the primitive Day of Yahweh are necessarily upon a level. To the extent that Our Lord used the words of the Gospel-apocalypse, as they are reported to us—and this is a critical problem quite outside the scope of this paper—He has taken up an old idea into His supremely creative mind, and has given it a transformed spiritual meaning that must be consistent with the rest of His lofty and unapproachable teaching. But surely we cannot find fault with anyone who would prefer to meditate on that other description of judgment which Christ has given: "Then shall the King say to them that shall be upon His right hand: 'Come, ye blessed of my Father; possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me to drink; I was a stranger and you took me in; naked, and you clothed me; sick, and you visited me; I was in prison, and you came to me. . . . Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me.'" (Matt. xxv, 34-40).

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[1] *Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten,* vol. 6, p.p 233-234.

William L. Sullivan.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ISRAEL*

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

Even a superficial examination of the nature and contents of the Pentateuchal or "Mosaic" legislation clearly shows how very little of it could have been suited to or intended for the Israelitish tribes during their nomadic life in the desert. The Sinaitic legislation, as we have it now, was, as a whole, intended for a people already in settled circumstances; and, in fact as Prof. MacCurdy remarks, "but little in the way of special new legislation was needed by Israel in the Desert."[1] All that was needed was to inspire in the wandering, disheartened tribes a spirit of courage and self-reliance, and a conviction of the reality and significance of Yahweh's promise that they should conquer their enemies and re-enter their ancestral dominion, the land of Canaan. This was the task of Moses; and, in spite of the fact that he had to deal with a crushed, discouraged, and anything but belligerent people, he accomplished it with considerable success. A conglomeration of politically disorganized tribes and families cannot be suddenly made into a nation, especially during a wandering life in the desert. Such a feat requires the work of years and generations. The greatness of Moses lies in the fact that he infused into the people a new spirit of self-reliance and a unity of sentiment and purpose. This he accomplished by means of a common ritual, and by a somewhat improved civil administration, neither of which had been necessary or possible in their sojourn in Egypt, where each of the clans had its own priesthood and local sanctuary.[2]

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* Cf. besides the general works referred to in our last article, p. 506, the following books: E. C. Wines, *Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews*, Philadelphia, 1859, (extremely clever but somewhat antiquated); J. F. MacCurdy, *History, Prophecy and the Monuments*, Vol. II., New York, 1901, pp. 78-236; G. C. M. Douglas, *Samuel and His Age, a Study in the Constitutional History of Israel*, London, 1901; and Schürer, *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, (Eng. trans. in five vols.), New York. For the administration of justice among nomad Arabs, comp. Jacob, *Altarabisches Beduinenleben*, *Leipzig*, 2d edit., pp. 209ff.

[1] *History, Prophecy and the Monuments*, Vol. II, p. 93.

[2] MacCurdy, *op. cit.*, § 448ff.

The statements, often made, that Moses made of Israel a nation out of a herd of slaves and that Hebrew society as a whole had greatly deteriorated during the later stages of their Egyptian residence should not be accepted unreservedly. But there are no good grounds for holding the other suppositions as frequently maintained, that Moses by prophetic insight foresaw that Israel would eventually become a powerful nation and an important factor in the destiny of Western Asia; and that the time would come when his countrymen, led by the example of the surrounding nations, would lose their relish for republican simplicity, and would demand the splendors of a throne and a court; and that, therefore, he promulgated laws and enactments by which the people of Israel were to be governed in their future social and religious evolution.[1] The seventeenth chapter of Deuteronomy, in which Moses is supposed to have enacted the fundamental laws defining and limiting the power of the future kings, after having failed to convince the people of their harmful influence, is, rather, a proof that the author of that section was writing under the influence of the evils of a much later time, when despotism, corruption, and inefficiency were the characteristic features of the Israelitish monarchy. The same line of evidence is equally conclusive when applied to the social, legal, religious and ceremonial sections of the Deuteronomic and Priestly legislations. Hence, in studying the governmental constitution at the time of Moses, and even down to the period of the early monarchy, we must be extremely cautious in handling the Old Testament material and especially the four Pentateuchal legislations.

It is undeniable that if there ever existed a Mosaic legislation, this must have retained, sometimes unaltered, sometimes slightly modified, many of the ancient patriarchal customs and institutions. What was the polity of the Hebrew tribes prior to the time of Moses is not difficult to describe. "Abraham, Isaac and Jacob governed their families with an authority well nigh unlimited. Their power over their households was little short of a sovereign dominion. They were independent princes. They acknowledged no subjection, and owed no allegiance to any sovereign. They formed alliances with other princes.[2] They treated with kings on a footing of equality.[3] They maintained a body of servants, trained to the use of arms; were the chiefs who led them in war; and repelled force by force.[1] They were the priests who appointed festivals, and offered sacrifices.[2] They had the power of disinheriting their children,[3] of sending them away from home without assigning any reason,[4] and even of punishing them capitally.[5]

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[1] Wines, *Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews*, pp. 487, 488.

[2] Gen. xxi, 22-32.

[3] Gen. xiv, 24; xxxiv, 6-19.

The twelve sons of Jacob ruled their respective families with the same authority. But when their descendants had become numerous enough to form tribes, each tribe acknowledged a prince as its ruler.[6] This office, it is likely, was at first hereditary in the oldest son, but afterwards became elective. When the tribes increased to such an extent as to embrace a great number of separate households, the less powerful ones united with their stronger relatives, and acknowledged them as their superiors. In this way, there arose a sub-division of the tribes into collections of households. Such a collection was technically called a family, a clan, a house of fathers, or a thousand.[7] This last appellation was not given because each of these sub-divisions contained just a thousand persons, or a thousand households; for, in the nature of things, the number must have varied, and in point of fact, it is manifest from the history, that it did. As the tribes had their princes, so these clans, families, or thousands had their respective chiefs, who were called heads of houses of fathers, heads of thousands, and sometimes simply heads.[8] Harrington denominates these two classes of officers phylarchs, or governors of tribes, and patriarchs, or governors of families. Both, while the Israelites were yet in Egypt, were comprehended under the general title of elders.[9] Whether this name was a title of honor, like that of sheik (the aged) among the Arabs, and that of senator among the Romans, or whether it is to be understood, according to its etymology, as denoting persons actually advanced in years, is uncertain. These princes of tribes and heads of thousands, the elders of Israel, were the rulers of the people, while they remained still subject to the power of the Pharaohs, and constituted a kind of "imperium in imperio." Of course they had no written constitution, nor any formal code of laws, but governed by custom, reason, and the principles of natural justice. They watched over and provided for the general good of the community, while the affairs of each individual household continued under the control of its own father. For the most part, it may be supposed, only those cases which concerned the fathers of families themselves would come under the cognizance and supervision of the elders."[1]

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[1] Gen. xiv, 13-16.

[2] Gen. viii, 20; xxii, 13; Job i, 5.

[3] Gen. xlix, 3, 4; Chron. v, 1.

[4] Gen. xxi, 14.

[5] Gen. xxxviii, 24.

[6] Num. i.

[7] Judges vi, 15; I Sam, x, 19-21; xxiii, 23; Num. xxvi, 5-50.

[8] Num. xvii, 3; xxv, 15; Joshua, xxii, 14; xxiii, 2.

[9] Exodus iii, 16; iv, 29.

That such was in sum the patriarchal form of government in Israel is almost certain. All that needs to be added is that the power of these elders was simply moral, i. e., they were appealed to in difficult cases only as arbitrators and advisers, having no judicial power to enforce obedience unless the tribe itself agreed to punish the guilty.

During their wanderings through the Desert the Hebrew tribes had no occasion to introduce any radical change in this form of government, for they had to contend with continuous difficulties of social, moral and religious character. And, although numerically superior to many Canaanitish tribes, they were, nevertheless, lacking in military discipline and were constantly moving from place to place. Realizing the necessity of defending themselves against the predatory tribes and rivals for the possession of fertile lands and oases, they soon developed a military spirit, which is the strongest external principle of cohesion in nomadic life. And success in conflicts with foes like the Amalekites created in them an enthusiasm which promoted greatly, while it lasted, the growing sentiment of comradeship and unity. Men who before had been disheartened and aimless now felt themselves bound together by the necessity of putting forth united efforts for the common good. Gratitude, dependence and trust bound them at the same time to Moses, their leader, and to Yahweh their God.[2] Moses was looked upon as judge, referee and counsellor, and also as the representative of Yahweh. But Moses could not have acted as judge or arbiter in all disputes and dissensions. The internal affairs of the tribes, of the households and of the clans, continued to be regulated as before, by the elders, leaving to Moses the work of settling difficult cases which concerned the general welfare of the whole community. Hence Moses was no longer looked upon as a great tribal chief over other chiefs, but as the head of a commonwealth, which marks a distinct change from the purely tribal organization, till then prevalent among the Hebrews. In that organization, as we have

[1] Wines, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-493.

[2] MacCurdy, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

seen, there were the elders for the purpose of administration, while the heads of each clan, or kin, or family settled minor affairs and controversies; their warrant resting mainly on seniority, personal fitnes, or, very often, on the consent of the kinsmen. "In any case," as MacCurdy remarks, "the choice came from below and not from above;"[1] while in the new system, "instead of recognizing the sacred divisions of the tribe or the clan, or even those of the kin or the household, the principle of local relation was introduced. Groups, larger and smaller, were made according to residence or vicinage. Hence the basis of division was to be made numerical. Over the several sections rulers were appointed by Moses. 'And Moses chose men of worth out of all Israel, and set them as heads over the people: rulers (or princes) of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens. And they used to judge the people regularly; the difficult cases they brought to Moses, but the minor ones they adjudicated themselves.'" (Exodus xviii, 25f).[2] Hence, according to this new system justice was administered not according to family, kin, clan, or tribe divisions, but according to local groups which, of course, were mainly based on the former.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

[2] *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* In Exodus xviii, 13ff; Num. xi, 16ff.; and Deut. i, 9-13, we have three variants telling us that, being unable to undertake the administration of justice of the twelve tribes alone, Moses on the advice of his father-in-law, Jethro, appointed the *elders*, or better, the *heads*, or *chiefs* of the tribes (Deut. i, 15), as judges in order to help him in the government of the people. In Deut. i, 9-13, Moses is represented as the originator of the idea of appointing judges or chiefs to help him in the administration of the Hebrew people; while in Exodus xviii, 13-26, the plan is referred entirely to the advice of Jethro. In the first account Moses announces to the people his determination to appoint judges or helpers and the people give their consent; while in the second, Moses takes action without at all consulting the people. Cf. Driver, *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, p. xxxv. That Moses should become the supreme leader of all the tribes, and that these latter should be distributed according to local and numerical groupings instead of tribal associations, were points of absolute necessity for a higher and permanent type of administration. "For military purposes alone an advance was indispensable. It was impossible that any general leader could permanently command the services or the loyalty of the warriors if these were at the absolute disposal of the clan leaders or the family councils. They must be habituated to consider themselves as parts of a greater whole, as owing allegiance to the community and its leader, and bound to stand together, not merely as kinsmen or clansmen, but as members of a large brotherhood. Again, the rights of property must be conserved as between man and man, and not merely as between a man and his tribe or sept. Finally, the initiative in legal progress must be taken by some representatives of the people rather than by the family or clan alone. The new principle could not secure these ends directly, but it was the best means of showing the inadequacy and unfitness of the old bonds of union, and it pointed the way to some higher and better state of society that should provide security, confidence, and repose to the vexed and harassed wanderers." MacCurdy, *op. cit.*, pp. 100, 101.

The administration of justice in Israel in the Mosaic age, and for a long time after, was in the hands of the elders, the local judges, and, somewhat later, the priests, or Levites, joined, afterwards, by the prophets. The elders, who represented the former heads of the families and clans under the tribal system, had undoubtedly ample jurisdiction concerning family affairs, disputes about conjugal relations,[1] inheritances, the division of property, the appointment of the *goel* or upholder of the family,[2] and the settlement of blood-revenge.[3] The local judges, as we have repeatedly remarked, were not what this technical title ordinarily means. They were merely arbitrators and advisers in settling disputes which could not be settled by the elders and, very often, they had to decide cases of appeal from the ordinary bench of elders at the city gates. They had also to administer the new legislation as it arose, and to establish precedents in novel and unforeseen instances. They were, as a rule, taken from the body of the elders of the city, and, later on, from the princes, chiefs, and military officers of the army. The third class consisted of priests, and, later on, of prophets. They were appealed to in all difficult cases, their authority and influence being undoubtedly very strong. To appeal to a priest was to appeal to God himself,[4] for he was universally acknowledged as the official representative of Yahweh. His decisions were regarded as "directions," and as such they were of an advisory character, constituting, thus, the "oracle" of the Hebrews. "As originally each family group had its own priest, resort was naturally had to him for light on practical difficulties, not so much the settling of disputes as pointing out the safe, judicious, or righteous way for the individual or the household in embarrassment."[5] The prophets were also, in course of time, appealed to, not so much as official representatives of Yahweh as from the fact that they were regarded as men eminent in wisdom and spiritual authority. From the eighth century downward the authority of the priests was greatly overshadowed by that of the prophets, who managed the destinies of the whole nation with an almost unlimited authority and assertiveness, proclaiming themselves as the messengers of Yahweh and the mouthpieces of His orders. The jurisdiction of the priests differed from that of the "elders" and local "judges" or "chiefs" in that the oracle of the priest or the prophet carried with it less judicial authority than the decision of the "elders" and "chiefs" or local "judges"; but executive authority and compulsory judgment were lacking in both cases.

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[1] Deut. xxii, 15ff.

[2] Ruth iv.

[3] Deut. xix, 12.

[4] Exodus xxi, 6; xxii, 8.

[5] MacCurdy, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

A single judicial centre for the whole nation was never attained till the period of the monarchy. During the period of the Judges several leading judicial centers existed, such as Shiloh, which was the most renowned among them all, both as a seat of religion and of justice. Of Samuel we read that he judged Israel all the days of his life, going from year to year in circuit to Beth-el, Gilgal, and Mizpah, and judging Israel in all these places, returning afterwards to Ramah, h s home, where also he judged Israel.[1] It was not that Samuel was usurping the power and authority of other local officials, chiefs, priests, and elders that he went around in circuit from one local center of justice to another. It was only a personal tribute to his wisdom and justice that his advice and judgment were sought by all Israel. He rendered his decisions, but these were not necessarily carried out in all cases; and when they were carried out, it was through the authority of the local chiefs and elders.

Whether Hebrew judges held their office for life is not altogether certain, although the presumption is that they did. It is likewise uncertain whether any salary or compensation was attached to the office. In the case of the ten Judges, no revenues were appropriated for them, except, perhaps, a larger share of the spoils taken in war; and in the case of the ordinary local judges or elders the offering of presents was quite common. This at first may have been a kind of testimonial of gratitude and respect, but it afterwards degenerated into mere bribery and corruption.

Whether the office of princes of tribes, chiefs, military officers, elders and judges was hereditary or elective is not easy to determine. Both systems may have had been in according to different circumstances, but that in the majority of cases it was hereditary admits of no doubt, for such was the prevailing custom in the Ancient East and, to a certain extent, is so even in our own days. Nevertheless in numerous other cases the elective system was adopted. Such is the testimony of Josephus, and he is sustained by the text of Deuteronomy i, 13: "Take you wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you," in which Moses is described as giving the people the right of electing or rather selecting for judges and elders those whom they may chose, reserving to himself, however, the power of sanctioning the selection. In the proceedings relating to the election of Jephtah, older commentators have felt themselves able to distinguish four different stages, scarcely less elaborate than our modern system of election, i. e., the preliminary discussion, the nomination, the presentation to the people and the installation. "The enemy was encamped in Gilead. At this point, the people and their rulers, assembled in convention on the plain, said to one another: Who shall be our chief, to lead us against the foe? This was the discussion in which every citizen seems to have had the right to participate. In the exceedingly brief history of the affair, it is not expressly stated, but it is necessarily implied, that Jephtah, of Gilead, a man of distinguished military genius and reputation, was nominated by the voice of the assembly. But this able captain had been some years before driven out from his native city. It was necessary to soothe his irritated spirit. To this end the elders went in person to seek him, laid before him the urgent necessities of the state, softened his anger by promises of preferment, and brought him to Mizpeh. Here, manifestly, they made a formal presentation of him to the people, for it is added: the people made him head and captain over them: that is, they completed the election by giving him their suffrages, recognizing him as their leader, and installing him in his office. Here, then, we have, (1) the free discussion of the people in a popular assembly concerning the selection of a leader; (2) the nomination of Jephtah by the meeting to be chief; (3) the elders' presentation of him to the people for their suffrages; and, (4) his inauguration as prince and leader of Israel."[1] However, in spite of the generalizations thus ingeniously deduced from such slender data, it is certain that the ceremonies connected with the election of judges and rulers were far from being as elaborate as the author would have us believe.

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[1] I Sam. vii, 15-17.

No external sign of honor seems to have been attached to the dignity of judges and elders in Israel They were without pomp, retinue, or equipage, although the passage n the Song of Deborah relating to those "who ride on white asses and sit in judgment,' probably refers to the princes of the tribes chiefs, elders and judges in their respective capacity of military commanders, magistrates and moral advisers or arbiters. In the East even at the present day the Qadis, or chief judges and magistrates have the distinctive privilege of riding either on mules or white asses as against the military officers and civil governors who must ride on horses.

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[1] Cf. Judges x, 17, 18; and xi, 1-11. E. C. Wines, *Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews*, Philadelphia, 1859, pp. 502, 503.

That the office of chief magistrate was unknown in ancient Israel is quite certain. In the whole Pentateuchal legislation allusion to such an institution is absolutely wanting. The supreme authority of the Hebrew community was in Yahweh; Moses, strictly speaking, was but the viceroy of Yahweh; and the same, to a certain extent, may also be said of Joshua. Their successors, the Judges, were rather military commanders than judges or magistrates in the strict sense With the beginning of the monarchy the civil as well as the military power began to be concentrated, as far as possible, in the person of the king.[1] But the Pentateuchal legislation, as a whole is decidedly adverse to the idea of concentrating all power in the pesron of the king,[2] or in that of any individual; and it is not improbable that the writer of Deut. xvii was influenced by Israel's historical experience under the monarchy.

Such in brief was the political constitution of Israel during the Mosaic age and through that of the Judges down to the beginning of the monarchy: a comparatively imperfect organization, greatly lacking in unity, executive authority and systematic administration of law and justice.

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[1] The notion that the king in person should be the supreme judge as well as ruler was a doctrine widely prevalent in Asia. In it lies the complete germ of Oriental despotism which in time became as supreme and as abominable in Israel as in any other Eastern nation. Thus we see how Saul, without inquiry, without trial, without the intervention of any impartial representative of justice, condemned to death eighty innocent priests, including the high priest himself, with their wives and children (I Sam. xxi, 11-19). Even David, not to mention practically all of his successors in Israel or Judah, had as little regard for judicial procedure as Saul (Cf. II Sam. i, 5-16; iv, 9-12; xiv, 4-11; II Kings ii, 5-9); and although in the latter part of his reign he is said to have appointed several thousand Levites as judges (I Chron. xxiii, 4; xxvi, 29-32), it is nevertheless safe to assume that these either acted in cases of importance or in the name of the king himself and under his direct and terrorizing influence.

[2] Deut. xvii, 14-20. The king was not indeed supposed to be ignorant of the law, but there was no wish to have him act as an ordinary judge or chief magistrate of the people.

Our main contention, however, viz., that law as law, and judicial power and executive authority in the administration of justice were practically unknown among the Israelites in the Mosaic and immediately post-Mosaic age, down to the period of the monarchy, can be further demonstrated by a careful examination of the four Pentateuchal legislations, and especially that of the Book of the Covenant.

We have already seen[1] that even a superficial glance at the nature and contents of the Book of the Covenant (Exodus xx-xxiii), which is universally admitted by scholars to be the oldest extant Hebrew code of laws, clearly reveals that it was intended for a people who had advanced but little beyond the pastoral stage. Cities are not alluded to, and city life is altogether unknown. Even the many Canaanitish cities, which during the earlier stages of the settlement were conquered by the Israelitish tribes, were not, as a rule, inhabited by the conquerors, because they were neither adapted nor inclined to settled town-life. Some of the more industrious individuals and families undoubtedly settled in these towns, but the people, as a whole, even during the period of the Judges, remained, if not altogether, certainly to a very large extent, semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural; for as MacCurdy rightly remarks, "Not one generation or two could convert a race of cattle-tenders into tradesmen, or dwellers in tents into builders of cities. The whole atmosphere of the contemporary records is redolent of the life of shepherds and husbandmen. The song of Deborah and the book of Ruth represent the same social conditions all the more vividly from their poetic and idyllic character The leading men up to the new era under David were men of the country or inhabitants of villages. David himself was the last of that renowned order of nobility. It is the land holder with his retinue of 'servants" who is the representative man in this democracy, the man of force and worth."[2]

Allusions to the administration of law and justice in this old Book of the Covenant are extremely meagre, being as follows:

> "Thou shalt not take up a false report; put not thy hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou speak in a cause to turn aside after a multitude to wrest justice; neither shalt thou favor a poor man in his cause."[3]
>
> "Thou shalt not wrest the justice due to the poor in his cause. Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not, for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take no bribe;

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[1] New York Review, Feb., 1906, p. 632ss.

[2] *History, Prophecy and the Monuments*, Vol. II, pp. 115, 116.

[3] Exodus xxiii, 1-3.

for a bribe blindeth them that have sight, and perverteth the words of the righteous."[1]

It is manifest that the Book of the Covenant, the oldest Hebrew code of laws, utterly fails to give us any clear (or even vague) reference to legal procedure, judges, courts, or to any system of administration of justice. It is true that the Book of the Covenant contains statutes and judgments, apparently enacted by some authoritative power; for such an authority must be assumed, otherwise there would be no meaning in the precise fixing of punishment, etc., such as the punishment of death, seven times prescribed, and the avenging on the body of the guilty person the wrong he had done.[2] Still, as Kautzsch rightly remarks, "We are wholly in the dark as to the circle from which all the statutes and judgments proceeded, and, above all, as to the public authority by which scrupulous obedience was ensured. And, emphatically as justice and impartiality in legal cases is insisted on (xxiii, 1ff.), there is not a single indication as to who is authorized to pronounce sentence or to supervise the execution of the verdict."[3]

In two cases, however, viz., in Exodus xxi, 6, and xxii, 8, in which the case is complicated and the law doubtful, the Book of the Covenant insists that the parties should present themselves "*before God*" (elohim): in the first case probably to perform a symbolic act which will have legal effect, and in the second probably to obtain an oracle.[4] The Septuagint seems to have understood the sense of the phrase "*before God*," in its most obvious meaning, rendering it "*before*

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[1] Exodus xxiii, 6-9.

[2] Exodus xx, 23ff.

[3] *An Outline of the History of the Literature of the Old Testament*, (Eng. trans.), London, 1899, p. 30.

[4] The two cases are as follows: "If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve; and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. If he come in by himself, he shall go out by himself; if he be married, then his wife shall go out with him. If his master give him a wife, and she bears him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself. But if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free: then his master *shall bring him unto God* (elohim), and shall bring him to the door, or unto the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him forever." (Exodus xxi, 2-7). "If a man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man's house, if the thief be found, he shall pay double. If the thief be not found, then the master of the house *shall come near unto God* (elohim), to see whether he have not put his hand unto his neighbor's goods. For every matter of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, whereof one saith, this is it, the cause of both parties *shall come before God* (elohim); He whom God (elohim) shall condemn shall pay double unto his neighbor." (Exodus xxii, 7-10).

the tribunal of God," i. e., that the matter is to be referred to the judgment of God, presumably in the sanctuary or before the priest Rabbinical tradition, however, as early as the time of St. Jerome, took the word "*elohim*" (God) as a plural, i. e , *gods*, arguing that the word here means simply "*judges*," from the fact that, on account of the sacredness of their office, and the place where their decisions were rendered (often in the temple or at some sacred shrine) the judges were called "*gods*."[1] This rabbinical interpretation, which has been followed by the majority of ancient and modern commentators,[2] ingenious though it be, is, nevertheless erroneous; for, considering the fact that the two cases referred to were such as no judge could decide with any certainty or probability, and in which only a divine intervention could bring about a satisfactory solution, we may assume that the rabbinical interpretation is exegetically untenable. This conclusion has been admirably vindicated by the Code of Hammurabi, where in several cases, in which the doubt is such as to make any human wisdom of no avail, and any judicial decision untrustworthy, the decision is left to God Himself. Hence, in all such cases, Hammurabi decrees that the litigants should present themselves "before God," and swear by His name or take an oath. The expression used by Hammurabi in all such cases is exactly the same as that used in the two passages of Exodus referred to, and the cases in which the expression is applied are analogous. But in the Code of Hammurabi "to appear before God," is the same as "to swear by the name of God," or more clearly, "to take a solemn oath;" hence, in the two passages of Exodus, to appear before "elohim," does not mean to appear before the judges, but to take a solemn oath at some holy place or sanctuary where the presence of the deity was more sensibly felt. By taking an oath the man in question constitutes God as the Judge before whom he protests his innocence and affirms his rights. God is thereby called upon to avenge Himself upon the perjurors. And this God is neither Bel nor Marduk nor any other particular god, but is the Deity; in its most abstract form, He who is considered to be everywhere and to know everything.[3] Hence the rabbinical interpretation, followed, till the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi, by the majority of commentators, may be confidently dismissed.

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[1] Cf. the writer's article in the preceding number of this REVIEW, pp. 508-9.

[2] *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

[3] Comp. J. M. Lagrange, *La Méthode Historique*, Paris, 3d edit., 1904, pp. 167-168; (English trans. under the title, *Historical Criticism and the Old Testament*, by Edw. Myers, London, Catholic Truth Society, 1905, pp. 165, 166).

The legislation of Deuteronomy, on the other hand, furnishes us with more abundant details concerning the administration of law and justice in Israel. These are contained mainly in chapters xvi, 18-20; xvii, 8-13, and 14-20; xix, 15-20, and xxv, 1-4, as follows:

> "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which Yahweh thy God giveth thee, according to thy tribes; and they shall judge the people with righteous judgment. Thou shalt not wrest justice; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a bribe; for a bribe doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous. That which is altogether just shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which Yahweh thy God giveth thee." (Deuteronomy xvi, 18-20).
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> "If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates; then thou shalt arise, and get thee up unto the place which Yahweh thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days: and thou shalt inquire, and they shall show thee the sentence of judgment. And thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence which they shall show thee from that place which Yahweh shall choose, etc. (Deut. xvii, 8-13, and 14-20).
>
> "One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established. If an unrighteous witness rise up against any man to testify against him of wrong-doing, then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before Yahweh, before the priests and the judges that shall be in those days. And the judges shall make diligent inquisition, and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and have testified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to do unto his brother; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee. And those that remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil in the midst of thee. And thine eyes shall not pity; life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." (Deuteronomy xix, 15-20).
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> "If there be a controversy between men, and they come into judgment, and the judges judge them, then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked. And it shall be, if the wicked man be worthy to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face, according to his wickedness, by number. Forty stripes he may give him, he shall not exceed; lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above these with many stripes, then thy brother should seem vile unto thee." (Deuteronomy xxv, 1-4).

And in Leviticus xix, 15, we read:

> "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment; thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty"; and v. 35

of the same chapter: "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment. in measures of length, of weight, or of quantity."

It is undoubtedly true that all the four Pentateuchal codes presuppose the existence of some kind of judges, and inculcate the duty of administering justice impartially, but we have already seen what the exact nature and duties of these judges or elders were during the Mosaic and immediately post-Mosaic age. They formed a class of moral advisers and counsellors, who served the people by giving advice and decisions and settling disputes, without, however, possessing any power or authority to formulate laws, to enforce obedience, or to inflict penalty. We know, however, that in the course of time, and especially during the monarchy, these elders, or heads, or judges gradually acquired the power of a governing body and a certain authority for carrying out their judgments and decisions. But even at this stage the office and power of an Israelitish judge was far inferior to that of a Babylonian judge of the Hammurabi period. The episode of the wise woman of Tekoah[1] and of the trial of Naboth[2] are sufficient evidence of this, although these stories carry us down to the period of the monarchy, i. e., about 300 years later than Moses. According to Deut. xix, 12; xxi, 2ff; and xxii, 15ff, the judges or elders are represented as having some executive power, but the author of Deuteronomy is evidently influenced, in this case, as in many others, by much later legal institutions and practices; for, according to him, the elders in the time of Moses, already formed a well-organized judicial college, which is extremely improbable. During the period of the monarchy the power and authority of the local judges or elders was to some extent absorbed by the king, who was considered as supreme judge, to whose authority appeal could be made from the judgment of the elders.[3] Princes and members of the royal house are also alluded to as exercising judicial functions.[4] The priests also undoubtedly had judicial authority, as is implied in the Book of the Covenant, and in Deuteronomy. In the the former, the priests communicate the decision of Yahweh,[5] while in Deut. the priests, together with the Levites, are represented as judicial officers, constituting a sort of spiritual college of justice, parallel to that of the elders.[1] Later on the jurisdiction of the elders became separated from that of the priests and Levites and was limited to particular cases, the power of the priests being thus extended at their expense. In this, however, as well as in many other instances, the author of Deuteronomy shows once more the priestly tendencies which characterize his whole theological and historical standpoint.

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[1] II Sam. xiv, 4ff.

[2] I Kings xxi, 8ff.

[3] Cf. II Sam. xiv, 4ff; xv, 2ff; II Kings xv, 5; I Kings iii, 16ff Deut. xvii, 9. Comp. also II Sam. viii, 15; xv, 2; I Kings vii, 7; Jeremiah xxii, 15ff; xxiii, 5; and Isaiah xvi, 5.

[4] Isaiah i, 23; iii, 14; Micah iii, 1, 9; Jeremiah xxi, 11ff; xxii, 2f; Ezech. xlv, 9; and Hosea vii, 7; xiii, 10; Isaiah i, 26; iii, 2; Micah vii, 3; Zeph. iii, 3.

[5] Exodus xxii, 8.

From II Chronicles we learn that King Jehosaphat established in Jerusalem a supreme tribunal, or court of justice, where priests and lay-judges participated in the administration of justice each in their own sphere;[2] and that he appointed judges in all the cities of Judah. Details are lacking, but in its broader features, the judicature thus established by Jehosaphat agrees remarkably with the system prescribed in Deuteronomy xvii, 8-13. Even in this case, it is doubtful whether these judges and tribunals could in any satisfactory measure compare with the Babylonian legal system of the time of Hammurabi. In Ezechiel's time (and this brings us down to the sixth century B. C.), the priests seemed to have absorbed all administrative power,[3] while the author of I Chronicles, evidently influenced by Ezechiel or Deuteronomy, tells us that David had appointed 6,000 Levites as judges, which is quite inadmissible.[4] In post-exilic times, and during the

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[1] Deuteronomy xvii, 9ff; and xix, 15ff.

[2] "And Jehoshaphat dwelt at Jerusalem; and he went out again among the people from Beer-Sheba to the hill-country of Ephraim, and brought them unto Yahweh, the God of their fathers. And he set judges in the land throughout all the fortified cities of Judah, city by city, and said to the judges: Consider what ye do; for ye judge not for man, but for Yahweh; and He is with you in the judgment. Now, therefore, let the fear of Yahweh be upon you, take heed and do it; for there is no iniquity with Yahweh our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of bribes. Moreover in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set up the Levites and the priests, and of the heads of the father's houses of Israel, for the judgment of Yahweh and for controversies. And they returned to Jerusalem. And he charged them saying: "Thus shall ye do in the fear of Yahweh, faithfully and with a perfect heart. And whensoever any controversy shall come to you from your brethren that dwell in their cities, between blood and blood, between law and commandment, statutes and ordinances, ye shall warn them, that they be not guilty towards Yahweh, and so wrath come upon you and upon your brethren; this do and ye shall not be guilty. And behold Amariah, the chief priest, is over you in all matters of Yahweh; and Zebadiah, the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, in all the king's matters; and also the Levites shall be officers before you. Deal courgeously, and Yahweh be with the good." II Chronicles xix, 4-11.

[3] Ezechiel xliv, 24. "And in a controversy they (the priests) shall stand to judge; according to mine ordinances shall they judge it," etc. . . .

[4] I Chronicles xxiii, 4; and xxvi, 29.

Greek and Roman periods, reference is made to professional judges, local courts and tribunals in all the cities of Israel,[1] which was undoubtedly due to Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman influences.

Judicial or legal procedure was very simple in early Israel. In Exodus xviii, 22, we are told that the elders appointed by Moses at Horeb were to judge the people "at all seasons"; and in Numbers xxvii, 2, (Comp. Exodus xviii, 19ff.), we read that Moses rendered judgments before the tabernacle of Yahweh, where he sat with Aaron and the princes or elders of the congregation to teach statutes and give judgments. According to Deuteronomy, xxi, 19; xxii, 15; and xxv, 7; (Comp. Prov. xxii, 22; Amos v, 11, 15; and Ruth iv, 1, etc.), the judges in the cities had their seat at the gate, which was the thoroughfare of the public, or in the public squares of the city, where the markets were held,[2] or in some other open place.[3] Even the supreme judges administered justice in public, Deborah, for instance, under a palm-tree,[4] and the kings at the gate or in the court of the royal palace.[5] Solomon is said to have erected a porch, or hall of judgment, in Jerusalem, for his own royal court of justice;[6] and from Jeremiah we learn that in later times the princes of Judah exercised judgment in a chamber of the royal palace.[7] Jeremiah himself, when accused by the priests and false prophets, was judged by the princes of the people, who are said to have come out of the king's house into the temple to judge at the entrance of the new gate before the assembled people.[1]

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[1] Cf. Ezra vii, 25: "And thou, Ezra, after the wisdom of the God that is in thy hand, appoint magistrates and judges, who may judge all the people that are beyond the River, all such as know the laws of thy God; and teach ye him that knoweth them not. And whosoever will not do the law of thy God, and the laws of the king, let judgment be executed upon him with all diligence, whether it be unto death, or to banishment, or to confiscation of goods, or to imprisonment." Cf. also Ezra x, 14; Judith vi, 16; Math. v, 22; x, 17; Mark xiii, 9; etc. . . . Similar references are also to be found in Josephus, the Babylonian and the Jerusalem Talmuds.

[2] Cf. II Kings vii, 1.

[3] Judges iv, 5; and I Samuel xxii, 6.

[4] "Now Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lappidoth, she judged Israel at that time. And she dwelt under the palm-tree of Deborah, between Ramah and Bethel, in the hill-country of Ephraim; and the children of Israel came up to her for judgment." Judges iv, 5.

[5] Of Absalom we read that "He rose up early, and stood beside the way of the gate; and it was so, that, when any man had a suit which should come to the king for judgment, then Absalom called unto him, and said: of what city art thou? and he said thy servant is of one of the tribes of Israel. And Absalom said unto him: See, thy matters are good and right; but there is no man deputed of the king to hear thee, etc. . . . " II Samuel xv, 2-4. Comp. also II Samuel xiv, 4ff; and I Kings iii, 16.

[6] "And he made the porch of the throne where he was to judge, even the porch of judgment; and it was covered with cedar from floor to floor." I Kings vii, 7.

[7] Jeremiah xxxvi, 12.

The litigants, viz., the plaintiff and the defendant, appeared personally before the elders,[2] and presented their complaint orally.[3] The accused, if not present, could be summoned to appear.[4] Advocates or counsels are unknown in the Old Testament,[5] for the plaintiff was supposed to look after his own case if he desired satisfactory judgment. Litigants were also at liberty to settle their differences personally without appealing to the judge.

The judge was held bound to hear and examine the case closely and conscientiously, his chief method of inquiry being the examination of the testimony of witnesses. The accusations of the father against his rebellious child needed no support of witness.[6] In other cases, however, witnesses were absolutely required, and these not less than two or three,[7] especially in criminal cases.[8] In all probability the testimony of slaves, children under age, or women was not accepted, as is expressly stated by Josephus and the Talmud, although not mentioned in the Old Testament. Witnesses were thoroughly examined; and, as in the Code of Hammurabi, false witnesses were punished according to the *lex talionis*, viz., by inflicting the precise kind of punishment the false witness had intended to bring upon his victim by his falsehood.[9] Witnesses do not seem to have been put on oath,[10] but when the nature of the case was such as to make it impossible to have or to produce witnesses, as in a case of theft, the oath was then administered and the case decided.[1] When the discovery of the crime and of the guilty party was a practical impossibility Yahweh was looked to for the accomplishment of the task.[2]

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[1] Jeremiah xxvi, 10ff.

[2] Cf. Deut. xvii, 5; xxi, 20; and xxv, 1.

[3] Deut. i, 16; xxi, 20; and xxv, 1. In the Book of Job, which undoubtedly reflects much later times and customs, there seems to be a reference to written accusation: "Oh, that I had one to hear me! Lo, here is my signature, let the Almighty answer me. And that I had the indictment which mine adversary hath written!" Job xxxi, 35.

[4] Deut. xxv, 8.

[5] Many old commentators have tried to prove the existence of counsels or advocates in Israel from Job xxix, 15-17, and Isaiah i, 17. But the first passage simply refers to Job's own justice and meritorious works, while the other refers to judges in general. "Learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless and plead for the widow."

[6] Deut. xxi, 18ff.

[7] Deut. xix, 15.

[8] Deut. xvii, 6; Num. xxxv, 30. Cf. also Mark xiv, 56ff; and Mat. xxvi, 60.

[9] Deut. xix, 18ff.

[10] The passage in Leviticus v, 1, does not refer to the swearing of witnesses, but is a solemn adjuration, addressed to those present, by which all those who know about the matter are summoned to come forward as witnesses. Comp. also Prov. xxix, 24.

The Law affixes no civil punishment for perjury; it forbids it as a profanation of Yahweh's name[3] and threatens it with divine punishment.[4] It must be noted, however, that in all cases in which an oath was taken before a judgment-seat, it consisted merely of an adjuration addressed by the judge and responded to by the person sworn with an *Amen.*[5] "Only in common life did the person swearing himself utter the oath, either: *So Yahweh do to me, and more also,*[6] or *God* (*Elohim*) *do so to me,* etc.,[7] or *as Yahweh liveth.*[8] But in such cases the name of Yahweh was probably avoided, and the oath was taken by the life (soul) of the man, to whom one wished to protest by oath.[9] In later times it became common, especially among the Pharisees, to swear by heaven, by the earth, by the temple, the holy city, and by one's own head.[10]

The verdict or the sentence was pronounced orally, although from Job xiii, 16; and Isaiah, x, 1, it appears that, in some cases, the sentence may have been given in written form. The sentence was to be executed without delay.[11] Punishment was administered before the eyes of the judge,[12] and that of stoning by the whole congregation[13] or the people of the city,[14] the witnesses being required to put their hands first to the execution of the guilty.[15]

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[1] Exodus xxii, 6-11. In the case of a deposit committed to any one being injured or purloined, the oath is prescribed; in which case the depositary could clear himself of guilt by taking such an oath (Exodus xxii, 10f.); and perhaps also when one refused to his neighbor a deposit committed to him, or something stolen or found (Leviticus v, 22ff.).

[2] Exodus xx, 8; I Sam. xiv, 40ff; Jos. vii, 14.

[3] Leviticus xix, 12.

[4] Exodus xx, 7; Deut. v, 11.

[5] Cf. I Kings xxii, 16; and Matt. xxvi, 63.

[6] I Sam. xx, 13; Ruth i, 17.

[7] I Sam. iii, 17; xxv, 22.

[8] Judges viii, 19; I Sam. xx, 3; and I Kings i, 29.

[9] I Sam. xvii, 55; and II Sam. xi, 11.

[10] Matt. v, 34f; and xxiii, 16. C. F. Keil, *Manual of Biblical Archeology,* (English trans., Edinburgh, 1888, in 2 vols. Vol. II, pp. 348, 349, note 7.

[11] Num. xv, 36; Deut. xxii, 18.

[12] Deut. xx, 2ff.

[13] Num. xx, 36.

[14] Deut. xxii, 21.

[15] Deut. xvii, 17; xiii, 9.

The practice of ordeals as means for ascertaining the truth, or obtaining a confession of guilt was not unknown in Israel, although Josephus expressly tells us that torture and the bastinado for this purpose were first introduced into Israel by the Herodians.[1] The most important one is the so-called "*ordeal of jealousy,*" prescribed in Numbers v, 11-31, in the case of a woman suspected of adultery which cannot be legally proved. For this purpose the husband of the suspected woman must bring her to the priest; he must also bring with him an offering of barley meal, which is called "*a meal-offering of jealousy, a meal-offering of memorial bringing guilt to remembrance.*" The priest brings the woman before Yahweh, makes her take an oath of purgation, and then gives her to drink a potion described as "*the water of bitterness that causeth the cure,*" consisting of "*holy water*" with which dust from the floor of the tabernacle has been mingled, and into which the written words of the oath have been washed. If the woman be guilty the potion proves harmful; if innocent, harmless; in the latter case, moreover, the woman becomes fruitful.[2]

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[1] *De Bello Judaico,* lib. I, 30, 2-5. Comp. also *Antiquitates Judaicæ,* iii, 11, 6.

[2] "And Yahweh spoke unto Moses saying: 'Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, if any man's wife go aside, and commit a trespass against him, and a man lie with her carnally, and it be hid from the eyes of her husband, and be kept close, and she be defiled, and there be no witness against her, and she be not taken in the act; and the spirit of jealousy come upon him, and he be jealous of his wife, and she be defiled; or if the spirit of jealousy come upon him, and he be jealous of his wife, and she be not defiled; then shall the man bring his wife unto the priest, and shall bring her oblation for her, the tenth part of an ephah of barley meal, he shall pour no oil upon it, nor put frankincense thereon; for it is a meal-offering of jealousy, a meal-offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance. And the priest shall bring her near, and set her before Yahweh; and the priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel; and of the dust that is on the floor of the tabernacle the priest shall take and put it into the water. And the priest shall set the woman before Yahweh, and let the hair of the woman's head go loose, and put the meal-offering of memorial in her hands, which is the meal-offering of jealousy; and the priest shall have in his hands the water of bitterness that causeth the curse. And the priest shall cause her to swear, and shall say unto the woman, if no man hath lain with thee, and if thou have not gone aside to uncleanness, being under thy husband, be thou free from this water of bitterness that causeth the curse. But if thou have gone aside, being under thy husband, and if thou be defiled, and some man have lain with thee besides thy husband, then the priest shall cause the woman to swear with the oath of cursing, and the priest shall say unto the woman, Yahweh make thee a curse and an oath among the people, when Yahweh doth make thy thigh to fall away, and thy body to swell; and this water that causeth the curse shall go into thy bowels, and make thy body to swell and thy thigh to fall away. And the woman shall say: Amen, Amen. And the priest shall write these curses in a book, and he shall blot them out into the water of bitterness. And he shall make the woman

Other kinds of ordeals must have certainly existed among the ancient Hebrews although there are no explicit references to them in the Old Testament. The custom was so universally practised by ancient peoples that it is most probable that it existed in its various forms in Israel also.[1]

The existence, at least at certain periods, of corruption and dishonesty in the administration of justice in Israel, and especially among the priests, need hardly be insisted on. The example of the two sons of Eli, notorious for their greed, is well known.[2] Micah,[3] Isaiah,[4] Hosea,[5] Zephaniah,[6] Jeremiah,[7] and Malachi[8] freely and

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drink the water of bitterness that causeth the curse; and the water that causeth the curse shall enter into her and become bitter. And the priest shall take the jealousy offering out of the woman's hand, and shall wave the offering before Yahweh, and offer it upon the altar. And the priest shall take a handful of the offering, even the memorial thereof, and burn it upon the altar, and afterwards shall cause the woman to drink the water. And when he hath made her to drink the water, then it shall come to pass that if she be defiled, and have done trespass against her husband, that the water that causeth the curse shall enter into her, and become bitter, and her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall fall away; and the woman shall be a curse among her people. And if the woman be not defiled, but be clean, then she shall be free, and shall conceive seed. This is the law of jealousy, when a wife goeth aside to another instead of her husband, and is defiled; or when the spirit of jealousy cometh upon him, and he be jealous over his wife, and shall set the woman before Yahweh and the priest shall execute upon her all this law. Then shall the man be guiltless from iniquity, and this woman shall bear her iniquity." Numbers v, 11-31. G. B, Gray, *Commentary on Numbers* (*International Critical Commentary*), New York. 1903, pp. 43-44ff. In a note (p. 48) in the same commentary, Dr. Gray mentions a suggestion made to him by the Rev. H. W. Robinson, which is worthy of consideration. "In the original rite administered in cases of suspicion aroused by pregnancy the water may have been credited with positive virtue in the case of guilt; being supposed to descend into the womb (מעים v, 22, as in Gen. xxv, 23; Psalms lxxi, 6; Ruth i, 11), it may have been regarded as affecting the offspring of a guilty intercourse, so that, though the woman grows great with child ('the swelling belly'), the birth is abortive (expressed by euphemistic or modified expression נפל ירך compare נפל abortion). In the other case the potion may have been regarded as innocuous to the growth of the foetus, which is duly brought to the birth. The latter point has then been characteristically modified: the innocent woman is promised that she shall *subsequently* conceive, as a reward directly granted by Yahweh (Cf. Gen. xvii, 15-19, and xxv, 21)". For analogous customs among other nations comp. the authorities referred to in the same work, pp. 43, 44.

[1] Comp. ex. gr., Num. xvi and Ps. cix, 18, and Stade, *Die Eiferopferthora*, in the *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, Vol. XV (1895), pp. 166-178. Comp. also W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 2d edit., London, 1894, pp. 180ff.

[2] I Sam. ii, 12ff.

[3] iii, 11.

[4] xxvii, 7.

[5] iv, 4ff.

[6] iii, 4.

[7] vi, 13; vii, 10.

[8] ii, 8f.

vehemently accuse them of unfairness, injustice, respect of persons, and dishonesty in their legal decisions. These corruptions have been made the subject of a full and vivid treatment in the admirable work of Professor MacCurdy:

"No region of Hebrew life is so thoroughly illustrated for us by competent observers as the sphere of the administration of justice. And upon none has such unqualified condemnation fallen. Those who cared most for justice, and for the essential welfare of the state—the historians, prophets, moralists, hymn-writers, who have left their impressions, and who were most likely to know the truth and to set it in its true relations—write in stern rebuke and bitter invective, so unreserved and so persistent that it forms of itself the most extensive moral rubric in the literature of Israel. There is no space to present the matter adequately. The following analysis may serve as a general characterization.

"The most frequent and virulent source of the abuse of justice was the venality of its ministers, whether local judges or the "princes" of the court. To a casual observer of Oriental life the prevailing official corruption is something appalling To the close inquirer it seems indigenous and inevitable. To the true servants of Jehovah it was appalling, but neither inherent nor necessary. It was rather an exotic growth, or a twist aside from the true bent of Israel's development. When we consider the social and governmental encouragements to laxity and neglect, and, still further, the seductive moral atmosphere in which the leaders of the people moved, we shall marvel at the moral courage of the Prophets in opposing the dominant evil. We must also admire their insight in discerning its essential relations to society, and their ideality in conceiving the possibility of its being discarded anywhere in the Semitic world. One illustration may suffice. The common word for a "bribe" (שחר) is, properly speaking, a "present," and is used of the propitiatory gifts sent to a superior in order to secure his protection,[1] or by one who seeks to evade deserved punishment.[2] A similar combination of meanings is shown by a less common term (מתנה).[3] That is to say, a present is for the most part a sort of bribe. The one meaning leads up to the other by a sort of social necessity. Presents are the ordinary preliminaries of visits and negotiations. Their motive and effect naturally comes to be the influencing of the beneficiary.[1] Citations of instances from Oriental or Biblical history would simply overcrowd my pages. Wherever and whenever we get a glimpse of the inner movements of Semitic society we find the custom and the motive. We shall only cite further Jacob's gift to Esau,[2] and the present of Merodach-Baladan to Hezekiah.[3] In general Semitic history we may go back some hundreds of years, and in the casually disclosed correspondence of the El-Amarna tablets the business is seen to be quite overdone. The annals of the Assyrian kings fairly swarm with instances. It is, therefore, the most natural thing in the world to send a present to a judge before a case comes up for hearing; though publicity was, of course, not desirable in the transaction,[4] and was usually avoided, as a suggestive proverb informs us.[5] Only public opinion frowning down upon open and shameful corruption, or the spectacle of judges repudiating any source of approach from the side of a litigant, would seem likely to discredit the custom.

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[1] I Kings xv, 19; II Kings xvi, 8.

[2] Prov. vi, 35; and xxi, 14.

[3] Comp. Gen. xxv, 6, with Prov. xv, 27; Eccl. vii, 7.

"The evil, indeed, was dealt with by the lawgiver of the ancient code (the Book of the Covenant) and that in the most reasonable and persuasive fashion: 'Thou shalt take no bribe; for a bribe blindeth those that have sight, and perverteth the cause of the righteous.'[6] Yet the abuse was prevalent in the time of the Judges. In spite of the noble record and example of Samuel, his sons, judges by his own appointment, became notoriously venal.[7] Samuel's protest and challenge[8] on his own behalf,[9] were of themselves an indication that his virtues were rare. We may learn something of the processes of civil justice under the kingdom by consulting the prophets. For the Northern Kingdom Amos asserts that bribery was a prevalent evil of his time.[10] For Judah and Jerusalem Isaiah cries aloud,[11] and his contemporary Micah sets forth the paradox that judge, priest, and prophet alike are greedy and corrupt, and yet proclaim their trust in Jehovah.[1] He lets us also into the inner methods of those betrayers of the people.[2] Ezechiel's arraignment is a review of the history of the kingdom.[3] The long-continued prevalence of the abuse is perhaps best shown by the large place given to it in the proverbial literature of the nation.[4] The final deliverance on the subject refers to the corruption practiced by the king himself. This alone, it is declared, is sufficient to undermine and ruin the state[5] We are brought into a somewhat different region when we turn to the lyrical poetry of the Hebrews. Here it is not the preacher of righteousness thundering out the judgment, nor the philosophical observer pointing the moral. It is the sympathetic partisan of the outraged and oppressed, who voices their wrongs and their sufferings, and brings them into relation with the practical claims of religion upon both the transgressors and their victims."[6]

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[1] Prov. xvii, 8; xviii, 16.

[2] Gen. xxxii, 13; xxxiii, 10; cf. xliii, 11; I Sam. x, 27; Psalm xlv, 12.

[3] Isaiah xxxix, 1.

[4] Prov. xxi, 14.

[5] Prov. xvii, 23.

[6] Exodus xxiii, 8; cf. Deut. xvi, 19.

[7] I Sam. viii, 1ff.

[8] Samuel's custom of taking a small fee or "present" for giving counsel from Jehovah, doubtless followed by other "seers" of the period, (I Sam. ix, 7ff.), was of a different nature; but it was a practice very easily abused.

[9] I Sam. xii, 3ff.

[10] Ch. v, 12.

[11] i, 23; v, 23; x, 1.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

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[1] Micah iii, 5, 11.

[2] Micah vii, 3. Translate vii, 3, according to a restored text:

"To make ready their hands for evil,
The noble asks counsel, and the judge answers for hire
And declares to him what his soul lusts for."

This passage and the context were probably written, not by an unknown prophet, as many recent critics suppose, but by Micah himself in his later years under Manasseh.

[3] xxi, 12ff.

[4] Prov. xv, 27; xvii, 8, 23; xviii, 16; xxi, 14; xxv, 14.

[5] Prov. xxix, 4.

[6] Ps. xv, 5; xxiv, 4; xxvi, 10; cf. Isaiah xxxiii, 15; *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, Vol. II, pp. 210-213.

FATHER TYRRELL AS AN APOLOGIST

Henri Bremond

Nova et Vetera is the title of the book which first won for Father Tyrrell the appreciative gratitude and confidence of the Catholics of England. Others followed later: *Hard Sayings, External Religion, Faith of the Millions, Lex Orandi,* and what not. *Lex Credendi* will be out shortly; perhaps before these lines appear in print. Each of these works as it appeared has borne witness to a process of continual and courageous evolution of a mind at once subtle and restless, but before all else sincere.

Yet one word is enough to bind his latest and earliest writings into a connected whole and to define the single spirit that pervades them all, and it is the word which Father Tyrrell has inscribed on the first page of his first work: *Nova et Vetera*—the New and the Old. The New, welcomed by a believer who has no intention whatever of sacrificing the riches of the Past; the Old, treasured up, maintained and loved by a searcher who refuses to condemn indiscriminately the scientific and intellectual activity of the Present.

Nova et Vetera, viz. a *via media* between those who would fain preserve everything and those who bid fair to destroy everything; between the intransigeance of the Right and that of the Left; between the fanaticism of petrifaction and the fanaticism of instability.

Nova et Vetera. Obviously these epithets are not applied to different objects, but to one and the same truth, "ever old and ever new," which the Church of to-day receives from the Church of yesterday to transmit to the Church of to-morrow, and which is sustained and renovated in all its youthful freshness as often as it wins the living inward adhesion of a new disciple.

In one sense these three Latin words are everyman's device. For in spite of himself the most arrogant of innovators must to a great extent march in the footsteps of that Past of which he boasts to have effaced every vestige; while the least "modern" of conservatives, did he really believe he had nothing new to say, would confine himself to re-editing the Councils and the *Summa Theologica* without note or comment. Thus without intending it they balance one another; the former checking the very movement he would fain hasten; the latter unconsciously hastening it in his endeavor to check it. The Catholic attack upon the Protestant rule of faith hastened the advent of Biblical Criticism; while the extravagant negations of Strauss and Feuerbach occasioned a revival of religious feeling and interest in the universities of Germany.

It is the essential law of all development. Ideas will neither race nor tarry at the caprice of those who affect to control them. Mastered by an irresistible and time-biding Power, both Reactionaries and Progressives co-operate in spite of themselves in a result which they can neither retard nor advance by a single moment. Intellectual modesty, a profound reverence for tradition, an absolute faith in the expansive power of eternal truth, such are the lessons forced upon us by this law of history, and those which Father Tyrrell has taken to himself. His apologetic, at once bold and cautious, keeps both Past and Future steadily in view; or rather it is from the Past that it seeks to forecast and prepare for the Future. If he welcomes fearlessly ideas that are called new, it is because he knows well that strictly speaking there are no new ideas, and that on the subject of religion "all has been said" nigh two thousand years ago. And if, on the other hand, he does not hesitate to adapt so-called old ideas to the lawful exigencies of modern times, it is because he knows that no wealth of dogmatic utterance can ever exhaust the divine fruitfulness of the revelation of Jesus.

This apologetic programme is less commonplace than it might seem at first sight. Its fulfilment exacts an assemblage of qualifications not too common in professional apologetics. As mediating between contemporary thought and ecclesiastical tradition the apologist should be thoroughly familiar with these two worlds if he is ever to effect their reconciliation; and here the author of *Lex Credendi* is well equipped. I do not think that the learned in philosophy or criticism will be able to say that he does not know their language. He does not merely quote or mention them; but he has read them for himself and read them well, with sympathy of comprehension if not always with that of agreement. Without pretending to be a specialist in the History of Religion or in Biblical Criticism, he has assimilated the substance of the best current literature on these subjects; and it is not the least originality of *Lex Credendi* that we find this solid and manifold erudition subtly permeating the pages of what is avowedly only a commentary on the Lord's Prayer considered as an expression of the spirit of Christ. On the other hand, he faces and discusses as a theologian the problems and conclusions of the various sciences. If at times he wanders beyond the limits prescribed by Scholasticism, he does so with his eyes open, as one who has sojourned long in that land; who knows every corner of it and the precise point where he steps over the boundary. It is from no neo-scholastic manual that he has learned St. Thomas. As to the official teachings of the Church, the definitions of Popes and Councils, the consensus of Fathers and Theologians, the answers of Roman Congregations, a word here and there, a well-weighed adverb, a cautious parenthesis, an implicit reference make it plain to the expert theologian that Father Tyrrell minds his steps carefully and never loses sight of the rule of faith.

If, on the other hand, some are surprised that he does not push his orthodoxy into bolder relief, it is doubtless because they fail to appreciate the very special character, the exact and immediate purpose of this apologetic. Ill-timed translations as well as hasty and misleading commentaries have in many cases brought this work under the eyes of classes for whom it was never intended and who were quite unprepared to profit by it, being strangers to the difficulties to which it is addressed, as well as to the language in which it is written. Of the religious writers of the day Father Tyrrell is perhaps less of a "man of letters" than any one I know. He never writes to make a book. A priest, a confessor, a preacher of retreats, a confidant of troubled minds and consciences, his works are but the continuation, integration and extension of his apostolate. Of these, the first seemed to minister exclusively to the devout. The "informal meditations" of *Nova et Vetera* offered an easier and gentler method of prayer to those who felt discouraged by the severe logic of the current system, and who for the most part, passed their prescribed hour of meditation in longing for the bell that would announce their deliverance. There was nothing very striking about this unpretentious, disorderly little book, which, however, somewhat surprised those of us who had only known Father Tyrrell as a keen theologian with the repute of a militant Thomist; and yet, everything was there already. Already there was the deep conviction that souls are not made for methods, but methods for souls. Already there was the desire, the instinctive and imperative need, not indeed of minimizing the exigencies of the

Christian life, but of reducing as far as possible the obstacles which certain souls encounter in the exterior programme, or contingent to the form under which that life is presented to them.

Never yet has a work of life and spontaneity failed to elicit a response. This one which seemed addressed only to religious, turned to Father Tyrrell the attention of unbelievers; of Anglicans haunted by the phantom of Rome, of Catholics perplexed in their faith; of those whose problem was not how to meditate but how to escape agnosticism, how to cling to their Christian profession. Thus from the two opposite poles of religious thought people came to this young priest: and what rendered his task all the more delicate was that the most urgent difficulties were by no means confined to free-thinkers or Anglicans. It is impossible fully to understand Father Tyrrell's books unless one has an intimate knowledge of the various intellectual strata which divide Catholicism in England. There, there is none of that almost military discipline which, at least for the moment, maintains German Catholics in the bonds of a strict uniformity; nor is there anything of that equable average religious temperature which prevails in France. Nothing could be less homogeneous. Here a childlike, almost infantile faith; there restlessness, doubt, and independence pushed to its limits. How could it be otherwise? On the one hand, be the fault where it will, the Catholic clergy no longer possess that intellectual authority which it might have had if it had welcomed the leadership of Newman more cordially. On the other hand, in a country where everyone is interested in religious questions, the current journals, periodicals, and publications, not to speak of works expressly directed to the spread and popularization of religious views, bring under the notice of everyone who is educated or half-educated all the latest objections and discoveries, theories of the most esoteric philosophers and the results of the most erudite investigations. To take a most average example: I cannot see how a man of ordinary education could read Tennyson or Browning attentively and not be tempted to question or at least to minimize and dilute many of the principles of Catholic orthodoxy. Still more might be said of the countless little books that deal expressly with the biblical question in a popular way. If Catholics may not read them, yet they must live and converse with those who do.

Moreover many of these same Catholics are converts. Few of us perhaps realize the sort of trial that awaits certain natures, in the years subsequent to conversion. On passing out of the heroic stage of first fervor in which all sacrifices seemed light, many begin to review in a quieter light the reasons that led them to so serious a step. In spite of themselves they cannot help comparing the impossible church which they sought with the actual church which they have found. They forget the limitations and remember only the advantages of their old religion; they grow used to the graces of the new and conscious of those necessary limitations to which enthusiasm had blinded them. They are wrong, no doubt; still they are certainly unsettled and troubled; they feel disillusioned, soured and irritable. The priest or the apologist has no heart, even if he had the right, to give them the *coup de grace* or rudely extinguish the smoking flax with an *Est, Est*, or *Non, Non.* I know, of course, that truth will not accommodate itself to our caprices or personal repugnances and I can even admire those who do not hesitate to give the last blow and say calmly: "That is enough. Go, you are no longer a Catholic"; but for my own part I have some difficulty in fixing the precise instant at which a Christian breaks definitely with the Truth, I do not say in word or profession, but in the depths of his soul. "He who is not against me is with me" —whatever be their attitude towards this or that particular doctrine, the readers whom Father Tyrrell addresses are certainly not against Christ. As a matter of fact all his books are intended to lead to the knowledge, love and imitation of Christ. The character of his work has not changed since the first volume. He writes still for devout souls who have never had the least doubt about any Catholic dogma; but insensibly he has widened his scope so as actually to include in his auditory, not indeed the profane, but the wavering, the unsettled, those who ask themselves: Do I still believe? or, those who, believing no longer, cannot resign themselves to the horrible loneliness of a world without God and of a life without religion. We shall see better by-and-by how the presence of these unbidden hearers has led him to remould his doctrinal message, but the picture as I have already presented it is enough to merit our attention and to help us to seize the precise originality of Father Tyrrell's work.

Is it not, after all, a somewhat unusual experience to find an apologist occupied solely with the task of leading his readers to the interior life, and yet by one and the same word arousing faith in some of them and fervor in others? It is still Pascal's method: "Prenez de l'eau bénite"; but with this difference, that Pascal wrote directly for unbelievers, whereas the author of *Nova et Vetera* invites unbelievers and believers mingled in the same crowd to a devotional conference.

No polemics, no aggressive disputes, no scholastic arguments in favor of dogma, no demonstration of the divinity of the Church; the believer would have no interest in all this scientific apparatus, the unbeliever would find in it only new matter for doubt. It is a fact of experience that for many of our contemporaries a simple earnest village sermon will often sweep away more doubts and refute more sophisms than twenty solemn conferences on the errors of the day. But here the utterances of practical devotion gain an additional efficacy. To steel himself against the appeal to his affection the reader can never say: "Ah, but if this man had only read such and such a recent book, so decisive against the Bible or against the claims of primitive Christianity; if he had but followed the latest discussions on the history of dogmatic development; in a word, if he but knew what we know, he could not speak like that." No, he has read all these books; he has followed all these discussions; nay, he has sometimes anticipated them, and I know some pages of his development of Dogma which mark a decisive step forward in that all-important question. He does not invent new terms at every turn, after the manner of youthful malcontents enamored of novelty for its own sake. He keeps as far as possible to the common language of spiritual writers as a symbol of that profound unity which can and ought to bind the present to the past. But in reading *Lex Credendi* one is quickly convinced that nothing is so modern as to be unfamiliar to this living thinker; and in these simple homilies on the "Our Father" one recognizes easily the mental habits, the methods, the exigencies, the intellectual attitude of the philosophers and scholars of the present day.

But once more, neither science nor philosophy holds the place of honor in this strange book. To those troubled believers who come to him with their intellectual difficulties Father Tyrrell replies by a series of meditations on the *Spirit* and on the *Prayer* of Christ. "First of all," he seems to say, "let us live the Christian life with all our might; afterwards we can formulate dogmatic principles by which it is governerned; first, let us pray the Prayer of Christ; and afterwards we can disentangle the theology implied in that prayer. Life first; Doctrine second; first let us realize Christ's spirit in ourselves and then endeavor to examine the mysteries of the Catechism. Since in these bewildering times such an examination is a complicated business, let us not begin by exhausting our spiritual energies over a troublesome enquiry, which in our present unprepared state, may well prove quite fruitless: *Qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem.* She of whom it was said 'I have not found such faith in Israel' would not have understood three lines of the Catechism. Begin, therefore, with the Syro-Phenician woman if you would finish with St. Thomas Aquinas." I know quite well there is another sort of apologetic. Some think that whatever be the issue we should firmly press the alternative of everything or nothing on minds such as I have described above, impatient of all dogmatic discipline, rebellious, not as formerly against this or that dogma, but against the very idea of dogma at all. For them there is to be no mean between light and darkness. "Hold all our dogmas and just in our sense, or else go about your business." This is one method, and it does not lack a certain dignity. It seems to have the sanction of great authorities. "Seems"—because those who use it in their writings often prove less exigent, more complaisant in the intimacy of the confessional, or when dealing with some individual soul which one such harsh utterance might sink forever in the slough of scepticism. Still, it is one method, and I do not claim the right to criticise it. I only say that one cannot hesitate as to which method offers the more efficacious means of leading contemporary intelligence to the acceptance of Christian truth, while at the same time keeping faithful to the dogmatic principle in its entirety. It is simply a question of point of view, simply a difference of perspective: Christian doctrine—Christian practice, at which end should we begin? For in truth the two are one. There is no Christian experience that does not imply a dogma; no dogma which does not express or translate into conceptions some spiritual experience. Poor, thin and commonplace is the life that does not tend to that clear self-consciousness of which dogma is the expression; poor and barren the dogma that severs itself from experience and feeds on its own abstractions. Let us say it once more: since love is the Alpha and Omega of the New Law, paltry is that love whose deepest aspirations do not postulate the dogma of Catholicism; and deplorable that theology that does not forthwith translate itself into love. This is not the place to explain how and for what reason these truths, in some sense as old as the Gospel, have of late years regained a sort of primacy in the world of Catholic thought. Newman in England; Deutinger in Germany; Cardinal Deschamps in Belgium are among the great precursors of this movement. When finally in the last years of the nineteenth century Maurice Blondel presented to the assembled Sorbonne the first synthesis of these ideas, tendencies, presentiments, and prophetic intuitions, he found the soil well prepared to receive the seed. We know the progress made since that date; the tentative beginnings, the cautious hesitancy of some, the enthusiastic adhesion of others, the discussions, the misunderstandings, the progressive clarification, the increasing hope of a coming day when the last remnant of distrust would be banished by a philosophy which would be what the old had really ceased to be —the handmaid of Christian dogma.

Lex Credendi, if I mistake not, marks a stage in the progress of this idea. This book, though written without any such ulterior controversial purpose, seems destined on the one hand to set at rest certain conservative disquietudes; and on the other to caution certain thinkers of the author's own school against the danger of disfiguring and impoverishing their own doctrine. There is a danger of exalting action to the detriment of thought of sacrificing dogma to life. Pragmatists are apt to run cheerfully on this rock in obedience to the desire which we all feel more or less of dragging victims behind our chariots, forgetting that for a philosophy every bloody victory heralds the approach of defeat. To depreciate thought is to put out the eyes of action, to suppress metaphysics is to undermine ethics, to renounce Christian dogma is to mutilate, or I might say, fossilize Christian life. *Lex Credendi* brings this essential principle into complete evidence. In this respect it is most instructive to compare it with its predecessor, *Lex Orandi,* which it continues and explains. Indeed, they are not so much two works as two chapters of a single book, whose complete title should be "Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi." The first chapter studies Catholic dogma in the concrete as ministerial to Prayer and to Life; the second shows how this Prayer and this Life postulate, suppose and imply Catholic dogma. Lex Orandi, Prayer primary: Lex Credendi, Theology secondary. Not that in the living reality prayer and doctrine are separable; they cannot be independent of one another. Still our mind can separate them as aspects of the same thing, and in the interests of a prudent and charitable apologetic can insist primarily on that aspect which seems more accessible to that soul which it would slowly conduct to the possession of the integral Truth. Slowly indeed it must be, since at its first meeting with the apologist this same soul is on the verge of agnosticism. When one stands at such an extreme one does not pass to the opposite at a bound. Yet though it does not hurry him forward, the word which leads him on is not on that account the word of one who betrays truth in the interests of charity. Listen once more to this word whose persuasive power may perhaps reach you through the disfigurement it suffers from a rough and rapid resumé:

"Since you are troubled; since you suffer from the thought that perhaps you have lost Christ, it is a proof that you love Him that you want Him, that you are still searching for Him; and, therefore that you have actually found Him. Those who have wholly lost Him do not know it, do not feel wretched. He is in you: and He in you who seek Him, is seeking Himself. Your restlessness is the palpitation of His life in yours. Do not put out this flickering flame. Take courage; preserve and amplify this lingering life. The hour has not yet come for you to face the intellectual side of the difficulty, or to reconcile your own metaphysical constructions with those of the *Credo*. Love, pray, follow, imitate Christ and later you will see that in feeding yourself with His spirit and in living His life you have unawares realized those very dogmas, though dry and precise formulation is so repugnant to you to-day. You think you are not a Christian because the clear abstractions which at present make up your private philosophy will not fit in with the principles of Catholic philosophy. But there is also another ferment of thought going on within you which you cannot formulate, and which none the less represents your deeper self. These same twilight hidden thoughts of the heart will clear and shape themselves in the direction of Christian dogma in the measure that you feed yourself on the Spirit of Christ and the Prayer of Christ: *Alias oves habeo quæ non sunt ex hoc ovili*. They are not of that flock which is kept together under strict discipline, and which the watchful shepherds suffer not to stray beyond the clearly marked limits. Seemingly strangers, they do not at once recognize the tones of the Pastor who calls them. Yet none the less He knows them, and knows that they are His; and that their crooked wanderings will never lead them very far from His sight or from the sound of His voice. Sooner or later they will recognize Him."

HENRI BREMOND.

STUDIES.

THE EXTRAORDINARY POINTS IN THE MASSORETIC TEXT

Romain Butin, S. M.

In our ordinary Hebrew Bibles, apart from the vowels, accents and other Massoretic additions, there are signs which our grammars hardly touch upon and which are not reducible to the Massoretic punctuation The most important of these unusual signs are the Broken and Suspended Letters, the Pisqa or blank spaces in the middle of a verse, the Inverted *Nuns*, and the Extraordinary Points. All these peculiarities are, partly at least, pre-Massoretic and even pre-Talmudic, and owing to their antiquity they are to us of a special interest. What is their meaning? Are they simply flourishes without any special purpose? Or have they been designed to convey a thought with reference to the text-elements which they affect? Many scholars have already dealt with these various problems and tried to solve them; but their conclusions are widely at variance. To some, most of these peculiarities are mere accidents; to others, they appear as exegetical mnemonic signs; and again to others, they represent a critical judgment. No theory has thus far gained universal acceptance; no solution has been reached, that is satisfactory to all. The final verdict may still be far distant, but everyone will agree that an accurate understanding of these adjuncts to the original consonantal text as well as a perfect knowledge of the ancient Qeres would be of the highest service in determining the various vicissitudes of the Hebrew Scriptures in pre-Christian times. Taken individually, they may be comparatively unimportant for the emendation of the text, but their proper treatment is likely to bring to light new historical possibilities and may eventually modify some of our views on the preservation of the Hebrew text. In any case, such a detailed study will guard against hasty generalizations and dangerous assertions for or against the scrupulousness of the Jews in handing down the original composition of the Sacred Writers.

(a) *Original Form of the Points.*—The so-called Extraordinary Points, one of these interesting additions to the text, are common dots found over some letters or words of the Bible. This form is the one prevailing both in Mss. and editions and existed as early as the time of St. Jerome "Appungunt desuper" etc.;[1] it may be traced even as far back as the days of Origen, at least if the Hexaplar note found in some Greek Mss. on Gen. XXXIII, 4, can be attributed to him, "ἐν παντὶ Ἑβραικῳ βιβλίῳ περέστικται"[2] The Hebrew word used to designate the Points, נקודות 'Points' or better 'pointed passages,' also implies that they were ordinary dots. The verb נקד from which נקודות (Nequdoth) is derived, means in New-Hebrew, 'to pierce,' to prick,'[3] and consequently, its palæographical usage must have been to imitate with pen and ink a puncture or prick made with some sharp instrument, i. e. 'to dot.'[4] There are, however, a few variations as to the shape of these signs. Occasionally they appear under the form of a little circle, thus cod. Kennicott 600.[5] cod. Ebner. etc.[6] At other times, vertical[7] or horizontal[8] strokes take the place of the common points; even in the same Ms., all these different forms are sometimes found.[9] These variations are evidently simple developments of the points, and, as they are interchanged with the dots proper, they must have the same meaning.

(b) *Use of the Points in the Bible.*—These extraordinary Points or their equivalents, the vertical and horizontal strokes, are found in fifteen passages of the Bible. Of these fifteen passages, ten occur in the Pentateuch, four in the Prophets and one in the Hagiographa. They are the following: Gen. xvi, 5; Gen. xviii, 9; Gen, vix, 33; Gen. xxxiii, 4; Gen. xxxviil, 12; Num. iii, 39; Num. ix, 10; Num. xxi, 30; Num. xxix, 15; Deut xxix, 28; 2 Sam. xix, 20; Isaiah, xliv, 9; Ezech. xli, 20; Ezech. xivi, 22; Ps. xxvii, 13.

This list, preserved in the Massorah,[10] does not exhaust all the occurrences of the Points in the Biblical Mss. and refers only to those that were sanctioned by the Western Schools. In a Ms. from Tzufutkale (Crimea), on Num. X, 35, the text gives הארן, and there is in the margin, a note apparently borrowed from Siphre, 984 נקוד מלמעלה ומלמטה 'pointed in the beginning and at the end,' understood evidently as 'pointed above and below.' In another codex from the same place, וחית in Job XXXIX, 15, has the letter *yodh* pointed, with the note נקוד על י׳ דמד [נחי] 'the *yodh* is pointed according to the Easterns.' Codex Erfurt 3, on Num. XXXII, 7 reads תנואון with the marginal annotation תניאון קרי נקוד על וו קדמא דתנואון 'read תניאון the first *waw* of תנואון is pointed;'[1] that this was the reading of the Easterns is corroborated by a Massoretic remark in cod. Harley 5710-11.[2] In the St. Petersburg codex of the Prophets there are many more examples,[3] and codex Cassel adds still further to the list, although in that last Ms. little vertical strokes are often used instead of the points.[4]

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[1] *De Gen. ad lit.*, on Gen. xix, 33.

[2] See Field, *Hexapla*, on Gen.xxxiii, 4, note 6.

[3] See the various Dictionaries, *s. v.* Heb.; *v. g.* Buxtorf-Fischer; Levy; Jastrow, etc.

[4] The obelus has a similar origin; cfr. Montfaucon, *Palæographia Græca*, p. 371.

[5] Bruno, *De Variis Lection. Biblorium Kennicott.*, in *Repertorium* f. *Biblische u. Morgenlaend. Litteratur*, xiii, 44.

[6] Eichhorn, *Einleitung*, etc.. ii, * 355.

[7] Michaelis, *Biblia Hebraica*, on Gen. xix, 33, etc.

[8] Michaelis, *orient u. exeget. Biblioth.*, Th. I, 230 ff.

[9] Koenigsberger, *Aus Masorah u. Talmudkritik*, p. 6, n. I.

[10] *Massorah Magna*, on Num. III, 39: cp. *'Okhlah We'Okhlah*, ed. Frensdorff, n. 96.

(c) The points were not limited to the Bible; the Jews used them also in their profane literature. Mnemonic catchwords, letters of the alphabet taken as such, first letters of abbreviated words when joined together, are oftentimes marked with horizontal or vertical strokes or points,[5] apparently to show that they should not be understood as regular words of the text. Points are placed over quotations, and, like our inverted commas, indicate that the words thus pointed are not of the author himself.[6] Numerical letters, though generally distinguished from the ordinary letters of the sentence by little slanting dashes, the usual sign of abbreviations, are also pointed.[7] Finally when a word cannot be written fully at the end of a line, the entire word is occasionally repeated in the following line; but to prevent the letters already written from being read twice, points are placed upon them, evidently to cancel them.[8]

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[1] On these Mss., see Baer and Strack, *Dikduke Hateamim*, p. 45, C. b.

[2] Cf. Ginsburg, *Introduction to the Massoretico-Critical Edition of the Heb. Bible*, p. 334.

[3] Ginsburg, *o. c.*, 321; Baer and Strack, *l. c.*

[4] Michaelis, *orient. u. Exeget. Biblioth.*, Th. I, 231 ff.

[5] See *v. g.*, Derenbourg,, *Manuel du Lecteur. Journal asiatique*, VIe Série, xvi, 315, 316, 327 etc.; Levias, *Grammar of the aramaic Idiom*. p. 6.

[6] Schechter, *Saadyana*, 122-126.

[7] Levias, *o. c.*, p. 5, n. 3; Ginsburg, *Introd.*, 85, etc.

[8] Thus in a small Massoretic fragment from the Cairo genizah, lent by Dr. S. Schechter to Prof. H. Hyvernat. No less than six examples occur in one little page.

The use of points is not a characteristic of Jewish palæography. We find them among the Samaritans,[1] Syrians,[2] and especially among the Latins and Greeks.[3] With the latter, the points have well established meanings, for which we can only refer the reader to works on the subject.

(d). *Arguments to be used in order to find out their meaning.*—We might be tempted to identify immediately the Jewish Nequdoth with the Greek and Latin dots, but resemblances are not always a safe criterion of identity. It may create a certain presumption, but we know too well that in palæography the same signs stand for many ideas, and have not always been preserved with their original import. Although a mere similarity, as such, is too vague to allow of more than a possible inference, it should not be thought that this argument has no value. If it can be shown that the *Nequdoth* have actually been borrowed from the corresponding Greek signs, the identification of the two is perfectly legitimate; but the whole value of this argument is derived from the dependence of the one on the other and its demonstrative force is commensurate with it. This certainly deserves investigation, and it is to be regretted that scholars have generally failed to apply this palæographical criterion to the Extraordinary Points of the Bible.

Nor is palæography the only source of evidence that should be consulted. An accurate knowledge of the mental preoccupations existing among the Jews when the Points originated, is also indispensable. This is simply the application to the *Nequdoth* of the principle—universally acknowledged in theory, but very often ignored in practice—that every effect must be judged in the light of its cause or causes, and that every historical fact must be considered in its surrounding historical circumstances. This one of the leading principles in historical criticism, and there is no reason why it should not be applied to the present problem. Here again, few, if any scholars have, to our knowledge, utilized this argument to its full value.

The extraordinary Points, whatever be their import, are certainly connected with certain words and letters of the Bible. If, then, we can establish the critical state of these pointed passages at the time the Points originated, we may be able to determine the peculiarity thus noted by them, and as a consequence, arrive at some conclusion with regard to their meaning. Textual Criticism, therefore, constitutes another argument to be used in investigating the meaning of the Extraordinary Points.

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[1] Petermann, *Ling. Samarit. Gram.*, § 8.

[2] In Cod. Hyvernat 10, three dots in red ink are used to cancel, cp. 326, etc.

[3] Thompson, *Handbook of Greek and Latin Palæography*, 74 f.; 104 ff., etc., Gardthausen, *Griech. Palæographie*, 274 ff., etc.

A last and most apparently direct source of information is derived from the Jewish testimonies concerning the Biblical dots. Some may be tempted to smile at the mere idea of having to depend on Jewish tradition in support of an historical fact. However, it is but natural to suppose that, since the Jews appended the Points, the true purpose which they had in view in so doing, should have been preserved in the records they have left us on the subject. The earlier Jewish writings, the Mishnah, Mekhilta, Siphre, Siphra, etc.,[1] are the reproduction of the oral lessons given in the Jewish schools and academies of the second century A. D. This is made evident from the fact that the authority of some Rabbi or Rabbis is generally given in connection with the various decisions and opinions. The explanations of the *Nequdoth* form no exception and many of them belong to that same period, being attributed to R. Yose (b. Chalafta) Mishnah Pesachim, IX, 2; Tosephta Pesachim, VIII, 3; Baba Mesi 'a 87a, etc. The explanations preserved in Siphre, it is true, are anonymous, but it is certainly very significant that on two passages (Gen. XVI, 5 and Gen. XXXIII, 4) discrepancies of opinions are mentioned, which clearly shows that the Points had been duly taken up in the scholastic discussions of the time. When we remember that among the early Jews we meet with textual and critical labors,[2] it is at least likely that these labors have left some historical traces in the discussion of the second century A.D. To reject the data of the Jewish writings *a priori*, to repudiate their explanations without having examined them sufficiently, is to reject and repudiate the best and most direct evidence as to the meaning of the Points, and to expose ourselves to mere subjective and conjectural conclusions. Of course, we do not intend to deny, that in the various Midrashic works, there may be and probably are many irrelevant amplifications and untrustworthy accounts with regard to the *Nequdoth*; but it may still be possible to trace these amplifications to their source, and by removing all later additions, to determine what corresponds to the original tradition. The task may be delicate but it should none the less be undertaken.

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[1] On these see the various Biblical Dictionaries, *ss. vv. Mishnah, Talmud,* etc.

[2] Such as counting the verses, words and even letters of certain portions of the Bible; correcting Biblical Codices according to the standard copy of the temple;

Such, then, are in their main outlines, the sources that should be consulted in treating of the Extraordinary Points, and we may add, in treating also of most of the other textual peculiarities that we have noted above. It is our conviction that a great deal of the uncertainty that prevails concerning the meaning of the *Nequdoth*, is due to the lack of comprehensiveness in their treatment. It is only by comparing with one another the partial results drawn from the above sources, and in controlling the one by the other that an accurate and scientific conclusion may be reached.

(e) *Historical Sketch.*—In order to complete these introductory remarks necessary for the proper investigation of the meaning of the Extraordinary Points, we beg leave to place before the reader a brief historical sketch of the opinions held by scholars on the question at issue.

The explanations of the *Nequdoth* found in the early Jewish literature, too long and too complicated to be mentioned here, were generally accepted without further comment, by the Jews of subsequent ages, as giving in their literal sense, the true import of the Extraordinary Points. These Rabbinical explanations seem to connect with the Points—at least as a mnemonic device—a special thought which the dotted letters or words, of themselves would never suggest. To give but one example; in Siphre, § 69, on Gen. XVIII, 9, we read that the passage has been pointed 'because the angels (who according to this verse inquired about Sarah), knew where she was;' the dots here seem therefore, to call attention to a special interpretation. In consequence, this theory is known as 'the theory of the hidden meaning.' Still there have always been among the Jews, even in the Middle Ages, scholars, such as Rashi[1], the Tosafists,[2] Ba'al ha-Turim,[3] Albo,[4] etc.,[5] who have not adopted these opinions. If these men did not attribute to the dots a critical value, they at least claimed that they practically annul the words or letters over which they are placed. However, these scholars, as far as we know, gave no special reason for their

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comparing Mss. to find out the right reading. On these see Critical Introductions.

[1] Comm. on the *Talmud of Babylon*, M. *Pesachim*, ix, 2; Baba Mesi'a, 87a; Sanh. 43b; Menachoth, 87b; also Comm. on the Bible, *v. g.* Gen. xix, 33.

[2] On Nazir, 23a; on the Tosaphists see Mielziner, *Introd. to the Talmud*, p. 66 ff.

[3] On Num. xxi, 30; on *Ba'al ha-Turim* (Jacob b. Asher), see *Jewish Encyclop.*' vii, 27 f.

[4] *Sepher Iqqarim*, iii, 22 (end); cp. Buxtorf, *Tiberias*, p. 180.

[5] See Blau, *Einl.*, p. 117, n. 2; Stern, in Weiss' *Beth Ha-Midrasch*, 1865, pp. 58-62; also Pollak, *ibid.*, p. 57.

view, and besides they do not seem to have influenced the trend of contemporary thought.

As for Christian scholars, for a long time they seem to have depended solely on the Jews for their convictions on this question.[1] Besides, it was not until the XVIIth century that they began to take an interest in the problem, and from the very start their views were divided. Morinus[2] and the greater number still adhered to the prevalent theory that made the Points express a hidden meaning, though some occasionally ridiculed the Jews for having attached such a special meaning to the pointed text-elements. This view is still held by many scholars in our own day, at least exceptionally for the Points of Deuteronomy XXIX, 28.[3]

Others finding in what they claimed to be the absurd character of the Jewish explanations of the *Nequdoth*, a sign that the Jews were trying to account for what they did not understand—"sunt palpitantia Hebræorum judicia ut cœcorum in tenebris"[4]—rejected these explanations as not giving the true motive for the pointing of certain textual elements, and simply confessed their inability to reach a satisfactory solution. Thus Buxtorf,[5] Cappellus,[6] Walton.[7]

Richard Simon took a still more radical stand and attributed the Points to chance and accident. According to him the explanations given to them are due to the superstitious bias of the Jews who saw mysteries everywhere. He says: "Un copiste aura laissé tomber par hazard au dessus de quelque lettre une petite goutte d'encre dont il se sera formé quelque point; un Juif ensuite superstitieux, qui est persuadé que tout, ce qui est dans l'Ecriture est mystère, mème jusqu'aux plus petits points, ne manque pas d'inventer des raisons de ce prétendu mystère."[8] For obvious reasons, Richard Simon has had few followers; Green, however, seems to explain the origin of the Points in a similar way.[9]

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[1] Cp. St. Jerome, *De Gen. ad lit.*, on Gen. xix, 33: "Appungunt (Judaei) desuper quasi incredibile et quid rerum natura non capiat coire quemquam nescientem."

[2] *Exercitationum Biblicarum de Hebræi Græcique Textus Sinceritate Libri duo*, (1669) Lib. II, Exerc. xii, Cap. vi, p. 406.

[3] See, *v.g.* Dillmann on Deut. xxix, 28. Driver *Deuter.* (in *Intern. Crit. Comm.*) on Deut. xxix, 28.

[4] Buxtorf, *Tiberias*, p. 181.

[5] *C. C.*, pp. 173 ff., 181.

[6] *Arcanum Punctationis Revelatum*, xx, xii.

[7] *Prolegomena, Prol.* viii, 3.

[8] *Histoire Critique*, Ch. xxvi, p. 144.

[9] *Hebrew Grammar*, § 4.

A departure from the existing theories was effected by Hiller in his *De Arcano Kethib et Keri.*[1] As far as we have been able to ascertain from quotations made from his work, he assimilated the Points to the Qeres, and claimed that they had been placed over certain words and letters in order to cancel them. This has become the prevalent theory in modern times, although it should be stated that adherents are not always very consistent, and occasionally maintain some of the other views according to the requirements of the pointed passages. In our own time, Blau[2] and Ginsburg[3] have also defended this theory and given it the support of new reasons; they add, however, that occasionally the Points indicate that another reading should be substituted for the present Massoretic one.

In the middle of the XVIIIth century, Huepeden[4] treated of the Points far more systematically than had been done hitherto, so much so that he is supposed by many to have been the originator of the critical theories. He claimed that the *Nequdoth* had been invented mostly to mark divergencies between manuscripts, and that, on this account, the dotted letters were critically doubtful, at least for us. He also has had many followers, among whom may be mentioned Michaelis,[5] Rosenmuller[6] and Scholz.[7] He has also influenced many other scholars who maintain likewise that the points mark letters considered doubtful, but who do not specify the reason of the doubt as he himself had done.

Akin to this last theory is the view of König[8], who believes that the dots do not imply any positive judgment as to the doubtfulness of the present Massoretic readings, but are simply the outcome of a timid suspicion entertained against some textual elements: "Die Hauptsache ist aber dies, dass Ueberpunktierung nur die Andeutung eines zaghhaften und unentschiedenen Bedenkens gegen die Richtigkeit einer Textlesart sein sollte." In this sense, the dots would correspond to our interrogation mark placed after words to which special attention is called for further investigation.

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[1] (Tuebingen, 1692), Lib. I., iii, pp. 152 ff.

[2] *Masoretische Untersuchungen*, p. 8.

[3] *Introduction to the Mass . . . . Hebrew Bible*, pp., 318 ff.

[4] *Neue wahrscheinliche Muthmassung von der wahren ursache und Bedeutung der, ausserordentlichen Punkte* (Hannover, 1751).

[5] *Oriental. u. Exeget. Biblioth.*, Th. I, p. 230; Th. xii, p. 135.

[6] *Scholia* on Num. iii, 39; Deut. xxix, 28, etc.

[7] *Einleitung in die Heiligen Schriften d. A. u. N. Testaments*, I, p. 42.

[8] *Einleitung in das A. Testam.*' p 33 f.

A last theory to be mentioned here is the one found in the Zohar.[1] It has been advocated by Schwab,[2] Buechler,[3] Königsberger,[4] adopted on one passage as possible by Strack,[5] and given as an alternative probability by Levias.[6] According to this view the *Nequdoth* are not at all designed to throw suspicion or doubt on the text, but correspond to our underscoring, underlining, to our '(sic)' or to our italics. "Pour souligner un mot, une lettre, on plaçait des points supérieurs correspondant à notre italique."[7]

Apart from the fact that most of the advocates of the critical theories are not always consistent, it is to be noted that with the exception of Huepeden, Blau, Königsberger, and Ginsburg,[8] none of them have treated the question at any length; they are, as a rule, satisfied in reproducing—tacitly in many cases—the views of their predecessors. We may say that, until recently, Huepeden was the final authority on whom subsequent writers depended. As far as we can see from the references made by scholars to Huepeden's work,[9] his conclusions were based mainly, if not exclusively, on the ordinary methods of Textual Criticism, and especially on divergencies between MSS. He does not seem to have directed his attention to the mental attitude of the Jews at the time of the origin of the *Nequdoth*, nor to the palæographical argument, nor to the data of the Jewish writings. Besides, the very title that he gave to his work, *Wahrscheinliche Muthmassung*, etc., sufficiently indicates that he did not consider his arguments conclusive, and that he proposed his view, more as a hypothesis than a proved system. His method, as well as his conclusions, seem to have been accepted by subsequent writers; for as a rule, the arguments that he has failed to consider have also been neglected by those that came after him.

In view of the complete disagreement among the various authors mentioned heretofore, we may well understand the judgment passed by Strack in 1873, on the then existing state of the controvesry relative to the meaning of the Extraordinary Points: "De origine et significatione punctorum horum, nihil pro certo affirmari potest. . . . Nunc plerique puncta lectionem variam vel corruptam significari existimant.[1] The same judgment could have been given in 1891, when Blau wrote his *Masoretische Untersuchungen*, for, nothing of any consequence was published during the intervening years. Blau was the first to use the Jewish writings systematically as a means of reaching the true import of the Points. His scholarly treatment of these writings shows a great progress on his predecessors; still his views have not as yet gained universal acceptance and his system has been strongly opposed by Königsberger. This last scholar is a firm believer in the Massorah as against the old Jewish Midrashic works. He claims that the Points are Massoretic and consequently should be judged according to the methods of the Massorah; and as the Massorah is supposed by him to have nothing but devices to preserve the text as it had been received, the Points cannot have any other meaning. König is also at variance with Blau, and does not hesitate to qualify Blau's reasoning as "hinfaellig." However, he has not considered the question at any length, and has devoted to it only two pages of his *Einleitung*.

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[1] Cabbalistic work attributed to Simon b. Yochai, but dating probably from the XIII. Cent.; see Zunz, *Die Gottesdienstlichen Vortrage der Juden*, 419 ff.

[2] *Talmud de Jérusalem*, v, p. 138, n. 1. See, however, "*Notice sur les Points Voyelles*," p. 26: "ils servent à dénoter l'hésitation du scribe" which would be the view of Koenig.

[3] *Entstehung. . . . der Hebr. Acc.*, Teil I, pp. 89, 97, 116, 141.

[4] *Aus Masorah und Talmud Kritik*, p. 9; cp. p. 7.

[5] *Die Buecher Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus. u. Numeri.*, on Num. ix, 10.

[6] *Masorah* in *Jewish Encyclop.*, VIII, p. 368.

[7] Schwab, *Talm. de Jer.*, *l. c.*

[8] It is to be noted that Ginsburg avowedly depends on Blau for his views.

[8] See Vogel, *Ludovici Cappelli Critica Sacra*, *l. c.*

The present state of the question may be given in the words of Levias, *Jewish Encyclop.*, Vol. VIII (1904), p. 368, art. *Masorah*. He says: "The significance of the dots is disputed. Some hold them to be marks of erasure; others believe them to indicate that in some collated manuscripts the stigmatized words were missing, hence that the reading is doubtful; still others contend that they are merely a mnemonic device to indicate homiletical explanations which the ancients had connected with those words; finally, some maintain the dots were designed to guard against the omission by copyists of text-elements which, at first glance or after comparison with parallel passages, seemed to be superfluous. . . . The first two explanations are unacceptable for the reason that such faulty readings would belong to Qere and Ketib, which, in case of doubt, the majority of manuscripts would decide. The last two theories have equal probability.'"

The present study has been intended as a mere statement of the question, and it belongs to the student to examine the various sources of evidence indicated above. The fact that the subject has been treated by others should not deter us from covering the same ground. Past works, as we have ourselves been able to ascertain and as the historical sketch just given amply demonstrates, do not render new investigations superfluous.

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[1] *Prolegomena*, p. 90.

The conclusion which the present writer has reached by following the above method, at least with regard to the Extraordinary Points of the Pentateuch, may be summed up as follows:

(1). At the time of the origin of the Points, individual letters or words, as are the dotted elements in the Bible, were not yet made the basis of special interpretations; this method of exegesis was adopted only after the time of Nachum of Gimzo (end of I century A. D.) and especially after the time of Aqiba (II century A. D.). Hence it is not likely that the *Nequdoth*, which are older, call attention to such an interpretation, and consequently, the theory of the hidden meaning is very probably wrong.

(2). At that time, Palestine was greatly influenced by the Greek culture of Alexandria and it is thence that the Extraordinary Points were very probably borrowed. The assimilation of the Jewish *Nequdoth* with the Greek dots seems, therefore, to be justified. The only meaning which they can have in common is that they are both used as deletive signs, and hence, while the theory of the hidden meaning is still further disproved, it becomes probable that the Points have the value of an erasure.

(3). This conclusion is fully borne out by establishing the critical state of the pointed passages at the time to which the Points belong, for, in almost every case, the pointed elements were wanting in some of the recensions then existing.

(4). Finally, the testimonies of the Jews, as preserved in Siphre, and also in many other Rabbinical documents after additions and amplifications have been removed, imply rather clearly that the Extraordinary Points are signs of deletion.

The final conclusion, therefore, must be that the Extraordinary Points were intended by their author to cancel the words and letters over which they were placed.

Romain Butin.

TATIAN: A PATRISTIC STUDY

Joseph Turmel

Life—Tatian tells us himself that he was born in Assyria; that he travelled much; and that he lived for a long time at Rome, where he came into touch with Justin. He adds that he received a Greek education; that he was initiated into the pagan mysteries, which, however, only disgusted him; and that the reading of the Bible converted him to Christianity.[1] Irenæus, Rhodo, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Epiphanius, and Theodoret[2] furnish us complementary information from which it seems that Tatian was born in the eastern part of Syria on the banks of the Tigris or the Euphrates; that he was a disciple of Justin, that he held school at Rome; that he had Rhodo for a disciple, that he left Rome after the death of Justin to return to his own country and that in the year 172 he spread the heretical sect of the Encratites. His birth may be placed about the year 120.

Writings—Tatian wrote six works, one of which, the *Discourse to the Greeks,* has come down to us in its entirety; another, the celebrated *Diatessaron,* has been restored in part by Zahn with the aid of the Commentary made on it by St Ephrem.[3] Of a third entitled *De Perfectione secundum Salvatorem,* we have some lines which have been transmitted to us by Clement of Alexandria.[4] Of the others we know only the titles. The *Diatessaron* was a Gospel history edited with the combined aid of our four Gospels, excluding the genealogies.

Theodoret, from whom we receive this information, adds that the *Diatessaron* was very widely used in his country. It is the general tendency to believe that Tatian wrote the book in Syriac, (in any case it is only in the countries of the Syriac language that it is mentioned) and that he wrote it after having fallen into heresy. Yet these two conjectures have nothing more in their favor than probability.[6] The

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[1] *Oratio,* 42, 29, 1, 35, 19.

[2] Cf. the texts of these Doctors in Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur* I. 486 ss.

[3] Zahn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutest, Kanons,* I, 112 ss.

[4] *Stromata,* 3, 12. Cf. Harnack, *op. cit.,* p. 488.

[5] *Haeret. Fabulae,* i, 20. Cf. Harnack, *op. cit.,* p. 492.

[6] The only difficulty to the theory that the *Diatessaron* was composed in Syriac is the Greek title which the author gave it. Were it not for this objection we would be able to affirm that Tatian wrote his Harmony in Syriac, and that he wrote it after his departure from Rome, and after his lapse into heresy.

Discourse to the Greeks is an apology for the Christian religion intended not only, like that of Justin, to claim the free exercise of Christianity and to defend the Christians against the calumnies made against them,[1] but also to persuade the pagans to give up their own religion and embrace Christianity. It is usually divided into two parts; the first (5-30) which shows that the Christian religion is superior to paganism; the second (31-42) which proves that it is more ancient. The superiority of Christianity and its antiquity: such are in fine the two ideas that Tatian endeavors to set forth. But apart from a few chapters in which he sketches the Christian doctrines, his apology is from end to end a violent sarcastic attack on pagan mythology, pagan art, and all that constitutes the intellectual and moral patrimony of the Greek world. It begins by informing the Greeks that they have stolen from the Barbarians all the science and all the arts of which they are so proud; with the exception, however, of rhetoric and poetry, which he acknowledges they have developed but only in the interests of injustice and corruption.

Is the *Discourse* a spoken or a written treatise? Is it addressed to auditors or to readers? Each of these hypotheses has its adherents; both of them, moreover, find a basis in expressions used by the author.[2] But the second is the more probable. Tatian could easily write a book addressed to pagans; but it is hard to see how he could create a pagan audience; and above all how a lecturer could go so far as to forget oratorical precautions to the extent of saying to his hearers that they are filled with foolishness.[3] But be it a conference or a brochure, what were the date and place of its composition? The best answer seems to be that the *Discourse* was written in Greece about 171, and between the time of Tatian's departure from Rome and his return to his own country. Harnack, who pronounces the date 155, objects that the *Discourse* mentions the name of Justin without speaking of his death, which would be unlikely if his death had taken place; and also that we do not find in it any trace of the influence of the *Apologies* of that great teacher—an omission which would be inexplicable if the *Discourse* were written as late as 170.[4] But Tatian speaks of "the admirable Justin"[1] as if that Doctor were dead; and in his work we come across ideas which he seems to owe to his master.[2] Besides, some of his expressions leave us to understand very clearly that he had already left Rome when he composed his Apology.[3] And in order to maintain his date, Harnack is obliged to attribute to Tatian a second voyage to Rome after the publication of the *Discourse,* a voyage that has no other foundation than the needs of the hypothesis.

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[1] These calumnies are the object of only one allusion, n. 25.

[2] We read in ch. 5: "I speak and you listen," which seems to indicate that he was addressing an audience. But in ch. 35, he says that he wishes to set down "in writing" what he had learned. Cf. Maran, *Præfatio*, iii, 12, 2; *P. G.* vi, 173; Puech, *Recherches sur le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien* (Paris, 1903), pp. 1 ss.

[3] *Orat.* 32.

[4] *Die Chronologie der altchrist. Litteratur*, i, 284.

Testimonies and Transcriptions—We owe the first mention of Tatian to St. Irenæus, who however contents himself with saying that at first he was a disciple of Justin and that after the death of his master he left the Church. But as is the case in St. Irenæus, whenever we meet with mention of Tatian, it is most frequently with reference to his heretical doctrines. The following are the principal exceptions: the *Diatessaron* is attested by Eusebius, Epiphanius and Theodoret. Clement of Alexandria speaks of the *Discourse,* and he himself made copious extracts from it. Eusebius ranks Tatian amongst the defenders of the divinity of Christ, without however quoting any text. Origen quotes the *Discourse.* Eusebius gives some extracts from it in his Church History. He utilizes it in his *Chronicle* and especially in his *Preparation for the Gospel,* where he gives the same extracts as Clement.[4]

The *Discourse* of Tatian takes its place in the collection of Apologetic Writings which Arethas, the Bishop of Cæsarea, caused to be drawn up in 904. It remained there until about the 13th century, when a pious reader, scandalized no doubt at the unorthodox doctrine which was found therein, destroyed the leaves of the manuscript which were offensive to him. Happily three copies of it had been made towards the eleventh century, and it is through these three copies of the Arethas-Codex that the Apology of Tatian comes down to us.[5]

As regards the *Diatessaron,* we have already seen that it has been transmitted to us by the Commentary that St. Ephrem made on it. Naturally this commentary does not give the text fully. Let us add that the book of the celebrated deacon of Edessa (written originally in Syriac) has not come down to us with the exception of some fragments in an Armenian version of the fifth century, which was published in 1836 and became the basis of a Latin version in 1876. In 1888, Ciasca published an Arabic version of the *Diatessaron*, but the Syriac text upon which this version is based was borrowed from the Peschito; whence it follows that the book published by Ciasca is a fresh treatment of the matter and not the work of Tatian itself. The *Homilies* of Aphraates made use of the *Diatessaron* and have put us in possession of some extracts.[1]

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[1] *Orat.* 18. The use of this phrase can scarcely be accounted for if Justin were still living.

[2] Cf. Puech, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ss.

[3] The expression (*Orat.* 35): "When sojourning in the city of the Romans" is decisive. See other texts in Puech, p, 6.

[4] Harnack, *Gesch, der altchr. Litt.*, i, 486 ss.

[5] Harnack, *Die Ueberlieferung der griechischen Apologeten*, in *Texte un Untersuchungen*, i, 1, pp. 1-24; 90-97.

Doctrines—When he became estranged from the Church, Tatian condemned marriage and raised continence to the dignity of a primordial duty (Encratism). He even claimed for this doctrine the sanction of St. Paul.[2] Besides, like all Gnostics, he established a distinction between the God of the Old Testament and the God of the New.[3] We do not find any trace of these doctrines in the Apology, which is confined to exposing the principal elements of the Christian belief.[4]

God—"The perfect God is without flesh, while man has a body (c. 15). It is God alone that we must fear, He who is invisible to the eyes of men and escapes the compass of their art. . . .Our God did not begin to be in time: He alone is without beginning, and He Himself is the beginning of all things. God is a spirit, not pervading matter, but the Maker of material spirits, and of the forms that are in matter; He is invisible, impalpable, being Himself the Father of both sensible and invisible things. Him we know from His creation, and apprehend His invisible power by His works." (c. 4).

Logos—God (c. 5) was in the beginning; but the beginning, we have been taught, is the power of the Logos. For the Lord of the universe, who is Himself the necessary ground of all being, inasmuch as no creature was yet in existence, was alone; but inasmuch as all the power of things visible and invisible, was in Him, He sustained all by means of the Logos, Himself and the Logos who was in Him.[5] And by His simple will the Logos springs forth; and the Logos, coming forth is not lost in the void but becomes the first begotten work of the Father.[1] Him (the Logos) we know to be the beginning of the world. But He came into being by participation, not by abscission; for what is cut off is separated from the original substance, but that which comes by participation, making its choice of function, does not render him deficient from whom it is taken. For just as from one torch many fires are lighted, but the light of the first torch is not lessened by the kindling of many torches, so the Logos, coming forth from the Logos-power of the Father, has not divested of the Logos-power Him who begot Him (c. 5). I myself, for instance, talk, and you hear; yet certainly, I who converse do not become destitute of my word by the transmission of speech."

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[1] Harnack, *Gesch. der Christ. Litt.*, i, 494 ss.

[3] Cf. *Stromata*, 3, 12, where Clement of Alexandria quotes an extract from *De Perfectione Secundum Salvatorem*.

[3] Cf. Clement, loc. cit., and Origen, *De Oratione*, 24. Maran has made a collection of these texts—see *P. G.* vi, 1602.

[4] We can notice, however, a trace of Gnosticism in the dislike for matter which Tatian already shows. Cf. *Orat.* 15 ad fin.

[5] The Greek text of this phrase has been altered. I have made use of the conjectures of Puech, *Recherches*, etc., p. 14.

It follows from this text that the Logos was originally in the Father; that the Father made Him spring forth out of Himself by an act of His will;[2] that the Logos then acquired a personal existence; that He is (inasmuch as he sprang forth) the first work of the Father; but that He did not always have this personal existence.[3]

Creation—"The Logos begotten in the beginning has in turn begotten the visible creation, making matter by Himself.... Matter is not, like God, without beginning. It has not, then, the same power as God, who is without beginning. It has been begotten and would not have been but for the Creator of the universe." (c. 5). In a word it is the Logos who has produced matter. To designate this productive act Tatian employed two words one of which served him to express the production of the Logos by the Father,[4] the other the production of human speech.[5]

Incarnation. Redemption. Christ-God—Tatian never makes use of the expressions "Son," "Christ," "Jesus." However he makes a passing allusion to the Incarnation in the following phrase:" O

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[1] The expression: "is not lost in the void" is intended to set the divine Word in contrast to a human word, which is lost in the air as soon as uttered. The divine Logos, on coming forth from the Father, acquires a personal existence.

[2] The words used by Tatian to express the coming forth of the Word are worth noting: προπηδα, προελθων.

[3] We do not find in Tatian the doctrine of the "seminal Logos," which according to Justin, was possessed by the sages of the Pagan world.

[4] The Logos, *begotten* in the beginning, has *begotten*....."

[5] He says (c, 5) that matter was "sent forth" (participle of the verb προβάλλω). Now he says a little above: "I who address you am not without my word when my speech passes my lips; but I send forth (προβαλλόμενος) my voice." Elsewhere (c, 12) we find the same word applied to matter. Tatian also uses the words δημιουργεῖν and κατασκευή.

Greeks we do not rave, we do not talk like fools when we teach that God has been made under the form of a man. You, who insult us, compare your fables to our narratives." (c. 21). We also find a passing mention of the Redemption, when he speaks of the "God who has suffered" (c. 13); but he does not furnish any indication of the idea that he himself had of this redemption. These two texts are remarkable from another point of view because the word "God" is used to designate the Christ. It is these two texts that the *Anonyma* of Eusebius has in mind when he ranks Tatian among those who have "divinised" Jesus.[1] So the author of the *Discourse to the Greeks* gives to our Lord the title of God. In what sense? Two hypotheses present themselves here. Tatian conceives the Christ as the incarnate Logos,—in which case he does not attribute to Him divinity in the absolute sense, since evidently the Logos is in his eyes "the work" of the Father, and has not always possessed a personal existence—in a word the Logos is a God inferior to the supreme God. But Tatian may have been a partisan of Modalist Christology: and therefore may perhaps intend to represent Christ as the Incarnation of the Father. In that case he attributes to the Saviour divinity without restriction. This second hypothesis would have slight probability and would not merit our attention, were it not for one passage which we shall proceed to consider.

Spirit—Tatian, at different times, distinguishes two kinds of spirit. The first is a spirit "extended in matter;" "analogous to the soul" to which he even gives the name of soul (cc. 4, 12). Yet this spirit is not so much an individual as a category or genus. We read that there are "material spirits" (c. 4); that there is "a spirit in the stars, a spirit in the angels, a spirit in the planets and in the waters; a spirit in men, a spirit in animals" (c. 12); and that this spirit is "the same" but that nevertheless "it has differences in it" (c. 12). Above this spirit or these material spirits there is "a spirit more divine (c. 4); a spirit more powerful (c. 7), which "is superior to the soul and is the image and likeness of God." (c. 12). It is the "Spirit of God." This spirit "is not in all but it has dwelt in some men who lead a righteous life; it is united to their soul and by prophecies it has announced hidden things to other souls. Those who are obedient to its wisdom have attracted to themselves the cognate spirit." (c 13). What is this divine spirit? The following passage teaches us: "The Logos put an end to this union with the author of this folly (Satan) and with his partisans. From that time he who had been made to the image of God (man) no longer having with him the all-powerful spirit, became mortal." (c. 7). It is evident that man is deprived of the divine Spirit by the very fact that the Logos withdraws from him. Hence it follows that the Spirit is identical with the Logos.[27] On the other hand we read that the Spirit is "the minister of God who has suffered," that is to say, Christ. Who, then, is Christ? If He is the Logos made man, the formula just read would mean that the Logos is His own minister; that is, it would be altogether meaningless. So we are led to conclude that the Christ of Tatian, "this God who has suffered," is God the Father of whom the Logos is "the work" and "the Minister." Tatian seems to have held a Modalist Christology.

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[1] Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl. v*, 28.

Psychology. The Human Soul—According to Tatian the human soul is a composite substance, which cannot subsist without the body, and which perishes with it. It will rise with it. It will rise with the body and will be happy or unhappy in its company. From this point of view man is an animal not differing from other animals, except in the power of articulate speech. But from another point of view, he is, or at least ought to be, the image and likeness of God. Unless he put an obstacle in the way he is a temple in which the Spirit of God comes to dwell. This spirit unites itself to the soul, not so as to become one with it, but in such a way as to form a couple. It is this spirit which elevates man above the animal and makes him to be the image and likeness of God. The soul, which is deprived of the divine spirit, dissolves, so to say, at death, and follows the body into the earth. True, it will rise at the day of Judgment, but only to lead a life of misery, to "taste death in immortality." The soul which possesses the spirit will also fall into dissolution at death, because it has need of the body to subsist; but it will be led back by the spirit into the higher regions where it will remain till the Resurrection. Then it will receive life once more and enjoy happiness. Following are the texts:

"The soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die. If, indeed, it knows not the truth, it dies, and is dissolved with the body, but rises again at last at the end of the world with the body, receiving as punishment death in immortality. But again if it acquires the knowledge of God, it dies not, although for a time it be dissolved. If it continues solitary, it tends downward towards matter, and dies with the flesh; but if it enters into union with the Divine Spirit, it is no longer helpless, but ascends to the regions whither the Spirit guides it; for the dwelling place of the spirit is above, but the origin of the soul is from beneath" (c. 13).

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[27] Cf. also n. 13, in which the words *logos* and *pneuma* are used indifferently to express the same meaning.

"The human soul consists of many parts, and is not simple. . . . Man is not as the croaking philosophers say, merely a rational animal, capable of understanding and knowledge; for, according to them, even irrational creatures appear possessed of understanding and knowledge. But man alone is the image and likeness of God; and I mean by man, not one who performs actions similar to those of animals. . . . The bond of the flesh is the soul; that which encloses the soul is the flesh. . . . Such is the nature of man's constitution; and, if it be like a temple, God is pleased to dwell in it by the superior spirit, but, if it be not such a habitation, man excels the wild beast in articulate language only—in other respects his manner of life is like theirs, as one who is not a likeness of God."[1]

Primitive Condition of Man. The Fall—The Logos, in imitation of the Father, made man the image of immortality. He resolved that man should partake of the privileges of God,—incorruptibility and immortality (c. 7). The demons and our first parents were expelled, the former from heaven, the latter from the earth—not this earth, but a better one (c. 20). We were not made to die—we die through our own fault. It is our free will which has ruined us. We were free and we have become slaves. We have been sold in consequence of our sin. God has done nothing evil; it is we who have done the evil. But after having done it we have power to repent of it (c. 11). At the beginning, the Spirit was united to the soul but he abandoned it because it did not wish to follow him. Yet the soul preserves, as it were, a spark of the Spirit but not enough to see what is perfect. In its endeavors to recover the divinity, it fashions many gods; in this it is influenced by the demons whom it followed (c. 13). What we have to do now is to labor to recover the gifts that we once possessed and have lost. We ought to unite our soul to the Holy Spirit and to strive after union with God (c. 15). The demons have given to men a law of death; but men, after the loss of immortality, have vanquished death by death in faith, and by repentance they have obtained for themselves a call (c. 15).

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[1] n. 15. Following Puech, I have translated πρεσβεύοντος by "superior." This is the meaning which Tatian gives to the word in n. 40.

In the texts just quoted, Tatian teaches that our first parents originally possessed prerogatives which they lost by their sin. They lived on an earth better than ours; they possessed the Holy Spirit; and they were immortal. The same doctrine is offered to us, although veiled in language somewhat obscure, in c. 7, where we read that the Logos withdrew his society from men when they became guilty and that men, deprived of the most powerful spirit, became mortal. Tatian believes, therefore, that Adam and Eve underwent a fall. But he adds that the union of the spirit with our soul is a blessing which we too have lost and which we should strive to recover. We are led to conclude that in the original plan of God we were to possess, on our entry into the world, the Holy Spirit, and with him immortality, of which he is the principle; in a word, Tatian teaches the fall of the human race. Let us add that he seems to place the sin of our first parents in idolatry—he says, in fact, in speaking of Adam and Eve, that the Logos withdrew from them when they set up in place of God the first-born of the angels. He adds that it is this fault that has cost us the primeval gifts (c. 29 ad fin.).

Our present state is a fallen one. Could God have created us in the condition in which we are born to-day? Tatian, without definitely stating this question, has nevertheless solved it in the negative and he can be classed without fear of mistake as a forerunner of Baius. Such is the impression given by the following phrase: "God has done nothing evil—it is we who have done the evil."[1] The evil of which there is question here is clearly indicated by the context: it is death. Tatian lets us understand that God, who cannot do evil, ought to make us immortal, and as a consequence, to give us the Holy Spirit, the principle of immortality. Moreover, he does not fear to say that we are of the race of the Spirit of God (c. 13).

Present Condition of Man. Grace—The following text shows the contrast that exists between the man who possesses the Holy Spirit and one who is deprived of it: "The perfect spirit is the wings of the soul. The latter, having cast them off, falls to the earth like a nestling, and begins to desire inferior goods in place of the higher things which it formerly enjoyed." (c. 20). But this last is the state of man coming into the world. Deprived of the Holy Spirit who gave wings to his soul, he can no longer raise himself towards heaven, but sinks into matter. And as we have seen, if the soul dissolves after death, it is because it has not the Holy Spirit to carry it to heaven and so it follows the body to the tomb. Nevertheless, it can change its state. "Our duty," says Tatian, "is to try to recover the gifts which we had and which we have lost: that is, to unite our soul to the Holy Spirit (c. 15). We ought to long for the pristine state, and set aside all the obstacles which separate us from it. It is possible for those who are naked to recover this apparel (of the Holy Spirit) and to return to their original condition" (c. 20). Elsewhere we read that "those who have done evil can reject it" (c. 11).

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[1] n. 11 ad fin. It goes without saying that God cannot do evil. The significance of the text lies in the fact that Tatian looks on death as evil.

The fallen man can then recover the Holy Spirit and with it immortality. Whence comes this power to him? and on what condition does the Holy Spirit come to unite Himself to him? The answer to the first question is found in the text which we have already quoted: "The soul preserved a spark of the Holy Spirit" (c. 13). Tatian teaches us that man of himself is an animal, that language alone distinguishes him from the other animals. But man can bring into his soul the Holy Spirit—a feat which the other animals are incapable of—because even when deprived of the divine spirit he at least preserves a spark thereof. But what have we to do to introduce the divine guest into our soul? The author of the *Discourse* tells us that the Holy Spirit comes to those who conduct themselves in a way to be temples of God (c. 15). Elsewhere, becoming more precise, he says that knowledge of God will make us live in Him and will put an end to the state in which we are born (c. 11). The knowledge of God, who manifests Himself by His works—this it is which attracts the Holy Spirit to us; this it is which makes us live with God, and the divine spark which is in all men is intended without doubt to make them "seek God"[1] (the phrase is Tatian's), "to put them on the way" of life. Do we not know that the sin of our first parents consists in losing the knowledge of the true God by prostituting their homage to Satan? Our mission upon this earth is to recover the gifts which the sin of Adam and Eve has lost for us; and to obtain this result we must restore in our souls the idea of the true God that our first parents have allowed to become obliterated. "The soul which knows does not die" (c. 13), because it possesses the Spirit.

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[1] n. 13. The context, although obscure, seems to connect this expression with "the spark."

We read in c. 16 that in order to conquer the devil it is necessary to repudiate matter. But is this task possible? Tatian, taking up this question, adds immediately that he who is armed with the breastplate of the celestial spirit "can preserve all that it protects" (c. 16). By this he seems to restrict to those who possess the Holy Spirit the power of struggling victoriously against the demons. As for the knowledge of God which makes this Spirit descend upon us, we know that he attributes it to the divine spark which remained in our soul after the fall. The dogma of actual grace has therefore a support in the apologist of the 2nd century. Furthermore the doctrine of habitual grace and that of the two orders of nature and grace can claim a support in his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who enters the soul without making Himself one with it; who is for the soul a pair of wings which enable it to raise itself to Heaven. But it is manifest that the language of the *Discourse to the Greeks* does not correspond in every point to that of the *Summa Theologica*; and that neither actual nor habitual grace in Tatian are exactly the same as in the Scholastics. As for the the two orders and their connections with each other, we have seen that his doctrine resembles that of Baius.

Angelology—Tatian teaches that the Logos was "the creator of the angels before fashioning man" and that one of the angels "was more powerful than the others, because he was the eldest of all" (c. 7). From this we can infer that the celestial spirits were not all created at the same time. He also teaches us that the angels were formed by means of matter;[1] and that they have received the spirit which inheres in matter. They were created free (c. 7). But "some turned towards that which is more pure, while the others gave their preference to that which is base in matter, and their life was conformed to it" (c. 12). Beyond these scant references we find nothing in the *Discourse* about the angels properly so called; on the other hand, our attention is frequently drawn to the demons.

"The demons have nothing carnal; their constitution is spiritual like that of fire and air" (c. 15). This text which treats of the nature of demons throws a light on the passages quoted above. The angels, whether they be good or evil, are drawn from matter. But they have no flesh; their constitution is analogous to that of fire and air. It is in in this sense that they are spiritual.

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[1] n. 12. Cf. the note of Maran, who proves that the word "demons" here refers to the good as well as to the bad angels.

Now what is their chief concern? "They make war," we read, "on matter, which is like to them (that is to say, the human soul) using the baser matter as their weapon. Being let loose against man they bend his soul towards the earth by all sorts of machinations and prevent him from raising himself towards heaven; they would overthrow heaven and earth if they could; but they do not do so because they cannot" (c. 16). Tatian, who is prolific on this point, accuses demons of entering into the bodies of men to make them suffer and to make them believe that they will find a cure in the practice of magic, which in our author is identical with medicine (c. 18). He accuses them of inculcating in the human race the doctrine of fatalism (c. 9); he reproaches them above all with making themselves adored by men (c. 14); and in this connection he calls them "robbers of divinity" (c. 12). He adds that the demons have on this point imitated the eldest (c. 7) of the angelic family. We have seen that the sin of Adam and Eve consists, according to the *Discourse*, in their worship of the eldest of the angels as God.

What was the cause of the Fall of the angels and of the other demons? Tatian says that "the eldest had already revolted against the law of God" when our first parents adored him (c. 7). But he does not give any information concerning the reason of this revolt. As for those whom he calls "the host of demons," he seems to attribute their fall to lust. Such is at least at the impression given by the text where we read that certain angels "preferred what is basest in matter." At any rate, we can draw no inference from the passage which represents the demons as the imitators of "the eldest." When they joined Satan in making men worship them, they were already fallen.

The demons were originally in heaven but on account of their sin, they were driven out (c. 20). Since that time they are compelled to live upon the earth. Those who possess the spirit of God can see them. The ψυχικοί, that is to say, those whose soul is not united to the Spirit, cannot do so regularly. Yet the demons have the power of showing themselves to anyone if they so wish (cc. 15, 16). For the present God gives free scope to these maleficent spirits. And this will hold good until the end of the world (c. 12). Then the demons will be punished. Instead of participating in eternal life, they will receive death in immortality. In a sense it may be said that even now they die each time they lead their followers into sin. Note that the punishment of the demons according to Tatian is postponed to the end of the world.

Eschatology—"There are some who believe that the soul alone will be immortal, but I believe that the flesh will also possess immortality (c. 25). We believe that there will be a resurrection of the body at the end of the world. We conceive this resurrection not as the return of things in cycles which the Stoics foolishly imagined, but we say that it will take place once for all at the end of time for men alone and for the purpose of judgment" (c. 6). Evidently Tatian believes in the resurrection of bodies. He adds that it will take place "on account of judgment," that is to say, to permit God to judge mankind. After that there will be no further judgment. "After the judgment the good will possess immortality in happiness" (c. 14); the wicked "will be delivered to eternal fire which will devour them." (c. 17). They too will be immortal but they will have "affliction in immortality." (c. 12). As for the present condition of souls separated from the body, we have already seen that according to Tatian the souls deprived of the divine spirit follow the body into the earth and become decomposed, only to rise again at the end of the world; while the souls united to the spirit are carried by it to the celestial regions. The *Discourse* does not give us any details concerning the exact condition of these souls. On the other hand, we learn that the evils of which men are victims on the earth are caused by the demons and not by the souls of the dead, who, deprived of their bodies, are notable to act (c. 16).

Motives of Credibility—"After having examined all the religions and while I was searching for good, I chanced to meet with certain foreign books more ancient than the doctrines of the Greeks and more divine than their erroneous teachings. I was led to put faith in them by their simplicity of tone, their fidelity of exposition, the satisfactory explanation that they give of the creation of the world, the knowledge of the future which they manifest, the excellence of the precepts which they contain and the monotheism that they teach." (c. 29). Tatian informs us that he was led to the faith by different motives of credibility, all drawn from the Scripture. In the *Discourse* he limits himself to the development of one of these: that of antiquity. "Our philosophy is more ancient than that of the Greeks." (c. 31). Such is the thesis that he attempts to demonstrate, beginning at c. 31. Stripped of the digressions which encumber it, his proof can be briefly stated. It is based on the synchronism established by the Egyptian Ptolemy between Moses, Amosis and Inachus. The King of Egypt, Amosis, during whose reign Moses led the Jews into the desert, was a contemporary of Inachus, King of Argos. Now it is only under the twentieth successor of Inachus that the Trojan war took place. It follows from this that Moses lived four centuries or more before Homer, who was the first poet and historian among the Greeks. We should therefore put more faith in Moses than in the Greek writers.[1] Here Tatian, who has just said that Homer was the earliest poet of Greece, revises this statement, recalling that several singers like Linus and Orpheus preceded the author of the Iliad. He then completes the demonstration by showing that Moses is far anterior to all these poets whose names are lost in the darkness of time (c. 41).

While insisting on the proof for the antiquity of Christianity, Tatian also touches the proof for its superiority, but in an unmethodical way. It is to establish this point that he so strongly attacks pagan beliefs and practices. The meagre information that he gives concerning Christian doctrine is offered for the same purpose. The exposition of the theory of the Logos is intended to show that Christianity possesses the solution of the problem of creation; and the pages devoted to the demons are but the basis of the proof that Christianity alone answers the problem of evil. To round out his proof, Tatian speaks (but in a very brief way) of Christian morality. He says that all licentiousness is kept at a distance by his co-religionists (c. 32); that among them all women are chaste; and that the maidens at their distaffs sing the words of God.

Scriptural Citations—Tatian only once refers openly to the Bible. In the *Discourse* are found three scriptural quotations, two of which are from the Gospel of St. John, and one from the Psalms.[2] He has also probably drawn from St. Matthew his reference to the hidden treasure found by digging in a field.[3]

JOSEPH TURMEL.

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[1] cc. 31, 36, 38, 39, 40. Cf. Puech, loc. cit., p. 82 ss.

[2] A verse of Ps. viii is cited in c. 15. The Gospel of St. John is used in c. 13 and c. 19. In the first of these latter instances, the quotation is introduced with the words: "This then is said;" the second is not acknowledged, nor is the passage from the Psalm.

[3] c. 30. The whole passage is very obscure. Cf. Puech, loc. cit., p. 146.

NOTES.

In connection with the work of Bishop Le Camus on *l'Œuvre des Apotres* (reviewed on the issue), the Holy Father has written the Bishop a letter[1] which has created a deep impression, as it is taken to embody the personal views of His Holiness on the proper attitude to be taken towards modern criticism. Following is the passage which is considered significant: "You deserve a special praise for your constant care, in explaining Holy Writ, to adhere to that method which, through respect for the truth and the honor of the Catholic doctrine, should absolutely be adhered to under the guidance of the Church. For as we must condemn the temerity of those who, having more regard for novelty than for the teaching authority of the Church, do not hesitate to adopt a method of criticism altogether too free, so we should not approve the attitude of those who in no way dare to depart from the usual exegesis of Scripture even when, faith not being at stake, the real advancement of learning requires such departure. You follow a wise middle course, and by your example show that there is nothing to be feared for the sacred books from the true progress of the art of criticism, nay that a beneficial light may be derived from it, provided its use be coupled with a wise and prudent discernment."

Venerabilis Frater, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem. Opportunum valde arbitramur, quod proxime edidisti, opus tuum, *L'Œuvre des Apotres*, tribus voluminibus comprehensum; quæ volumina grato Nos abs te munere accepimus.

Neque enim dissimulari licet, quod apparet: fidei morumque Christianorum fastidium atque adeo invidiam misere hodie increbrescere, ut jam nimis multi dedecus vetustatis ethnicæ privatim et publice revocare contendant. Quid vero ad id tantum cohibendum malum magis valeat, quam senescenti labentique sæculo speciem exorientis Ecclesiæ offerre, propositisque documentis atque exemplis patrum, animos hominum ad christianam tuendam et sapientiam et vitam incendere? Huc autem plane tuus iste labor pertinet: quo quidem Origines nominis christiani sic exsequeris, ut non modo te doctum sollertemque virum, sed etiam prisca illa pietate penitus imbutum præbeas.

At illud præcipue tibi dandum est laudi, quod eam viam explicandi sacras Litteras studiose teneas, quam in obsequium veritatis atque in decus doctrinæ catholicæ omnino teneri, Ecclesia duce oportet. Ut enim damnanda est eorum temeritas qui, plus tribuentes novitati quam magisterio Ecclesiæ, critices adhibere genus non dubitent immodice liberum; ita eorum ratio non probanda, qui, nulla in re, ausint ab usitata exegesi Scripturæ recedere, etiam quum, salva fide, id bona studiorum incrementa postulent. Hos inter medius tu recta incedis; tuoque exemplo ostendis nihil timendum esse divinis libris a vera progressione artis criticæ; quin commodum ex hac subinde eis lumen peti posse; ita nempe si prudens sincerumque judicium huc accesserit, quale tibi suppetere videmus.

Quare nec mirum est, si jam primum Operis tui volumen, ubi prodiit, illico magnam tibi apud peritos gratiam conciliavit; neque dubitandum quin iidem similiter sint integrum nunc Opus probaturi. Nos certe tibi gratulamur venerabilis

As an example of the impression made by the letter in Catholic circles, we quote the following from *l'Univers*: "The importance of the Pontifical document can escape no one. It outlines clearly the correct mean to be taken between the dangerous extravagances of hypercritical exegesis and the regrettable stubbornness of an exegesis anchored in old positions which it is no longer possible to defend. The highest authority in the Church does not hesitate to propose Mgr. Le Camus as one of the models to be followed in the wisely progressive movement of Catholic exegesis, a movement which can be a cause of fearlessness only to souls that are timid because not sufficiently aware of the situation. Pius X expresses the desire to see true exegesis go forward and make use of all that the most modern Scripture science has to offer for the defense of the Sacred Books, even though it be necessary to sacrifice as no longer tenable, a good number of apologetic positions of the past. This document will naturally cause a profound sensation."

Almost concurrently with the date of the Pope's letter there appeared in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologetique* an article by M. l'Abbé Lesêtre on "Les Récits de l'Histoire Sainte." The article was evidently written before the letter to Mgr. Le Camus was published, but it shows the same concern about the efficiency of the weapons which our Biblical apologists are using. The article is noteworthy not by reason of anything novel or startling in it, but on account of the well-known conservative attitude of the author, and also because of the fact that the opinions advanced are intended not for the guidance of scholars, but as a recommendation for practical apologetics. He is offering an answer to the question: Does the Church oblige us to take literally all the narratives of the Old Testament? How shall we understand them? and especially how should we present them to children and to the faithful in general? Some of the more marvellous of the ancient narratives are used by unbelievers as their basis of attack on all revealed religion; French children hear them ridiculed in the public schools; and many priests naturally fret at the difficulty of finding out how much, if anything, should be conceded in the face of these objections.

In his answer Father Lesêtre first discusses the Catholic position on the matter. (1) In the first place the Church alone can settle in what sense the Bible, or any parts of it, must be taken; and for the most part she has not done so; and all that we know of her methods leads us to believe that until her scholars have discussed the whole matter thoroughly, she will not no so; that is, we shall have no binding settlement for years to come. (2) When we look to see what opinions she has tolerated we find widely different schools of interpretation, from that of Alexandria with its generous use of allegorism to the *a priori* theological school which

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Frater, atque, ut ex operoso labore tuo utilitates, quæ jure inde expectandæ sunt, quamplurimi hauriant vehementer optamus.

Auspicem divinorum munerum ac testem benevolentiæ Nostræ, tibi et clero populoque tuo Apostolicam Benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum, die XI Januarii, anno MDCCCCVI, Pontificatus Nostri tertio.

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inclined towards settling the question as to what God *did* do by discussing what God *could* do. Difficulties urged from the point of view of the facts received a sufficient answer by dubbing them "rationalistic." Men of this school can still be found, says Father Lesêtre "par suite d'une formation un peu archaique." (3) Of decisions coming more directly from the source of authority, the author quotes two quite recent utterances, both of which are framed to leave room for the less rigorous views: the remark in the encyclical *Providentissimus* which seems to extend to the relations between the Bible and historical science the principles already admitted in the case of its connection with physical science; and the more recent answer of the Biblical Commission admitting, howsoever carefully, that it may be an open question whether in certain instances the sacred writer intended to give history. Using the liberty accorded him, Father Lesêtre proposes to take up certain of these difficulties, and in all submission to Church authority, to offer solutions which have been already suggested by the Fathers and orthodox modern exegetes without having incurred censure.

It is highly significant that he evidently believes that serious criticism of his plan will come not so much from Catholic sources, as from the enemies of religion, to whose interest it has been to insist on the crudest literal acceptance of Biblical narratives. They will accuse us of being unfaithful to the traditional interpretation of the Church, and of surrendering them only because forced to do so by the assaults of rationalists who alone, they will claim, have shown ability and good sense in understanding the Bible. "It must be confessed," he acknowledges, "that we Catholics have been excessively slow in accepting acquired solutions. But it would be to add to this fault another much more serious and compromising if we were to lag perpetually in the rear under pretext of fidelity to opinions which were once worthy of respect but which are now antiquated. We shall have to stand the charge of unfaithfulness to ancient interpretations; or we must face a second, and in this case, a just accusation—that of resisting common sense and true science. Sooner or later we shall have to bear the first of these accusations; as for the second, it is not to-morrow, but right to-day that we should cease to deserve it, for the honor of the Church which we serve, and for the love of truth."

The initial number of the *Irish Theological Quarterly* gives assurance to the hope that this new publication marks the beginning of a revival of Irish activity in a field so fruitfully cultivated in the past by men of the stamp of Russell and Murray. On its present lines the *Quarterly* is a means of giving Maynooth professors a wider audience than their class-rooms afford; and as they are the most competent body of scholars in Ireland, it is well that they should initiate, and for a time at least, control the movement. In the long run, however, the *Quarterly* cannot fail to become a medium for the presentation of the views of the constituency which it is sure to create. One advantage of the plan of having the articles written by the professors of the different departments of the theological course is that it secures a variety of subjects. Thus the topics treated in this opening number represent Philosophy, Scripture, Morals, History, Dogma, and Sociology. We shall notice briefly those which may be considered of special interest to our readers.

Dr. Walter McDonald in the opening article, discusses the proofs for Theism with his customary frankness and straightforwardness. He uses Mallock's recent work on *The Reconstruction of Religious Belief* as a peg to hang his remarks on, but the article is of value mainly as a personal statement from a careful thinker of his own views concerning the value of the different arguments advanced for the existence of God. The various considerations which are often summed up vaguely enough as "the moral argument" appeal to Dr. McDonald only in one phase, viz., the argument "ex fructibus." He believer that in order to have a real proof we must be able to show that somewhere at the start or in the course of events, there has been a real beginning of some new substantial thing. The argument from the dissipation of energy he considers valid as showing that the present cosmic order and development had a beginning; but his main reliance is on the fact that spiritual substances possessed of intelligence and free-will are in no way contained in lower forms, and therefore postulate a Producer.

Dr. McRory writes on "The Church and the Biblical Question." The article is evidently intended to present the subject matter in its broad outlines for the benefit of the general reader. Dr. McRory's own attitude is that of a man who is a conservative by principle, but who believes in a thorough examination of the facts. He insists that "if science has absolutely proved anything, what is thus proved is as true as the Bible itself." He gives a brief account of what is *de fide* on the matter, and says that inerrancy in matters not connected with faith or morals has never been defined by Councils or Popes. But when he turns to question the *ordinarium et universale Magisterium* of the Church, he feels that he finds an obligation of faith to accept the inerrancy of the Scriptures. In handling the difficulties which seem to be in the way of this belief he shows himself partial to the theory that the human author in his use of certain statements, scientific or historical, did not intend to teach, indeed may have had it as part of his inspiration that he should not intend to teach in extra-religious matters. Thus the whole work would be inspired, but all the statements would not have the guarantee of divine veracity.

Dr. Toner presents the first instalment of a scholarly study on "The Modern Kenotic Theory." After giving a lucid exposition of the theory in its various forms, he devotes his principal attention to Kenoticism as advocated by Bishop Gore. Dr. Toner's study invites comparison with the remarkable series of articles on "The Human Knowledge of Christ" contributed by Dr. Hanna to this REVIEW. Dr. Hanna's treatment of the Kenotic question was incidental, as leading up to this more special point of discussion; Dr. Toner, at least so far as the present instalment extends, makes Kenoticism his main object, but he adds (and his words are worthy of deep consideration): "The Kenotic movement—though its exegetical arguments are irrelevant to the main issue—has succeeded in bringing into relief the main issue, on which those arguments really bear; and it cannot be denied that for the Catholic student there are difficulties connected with that question which it would be foolish to pretend to ignore." At a time when Christological problems are taking on an interest which they have scarcely possessed since the days of Chalcedon, it is gratifying to make the sudden discovery that two such scholars have been delving away at the heart of the question and are now ready to speak on it with the authority of experts.

To anyone but a Catholic it would seem a far cry from Dublin to Rome, but we find the transition a natural one, especially since we make it in order to herald another young and vigorous contemporary which is devoted to the service of the ancient Faith—the *Rivista Storico-Critica delle Scienze Teologiche*, a monthly which has recently completed its first year of existence. We must own that we felt a bond of sympathy between our American "Review" and the Roman "Rivista" from the moment we perused its title page, for it also advances as a plea for its existence the example of the learned scribe who draws from his treasures "new things and old." And to add to the attraction of its title page, it possesses the magic word Roma, since the Rivisita is published in the city which is the souce of faith and the centre of unity, and its editor, Father Bonaiuti has the distinction of being under the immediate obedience of the Apostolic See. But the periodical does not need to depend on the attraction of its title-page. Its contributors comprise many from among that remarkable group of Italian Catholic scholars who during the past few years have been working so zealously, yet with so fine a spirit, to turn the efforts of students towards the questions which are of importance to the thinking minds of this generation and which will be of vital importance to all grades of intelligence in the generation to follow. Those who have followed, even from afar, this movement in the Italian Church will recognize with admiration the names of Genocchi, Fracassini, Bonaccorsi, Bonaiuti, Mercati, Turchi and Amelli, all of whom are contributors to the new review. Their articles bear on a variety of topics: Biblical Criticism, Archæology, Patrology, Positive Theology, and Church History. The department of book reviews displays great breadth of selection and treatment. A special feature of the Review is the presentation of very complete Bibliographies of recent works in various languages bearing on different departments of theological science.

In the year's volume there is but one jarring note. Father Amelli, O. S. B., of Monte Cassino offered a criticism, characteristically Benedictine in its calmness of tone and equableness of temper, of certain views propounded by Father Cereseto of Genoa. The learned Cassinese objected to a certain definition of the Bible advanced by the Genoese professor, namely that it is a collection of books proposed by legitimate authority, not only as true and inspired but "come scritti interamente dagli autori a cui si riferiscono." Father Amelli very properly objected to putting authenticity on the same basis as inspiration as if both were equally guaranteed by Church authority. He takes occasion of his theme to utter a grave warning against attempts to impose on Catholics as matters of faith views which the Church has in no wise defined. Such a course is not only an infringement on our Catholic liberty; it is most unwise even considered as a policy, since it can be productive only of losses to the faith. He also deprecates heat of controversy among Catholic scholars in their attempts, on howsoever different lines, to find a solution of questions which cannot be ignored and which it is to the interest of the whole Church to settle.

Father Cereseto on the other hand evidently does not believe that calmness is in this connection a virtue. He sent the Rivista a long reply threatening the editors with legal proceedings if they failed to publish it. They gave it a first place in the July issue with italics and heavy type to mark the liberal underscorings of the author. In regard to the main issue, Father Cereseto admits that the authorship of the Sacred Books is not defined, but he claims that he did not assert that it is defined. He is ready to maintain, moreover, that the authorship of some of them is a part of the universal and binding teaching of the Church. But he devotes his attention mainly to a passing remark of his critic, viz., that he had been attacking "innocuous results" of modern criticism. In reply he gives a list of results which he considers baneful and untenable. The list makes curious reading. The good Padre will admit no liberty of opinion on the Davidic authorship of the Psalms, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the admission of legendary elements in patriarchal history, the historicity of certain books of the Old Testament, the dual authorship of Isaias and Daniel, the composite character of other books; and he applies his logic to show that anyone bold enough to consider any of these as open questions must necessarily reject articles of faith. It only remains for Father Cereseto to excommunicate his fellow members of the Biblical Commission, scarcely one of whom would be able to satisfy fully his standards of orthodoxy.

The writer of the "Literary Notes" in the *Tablet*, quoting our remarks in the December issue concerning Mr. Ward's appointment as Editor of the *Dublin*, takes occasion to say: "It is pleasant to note the absence of rivalry in Catholic organs which serve the same cause and, to a great extent, appeal to the same circle of readers." We quote this remark here because it gives us an opportunity to acknowledge the extreme generosity shown by our editorial brethren in giving their sanction and active co-operation to our plans for this Review. We believed that there was room for a periodical in the field we had chosen, but we were anxious to work in harmony with already existing magazines, so we consulted several Catholic editors in America who were already doing good work, at least incidentally, along the lines we had chosen.

As was eminently proper, the plan was first laid before the editor who, both from length of service and efficiency, merits the title of Dean of the Corps, Dr. Heuser of the *Ecclesiastical* and (at that time) of the *Dolphin*. It met with his approval; and his able collaborator, Dr. Siegfried, listed himself among our contributors. When the matter was laid before Dr. Shahan of the *University Bulletin*, he said with characteristic generosity: "A new venture like this does no harm to those already in the field; it only stirs up wider interest and all are benefited by it; and what matters it after all if we do lose a few subscribers, so long as the good work is done?" and he and his colleague, Dr. Pace, devoted hours of their time to the gracious task of charting the hidden shoals that menace a newly launched craft in literary seas. Father Wynne of the *Messenger* was most willing and helpful in suggesting contributors, and we hope soon to present an article from his eminent colleague, Father A. J. Maas, S. J. Father John Burke of the *Catholic World* has been from the outset our generous and helpful friend, and our opening number contained articles by two of his most valued contributors, Dr. Fox and Father McSorley, whose names with that of Father Sullivan will be associated with his own in the praise due to him for the pitch of excellence to which he has carried his valuable monthly.

Our experience with the editors of foreign periodicals was no less encouraging. The first article in our initial number was by Mr. Wilfrid Ward, who was even then, in all probability, considering his own future editorship; indeed, we have an even more striking proof of his good will and generosity, for in spite of the exacting duties of his new position, he has found time to write for us an important contribution which will appear as the leading article in our next number, which opens our second volume. A communication to Dr. Walter McDonald of Maynooth brought the news of the projected *Irish Theological Quarterly*, and with it the generous promise to contribute a number of articles to its American contemporary. And as England and Ireland responded, so did France and Italy. M. Brunetière of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Father Lagrange of the *Revue Biblique*, M. Fonsegrive of *La Quinzaine*, Mgr. Batiffol of the *Bulletin* of Toulouse; and also Fathers Minocchi, Bonaccorsi and Bonaiuti, representing the Italian Reviews—all have sent us artcles or the promise of them for the near future.

We cull the following from the *Tablet*: "The Rev. Dr. Barry delivered the second of the series of lectures organized by Dr. Aveling. The Duke of Norfolk presided and introduced the lecturer, who proceeded to deal with the subject of 'Higher Criticism' in that brilliant manner which has made his name so widely known. His object was to show in the enumeration of some of the results of 'Higher Criticism' that there was no cause for alarm to Catholics, that even if they were established and accepted they would not affect the position held and defined by the Catholic Church. The changes in interpretation would not be in his view essential changes, the Scripture would issue from all investigation more impregnable, and the Catholic faith remain as it ever had been, always the same. The length of the lecture precluded questions." In this connection we may announce that Dr. Gigot's contribution on the same topic in the present number is the beginning of a series of brief expository articles on the nature, methods, and general results of the "Higher Criticism." He has undertaken this task in response to a number of requests from our readers for a clear statement of the meaning and bearings of this much discussed method of Biblical study.

The *Catholic Encyclopedia* has issued, by way of advertisement, a very attractive volume of "Specimen Pages". From it we learn that the coming Encyclopedia is to consist of fifteen volumes of eight hundred pages with over twelve hundred words to the page. Promise is also given of a generous supply of maps and illustrations. Judging by the specimen, the make-up of the work will be of the highest class. In their selection of paper, type, etc., the publishers have evidently profited by the experiments of others in the same field in order to secure the best results. The specimen articles are well selected to show the broad scope of the work and the excellence of the contributions. As an evidence of the scholarly tone of the Encyclopedia and also as another instance of the willingness of all our Catholic scholars to co-operate in every work for the advancement of religion, we are glad to note that the editors have been able to secure the collaboration of the writers who have been so generous in their efforts for this Review. It is easy to feel confident in the success of an undertaking which can offer as security names like Clifford, Gigot, Maas, Oussani, Hanna, Fox, Brosnahan, Ward, Walter McDonald, McNabb, McSorley, Maher, Pace, Driscoll, Turner, Siegfried, Brunetière, Shanahan, Plater, Barry, Kerby. Although it must be a serious problem for the editors, in a time of transition like the present, how to produce a work of reference which on debatable questions will not become antiquated within a decade, still we can have confidence that with contributors like those we have named the difficulty will be triumphantly overcome.

Death has taken away several prominent Catholic scholars during the past few months. Austria loses Dr. Bickell, Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Vienna, formerly of the theological faculty at Innsbruck. In addition to other troubles, Catholic France has to mourn the loss of Cardinal Perraud, Bishop of Autun and member of the French Academy. From Belgium comes the news of the death of Mgr. Abbeloos, the eminent Syriac scholar of the University of Louvain.

From Louvain also comes the news that the Holy Father has appointed as successor to the late Cardinal Goossens in the Archbishopric of Mechlin Mgr. Desiré Mercier, professor of philosophy at the University and director of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie and of the Seminaire Léon XIII. It is generally admitted that the revival of Scholastic philosophy owes more to Mgr. Mercier than to any other scholar of our generation. Well informed in the fields of modern philosophy and contemporary sciences, and still thoroughly convinced of the superiority of the Aristotelian philosophy, he has been able to give the Neo-Thomistic movement an impetus in quarters where men of a narrower formation could never obtain even a hearing. By his work as a professor he inspired enthusiasm for sound philosophical studies in the hearts of an ardent band of pupils; his lectures published as a *Cours de Philosophie,* extended the range of his influence to a wider circle of followers; and the *Revue Néo-Scholastique* became the organ of a movement of which he was the recognized head. The Church in Belgium is fortunate in having a Churchman of his acknowledged ability, executive as well as intellectual, as the occupant of its primatial See.

BOOK REVIEWS.

L'Œuvre des Apotres—by S. G. Mgr. Le Camus, Eveque de La Rochelle et de Saintes. H. Oudin, Paris, 1905. Three vols., in 8vo., pp. 376, 407, 611.

During the course of the last century, few Catholic bishops, if any, have done as much and as excellent Scriptural work as the author of the present volumes. Besides this study on *The Work of the Apostles*, Bishop Le Camus has published among others, such important writings as the following: *La Vie de Notre-Seigneur Jésus Christ* (3 vols.), an English translation of which will appear shortly; *Voyage aux Sept Eglises de l'Apocalypse*; *Notre Voyage aux Pays Bibliques* (3 vols.); *Théologie Populaire de Notre-Seigneur Jésus Christ*. Throughout these various works the distinguished prelate has displayed an extensive knowledge of recent Biblical literature as well as an intimate acquaintance with the Pagan, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant sources of information. He has also made the most of his personal travels in Bible lands to illustrate the Sacred Scriptures, and has freely availed himself of the best-ascertained results of Biblical criticism for the defense of Holy Writ.

As might be well expected, all these excellent features of Bp. Le Camus' contributions to Catholic Biblical literature can be easily noticed in his three volumes on *L'Œuvre des Apotres*. The first, a volume of nearly 400 pages, opens with a valuable "Introduction" wherein the genuineness and historical character of the Book of the Acts are vindicated with a true critical insight and moderation. The body of the volume is taken up with the "Founding of the Christian Church." Its main source of information is naturally the narrative found in the first twelve chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, and it is utilized with an admirable insight into the early growth of Christianity. Jerusalem, Palestine, and lastly Antioch are the three great centres of the new religion in its infancy, and correspond to the three several stages through which it passed before it finally parted with Judaism, its parent. Hence the three great divisions of this first volume to which Bp. Le Camus has appropriately given the title of the "Founding of the Christian Church."

The other two volumes deal with the "Expansion of Christianity" throughout the Gentile world as it is described in the remainder of the book of the Acts. St. Paul's first missionary journey and his three earliest epistles—those to the Galatians and the Thessalonians—form the chief subject-matter of the second volume, while his second and third missionary travels together with his three great epistles to the Corinthians and the Romans are studied in the third volume. The work is thus made to conclude with Rome as the one great and final centre of a religion which was intended from the first to embrace both Jews and Gentiles within its fold.

In dealing with the various topics which fill up these three large volumes, Bp. Le Camus omits nothing that can contribute to the interest and the instruction of the reader. His descriptions of the places great or small, visited by the Apostle of the Gentiles, are vivid and full of those particulars which bespeak a personal acquaintance with them. His constant care to supply all the information needed to realize the life, political, social, religious, moral, etc., of the ancient countries or cities mentioned in his narrative, gives to his entire work an admirable local coloring. His commentary on the discourses recorded in the book of the Acts, and on the six great epistles of St. Paul which bear on the early expansion of Christianity, is never arid or too technical, and distinctly sets forth their exact meaning at the time in which they were composed. His examination of facts and discussion of theories, old and new, are always interesting and instructive, for he is not wedded to a tradition because it is ancient, or anxious to accept a critical opinion because it is new. His great concern is to ascertain the truth concerning any point he takes up, and hence he is not afraid to depart from a view however widely received among ultraconservative scholars, when he clearly sees that it has been disproved by modern critical science.

All these qualities of Bp. Le Camus' work, and more particularly, the truly scientific temper just referred to, have deserved for him a highly commendatory letter (Jan. 11, 1906) from His Holiness, Pope Pius X. After reproving the rashness of hypercriticism, and the stagnation of ultraconservatism, the Pontiff says: "You have struck the right path between these two extremes, and by your example have shown that nothing is to be feared for our sacred books from the true progress of critical science; nay more, that a valuable light may be thrown upon them by that science when it is prudently and judiciously pursued as you have done."

In view of such weighty words of praise and approval, it may not be amiss to point out a few of the positions which the bishop of La Rochelle has deemed it wise to adopt because sufficiently established by critical science. In opposition to a very widely received view he thinks that the Epistle to the Galatians was the first written by St. Paul (vol. ii, pp. 105, 325), and that those to whom it was addressed were the converts of Southern Galatia (vol ii, pp. 87, 181). He distinctly affirms that "the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles on Pentecost day did not make them omniscient," and that in point of fact, "though they firmly believed in the ultimate and universal triumph of the Gospel, yet their belief was coupled with a very great and very prevalent error. . . ." (vol. i, p. 235 footnote). He positively admits that "the notions of the Apostles concerning the Parousia were inexact" (vol. ii, p. 342), and that "all the attempts that have been made to explain away Paul's illusion concerning the nearness of the Parousia are both superfluous and desperate" (vol. ii, p. 343 footn. 5) In particular, he argues that "the very fact that the Parousia was expected as near at hand by the writer of the first Epistle to Thessalonians and by the Thessalonians themselves, proves that the epistle in question was written at a date when this error concerning Christ's words was still possible" (vol. ii, p. 341, footn. 2). In his commentary on 1 Cor. xv, 51, he sets aside the reading of the Vulgate: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed," and accepts the following, on critical grounds: "We shall not all die, but we shall all be changed (vol. iii, p 195 footn.). According to him, when St. Paul speaks of "a sting in the flesh," "there is no ground for thinking that the Apostle complains of temptations against chastity" (vol. iii, p. 293). In reference to the accounts of St. Paul's conversion which are found in the book of the Acts, Bp. Le Camus writes significantly: "The comparison of the three narratives, given in one and the same book, by one and the same author, shows that it is superfluous to expect from our sacred writers an absolute accuracy. Since they are not always consistent with themselves we should not expect a greater accuracy, when they are compared with one another" (vol. iii, p. 503 footn. 4. See also vol. i, p. 121 footn. 2, and p. 182 footn.). Again, we are told that when St. Paul speaks of his rapture even to the third heaven, he really "does not know" whether this took place in the body or out of the body (vol. iii, p. 292 footn. 3). In connection with Gal. iv, 21-31 the distinguished prelate says: "This (Paul's) argumentation, wholly permeated with rabbinical theology, could be conclusive only in the eyes of the Jews. Paul deems it advisable to accept even the ground of his opponents to fight against them" (vol. ii, p. 140). With regard to the manner in which St. Paul cited the old Testament, he tells us that "the Apostle quotes freely and from memory Isaias and the Psalms, or even modifies them so as to set forth better their meaning." (vol. iii, p. 340), and that in quoting Isai. lii, 7, the Apostle "suppresses *on the mountains*, and substitutes the plural for the singular, in order to denote the happy multiplicity of the messengers of the Gospel" (vol. iii, p. 416 footn.).

It would be easily to add other samples of Bp. Le Camus' deviations from old traditional views. But we forbear giving them lest one might be tempted to look upon his study on l'*Œuvre des Apotres* in a false light. Throughout his three volumes the learned writer has constantly defended traditional positions, and this with uncompromising vigor. Indeed the fact that time and again he has departed from what may be called the beaten track, leaves upon the reader the impression that whenever he abides by the time-honored positions, he does so because he has honestly come to the conclusion that they rest on scientific grounds.

To conclude. The work is that of a very competent critic who has a thorough confidence in the value of both external and internal evidence in regard to literary and historical matters, and who effectively meets on their own grounds the recent Rationalistic writers of France and Germany.

Francis E. Gigot.

The Tradition of Scripture, Its Origin, Authority and Intrepretation: by Rev. William Barry, D. D. Crown 8vo, pp. xxv, 278. $1.20. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, London and Bombay.

This small volume which is the first of "A Series of Manuals for Catholic Priests and Students," to be known under the name of "The Westminster Library," is the most recent production of Dr. William Barry's prolific and skilful pen. The work was expected with eagerness, and will be read with great profit by those for whom it is intended. It forms a concise, lucid, dispassionate, and reliable guide to the study of Holy Writ.

The book begins with an Introduction of 27 pages, wherein the two terms of its title "The Tradition of Scripture" are carefully examined in the light of history and criticism. Dr. Barry shows that the "Tradition" of the East and the West culminated in the decisions of Trent, and is, as it has always been, "a bulwark of true critical science," while it allows us to "move with freedom" in our interpretation of the sacred writings. Dealing with the second term "Scripture," the learned writer rightly insists on the fact that the Bible is an *Eastern* book on the study of which "we should not bring to bear current notions of authorship, critical history, and expert handling of sources." He no less rightly points out how the three great laws of organic evolution,—gradual ascent, correlation, and assimilation,—really apply to the development of opinion in the Sacred Scriptures, and thus prove "that we are dealing in Christianity," (the culmination of Bible religion,) "with a system beyond nature, therefore miraculous, or in its cause and development, strictly Divine."

The body of the work is very fittingly divided into three great sections: (1) the Canon of the Old Testament; (2) the Canon of the New Testament; (3) the Inspiration and Interpretation of both Testaments.

After premising some general remarks among which we may notice the following: "No definition, fixing the authorship of a sacred volume has ever been issued by the Church," (p. 40); "Inspiration is neither dependent on known and acknowledged authorship nor conterminous with it; and where inspiration does not set bounds, the critic is free," (p. 42), Dr. Barry treats of the Higher Criticism of the books of the Old Testament, that is of the questions: "Who wrote them and from what sources?" His method throughout is that of a well-informed and discriminating scholar. He avails himself of the labors of both ancient and modern interpreters and critics, and sets forth with scrupulous accuracy the facts, arguments, and theories with which priests and students should be acquainted in the present day. His examination of the sources and authorship of the Pentateuch leads him to consider Moses as the "virtual" rather than the "technical" author of the first five books of the Bible, a view which offers him a way of reconciliation between the old views and the modern critics, and which he decidedly regards as not really running counter to Our Lord's expressions in Mark xii, 26; Luke xx, 37; John v, 46, 47 (pp. 55, 59-61). The book of Josue "is a history and a Doomsday book, highly idealized" (p. 66); it is a compilation concerning whose author "Catholic tradition seems to leave us entirely to ourselves, for the ascription to Josue, though widespread, is not binding" (p. 67). According to Dr. Barry, Judges, Samuel, and Kings "are anonymous; we know nothing whatever of the men who wrote them; all have been compiled from other sources" (p. 63). He sums up admirably the critical arguments in favor of the compilatory character and manifold authorship of the book of Isaias, and thinks that "until the Church utters her sentence, individual writers would manifestly be exceeding their commission if they did more than set out the reasons on each side, within the bounds of orthodoxy, for the opinions advanced" (p. 87). In regard to the text of Jeremias he admits "two recensions of which the Greek (the Septuagint translation) would represent the earlier" (p. 88), and inclines to regard "the collection" of his prophecies "as not formed before the close of the exile" (p. 90). Of the prophecy of Jonas, he writes: "Whatever be the view taken of Jonas —history or parable,—its present form is dated in the fifth century B. C." (p. 97). He accepts the general view of contemporary critics anent the chief collections of Psalms imbedded in our Psalter (p. 101), and does not see his way clear towards determining what special Psalms David wrote. In reference to the Book of Wisdom long spoken of as "the Wisdom of Solomon" he says: "No Catholic is required to suppose the Greek book of Wisdom to be the composition, though written in the person, of Solomon" (p. 106). The arrangement of the collections in the book of Proverbs, he regards as "evidently gradual," and he adds: "Its date is uncertain" (p. 107). Concerning Ecclesiastes or Koheleth he writes: "Whether we choose a date from Persian times before Alexander (350) or under the Seleucids (300-200), no one doubts that the language is quite foreign to Hebrew at its best. In any view, the figurative ascription to Israel's wisest king is not a 'pious fraud' but a literary form" (p. 109). Of Job Dr. Barry says: "Job which on any supposition, whether history or parable, is a religious poem unsurpassed in literature, has no author's name and no date" (p. 112). Ruth he considers as "a perfect example of the *Haggadah,* or moralizing narrative among the Isralites" (p. 113); and a little further he declares that "Haggadah never pledges itself to the exactitude which moderns cultivate as scientific" (p. 116). Whereupon he quotes the following significant words of Father Prat, S. J.: "Are the books of Ruth, Judith, Esther, Tobias in their design strictly historical? These questions so frequently discussed, will, in all probability never be decided. But we are not bound to hold the stricter view. The books will always make for edification and moral teaching; for this purpose they were written and inspired. Hence it follows that we need not look in them for the bare historical fact which lay beyond the scope of the authors." And whoever reads attentively Dr. Barry's treatment of Tobias and Judith and other books, both proto—and deutero—canonical, will clearly see that he fully endorses Father Prat's position. Of Tobias, for instance, he writes: "Tobias is certainly Haggadah of a beautiful kind" (p. 128), and of Judith: "While assuming a basis of fact, we may call the book an inspired parable" (p. 130). Lastly, he tells us that "the second book of the Machabees throws an instructive light upon the laws which govern inspiration both as regards its human preliminaries and its relation to the materials brought under survey. Compilation is now regarded by scholars as the appropriate method of our historical books; and that edification, not the imparting of knowledge was their chief aim (as so clearly appears in this abridgment) is a principle which lightens indefinitely the task of exegesis. Thus then, II Mach. confirms what has been said by Newman: 'though the Bible be inspired, it has all such characteristics as might attach to a book uninspired'" (p. 132).

After vindicating the full Catholic canon of the Old Testament from the attacks to which it has been subjected since the beginning of Protestantism, Dr. Barry deals in his second section with the Canon of the New Testament. He takes up first the Synoptic Gospels, shows rapidly how these were known and accepted at a very early date, and admits that they "all three originated before the year 90 A. D." (p. 153). He has no theory of his own to account for the wonderful resemblances and the dissimilarities which exist between the three Gospels, and simply sets forth "the conclusions at which eminent writers, Catholic among them, have arrived. Allowing for points on which unanimity is not to be expected, it is a wide-spread opinion: (1) that our Synoptics *in their present form* were composed between 65 and 85 A. D.; (2) that Mark is the quasi-original text on which Mt. and Lk. proceeded to work out their own narrations; (3) that Mt. preceded Lk. by some years; (4) that the writer of the third Gospel, who has many affinities with the first, nevertheless did not borrow them from our Matthew as we have it; (5) that all this implies the existence of a more primitive Gospel in writing, which was a collection of Our Lord's 'oracles' (Logia) composed in Aramæan by the Apostle St. Matthew, known at least by hearsay to Papias, and adapted to Judaizing Christians in our actual First Gospel, to Roman Christians in our Second, to Hellenists of the type anticipated by St. Stephen and realized by St. Paul, in our Third" (p. 157).

Father Barry's treatment of the Johannine writings is even shorter than that of the Synoptic Gospels. And within the compass of a few pages he imparts to his reader a great deal of information. He maintains the traditional authorship of our fourth Gospel, of the Apocalypse, and of the three Epistles ascribed to St John, and gives valuable answers to the difficulties that are often urged against it. To account for the great literary differences which exist between the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse he assumes that "St. John gave the substance [of the former] which his Hellenistic secretary put into shape" (p. 169). And to explain the striking contrast between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, he thinks that he wished to supplement them, and that having "an aim in a very high degree dogmatic, he wrapped up doctrine in history, using his facts with freedom. Hence a certain method of transposition, by which he turns the Synoptic parables into similitudes, exhibits a word as an action, and supposing his readers be familiar with institutions like Baptism and the Eucharist, gives to them a spiritual meaning in the discourses of Christ. Such a procedure does not imply that speeches and incidents were all invented for a purpose." (p. 169).

The remaining books of the New Testament are likewise dealt with very briefly. Naturally enough he admits the Lucan authorship of the Acts of the Apostles, and the period after 70 A. D. as the date of their composition. On page 178 he gives the fixed and disputed points concerning the authorship of the Epistles ascribed to St Paul. In regard to the Epistle to the Hebrews he rightly says that the Pauline authorship was "denied by the Roman Church from a period long antecedent to Jerome's mention of this fact" (p. 178). In his brief review of St. Paul's epistles, however, he states that the Epistle to the Hebrews is Pauline in ideas and substance, and inclines to regard Apollo as its writer (p. 194 sq.) He refers the Epistle of St. James to about 60 A. D. (p. 196) and declines to discuss the questions connected with the authorship and date of the second Epistle of St. Peter (p. 197). Finally, he tells us that "no view of the date, compilation, or literal meaning [of the Apocalypse] has ever been sanctioned by authority" (p. 198).

Dr. Barry devotes his third Section (66 pages) to the Authority and Interpretation of Holy Writ. In his study on the Divine element in Inspiration, the following careful statements deserve to be quoted: "To be inspired for writing is to have one's knowledge so governed and one's powers so moved that the result shall be a document free from approved error, conveying that information (and neither more nor less) which the Holy Ghost wills to have put on record. He therefore gives light, guidance and control." Hence "the Bible is far beyond other writings, however grave or lofty in its total effect" (p. 208). "Not a single Father dreamt of calling in question the fact that Holy Scripture is inspired. But discussions arose concerning the manner and extent of the divine afflatus, which after 1,600 years, if we reckon from Origen, are not yet decided" (p. 210). With regard to the human element in Inspiration he informs us that "between the Spirit and the page a living mind intervenes, with its furnishing of ideas, its development, its freedom under guidance, its moral qualities or defects, its aptitude for literary expression or difficulty in finding words and phrases, its relation to times gone by, its apprehension of present and future;" and that "the inspired men are children of their age, limited by its horizon, and project the unknown by shadows of that which they have seen. They do not guess that there will be a modern Europe. . . . St. Paul contemplates the Roman Empire as filling all the years until Antichrist shall be revealed" (p. 219). He rightly maintains that Inspiration is not mechanical; thinks that the inspiration of the sense, not of the words, was "a good working hypothesis, until the deeper questions of criticism were started" (p. 223); and favors what he calls "Plenary" inspiration whereby "all the elements [thoughts and words] of the Bible are subject to inspiration, but all are likewise human. It is a 'great Sacrament,' where the inward grace penetrates and enfolds the outward sign" (p. 225). He fully recognizes, however, freedom for opinions and schools within the limits of that orthodox position which does not allow to give up inerrancy, while it is compatible with the theory of relative truth (pp. 226-230).

Lastly, in his treatment of Biblical Interpretation, the learned author is for a "method of interpretation critical and historical, never losing sight of the Divine Idea that little by little dawned upon the sense of Israel, but never superseding the more ancient methods, by incorporating what was good in them severally" (p. 238). He next applies that method principally to the opening chapters of Genesis; discusses the recent Roman decrees concerning Sources and Implicit Quotation; and concludes with a suggestive chapter entitled "Christ in the Bible."

The foregoing review of Dr Barry's *Tradition of the Scripture* will perhaps appear longer than required by the size of the volume. But since the book is the first of a "Series for Catholic Priests and Students," since it deals with nearly every important topic concerning our sacred records, and since it is so thoroughly in harmony with the recent letter of Pope Pius X (Jan. 11, 1906), in favor of a progressive and orthodox Catholic exegesis, it certainly deserved a notice and analysis of more than ordinary length. The work is irenic throughout in the best sense of the word, and should be read by every Catholic priest and student at all acquainted with the English language.

Francis E. Gigot.

The Ten Nequdoth of the Torah or the Meaning and Purpose of the Extraordinary Points of the Pentateuch (Massoretic Text): A Contribution to the History of Textual Criticism Among the Ancient Jews (ix. 136)—by Romain Butin, S. M., S. T. L. Baltimore J. H. Furst Company. 1906.

Critical work bearing directly on the Rabbinical Massorah or Tradition has hitherto received little attention on the part of Catholic scholars. Indeed, it may be said that it is a department of biblical science which has been more or less neglected by critics and Semitic scholars generally, or at least, that it has not held in their esteem the place that its intrinsic importance would seem to warrant. The uncritical nature of the great work done by the Massoretes and those whose mission it was to preserve the Old Testament writings, has perhaps been too readily and too largely assumed on the part of many recent critics, who in consequence have used great freedom in their reconstruction of the received text, changing it, if not arbitrarily, at least for slight reasons—such for instance, as a variation found in the Septuagint.

It must indeed be freely granted that at an early date many variations and errors crept into the Sacred Writings, and that notably in some books there is need of not a little textual emendation. It is likewise true that though an exaggerated and preconceived idea of what was looked upon as the quasi-inspired accuracy of the Massoretic text, the earlier Old Testament scholars were often led astray, and thus our Hebrew grammars are even now encumbered with observations and exceptions of which the *raison d'etre* is not to be sought in the philological structure of the language, but in anomolies and mistakes that have been canonized, so to say, by the Massoretic tradition. While all this is plainly recognized, it is the opinion of many competent scholars that the reaction in the other direction is often carried to unwarranted extremes. The well known reverential care with which the sacred text has been handed down to us by the Hebrews should make us cautious in our attempts at reconstruction, and especially any light that can be thrown on the methods of the early Jewish scholars and their work ought to be welcome to all Old Testament students. To contribute something toward this end is the modest purpose of Father Butin's book. It is a contribution to the history of textual criticism among the Ancient Jews, and embodies a critical study of the so-called "Extraordinary Points" which occur in only fifteen passages of the Hebrew Bible, and which are not accounted for by the traditional Massoretic punctuation. The work which reveals much painstaking, scholarly research, is the outcome of studies pursued in the Semitic Department of the Catholic University. It is a credit to that institution and shows that Prof. Hyvernat's able contributions to the scientific study of the Massorah, which are being published in the *Revue Biblique,* have not failed to awaken scholarly interest.

Father Butin confines his study to the ten passages of the Pentateuch in which the *Nequdoth* or "Extraordinary Points" occur, and with regard to the latter he limits his enquiry to the question of their meaning and purpose. As the problem under discussion is not altogether new, the author traces briefly the history of the question, classifying and analyzing the various opinions advanced by ancient and modern scholars. The matter being confessedly obscure, these opinions differ widely and they rest, in many instances, on little more than clever conjecture. The author thinks, therefore, that the whole field of discussion should be surveyed and examined in the light, not of one or two lines of argument only (which has too often been the case in the past) but on the basis of a more comprehensive treatment in which all the available evidence should be combined. The sources of this evidence he reduces to four heads, viz: (1) The mental preoccupations at the time when the points originated. (2) Palæography. (3) Textual criticism. (4) The Jewish writings. The discussion of the matter from these different view points is conducted with a great detail of erudition, all of which is very commendably controlled by a keen sense of discrimination or critical acumen; but it is on the whole of too technical a nature to be touched upon here even in outline. Suffice it to indicate the conclusions arrived at, which are as follows: (1) The points are not due to chance. (2) They have not an exegetical import. (3) They have not an underlining value corresponding to our Italics; but (4) their primary import was deletive, i. e., they were originally intended to cancel as spurious readings the words or letters over which they were placed.

The theme of the discussion is naturally not one that will appeal to the average reader, but Old Testament students will find Father Butin's treatment of it lucid, comprehensive and interesting. They will find condensed therein in clear, orderly fashion, practically all the information at present available concerning a minor problem of textual criticism, which if not definitely solved, has at least been put into much clearer light by this scholarly publication.

James F. Driscoll.

Comparative Religion, Its Genesis and Growth—by Louis Henry Jordan (late Special Lecturer in Comparative Religion at the University of Chicago). with an Introduction by Principal Fairbairn. New York. 1905. Scribners. pp. xix-668.

This is the first part of a three-volume work undertaken by Dr. L. H. Jordan on the study of comparative religion. The capital importance of this study to the theologian, apologist, historian and archeologist as well as to the less special student needs hardly to be emphasized; and it is only to be regretted that among Catholics, if we accept that brilliant and versatile scholar, the late Abbé de Broglie, and a handful of others, few of us seem to realize that such a study is an indispensable preparation for a scientific course of theology and apologetics. The last mentioned branch of study, as formerly understood, was practically limited to a defence and vindication of the Christian dogma and ethics; but it is now very generally recognized that no one can expound the real significance of that Faith until he has made himself acquainted with its relationships to the various non-Christian Faiths. The times when Hebrew and Christian religions alike were looked upon as entirely spontaneous heavenly productions, absolutely free from any human admixture and having no connection whatever with other religious systems of the world, have now passed away. The Yahweh who chose Israel for His favorite people, giving them His true revelation, and the Christ who came to this world to unite all nations and religions into one universal religion of love and virtue, this God cannot be conceived as One who would deprive all other peoples, equally His creatures and equally dear to Him, of at least some measure of participation in His fatherly love and self-revelation. He has undoubtedly revealed Himself in a more or less luminous way to all nations and peoples, more particularly, of course, to Israel, but, certainly also to others. And if certain of the Jewish and Christian theological conceptions of the Divinity, of its attributes, of sacrifice and worship, of morality and of religious customs and practices have been till recently believed to have been the exclusive inheritance of Judaism, having no antecedents and no possible common origin with those of other nations, it must be admitted now that in the light of the modern investigations in the domain of comparative religion and mythology, this belief cannot be any longer substantiated. And it is precisely for this same reason that the comparative study of religions is not only useful but absolutely indispensable for a clear and scientific conception of Judaism and Christianity; and our Catholic theologians and apologists will do well to avail themselves of the labors and researches of those scholars who have devoted their life and energies to this work in order the better to understand and to defend our divine inheritance. Such study will amply repay their labors, as it will prepare them for a more scientific and more effective apologetic.

It would be almost an injustice to pretend to give any adequate idea of the comprehensiveness and other excellent qualities of Dr. Jordan's work, whose 650 pages bear ample evidence of the competency of the author. He shows an almost unique acquaintance with the vast literature on the subject, and the broad lines on which such studies should be carried, while in the forty appendices, covering about 100 pages, he discusses a great variety of topics, more or less closely connected with the main subject of the work.

Dr. A. M. Fairbairn, who writes a short introduction to the book, tells us that "Mr. Jordan has made many sacrifices for the work which he now gives to the world. He has for years sundered many friendships, surrendered his pastoral ties, wandered and dwelt in lands remote from his delightful Canadian home, that he might with a freer and more unfettered mind pursue the studies which have taken shape in this book. He has not only steeped himself in the literature of his subject, but has also visited the great Universities, English, Continental, or American, where he could by the help, whether of the library of the living voice, acquaint himself with what had been, and was being, thought and accomplished in the field which he has cultivated with such remarkable pains. And now he here lays at our feet the fruit of these years of labor, that we may eat while we rest, and reap the profit of his toil."

The object of Dr. Jordan's work is well outlined by the author himself. "It embodies an attempt to give the reader a condensed yet comprehensive view of the origin, progress, and aim of the science of Comparative Religion. It presents a sketch of the advent of a new line of research, the difficulties which it has had to encounter, the problems which it has set itself to solve, and the results which thus far it has been able to register." Hence in the Prolegomena (pp. 3-98), we have a complete sketch of the beginnings of our science, of its nature, object, method, aim and scope. In chapters iv and v, (pp. 99-160), the tardy genesis of this new science is described with a complete list of the names and works of its pioneers, such as John Spencer (1630-1693), Charles François Dupuis (1742-1809), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Lessing (1729-1781, K. Ottfried Muller (1797-1840), and others. In chapter vi, we have a most interesting biographical and bibliographical sketch of the founders and masters of the science of Comparative Religion, with a due appreciation of their work and researches, such as: Max Muller, Robertson Smith, Fairbairn, Tiele, Kuenen, Chantepie de la Saussaye, Renan, Reville, Marillier, Goblet d' Alviella, Rydberg, Westergaard, Clarke, Johnson, Warren, Toy and many others; and in chapter vii, a good survey is given of the various schools of the science, such as the Revelationists, the Evolutionists, and the Composits, with their various divisions and sub-divisions. In chapter viii, ix the auxiliary sciences for the comparative study of religions are enumerated and discussed, such as Anthropology, Archeology and Psychology, in its widest meaning, Mythology, Ethnology, Philology, Folklore and Sociology. And here we meet with the illustrious names of scholars like E. B. Taylor, Andrew Lang, T. G. Frazer and F. B. Jevons; Frd. Delitzsch, F. Hommel, R. Kittel, G. Maspero, A. I. Evans, F. Petrie, H. Hilprecht, Lenormant and others; E. Von Hartmann, F. W. H. Myers, I. R. Illingworth, T. Baldwin, G, A. Coe and E. D. Starbuck; F. Max Muller, R. Brown, W. R. Smith, C. P. Tiele, Fairbairn, J. L. K. Grimm, K. J. Simrock, G. W. Cox, G. L. Gomme, H. Gaidoz, D. G. Brinton, Spencer, H. H. Ellis, J. H. Stuckenberg, E. A. Westermarck, J. M. Létourneau, R. de la Grasserie and others; with a very comprehensive sketch of their personalities, works and researches, in their particular fields of study. In chapter x the "mental emancipations" of the science are briefly stated and emphasized. In chapter xi the great achievements of this new science are fully enumerated; while in the xiith and last chapter of the book an extended and very full bibliography of the subject is given with full particulars about hundreds of authors and writers who have in some way or other contributed to its advancement, with a very interesting list of periodicals, magazines, museums, universities and congresses devoted to its service. The book is supplemented by a very full topical, literary and chronological Index.

In addition to its merits as a work of erudition, it is very readable, and the intelligent student who has once opened it will not soon lay it down.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

A History of Egypt From the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest —by JAMES HENRY BREASTED, (Professor of Egyptology and Oriental History in the University of Chicago). New York. Scribners. 1905. In 8o gr. pp. xxix, 633.

Readers of English cannot reasonably complain of lack of good and reliable histories of Egypt. Leaving out of account the still interesting but antiquated works of Wilkinson, G. Rawlinson and others, we must remember that we have in English dress Maspero's huge and monumental history of the Ancient East, in which, owing to the distinguished author's sympathy and competency in matters Egyptian, a large amount of space is given to the history of Egypt (*Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l' Orient Classique*, Paris, 3 Vols., 1895-1899; translated, Vol. I, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 1895; Vol. II, *The Struggle of the Nations*, 1897; Vol. III, *The Passing of the Empires*, 1900). In 1898 Prof. Flinders Petrie, the most distinguished living Egyptologist of England, undertook, with the co-operation of Profs. Mahaffy, Milne and Stanley Lane Poole, a complete and exhaustive history of Egypt from the earliest times down to the Mohammedan domination. (*A History of Egypt*, in 6 Vols., London-New York, 1898-1905; Vols. I-III, from the first Dynasty down to the xxxth, by Prof. Petrie himself; Vol. IV, the Ptolemaic Dynasty, by J. P. Mahaffy; Vol. V, Under the Roman Rule, by J. G. Milne; Vol. VI, Arabic Egypt, by Stanley Lane Poole, with maps and illustrations). Needless to say, Prof. Petrie's part of the work is admirable in its fullness and accuracy, and contains an almost unlimited knowledge of the original sources and documents of Egyptian history and archeology. Its defect is that it gives a rather undigested collection of original Egyptian documents, and so is anything but a popular book for ordinary students. Somewhat less technical and more popular is Dr. W. Budge's *History of Egypt From the End of the Neolithic Period to the Death of Cleopatra*, in 8 handsome volumes, 1902, with original Egyptian documents and texts, accurate, scholarly and readable, but too bulky for the general reader. Dr. Breasted's book, consequently, comes just in time to fill a need, which was well expressed by W. Max Miller: "An English Meyer—i. e., a readable history—by the side of the English Wiedemann (Petrie) is still a desideratum." (*Encyclopædia Biblica*, art. "Egypt," Col. 1,231).

Dr. Breasted's book contains an admirably written history of Egypt, from the earliest times to the Persian Conquest: succinct, complete, luminous and extremely readable. He has, for justifiable reasons, avoided all technical discussions and cumbrous bibliographical references which, however serviceable they might be, are out of place in a popular work. A history may be thoroughly scientific and accurate, provided it is written by a competent scholar, as Dr. Breasted undoubtedly is, and yet be free from technicalities. An important feature in Dr. Breasted's method is that he bases his statements not on modern authors and second-hand, or, as is often the case, fourth and fifth-hand references, but on the original sources themselves, which he has personally examined and translated into English. These he intends to publish in four separate volumes, the first of which has already appeared under the title *Ancient Records of Egypt: the Historical Documents*: Vol. I, *The First to the Seventeenth Dynasties*, (Chicago, 1906). The author tells us that in order to be accurate he was abliged to go behind the publications to the original monuments themselves in every possible instance, a task which consumed years and demanded protracted study among the great collections of Europe. "In this work a related enterprise has been of the greatest assistance. A mission to the museums of Europe to collect their Egyptian monuments for a Commission of the four Royal Academies of Germany (Berlin, Leipzig, Goettingen and Munich), in order to make these documents available for a great Egyptian Dictionary endowed by the German Emperor, enabled the author to copy from the originals practically all the historical monuments of Egypt in Europe. For those still in Egypt, the author has been able to employ his own copies of many, especially at Thebes and Amarna, where he copied all the historical inscriptions in the tombs there, and in the museum at Gizeh (now Cairo). Of monuments in Egypt not included in the author's copies, squeezes were in most instances found in the enormous collection made by Lepsius and now in the Berlin museum. For others the author was given access to the extensive collections made for the Dictionary above referred to; now and then a colleague furnished the necessary collection; and where all other sources failed, I was able in all important cases to secure large-scale photographs of the originals. The final remainder of monuments for which the author was dependent upon the publications alone is very small, and in most cases the publication was one made on modern methods, and almost as good as the original itself In general, therefore, it may be fairly claimed that this account of the historical career of the Egyptians rests upon the surviving original records themselves." (Preface, pp. ix-x).

The author's positions on Egyptian chronology are more moderate and conservative than is generally the case with Egyptologists. Menes and the beginning of the first dynasty are assigned to about 3400 B. C. The Hyksos invasion and supremacy over Egypt is placed at about 1788-1580 B. C.; the nineteenth dynasty at 1350-1250 B. C.; and Ramses II (1292-1225) is looked upon as the probable oppressor of the Hebrews and also as the Pharaoh of the Exodus, as against the opinion of other Egyptologists who, while conceding the fact that Ramses II was an oppressor of the Hebrews, regard Mernephtah, Ramses' successor, as the Pharaoh of the Exodus. Our author has a clever hypothesis as to the cause of the ascendancy of the sons of Jacob, and especially of Joseph, in Egypt: "That it (the Hyksos dynasty) was a Semitic empire we cannot doubt in view of the Manethonian tradition and the subsequent conditions in Syria-Palestine. Moreover the scarabs of a Pharaoh who evidently belonged to the Hyksos time, give his name as Jacob-her or possibly Jacob-El, and it is not impossible that some chief of the Jacob tribes of Israel for a time gained the leadership in this obscure age. Such an incident would account surprisingly well for the entrance of these tribes into Egypt, which on any hypothesis must have taken place at about this age; and in that case the Hebrews in Egypt will have been but a part of the Beduin allies of the Kadesh or Hyksos empire, whose presence there brought into the tradition the partially true belief that the Hyksos were shepherds, and led Manetho to his untenable etymology of the second part of the word Likewise the naive assumption of Josephus, who identifies the Hyksos with the Hebrews, may thus contain a kernel of truth, however accidental" (p. 220). As to the Exodus the author rightly remarks that "there is probably little question of the correctness of the Hebrew tradition in attributing the oppression of some tribe of their ancestors to the builder of Pithom and Ramses; that a tribe of their forefathers should have fled the country to escape such labor is quite in accord with what we know of the time" (p. 446-7) As to the nationality of the Hyksos the author holds, as against Meyer and others, that "Manetho's tradition that they were Arabians and Phoenicians may well be correct" (p. 219).

The work is beautifully adorned with 186 illustrations and 13 maps; neatly printed, elegantly bound and supplied with a very comprehensive index. The competency of the author, the scientific character of the work as well as its readable features and the valuable information it contains all combine to make it one of the best modern histories of ancient Egypt.

The Theory of Psychical Dispositions—by CHARLES A. DUBRAY, S. M. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1905. pp. 170.

We are informed in the sub-title of this work that it is "a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy" It therefore forms one of the small but remarkably efficient group of books on various topics which the University has engendered during the short period of its existence. Those who reckon the effectiveness of an educational institution not by the process of counting heads, but by the quality of the results gotten from them, will be convinced by works such as this that the University is amply fulfilling the hopes of its supporters.

The first merit which strikes one in the present work is that it possesses what the French call "actualité." Here is no threshing of old straw. Dr Dubray has selected a topic which lies at the very heart of the problem of Mental Philosophy as it is presented to-day. Readers of Dr. W. G. Ward's *Philosophy of Theism* are familiar with the vigorous and cogent arguments with which that fine old warrior in Israel forced John Stuart Mill into the admission of the necessity of "postulating memory" in his system. More recent adherents of "Psychology without a soul" have elaborated a theory of "psychical dispositions" or "traces" to account for the persistence and reproduction of mental states. It is this theory which Dr. Dubray has elected for discussion, rightly considering that it is a crucial point in the philosophy of mind offered to us as the conclusion of the new psychology.

As for the method of treatment which he employs, it is a criticism of the modern theories from the standpoint of logical consistency. The question asked is: Can room be found for "dispositions" or "traces" in any system which denies the existence of a soul-substance? The conclusions reached are thus expressed by the author: "If one may and must admit psychical dispositions, it is not logical to do so in a system where the mind is supposed to consist merely of a series of conscious states, whatever be the particular mode according to which that series is explained. The scholastic system, on the contrary, with its concept of a substantial soul endowed with various faculties, may and does consistently postulate psychical dispositions." Of these two points, the latter is briefly treated, the former occupying the main attention of the writer.

The author has followed a careful plan which may be roughly expressed as (1) historical. (2) psychological, (3) logical. In the historical part he gives brief but lucid expositions of the various theories proposed by psychologists to account for habit and memory, with special consideration of the more modern schools which advocate some theory of "dispositions." Some idea of the thoroughness of this inquiry may be had from a random selection of names of authors considered: Lotze, Bowne, Wundt, Stout, James, Bergson, Ribot, Maudsley, Sollier. The psychological portion is an investigation of the evidence in favor of psychical dispositions. Finally, the author applies the test of consistency to the two opposing views in chapters on "Psychical Dispositions in the Mind Series Theory" and "Psychical Dispositions in the Mind Substance Theory."

The work is a clear and cogent bit of reasoning, all the more so from the calm and impartial temper of the author. His criticisms are of a sort that demand and receive a hearing. In fact we have good evidence that this work receives an appreciation of a sort seldom accorded to presentations of scholasticism in the fact that it is published in the series of Monograph Supplements of the *Psychological Review*.

Francis P. Duffy.

The Writings of Saint Francis of Assisi—Newly translated into English with an Introduction and Notes—by FATHER PASCHAL ROBINSON, of the Order of Friars Minors. Philadelphia. The Dolphin Press 1906 pp. xxxii and 204

This is the age of the Saint of Assisi. This monk of the thirteenth century has a strong hold on the affections of Christians of all denominations to-day because his life and actions were a striking manifestation and re-embodiment of all the Gospel virtues. As a result of this Saint and Hero worship, we have been inundated with a deluge of Assisian literature, good, bad and indifferent. Biographies have been published which, like Paul Sabatier's *Vie de S. François*, have attached what some regard as almost undue weight to the writings of St. Francis as a source of our knowledge of him. Others display a tendency to belittle their importance. Then we have been presented with the Writings of St. Francis: a few have aimed at being critical: others endeavoring to foster devotion have given us anything and everything that was ever attributed to the pen of the founder of the Friars Minors, and thus it comes to pass that side by side with the undisputed writings of St. Francis, we find doubtful, even spurious, extracts from different sources attributed to the Seraphic Father. The remarkable upgrowth of interest in the sources of early Franciscan history that has characterized the literature of the past decade accentuated the need of a more critical edition of St. Francis' writings. The matter was taken in hand by the Friars Minors at Quaracchi—already famous in the history of the Order—and in 1904 they issued the first critical edition of the *Opuscula Sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis*. Many a familiar page was found wanting in the new edition: a number of doubtful and apocryphal pieces were purged from the text: letters and rules, conferences and prayers, colloquies and parables have likewise disappeared. It is very probable that many of the suppositious pieces thus excluded embody the doctrine and ideas of St. Francis: to a greater or lesser extent some of them may even be his in substance but as there was no good reason to believe they were his own composition, they were not embodied in his writings. The text of the authentic writings was also perfected by emendations and collations, notes and comments.

Without ignoring the two critical works dealing with the *Opuscula* which came from Bonn and Munich, and which in substance agreed almost completely with the Quaracchi edition, the present book aims at being a literal translation of the Latin text of the authentic writings of St. Francis as it stands in the Quaracchi edition. The text is divided into three parts: (1) Salutations, Admonitions, Rules and the like; (2) Six Letters; (3) Paraphrases, Prayers, Praises, etc. There are a few modifications in the translation As the English version is not restricted to the Latin works of St. Francis the *Canticle of the Sun* is added. The translator has deviated from the original order and has improved the work by distributing the critical notes throughout the book instead of relegating them to the end; and only those variants in the Latin text which change the sense have been kept. But the present volume represents something more than a mere translation with these modifications. Father Robinson, on his own part, has added a very interesting and instructive Introduction which treats in a critical manner of the doctrinal and literary characteristics of the writings and includes a short history of them from the early manuscript collections to our modern editions and translations. A short appendix is also subjoined which notes some lost, doubtful and spurious writings of the Seraphic Father. And we are indebted to the translator for an excellent Bibliography and a splendid Index.

The book is embellished by a Photogravure Frontispiece of della Robbia s famous statue of the Saint and facsmililes of the autograph letter written by St. Francis to Brother Leo and of an Assisi manuscript. The material make-up of the book is a credit to the Dolphin Press. We recommend this volume to all lovers of St. Francis. Matthew Arnold may or may not succeed in holding up the Man of Assisi as a literary type; it looks as if the author of *Essays on Criticism* is doomed to failure for our Saint's education left his literary culture quite incomplete. Yet his writings reflect his personality and his spirit and strikingly manifest the intimate union of the human and supernatural that was in his heart. In the words of Father Robinson, "His constant contemplation of the 'things that are above' and the perfect purity of his life whetted alike his understanding of supernatural truth and the human heart, and so it comes to pass that his simple words, written down in the far-off thirteenth century, and with a fashion of speech different from ours, yet works wonders to this day, while the tomes of many a learned doctor 'leave all things as they were before.'"

WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

Pierre Batiffol was born in 1861. He made his ecclesiastical studies at Saint Sulpice and gained the degree of Docteur es Lettres at the University of Paris. During the years 1886-1889 he pursued further studies in Rome under J. B. de Rossi, forming one of the brilliant group of scholars among whom are numbered Mgr. Kirsch, Mgr. Wilpert and Mgr. Ehrhard. On his return to France in 1890 he was appointed to the College of St. Barbe in Paris. In 1898 Cardinal Mathieu, then Archbishop of Toulouse, called him to the post of rector of the Catholic Institute of that city. In that position he gave a vigorous stimulus to ecclesiastical studies; and under his direction the Institute began to take its present position as a leader of theological thought in the Church of France. Monsignor Batiffol has published numerous studies in Early Christian Literature; two volumes of *Etudes d'histoire et de théologie positive* (1903-1905) which have already run through several editions; *Tractatus Origenis de libris scripturarum* (1900), which has given rise to a number of works on the same topic; and quite recently a volume on *L'enseignement* de *Jésus* (1905), which was reviewed in our last issue. Mgr. Batiffol is director of the *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* which he founded at Toulouse.

We are glad to be able to present to our readers in this issue an appreciation of the apologetical work of Father Tyrrell by M. Henri Bremond. At a time when Father Tyrrell's methods of Apologetics are attracting the attention of the general public, the subject itself will undoubtedly possess great interest; Father Brémond has been long recognized in France as the leading exponent and propagator of the views of the greatest of English defenders of Catholicity, Cardinal Newman; and readers will not fail to perceive in his present article the combination of breadth and sympathy with loyalty to Catholic truth which is so marked a characteristic of Newman and of those who partake of his spirit. In connection with the present article it may not be amiss to point out, as has been already indicated by a writer in *Demain*, that students of Father Tyrrell's views who form their opinions from *Lex Orandi* should not neglect the light thrown on that work by his article in the third number of this Review, entitled "The Dogmatic Reading of History." It will be a matter of rejoicing, to all who are interested in the welfare of the Church Catholic rather than in the clash of parties, to know that Father Brémond finds in the latest work of our most distinguished English apologist, certain evidences that he is firm in the faith once delivered to the saints.

Romain Butin was born in 1871, at Saint-Romain d'Urfé, department of Loire, France. After a preparatory training in the schools of his native town, he pursued the study of the classics at the Ecole Clréicale' of Les Salles, and at the 'Petit Seminaire' of Saint Jodard, in the same department. In 1890, he came to America and spent two years in the study of philosophy at the scholasticate of the Marist Fathers, in Maryland. He then entered the Society of Mary, and after two years of active work at Jefferson College, Louisiana, came to the Marist College, near the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., for his theological training.

In 1898, he matriculated at the Catholic University, where he followed the courses of Moral Theology under the late Prof. Th. Bouquillon, of Sacred Scripture under Prof. C. P. Grannan, and of Hebrew under Prof. H. Hyvernat. In 1900, he received the Degree of Licentiate of Theology, and was appointed professor of Hebrew and Sacred Scripture at the Marist College. In the Fall of the same year he registered in the Department of Semitic and Egyptian Languages and Literatures. Since then, while continuing the study of Sacred Scripture under Prof C. P. Grannan, he has devoted most of his time to the Hebrew and Aramaic Languages and to post-Biblical Jewish Literature under Prof. H. Hyvernat.

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